

Geopolitics

A Guide to the Issues

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Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues



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History of Geopolitics and Biographies of Key Personalities (20th Century)

The term *geopolitics* is generally regarded as being first used by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) in an 1899 article in the Swedish geographical journal *Ymer*, and Kjellén used the German term *Geopolitik* in a 1905 article in the German journal *Geographische Zeitschrift*. Kjellén defined geopolitics as describing the role of geographical factors in determining national behavior and was also a Swedish nationalist sympathetic to German World War I efforts.¹

Political geography is also used to describe the relationship between physical environment and politics and has both domestic policy and international implications, but *geopolitics*, as used in this work, will refer to the international economic, environmental, diplomatic, and security relationships between nation-states, international government organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. While geopolitics has been practiced by nation-states throughout history, its rise as a scientific discipline and formalized governmental policy-making instrument begins in the early 20th century. Key emphases of geopolitics include the belief that states have boundaries, capitals, communication lines, consciousness, and culture; the belief that a state's size and resources can determine its strength; and the belief that states are in continual competition and that larger states seek to expand to consolidate their power. It is also an interdisciplinary subject encompassing topics such as demographic movement, economic development, land use, and natural resource distribution.²

U.S. geopolitical theory and practice during this time were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), who contended that nations with superior sea power consisting of a navy, merchant marine, maritime-oriented populaces, well-distributed bases, and control of narrow waterways

could dominate international affairs by using this power to blockade and choke rivals.³ British geopolitics, most prominently articulated by Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), was concerned about Germany's emerging naval challenge and sought to prevent national decline by uniting with Britain's overseas territories into a league of democracies with common defense and foreign policies as well as giving trade preferences to these countries by imposing higher tariffs on products from other countries.⁴

Geopolitics would achieve its greatest use and controversy in Germany during the 20th century's earliest decades. Numerous individuals were involved in developing German geopolitical thought, including Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) and Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904). German geopolitical thought was influenced by Germany's central European location; its recurring historical antagonism with France and Russia; an acute emphasis on the unity of the German Volk (people or nation); national desires for a "place in the sun," including dominance of Europe; the zeal to rectify World War I defeat and avenge themselves for the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; the desire to gain additional lebensraum (living space) through a *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the east) by conquering territory in Eastern Europe and Russia to populate a growing German population; and a sense of racial superiority, influenced by the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) and others who believed that Germany was entitled to European dominance and that the Jews and other foreign and domestic "traitors" were responsible for keeping Germany from reaching what they saw as its Manifest destiny, to be a preeminent global power.⁵

Geopolitics would receive its most prominent and negative association with Nazi Germany. Hitler's regime incorporated traditional aspects of German national and international security policy making with its nauseating ideology of racial superiority toward Jews and Slavic peoples, whom it considered to be genetically inferior. Lebensraum and other aspects of Nazi ideology were incorporated into educational curricula at all levels and into geographical, historical, and political science research, as evidenced by journal publication practices and Haushofer's regular contact with Nazi officials. Although geopolitics was a legitimate scholarly discipline incorporated into the academic research in the United States, France, and other major countries at this time, its strong association with Nazi Germany resulted in it being discredited in World War II's aftermath.⁶

Geopolitics was largely neglected in North America and Europe, though not in South America, in the four decades after World War II because of the Nazi stigma, although there were detailed scholarly analyses of international security and strategy published during this time. The German journal *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* was published from 1951 to 1968, and the U.S. Air Force produced *Military Aspects of World Political Geography* (1958) as part of

its education programs. Key factors prompting renewed interests in geopolitics include bipolar cold war U.S.-Soviet competition encompassing many geographic regions; the Sino-Soviet split; the rise of third world nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism; the inflexibility of nuclear weapons in dealing with regional problems; and economic changes, including the rise of energy prices and the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Nazi Germany's receding into historical memory, Henry Kissinger's extensive use of geopolitics as a scholar and policy maker, and the increasing need to understand geographical factors in international cultural, economic, political, and strategic development all contributed to a reemergence of geopolitics in scholarly analysis by the 1980s.⁷

The next two decades would see the increasing importance of geography in international affairs. The Soviet Union's collapse created an increasingly multipolar world, producing an environment conducive to the recurrence of tribally based conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Rwanda; the emergence of transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda; natural disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami; concern and controversy over climate change and how to respond to it; rising energy prices due to increased demand from growing economies such as China and India; increasing nuclear proliferation evidenced by the desire of countries such as Iran and North Korea to acquire weapons of mass destruction; and the creation of new nation-states such as East Timor, Kazakhstan, and Macedonia. A world increasingly connected by transportation; instantaneous communication systems such as the Internet; and increasingly interlocked economic, environmental, and military-strategic interactions made it impossible for engaged citizens to ignore geography as an increasingly critical factor in personal, national, and international economics and security.

One prominent writer has described this development as "The Revenge of Geography" and goes on to argue that geography will determine the success of political ideas, that wealth and political and social order will erode, and that natural frontiers and human passions will determine who can coerce whom. He goes on to maintain:

We all must learn to think like Victorians. . . . Geographical determinists must be seated at the same honored table as liberal humanists, thereby merging the analogies of Vietnam and Munich. Embracing the dictates and limitations of geography will be especially hard for Americans, who like to think that no constraint, natural or otherwise, applies to them. But denying the facts of geography only invites disasters that, in turn, make us victims of geography.⁸

Numerous figures have contributed to geopolitics global development, and this chapter will profile them, their work, and the multiple perspectives

they bring to this topic, which still resonate with contemporary geopolitical issues.

