# Foreign Intervention in Africa

## From the Cold War to the War on Terror

ELIZABETH SCHMIDT

*With a Foreword by William Minter*

New Approaches to African History

CAMBRIDGE

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*Foreign Intervention in Africa* chronicles the foreign political and military interventions in Africa during the periods of decolonization (1956–75) and the Cold War (1945–91), as well as during the periods of state collapse (1991–2001) and the "global war on terror" (2001–10). In the first two periods, the most significant intervention was extracontinental. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the former colonial powers entangled themselves in countless African conflicts. During the period of state collapse, the most consequential interventions were intracontinental. African governments, sometimes assisted by powers outside the continent, supported warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors' resources. The global war on terror, like the Cold War, increased the foreign military presence on the African continent and generated external support for repressive governments. In each of these cases, external interests altered the dynamics of internal struggles, escalating local conflicts into larger conflagrations, with devastating effects on African peoples.

Elizabeth Schmidt is Professor of History at Loyola University Maryland. She is the author of *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958* (2007), which received the African Politics Conference Group's 2008 Best Book Award, and *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (2005), which received Alpha Sigma Nu's book award for history in 2008. Her 1992 book, *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939*, was awarded a special mention in the Alpha Sigma Nu book competition for history, was a finalist for the African Studies Association's Herskovits Award, and was named by *Choice* an "Outstanding Academic Book for 1994."

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Elizabeth Schmidt
*Loyola University Maryland*

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521709033



First published 2013

Printed in the United States of America

*A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

Schmidt, Elizabeth, 1955– author.
Foreign intervention in Africa : from the Cold War to the War on Terror / Elizabeth Schmidt, Loyola University Maryland.
pages cm. – (New approaches to African history ; 7)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-88238-5 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-521-70903-3 (paperback)
1. Africa – Foreign relations. 2. Africa – Politics and government. 3. Africa – Foreign economic relations. 4. Insurgency – Africa – History. I. Title.
DT31.S32 2013
327.6009′045–dc23 2012035195

ISBN 978-0-521-88238-5 Hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-70903-3 Paperback



Cover photograph: Angolan soldier with Soviet-made AK-47 Kalashnikov submachine gun, guarding Soviet-made ground-to-air missiles near Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, February 29, 1988 (Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images)

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# Acknowledgments

I could not have written this book without the invaluable critique, sharp insights, and sound advice of William Minter, who read every chapter with a fine-toothed comb. A scholar and activist on Africa issues since the mid-1960s, Bill has an extraordinary grasp of the scholarship, the details, and the big picture, and he understands the complexities of the continent better than anyone I know. I owe him an incalculable debt.

This book would not have seen the light of day without the support of Martin Klein, editor of Cambridge's New Approaches to African History series, who invited me to write a different book but enthusiastically supported my proposal to write this one instead. At Cambridge University Press, Eric Crahan, Abigail Zorbaugh, and Paul Smolenski worked tirelessly to bring the project to fruition. I received extremely valuable advice from several Cambridge readers. In particular, I would like to thank Allen Isaacman, who generously read and commented on the entire manuscript, helping me to publish a better book, as he has several times in the past. (I also owe a debt of gratitude to Barbara Isaacman, who pressed Allen to take on this task despite his overloaded agenda.) David Newbury, Mamadou Diouf, and several anonymous readers provided helpful comments on various versions of my proposal.

My manuscript benefited from other insightful critiques. Participants in the African Seminar at the Johns Hopkins University provided many useful suggestions, and Richard Immerman and Petra Goedde,

editors of *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (2013), offered constructive comments on my contribution to their volume, which helped me to write a more polished, expanded account in this book. Many thanks to Oxford University Press for allowing me to use excerpts from my contribution to their book in this one.

Other individuals and institutions supported the project in important ways. I would like to thank the staffs of Loyola–Notre Dame Library and of the Library of Congress for their ever-prompt response to my requests for materials and advice. Loyola University Maryland contributed significant financial support. The Research and Sabbatical Committee, the Center for the Humanities, and the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences provided two summer research grants, and the center, the dean, and the Office of Academic Affairs generously helped to pay for the cost of maps and photographs. Cartographer Philip Schwartzberg at Meridian Mapping willingly produced the maps to precise specification, and Ryan Bakerink at Getty Images and Louis Riquelme at Corbis helped me acquire the appropriate photographs. I offer many thanks to the staff at Aptara, Inc., where Peggy Rote expertly supervised the book's production, Katherine Faydash applied her skills as copy editor, and the Help Desk responded to my numerous indexing queries.

I owe an enormous amount to activist academics, friends and colleagues of more than three decades, who taught me how to integrate scholarship and solidarity. In particular, I would like to thank Prexy Nesbitt, my earliest teacher and inspiration, and Bereket Habte Selassie, both of whom were my mentors and colleagues at the Africa Project of the Institute for Policy Studies; Carol Thompson, my teacher in the anti-apartheid and Southern African solidarity movements in Zimbabwe and the United States, whose scholarly activism is a model for us all; Allen Isaacman, my mentor in the Twin Cities, who introduced me to the Mozambique Support Network and encouraged me to participate in engaged scholarship; and Bill Minter, with whom I first collaborated on Southern African research and writing in the mid-1980s.

For their love, support, and encouragement, I thank my parents, Albert and Kathryn Schmidt; my son, Jann Grovogui; and my partner, Mark Peyrot – all of whom kindly tolerated the mood swings that writing a book seems to entail. Finally, this book is dedicated to Prexy Nesbitt, who introduced me to the liberation struggles of Southern Africa and set me on my path.

# Foreword

Foreign intervention, as this survey by Elizabeth Schmidt makes clear, is no simple concept to define. The reality is no less complex than the definition. Even in the periods of the slave trade and of established colonial rule, the dominant powers from outside the continent had to take account of local realities. African societies defeated on the battlefield and subordinated to economic coercion found ways to resist, adapt to, or manipulate the presence of outside powers.

From 1945 to 1991, most of the period covered by this book, the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, dominated world politics. Outsiders often viewed African conflicts as reflecting this global contest. Although superpower competition may have been the dominant factor in European confrontations, in Africa the realities did not fit as easily into a bipolar framework. The colonial powers retained influence and had their own distinct interests as their control over the continent diminished. The Soviet Union led a coherent bloc including most of Eastern Europe. However, other communist powers, including Yugoslavia, Cuba, and China, had their own foreign policies, based on distinct interests in Africa. Most significantly, African nations themselves, along with Asian and Latin American countries, shared an alternate dominant narrative based on anticolonialism and nonalignment between the superpowers. Different nations within Africa, and different political forces within each country, had their own interests, which led them to seek international alliances and sometimes invite external intervention against domestic enemies or neighboring countries.

No continent-wide account of this complex period could even come close to being "complete." However, Schmidt's wide-ranging review of multiple case studies succeeds in paying due attention to nuance without getting bogged down in detailed narratives and academic disputes.[1] In each case, the historical record allows for differences among historians and social scientists in evaluating the scale and character of external intervention and the relative influence by external and internal actors on the outcomes. Assessments of the damage done or the possible positive effects of intervention also vary depending on who is doing the evaluation. Most would probably agree on the horrific negative balance of the slave trade and of colonial rule, particularly when combined with expropriation of land and property by European settlers, and most would probably agree with Schmidt's considered judgment that in most cases external intervention from 1945 to 2010 brought more harm than benefit. However, sharp disagreements will undoubtedly continue in evaluating particular interventions, past, present, or future.

In my personal opinion, the 1979 overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda by Tanzanian troops, for example, was more justified than would have been a failure to intervene, although subsequent events made clear that it was hardly a solution to Uganda's problems. Similarly, in my judgment, the intervention of Cuban troops in Angola in 1975 to counter Central Intelligence Agency and South African intervention, and their role in subsequent years in protecting Angola against attacks by South Africa and the UNITA rebels, was also justified. Moreover, if the international community had not failed to intervene against the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, hundreds of thousands of lives probably could have been saved.

All such judgments admittedly depend on incomplete evidence and hypothetical reasoning about the options not chosen, as well as on value judgments of both observers and participants. What should be clearly rejected, however, are simplistic accounts that reduce events to a simple story of dueling outside interventions or a clear dichotomy between external and internal causes of conflict. The postcolonial wars in Angola and Mozambique, for example, which I analyzed in *Apartheid's Contras*, were neither simply civil wars nor conflicts among proxies of the United States, Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Africa.

