

CHAPTER 8

From the Cold War to the War on Terror, 1991–2010

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and the Cold War ended, African client states were economically devastated, fraught with political divisions, and awash in weapons. No longer propped up by outside powers, dictators were driven from power and fragile states collapsed. In many instances, nascent prodemocracy movements were trampled as warlords, criminal gangs, and paramilitary groups devoid of political ideology or program moved into the power vacuums. The pervasive violence of the first post–Cold War decade was rooted in the political and economic crises of the Cold War era. As states and economies fragmented, opportunists mobilized the alienated, impoverished, and unemployed to claim their share of power and resources on the basis of their race, ethnicity, clan, or religion. Those who did not share these identities were excluded as unworthy and their claims as illegitimate. Marginalized out-groups were easy scapegoats for the countries' enormous political and economic problems. Thus, the politics of exclusion laid the groundwork for intergroup violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Foreshadowed by the Cold War era wars of destabilization in Angola and Mozambique, in which antigovernment forces controlled indigenous populations through terror, the wars of the 1990s were characterized by widespread violence and atrocities against civilians.

Foreign intervention after the Cold War also assumed new characteristics. The state and its foreign backers no longer monopolized the means of coercion. The new wars were both privatized and globalized. Contests for control over power and resources were waged by private

factions – warlords, criminal gangs, rebel groups, renegade soldiers, and old-fashioned foreign mercenaries and their new transformations as private military companies. Foreign intervention during this period involved neighboring states as well as non-African powers. Intervention was sometimes bilateral, just as it was when former colonial powers or Cold War superpowers policed their privileged domains. In other instances, it was multinational, characterized by the involvement of UN, African Union, regionally based peacekeeping forces, or international humanitarian organizations.¹ Some of these bodies intervened to monitor and enforce peace accords or to facilitate humanitarian relief operations. In other cases, foreign powers and peacekeeping forces took advantage of state disintegration to promote their own strategic goals and to abscond with natural resources. They, too, preyed on local populations in actions that bore a striking resemblance to those of the warlords, rebel armies, and criminal gangs they came to oppose. Funding sources were also diversified in the post-Cold War period. The new wars were generally financed not by foreign patron states but by looting natural resources, pillaging local populations, commandeering international humanitarian aid, gunrunning, money laundering, and drug smuggling. Because many groups profited from the continuation of war, peace accords often failed.

In contrast to the Cold War period, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries foreign states were criticized as much for their failure to intervene as for their intervention. Following the refusal of the international community to act to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and ethnic cleansing in Darfur in 2003–4, the UN took an unprecedented action. In 2005, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that held states responsible for protecting their citizens “from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and granted the international community the right to intervene militarily if states failed to meet their “responsibility to protect.”² The resolution contravened the principle of state sovereignty embedded in international law since the seventeenth century and enshrined in the UN Charter. In theory, respect for state sovereignty could no longer be used as an excuse to allow mass killings to proceed unhindered. In reality, the situation was far more complicated.

¹ The African Union replaced the OAU in 2002.

² UN General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” paragraphs 138–9, adopted September 15, 2005, <http://www.un.org/int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf>.

Governments remained reluctant to set precedents that might be used against them in the future, and powerful nations rarely committed the resources or personnel necessary to implement the resolution. Notable exceptions occurred in 2011, when UN and French forces conducted military strikes against government strongholds in Côte d'Ivoire and NATO launched UN-approved air strikes against government tanks and artillery in Libya to protect the lives of civilians under attack by state security forces. While foreign intervention was justified on the grounds of protecting civilian lives, the application of external military power also supported local insurgencies that paved the way for regime change.

This chapter begins with an overview of the economic crisis that engulfed sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, severely weakening a number of American Cold War clients. Examining the cases of Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire, it explores the relationship between political and economic practices during the Cold War and the traumas of the first post-Cold War decade (1991–2001). Despite the large degree of American responsibility for the devastation these countries faced, concern for Africa was low on the U.S. agenda, and foreign aid and development assistance declined precipitously during the 1990s. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, however, terrorism replaced communism as the rallying cry for American overseas involvement. During the first decade of the global war on terror (2001–10), the United States revamped its Cold War African strategy, increasing support for repressive regimes in strategic states in exchange for cooperation on counterterrorism.

Economic Decline, State Collapse, and Competition for the Spoils

As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s and early 1990s, African states were in crisis, both politically and economically. Despite a massive influx of U.S. military and economic aid during the Cold War years, American clients such as Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire were bankrupt. Although corruption, war, and economic mismanagement were responsible for much of the devastation, the position of these countries in the global political economy was also a crucial factor. In the decades after independence, most African countries continued the colonial practice of exporting low-priced primary

commodities and importing expensive manufactured goods from the West. Lacking developed oil resources of their own, they were forced to import petroleum products critical to their economic development. As a result, the worldwide economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s had a catastrophic impact on much of the African continent.

Two economic traumas sparked the crisis. The first stemmed from dramatic increases in oil prices in 1973–74 and 1979–80, which forced African countries to deplete their foreign exchange reserves and intensify their debt burdens to pay for petroleum products. The second trauma – a sharp global decline in commodity prices – coincided with the second oil price increase. As worldwide prices for copper, cocoa, cotton, and coffee plummeted, African economies were devastated. Between 1980 and 1989, sub-Saharan African countries suffered from low export prices, high import prices, and mounting trade deficits, which resulted in a 28 percent decline in their terms of trade. Unable to produce the ever-greater amounts of cash crops and minerals needed to buy the oil, manufactured goods, and capital equipment required for development, African countries borrowed heavily from foreign commercial banks and governments. In many cases, the amount required for annual debt servicing was equivalent to the bulk of a country's gross domestic product or export earnings. As interest rates rose in the mid-1980s, many African countries were unable to pay the yearly principal and interest owed on their debts. Faced with insoluble debt crises, their governments turned to international financial institutions for assistance. Although these institutions were willing to help African governments repay their debts, their loans came with strings attached.

Driven by free market ideologies aimed at strengthening global capitalism, Western-dominated international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank imposed stringent conditions on their loans. The IMF, which concerns itself with trade and currency imbalances, focuses on both short-term stabilization measures and long-term structural adjustment. To stimulate exports and decrease imports, the IMF typically requires currency devaluations. To promote free market ideals, it mandates reductions in government spending. The World Bank also focuses on the long term, stipulating changes to economic structures that are intended to remove the government from economic affairs. The IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs invariably emphasize free trade (an end to government subsidies, price controls, tariffs, and marketing boards) and free enterprise (privatization of government-owned economic entities and

reduction in the number of government employees). Recipients of IMF and World Bank largesse are frequently compelled to implement measures that stimulate foreign investment, including currency devaluation, reduced taxation of foreign firms, and liberal profit repatriation arrangements.

By the late 1980s, economic decline and external prescriptions for addressing the crisis had led to severe political instability in many African countries. The IMF and World Bank stabilization and structural adjustment programs, imposed from above by unrepresentative regimes, sparked significant social unrest. People took to the streets in protest as compliant African governments ended food, seed, and fertilizer subsidies; cut spending on health and education; and laid off public employees. If these free market measures caused the greatest harm to the most vulnerable members of society, currency devaluations spread the pain more broadly, reducing profits on exports and increasing the cost of imports critical to development. Externally imposed reforms also disrupted longstanding patronage networks as retrenched soldiers and civil servants lost access to state resources. Although some elites benefited from privatization measures by snatching up state-owned enterprises, others were forced to seek new sources of income and power. Like the rulers of these weakened states, some ousted elites partnered with foreign entities, engaging in illicit economic activities such as money laundering and drug, weapons, and minerals trafficking. Some became warlords whose power was rooted in their control over commercial networks and the populations that produced the wealth.

Foreign policies and practices in Africa during the Cold War had much to do with this troubling scenario, and the United States bore a major share of the responsibility. During the four decades of U.S.-Soviet competition, anticolonial nationalists, prodemocracy activists, and issues of good governance and development were ignored or opposed if they interfered with U.S. strategic interests. No regime was deemed too corrupt or repressive for American support so long as it allied with the United States in the Cold War. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States cut loose many of its longtime clients. Without American military and economic aid, repressive governments were vulnerable to the pressures of popular movements agitating against poverty, oppression, and corruption. As dictators were driven from power in the 1990s, either by popular democratic forces or by armed

insurrection, a number of countries lapsed into violent conflict. Unstable nation-states were flooded with weapons left over from the Cold War. In many instances, warlords stepped into the void, manipulating ethnicity, clan, or religion to establish new bases of power, while neighboring countries intervened to support proxy forces that would allow them to gain control over lucrative resources. The cases of Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire, discussed here, are emblematic of many others.

Liberia

A virtual colony since its founding by freed American slaves in the early nineteenth century, Liberia was a vital U.S. Cold War ally. For 133 years, Americo-Liberian settlers and their descendants, who constituted a mere 5 percent of the population, monopolized power and imposed a near feudal system on the indigenous population. In exchange for their services as regional policemen, a succession of Americo-Liberian dictators received substantial U.S. military and economic support. President William Tubman, who ruled Liberia from 1944 to 1971, built a powerful network of secret police and regarded the public treasury as his private bank. During his reign, the United States built or enhanced a number of important facilities in Liberia: a Voice of America relay station, which broadcast American propaganda throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; the Omega navigation station, which facilitated shipping along the West African coast; a critical CIA listening post; and Roberts Field, where American military planes landed and refueled on twenty-four hours' notice.

During the presidency of William Tolbert (1971–80), deteriorating economic conditions culminated in the rice riots of 1979. After Tolbert announced a major price increase in the dietary staple, unarmed protesters took to the streets. Police opened fire, killing at least forty and injuring hundreds more. As unrest mounted, dissidents in the Liberian army, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group, overthrew the Tolbert regime. Described as a strike against repressive Americo-Liberian rule, the coup d'état was initially applauded in Liberia and elsewhere. However, in short order, Doe suspended the constitution, declared martial law, banned political activities, and imprisoned or executed his rivals.

During his decade in power, Doe continued his predecessors' corrupt practices, as he and his associates stole some \$300 million from public coffers.

Throughout this period, Liberia remained one of America's most important African allies. During the Reagan administration, Liberia served as a staging ground for a CIA task force operating against Qaddafi's Libya, which the United States had designated a "state sponsor of terrorism."³ The United States upgraded Roberts Field, which, along with the Kamina and Kinshasa air bases in Zaire, served as a key transit point for covert aid to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. In return, the Doe regime received enormous financial support. In 1982, Liberia was the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. It received nearly \$500 million in military and economic aid from 1980 to 1985 – amounting to one-third of its operating budget.