Isaiah Bowman (1878–1950)

Bowman became prominent during World War I for his role in U.S. preparation for postwar reconstruction and redrawing European national boundaries. He served as director of the American Geographical Society and was responsible for assembling cartographic and geographical data used by Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference. Additional professional honors Bowman also received included his 1930 election to the National Academy of Sciences and becoming president of the Johns Hopkins University in 1935. Land settlement was one of his areas of scholarly expertise, and his prominent writings on this and other geopolitical subjects include *The New World* (1921), *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences* (1934), and *The Limits of Land Settlement: A Report on Present-Day Possibilities* (1937), along with articles examining the relationships between geopolitics, political geography, and power.

During World War II, he advised the Roosevelt administration and helped design many aspects of postwar U.S. foreign policy, including development of the United Nations and formulation of postwar European territorial reconstruction. Although critical of Nazi Germany's use of geopolitics, Bowman believed it was important to learn historical lessons and played influential academic and policy-making roles in ensuring that geopolitical questions are inherently political and are recognized as such, instead of being viewed only as scientific questions.⁹

James Burnham (1905–1987)

Burnham began his political career as a radical leftist actively involved in Trotskyite circles, where he regularly contributed to the Marxist journal *New International*, advocated socialist revolution in the United States, and published *Managerial Revolution* (1941), which contended that the world's industrial countries would be ruled by managers, instead of capitalists or communists. During World War II, Burnham served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and his politics began shifting in a more conservative direction; in 1944, he wrote an analysis for the OSS warning of an emerging Soviet geopolitical threat to Western democracies.

This work, *The Struggle for the World* (1947), was published the same week President Truman announced the U.S. assistance program to Greece and Turkey, which would become known as the Truman Doctrine. In this work, Burnham warned that the Soviets sought to achieve control of Eastern Europe,

Eurasia, and Mackinder's World Island, consisting of Eurasia and Africa, and effectively to dominate the world. He criticized early cold war containment policy as being excessively defensive in *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (1949) and *Containment or Liberation?* (1951) and urged U.S. adaptation of policies to undermine Soviet power in Eastern Europe by exploiting inherent Communist structural vulnerabilities.

Burnham consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency and increasingly began writing for conservative publications such as William Buckley's *National Review*, in which he analyzed a variety of geopolitical issues. Burnham's last major work, *Suicide of the West* (1964), warned that Western civilization was killing itself due to religious decline and excessive material luxury and was becoming tired and worn out pursuing material gain. He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Reagan in 1983 and should be remembered as an influential figure in conservative American geopolitical thought and analysis.¹⁰

Julian Corbett (1854–1922)

Corbett was a prominent naval historian whose work influenced British military history writing and the conduct of British naval geopolitics. He also wrote fiction, and it's possible that his service as a war correspondent for the *Pall Mall Gazette* during the 1896 Dongola expedition to Sudan caused him to think about the conduct of war as a writing topic. His first serious military writing was *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (1898), which, along with other works, got him involved in the naval educational reform movement and made himself known to Admiral John Fisher (1841–1920), who would eventually serve as First Sea Lord, Britain's highest-ranking naval officer.

Corbett became a history lecturer at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich in 1902 and published *England in the Mediterranean, 1603–1714* (1904), which was a comprehensive analysis of naval strategy. Additional Corbett books include *England in the Seven Years War* (1907), *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911), *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War* (2 volumes; 1915), and a three-volume analysis of World War I naval battles titled *Naval Operations* (1920–1923), in which he had to mute his criticisms of British strategy and tactics at the 1916 Battle of Jutland due to their political sensitivity.

Corbett was a valuable advisor to Fisher and Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill (1874–1965) during World War I, writing persuasive official memoranda providing valuable naval policy-making advice. He favored using British sea power in a limited way, recognizing the limits it placed on its user during wartime. Corbett saw military history as an intrinsic part of national history and international politics dating back to the Elizabethan age and,

like Alfred Thayer Mahan, considered sea power synonymous with national power.¹¹

Albert Demangeon (1872–1940)

Demangeon was a French geographer with a strong interest in geography's political aspects. During his career, he taught at the University of Lille, the Sorbonne, and École des Hautes Études Commercialles; served as an advisor on frontier problems at the Versailles Peace Conference and as editor of *Géographie Universelle* and *Annales de Géographie*; and was also involved in the Annaliste historical movement.

Following World War I, Demangeon came to believe that Europe's dominant world position was ending due to the rise of the United States; Japan's growing power in the Far East, which would turn the Pacific into a "new Mediterranean" and an East-West meeting place; and the rise of militant Islam, which he viewed as being highly dangerous to Europe's international strategic position. These sentiments were articulated in *The Decline of Europe* (1920) and other works.

He was also concerned that the post–World War I establishment of new European states would have a negative impact on continental security; wanted regional agreements established as a means of enhancing political stability; was skeptical that the League of Nations would be able to achieve lasting peace; was concerned about Germany's growing assertiveness in the 1930s; wanted France to modernize its agriculture, industry, and colonization practices to serve as a counterweight to Germany; and ultimately believed greater continental cooperation, instead of confrontation, was in Europe's long-term interests, even being an early user of the terms *European Community* and *United States of Europe*.¹²

Yann Morvan Goblet (1881–1955)

This French geographer taught at the École Supérieure de Commerce, École des Hautes Études Sociales, and Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études in Geneva. Goblet considered geopolitics to be a subtle and complex subject and that theories must be based on rigorously examined existing conditions. He wanted to keep international relations analysis grounded in concrete reality and proposed developing new and more sophisticated geopolitical analysis techniques to resolve international problems.