[1] Full disclosure: I served as a consultant on this book project, reviewing drafts, discussing the topics, and raising difficult-to-answer questions with the author.

Instead, internal, global, and regional conflicts intersected in complex patterns, which shifted over time. Moreover, as many scholars have demonstrated with more finely grained analyses, in each country these wars featured local realities with their own distinctive features.

For the policy analyst or social justice activist trying to make sense of and support or oppose today's interventions, factual information is almost always incomplete, and the motives of those involved are mixed. There are no simple formulas. Supporting (or opposing) an intervention simply because the United States, the African Union, or the United Nations supports it, for example, would be a recipe for ignoring the realities of particular cases and the contradictions within the policies of these states and institutions themselves. The concept of a purely humanitarian intervention simply to aid innocent civilians, with no political or military implications, is an illusion. An intervention with a limited mandate, such as to protect corridors for relief supplies, may or may not be justified in a particular case. Yet it will have political consequences; it will weaken some forces and strengthen others. So, of course, will unilateral or multilateral interventions designed to combat terrorism, reverse a coup against an elected government, or "protect civilians" against human rights abuses by a repressive regime or a rebel movement. However, ruling out all interventions ignores the fact that inaction also affects the outcome of any conflict, by deferring de facto to the most powerful and ruthless forces on the ground. The balance of forces between governments and rebel movements, whatever their ideological orientation or extent of abuses against civilians, is affected by their structural links to the outside world, including political and economic as well as military ties. Finally, the failure of diplomatic action, which should be the first resort, may also lead to enormous human costs.

There is no alternative to making fallible judgments about particular cases. The human suffering from some conflicts does indeed "cry out" for intervention. Yet the consequences of actual interventions can appall even those who called for the interventions in the first place. It would be easier if there were some formula to tell us which interventions would alleviate human suffering and increase the possibility that people would get a chance for a fresh start and which interventions should be opposed because of ulterior motives or the high probability of making things worse. If, as I believe, such reliable formulas do not exist, it is better to recognize that, and then get on with sorting out our messy and inevitably inconclusive collective judgments on specific

cases. As a corollary, we must recognize the likelihood of ongoing disagreements among humanitarians, progressives, and people of goodwill. If "dialogue" is needed among internal parties to a conflict, it is equally essential among outsiders, including not only representatives of states and multilateral agencies but also national and international civil society.

In the context of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the danger of too much intervention or bungled intervention seems more likely than the danger of no intervention at all. The impetus to intervene is coming not only from outside governments, most notably that of the United States, in response to real or imagined terrorist threats. It is also coming from African governments and rebel movements, which are increasingly turning to African regional organizations; the United Nations; and bilateral suppliers of arms, training, and security personnel (both public and private). Increased multilateral involvement in conflicts both within and across borders is no doubt inevitable. However, the outcomes are as uncertain as ever. The consequences are far too great for the decisions to be made by governments behind closed doors, without transparency and input from a wider range of voices, particularly those most affected.

Today, in comparison to much of the period covered in this book, modern communications technologies allow for more transparent decisions, more consultation, and better checks on the ulterior motives of parties to a conflict and of those who volunteer to be peacemakers. Whether this opportunity leads to better decision making depends, first, on the decision makers themselves. It also depends on the capacity of media and scholars to provide deeper analysis that rejects simplistic solutions and on local and international civil society to sustain the pressure for genuine human security.

William Minter
Washington, D.C., June 20, 2012

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AFDL | Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire |
| AFRICOM | U.S. Africa Command |
| ANC | African National Congress (South Africa) |
| CENTCOM | U.S. Central Command |
| CFA | African Financial Community |
| CGT | General Confederation of Labor (France) |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CJTF-HOA | Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa |
| CONCP | Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies |
| CONSAS | Constellation of Southern African States |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EACTI | East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative |
| ECOMOG | Economic Community Monitoring Group (Liberia) |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ELF | Eritrean Liberation Front |
| EPLF | Eritrean People's Liberation Front |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EUCOM | U.S. European Command |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FLN | National Liberation Front (Algeria) |
| FNLA | National Front for the Liberation of Angola |
| FRELIMO | Front for the Liberation of Mozambique |
| FROLINAT | Front for the National Liberation of Chad |
| GUNT | Transitional Government of National Unity (Chad) |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MDRM | Democratic Movement for Malagasy Restoration (Madagascar) |
| MNC | Congolese National Movement |
| MPLA | Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola |

| | |
|---|---|
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPFL | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OEF-TS | Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara |
| PAIGC | African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde |
| PCF | French Communist Party |
| PSI | Pan-Sahel Initiative |
| RDA | African Democratic Rally |
| RENAMO | Mozambique National Resistance |
| RPF | Rwandan Patriotic Front |
| R2P | Responsibility to Protect |
| RUF | Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADCC | Southern African Development Coordination Conference |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SDECE | External Documentation and Counterespionage Service (France) |
| SPLM | Sudan People's Liberation Movement |
| SWANU | South West Africa National Union (Namibia) |
| SWAPO | South West Africa People's Organization (Namibia) |
| TPLF | Tigray People's Liberation Front (Ethiopia) |
| TSCTI | Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative |
| TSCTP | Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership |
| UDI | Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia) |
| ULIMO | United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNITA | National Union for the Total Independence of Angola |
| UNITAF | United Task Force (Somalia) |
| UNOSOM | UN Operation in Somalia |
| UPC | Union of the Peoples of Cameroon |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USPACOM | U.S. Pacific Command |
| WSLF | Western Somali Liberation Front |
| ZANU | Zimbabwe African National Union |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front |
| ZAPU | Zimbabwe African People's Union |


**MAP 0.1.** Africa, 1947. (Map by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis.)


**MAP 0.2.** Africa, 2011. (Map by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis.)

# Introduction

For many outsiders, the word *Africa* conjures up images of a continent in crisis, riddled with war and corruption, imploding from disease and starvation. Africans are regularly blamed for their plight. They are frequently viewed as being intolerant of ethnic and religious differences but accepting of corruption and dictatorship. They are often presumed to be unwilling or unable to govern themselves. This book challenges such popular myths. By examining the historical roots of contemporary problems, the book demonstrates that many of the predicaments that plague the continent today are not solely the result of African decisions but also the consequence of foreign intrusion into African affairs. Focusing on foreign political and military intervention in Africa during the periods of decolonization (1956–75) and the Cold War (1945–91), with reflections on the later periods of state collapse (1991–2001) and the "global war on terror" (2001–10), this book advances four central propositions.[1]

First, as colonial systems faltered, imperial and Cold War powers vied to control the decolonization process. While imperial powers hoped to transfer the reins of government to neocolonial regimes that would continue to serve their political and economic interests,

[1] Portions of this book have appeared in my contribution to *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (2013), ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, and are reproduced here with the permission of Oxford University Press. The post–Cold War periods are dealt with more extensively in my book, *From State Collapse to the War on Terror: Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War* (Athens: Ohio University Press, in progress).

Cold War powers strove to shape a new international order that instead catered to their interests. Although independence struggles and their aftermath were dominated by local issues, Cold War intervention rendered the conflicts more lethal and the consequences longer lasting. Second, as the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, African nations were abandoned by their Cold War allies. They were bequeathed a legacy of enormous debt; collapsed states; and, in many cases, deadly competition for the spoils. While indigenous prodemocracy movements challenged warlords and autocrats, foreign actors both helped and hindered their efforts. Neighboring states and regional, continental, and transcontinental organizations supported opposing sides in the war-making and peacebuilding processes. Third, the global war on terror, like its Cold War antecedent, increased foreign military presence on the African continent and generated new external support for repressive governments. Fourth, throughout the periods under consideration, foreign intervention tended to exacerbate rather than alleviate African conflicts and to harm rather than help indigenous populations. Even international humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts were marred by conflicting interests that sometimes hurt the people they were intended to assist.

In considering these propositions in relation to the case studies that follow, readers should bear in mind several caveats. Although four discrete historical periods have been described, in reality, events do not fit into neat time frames but progress unevenly. Some African states began to collapse even as the Cold War raged – particularly during the economic crises of the 1980s – and in some areas, the war on terror commenced even before the September 2001 attacks on the United States. Just as historical periodization is necessarily imprecise, terminology can be complicated by multiple meanings. The book's title, *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, refers not only to military terrain and the corridors of power but also to the struggle for African hearts and minds. For the purposes of this study, *foreign* refers to alien political powers rather than individuals. Sometimes these powers are external to the continent. In other instances, the term describes the relationship of one African country to another. *Intervention* implies a relationship with an imbalance of power. It is not synonymous with engagement, involvement, or influence, which reveal nothing about the power dynamics of the relationship. Foreign intervention occurs

when a dominant country uses force or pressure to interfere with and exert power over the affairs of a weaker sovereign entity. In many cases, force is employed when political pressure fails. Sometimes intervention can be viewed in a positive light, such as when powerful nations intervene to halt a genocide or to help maintain the peace. More often it has negative connotations, such as when powerful nations intervene to conquer, colonize, overthrow governments, install new ones, or plunder resources.