In 1985, General Thomas Quiwonkpa, whom Doe had removed from his position as commanding general of the Liberian armed forces, attempted another coup d'état. Whereas most of the president's associates were members of his Krahn ethnic group, Quiwonkpa was of Gio origin. Doe responded to the failed coup with a brutal crackdown on the Gio and related Mano populations. When the reprisals were over, as many as 3,000 people were dead. With Washington standing behind Doe and all moderate opposition quashed, warlords seized on popular anger. The most notorious of these was Charles Taylor, an American-educated member of the Americo-Liberian elite. In December 1989, Taylor and his Libyan-trained rebels in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an attack from Côte d'Ivoire. Exploiting the rage of the brutalized Gio and Mano civilians, Taylor distributed weapons to alienated young men – including hundreds of boys whose parents had been killed in government raids. These recruits formed the first Small Boy Units – child soldiers, emboldened by drugs, who were urged to seek revenge against the Krahn and Mandingo populations. While Krahn soldiers had been responsible for many of the anti-Gio and Mano atrocities, Mandingos – who were primarily traders and small-scale entrepreneurs and possessed 60 percent of Liberia's wealth – were targeted for having prospered under the Doe regime. Taylor also stoked religious hatred, encouraging Christian

³ The criteria for and consequences of the designation "state sponsor of terrorism" can be found on the State Department website, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm>.

Liberians to attack Mandingos because they were Muslim. His crusade eventually attracted high-profile support from leaders of the American religious right. In the meantime, Doe's American-trained army responded to the rebel invasion with a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Gio and Mano civilians. American Navy ships staffed with more than 2,000 Marines evacuated American citizens and other foreigners but refused to intervene to stop the slaughter, characterizing it an internal Liberian affair.

While the U.S. armed forces stood by, neighboring countries entered the fray, driven by diverse motives. As members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia were united in their desire for regional stability. Specific national interests were also at stake. Nigeria, under pressure to protect Liberian Muslims, demonstrated its regional dominance by leading the ECOWAS action. Ghana intensified its involvement to counter Nigerian domination. Guinea was also worried about the fate of Liberian Muslims, many of whom had Guinean business and family ties. Sierra Leone and Gambia were troubled by Taylor's recruitment and training of their own dissident nationals, whom he had incorporated into his rebel forces. In August 1990, ECOWAS sent troops to Monrovia to effect a cease-fire. Operating under the name Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the 4,000-man force – which rose to 16,000 three years later – was led by Nigeria and Ghana, with important contributions from Guinea and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone and Gambia. The ECOMOG intervention was strongly supported by the United States, which provided significant financial and diplomatic resources.

The prominent roles played by the United States and English-speaking African countries contributed to a new set of problems. France considered the ECOMOG operation further proof of Anglophone attempts to usurp its "traditional" sphere of influence in West Africa. French protégés in the region were hostile to American influence in Liberia and threatened by Nigeria's growing power. Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire countered Anglophone dominance by supporting Taylor's rebel movement. President Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso) helped equip Taylor's men, allowed them to traverse his country en route to and from Libya, and sent Burkinabe soldiers to fight alongside Taylor's forces. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d'Ivoire) allowed Taylor to use his country as a rear base and transfer

point for weapons sent from Burkina Faso. Moreover, Ivoirian government officials and entrepreneurs made enormous profits by supplying Taylor with weapons and facilitating the illicit export of diamonds, gold, iron ore, timber, and rubber to finance his war effort.

As the peacekeeping operation floundered, Taylor further internationalized the war in March 1991 by opening a second front in Sierra Leone, where Joseph Momoh's government threatened his supply route. To undermine his nemesis, Taylor helped to organize, train, and equip a Sierra Leonean rebel organization, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Led by Taylor protégé Corporal Foday Sankoh, the RUF modeled its strategy and tactics on those of the NPFL. The rebels press-ganged boys and girls into RUF forces, where they were used as soldiers, porters, miners, cooks, and sex slaves. Brutalized RUF recruits were taught to abduct, rape, amputate, and kill, terrorizing the Sierra Leonean countryside. They killed chiefs, elders, traders, and agricultural development workers – anyone who was prosperous or associated with the Sierra Leonean government.

Meanwhile, in Liberia, it had become clear that ECOMOG was part of the problem. Although touted as a stabilizing force, ECOMOG soldiers sucked the country dry, absconding with railway cars, mining equipment, trucks, and natural resources – anything they could sell abroad. Unable to beat Taylor outright, ECOMOG had encouraged the establishment of new rebel groups and provided them with arms in exchange for booty. Because they profited from the prolongation of the war, ECOWAS countries could not be counted on to end it.

The most important of the anti-Taylor rebel movements was the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), which was founded in 1991 by exiled Doe supporters. Although ULIMO included both Mandingos and Krahns, the Krahns were dominant. Within a year, ULIMO fractured as Mandingos and Krahns began killing one another. Nigeria formed alliances with Krahn warlords, while Guinea supported their Mandingo counterparts. Guinean government officials also engaged in diamond and arms trafficking, profiting from strong ties between Guinean and Liberian Mandingo traders who smuggled Liberian diamonds and foreign weapons across the porous border.⁴

By the early 1990s, the Liberian war was no longer primarily ethnic in character – it was a free-for-all among warlords, their

⁴ In Guinea, the Mandingo are called the Malinke.

personal followers, and external backers, with plunder as its goal. For the remainder of the decade, Liberia was run by organized criminal gangs that controlled its vast mineral resources, timber, and rubber. During his warlord years, Taylor is estimated to have amassed a personal fortune worth nearly half a billion dollars. Diverse interests in Europe, the United States, and Japan bribed Taylor for the right to illegally exploit Liberian resources. French firms were particularly egregious in this regard. By 1991, NPFL-controlled areas served as France's third-largest source of tropical timber, and Taylor allowed a French company to assume control of the world's largest iron mine.

By 1995, Taylor realized that he could not become president of Liberia without Nigerian backing. Making peace with the regional powerhouse, Taylor signed an accord in August 1995 and was installed as Liberia's *de facto* ruler. Two years later, he was elected president by voters who feared that his defeat would mean a return to war. However, the killing did not stop. By the late 1990s, at least seven rebel factions were operating in Liberia. All had external backers, some of which were simultaneously providing soldiers to the ECOMOG "peacekeeping" forces. The rebels mimicked the NPFL in both method and objectives, engaging in massive human rights abuses against the civilian population as they plundered the country's riches.

By April 2003, rebel factions had seized 60 percent of Liberia, including most of its diamond-mining areas. During the ensuing siege of Monrovia, hundreds of civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee. Throughout the month of July, UN officials, African heads of state, and European diplomats urged the United States, as the *de facto* former imperial power, to take the lead in ending the crisis. Ignoring the long history of American support for a succession of oppressive Liberian regimes, the George W. Bush administration charged that Liberia was the responsibility of its West African neighbors and the UN – not the United States. As the battle for Liberia wound down, Washington remained largely on the sidelines. In August, Taylor resigned and accepted refuge in Nigeria. The following week, the warring parties signed a peace agreement that provided for an interim government, elections, and a new national army that incorporated both rebel and government soldiers.

The war was over, but the cost had been enormous. In the wars that had consumed the country since the 1980 coup, at least 250,000 Liberians had died, more than a million had been displaced, and tens of thousands of women and girls had been raped. The country's

infrastructure and economy were devastated, and three-quarters of the population were living on less than one dollar a day. The country's \$3.7 billion debt, much of it incurred by the Doe and Taylor regimes, was worth almost eight times the value of its annual gross domestic product.

Somalia

Across the continent in Somalia, another American client was also consumed by civil strife. During the Cold War, Siad Barre's regime had stifled political dissent and divided the opposition by encouraging clan rivalry. By the late 1980s, the divide-and-rule strategy had backfired. Clan-based militias and Islamic militants, who had been repressed by the Siad Barre dictatorship, began to compete for power. The regime cracked down hard, killing thousands of dissidents across the country. With the Soviet Union in dire straits, the Somali alliance was no longer critical to the United States. Washington distanced itself from the Somali dictator.

Without American support, Siad Barre was extremely vulnerable. In January 1991, the Hawiye clan-dominated United Somali Congress, led by former cabinet minister General Mohamed Farah Aidede, overthrew the Siad Barre regime. The congress's Ali Mahdi Mohamed was elected interim president. In 1991–92, a war between the Aidede and Ali Mahdi factions destroyed much of Mogadishu. As the central state collapsed, the formal economy ceased to function, and southern Somalia disintegrated into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords and their militias. The war resulted in some 20,000 civilian casualties and one million displaced people.

One year after Siad Barre's ouster, the UN began to respond to the Somali crisis. In January 1992, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo, which prohibited the delivery of any weapons or military equipment to Somalia. Two UN military missions followed. In April, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established to monitor a ceasefire and to escort and protect aid convoys. However, the UN operation was of little help to thousands of starving Somalis. Warlords, who controlled Mogadishu's port and airport, confiscated food aid and manipulated supplies for political ends, doling it out to their supporters, denying it to those who opposed them, and selling the remainder to purchase weapons. In December, the

Security Council authorized the establishment of the multinational United Task Force (UNITAF) to work with UNOSOM I to secure ports, airports, warehouses, feeding centers, and roads so humanitarian relief could be delivered. The United States announced that it would take the lead in the task force action, which it dubbed "Operation Restore Hope." The UNITAF endeavor, which involved 28,000 American troops as well as personnel from other countries, operated under a narrow mandate. It was not authorized to disarm or demobilize warring parties, to confiscate heavy weapons, or to intervene to stop fighting between rival groups. Its mission was solely to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the civilian population. This continued to be the public face of the mission even after the American role had changed substantially.

Both UNITAF and UNOSOM I concluded in May 1993 and were followed by UNOSOM II, which was also led by the United States. Comprising 18,000 peacekeepers, including 4,200 Americans, UNOSOM II was assigned a mission that was far removed from the traditional UN peacekeeping role. Believing that mass starvation could be averted only if local militias were neutralized, the UN leadership prescribed a course of action that included the forcible disarmament of Somali militias, particularly that of Mohamed Farah Aideed.

Tension between the UN and Aideed broke to the surface on June 5, when Aideed's militia ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers who were attempting to inspect his radio station and weapons depots. The Security Council quickly expanded UNOSOM II's mandate, authorizing it to arrest, detain, try, and punish those responsible for the killings. Having moved from the original mission of protecting aid convoys and relief workers to capturing, disarming, and punishing one faction in the fighting, the UN crossed the line from humanitarian intervention to choosing sides in a deadly conflict. As the mission's chief advocate and leader, the United States had become deeply embroiled in Somalia's civil war.

On June 11–17, American soldiers manning AC-130 gunships and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters attacked several Mogadishu compounds believed to hold weapons caches, as well as the radio station Aideed used to direct his militias and denounce the UN. UN troops fired on the angry crowds that poured into the streets, killing and maiming a large number of civilians. In July, a similar airborne force assaulted clan elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen who were meeting to consider a UN peace initiative.