His works, including *Twilight of Treaties* (1935), condemned German geopolitics for wrong ideas of geographical determinism that treated nations as metaphysical beings, and he believed that its proponents were modern

alchemists who added somber fanaticism to their ideas. Goblet also wrote *Political Geography and the World Map* (1955) and was very interested in Irish geopolitics, on which he wrote extensively. His interests in regionalism and small states rights became increasingly irrelevant in the bipolar post–World War II European security environment.¹³

Golbery do Couto e Silva (1911–1987)

This Brazilian geopolitical writer served in his country's military forces, participated in the Italian campaign during World War II, and was a member of the Brazilian military's Sorbonne Group, who were military officers closely associated with Brazil's Higher War College. This group supported Brazil's military government between 1964 and 1985 and favored an anti-Communist foreign policy but tended to be more moderate, supportive of free enterprise, and desirous of a long-term return to democracy. Golbery also was a key advisor to these military governments between 1964 and 1981 and served as Brazil's equivalent to the White House chief of staff.

His geopolitical thinking, articulated in works such as *Brazilian Geopolitics* (1981), saw Golbery advocate exclusive Brazilian leadership in South America. He favored an anti-Communist partnership with the United States to protect South Atlantic maritime waters from Soviet attack between the Atlantic Narrows and West African Bulge. Golbery distrusted neighboring Spanish-speaking countries, such as Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, which he believed wanted to encircle Brazil. He also advocated expanding internal Brazilian frontiers by developing the Amazon and Brazil's northeastern and southern regions.

Golbery believed Brazil could not escape from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; that it could not pursue cold war nonalignment, as advocated by some Latin American foreign policy thinkers; that Brazil should collaborate with other Portuguese-speaking nations; and that it should seek to expand its influence beyond South America. He incorporated insights from Mackinder and Mahan into his writings and is an example of how geopolitics played an important role in Brazilian foreign and national security policy making during an era when it was deemphasized in U.S. and European policy making.¹⁴

Sergei Gorshkov (1910–1988)

Gorshkov was a Soviet admiral and commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985. He joined the navy in 1927 after graduating from the Frunze Higher Naval School, served in destroyers in the Black Sea and

Pacific fleets during the 1930s, became rear admiral in 1941 after the German invasion, and distinguished himself in several World War II commands. In 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1893–1971) appointed him to lead the Soviet Navy and to implement nuclear weapons into this force and its doctrine. Gorshkov began this process and is also best known for transforming the Soviet Navy from a coastal force to a blue water maritime striking power with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines capable of challenging U.S. naval supremacy in many global arenas.

Gorshkov wrote about his geopolitical philosophy in works such as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974) and *Seapower of the State* (1983) as well as various articles in the journal *Military Thought*. He wanted to achieve parity with U.S. and NATO navies and sea control in the world ocean and expanded the size of the Soviet shipbuilding industry to build various surface vessels, including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. His incentive to build this force was heavily influenced by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrating the Soviets did not have the long-range fleet to thwart the U.S. quarantine of Cuba. Gorshkov was also involved in Soviet efforts to build naval bases in friendly developing countries like Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam; believed in the importance of aircraft carriers and tactical aviation to achieve balanced fleet forces; and sought to strengthen discipline in the Soviet Navy to enable it to achieve its geopolitical aspirations of counterbalancing U.S. maritime power.

High financial costs made it impossible for the Soviet Navy to sustain its large size, and Gorshkov's fleet was losing its strength at the time of his death. The Russian Federation has not been able to rebuild its fleet to its halcyon days under Gorshkov, although it is seeking to increase its assertiveness in the Arctic Ocean and other areas. Gorshkov should be remembered as a significant military leader and strategist who was able to launch the Soviet Navy on a trajectory of at least partial parity with the United States during the cold war.¹⁵

Enrique Guglialmelli (1922–1983)

This Argentine held several important political and military appointments including the Superior War College and Center for Advanced Military Studies. He also commanded the Fifth Army Corps, served as National Development Council Secretary between 1966 and 1971, directed the Argentinean Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations, and served as editor of the journal *Estrategia*.

Guglialmelli's writings in this journal and books such as *Argentina, Brazil, and the Atomic Bomb* (1976) and *Geopolitics and the Southern Cone* (1979) focused on national and regional geopolitics with particular emphasis on what

he saw as Brazilian expansionism and Argentina's inability to counter it. He was a nationalist policy advocate, and his writings addressed the historical development of Argentine geopolitical writing, the potential impact of nuclear weapons in the Southern Cone, and the armed forces' proper role in national development. He favored protectionist tariffs and governmental industrial subsidies and believed that national resources should be devoted to developing southern frontier regions like Patagonia and northern frontier regions adjacent to Bolivia and Brazil to counter what he saw as Brazilian attempts to control natural resources and gain access to the Pacific.

Guglialmelli also believed Argentina should develop nuclear weapons if Brazil did; that the United States would support Brazil in any dispute with Argentina; and that advocates of free trade and capitalism from Brazilian, British, and U.S. multinational corporations made Argentina economically dependent on them, which he regarded as dangerous to Argentine national economic development, security, and social cohesion.¹⁶

Karl Haushofer (1869–1946)

Haushofer is one of geopolitics's seminal historical figures. He served as a German military commander during World War I and wrote several books and articles, including *Western Pacific Ocean Geopolitics* (1925), *World Politics Today* (1934), and *Japan Builds Its Empire* (1941). Haushofer also edited the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1924–1944), served as professor of geography at the University of Munich (1921–1939), and was president of the German Academy (1934–1937), which was Germany's premier scientific research and German culture-promoting institution.