During the periods of the Cold War and decolonization, the most significant intervention was extracontinental. The United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and the former colonial powers embroiled themselves in countless African conflicts. During the period of state collapse, countries outside the African continent continued to implicate themselves in African affairs, often under United Nations (UN) auspices. However, the most consequential foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental. African governments, sometimes assisted by extracontinental powers, supported warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors' resources. The African Union and regional bodies regularly intervened to broker, monitor, and enforce peace agreements, their personnel sometimes profiting from the strife. With the onset of the war on terror, extracontinental intervention again became the most salient form. In all cases, external interests altered the dynamics of internal struggles, often escalating local conflicts into larger conflagrations, with devastating effects on African peoples.

Three other points should be borne in mind. First, governments are not sentient beings with desires, will, and the capacity to act. Yet the need for shorthand sometimes leads to the personification of political structures and the occasional reference to governments as actors. Second, governments are not monolithic. There is often dissension within and between branches of government. Policies are contested, and outcomes are the product of struggle. The good intentions of some quarters may be thwarted by the realpolitik of another. Humanitarian rationales may be genuine – or used to mask broader strategic and economic interests. Third, foreign intervention cannot occur without internal collaboration. To effect change in African countries, foreign governments must form alliances with indigenous actors who benefit from the relationship, whatever the cost to the rest of the population.

## Historical Background: Situating the Book

Although this book begins with the Cold War, the history of foreign involvement with Africa has deep roots. Africans have engaged with peoples from other continents for thousands of years. Much of this interaction cannot be termed intervention, and much of it was mutually beneficial. The development of commercial and cultural exchanges is a case in point. Nearly 2,000 years before the common era, Egypt participated in a trade and communications network that embraced the Persian Plateau, the Indus Valley, and lands as far away as China. By 800 BCE, Phoenician trade routes spanned from Egypt to Morocco, and by the first century of the common era, Africans on the Indian Ocean coast had developed commercial links with the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and India, establishing a trading complex that eventually extended to China and Indonesia. North Africans were an integral part of the Greek and Roman worlds, where goods, ideas, and cultural practices traveled in all directions and brought many shared benefits. World religions also spread into Africa, transforming the African religious landscape and assuming new forms as they absorbed indigenous beliefs and practices. During the first three centuries of the common era, Judaism expanded into Ethiopia, while Christianity spread into Egypt, Ethiopia, and across North Africa to the Maghreb. In the seventh and eighth centuries, Islam began to take root in North Africa, whereas in later centuries, Muslim merchants extended its reach along the East African coast, into the Sudan and the Horn of Africa, and across the Sahara Desert into West Africa.

Unlike commercial and cultural exchange, other forms of foreign contact clearly involved dispossession and the loss of sovereignty. These unequal relationships can properly be characterized as intervention. Centuries before the common era, Egypt was forcibly incorporated first into the Persian and then into the Greek Empires. By the first century BCE, all of North Africa had been absorbed into the Roman Empire, following the defeat of indigenous rivals. Arab conquests began in the seventh century of the common era. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Turkish conquests had rendered the Ottoman Empire the dominant power in North Africa. During the same period, Ottomans and Portuguese vied for control of East African port cities and the lucrative Indian Ocean trade, bolstering their respective positions by forming alliances with indigenous political forces.

Externally driven slave trades, like conquest, can be considered foreign intervention. They, too, were dependent on African collaborators for success. Beginning in the seventh century CE, Arab-dominated trading networks exported millions of Africans from the northern and eastern parts of the continent to the Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean islands, and India. Other nexuses transported West Africans across the Sahara Desert to North Africa and the Mediterranean. Arab-led slave trades lasted through the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the European- and Euro-American-dominated trans-Atlantic slave trade, which spanned the mid-fifteenth to the late nineteenth centuries, forced more than ten million Africans into slavery in the New World. Millions more died in slave raiding wars, in transit to and inside coastal holding stations, and during the treacherous Middle Passage.

The distinction between foreign involvement and intervention can be blurred. Economic interactions have sometimes precipitated foreign intervention. As the trans-Atlantic slave trade waned in the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution took off in Western Europe and North America, stimulating a new interest in Africa. Industrial and commercial concerns from the Northern Hemisphere targeted the continent for its rich natural resources and potential markets. While African producers and merchants prospered from the new "legitimate" trade, indigenous strongmen also took advantage of the increased opportunities for wealth and power, which were enhanced by the influx of modern European weapons. Competition among Africans for control of lucrative trade routes resulted in war and instability in many parts of the continent, while heightened demand for labor to produce cash crops generated new forms of indigenous servitude. As European powers vied with one another for control of African resources, government officials worried that informal spheres of influence could no longer protect their countries' economic interests. The Berlin Conference was convened in 1884–85 to stave off the threat of an intra-European war. Without a single African present, representatives of European political and commercial interests mapped out plans to establish "effective occupation" and formal colonial administration throughout the continent, claiming for their countries a share of what Belgian King Leopold II called "this magnificent African cake."[2]

[2] Quoted in Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 58.

The scramble for Africa was unleashed with a new wave of foreign intervention. By the first decades of the twentieth century, most of the continent had been conquered, colonized, and placed under European control. France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Spain had established regimes to extract African wealth – especially rubber, cotton, minerals, and oils – and to force Africans to provide the labor and taxes necessary to keep the system afloat. Once again, African responses were varied. Indigenous political leaders whose powers were threatened, and peoples whose land, labor, and livestock were alienated, generally resisted the imposition of European authority. Those jockeying for position or those who had been oppressed or marginalized by indigenous rulers or rivals sometimes sought alliances with the new rulers. Responses varied across time and space. Any given individual might resist, acquiesce, accommodate, or collaborate depending on the circumstance.

## Focus of the Book

The balance of forces began to change during World War II, sparking the postwar period of decolonization, which encompassed the middle decades of the twentieth century. Wartime exactions had resulted in increased hardships for African populations, as they were forced to provide labor, resources, and soldiers to support the European war effort. Propaganda promoting democracy and self-determination, the experiences of African military conscripts, and economic distress led to widespread resistance after the war. For many European powers, the political and economic costs of colonial rule increasingly seemed to outweigh the benefits. As the "wind of change" blew across the continent during the postwar period, African nations in growing numbers achieved political independence.[3] Although most attained independence in the 1960s, others remained under European rule until the mid-1970s. Majority rule was not instituted in the settler-dominated territories of Southern Africa until the 1980s and 1990s. With varying degrees of success, the former imperial powers attempted to

[3] In 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously announced that "the wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact." Quoted in Frank Myers, "Harold Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3 , no. 4 (Winter 2000): 565.

control the decolonization process, just as they had asserted their authority over African political and economic processes during the colonial period.

As colonialism collapsed, the contemporaneous Cold War brought a new surge of foreign intervention to the continent. The Cold War was characterized by political competition, economic rivalry, and military friction between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as their respective allies. Although direct military confrontation between the two superpowers did not erupt, the Cold War period was punctuated by proxy wars in the developing world, where internal actors were supported by external powers. Just as the periods of decolonization and the Cold War overlapped, so, too, did the major participants. The major extracontinental players in the decolonization process were the colonial powers, in particular, France, Britain, Belgium, and Portugal. During the Cold War these countries were allied with the United States through their membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The settler regimes in Southern Africa (South Africa and Rhodesia) played the Cold War card in an attempt to protect their quasi-colonial systems of white privilege. The United States, which hoped to replace the imperial powers as the dominant external force in Africa, bridged the decolonization and Cold War processes. Wavering between its European allies and moderate African nationalists, the United States strove to keep both radical nationalism and communism at bay. The Soviet Union and other communist countries sided unabashedly with African liberation movements, although they differed over strategy and choice of partners. Eastern Bloc nations like Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), which played critical roles as weapons suppliers, followed the Soviet line. Cuba, which was deemed by the West to be no more than a Soviet proxy, often took an independent course. Yugoslavia, though communist, rejected Soviet hegemony, as did the People's Republic of China after the 1960s Sino-Soviet split. Standing apart from both imperial and Cold War powers, Israel followed its own agenda, aligning with the former colonial powers to attack Egypt during the 1956 Suez War, supporting newly independent nations with military and economic aid in the early 1960s and establishing close ties to apartheid South Africa as Israel became increasingly isolated after the June 1967 Six-Day War.

