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# AN INCONSISTENT TRIAD?

## Competing Ethics in *Star Trek into Darkness*

Jason T. Eberl

While surveying the planet Nibiru, the crew of the U.S.S. *Enterprise* discover that the primitive native population is threatened with extinction by the imminent eruption of a massive volcano. Our spacefaring heroes, under the command of the young and impetuous Captain James T. Kirk, decide they could save the natives by detonating a cold fusion device within the heart of the volcano. They construct a plan to accomplish their Good Samaritan mission while at the same time disguising their presence in keeping with Starfleet's Prime Directive: "No identification of self or mission. No interference with the social development of said planet. No references to space or the fact that there are other worlds or civilizations."<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, we all know what may happen to even the best laid plans, and the *Enterprise's* first officer, Commander Spock, is trapped in the heart of the volcano with a mere thirty seconds until the cold fusion device will go off and, in addition to extinguishing the volcano, "render him inert."<sup>2</sup>

The only means of saving Spock is to fly the *Enterprise*, which has been hiding at the bottom of the Nibiru ocean, to the volcano and beam him out within line of sight. Spock, however, objects:

SPOCK: The *Enterprise* is too large. If utilized in a rescue effort, it would be revealed to the indigenous species.

KIRK: Spock, nobody knows the rules better than you, but there has got to be an exception.

SPOCK: No, such action violates the Prime Directive.

MC COY: Shut up, Spock! We're trying to save you, damnit!

SPOCK: Doctor, the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.

KIRK: Spock, we're talking about your life!

SPOCK: The rule cannot be broken under any circumstances.

[*Communication is lost.*]

KIRK: If Spock were here, and I were there, what would he do?

McCOY: He'd let you die.

Kirk decides that "the needs of the one outweigh the needs of the many" and saves Spock just in the nick of time.<sup>3</sup> Safely beamed into the *Enterprise's* transporter room to a smiling Kirk, Spock immediately protests, with a certain degree of shock, "You violated the Prime Directive!" As the *Enterprise* flies away from Nibiru, the indigenous chieftain is seen drawing an image of the grand starship that lifted out of the water like a giant leviathan, flew into the heart of hell itself, and stopped the fiery eruptions from killing them all. Is this a new religion being born?<sup>4</sup>

Clearly, the *Enterprise* crew's actions that day will have a profound impact on the people of Nibiru. Even detonating the cold fusion device to stop the volcanic eruption in the first place interfered with the natural course of events on that planet, although it arguably makes little sense to follow a rule concerning noninterference with an indigenous society if that society will be rendered extinct unless one takes action. The wisdom of the Prime Directive is aptly described by a later captain of the *Enterprise*, Jean-Luc Picard: "The Prime Directive is not just a set of rules. It is a philosophy, and a very correct one. History has proven again and again that whenever mankind interferes with a less developed civilization, no matter how well intentioned that interference may be, the results are invariably disastrous."<sup>5</sup> The various attitudes portrayed concerning the Prime Directive and what's at stake whether it is adhered to or not in a given situation illustrate three distinctive moral viewpoints. First, there is Spock's absolute adherence to the Prime Directive, a *duty* for which he's willing to sacrifice his own life. Second, the Prime Directive itself is justified by a *utilitarian* concern to maximize the best overall consequences, even if doing so involves sacrificing the interests, or even the lives, of a smaller number of people. Finally, there is Kirk's motivation in violating the Prime Directive to save Spock, which the latter learns about only when faced with Kirk's own sacrifice to save the *Enterprise* and her crew:

KIRK: I wanted you to know why I couldn't let you die . . . why I went back for you . . .

SPOCK: Because you are my friend.

*Loyalty* is what binds family, friends, and communities together. Kirk's loyalty to Spock is what motivates him to violate the Prime Directive. Kirk's loyalty to his ship and crew is also what motivates him to give up his own life later on.