Haushofer had only sporadic contact with Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) but was close friends with Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess (1894–1987), which allowed his geopolitical theories to gain significant influence in Nazi policy-making circles. Haushofer's geopolitical ideology had clear imperialist proclivities by the 1920s as he sought to increase German territory. He believed there was an Eurasian continental block stretching from Germany through Russia to Japan that Germany could use to conduct a land power-oriented foreign policy against maritime nations such as France and the United Kingdom, and he argued for building such an alliance in 1940. Having spent time in Japan between 1908 and 1910, Haushofer also admired that country and its politicians.

He increasingly began seeing sea power as an important element in his geopolitical *Weltanschauung*, and his thought and writings would divide the earth into three north-south regions with a core and periphery and Arctic, temperate, and tropical environments. These regions, which had the potential for economic self-sufficiency, were

- Pan-America, with the United States as the core
- Eurafrica, with Germany as the core
- East Asia, with Japan as the core and Australia as the periphery

Haushofer never constructed a concrete geopolitical theoretical concept in order to retain intellectual and political flexibility. He and his editorial colleagues at *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, along with a Geopolitics Study Group founded in 1932, sought to expand geopolitics's popular appeal, serve as a foreign policy propaganda mechanism, and educate the general public in what they regarded as proper political thought in order to rectify incorrect political views which they believed produced German defeat in World War I. He was involved in preparing the November 1936 Anti-Comintern agreement between Germany and Japan and lost much of his political influence with the Nazis following Hess's 1941 flight to Scotland.

After World War II, Haushofer was interrogated by the U.S. Office of Chief of Counsel concerning his activities and writings but was not accused at the Nuremberg Military Tribunals and released. He and his wife committed suicide on March 10, 1946, and his legacy is being one of the individuals responsible for promoting the intellectual groundwork for Nazi ideology and policies and preparing Germans for World War II's aggressive violence.¹⁷

Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922)

As mentioned earlier, Kjellén is credited with coining the term *geopolitics* in an 1899 journal article on Swedish boundaries. During his career, Kjellén served as a political science and geography professor at Gothenburg University and Uppsala University, a Conservative MP in the Swedish parliament, and a foreign affairs columnist for conservative Swedish newspapers.

His geopolitical thought was influenced by German idealist philosophy, social Darwinism, and prevailing imperialist views. Kjellén rejected the prevailing view of the state as a legal object and viewed it as a power in foreign affairs with particular emphasis on using organic analogy, which stressed that nation-states like Sweden were more important than individuals residing within those countries. Key tenets of his thought stressed that a state's attributes include

1. geopolitics as studying a state's territory
2. demographic politics involving studying a state's population
3. the critical importance of a state's economy
4. societal politics, including traditions held for generations
5. governmental-constitutional politics, including relationships between states and their peoples

He defined geopolitics as the study of the state as a geographical organism or spatial phenomenon with particular emphasis on a state's location in relation to other states, its territorial form, and its size. Kjellén envisioned a future of fewer but larger territorial states, believed that territorial size was crucial for states in their relationship with other powers, emphasized the importance of freedom of movement in state policy making such as not being constrained by other states blocking straits of water, and emphasized the importance of a state being in one territorial piece to promote cohesion. He also believed that the nation was a state's soul; that national homogeneity involved common culture, identity, and values instead of race; and that a state's ability to become economically self-sufficient was crucial to its success.

He also believed that, barring incompetent leadership, states possessing the greatest power resources would win wars, saw Germany and Japan as increasingly powerful and England and France and declining before World War I, and saw the United States and Russia as being the only two powers capable of fulfilling his category of becoming world powers. Although a Swedish nationalist, Kjellén supported many of Germany's World War I aims, and Haushofer and other German geopolitical theorists incorporated many of his elements into their thinking, with particular emphasis on Kjellén's organic theory of state power. Besides inventing the term geopolitics, his work is significant for emphasizing environmental traditions influencing state-to-state relationships and emphasizing a state's physical character, size, and location as keys to its international political power position.¹⁸

Halford Mackinder (1861–1947)

Mackinder is arguably the most historically influential geopolitical strategist. During his career he held faculty appointments at Oxford University and the London School of Economics; served as a Conservative MP representing Glasgow's Camlachie constituency from 1910 to 1922; was appointed British high commissioner to south Russia in 1919, where he was charged with finding ways to stop Bolshevik expansion; and chaired the British government's Imperial Shipping Committee between 1920 and 1945.

He was an assiduous promoter of geographic education and favored strengthening the British Empire by granting preferential trading rights to countries and territories within the empire. His geopolitical writings began with *Britain and the British Seas* (1902), which showed the strategic and imperial implications of the British Isles physical location and natural resource endowment. His ascension to geopolitical prominence began with his essay "The Geographical Pivot of History," published by the Royal Geographical Society's *Geographical Journal* in 1904. This seminal work stressed his concern that one power or alliance of powers could gain control of Eurasia and

use that region's resources to dominate the world. It stressed factors such as Asiatic influences on Europe dating back to the Mongols; the importance of river water drainage on national economies and international security; how settlement patterns and agronomy influence political and economic development; the importance of climate and railroads in determining human settlement and inhabitation; Russia's geographically advantageous position, which makes it possible to strike out in all directions and be attacked from all directions except the north; and China's and Japan's possible future potential to challenge Russia.¹⁹

Another significant exposition of Mackinder's geopolitical thinking was reflected in *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919). This work was written hastily for the Versailles Conference and expanded his geographical pivot ideas. Analyzing the weakness of the emerging postwar order, he contended that power was becoming centralized in large states and that mass political movements were emerging but that populations would be susceptible to manipulation by organizers controlling state machinery. He favored creating new nation-states from the defeated German and Austro-Hungarian empires but saw that countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland would be vulnerable to aggression and subversion from Germany and Russia.