Other countries and international bodies refused to take sides in the East-West struggle yet played critical roles in the decolonization

process. The Non-Aligned Movement, composed primarily of developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, supported the emancipatory program of African colonies, and some member nations gave material support to African liberation movements. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), composed of independent African states, promoted national liberation in territories still under colonial or white-minority rule, providing liberation movements with military, economic, and diplomatic support. The Nordic countries and international bodies such as the UN and the World Council of Churches offered humanitarian and other nonmilitary aid to the Southern African liberation movements, helping to tip the balance toward independence and majority rule.

All of these outside powers became embroiled in the internal affairs of numerous African countries in the decades following World War II. Although domestic and regional conflicts and national liberation struggles centered on local issues, they were played out in the context of the Cold War. External interests altered the dynamics of internal struggles as Cold War tensions were superimposed on local ones. Small-scale conflicts escalated into full-scale wars armed and financed by opposing sides in the geopolitical struggle. The result was widespread destruction and instability, with consequences that continue to plague the continent today.

Some of these interventions resembled past imperial practices, with more powerful nations attempting to exploit Africa and its riches for their own ends. Former colonial powers and the United States tended to support regimes that opposed communism and left colonial economic relationships intact – even when they were corrupt or repressive. Western patronage was often based on the willingness of local actors to serve as Cold War allies and regional policemen, providing military bases for Western use and thwarting radical movements among their neighbors. With fewer means at its disposal and less intrinsic interest in the continent, the Soviet Union generally increased its presence in response to escalated Western involvement. It supported movements and regimes that declared themselves in favor of scientific socialism and a Soviet-style model of development – regardless of their internal practices – as well as radical nationalist regimes that were shunned by the West. Although deemed by the United States to be following the Soviet lead, Cuba often took an independent route, not always to the liking of its Soviet ally. China favored African political parties, movements, and regimes that opposed Soviet influence and ideology.

Their mutual opposition to the Soviet Union sometimes resulted in awkward alliances among China, the United States, and apartheid South Africa.

Although this book focuses on foreign political and military intervention in Africa, the problems that plague Africa today cannot be properly understood if the impact of foreign intrusion into African economies is ignored. Unequal exchange between African commodity producers and industrialized countries is a legacy of the colonial era that has contributed to the deep impoverishment of African populations. The inequality inherent in these economic relationships persisted after political independence in a system that has been characterized as neocolonialism. In the words of Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonial states had "all the outward trappings of international sovereignty," while their economies and political programs were "directed from outside."[4] Entrenched economic inequalities were exacerbated by the steep rise in oil prices in the early 1970s and the worldwide collapse in commodity prices at the end of that decade. As exporters of primary products and importers of manufactured goods, African nations suffered severe balance of trade deficits, which were compounded by inflated military budgets, corruption, and economic mismanagement. With few alternatives available, many governments turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Western governments and commercial banks for assistance.

Foreign aid came with strings attached. Motivated by free market ideologies that were intended to bolster global capitalism, Western-dominated international financial institutions imposed draconian stabilization and structural adjustment programs on African nations as a condition for foreign loans. Private banks generally required the IMF's seal of approval before granting loans of their own. Development agencies attached to Western governments and international nongovernmental organizations dependent on government funds refused assistance to projects that did not conform to free market or "neoliberal" norms. All of these institutions required the implementation of economic development models in which African populations had no say. In what was broadly referred to as the Washington Consensus, in reference to the home of the IMF, the World Bank, and the

[4] Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1966), ix.

U.S. government, these neoliberal programs curbed government involvement in the economy, ending subsidies, price controls, and tariffs; undermining health and educational services; and destroying social safety nets. Mandated currency devaluations resulted in spiraling inflation and shortages of imported goods. Stipulated privatization programs resulted in widespread layoffs, rising unemployment, and an upsurge in crony capitalism. These measures had devastating effects on the most vulnerable members of society. Moreover, because the structural adjustment programs were imposed from above – and thus were inherently undemocratic – the balance of power was tipped in favor of governments with the coercive means to impose unpopular measures. Foreign intervention in African economies not only resulted in increased economic hardship for many but also stimulated the installation of politically repressive regimes.

The wave of neoliberal economic interventions that began in the late 1970s, like their neocolonial antecedents, constituted a fundamental denial of African sovereignty. More than a decade earlier, Nkrumah had described neocolonialism as "the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress." He had warned that "a State in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny."[5] Such characterizations were equally true of the neoliberal policies imposed by Western-dominated international financial institutions, governments, and agencies in a later period and the African states that implemented them.

Massive foreign debts incurred by African governments in the 1970s and 1980s continued to take their toll in the early decades of the twenty-first century. In many cases, the borrowed money was consumed by corrupt leaders, spent on extravagant showcase projects or on military rather than economic development. Nonetheless, successor governments were forced to service the debts with scarce foreign currency, exhausting export earnings, foreign aid, and new foreign loans. Debt servicing to foreign governments, banks, and international financial institutions continued to consume a large portion of African government revenues, which could not be allocated to essential services, let alone economic development. Although foreign intervention into African economies is not a central focus of this book, it is the critical backdrop to the crises of the 1980s and 1990s, which

[5] Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*, x, xi

stimulated a new wave of external political and military intervention on the continent.

The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. African dictators, no longer useful to their former patrons, were cut adrift. African nations were left with a legacy of looted resources, massive debt, collapsed states, and multiple regional wars over the spoils. This devastating situation was not solely the result of the Cold War. Distinctions in power and privilege and conflicts over natural resources predated the colonial period. The plundering of African riches through unequal exchange was rooted in colonial economic practices, and ethnic and regional hierarchies established during the colonial period often endured. Internal corruption, mismanagement, and the privileging of some groups over others had resulted in volatile societies characterized by vast disparities in wealth and power. However, the influx of weapons and money during the Cold War entrenched power differentials and rendered local conflicts far more lethal. When the Cold War ended, unstable countries were flooded with leftover weapons that fueled new competition for riches and power. Years of war and repression had destroyed organized political opposition in many countries. Thus, as popular forces ousted Cold War dictators no longer bolstered by outside aid, warlords and other opportunists frequently moved into the power vacuum. Having "won" the Cold War, the United States felt no compelling reason to intervene, and the Soviet Union was no more. A number of wealthy nations turned their backs on Africa in the 1990s. Despite the HIV/AIDS pandemic, widespread poverty, and regional wars, French, German, and American aid declined precipitously, and African peoples were expected to pay off massive debts incurred by Cold War dictators.

Although bilateral intervention by countries outside Africa decreased in the 1990s, multilateral intervention assumed new forms. A number of post–Cold War crises stimulated appeals for foreign intervention – from actors within Africa and supporters in the international community. As a result, UN, African Union, and regional bodies intervened to broker, monitor, and enforce peace accords and to facilitate humanitarian relief operations. These types of intervention were viewed as positive by many African constituencies, although the unequal power differentials meant that African agents frequently could not control international forces once they established themselves on African soil. In some cases, the international community

was criticized for not acting quickly or forcefully enough – as in the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994; the Liberian civil war, which ended in 2003; and the Darfur conflict in Sudan that began in 2003. Condemned for its failure to thwart the Rwandan genocide and under pressure to act more resolutely in Darfur, the UN General Assembly endorsed a document in 2005 that held countries responsible for protecting their citizens from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" and granted the international community the right to intervene if governments failed to fulfill their "responsibility to protect" (R2P).[6] Supported by 150 countries, the endorsement resolution upended a fundamental precept of international law since the seventeenth century – the principle of state sovereignty – which was enshrined in the UN Charter. Henceforth, respect for "state sovereignty" could no longer be used as an excuse to allow mass killings to proceed unhindered.

Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, foreign intervention in Africa has again assumed new characteristics. The global war on terror and the struggle to secure the flow of oil and other strategic resources have put Africa back on the map. Increased foreign military presence, outside support for repressive governments, and unsavory alliances purportedly established to eradicate terror have brought another round of foreign intervention to the continent. Africa, its people, and its resources have again become the object of internal and external struggles in a pattern that stretches from precolonial conquests and slave trades through the current quest for resources and the war on terror. Once again, local concerns have generally been subordinated to foreign interests. Humanitarian interventions, though well intentioned, have often been ineffective or counterproductive, whereas military interventions, even under the auspices of R2P, have frequently led to regime change with uncertain consequences.