Sixteen prominent members of Aideed's party and dozens of others were killed, including many who opposed Aideed's stance and anxiously sought peace. The massacre generated strong anti-UN and anti-American sentiment among a population that had welcomed the international humanitarian mission only a year before. In the view of many Somalis, the United States and the UN had declared war; their soldiers were now perceived as an occupation force. Violent retaliation was directed at all foreigners, causing numerous relief organizations to withdraw their operations.

Although the delivery of food aid was the priority of American soldiers during the fall of 1992, it was not their objective one year later. From late August to early October 1993, the American armed forces were bent on capturing or killing Aideed and his top lieutenants. The final raid took place on October 3, 1993, when 120 elite U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force troops attempted to capture key leaders of Aideed's militia in one of Mogadishu's most dangerous neighborhoods. The militia shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, which crashed into children in the streets below. Angry crowds attacked the soldiers who survived the crash and those who came to rescue them. In the fighting that ensued, eighteen American soldiers and some 500 Somali men, women, and children were killed. Within days, President Clinton announced that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Without American backing, the UN was forced to terminate its operation. However, foreign intervention and internal strife continued to plague Somalia. Nearly two decades after the American and UN withdrawal, Somalia still lacked a functioning central government. The ongoing conflict attracted the attention of neighboring Ethiopia, which, with American support, invaded and occupied Somalia in 2006–9 in an attempt to install a compliant government; and of al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network that harnessed Somali anger at the violation of national sovereignty to its own quest for global jihad.

Sudan

From 1976 until the end of the Cold War, Sudan, like Liberia and Somalia, was an important American client. During the Carter years, Sudan was the largest beneficiary of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The Reagan administration bolstered military aid to Khartoum in

order to counter Qaddafi's expansion into East Africa and Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Similarly concerned about Qaddafi's designs on western Sudan and Soviet interest in the Horn, President Jaafar Nimeiri allowed the United States to use Sudan as a base for covert operations against Libya and as a regional center of operations during the Cold War. In exchange for American largesse, Nimeiri permitted the U.S. Army's Rapid Deployment Force, charged with protecting vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, to operate from Sudan.

Nimeiri also sought support from conservative Arab governments and turned to Sudanese Islamists in an attempt to strengthen his wavering domestic support.⁵ In 1983, his government imposed Islamic law (*sharia*) throughout the country, sparking the resumption of a civil war that had long pitted the Muslim north against the predominantly Christian and animist south. Spearheaded by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the southern struggle called for an end to northern and Islamic dominance and demanded greater southern control over the country's oil and mineral wealth, most of which was produced in the south. The SPLM's Marxist language and support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Ethiopia gave the United States the excuse it needed to continue its support for the Nimeiri regime.

The enormous costs of war, compounded by the worldwide economic crisis, triggered an economic meltdown in Sudan that was characterized by rising food and fuel prices, famine, and massive external debt. An IMF-imposed austerity program, implemented in exchange for new loans, resulted in protests, strikes, and, finally, the 1985 military coup that overthrew the Nimeiri regime. Following a brief return to civilian rule, Colonel Omar al-Bashir staged another military coup, toppling the civilian government in 1989.

Rising to power in the waning years of the Cold War, Bashir was more concerned about establishing his Islamist credentials at home and abroad than maintaining a relationship with the United States. He opened the country to radicals from across the Muslim world, including hundreds of mujahideen veterans of the 1979–89 Soviet-Afghan War, many of whom had been funded, trained, and equipped by the CIA.⁶ Among these CIA protégés was Osama bin Laden, a Saudi

⁵ Promoters of "political Islam" or "Islamism" believe that Islamic precepts should serve as the basis of the social and political order as well the personal lives of individual Muslims. They strive to establish Islamic as opposed to secular states.

⁶ The Arabic term *mujahideen* is the plural of *mujahid* – that is, one who wages jihad, or holy war.

leader of the Afghan resistance and founder of al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network whose goal was to install Islamist governments throughout the Muslim world. Bin Laden established al-Qaeda training camps in Sudan and a network of cells and allied organizations that extended to nearly a dozen countries in East Africa and the Horn.

In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Ethiopian dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was driven from power. The new Ethiopian government became Washington's strongest regional ally, while relations with Sudan deteriorated rapidly. In August 1993, the U.S. State Department designated Sudan a "state sponsor of terrorism" and imposed financial sanctions and an arms embargo. Following a 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a staunch American ally, Washington supported the imposition of UN sanctions against Sudan, which was accused of harboring the culprits. Under enormous pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UN Security Council, Khartoum expelled bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network from Sudan in 1996. Washington barred American businesses and nongovernmental organizations from working with the Sudanese government, prohibited the transfer of bank loans and technology, and seized Sudanese assets in the United States. However, the Clinton administration was convinced that Khartoum's links to al-Qaeda persisted. In August 1998, after al-Qaeda operatives bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, American missiles destroyed a Sudanese factory outside Khartoum. Although Washington charged that bin Laden was manufacturing chemical weapons components on the premises, independent investigators found no credible evidence to support the claim. Rather, they determined that the facility had been a pharmaceutical factory that produced the majority of Sudan's major medications, including veterinary, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs.

Increasingly isolated at home and abroad, Bashir was desperate for allies and international respectability. He desired an end to economic sanctions, which would open the door to foreign investment in Sudan's emerging oil industry and help pay down the country's \$22 billion debt. Toward this end, Bashir sidelined some of his more radical Islamic associates, who were threatening his position both internally and externally, and began to cooperate with American counterterrorism initiatives. Following al-Qaeda's attacks on the United States in September 2001, this collaboration increased significantly. At Washington's request, the Bashir regime arrested foreign Islamists

transiting Sudan and delivered them to the United States, helped the United States capture al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia, and permitted U.S. Special Operations Forces to detain alleged terrorists on Sudanese soil. However, as a result of Khartoum's ongoing atrocities against civilians in southern Sudan and, from 2003, in the Darfur region, Washington refused to lift sanctions or remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.⁷

Zaire

Bordering nine countries in a mineral-rich, strategic region, Zaire (formerly the Congo) was the largest, most populous country in Franco-phone Africa. During the Cold War, it served as a regional policeman for both the United States and France, which joined Belgium as major lenders and donors. All three countries helped the Mobutu regime quash antigovernment insurgencies in the 1970s. Mobutu allowed the United States to use the Kamina air base in Shaba Province to train and supply UNITA rebels, while Washington provided Zaire with more than \$1 billion in military and economic aid between 1961 and 1990 and pressured the IMF and the World Bank to grant loans, reschedule debts, and relax lending conditions. Hoping to counter the regional influence of Anglophone Uganda, France also provided Zaire with generous loans, military hardware, and military training.

Like his counterparts in other American client states, Mobutu stood at the pinnacle of a corrupt patronage system. He treated Zaire's vast mineral resources, parastatal companies, central bank, and tax offices as his own and distributed the proceeds to family members and loyalists. During his thirty-two-year reign, he amassed a personal fortune worth an estimated \$5 billion–\$8 billion while Zaire's economy was ravaged by plummeting copper prices, food shortages, inflation, and an external debt that reached \$10.2 billion in 1990. As the Cold War waned, Mobutu and his collapsing state were abandoned by important foreign sponsors. In 1990, Belgium ceased all military and economic assistance. In 1991, the United States suspended its aid programs, the IMF barred Zaire from receiving further loans, and the World Bank withdrew support for the country's development projects.

⁷ Following a peace accord in 2005 and a popular referendum in January 2011, South Sudan became an independent state in July 2011. However, violent conflict between north and south continued.

As Mobutu's hold weakened, internal prodemocracy forces exerted enormous pressure on the regime. However, it was an externally backed insurgency that finally drove Mobutu from power. The insurgency and its aftermath were intimately linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which had claimed some 800,000 lives. A longtime supporter of Rwanda's Hutu extremist regime, Mobutu opened Zaire's borders to more than a million Rwandan Hutus who fled the advancing RPF – the Uganda-backed Tutsi army that had stopped the genocide. Perpetrators of the genocide quickly asserted their dominance over the UN-administered refugee camps, controlling the distribution of food, medicine, and other humanitarian aid, while relief agencies paid them kickbacks as the price of doing business. Mobutu turned a blind eye as camp leaders trafficked in arms, conscripted and trained military cadres, and conducted raids into RPF-governed Rwanda. Mobutu's soldiers joined Hutu extremists in ethnically cleansing eastern Zaire, displacing tens of thousands of indigenous Tutsis and killing thousands more.

The anti-Tutsi pogroms and the security threat posed by Hutu extremists on the Rwandan border led to the First Congo War (1996–97), which would eventually embroil most countries in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda, Uganda, and, to a lesser extent, Burundi pushed their own agendas in Zaire – at great cost to the indigenous population. In October 1996, the Rwandan army launched a raid into Zaire to destroy UN refugee camps and to encourage Zairian Tutsis to rebel. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was established a few weeks later. Rather than emerging from the local milieu, the rebel army was created by longtime Zairian exiles backed by the Rwandan government. It was trained, equipped, and led by the Rwandan army, and its spokesman, Laurent Kabila, was handpicked by the Kigali regime.

By November, the AFDL and its Rwandan backers controlled the borderlands from Uganda to Burundi. They quickly defeated Zaire's undisciplined army, which raped, looted, and killed as it retreated, and emptied the refugee camps, forcing as many as 700,000 Hutus back into Rwanda. Another 300,000 Hutus fled westward into the Zairian rainforest, pursued by AFDL and Rwandan forces, which slaughtered men, women, and children, making no distinction between former soldiers, government officials, and militia members, and innocent Hutu civilians. The response from the international community was muted, and the UN Security Council remained on the sidelines. Although France called for humanitarian

and military intervention, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United States rejected its call. Paris's preoccupation with its loss of influence to Anglophone countries and its previous support for the Hutu extremist regime in Rwanda weakened its claim of humanitarian concern. Moreover, officials in the United States and Britain, remorseful for having failed to act in 1994, refused to countenance criticism of the RPF, which had halted the genocide as the world community stood by.

The war quickly became a regional one. As Kabila's rebel forces moved north and west, the Ugandan army moved in to assist them. As they approached Angola, UNITA guerrillas teamed up with Mobutu's army, drawing the MPLA government into war on the side of the AFDL. In response, Mobutu recruited European, South African, and Angolan mercenaries to bolster his undisciplined forces. Zaire's third-largest city, Kisangani, fell to the rebels in March 1997. A few days later, the rebels took Mbuji-Mayi, capital of the diamond-mining province of East Kasai, from which the government drew much of its revenue. In April, the AFDL arrived in Lubumbashi, Zaire's second largest city. Capital of the Shaba Province, Lubumbashi stood at the center of the country's copper and cobalt production.⁸ American, Canadian, and South African mining interests initiated contacts with the AFDL. Zambia allowed the rebels to launch attacks from its territory, and Zimbabwe provided them with military equipment. By the middle of April 1997, Kabila, his army, and his foreign backers controlled all of Zaire's sources of revenue and foreign exchange.