It also supported national self-determination and the League of Nations and established the concept of the Heartland, which included all of Eastern Europe, and that Germany and Russia would vie for control of this region, contending that

1. who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
2. who rules the Heartland commands the World Island
3. who rules the World Island commands the world²⁰

The World Island included separate regions such as Arabia covering as far north as the Turkish border, European coastland extending from Scandinavia to North Africa, Monsoon coastland extending from India through Southeast Asia and China and northeast Russia, the southern Heartland region consisting of most of Africa, and North and South America as part of an oceanic realm. *Democratic Ideals and Reality* had little immediate impact in the United States and United Kingdom and was not consulted by Isaiah Bowman and the U.S. delegation at Versailles. However, it received more detailed scrutiny in Germany, where Haushofer approved of it and advocated a German-Soviet alliance to defeat maritime powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Hitler, though, did not see the Soviet Union as an ally but as a region to be plundered for its resources.²¹

Mackinder has been the source of laudatory and negative assessments in historical and geopolitical literature, depending on the prevailing thinking

and geopolitical conditions of subsequent historical periods. He can be praised for being a pioneer in attempting to establish and communicate a reasonably coherent geopolitical theory of international politics and economics. Some critics see him as an apologist for the British Empire and for what they regard as Western imperialism. Mackinder had a major influence on geographic education within the United Kingdom and commonwealth countries. Although he failed to gain lasting support for a unified and modernized empire to offset continental European powers which might threaten Britain, his work remains highly influential and instructive reading as we enter and immerse ourselves in a globalized era where geography is becoming increasingly important in international economic, environmental, natural resources, and security policy making and the impact these activities have on our lives.²²

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914)

Mahan is one of the world's premier naval and maritime geopolitical strategists, and his work continues influencing U.S. naval planning. The son of West Point military engineering professor and faculty dean Dennis Hart Mahan (1802–1871), Alfred Thayer Mahan graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1859 and served on blockade and shoreline duty during the Civil War, despite being susceptible to seasickness. He gradually rose through the ranks and was promoted to captain in 1885. While serving at Brooklyn's Navy Yard in 1883, he was asked by Scribner's publishing to produce a book on the navy in the civil war, which was published that year as *The Gulf and Inland Waters*.

This work contained no illuminating strategic insights but demonstrated his writing ability and was noticed in 1884 by Stephen B. Luce (1827–1917), who was the founder and president of the newly opened U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Luce appointed Mahan to write and teach naval history, and his class lecture notes were published in 1890 as *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, which had a stunning impact on global foreign ministries and war departments. A two-volume sequel, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*, appeared in 1892.

The first book is a classic of maritime and geopolitical strategy. It asserted that naval and merchant marine assets were the primary reasons England, France, Holland, and Spain won wars, permitting them to seize overseas colonies, eliminate enemy access to these colonies, and exploit their natural resources. The publication timing of these works also proved fortuitous as European powers were dissecting Africa and, along with Japan, had similar objectives for China and East Asia. Expansionist-oriented Americans such as Secretary of State John Hay (1838–1905), Senator Henry Cabot

Lodge (1850–1924), and Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) read this work and asserted that the United States would be economically and politically disadvantaged internationally until it abandoned its post–Civil War isolationism. These individuals went on to argue that the United States should increase its agricultural and industrial exports to overseas markets such as the Far East and would gradually come to advocate larger U.S. naval forces.

Mahan would come to advocate a larger navy to patrol and defend the Gulf and Caribbean coasts; believed that a canal would soon penetrate Central America, attract global merchant and naval shipping, and be militarily controlled by the United States; and favored establishing an eastern Pacific naval perimeter to permit Japan or any other country from establishing a naval presence within 3,000 miles of San Francisco.

A prodigious literary output would emanate from Mahan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including works such as *Lessons of the War with Spain* (1899). Viewpoints stressed in these writings include the inadvisability of arms limitations, treaties, international arbitration courts, and rules of war because they compromised combat effectiveness and the chance of achieving fast and victorious wars; the imperative of navies using tactical concentration to combine their firepower on enemies weaker firepower assets; and welcoming Hawaii's and Puerto Rico's annexation and reluctantly accepting Philippine annexation as part of expanding the United States' security perimeter while forecasting that the Philippines could not be militarily defended against Japan.

However, he believed the United States' open door policy in China and Monroe Doctrine in the western hemisphere overextended U.S. resources; disagreed with Roosevelt's desire of building HMS *Dreadnought* big-gun battleships between 1906 and 1914, believing that naval ships should have varied sizes and arsenals; and failed to see the emerging tactical and strategic significance of the airplane, submarine, and wireless telegraphy. He also believed that good political and naval leadership counterbalanced geography, favored free trade over autarchy, appreciated contingency's power to affect geopolitical outcomes, and believed that sea transport and trade's fundamental importance needed to be examined within the relationship of continental and land structures and that national policy on these subjects must be set within the parameters of transnational perspectives.²³

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1915–2006)

Pinochet is best known for his controversial tenure as Chile's president between 1973 and 1990. He also was a career army officer who began serving

the Chilean armed forces in 1933 and taught at Chile's war college on geopolitics and was credited with writing works such as *Military Geography: Military Interpretations and Geographical Factors* (1980) and *Geopolitics* (1984).

Pinochet argued that Chile had three regions, Andean, Pacific, and Antarctic, and he desired a closer integration of the core central valley with geographically peripheral and less-developed areas and sought to build land and maritime highways to reach remote southern territories without having to cross into Argentina. He established the Chilean Pacific Ocean Institute and a national ocean policy to emphasize the importance of oceans in Chilean national policy. He also sought to promote geographic education in all levels of Chilean society and emphasized Chilean claims in Antarctica.