## Organization of the Book

The book is organized into eight chapters. The first seven chapters investigate nationalism and decolonization during the Cold War

[6] UN General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome," paragraphs 138–139, adopted September 15, 2005, http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf.

(1945–91). Chapters 2–7 each focus on a particular geographic region or on multiple regions colonized by a single European power. These chapters examine the ways in which African actors sought outside assistance to bolster their positions in internal struggles and how their external allies introduced geopolitical considerations into local and regional conflicts. Some of these considerations were rooted in past colonial relationships and current bilateral and regional alliances; others were related to the Cold War. Although some local actors initially benefited from outside intervention, the increasingly militarized conflicts were decidedly detrimental to civilian populations, and their negative impact intensified over time. The final chapter considers the period following the Cold War and explores cases from several regions.

To explain why foreign powers became embroiled in these conflicts, Chapter 1 examines the ideologies, interests, and practices of the main external actors, including both former colonial and new Cold War powers. Chapters 2–6 survey major arenas of conflict that are representative of broad trends in foreign intervention during this period. Chapter 2 focuses on North Africa, including Nasser's Egypt, which served as a model of radical nationalism and nonalignment for many African countries, and Algeria, which fought a long war for independence from France. Chapter 3 examines the former Belgian Congo, the site of the first Cold War crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 4 investigates the three Portuguese colonies on the African mainland, where decolonization came only after protracted guerrilla war involving outside players. Chapter 5 explores the white-ruled countries of Southern Africa, where indigenous actors backed by external powers engaged in armed struggle against settler regimes. Chapter 6 examines the Horn of Africa, where shifting Cold War and regional alliances and conflicts wrought widespread devastation and instability that have outlasted the Cold War. Chapter 7 takes a different approach, focusing on French intervention in Africa, as France moved aggressively to retain close military and economic ties to its former colonies, to expand its influence into other Francophone countries, and to stave off Anglo-American encroachment.

Chapter 8 explores the aftermath of decolonization and the Cold War, focusing on the periods of state collapse (1991–2001) and the global war on terror (2001–10). As dictators were abandoned by their external benefactors, countries already buffeted by economic and political crises lapsed into violent conflict. Neighboring states intervened to support proxy forces that would allow them to gain control

over lucrative resources. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the ensuing global war on terror sparked a new wave of foreign intervention in Africa. American aid became increasingly militarized, focusing on oil- and gas-rich countries and those considered strategic to the American war on terror. A new generation of African strongmen benefited from U.S. military and economic largess, transforming the old rallying cry against "communism" into a new one against "terrorism" – a catchall term used to justify cracking down on a broad range of domestic dissent.

## Suggested Reading

The "Suggested Reading" entries at the end of each chapter represent a selection of the most useful sources for readers who wish to investigate particular issues in more depth. The following list includes some of the most important overviews of various themes, historical periods, and foreign actors – and points the way to critical online resources.

Works that explore Africans' interactions with a wider world before colonial conquest include Philip Curtin, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, and Jan Vansina, *African History: From Earliest Times to Independence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995); Bill Freund, *The African City: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael A. Gomez, *Reversing Sail: A History of the African Diaspora* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and David Robinson, *Muslim Societies in African History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

For the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, a number of older but still relevant studies are recommended. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis's *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) and *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988) contain a wealth of articles and bibliographic references on specific colonial powers and regions. For readable overviews covering the entire continent, see Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) and John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1996). For the Southern African region, see William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

For a comprehensive study of the Cold War – albeit with relatively little focus on Africa – see Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, 3 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a brief overview of the Cold War, see David S. Painter,

*The Cold War: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 1999). Other works explore American and Soviet ideas about anticolonial movements and superpower interventions in Africa. See especially Zaki Laïdi, *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). For Southern Africa and the Horn, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

For broad assessments of U.S.-Africa policy during the Cold War, see Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). For the impact of race relations and the civil rights movement on U.S. Cold War policies, see Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

Several recent books investigate Soviet involvement in Africa. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin's *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) discusses KGB clandestine operations in Africa. Vladimir G. Shubin's *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008) provides a thorough examination of a major Soviet area of involvement, focusing on Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. Sergey Mazov explores Soviet activities in the Congo, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali in *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali examine Soviet involvement in Egypt and the Congo in *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

For China's political and economic relations with African states and liberation movements, see Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958–1971* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974). For an engrossing case study of Chinese aid and its political and economic implications, see

Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

For a superb examination of Cuba's involvement in Africa, see Piero Gleijeses's *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

A number of sources focus on foreign intervention in Africa during the post–Cold War period. Ian Taylor's *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: Continuum, 2010) investigates the interactions of sub-Saharan African countries with the United States, Britain, France, China, India, the European Union, and international financial institutions. Contributing much-needed internal perspectives, Adebayo Oyebade and Abiodun Alao examine the continent's quest for security in their edited collection, *Africa after the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), as does Adekeye Adebajo in *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War* (London: Hurst & Co., 2010). A number of accounts offer interpretations of recent conflicts and crises. Among the most significant academic studies in this category are Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., *African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007); William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Well-researched and accessible journalistic accounts include Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Howard W. French, *A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004); and Mark Huband, *The Skull beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).

Most investigations into international terrorism and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies have paid little attention to Africa. Although lacking an African focus, a good overview of the interactions of local insurgencies, international movements, and the global war on terror is David Kilcullen's *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Malinda S. Smith's edited collection, *Securing Africa: Post–9/11 Discourses on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), offers a much-needed African focal point that includes diverse regional and national perspectives. The implications of the U.S. Africa Command for African and global security are analyzed in Daniel Volman and William Minter, "Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (March 13, 2009; http://www.fpif.org), and Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM'S Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security*

*Policy in Africa* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2007; http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil).

Online sources that have not been vetted by experts must be regarded with caution. Online sites that offer high-quality analysis and documentation include the following: *Africa Focus Bulletin* (http://www.africafocus.org) features analysis of current African issues and includes excerpts from African publications, reports by nongovernmental organizations, and so on; AllAfrica (http://www.allafrica.com) distributes news from Africa, posting more than 1,000 stories in English and French each day and offering more than 900,000 articles in its digital archive; "Southern Africa Liberation History" (http://www.noeasyvictories.org/search/smartsearch1.php) provides links to important digital archives around the world that focus on Southern African liberation struggles; the National Security Archive (http://www.nsarchive.org) provides access to declassified U.S. government documents, presidential papers, congressional records, and court testimony that focus on U.S. national security, foreign policy, intelligence, and economic issues.

CHAPTER 1

# Nationalism, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1945–1991

This chapter introduces the major external actors in Africa during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, examines their motives for intervention, and summarizes the book's case studies. The primary foreign participants in the decolonization process were the European imperial powers: France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium. Italy, which lost its colonies in the aftermath of World War II, played a lesser role. The key players during the Cold War were the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba.

## Imperial Actors

As anticolonial agitation swept across Africa in the postwar period, the major imperial powers – France, Britain, Belgium, and Portugal – were forced to respond. Their strategies and policies varied, depending largely on their political and economic circumstances. All the colonial powers faced nationalist resistance, and none agreed without internal pressure to grant independence to their colonies. Most anticolonial movements used nonviolent tactics, although some waged armed struggles for national independence. During the first postwar decade, France and Britain responded to political challenges with repression. Armed uprisings in Madagascar, Tunisia, and Cameroon were brutally suppressed by the French, as were anticolonial activities in Côte d'Ivoire and other overseas territories. Britain employed draconian methods to end the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya and did enormous

harm to the civilian population that lived in rebel-controlled areas. Under duress, both France and Britain ultimately acceded to African demands for independence, confident in their ability to transfer political power to African governments that would protect their economic and political interests.

Weaker colonial powers, in contrast, tended to protect their interests by military means. Incapable of maintaining economic dominance without political control, Portugal fought lengthy wars to resist decolonization. Fearful of losing economic clout and influence, Belgium intervened militarily in the newly independent Congo. The presence of white settlers changed the dynamics of all independence struggles and generally resulted in prolonged wars of national liberation. Such was the case in French Algeria, Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, British Rhodesia, and Afrikaner-dominated South Africa and Namibia. Decolonization conflicts opened the door to Cold War intervention by other powers. The most dramatic Cold War interventions were in territories and nation-states where colonial powers had been the weakest.