Of Mobutu's many Western allies, only France supported him to the bitter end. The United States stood by while its longtime protégé floundered, ignoring pleas even for humanitarian intervention. In the final weeks, the Clinton administration urged Mobutu to step down. France, in contrast, embarked on a covert operation on the dictator's behalf. Vehemently opposed to Kabila, whom Paris considered a Ugandan proxy furthering Anglophone interests, Paris provided the Zairian regime with combat aircraft, pilots,

⁸ During Mobutu's rule, the names of several cities and provinces were changed. Léopoldville became Kinshasa; Stanleyville became Kisangani; Elisabethville became Lubumbashi; Bakwanga became Mbuji-Mayi; and Katanga Province became Shaba. The rebellious province of South Kasai, which had rejected central government authority from 1960 to 1962, included parts of the provinces later known as East and West Kasai. Bakwanga (later Mbuji-Mayi) was the capital of both South and East Kasai.

and mechanics – as well as hundreds of French, Belgian, Serbian, Ukrainian, and South African mercenaries.

On May 17, 1997, Mobutu fled the country. Zairian soldiers, whose wages had been pocketed by their officers, refused to risk their lives to defend the capital, and the AFDL took Kinshasa without a fight. Kabila immediately declared himself president and changed the country's name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He rejected the notion of a broad-based coalition government and refused to work with the internal opposition that had resisted Mobutu for years. Following Mobutu's lead, he outlawed opposition parties, prohibited public demonstrations, imprisoned opponents, and ruled by decree. Like Mobutu, Kabila ran the country through his relatives and cronies, among whom he divided the spoils. Nonetheless, the United States immediately rallied to Kabila and blocked UN Security Council condemnation of his regime.

The Second Congo War began in 1998, initiating more than a decade of violence and upheaval that claimed some 5.4 million lives, a 2002 peace agreement notwithstanding. Eight of the nine Great Lakes countries joined what came to be known as Africa's First World War – with only Tanzania refraining. During this round, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi turned on Kabila, disgruntled by his growing reluctance to follow their instructions. Determined to install a compliant regime that would allow them to protect their borders and divert DRC resources for their own development, Kabila's neighbors conspired to overthrow him. They backed disparate Congolese rebel factions with little popular support, including Congolese Tutsis linked to the Rwandan government, Mobutu cronies who hoped to return to power, disappointed office seekers denied positions in Kabila's government, and leftist intellectuals disenchanted with Kabila's corrupt personal rule.

As Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi sought to undermine Kabila, a dozen African nations came to his rescue. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia cited the Southern African Development Community (SADC) security pact as the basis for their intervention.⁹ Zimbabwe sent 12,000 troops, funding its war effort with the DRC's own resources. Although Zimbabwe had no legitimate claim to security concerns in the DRC, it did have economic interests. Kabila was

⁹ SADC was reformulated as SADC in 1992, eventually broadening its membership to include fifteen African countries.

indebted to Zimbabwe for military equipment and supplies delivered during the 1996–97 war, and Zimbabwe was anxious for repayment. Moreover, the Zimbabwean regime hoped that unfettered access to the DRC's riches would appease powerful domestic constituencies that might otherwise protest their own government's failed policies. Zimbabwean political, economic, and military elites thus plundered the country's copper and cobalt wealth while Zimbabwean soldiers looted diamonds from Kasai and stashed profits from the illicit diamond trade in their private coffers.

If Zimbabwe did not have security interests in the DRC, Angola did. The MPLA government was anxious to protect Angola's oil and diamond regions, especially the oil-rich Cabinda Enclave, which was separated from the bulk of Angola by a wedge of Congolese territory. The Luanda government was concerned about collaboration between UNITA and anti-Kabila forces in western DRC, the threat of renewed attacks from Congolese soil, and UNITA's illegal mining of Congolese diamonds to finance its war against the MPLA. Beyond these immediate concerns, Angola was disturbed by the growing power of Uganda and Rwanda in the Central African region and their support for rebel forces that included Mobutu stalwarts. Namibia's concerns dovetailed with those of both Angola and Zimbabwe. Like Angola, Namibia was anxious to weaken UNITA, which supported a secessionist movement in the Caprivi Strip, while Namibian elites, like those in Zimbabwe, had developed extensive mining interests in the DRC.

Reminiscent of the Belgian colonial rulers in another era, the Great Lakes countries bled the DRC dry. The UN Security Council charged Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi with the systematic looting of the country and implicated Zimbabwe in the depredations. Together with Congolese officials and rebel warlords, these countries stole billions of dollars worth of diamonds, gold, coltan, cobalt, copper, tin, timber, and cash crops. The wealth extracted from the eastern war zone was transmitted into the global economy through Rwanda and Uganda and used to finance their own development. From 1996 to 2009, Rwanda controlled the mineral-rich provinces of North and South Kivu – effectively integrating them into its domestic economy. In the same vein, Ugandan soldiers took control of gold-bearing regions in the east and forced the local population to extract the gold for Ugandan interests. Following the signing of peace accords in 2002, Rwanda and Uganda withdrew from the DRC but supported rebel proxies who continued to battle for control of the mines and trade routes.

The Global War on Terror (2001–10)

During the first post–Cold War decade, Africa was low on America’s radar screen, even as former clients like Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire descended into chaos. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, however, existing policy was reevaluated. Economic deprivation and political chaos concerned the United States anew. Impoverished nations with weak state apparatuses were viewed as potential breeding grounds for political extremism – which during this era was understood to be terrorism rather than communism. As a result, Washington again sought to strengthen military alliances, provide financial assistance and training, and open military bases in dozens of African countries. The George W. Bush administration’s “global war on terror” became the new anticommunism.

Just as domestic insurgencies sparked by local grievances were mistaken for “communist aggression” during the Cold War, the vague rubric of “international terrorism” was used to explain a range of civil disturbances in the early twenty-first century. African dictators who had appealed to the West by playing up the communist menace were replaced by a new generation of strongmen who won support by cooperating in the fight against terrorism. American foreign assistance became increasingly militarized. The Pentagon assumed responsibility for many humanitarian and development assistance programs previously under civilian authority, and the human security and human rights agenda of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was eclipsed by the counterterrorism program of the Defense Department. As war and instability engulfed the Middle East, America’s access to its traditional sources of foreign oil were threatened. By the early twenty-first century, the United States had revised its Africa policy to focus on countries rich in oil and natural gas and those considered critical to the American war on terror.

Since September 2001, a cohort of American policy-makers have warned that “Islamic terrorism” is threatening American lives and security. However, the appellation is more confusing than enlightening. The Islamic groups designated “foreign terrorist organizations” by the U.S. secretary of state include diverse movements, organizations, cells, and individuals.¹⁰ Many have local origins and grievances

¹⁰ The criteria for and consequences of the designation “foreign terrorist organization” can be found on the website of the National Counterterrorism Center, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/fto.html>.

that have little if anything to do with the United States. However, the American security establishment has tended to view them as part of a vast, monolithic global conspiracy. As a result, the U.S. Special Operations Command, which coordinates the covert operations of all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, has engaged in counterterrorism activities that have alienated local populations and undermined Washington's long-term security interests. In 2006, for instance, the CIA enlisted warlords in its fight against terror suspects on Somali soil, while U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia that removed the popular Islamic Courts Union from power and sparked an antiforeign insurgency. The insurgency provided an opportunity for international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda to embrace local Islamist groups that previously had been independent.

Hostility toward the West – and particularly the United States – stems from a number of issues. Many Muslims have been angered by the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, which have resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands of Muslims; and the decades-long plight of Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories. Other Muslims resent American exploitation of Middle Eastern and African oil and U.S. support for repressive regimes that violently suppress local populations. From Egypt to Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, U.S.-allied governments have banned Islamic fundamentalist parties and arrested thousands of militants. In some instances, homegrown guerrilla organizations emerged from the outlawed parties. Only later did al-Qaeda seize the opportunity and offer its support.

The global war on terror radically transformed longstanding American practices. Among the first casualties was a decades-old ban on foreign political assassinations. In 1975, the U.S. Senate's Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities published an in-depth investigation of American involvement in the assassination of foreign leaders. In response, President Ford issued a 1976 executive order that forbid U.S. government involvement in political assassinations abroad. For more than twenty-five years, this directive remained U.S. policy – at least, officially. However, shortly after the September 2001 attacks, President Bush issued an order that permitted the CIA and the Pentagon to ignore the assassinations ban and to capture or kill al-Qaeda militants worldwide. In the spring of 2004, the Bush administration authorized

the U.S. Special Operations Command to conduct covert military operations to capture or kill suspected terrorist leaders anywhere in the world. The executive order granted U.S. forces the authority to engage in such activities in countries that were not at war with the United States – and without those countries' consent. The Pentagon subsequently sent Special Operations troops into African and Asian nations to collect intelligence and to capture or kill alleged terrorists – a practice that continued under the Obama administration. Repressive regimes played up the international terrorist threat as a means of obtaining American funds and military assistance – just as their predecessors exaggerated the communist menace during the Cold War. Security forces trained and financed by the United States were used to crack down on internal opposition and to fight regional wars. Rather than winning hearts and minds, American intervention often rendered local populations even more susceptible to the appeals of international terrorist organizations.

The new focus on counterterrorism also resulted in a surge of American military activity in Africa. East Africa and the Horn constituted Washington's first African front in the global war on terror. In 2002, a U.S. military base was established at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti – the first American base to be opened in Africa since the Cold War. Strategically located at the juncture of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden – opposite Yemen and adjacent to Somalia – Camp Lemonnier was home to the new Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which included some 1,800 military and civilian personnel. CJTF-HOA's mission was to discover and destroy international terrorist networks in the Horn, East Africa, Yemen, and adjacent Indian Ocean islands. Toward that end, it conducted patrols of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean and assisted in training the military forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. During the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the CJTF-HOA provided the Ethiopian army with satellite photos and other intelligence so it could locate Islamist fighters.

In 2003, the United States launched the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), a \$100 million program to combat terrorist activities in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Personnel from these countries were trained in border, coastal, and aviation security and in general police work. EACTI also established programs to thwart money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as education programs to undermine the appeal of extremist

ideologies. The United States counted on Ethiopia and Kenya to support its attacks on al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia, and U.S. Special Operations Forces launched numerous strikes from bases in those countries.