Additional attributes of Pinochet's geopolitical thinking included bolstering Chile's presence in the Antarctic and Beagle Channel; negotiating with Bolivia to give that country a Pacific access corridor; advocating exchanging maritime land for space and guaranteeing a security zone in cooperation with Peru; and preventing Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru from encircling Chile. Pinochet also wanted to increase Chile's merchant marine and enhance national port facilities, promote increased use of oceanic food and mineral resources, and enhance Chile's interior industrial manufacturing capabilities. He was concerned the United States lacked the will to contain communism in South America; favored national self-reliance and an independent bloc of third world nations to restrain great power actions; and believed Chile was entering a Pacific era that would bring increased wealth from the Antarctica and the Orient.²⁴

Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904)

Ratzel was a major German geographer and is regarded as a founder of modern human and political geography. He began his professional career as a chemist's assistant, did graduate work in the natural sciences, and was also a journalist. Limited professional opportunities in these fields in Germany and 1870s travels in the United States and elsewhere turned his interest to geography, and he became a professor of geography at the University of Munich in 1876, before taking a similar position in 1886 at the University of Leipzig, which he held until his death.

"Laws of the Spatial Growth of States," published in 1896, described the state's expansion through war as a natural and progressive tendency. It went on to assert that a state's territory grows with its culture and that expansionist politics's greatest success depends on its effective use of geography. Ratzel's preeminent work, *Political Geography* (1897), is credited with laying the foundations for geopolitics. This work saw him introduce the concept of

lebensraum to German political discourse and present what he considered seven laws on state growth:

1. State space increases with cultural growth.
2. Territorial growth follows other developmental aspects.
3. A state grows by absorbing other, smaller units.
4. Frontiers are peripheral state organs reflecting a state's strength and growth and are not permanent.
5. States seek to absorb politically valuable territory as they grow.
6. A primitive state's incentive to grow comes from a more highly developed state.
7. Tendencies toward territorial growth increase as they pass from state to state.

Haushofer was one of Ratzel's most influential followers and helped spread his beliefs throughout German academic and governmental circles. Ratzel published *The Sea as a Source of the Greatness of a People* (1900) as a written demonstration of Germany's commitment to *Weltpolitik* as a maritime and expansionist foreign policy. Besides space and distance, Ratzel was concerned with the importance of environmental influences, including climate, resources, terrain, and vegetation. He believed that the world is inherently conflict ridden; that competition for living space is part of a nation-state's life cycle; that powerful states must become larger over time; that *Grossraum* (large space states) is the world's future; and that Germany had to compete for lebensraum to become a world power. These beliefs would be reflected in *The Geography of States, Traffic, and War* (1903) and solidify Ratzel's legacy as a proponent of Wilhelmine nationalism, which would eventually be adopted by the Nazis for their own political purposes.²⁵

Alexander P. De Seversky (1894–1974)

Seversky was a Russian American naval aviator who played a critical role in publicizing how airpower transformed national security and militarily extended the geographic reach and striking power of national militaries. He initially came to the United States on a military mission in 1918, where he defected and became an advisor to military aviation pioneer Billy Mitchell (1879–1936). Seversky founded what eventually became Republic Aircraft, which built the P45 fighter. In the early 1940s, he began publicizing the potential for American military victory through air power and long-range aircraft, which he articulated in *Victory through Air Power* (1942).

His argument stressed using polar projection to enhance global U.S. air control extending over an offensive radius of 6,000 miles and a defensive radius of 3,000 miles controlled from what he regarded as an impregnable superfortress. In later works, such as *Air Power: Key to Survival* (1950) and *America: Too Young to Die* (1961), he argued that whoever gained control

of airspace overlapping Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and North America could achieve global dominance and that the United States needed to make its heartland an invincible base so it could project offensive power to all corners of the world.

Seversky criticized the importance of armies and navies and was a tireless advocate of air power, although he exaggerated the extent of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, he helped expand geopolitics to a subject that must include the application and projection of aerospace power along with land and maritime power.²⁶

Nicholas J. Spykman (1893–1943)

Spykman was a Dutch-born American scholar and geopolitical writer who was a professor of international relations at Yale University's Institute of International Relations. His two principal works, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (1942) and *The Geography of Peace* (1944), are updated versions of Mahan's quest for a realistic sea power-based foreign policy.

Spykman believed that geography was the preeminent factor in international relations because it was this subject's most enduring characteristic. His key philosophical tenet was that U.S. foreign policy objectives would be best served by dropping its traditionally idealistic and isolationist view of world affairs and adopting European balance of power principles. He believed the United States should protect its security by pursuing an active foreign policy so it could influence events, prevent threats to its interests, and be prepared for dangerous confrontations.

He believed that the Old World and New World were the two principal geographical entities in international politics. Spykman asserted that the Old World included the Eurasian continent, Africa, Australia, and smaller offshore islands adjacent to these areas and that the New World included the Americas in the western hemisphere. He believed both of these worlds interacted with each other across the Atlantic and Pacific and that this interaction could determine if one of these worlds could "strangle" the other.

Spykman contended that the New World was not a cohesive alliance but that it was dominated by the United States, and if one state achieved dominance in the Old World and acquired and mobilized eastern hemisphere human power and resources, it could threaten the United States and western hemisphere. Consequently, he believed U.S. foreign policy should focus on dividing the Old World by striving for alliances with weaker states against potentially hegemonic states.