Duty, utility, and loyalty . . . these ethical values and the theories built around each are often understood as contrary to one another, and typically taught that way in undergraduate philosophy courses. But perhaps they may be successfully combined into a coherent ethic. The attempt to express these multiple moral attitudes simultaneously is, I believe, at the heart of the philosophical drama that unfolds throughout J. J. Abrams's *Star Trek into Darkness* (STID).

### KAAAAANT!!!

Although Spock is grateful to his captain for saving his life, he nevertheless files a report on the Nibiru mission to Admiral Christopher Pike that describes in detail what Kirk decides to omit from his captain's log. Pike is understandably upset at Kirk on two counts: (1) he violated the Prime Directive, and (2) he falsified his log entry. He tells Kirk, "You think the rules don't apply to you because you disagree with them. . . . I saw greatness in you, and now I see you haven't got an ounce of humility." Kirk retorts that his penchant for "changing the conditions" in his favor is exactly what Pike thought Starfleet had lost and why he recruited Kirk to enlist in the first place. In fact, Kirk hadn't even made it out of Starfleet Academy when he cheated on the Kobayashi Maru "no win scenario" test. Pike and the rest of the Starfleet admiralty overlook the fact that Kirk's academic misconduct hearing was interrupted when the Romulan Nero attacked Vulcan. Apparently, Kirk's leading the *Enterprise* to save Earth, rescue Pike, and defeat Nero excuses his earlier indiscretion. However, his present violation of the Prime Directive on Nibiru can't be so easily dismissed. Kirk is stripped of his captaincy and is initially going to be sent back to Starfleet Academy, where he will learn to "respect the chair," which includes strict adherence to the Prime Directive.

Some philosophers are as much sticklers for the rules as the Starfleet admiralty. *Deontology* is a moral theory in which one is bound to fulfill certain duties—the Greek word *deon* means "duty"—and not to violate such duties even if doing so would result in better overall consequences. Certainly, the consequences would've been dire if the *Enterprise* crew hadn't interfered

with the Nibiru at all by attempting to stop the volcano from erupting—which is what Admiral Pike says he'd have done in that situation. But even the consequence of the loss of one life suffices in Kirk's conscience for him to violate his sworn duty as a Starfleet officer.

Furthermore, while deontologists may disagree on what our specific moral duties are, some hold that we have a strict moral duty not to lie, even from an altruistic motive intended to spare someone's feelings being hurt or to save an innocent life. The "father" of deontology, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), is quite clear in stating his absolute prohibition on lying: "By a lie a human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being. A human being who does not himself believe what he tells another . . . has even less worth than if he were a mere thing."<sup>6</sup> Kant isn't simply being melodramatic in portraying his ethical distaste for lying. Rather, the prohibition is premised upon his concept of the intrinsic *dignity* human beings possess as *rational* and *autonomous* beings who are capable of understanding their moral duties and self-legislating their own actions: "What has a price can be replaced by something else as its *equivalent*; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity . . . morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity."<sup>7</sup> We'll return later to discuss further implications of Kant's view of human dignity, but the point here is that our dignity is founded upon our existence as moral beings. Those who fail to use their reason or autonomy properly—that is, in order to understand and govern their behavior by moral duties—violate the very foundation of their dignity. If we agree with Captain Picard that the Prime Directive represents a "very correct philosophy," then Admiral Pike is correct that Kirk fails Kant's test of moral virtue twice over: by violating the Prime Directive and by lying about it in his log.