Washington identified the sparsely populated, lightly governed western Sahel as the second African front in the global war on terror. In 2002, the U.S. government launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which included Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The PSI's mission was to coordinate and enhance border control against terrorist movement and arms and drug trafficking, which were believed to thrive in the Sahel's large "ungoverned" spaces. In 2005, the PSI program was extended and transformed into the five-year interagency Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Like its counterpart in East Africa, TSCTI's mission was to help countries with large Muslim populations curtail the proliferation of extremist ideologies and the appeal of terrorism by extending aid to the disaffected. TSCTI's military program, Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), provided equipment, logistical support, and training to regional forces in border control, rapid response capabilities, and terrorism prevention. Under these auspices, U.S. Special Operations Forces were widely reported to have engaged with their African counterparts in offensive operations as well as training operations. TSCTI's civil component included USAID programs to promote education and good governance; State Department programs to enhance airport security; Treasury Department aid to curb money laundering; and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assistance in tracking down illegal operatives. By 2010, the renamed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) included eleven North and West African countries, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. A number of these countries joined the United States in military exercises, including Flintlock 2005, which was the largest joint military operation between the United States and Africa since World War II.

Washington's failure to understand the complex situation on the ground and its pursuit of short-term counterterrorism objectives over long-term human development goals embroiled American personnel in local conflicts that intensified anti-American feelings. Washington's bolstering of the Idriss Déby regime in Chad is a case in point. Notoriously repressive and corrupt – Transparency International designated Chad the world's sixth most corrupt country in 2010 – the military

regime engaged in serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, torture, rape, and murder. Although foreign-backed rebels rather than international Islamic extremists were the regime's primary security threat, the United States justified its support on the grounds that it was helping Déby combat international terrorism. U.S. Army Special Forces trained Chadian military battalions, including one charged with protecting the Déby regime from a possible coup d'état. In essence, the United States helped a dictator maintain his hold on power under the guise of counterterrorism. U.S. military involvement in Mali and Niger also had unforeseen and problematic consequences. In 2007–8, U.S. Army Special Forces assisted the Malian government with combat support as it fought against a Tuareg insurgency that had emerged from local grievances, while American-trained troops in Niger engaged in atrocities against Tuareg civilians. Other consequences surfaced in March 2012, when Mali's democratically elected government was overthrown in a coup led by an American-trained army captain. Bolstered by weapons and fighters that had flooded Mali following the NATO-assisted overthrow of Qaddafi's Libyan regime in 2011, Tuareg rebels seized the opportunity presented by the coup to gain control of much of Mali's north and to announce the formation of a secessionist state. By June, Islamist factions, some of which were associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, had ousted the Tuareg nationalists and established a harsh regime that brutalized the civilian population.

Western diplomats, terrorism experts, and human rights organizations criticized American policies in the Sahel, charging that the terrorist threat in the region had been exaggerated. The vast majority of conflicts and insurgencies had local roots and little, if any, connection to international terrorist organizations. Many of the target groups blended religious fanaticism with illegal ventures such as drug and weapons trafficking, providing livelihoods to people with few alternatives. The dire political and economic conditions of Sahelian countries, long stricken by drought and famine, made it relatively easy for such groups to attract adherents. When U.S.-backed military operations removed their means of survival, Washington lost the battle to win their hearts and minds, and international terrorist organizations sometimes profited from the anger that ensued.

The capstone of America's increasingly militarized Africa policy was the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). In February 2007, President Bush announced plans to create a unified military command

that would oversee U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine activities in Africa. This development was significant. During the Cold War and its aftermath, responsibility for American military activities on the continent had been divided between the European, Central, and Pacific Commands, attesting to Africa's adjunct status in the geopolitical arena. The European Command (EUCOM) had jurisdiction over forty-three African countries, most of which were in sub-Saharan Africa and all of which had been European colonies – with the exception of Liberia. The Central Command (CENTCOM) had jurisdiction over Egypt and the Horn, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, as well as the Middle East and Central Asia. The Pacific Command (USPACOM) covered the Asia-Pacific region, from the west coast of the United States to Madagascar, Seychelles, and the other Indian Ocean islands. Seen through the lens of U.S.-European relations or the Cold War, Africa as a self-contained entity was not high on the U.S. priority list. The establishment of AFRICOM was concrete evidence that Africa had migrated from the periphery to the core of American security concerns.

AFRICOM was also significant because of its new focus on interagency cooperation. Rooted in the security-development discourse that had come to characterize U.S. aid policy, AFRICOM's premise was that poverty, corruption, and failed states breed discontent and provide fertile ground for terrorism. To counter the threat effectively, the United States must link strategic and humanitarian interests. Stressing security, good governance, and development, AFRICOM's programs included personnel from the State Department and USAID as well as the Defense Department. However, Defense was by far the strongest partner in terms of resources and authority, and counterterrorism initiatives like CJTF-HOA and TSCTI continued to dominate AFRICOM's agenda.

Criticisms of AFRICOM have been many. As during the Cold War, target countries were chosen on the basis of political and economic interests, without regard for good governance or respect for democracy and human rights. AFRICOM's priorities were to secure American access to energy resources and to fight international terrorism. As a result, AFRICOM focused on countries that were rich in oil, natural gas, or uranium; in close proximity to strategic communications routes; or near sites of Islamist activities. Its detractors warned that if military priorities dominated the agenda, humanitarian initiatives would be suspect, and the long-term objective of

winning hearts and minds would be undermined by short-term military considerations. They charged that AFRICOM had militarized police and development functions that were better left to civilian authorities. As the Pentagon took over humanitarian and development initiatives previously under the domain of USAID, soldiers engaged in activities for which they were not trained – and trained experts were shunted aside. Critics asserted that AFRICOM personnel frequently conflated local unrest with international terrorism and strengthened the military capacity of countries whose armed forces were used to attack civilians. In resource-rich countries, AFRICOM enhanced military capabilities without addressing the inequitable distribution of wealth, thereby harming rather than helping African peoples. Because American rather than African security concerns dominated the agenda, AFRICOM and its constituent programs risked intensifying rather than reducing international terrorist threats. These criticisms will bear ever greater scrutiny as U.S.–Africa policy evolves during the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Beyond the War on Terror

Despite their prominence in American military strategy, the global war on terror and the systematization of U.S. military involvement through AFRICOM were not the defining features of foreign military intervention in Africa during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This period witnessed a wide range of interventions, including bilateral operations by African and non-African countries and multi-lateral actions by global, continental, and regional organizations. In many cases, the lines between intervention on behalf of political and economic interests and those based on humanitarian and peacemaking concerns were blurred. A more detailed examination of these interventions and their implications is the subject of a future book, but it is worth noting here three of their most salient characteristics.¹¹

First, with the formation of the African Union in 2002 and the expansion of regional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African international organizations, often in collaboration with UN or ad hoc

¹¹ See Elizabeth Schmidt, *From State Collapse to the War on Terror: Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War* (Athens: Ohio University Press, in progress).

international initiatives, played a more prominent role in both diplomacy and peacekeeping efforts. Although African organizations could boast some success, their activities were frequently hampered by a lack of resources, discordant interests among the states involved, and problematic resolutions that opened the door to future conflict. In 2004, for instance, the African Union and IGAD worked with the UN and the European Union to establish a central government in Somalia, and the African Union contributed peacekeeping troops. However, the transitional government had virtually no support inside Somalia, and many Somalis considered the African Union troops to be unwelcome intruders. The African Union and IGAD also helped to negotiate the 2005 peace agreement that ended Sudan's civil war. However, the agreement was rife with unresolved problems, and it paved the way for further strife.¹² The African Union was also involved in attempts to settle the Darfur conflict in western Sudan. In 2004, it sent an underfunded and ill-equipped peacekeeping force to the region to monitor a ceasefire agreement. Three years later, the ineffective force was bolstered by an infusion of UN aid and the establishment of a joint African Union-UN mission. A peace agreement was signed in 2011, but it failed to include the most significant rebel groups, thus ensuring further conflict. In West Africa, a UN-backed ECOWAS mission in Côte d'Ivoire was authorized to enforce a 2004 ceasefire between the government and rebel forces and to protect civilian and humanitarian workers. In 2008 and 2009, SADC played a key role in conflict resolution during crises of governmental authority in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, respectively. A notable UN initiative involving African, Asian, and Western nations was the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, established in 2009 to suppress activities that threatened international shipping, humanitarian relief, and human security. In contrast to organizations focusing on counterterrorism, the contact group recognized piracy as a symptom of the general breakdown of Somali society and emphasized the need to address such issues as illicit fishing and toxic waste disposal in Somali waters as contributory factors to the development of an outlaw economy.

¹² The agreement provided for a referendum on self-determination that led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Unresolved disputes over boundaries and the division of oil revenues gave rise to renewed violence shortly after South Sudan's independence.

Second, emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Middle Eastern Gulf states increased their economic involvement in Africa during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Although these countries initially played only limited diplomatic and military roles, their presence gave African states more flexibility and opportunity in forming international alliances. These benefits did not always trickle down to the general population. Interested in African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, the emerging powers often dealt with repressive regimes that promoted their own interests at the expense of the population at large. In some instances, however, outside powers used their influence to persuade their allies to compromise. Such was the case in the 2012 conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, which threatened to escalate into a wider war. With significant oil and infrastructure investments in both countries, Beijing joined the African Union, the United States, and other powers in pressuring both sides to pursue peace.

Third, the growth of public pressure for “humanitarian intervention” in response to African crises became a significant factor in political decision making. In the United States, this phenomenon was best illustrated by the campaigns of the Save Darfur Coalition, a broad-based movement that sought international intervention to stop atrocities in Darfur, and the nonprofit organization Invisible Children, which mobilized support for action against Joseph Kony’s brutal Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa. Although their advocacy emerged from a humanitarian impulse, similar to that underlying the UN R2P resolution, these groups generated criticism as well as praise. Although both organizations brought mass atrocities to world attention and rallied support for action to protect civilians, critics claimed that they oversimplified complex issues, ignored human rights abuses committed by individuals and entities they supported on the ground, and proposed military solutions that could have adverse effects on civilian populations. Detractors warned that the organizations’ support for foreign military intervention, in particular, risked perpetuating a trend toward simplistic military solutions that failed to address the fundamental political, economic, and social issues underlying the crises.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, there was little consensus in ongoing debates about foreign intervention in Africa. In the United States, those who shaped Africa policy did

not speak with one voice. As was the case during the years of decolonization and the Cold War, advocates of caution and negotiation were often found among Africa specialists in the State Department, while those who supported counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures were generally found in other sectors of the State Department, in the Pentagon, and in the various national security agencies. The resulting policies were criticized both domestically and internationally. Some critics warned that aggressive intervention could be counterproductive, fomenting rather than reducing antiforeign sentiment and deepening regional insecurity. Others charged that American responses to terrorism or to humanitarian crises were too timid.

As calls for multilateral diplomacy evolved into appeals for military intervention under the mantle of responsibility to protect, there was sharp disagreement over the motives of those intervening, the means used, and whether the outcomes provided protection or increased insecurity. Some multilateral interventions gained widespread support from the UN and from African regional organizations, while others were weakly supported or opposed. In countries and regions affected by conflict, people and governments were often divided on the merits of outside intervention, whether by neighboring states, international organizations, or external powers. When outside entities supplied arms and training to repressive regimes beset by rebel insurgencies, African commentators and civil society groups demanded that all parties responsible for human rights abuses be held accountable – governments as well as rebel movements. They remained skeptical of outsiders' motives and their capacity to bring peace, even when their actions were part of an approved multilateral initiative. These concerns did not diminish as the new century's second decade began.