His description of the Old World went on to divide it into four geographical features. The Heartland was Eurasia's core and patterned after Mackinder's

heartland. The Rimland was generally similar to Mackinder's inner crescent, covering European coastland, Arab–Middle Eastern deserts, and Asiatic monsoon territory. Spykman believed a third Old World feature was a "great circumferential maritime highway" covering the Baltic, North Sea, and Mediterranean to the Sea of Okhotsk and that a fourth feature was offshore islands, including England, Africa, Australia, and Japan. His Rimland was the most strategically critical because it had been involved in all large-scale historical military conflicts and because it served as an intermediate zone between the Heartland, circumferential maritime highway, and offshore islands. Consequently, he believed the United States should project its power in the Rimland to prevent the expansion of a states or alliance of states such as the Soviet Union and believed that Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom would be critical U.S. allies even during the early days of World War II.²⁷

Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903–2002)

Strausz-Hupé was born and grew up in Austria before immigrating to the United States following World War I. Parleying a Wall Street career as a political risk analyst for Americans holding European bonds, Strausz-Hupé became increasingly concerned about Hitler and Nazi Germany and that their policies would replace the traditional European balance of power. His professional contacts brought him in contact with Isaiah Bowman, and he eventually became an international relations professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a research chief for a Roosevelt administration project on refugee affairs and natural resources. These contacts gave him the opportunity to work closely with eventual secretary of state Dean Acheson (1893–1971) and with Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (1892–1949).

Strausz-Hupé detested communism as being a crude scientific fraud for maintaining and holding political power and suggested to Forrestal that George Kennan be used to write the "MR. X" 1947 containment article in *Foreign Affairs*, outlining U.S. cold war containment strategy toward the Soviet Union. Strausz-Hupé would produce a significant corpus of works on geopolitical strategy over the next few decades. Examples of these works included *The Zone of Indifference* (1952), which depicted Europe as weak and vulnerable to the products of technological prowess such as mass organization and atomized societies but capable of being rescued by the United States and NATO, and *The Protracted Conflict* (1963), which argued that the West needed to fight a long-term conflict with the Soviet Union and that it needed to regain its lead in advanced military weaponry.

He was also involved in establishing the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in 1955 at the University of Pennsylvania to conduct scholarship to

advance U.S. interests. FPRI is now independent of this university, but one of its enduring publications is the scholarly journal *Orbis*, established in 1957.

Strauz-Hupé criticized the belief that foreign assistance and state building could benefit developing countries, warned that the guilt complex developed in these countries by Western benefactors created a large psychological gulf enabling them to attack the free-market West even as they desired its material benefits, and asserted that there would always be a gap between these countries rising expectations and the amount of assistance the West could provide them. He remained influential in Republican administrations, serving as U.S. ambassador to countries such as Belgium, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Turkey through the 1980s. He also served as U.S. ambassador to the NATO Council and gained U.S. military access to the United Kingdom Indian Ocean military base Diego Garcia, which has been used in numerous military operations in that part of the world and advocated deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles in Western Europe to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe.

He concluded his career at FPRI and began writing on geopolitical issues such as urging improved relations with Russia to curtail China; advocating enhanced U.S. relations with India; favoring Turkish membership in the European Union; and urging the Arabs, Israelis, and Turks to work together to enhance Middle East water supplies.²⁸

Paul Vidal De La Bache (1845–1918)

This French geographer was educated and taught at the École Normale Supérieure and also lectured and taught at the University of Nancy and the Sorbonne. He founded and edited the journal *Annales de Géographie* and edited *Géographie Universelle*. His background was in history and classics, and he saw geography as being a synthesis and a unifying discipline whose objective should be studying the creative relationship between humans and their environment.

Vidal de la Bache was particularly interested in regional synthesis and the geographic roles played by *pays*, or country. He believed that the interaction of civilization and milieu produced ways of live which he believed were the foundations of human geography. In works such as *France and the East* (1917) and *Principles of Human Geography* (1922), he recognized the importance of political factors in shaping human landscapes and argued that political geography or geopolitics was best understood within a wider human geographic context. He disagreed with Ratzel's attempts to formulate geopolitical behavioral laws and emphasized the roles played by frontiers such as Alsace-Lorraine in national spatial development. He went on to view provinces in a wider European context, was concerned about the potential for German

continental hegemony, and ultimately believed transnational groups should substitute for sovereign states in conducting international affairs.²⁹

Notes

1. See Sven Holdar, "The Ideal State and the Power of Geography: The Life-Work of Rudolf Kjellén," *Political Geography*, 11 (3)(May 1992): 307–9, 319–20; and Greg Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt, Geopolitics, and Cosmopolitan Ideals," *Review of International Studies*, 32 (3)(July 2006): 543–44.
2. See Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, eds., *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge, 2000); Harm De Blij, *Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America: Climate Change, the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 9; and Russell, "Theodore Roosevelt," 542–44.
3. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (New York: Dover, 1987).
4. Brian W. Blouet, "The Political Career of Sir Halford Mackinder," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (4)(October 1987): 355–67.
5. See Norman Levine, "Gerhard Ritter's Weltanschauung," *The Review of Politics*, 30 (2)(April 1968): 209–27; David Thomas Murphy, *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997); and Marcel Stoeltzer, *The State, the Nation, and the Jews: Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck's Germany* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).
6. See Henning Heske, "German Geographical Research in the Nazi Period: A Content Analysis of the Major Geography Journals," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 5 (3)(July 1986): 267–81; Leslie W. Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 5 (4 Suppl.)(October 1986): S21–36; Hepple, "Karl Haushofer: His Role in German Geopolitics and in Nazi Politics," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (2)(April 1987): 135–44; and Geoffrey Parker, "French Geopolitical Thought in the Interwar Years and the Emergence of the European Idea," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (2)(April 1987): 145–50.
7. Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics."
8. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Revenge of Geography," *Foreign Policy*, 196 (May–June 2009): 96–105.
9. See Geoffrey J. Martin, *The Life and Thought of Isaiah Bowman* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1980); and Neil Smith, "Isaiah Bowman: Political Geography and Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 3 (1)(January 1984): 69–76.
10. See Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics and American Strategy: A Reassessment," *Strategic Review*, 15 (2)(1987): 26–38; Daniel Kelly, *James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002); Philip Abbott, "'Big' Theories and Policy Counsel, James Burnham, Francis Fukuyama and the Cold War," *Journal of Policy History*, 14 (4)(October 2002): 417–30; Francis Sempa, *America's Global Role: Essays and Review on National Security, Geopolitics, and War* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009): 59–62.