But wait just a goddamn minute! (As Dr. McCoy might say.) Kirk didn't "lie" *per se* in his log. He merely *omitted* the truth of all that happened on Nibiru. Well, he did report that the mission was "uneventful," and that word certainly doesn't seem to capture accurately the opening scenes of *STID*. Furthermore, while Kant does distinguish telling a lie from omitting the truth, he allows for the latter only in a particular type of situation: "If an enemy, for example, takes me by the throat and demands to know where my money is kept, I can hide the information here, since he means to misuse the truth. That is still no lie, for the other knows that I shall withhold the information, and that he also has no right whatever to demand the truth

from me.”<sup>8</sup> One may justifiably omit the truth from a person who has no right to the truth and intends to misuse the information. Spock Prime is thereby justified in “exaggerating” in *Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan* (1982) when he substitutes “days” for “hours” in reporting to Kirk on how long it’ll take to repair the *Enterprise* while suspecting that Khan may be eavesdropping.<sup>9</sup> He avoids lying to Kirk by referring to the fact that he’s going “by the book,” meaning that he’s dutifully following regulations against uncoded transmissions during battle; thus, Kirk is able to easily discern the truth that Spock is clandestinely communicating. And while Spock is arguably lying to Khan, as pointed out by his protégé, Lieutenant Saavik, Khan has no right to the truth of the *Enterprise*’s condition and would misuse that information to destroy the starship. Unfortunately for Kirk in *STID*, Admiral Pike isn’t Khan and doesn’t fit the bill as someone who has no right to the truth. Thus his falsified log is nothing more than an ass-covering maneuver that unequivocally falters under Kant’s strict test of moral behavior. No way to “change the conditions” of *this* test.

### “I’m Not Going to Take Ethics Lessons from a Robot”

Spock, on the other hand, looks to be a thoroughgoing Kantian insofar as he rigidly adheres to the Prime Directive, even to the point of sacrificing his own life, and, as he likes to remind everyone, Vulcans are incapable of lying—although they do “embrace technicalities” and, as noted above, may “exaggerate.” Spock’s adamant refusal to violate the Prime Directive, however, is premised upon *consequentialist* reasons, and his willingness to give up his life is based upon a *calculation* of benefits and harms in accord with the Vulcan dictum that “the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.”<sup>10</sup>

For Kant, because of our inherent dignity, individual persons cannot be weighed in the scales such that the interests or lives of a smaller number of people could be sacrificed for the sake of a larger number. Rather, each person is of *infinite* value, such that the life or well-being of one person can’t be mathematically compared to that of one or more others. Spock’s life, singular though it is, has a value of  $\infty$ , as does each Nibiru life; let’s say there are five hundred Nibiru Spock will save by detonating the cold fusion device while still trapped in the volcano.  $500 \times \infty = \infty$ , but  $1 \times \infty = \infty$  too! This premise underwrites one of Kant’s formulations of his own version of the Prime Directive—the Categorical Imperative: “So act that you use human-

ity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”<sup>11</sup>

*Utilitarians*, however, disagree with Kant and other deontologists on this score. As consequentialists, utilitarians contend that each moral decision should result from a calculus in which all benefits and harms, and the number of people who will receive the benefits or suffer the harms, is evaluated for each possible action one may take in the given circumstances. Or, alternatively, a *rule* may be devised that guarantees the maximization of the best consequences over time—which is evidently the purpose of the Prime Directive. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), one of the two founders of utilitarianism, states the theory’s moral axiom thus: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”<sup>12</sup> In calculating which action or rule can be reasonably expected to produce the greatest amount of happiness, the well-being or life of each person who may be affected positively or negatively has to be taken into account, but no person’s well-being or life should be considered any more important than another’s: “[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”<sup>13</sup> Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), Mill’s mentor, in describing the mathematical values of the *utility calculus*—that is, how to estimate the overall positive or negative value of each benefit or harm—states that the well-being or life of each person potentially affected by one’s action is to count as one and no more than one.<sup>14</sup> Unlike Kant, then, utilitarians hold that individual persons don’t possess infinite value but rather a value of *one*, which may thus be multiplied in terms of the number of individuals affected by a moral action. Hence, when comparing Spock’s life to that of five hundred Nibiru, a simple calculation shows that the lives and well-being of the Nibiru outweigh that of a single individual.