Suggested Reading

Several works establish a framework for better understanding the events that transpired in post–Cold War Africa. Michael Clough's *Free at Last? U.S. Policy toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992) lays the groundwork with an overview of U.S.-Africa policy during the Cold War and its effects, examining the “dismal balance sheet” in six countries where the United States spent the most resources. Nicolas van de Walle's *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) examines the African economic crisis that began in the 1970s, which is critical to understanding post–Cold War political events. For a fascinating case

study, see Isaac A. Kamola's "The Global Coffee Economy and the Production of Genocide in Rwanda," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (2007): 571–92, which analyzes the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the context of the international coffee economy, economic crisis, and structural adjustment.

A number of books explore state collapse, warlordism, and political violence in the 1990s. Especially recommended is William Reno's *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), which offers important insight into the failure of the bureaucratic state in post-Cold War Africa and its replacement by warlords whose goal was to control economic resources rather than to mobilize citizens. See also the chapter "Warlord Rebels" in his book *Warfare in Independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Mary Kaldor's *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) explores the causes of increased ethnic violence in the 1990s and the reasons the international community failed to stop it. Continuing the focus on the international community, Adekeye Adebajo's *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011) examines UN peacekeeping missions in Africa since the end of the Cold War, exploring the reasons for their success or failure. Elizabeth Schmidt's *From State Collapse to the War on Terror: Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War* (Athens: Ohio University Press, in progress) examines intra- and extracontinental intervention in African political and economic affairs during the two decades following the Cold War.

The following sections offer suggestions for the cases studies of Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire. For Liberia, besides Reno's *Warlord Politics and African States* (mentioned above), Stephen Ellis's *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2006) is especially recommended. Ellis's book explains the origins and process of the Liberian civil war, focusing on corruption, the collapse of the state bureaucracy and patrimonial political system, the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians and warlords, and the role of indigenous religious belief systems. Bill Berkeley's *The Graves are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), a clearly written journalistic account, also explores the ways in which Doe and Taylor manipulated ethnicity to gain access to power and resources and pays special attention to the role of the United States in the Liberian catastrophe. Mark Huband's *The Liberian Civil War* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998) is a riveting personal memoir of the early years of the Liberian civil war by a journalist who was captured by Taylor's forces. The related war in Sierra Leone is examined in David Keen's *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (Oxford, UK: James Currey; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), which investigates the crisis of the patronage-based

political and economic system and the response of the dispossessed. Lansana Gberie's *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), an insider account by a Sierra Leonean journalist-historian, offers insights into the disintegration of the state, the nature of the RUF, the role of Liberia, and the impact of British and UN intervention.

For Somalia, several works examine the failed U.S.-UN intervention in the early 1990s. Mohamed Sahnoun's *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994), written by the senior UN representative in Somalia in 1992, provides a critical account of the failed UN operation. For the perspective of Robert B. Oakley, the U.S. special envoy for Somalia in 1992–94, who led the humanitarian phase of the operation, see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995). For a critical account of the operation's misunderstandings, missteps, and failures by a humanitarian relief worker, see Kenneth R. Rutherford, *Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia* (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008). Mark Bowden's *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), based on interviews and primary documents, offers a gripping account of the failed October 1993 U.S. Army Ranger Task Force operation.

For Sudan, besides Berkeley (mentioned above), several books are especially recommended. Douglas H. Johnson's *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007) provides a historical overview of north-south conflicts; differential distribution of power and resources; manipulation of ethnicity and religion; and the role foreign governments, institutions, and aid organizations. Peter Woodward's *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006) examines the evolution of U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa, with special emphasis on Somalia, Sudan, and Islamist movements. Donald Petterson's *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), an insider account by the American ambassador to Sudan from 1992 to 1995, covers such topics as U.S. relations with Sudan, civil war, terrorism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Two recommended books focus on Darfur. Gérard Prunier's *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008) is a highly accessible comprehensive account of the Darfur conflict, its historical underpinnings, and the key players. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal's *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, revised and updated (New York: Zed Books, 2008) introduces the history of the conflict, the main participants, and the response of the African Union and the broader international community.

Three recommended books focus on the Congo/Zaire/DRC. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner's *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) provides an overview of Zairian politics from the Belgian colonial state through the Mobutu regime. It examines the transformation of the colonial bureaucracy into a corrupt, personalized, patrimonial state and explores the consequences of economic decline and the role of Western countries and corporations. Michael G. Schatzberg's highly accessible *Mobutu or Chaos: The United States and Zaire, 1960–1990* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991) focuses on U.S. policy toward Zaire from independence to the end of the Cold War. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja's *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), written by a Congolese scholar and activist, offers a valuable historical overview that includes a detailed history of the Congolese prodemocracy movement.

Four recent books explore late-twentieth-century political violence and wars in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, with particular emphasis on the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. They focus on the causes, internal dynamics, and effects of the conflicts, as well as the role of outside powers and corporations. See René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).

Several works focus on the militarization of U.S.-Africa policy in the early twenty-first century. Robert G. Berschinski's *AFRICOM'S Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2007), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/>, critiques the United States' post-9/11 model of military engagement in Africa, military involvement in humanitarian and development operations, and Washington's misunderstanding of many antigovernment movements. Malinda S. Smith's edited collection, *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), which includes contributors from several continents, focuses on the impact of the war on terror on African societies across the continent. John Davis's edited collection, *Africa and the War on Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), explores the evolution of the war on terror in Africa, with special attention paid to the role of the African Union and U.S. Special Forces. Daniel Volman and William Minter's "Making Peace or Fueling War

in Africa,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 13, 2009, <http://www.fpif.org> critiques Washington’s emphasis on the strengthening of bilateral military ties and its reduction of resources for the UN and other multilateral institutions, as well as its focus on counterterrorism and access to natural resources, rather than humanitarian concerns.

Four recommended books focus on militant Islam and U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa, which is considered the African front line in the American war on terror. Besides Woodward (mentioned above), Alex de Waal’s edited collection, *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), examines the emergence of new forms of radical Islam and their relation to American political and economic power, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S. intervention in the Horn. Robert I. Rotberg’s edited collection, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and the World Peace Foundation, 2005), focuses on the Horn as a front line in the American war on terror and Washington’s use of regional powers to promote U.S. interests. Gregory A. Pirio’s *African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2007) offers a narrative account of al-Qaeda’s presence in East Africa and the Horn, focusing especially on Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania.

Conclusion

This book has demonstrated that during the period of decolonization and the Cold War (1945–91) and the first two decades of its aftermath (1991–2010), foreign intervention in Africa strongly influenced the outcome of conflicts and the fate of African nations. However, foreign powers did not simply impose their will on a passive continent or use African actors as proxies for their own interests. Rather, external powers interacted in complex ways with African societies. While foreign governments took advantage of divisions within African societies to promote their own interests, African actors also used external alliances for their own ends. The scale and character of the interventions varied across time and space, reflecting both the interests and concerns of foreign powers and the regional and national contexts in which they occurred. Although most interventions during the Cold War and decolonization period were perpetrated by extracontinental powers, African nations also embroiled themselves in their neighbors' affairs. During the period of state collapse (1991–2001), the most serious instances of foreign intervention involved intracontinental powers, which in turn implicated regional and extracontinental peacekeeping forces. The narrative of the global war on terror emerged during the first decade of the twenty-first century (2001–10), focusing on real or imagined threats from Islamist extremists in several parts of the continent. However, this period also witnessed an array of interventions that were unrelated to the war on terror, as global, continental, and regional organizations became involved in African conflicts on behalf of political and economic interests and for humanitarian and

peacemaking purposes. In many instances, the boundaries between conflicting objectives were muddled.

Although varying in their specifics, the case studies presented in this book support four general observations. First, both colonial and Cold War powers attempted to control the decolonization process in ways that would advance their interests. While Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal tried to influence political and economic practices in their former colonies, France, more than any other power, engaged in military actions to protect its interests. The colonial powers hoped to establish neocolonial regimes that would function much as before, operating on behalf of external political and economic interests. The Cold War superpowers looked forward to a new international order in which they would play the leading roles. When their interests converged, the United States preferred to let European powers take the lead in their former colonies, as in the case of Belgium in the Congo and Britain in Rhodesia. However, when old-style imperialist policies threatened to provide opportunities for the Soviet Union, the United States opposed its NATO allies, as it did during the Suez Crisis and the Algerian independence war. The Soviet Union generally increased its involvement in response to intervention by the United States and its associates, as it did in the Congo and Angola. However, Moscow was sometimes drawn into regional conflicts when its African allies were threatened by outside forces, as in the case of Ethiopia after the 1977 Somali invasion. Although viewed by the West as a Soviet proxy, Cuba often navigated its own course, as it did in Angola and Eritrea. Hostile to Moscow after the Sino-Soviet split, China promoted political movements that rivaled those backed by the Soviet Union, throwing its support to ZANU in Zimbabwe and the FNLA and UNITA in Angola.

The second observation suggests that conflicts during the Cold War and decolonization period, free market austerity policies imposed by international financial institutions, and weak postcolonial states led to deadly struggles over power and resources in the post-Cold War period. The cases of Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire demonstrate the ways in which Cold War era despots who repressed their citizenry and plundered their countries' resources were vulnerable to political pressures once their sponsors abandoned them. In the case of Sudan, a weakened dictator sought support from radical Islamists, which resulted in retaliatory action by the United States. As dictators were driven from power, indigenous strongmen and neighboring states intervened

to further their own interests, while international peacekeeping forces sometimes ameliorated and in other instances exacerbated the crises.

The third observation is that Washington's global war on terror resulted in increased foreign military presence on the continent and renewed support for repressive regimes. Concerned about U.S. energy and physical security, Washington focused on countries rich in energy resources and those considered vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. U.S. military aid, combined with commercial sales and arms left over from the Cold War, contributed to an escalation of violence in many parts of Africa. Rather than promoting security, American military and covert operations in the Horn and the Sahel often provoked intensified conflict and undermined the prospects for peace negotiations. A notable exception during this period was in Sudan, where international peace efforts supported by the African Union, the United States, and other international forces resulted in a fragile peace accord that led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Despite this success, serious differences were not resolved, and the region continued to be wracked by violence.

Although American counterterrorism initiatives cast a large shadow, they were not the only foreign interventions in Africa during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Together with the UN, the African Union and various regional organizations played a growing role in diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives, which sometimes led to multilateral military action. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Middle Eastern Gulf states, which were heavily invested in African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, exerted increased political influence. Although these countries often reinforced the powers of repressive regimes, in some instances they used their authority to promote peace and security efforts. Public pressure for "humanitarian intervention" in response to African crises also contributed to new foreign involvement. Although activist groups in Western countries put the spotlight on mass atrocities and mobilized support for action to protect African civilians, they often oversimplified complex issues and proposed the kinds of military solutions that historically have had negative effects on civilian populations.