British officials recognized the power of African nationalism – and its logical consequences – long before their counterparts in other countries. Given its diminished political and economic stature in the postwar period, and increasingly aware of the high costs of repression, Britain realized that it was more advantageous to concede governing power to trusted African collaborators than to attempt to maintain political control. By the 1940s, the Colonial Office assumed that it was preparing British subjects for eventual self-rule – albeit at some indefinite time in the future. In anticipation, the government instituted programs to reshape African societies in ways that promoted the interests of Britain and the Commonwealth, intending to turn over the reins of government to carefully selected Anglophile elites. Only in Kenya, where an armed insurgency threatened the lives and property of white settlers, did Britain pit the imperial army against the African civilian population.[1] Otherwise confident in its ability to maintain influence in the Commonwealth of sovereign independent states composed of the former constituents of its empire, Britain was less worried than other

[1] In the case of Rhodesia, Britain opposed the declaration of independence by the white-settler regime, which refused to concede the principle of future majority rule. Because it failed to follow the British decolonization plan, London did not support the settler cause militarily (see Chapter 5).

imperial powers about its ability to fare well in a free-trade system stripped of protective tariffs. Although the new nations could conceivably choose new economic and political partners, it was highly unlikely that most would reject their imperial mentor.

The government of France, in contrast, was convinced that the maintenance of empire was critical to ensuring the country's standing among the world's great powers. France fought protracted wars against nationalist movements in Indochina and Algeria to prevent their secession. Implementing colonial reforms in the face of war and political unrest, France renovated the empire in an attempt to save it. In the 1950s, Paris conceded the principle of local self-government within the empire but never considered political independence to be a legitimate option. The 1958 French constitution, which laid the foundations for the Fifth Republic, dissolved the great federations of French West and Equatorial Africa in order to divide the transterritorial nationalist movements. Demands for independence remained strong, however, and in 1960, France was forced to yield political independence to most of its African territories. Concerned that it would lose power and influence in the free flow of the market, France negotiated political, economic, and military agreements that guaranteed a strong French presence in the newly independent states.

Belgium and Portugal were even less willing than France to grant political independence to their colonies. They had provided only rudimentary levels of social and economic development in the colonies, and the vast majority of their subjects had little, if any, formal education. As a result, when independence came, the African populations were ill prepared for self-rule. It was not until 1959, when popular unrest forced its hand, that Brussels seriously considered independence for the Congo. In January 1960, the government scheduled Congo's independence for June 30 – with fewer than six months to prepare. Like France, Belgium was determined to maintain control of the political and economic processes before and after independence, guaranteeing its continued access to the Congo's enormous mineral resources. In the months before June 30, Brussels transferred the lucrative holdings of colonial state-run companies to private Belgian concerns. After independence, Belgian administrators remained to protect their country's economic interests, and 1,000 Belgian army officers took charge of the Congolese army. Like Belgium, Portugal had no intention of relinquishing control of its lucrative colonies. An impoverished, partially industrialized country, Portugal could not

withstand the competition of the world market. It was determined to maintain political control of its African colonies in order to ensure access to cheap raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods. As a result, it fought long, costly wars against liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea, which led to the toppling of Lisbon's authoritarian regime in 1974.

Unlike the other imperial powers, Italy was forced to relinquish its empire as a result of its defeat in World War II. The Italian East African empire, comprising Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia – which Italy occupied between 1936 and 1941 – was conquered by Britain in 1941. Libya fell to Britain and its colonial and Commonwealth forces in 1943. After the war, the Allies forced Italy to renounce all its colonial claims. France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union – and from 1949, the UN – determined the fate of the Italian colonies. France and Britain took a special interest as the dominant imperial powers in North Africa and the Middle East, while the United States and the Soviet Union positioned themselves for their insipient Cold War competition. Although Moscow lobbied to control a portion of Libya as a UN trust, London and Washington feared the establishment of a Soviet naval base on the Mediterranean, and American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes worried that a Soviet presence in Libya would threaten Western control of the distant Belgian Congo, which had provided the uranium for the first atom bomb. Dominated by the Western powers, the UN thwarted Soviet aims and left Libya under French and British tutelage until 1951, when growing anticolonial sentiment forced the UN to concede Libyan independence. Ethiopia was administered by Britain from 1941 to 1952 and then returned to the feudal stewardship of Emperor Haile Selassie. The UN transferred the Italian colony of Eritrea to Ethiopia for administration, despite significant popular sentiment in Eritrea for independence. The international body was under tremendous pressure from the United States, which was determined to keep the strategic Red Sea coast under the control of a faithful Western ally. Federated to Ethiopia in 1952 as a semiautonomous unit, Eritrea was annexed outright a decade later. At the behest of France, Britain, and the United States, Italian Somaliland was placed under Italian trusteeship for ten years – despite protests from Somalis and opposition from the Soviet Union. Italian Somaliland was joined with British Somaliland in 1960 as the independent nation of Somalia. The United States again intervened to ensure that the disputed Ogaden territory was turned over

to America's Ethiopian ally, despite the fact that it was inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis.

## Cold War Actors

Conflict and instability during the African decolonization process provided an opening for Cold War competition. The United States was the most powerful of the external actors whose ideology and interests shaped Africa's Cold War contests. America's interests and involvement varied across time and space, and its actions were influenced by the concerns of the former imperial powers. Many in Washington preferred that European countries take the lead in their former colonies. Hence, the United States followed Belgium in its determination of a Congo policy and took its cue from Britain on Rhodesia. France remained a formidable force in Francophone Africa and resisted American intrusion in its sphere of influence. Thus, U.S. actions were constrained not only by America's Cold War rivals but also by its allies.

From the end of World War II until the collapse of communism in the early 1990s, the promotion of free market capitalism and opposition to communism were dominant features of American foreign policy. As European nations lost their empires after the war, the United States hoped to gain access to the raw materials and markets previously controlled by the colonial powers. Washington also saw a chance to promote American political and economic ideologies in the newly established nations. Although Europe, Asia, and Latin America were more central to American policy concerns, Africa received considerable attention from successive presidential administrations. High-level officials in the Eisenhower administration, which took office as African nationalist movements gained momentum, viewed nationalism with suspicion, considering anticolonial movements to be the product of external communist subversion. Although in general the United States expected Britain, France, and Belgium to take the lead in ensuring stability and pro-Western governments in their traditional spheres of influence, it broke ranks when – as in the 1956 Suez Crisis – the former imperial powers, by discounting the power and legitimacy of nationalist aspirations, threatened to bring about a major Cold War conflagration. Inside the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations, minority voices in the State Department stressed the importance of

responding to nationalist concerns and befriending the governments of the future. They advocated forging an anticommunist coalition under American leadership that would press for gradual social and political change. However, even these officials opposed political movements that the United States could not control. The maintenance of good relations with European allies and the containment of radicalism remained paramount. In the end, even liberal Democratic administrations backed away from any actions that might threaten these fundamental objectives. The Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations were less nuanced in their understanding. Republican administrations were less likely than their Democratic counterparts to court African alternatives. In general, they viewed Africa through the prism of white-minority rights and the Cold War and considered radical nationalist movements to be Soviet proxies.

Despite their differences, Democratic and Republican presidential administrations pursued many common objectives in Africa. All of them sought relations with pro-Western governments that were friendly to American business and foreign policy interests. Because poverty and instability provided fertile ground for communist ideas, successive American administrations strove to thwart communism through economic development. Political stability and governments that favored American economic models were considered prerequisites for success. From the mid-1950s until the end of the Cold War, the United States engaged in a massive transfer of foreign aid to developing countries. It offered assistance to leaders who adopted free-enterprise models, opened their countries to American investment and trade, and agreed to the export of profits on generous terms. In addition, the United States provided military and security assistance to its protégés – to protect them from both domestic insurgencies and international communism.

Although useful for the purposes of analysis, generalizations about Democratic and Republican policies must be employed with caution, as they fail to highlight divisions within the government at any given time. Policy options are contested and debated within and between governmental branches. The final determinations are the product of struggle, representing the victory of one set of concerns over others. Democrats and Republicans in Congress may be at odds, and the legislative branch may be pitted against the executive. Within the executive branch, the National Security Council; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and Departments of Defense, Commerce, Treasury,

and State may challenge one another. Within the State Department, the Bureau of African Affairs is often more sympathetic to African perspectives than offices operating under different mandates.