While the utilitarian principle of strict impartiality may lead to heroic self-sacrifices such as Spock’s, or Kirk’s at the end of *STID*, there is a dark side of the theory that leads some critics of utilitarianism to charge its adherents with moral *corruption*.<sup>15</sup> Admiral Alexander Marcus betrays his “corrupt mind” by utilizing the historical arch-villain Khan Noonien Singh,

cryopreserved for over three hundred years since he and other genetically enhanced “supermen” were exiled after controlling more than three-quarters of the world during the Eugenics Wars.<sup>16</sup> Concerned about the advanced weaponry displayed by the Romulan Nero’s future warship (*Star Trek* [2009]) and an impending war with the Klingon Empire, Marcus has Khan revived and holds the rest of his people, seventy-two in all, hostage so that Khan will help him protect the Federation:

KHAN: Alexander Marcus needed to respond to an uncivilized threat in a civilized time, and for that, he needed a warrior’s mind—my mind—to design weapons and warships.

SPOCK: You are suggesting the Admiral violated every regulation he vowed to uphold, simply because he wanted to exploit your intellect.

KHAN: He wanted to exploit my savagery! Intellect alone is useless in a fight, Mr. Spock. You can’t even break a rule, how can you be expected to break bone?

With Khan’s help, Marcus designs a savagely lethal *Dreadnought*-class starship, the U.S.S. *Vengeance*, and is prepared to use it to destroy the *Enterprise* to safeguard his secret war machine. When confronted by Kirk, Marcus declares unapologetically, “War is coming! And who’s gonna lead us, *you*? If I’m not in charge, our entire way of life is decimated!”

Unlike Khan, Marcus isn’t “homicidal, power-mad, despotic.” He truly believes that he’s doing what’s best for the Federation and is willing to sacrifice not only the lives of the *Enterprise* crew and Khan’s own people but even the respect and love of his daughter, Carol, who can’t believe that the dad who raised her would be willing to take such drastic action. Marcus threatens Khan with the lives of those he considers *family*—his fellow “augments”—Kirk sacrifices his own life to save those he considers family—his crew—and the tragedy of Admiral Marcus is that, even before he’s brutally killed by Khan, he suffers the loss of his own family when Carol slaps him in disgust.<sup>17</sup>

### **“Is There Anything You Would Not Do for Your Family?”**

We’re first introduced to Khan in *STID*, offering to save the life of a little girl dying in a hospital. Being genetically enhanced, Khan’s blood contains advanced healing properties. The girl’s father, a Starfleet officer, strikes a Faus-



tian bargain to save his daughter at the cost of his own life when he becomes a suicide bomber, destroying a secret Starfleet facility run by the shadowy Section 31.<sup>18</sup> Clearly, a father's love is a powerful motivator that could drive one to commit even the most heinous of crimes, blinding a person to his moral obligations to others—hence, the utilitarian doctrine of strict *impartiality*. But even nonutilitarians, such as contemporary philosopher Marcia Baron, agree that “moral reasoning and moral conduct demand that one be impartial, that one not play favorites.”<sup>19</sup> Famed Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) goes even further in asserting that loyalty to one's family, friends, or nation is a matter of “bigotry and superstition.”<sup>20</sup>

Other philosophers, however, such as American philosopher Josiah Royce (1855–1916), consider loyalty to be a bedrock of morality. Royce defines loyalty as “the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause.”<sup>21</sup> This definition isn't complete, however, as loyalty to an abstract “cause” often goes hand in hand with loyalty to one's fellow adherents to the cause, and especially the leaders of the cause. Soldiers who fought in World War II were willing to go into harm's way both for the cause of their country and for the sake of the “band of brothers” formed among groups of infantrymen, sailors, and pilots. They were also willing to follow certain military leaders without question. One U.S. Navy sailor, not realizing that famed admiral William “Bull” Halsey was walking right behind him, said to his fellow sailor, “I'd go to hell for that old son of a bitch.”<sup>22</sup> Of course, not every cause, group, or individual to whom one may be loyal may be morally worthwhile, but the question remains whether loyalty is something we ought to value despite it being loyalty to a disreputable cause, person, or group.