The fourth and final observation suggests that during the period under consideration (1945–2010), foreign intervention in Africa generally did more harm than good. External involvement often intensified conflicts and rendered them more lethal. Even humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which were weakened by inadequate

mandates, funding, and information and undermined by conflicting interests, sometimes hurt the people they were intended to help. At the close of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the merits and demerits of foreign intervention remained hotly contested, while the consequences of failure to intervene were also the subject of much debate. As the second decade opened with no clear path for moving forward, it became increasingly imperative that the voices of African civil society be heard and that in future debates over foreign involvement, the people of the affected countries set the agenda.

Index

- Abidjan, 174
Addis Ababa, 150, 159, 160
Adoula, Cyrille, 68–70, 85. *See also*
Congo (Belgian)
Afewerki, Isaias, 160. *See also*
Eritrea; Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF)
Afghanistan, 154. *See also* al-Qaeda;
bin Laden, Osama; mujahideen;
Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989)
and the Soviet Union, 154, 155,
206–207
and the United States, 206–207,
214
Africa Cell. *See* France
African Americans, 24–25, 103
anti-apartheid movement, 25, 103,
104
anticolonial solidarity movements,
24–25, 29
African Democratic Rally (RDA),
170–172, 182. *See also* Boda,
Biaka; Communist Party;
General Confederation of Labor
(CGT); Houphouët-Boigny,
Félix; Nigerien Democratic
Union; Senegalese Democratic
Union; Union of the Peoples of
Cameroon (UPC)
Bamako Congress, 170–171
coordinating committee,
171
expulsions, 171
and French Communist Party,
171
membership, 170–171
program, 171
repression of, 171
African Financial Community
(CFA), 177–178
convertibility, 177–178, 189
devaluation, 178, 189
African National Congress (ANC),
106, 112–113, 114, 115. *See also*
anti-apartheid movement;
Congress Alliance; Mandela,
Nelson; South Africa;
Umkhonto we Sizwe
African support, 113, 130
armed struggle, 112, 118
communism, 112–114
and Frontline States, 129
humanitarian aid, 113
military aid, 113, 130
military bases, 113, 129
sanctions, 106
terrorism, 113–114
and the United States, 113–114

- African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 89–90, 158. *See also* Cape Verde; Portuguese Guinea
- African involvement, 80, 90–91
- and China, 90
- communist influences, 89
- and Cuba, 90, 91
- and Guinea, 90
- and Morocco, 90
- Nordic countries, 80, 90
- and the OAU, 90
- and the Soviet Union, 90, 91
- and the United Nations, 80, 91
- and the United States, 90–91
- and the World Council of Churches, 80, 90
- African Union, xiii, 194, 219–220, 229. *See also* Organization of African Unity (OAU)
- peacekeeping, 2, 11, 194, 219–221, 227–229
- African unity, 150
- Africanization, 59–60
- Africa's First World War. *See* Second Congo War (1998–2002)
- Afrikaners, 19, 105. *See also* South Africa
- Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, 36, 173
- Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 182. *See also* Cameroon
- Aideed, Mohamed Farah, 156, 203, 204–205. *See also* Somalia; United Somali Congress
- Algeria, 19, 28, 30, 73, 168. *See also* Communist Party; Egypt; National Liberation Front (FLN)
- aid to liberation movements, 53–54, 90, 113, 173, 182
- and Bandung Conference, 35–36
- Battle of Algiers, 49–50
- Evian Accords (1962), 52–53
- and France, 30, 48, 49, 52–53, 79, 84, 180
- and French Communist Party, 48, 52
- French economic interests, 46
- independence, 52–53
- independence war, 13, 20, 35, 46, 48, 52–53, 60, 173, 180
- Islamic militants, 48, 214
- military accords, 52
- and NATO, 45–46, 49, 50–51
- oil, 36, 45, 46, 52
- provisional government, 51, 52, 53
- referendum, 52
- settlers, 19, 46, 103
- and the Soviet Union, 30, 45–46, 48, 51–52, 53, 54
- and the United Nations, 49, 51
- and the United States, 30, 45–46, 48–50, 51, 52, 54, 214, 216, 228
- Algerian Communist Party. *See* Communist Party
- Allegheny Ludlum, 118. *See also* Rhodesia lobby
- Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), 209–211. *See also* Kabila, Laurent; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- al-Qaeda, 205, 207, 208, 214, 216, 217. *See also* Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; bin Laden, Osama; global war on terror; mujahideen; Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989); Sudan; terrorism; terrorist attacks
- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 217
- Alvor Accord. *See* Angola
- American Committee on Africa, 104. *See also* anti-apartheid movement
- Amhara, 145, 151, 159. *See also* Ethiopia
- Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 36. *See also* Iran
- Anglophone Africa, 165, 181, 182, 184, 188, 200–201, 208, 210

- Angola, 30, 79, 104, 129. *See also*
 National Front for the
 Liberation of Angola (FNLA);
 National Union for the Total
 Independence of Angola
 (UNITA); Popular Movement
 for the Liberation of Angola
 (MPLA)
- aid to liberation movements, 113,
 119, 122, 129
- Alvor Accord, 93–94, 96
- assimilados, 81
- Benguela railroad, 132
- Bicesse Accords (1991), 132
- Cabinda Enclave, 88, 93, 95, 212
- and China, 8–9, 92, 93
- coffee, 84, 92
- and Cuba, xii, 92, 93, 96–98,
 125–126, 132, 155, 228
- Cuito Cuanavale, 126
- destabilization, 128, 129, 130,
 131–133, 193
- diamonds, 92, 95, 133, 212
- elections, 132–133
- independence, 89, 92, 94, 96–98,
 122
- liberation movements, 53, 81,
 83–84, 92–94, 122
- liberation struggle, 26, 81, 83–84,
 92–98
- mercenaries, 95–98, 210
- mestiços, 81, 84
- oil, 88, 92, 93, 95, 133, 212
- sanctions, 132–133
- settlers, 19, 81, 84, 103
- and South Africa, xii, 9, 92,
 95–97, 98, 106–107, 123,
 125–127, 129, 130, 131–132
- and the Soviet Union, xii, 26, 31,
 92, 96, 98, 126, 155, 228
- and SWAPO, 95, 122, 125, 129,
 131–132
- and the United States, xii, 8–9, 31,
 87, 92–93, 94, 95, 98, 126, 199,
 208, 228
- and Zaire, 92, 95, 187–188, 208,
 210, 211–212
- animism. *See* Sudan
- anti-apartheid movement, 135. *See also* African Americans
- British, 134–135
- U.S., 25, 103–104, 113, 114–115
- world, 103, 104, 106, 133–135
- anticolonial activities, xi, 6–7, 18, 21,
 22, 25, 82, 83, 134, 166–167,
 168, 172–173, 197
- apartheid. *See* South Africa
- Arab League, 51, 149, 157
- Arab states, 40, 49, 51, 53, 149, 152,
 157, 158, 159, 206. *See also*
 pan-Arab movement
- Arabian Peninsula, 4–5
- Arab-Israeli War (1973), 44, 88,
 181–182. *See also* Egypt; Israel;
 Sadat, Anwar
- Arabs, 4–5, 186
- armed struggle, 13, 18, 19, 20,
 79–80, 85, 89, 91, 105, 118–119,
 120, 122, 173, 185, 197, 198. *See also* Algeria; Angola;
 Mozambique; Namibia;
 Portuguese Guinea; Rhodesia;
 South Africa
- arms embargo. *See* sanctions;
 United Nations
- arms trafficking. *See* illicit activities
- Asia, xi, 7–8, 22, 25, 27–28, 29, 36,
 38, 42, 44, 49, 51, 82, 84, 90,
 105, 134, 167–168, 169, 172,
 214–215, 218, 220, 221
- Asia-Pacific region, 218
- Asmara, 145, 158, 159
- Assab, 158
- Atlantic Charter (1941), 48–49,
 167–168, 169
- Atlantic Ocean, 181
- Azores, 84. *See also* Portugal
- air base, 84–85, 86, 88, 90
- islands, 84, 89
- Ba'ath Party. *See* Iraq
- Baghdad Pact, 37–38, 43
- Bakongo, 81, 93. *See also* Angola
- Bakwanga, 210. *See also* Mbuji-Mayi

- balkanization, 150. *See also* decolonization
- Ball, George, 85. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- Bamako, 170
- Bamako Congress (1946), 170–171. *See also* African Democratic Rally (RDA)
- Bandung Conference (1955), 27–28, 36, 38, 59
- Bank of France, 175, 177–178
- Bashir, Omar al-, 206–208. *See also* Sudan
- Baudouin, King, 59. *See also* Belgium
- Bay of Pigs, 72. *See also* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Cuba
- Beira, 132
- Belgium, 18, 20, 22, 92, 108. *See also* Congo (Belgian); Lumumba, Patrice
- colonialism, 5–6, 7, 20, 59, 181, 212
- decolonization, 7, 19, 20, 30, 66–68, 79, 228
- economic interests in the Congo, 20, 30, 57, 60, 212
- mercenaries, 60, 72, 210–211
- military intervention in the Congo, 19, 30, 57–60, 63–66, 68, 71–73, 86
- political intervention in the Congo, 58, 69, 73–74
- settlers in the Congo, 19, 30, 59–60
- Ben Bella, Ahmed, 53. *See also* Algeria
- ben Yusuf, Mohammed, 46, 47. *See also* Morocco
- Benin, 175, 180, 188
- Berbera, 149, 151, 155
- Berlin Conference (1884–1885), 5
- Berlin Crisis (1961), 51–52, 84, 85
- Biafran secession. *See* Nigeria
- Biko, Steve, 109. *See also* South Africa
- bin Laden, Osama, 206–207. *See also* Afghanistan; al-Qaeda; global war on terror; mujahideen; Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989); Sudan; terrorism; terrorist attacks; United States CIA support, 206–207
- Black Consciousness Movement. *See* Biko, Steve; South Africa
- Boda, Biaka, 171. *See also* African Democratic Rally (RDA); Côte d'Ivoire
- Bokassa, Jean-Bédél, 184–185. *See also* Central African Republic
- Bolshevik Revolution, 112
- Bongo, Omar, 184. *See also* Gabon
- Botha, P. W., 110, 123, 128. *See also* Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS); South Africa
- total onslaught, 128
- total strategy, 128–129
- Botha, Roelof “Pik,” 110–111. *See also* South Africa
- Botswana, 104, 119, 128, 129
- Bourguiba, Habib, 46, 47. *See also* Tunisia
- Bowles, Chester, 85. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- Brazil, 221, 229
- Brazzaville Conference (1944), 168
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 26. *See also* Soviet Union
- Britain, 6, 18, 21, 22, 48–49, 57, 150, 168, 175. *See also* Congo (Belgian); South Africa; Suez Africa policies, 32, 79
- Colonial Office, 19
- decolonization, 7, 19–20, 30, 68, 79, 167–168, 228
- economic interests, 57, 92, 106, 121, 123
- empire, 20, 167
- mercenaries, 72
- military intervention, 32, 40–42, 43, 60
- oil interests, 36–37, 40, 43