Because the balance of forces changes over time and according to circumstances, the United States has pursued contradictory Africa policies. On the one hand, as an early proponent of decolonization, which would open the door to American influence, the U.S. government rhetorically championed freedom, democracy, and self-determination. On the other hand, factions in the government have sympathized with the concerns of white settlers, and at times, their voices were dominant. Pervasive anticommunism in some quarters often led to a misunderstanding of nationalist movements. Radical nationalism was frequently confused with communism – or viewed as an equal threat to Western interests. Fear of communism – real or imagined – led the U.S. government to support many unsavory dictatorships. Although the dictatorships were pro-Western and anticommunist, they did not promote the freedom and democracy that Washington claimed to endorse. In the case of Southern Africa, a region valued for its strategic location and minerals and home to a significant population of white settlers, conflicting American interests led the United States to reinforce, rather than oppose, colonialism and white-minority rule.

The U.S. government's support for European and settler agendas was a contentious issue during the Cold War, as the status quo was challenged by opponents both inside and outside the government. Policy-makers in Washington, who generally hailed from elite, all-white-male backgrounds, often felt more comfortable with European allies and representatives of white-minority regimes than with African nationalists. They shared a common view that sovereignty within a country's borders precluded the interference of international bodies in determining how governments should treat the people residing within them. They were usually supportive of the notion that European colonial powers would pass the torch of their "civilizing mission" to the United States, which would assume the "white man's burden" – fostering Western civilization and economic development – and, in a natural progression, take the lead in fighting communism. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, prominent American officials had no qualms about expressing their beliefs in white superiority and racial segregation. Prosegregation advocates dominated the foreign policy establishment and the most powerful congressional committees. However, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, African

Americans, who constituted about 11 percent of the U.S. population in 1965, increasingly linked the struggle for civil rights at home to black liberation and national independence abroad. Many were vocal proponents of African decolonization. Simultaneously, a growing number of liberals in the foreign policy establishment argued that racial discrimination at home and support for white-minority and colonial regimes abroad eroded America's moral high ground. How could the United States expect to win friends among newly independent African nations when black Americans were treated like second-class citizens? How could it avoid charges of hypocrisy in its claim that it represented a more humane and democratic society than those of communist states? New power dynamics emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, as the growing number of black elected officials established the Congressional Black Caucus and explicitly linked African and African American struggles for equality and justice. These efforts, which culminated in the African American–led Free South Africa Movement of the mid-1980s and the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, were part of a broad and diverse anti-apartheid movement that engaged millions of Americans.

After the United States, the Soviet Union was the second most important Cold War actor in Africa. Washington and Moscow had very different concerns after World War II. While the American economy had been bolstered by the war, the Soviet Union had lost twenty million people and almost half its economic capacity. Far from being bent on world conquest, the Soviet Union was primarily concerned with securing its perimeters and surrounding itself with compliant regimes that would forestall future invasions. However, the country also took an interest in Third World decolonization, which offered the possibility of new alliances in the struggle against Western imperialism. Arguing that the "backwardness" of emerging nations was the result of capitalist exploitation, Moscow deemed the removal of colonial capitalism necessary for Third World advancement, and the triumph of national liberation over imperialism a precondition for the victory of socialism over capitalism. In keeping with this view, Nikita Khrushchev, who held power from 1953 to 1964 first as Communist Party leader and then as premier, initiated diplomatic and economic relationships with anticolonial and anti-imperialist regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Khrushchev's goal was not to establish communist states but simply to increase Soviet influence in the new nations and to diminish that of the West. The Soviet Union's involvement in Africa generally occurred in response to the interference of former

colonial powers or the intensified activities of the United States or China. When Western powers spurned or undermined African governments with pronounced anti-imperialist rhetoric or programs, the Soviet Union offered economic and military aid. Such was the case in Egypt (North Africa); the Congo (Central Africa); Guinea, Ghana, and Mali (West Africa); and Somalia (Horn of Africa). None of these regimes was communist. In the Horn, Moscow was motivated as much by strategic as by ideological concerns when it came to the aid of Marxist Ethiopia, which was threatened by socialist Somalia.

In the early 1970s, under Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, Soviet policy entered a new phase. In Southern and West Africa, the Soviet Union began to provide substantial amounts of military aid to Marxist liberation movements fighting intransigent colonial powers such as Portugal (in the case of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea) and white-settler regimes (in the case of Rhodesia, South Africa, and South African–occupied Namibia). In the strategically located Horn of Africa, the United States had long sustained Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's imperial regime, while the Soviet Union supported the socialist-military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia. However, after a military coup toppled the emperor and established a Marxist government in Ethiopia, Moscow and Washington swapped partners. Although the Soviet Union established commercial agreements with most African countries and helped build hundreds of industrial and other facilities, it was in the realm of military assistance to radical regimes and national liberation movements that the Soviet contribution was most decisive.

In their competition for Third World allies, the United States and the Soviet Union offered two very different development models. Promoting the free-enterprise capitalist system, the American model depended on the slow accumulation of capital through profits generated by the market. The Soviet model, in contrast, was premised on centralized economic planning. It focused on the collectivization of agriculture, the development of heavy industry, and the advancement of large infrastructure projects. In the eyes of many Third World leaders, development according to the American model would take far too long. The Soviet Union provided an attractive alternative. It had moved rapidly from an agrarian to an industrial society. Its strong state and centralized economic plan had enabled it to engage in a massive redistribution of wealth. All of this was extremely appealing to many Third World nationalists.

Besides its seductive economic example, the Soviet Union had another advantage. Because the Soviet Union did not have extra-continental colonial possessions, African countries did not associate it with exploitative European colonialism. Conversely, the United States, closely aligned with Western European nations, was linked to the powers that had dominated both Africa and Asia. America's continuation of French colonial wars in Indochina and its own history in Latin America provided little reassurance. Thus, many in Africa associated the United States with the poverty and oppression they experienced under the colonial capitalist system, whereas the Soviet Union evoked no such connotations.

The third Cold War actor in Africa was the People's Republic of China. Like the Soviet Union, China saw the African continent as an arena in which to challenge imperialism. However, during most of the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union supported rivals in the struggle for power. Despite Soviet support for the Chinese Communist Party during China's 1945–49 civil war, and the friendship treaty that provided Beijing with critical Soviet technology and economic assistance, the two countries struggled over both ideology and policy and competed for allegiances in the Third World. Between 1959 and 1965, the alliance broke apart as the Soviets criticized Mao Zedong's leadership and policies while Mao decried Khrushchev's goal of "peaceful coexistence" with the West as counterrevolutionary and challenged Soviet political and economic models. In 1959, Khrushchev abrogated an agreement to provide China with modern military technology. In 1960, he recalled more than 1,000 Soviet scientists and industrial specialists from China, while Beijing declared its independence from Soviet international and domestic policies and sought new allies among emerging Third World nations. By 1965, the Soviet Union openly considered Chinese activities in Africa and Asia to be a threat to its interests, and China publicly declared its independence in both domestic and international affairs. The Sino-Soviet split was complete, and the scramble for allies began.

Chinese interest in Africa emerged publicly at the Conference of Asian and African States in Bandung, Indonesia, a decade before the Sino-Soviet split. At the April 1955 conference, representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African nations and territories, as well as those of numerous liberation movements, agreed to oppose all forms of colonialism and imperialism and to promote economic and cultural cooperation. The participants voiced particular support for decolonization

and national liberation in Africa. China played an important role in the conference and moved to strengthen ties to other developing countries – in what was dubbed the "Third World." Its early focus on Africa was in the Bandung spirit of African-Asian solidarity and cooperation. From the early 1960s until the mid-1970s, China sent tens of thousands of "barefoot doctors," agricultural technicians, and solidarity work brigades to African countries that had declared their opposition to imperialism and neocolonialism. It offered grants and low-interest loans for development projects in Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia. Beijing also provided military training, advisors, and weapons for African liberation movements. Maoist ideas were prominent in Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) doctrines during the struggle against white-minority rule in Rhodesia. Mozambique's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) benefited from Chinese military training and employed Maoist guerrilla strategies to attain independence from Portugal. (FRELIMO also welcomed Soviet aid, embraced Soviet development models, and remained strictly neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict.)