One view is that loyalty can be a virtue only if it's a bond between virtuous individuals. In other words, I must be loyal only to persons or causes that are themselves virtuous—while being virtuous myself. Thus, contemporary ethicist John Ladd contends, “A loyal Nazi is a contradiction in terms.”<sup>23</sup> Khan, while apparently loyal to his fellow augments, cannot be *truly* loyal to them given his evident ruthlessness and brutality, nor would it be virtuous for them to be loyal to him, as many sailors were to Admiral Halsey, if he were to unfreeze them. R. E. Ewin counters Ladd, though, arguing, “The question to consider is this: is a disloyal Nazi better than a loyal Nazi? There are problems in the Nazism, but is there anything wrong with the loyalty? A disloyal Nazi, after all, still has all the vices of Nazism and has added disloyalty to them. . . . It is yet another thing to be held against him and yet another reason for us not to trust him.”<sup>24</sup> On this view, the tears Khan

sheds for his fellow augments may be his one saving grace, the one virtue that, while perhaps not justifying, at least reasonably motivates his actions against Starfleet, and Admiral Marcus in particular. We don't have to agree with Khan's actions to be sympathetic to his motives.

On the flip side, Kirk's loyalty to Spock, which motivates him to violate the Prime Directive, and his loyalty to his ship and crew, which motivates his own self-sacrifice, is a clearly laudable virtue—even if strict Kantians or utilitarians might have let Spock die in the volcano. Part of Abrams's purpose with *STID*, in fact, is to cement the bond of *friendship* between Kirk and Spock, a bond already well-established in Spock's heart-wrenching death scene in *Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan*. Kirk's and Spock's respective deaths in the two alternate timelines—and miraculous resurrections, thanks, in both cases, to Khan (detonating the Genesis device in one timeline and possessing "super-blood" in the other)—poetically bookend their friendship.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) argues that friendship is an essential component of human happiness and living a virtuous life: "Further, [friendship] is most necessary for our life. For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods. Indeed rich people and holders of powerful positions, even more than other people, seem to need friends. For how would one benefit from such prosperity if one had no opportunity for beneficence, which is most often displayed, and most highly praised, in relation to friends?"<sup>25</sup> He goes on to define three distinct types of friendship. The first are friends who are merely useful to each other. While it would certainly be a stretch to call Admiral Marcus and Khan "friends," whatever level of relationship existed between them that allowed Marcus to benefit from Khan's intellect and savagery is based merely on utility. The second is friendship merely for the sake of pleasure. Kirk's numerous sexual liaisons—including Uhura's Orion roommate in *Star Trek* (2009), a Caitian double-team in *STID*, and, apparently, Christine Chapel—involve only shared pleasure. The third, true friendship, involves "those who wish goods to their friend for the friend's own sake" and can only be shared, according to Aristotle, among the virtuous.<sup>26</sup> This is the type of friendship Kirk and Spock are cultivating.

A similar distinction also separates true *romantic* relationships, as we see between Uhura and Spock, from Kirk's hedonistic dalliances—when Carol Marcus mentions Chapel, Kirk doesn't even remember her. Aristotle claims that a person can't be in love with many people simultaneously, as erotic love involves excessive feeling toward one person.<sup>27</sup> When Spock is

facing imminent death in the volcano on Nibiru, his love for Uhura actually motivates him to close off his feelings at that moment. Uhura is upset that Spock would allow himself to die and leave her behind without any thought to her grief, but Spock explains that the excessive feeling she arouses in him—especially given that Vulcan emotions are more intense than humans experience—necessitated that he render himself emotionally numb; otherwise, he wouldn't have been able to perform his duty and face his death with equanimity. Later, he does allow himself to express excessive feeling at the moment of Kirk's death.