11. See Donald M. Schurman, *Julian S. Corbett, 1854–1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981); James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993); and G.A.R. Callender and James Goldrick, “Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 400–401.
12. See Geoffrey Parker, “French Geopolitical Thought in the Interwar Years and the Emergence of the European Idea,” *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (2)(April 1987): 145–50; and Parker, “Demangeon, Albert,” in *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, ed. John O’Loughlin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994): 61–62.
13. Geoffrey Parker, “Goblet, Y.-M.,” in O’Loughlin, *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, 99–100.
14. See David M. Schwam-Baird, *Ideas and Armaments: Military Ideologies in the Making of Brazil’s Arms Industries* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983): 30–33; Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988): 21; and Philip Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997): 88–92.
15. See Robert Warring Herrick, *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988); U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1991): 11–22; Ronald J. Kurth, “Gorshkov’s Gambit,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28 (2)(April 2005): 261–280; and Sergei Chernyavskii, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28 (2)(April 2005): 281–308.
16. Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts*, 96–100.
17. See Donald H. Norton, “Karl Haushofer and the German Academy,” *Central European History*, 1 (1)(March 1968): 80–99; Henning Heske, “Karl Haushofer: His Role in German Geopolitics and Nazi Politics,” *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (2) (April 1987): 135–44; David Thomas Murphy, *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997); and Holger Herwig, “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler, and Lebensraum,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 22 (2–3)(June 1999): 218–41.
18. See Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State and the Power of Geography: The Life-Work of Rudolf Kjellén,” *Political Geography*, 11 (3)(May 1992): 307–23; Ola Tuander, “Geopolitics of the North: Geopolitik of the Weak: A Post–Cold War Return to Rudolf Kjellén,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43 (2)(June 2008): 164–84.
19. See Brian W. Blouet, “Mackinder, Sir Halford John,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35: 648–51.
20. See Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideas and Reality*, ed. Anthony J. Pierce (New York: Norton, 1919/1962): 74–77; and Brian W. Blouet, *Halford Mackinder: A Biography* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987): 165–72.
21. See Blouet, “Mackinder,” 35: 650–51; and Blouet, *Halford Mackinder*, 177–80.

22. Literature on Mackinder and his significance, besides that already cited, includes Arthur Butler Dugan, "Mackinder and His Critics Reconsidered," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (2)(May 1962): 241–57; Brian W. Blouet, "The Political Career of Sir Halford Mackinder," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6 (4)(October 1987): 355–67; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Putting Mackinder in His Place: Material Transformations and Myth," *Political Geography*, 11 (1)(January 1992): 100–18; Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics," *Naval War College Review*, 52 (4)(Autumn 1999): 60–77; and Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

23. See Richard W. Turk, *The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); Robert Seager II, "Mahan, Alfred Thayer," in *American National Biography*, ed. John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 14: 336–38; and Jon Sumida, "Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 22 (2–3) (1999): 39–61.

24. See Stephen M. Gorman, "The High Stakes of Geopolitics in Tierra Del Fuego," *Parameters*, 7 (2)(June 1978): 45–56; Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts*, 114–16; and Mary Helen Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile*, updated ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 22.

25. See Woodruff D. Smith, "Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum," *German Studies Review*, 3 (1)(February 1980): 51–68; J. M. Hunter, *Perspectives on Ratzel's "Political Geography,"* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983); Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983): 224–26; Klaus Kost, "The Conception of Politics in Political Geography and Geopolitics in Germany until 1945," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 8 (4)(October 1989); Henning Heske, "Ratzel, Friedrich," in O'Loughlin, *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, 205; Geoffrey Parker, "Ratzel, the French School and the Birth of Alternative Geopolitics," *Political Geography*, 19 (8)(November 2000): 957–69; and Sebastian Conrad, "Globalization Effects: Mobility and Nation in Imperial Germany, 1880–1914," *Journal of Global History*, 3 (1)(March 2008): 43–66, for assessments of Ratzel and the rise of German nationalism.

26. See Neil Smith, "De Seversky, Major Alexander P," in O'Loughlin, *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, 62–63; Philip S. Meilinger, "Proselytiser and Prophet: Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 18 (1)(March 1995): 7–35; and David L. Butler, "Technogeopolitics and the Struggle for Control of World Air Routes, 1910–1928," *Political Geography*, 20 (5)(June 2001): 635–58.

27. See Geoffrey R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890–1987* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988): 16–19; and Jan Nijman, "Spykman Nicholas," in O'Loughlin, *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, 222–23.

28. See Walter McDougall, "The Wisdom of Robert Strausz-Hupé," *FPRI Wire*, 7 (4)(1999); and Harvey Sicherman, "Robert Strausz-Hupé: His Life and Times," *Orbis*, 49 (2)(Spring 2003): 195–216.

29. See Geoffrey Parker, "Vidal de la Bache, Paul," in O'Loughlin, *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, 232–33; and Parker, "Ratzel, the French School, and the Birth of Alternative Geopolitics," *Political Geography*, 19 (8)(November 2000): 959.