Although Soviet aid to African liberation movements and nations was more substantial, Chinese ideology often had greater allure. Soviet ideology, following the orthodox Marxist position, posited that the level of development of the productive forces determined whether a society was feudal, capitalist, socialist, or communist. A higher social form could not be attained if a society's productive forces were not sufficiently developed. Mao, in contrast, argued that human ideas, will, and actions were the most important factors in historical change. He believed that societies could skip quickly through stages of material development if the people's consciousness was suitably evolved. China and the Soviet Union also differed in their views of the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry. Whereas the Soviet Union adhered to the Marxist-Leninist perspective that had little regard for the rural populace and claimed that the urban proletariat would spearhead the socialist revolution, Mao argued that the rural peasantry, with its innate wisdom and natural revolutionary consciousness, would lead a country to socialism. This notion dovetailed with Mao's claim that a high level of industrialization was not necessary for the march to socialism. All that was required was a revolutionary peasantry. Maoism, with its emphasis on rapid industrialization and the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry, had significant appeal in emerging African nations, where populations were predominantly rural and colonial powers had done little to develop the productive forces.

Rivalry with China, as well as the United States, became an important stimulus for Soviet involvement in Africa. During the anticolonial struggles of the 1960s–1980s, the Soviet Union and China generally supported competing movements. After the Nixon administration's rapprochement with China in 1972, the United States and China often assisted the same faction, finding common cause in their mutual opposition to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union aided the struggle of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) against white-minority rule in Rhodesia, while China assisted ZANU's breakaway movement. In Angola, the Soviet Union supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while China and the United States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Cuba was the fourth Cold War actor in Africa. Although considered a Soviet surrogate by the United States, Cuba followed an independent foreign policy in Africa, often straining its relationship with the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro and his associates believed that Cuba could serve as an example to oppressed peoples in Latin America and Africa. The tiny Caribbean island had thrown off an exploitative dictatorship and stood up to the United States in the process. In January 1966, Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference, at which the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was founded with the pledge to support national liberation and economic development on the three continents. Cuba's subsequent involvement in Africa was very much in keeping with the revolutionary vision articulated at the Tricontinental Conference.

Although Cuba's African focus stemmed from the belief, shared by all the Cold War powers, that decolonization provided a new arena for the struggle between socialism and capitalism, this was not the whole story. Like African Americans in the United States, Cuba also had an emotional link to Africa. Approximately one-third of all Cubans could boast some African blood. Many were inspired by the desire to liberate their African brothers and sisters from colonialism and imperialism and to share the fruits of the Cuban Revolution with them. In consequence, tens of thousands of Cuban health, education, and construction workers, and tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers, served in more than a dozen African countries during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War – all expenses paid by the Cuban government. Africans were generally impressed by Cuba's willingness to donate military, medical, and educational assistance without expectation of future reward.

## The Case Studies

The six Cold War and decolonization case studies featured in this book include countries from each of Africa's five geographic regions. They represent territories formerly controlled by the four major imperial powers and demonstrate a range of motivations for foreign intervention. Chapter 2, which focuses on Egypt and Algeria from 1952 to 1973, examines decolonization in North Africa, where the British and French imperial powers were the key external actors. Instability in this strategic region, which Britain and France could no longer control, stimulated the involvement of the American and Soviet Cold War powers, while Israel's involvement in the 1956 Suez War was sparked by regional political concerns.

Chapter 3 examines decolonization in the Central African nation of the Congo from 1960 to 1965. As the former colonial power with significant economic interests in this strategically located, resource-rich country, Belgium was the primary external actor. Although Brussels intervened shortly after Congolese independence, primarily to protect Belgian mining interests, Belgian settlers, and their property, the situation was far beyond Belgium's capacity to control. Threatened by the radical nationalism of the new government, which Washington viewed as pro-Soviet, the United States was quickly drawn into the imbroglio, which in turn galvanized the Soviet Union and Cuba. The UN, at that time dominated by American foreign policy interests, was also an important actor.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine decolonization and the Cold War in Southern Africa, where the presence of white settlers and/or a weak colonial power prolonged the decolonization process, led to greater postcolonial conflict, and opened the door to intervention from external Cold War powers. The fourth chapter, covering the period 1961–75, focuses on the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique (as well as Portuguese Guinea in West Africa), where a weak imperial power fought to maintain the political control of territories it could not dominate through neocolonial economic mechanisms. The presence of Portuguese settlers in both Angola and Mozambique further complicated the situation. National liberation wars implicated Portugal's NATO allies – notably, the United States – and wars of destabilization before and after independence drew in other external actors. The United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Cuba took sides in the Angolan wars, while South Africa waged postcolonial

wars of destabilization in both Angola and Mozambique (explored in Chapter 5).

The fifth chapter examines the white-minority regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa, and South African–occupied Namibia from 1960 to 1990. As white settlers fought to retain control of the countries they considered theirs to rule as they saw fit, they were opposed by African liberation movements that received military aid from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China – as well as humanitarian support from Nordic countries and nongovernmental organizations like the UN and the World Council of Churches. As the former colonial power, Britain framed the Western response to the rogue regime in Rhodesia. Although the United States generally followed Britain's lead on Rhodesia, its policies toward South Africa and Namibia were governed by both Cold War and domestic political concerns. Along with Britain and the United States, France and Israel provided significant support to South Africa's apartheid regime, even as they publicly criticized its racial policies.

Chapter 6 focuses on the Horn in East Africa from 1952 to 1993. Following Somalia's independence in 1960, Britain and Italy departed, and Ethiopia stood alone as the region's last imperial power. Having conquered and ruled territory inhabited by Somalis and other ethnic groups and annexed the former Italian colony of Eritrea, Ethiopia was challenged by internal rebellions, an independence war, and armed conflict with neighboring Somalia. Regional strife took on a Cold War hue as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba became embroiled in the conflagrations.

Chapter 7 focuses on French involvement in its colonies and former colonies, primarily in West and Central Africa, from 1947 to 1991. After independence, economic and military agreements bound the new nations to the former imperial power. This chapter stands apart from the others in that it examines the aftermath of decolonization with relatively little reference to the Cold War. In fact, France's involvement in the affairs of its onetime protégés was unique. No other imperial power remained as deeply entrenched in the postindependence politics of its ex-colonies or engaged with such frequency in military interventions to prop up or overthrow African governments. Only Cuba, a major Cold War player, had more troops on the continent during the postwar periods of decolonization and the Cold War.

These case studies represent only a fraction of the many instances of foreign intervention in Africa during the years 1945–91. Rather than

offering a comprehensive overview, they provide evidence of patterns that transcended time and space. Although they constitute some of the most significant cases with the broadest ramifications, they are by no means the only ones of consequence. Space constraints preclude a more thorough examination of other critical cases, such as Britain's military intervention in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda in January 1964, following mutinies in all three national armies and a popular revolt on the neighboring island of Zanzibar; the role of foreign governments and private interests in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–70, which prolonged the war and contributed to the deaths of some two million civilians; and the role played by Israel in the 1971 military coup that brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda and the support given by Israel and Britain to his brutal eight-year dictatorship.

## Suggested Reading

A number of readings referenced in the introduction are also included here.

For the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, a number of older but still relevant studies are recommended. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis's *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) and *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988) contain a wealth of articles and bibliographic references on specific colonial powers and regions. For readable overviews covering the entire continent, see Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) and John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1996). For the Southern African region, see William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For books that focus on particular imperial powers, see Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005); Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (New York: Berg, 2002); and M. D. D. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: Longman, 1981). For Israel's involvement in Africa, see Zach Levey, *Israel in Africa, 1956–1976* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Republic of Letters, 2012) and Sasha Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Pantheon, 2010).

For superpower attitudes toward African anticolonial movements and intervention in Africa, see Zaki Laïdi, *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints*

*of a Rivalry, 1960–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

For broad assessments of U.S.-Africa policy during the Cold War, see Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

Several recent books investigate Soviet involvement in Africa. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin's *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) discusses KGB clandestine operations in Africa. Vladimir G. Shubin's *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008) provides a thorough examination of a major Soviet proving ground, focusing on Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. Sergey Mazov explores Soviet activities in the Congo, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali in *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali examine Soviet involvement in Egypt and the Congo in *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

For China's political and economic relations with African states and liberation movements, and see Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958–1971* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974). For an engrossing case study of Chinese aid and its political and economic implications, see Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

For a superb scholarly examination of Cuba's involvement in Africa, see Piero Gleijeses's *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and his more popularly written *The Cuban Drumbeat: Castro's Worldview: Cuban Foreign Policy in a Hostile World* (New York: Seagull Books, 2009).




**MAP 2.1.** North Africa and the Middle East, 1971. (Map by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis.)