Another key relationship Aristotle discusses is between parents and children: "The friendship of children to a parent . . . is friendship toward what is good and superior. For the parent conferred the greatest benefits on his children, since he is the cause of their being and nature and of their education once they have been born."<sup>28</sup> This is depicted most clearly in *STID* between Kirk and Admiral Pike. Having lost his biological father when he was born, a rebellious Jim Kirk needed a straight talking-to from someone "good and superior" after the "epic beating" he provoked with some hot-headed Starfleet cadets (*Star Trek* [2009]). Pike challenges Kirk to an even greater degree of heroism than his father; yet it's Pike himself who becomes Kirk's inspirational "father figure" to meet that challenge—believing in Kirk even after dressing him down for what happened on Nibiru.

Aristotle contends that parents know their children better than the latter know themselves, and Pike persistently trusts in Kirk's character and ability—from initially making him first officer of the *Enterprise*, to supporting his promotion to captain, to reinstating him as first officer after the Nibiru incident.<sup>29</sup> While Pike isn't literally responsible for Kirk's "being and nature," he's instrumental in Kirk's *becoming* the captain we all know he's destined to be—as well as being literally responsible for Kirk's education to help him achieve his future destiny. When Kirk recites the "Captain's Oath" at the *Enterprise's* recommissioning ceremony, he admits that he didn't fully appreciate the words the first time Pike had him recite them; now, having "acquired some comprehension, or [at least] perception" due to the events in *STID*, Kirk can better appreciate the paternal lessons of his elder.<sup>30</sup>

### **"You Seem to Have a Conscience, Mr. Kirk"**

We've seen how duty, utility, and loyalty motivate our moral behavior and could lead to both laudable and condemnable actions. And while these

motivations may lead to divergent moral decisions, sometimes they coincide. When Kirk enters the irradiated warp core to repair it and save the *Enterprise*, his action is praiseworthy from all three moral perspectives: he's fulfilling his duty as a starship captain to put his ship and crew first, he's putting the needs of the many ahead of those of the one, and he's expressing his loyalty to his "family." Unfortunately, not all moral decisions will combine these three motivations in such a tight package; Kirk did have to violate his duty to the Prime Directive and the utility maxim to save Spock out of loyalty to his friend.

By the end of *STID*, having seen how Marcus's loyalty to the Federation and Khan's loyalty to his fellow augments have morally corrupted them, Kirk is able to give the first of what will surely be many "soapbox" speeches during the *Enterprise's* ensuing five-year mission: "There will always be those who mean to do us harm. To stop them, we risk awakening the same evil within ourselves. Our first instinct is to seek revenge when those we love are taken from us. But that's not who we are." Khan deliberately destroys a Section 31 facility, attacks Starfleet headquarters, and crashes the *Vengeance* into San Francisco—potentially killing thousands of innocent people to avenge what he falsely believes was the death of his fellow augments. Kirk himself immediately wants to hunt down Khan to avenge Pike's death. Only Spock's constant moralizing, along Kantian lines of never using a person—even an evil person like Khan—merely as a means toward the end of satisfying one's desire for vengeance, leads him to capture Khan instead of killing him outright.

Spock's ability to stand up to Kirk and remind him of his moral duty is a sign of his loyalty to his captain, which is not the same as blind obedience to authority. We also see this virtuous form of loyalty when Scotty refuses to sign for the top-secret torpedoes being loaded onto the *Enterprise* without any technical schematics. Not knowing how they might interact with the warp core, Scotty exercises his primary duty to safeguard the ship, to the point of resigning his post when Kirk directly orders him to authorize loading the torpedoes. Despite this seemingly disloyal act on Scotty's part, he's ready to come to the aid of "Captain James T. 'Perfect Hair'" when the latter comes calling—leading him to be at just the right place at the right time to save the *Enterprise*. Scotty isn't disloyal to Kirk, the virtuous captain, but only refuses to obey the morally blind captain who's hell-bent on vengeance no matter the risk to his crew.

When Kirk welcomes Carol Marcus aboard the *Enterprise* as "part of the family," we can easily imagine future violations of the Prime Directive

when the life of one or more of Kirk's crew is at stake. But that might be okay so long as the intrepid crew of the *Enterprise* remain virtuous and thereby worthy of the loyalty they share among themselves. Khan's loyalty fueled wrathful vengeance; Kirk's will fuel only self-sacrifice and the occasional rule bending. Whod you rather have as the head of *your* family?

## Notes

I'm grateful to the editors for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

1. *Star Trek: The Original Series*, "Bread and Circuses" (1968).
2. All quotations, unless otherwise cited, are from *Star Trek into Darkness* (2013).
3. Kirk utilizes this axiom to justify sacrificing his career and the *Enterprise* to save Spock in *Star Trek III: The Search for Spock* (1984).
4. Other examples from the *Star Trek* universe in which crew members have been mistaken for gods, or devils, include the *Original Series* episodes "The Omega Glory" (1968) and "The Paradise Syndrome" (1968) as well as the *Next Generation* episode "Who Watches the Watchers" (1989).
5. *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, "Symbiosis" (1988).
6. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 182.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42. While Kant consistently refers to "human beings" and "humanity" as having dignity, that is because he doesn't consider that there may be other creatures who possess rationality and autonomy as we do. If Kant were living and writing in the twenty-third century, he wouldn't be so "speciesist" and would include beings such as the Vulcans and the Nibiru as having dignity. Hereafter, unless quoting directly from Kant, I'll use the term "person" to refer to any rational and autonomous being who thereby possesses intrinsic dignity.
8. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 203.
9. "Spock Prime" is the designation used within *Star Trek* fandom to refer to Ambassador Spock—portrayed by Leonard Nimoy—who journeys back in time along with Nero, instigating the new timeline depicted in J. J. Abrams's *Star Trek* films.
10. This same dictum justifies Spock Prime's sacrificing his life to save the *Enterprise* in *Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan*—a reversal of Kirk's sacrifice in *STID*.
11. Kant, *Groundwork*, 38.
12. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 7.
13. *Ibid.*, 17.

14. See Jeremy Bentham, *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 1988).
15. See Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy* 23 (1957): 16–17.
16. For a clever depiction of how Khan and his followers could control most of the world from 1992 through 1996, as cited in the *Original Series* episode "Space Seed" (1967), without those of us who lived through those years knowing about it, see Greg Cox, *The Eugenics Wars: The Rise and Fall of Khan Noonien Singh*, 2 vols. (New York: Pocket Books, 2001–2002).
17. Additional portrayals of genetically enhanced "augments" in the *Star Trek* universe include the *Star Trek: Enterprise* episodes "Borderland," "Cold Station 12," and "The Augments" (2004). For further discussion of the philosophical themes raised in these episodes, see Jason T. Eberl, "'Killing Your Own Clone Is Still Murder': Genetics, Ethics, and Khaaaaan!" in *Star Trek and Philosophy: The Wrath of Kant*, ed. Jason T. Eberl and Kevin S. Decker (Chicago: Open Court, 2008).
18. Section 31 has existed since the birth of Starfleet and is first depicted in the *Star Trek: Deep Space Nine* episode "Inquisition" (1998).
19. Marcia Baron, *The Moral Status of Loyalty* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1984), 5.
20. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 359.
21. Josiah Royce, *The Possibility of Loyalty* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 16–17.
22. As quoted in Walter R. Borneman, *The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—the Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea* (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 473.
23. John Ladd, "Loyalty," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006), 596.
24. R. E. Ewin, "Loyalty and Virtues," *Philosophical Quarterly* 42 (1992): 418.
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