- and Portugal, 84, 86
- repression, colonial, 18, 19
- socialism, 134
- trust territories, 21
- and the United Nations, 61, 84, 86, 108
- British East Africa, 150. *See also* Kenya
- British Secret Intelligence Service, 36–37, 41
- British Somaliland. *See* Somalia
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 154–155. *See also* United States
- Bulgaria, 175
- Burkina Faso, 175, 188, 200–201, 216
- Burundi, 73, 181. *See also* Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Bush, George H. W., 155. *See also* United States
 - administration, 155, 156, 159
- Bush, George W., 202, 217–218. *See also* global war on terror; United States
 - administration, 202, 213, 214–215
- Byrd Amendment, 118. *See also* Rhodesia; United States
- Byrnes, James F., 21. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- Cabinda Enclave. *See* Angola
- Cabral, Amílcar, 80, 89, 90. *See also* African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC); Cape Verde; Portuguese Guinea
 - assassination, 90–91, 92
- Caetano, Marcello, 87. *See also* Portugal
- Cameroon, 168. *See also* Cameroon, British; Cameroon, French
 - dictatorship, 182
 - German colony, 168, 172
 - independence, 182
 - national conference, 188
 - and RDA, 170–171
- Cameroon, British, 172, 182–189
 - League of Nations mandate, 172
 - UN trust, 172
- Cameroon, French, 18, 172, 177. *See also* Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC)
 - communism, 171–172
 - French military intervention, 165–166, 180, 181, 182
 - French repression, 165, 171–173, 175
 - and French Union, 171–172
 - independence struggle, 168–169, 171–173, 182
 - League of Nations mandate, 172
 - UN trust, 168, 170, 172, 175
- Camp Lemonnier, 215. *See also* Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA); Djibouti
- Canada, 62, 121, 123, 154, 210
- Cape Verde, 79, 80. *See also* African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC); Portugal; Portuguese Guinea
- capitalism, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 48
 - free market economics, 9–10, 20, 22, 26, 35, 48–49, 167–168, 196–197, 228
 - privatization, 9–10
- Caribbean, 134
- Carter, Jimmy, 109, 110, 111, 120, 153. *See also* United States
 - administration, 22, 109–110, 118, 147, 154–155, 205
 - and Ethiopia, 147
 - human rights, 109–110, 147, 155
 - and Rhodesia, 118, 120–121
 - and Somalia, 154–155
 - and South Africa, 109–110
- Castro, Fidel, 29. *See also* Cuba
- Catholic Church, 132
- Central Africa, 26, 30, 31, 57, 60, 79, 212, 221
- Central African Empire. *See* Central African Republic

- Central African Federation, 57–58, 60, 69. *See also* Northern Rhodesia; Nyasaland; Rhodesia
- Central African Republic, 165, 175, 180
- coup d'état, 184–185
- diamonds, 182, 184
- dictatorship, 184–185
- French military intervention, 165, 180, 181–182, 184–185
- national conference, 188
- uranium, 181–182, 184
- Central Asia, 218
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), xii, 23, 37, 41, 43, 63, 64, 65, 68, 72, 73, 85, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97–98, 113, 184, 187, 198, 199, 206, 214. *See also* United States
- Central Intelligence Organisation, 120–121, 130. *See also* Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO); Rhodesia
- CFA franc. *See* African Financial Community (CFA)
- Chad, 175, 180
- armed conflict, 185–187
- Christians, 185
- colonial legacy, 185
- corruption, 216–217
- coup d'état, 186, 217
- dictatorship, 185, 187, 216–217
- ethnic conflict, 186
- French military intervention, 165, 180, 181–182, 185–187
- human rights abuses, 216–217
- and Libya, 185–187
- Muslims, 185, 186
- national conference, 188
- OAU, 186–187
- oil, 181–182, 185
- and the United States, 186, 187, 216, 217
- uranium, 181–182, 185
- and Zaire, 187
- Chamoun, Camille, 42–43. *See also* Lebanon
- child soldiers, 199, 201. *See also* National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
- China, ancient, 4
- China, People's Republic of, xi, 3, 18, 27, 29, 39–40, 51, 63, 153, 154, 168, 175, 182, 184, 221, 229. *See also* Angola; Communist Party; Sino-Soviet split; Soviet Union
- and Bandung Conference, 27–28, 38
- civil war, 27
- Cold War, 27–29, 87
- economic aid, 27–28
- ideology, 27–28, 89, 119
- military aid, 28, 29, 31, 73, 83, 104, 113, 119, 155, 157, 182
- Soviet Union, friendship with, 27
- Soviet Union, rivalry with, 7, 8–9, 27, 28–29, 228
- and the United States, 8–9, 29
- China, Republic of (Taiwan), 39–40
- Chirau, Jeremiah, 120. *See also* Rhodesia; Zimbabwe
- Christianity, 4, 42–43, 103, 132, 145, 151, 157–158, 185, 199–200, 206
- civil rights movement. *See* United States
- civilizing mission, 24
- Clark Amendment, 98, 126. *See also* Angola; United States
- Clinton, Bill, 207. *See also* United States
- administration, 207, 210–211
- and Somalia, 205
- and Sudan, 207
- Cold War, xi, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12–13, 18, 19, 21, 30–31, 36, 83, 103, 112, 128, 131, 134, 135, 143, 145, 154–155, 156, 169, 193–195, 197–198, 208, 215, 218, 222, 227. *See also* China, People's Republic of; Cuba; Soviet Union; United States
- actors, xi–xii, 1–2, 3, 7, 13, 22–29, 35, 167, 194, 197, 205–206, 228

- détente, 96
 regional policemen, 8, 87, 198, 208
- colonial powers. *See* imperial powers
- colonialism, xi, 12–13, 73, 185. *See also* decolonization; liberation movements
- conquest, 5–6
- extraction, 6, 11, 27, 57, 59, 60, 79, 92, 128–129
- reform, 35, 45, 46, 166, 167–168, 173
- repression, 18, 59, 66, 80, 84
- resistance, 6, 8, 18–19, 27–28, 35–36, 66, 68, 80, 82
- Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 215, 218.
See also global war on terror
- Commonwealth, 19, 21, 42, 46, 105–106, 114, 116, 120, 134
- communism, xi, 7, 8–9, 14, 24, 26, 35, 59, 60, 68, 73, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 103, 109, 112–115, 118, 119, 128, 131, 134, 143, 145, 152, 153, 158, 159, 165, 166–167, 169, 170, 171–172, 180, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 195, 213, 215. *See also* Communist Party
- Communist Party, 38
 Algerian, 48
 Chinese, 27, 134
 Egyptian, 38, 43
 French, 45, 48, 52, 165, 166–167, 171, 182
 Portuguese, 81, 88–89
 South African, 112–115
 Soviet, 25, 26, 48, 154
- Community of Sant'Egidio, 132. *See also* Mozambique
- Comoros, 180
- Compaoré, Blaise, 200–201. *See also* Burkina Faso
- Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986), 25, 114. *See also* anti-apartheid movement; South Africa; United States
- Conakry, 90–91, 174. *See also* Guinea
- Conference of Asian and African States. *See* Bandung Conference (1955)
- Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), 82. *See also* African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC); Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); Tricontinental Conference (1966)
- Congo (Belgian), 13, 19, 20, 21, 30, 81, 85, 143, 181. *See also* Belgium; Katanga lobby; Lumumba, Patrice; Mobutu, Joseph-Désirée; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- African involvement in, 57, 63, 64, 68, 73
- army mutiny, 59
- and Belgium, 58–60, 62–66, 71–73
- and Britain, 59–61, 69, 71–72, 74
- commercial interests, 57, 58, 59–60, 61, 69
- Congo Crisis, 57–58, 65
- coup d'état, 58, 63, 69, 70, 74
- and Cuba, 58, 68, 71–72, 73–74
- independence, 20, 58, 59
- Katanga Province and secession, 57–58, 59–60, 62, 63, 64–65, 69, 70, 84, 208
- mercenaries, 60, 69, 72, 73, 74
- mineral wealth, 57, 58–59
- parliament, 63, 68
- People's Republic, 72–73
- political unrest, 58, 69, 70
- rebellion, 58, 70–74
- South Kasai, 57, 60, 62, 63, 70, 210

- Congo (Belgian) (*cont.*)
 and the Soviet Union, 26, 30, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 73, 228
 Stanleyville raid, 72–74, 86
 and the United Nations, 57, 60–62, 63, 64, 69, 70
 and the United States, 30, 57, 58, 59–61, 62, 65–66, 68–69, 70, 71, 72–73, 228
 uranium, 21, 57, 59
 Western powers, 58, 61–62, 71–72
 Congo, Democratic Republic of. *See* Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
 Congo, Republic of, 73, 175, 180, 188
 Congo-Brazzaville. *See* Congo, Republic of
 Congolese National Movement (MNC), 59, 69
 Congress Alliance, 112, 113. *See also* African National Congress (ANC)
 Congressional Black Caucus, 25. *See also* United States
 Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), 128–129. *See also* Botha, P. W.; South Africa
 constructive engagement. *See* Reagan, Ronald
 Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 220. *See also* Somalia
 Cordier, Andrew, 63. *See also* United Nations; United States
 Côte d'Ivoire, 18, 175–177, 180, 184, 199, 200–201
 and ECOWAS, 219–220
 French military intervention, 180, 195
 French repression, 171
 UN intervention, 195, 219–221
 Council on African Affairs, 103. *See also* anti-apartheid movement; United States
 Crèvecoeur, Jean-Marie, 66. *See also* Congo (Belgian); Tshombe, Moïse
 crimes against humanity, 12, 194. *See also* genocide; human rights; war crimes
 Crocker, Chester, 111, 124–125. *See also* Reagan, Ronald; United States; U.S. Department of State
 Cuba, xi–xii, 18. *See also* Castro, Fidel; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Guevara, Ernesto “Che”; Tricontinental Conference (1966)
 African solidarity, 29, 83, 90, 92, 113, 122, 149, 151, 153, 158, 182, 206
 and Angola, xii, 92, 93, 96–98, 125–126, 132, 155, 228
 anti-Castro Cubans, 68, 72, 73, 126
 Cold War, 29–30
 and Congo, 58, 68, 71–72, 73–74
 Cuban revolution, 29, 89
 soldiers in Africa, 31, 68, 72, 73, 96–97, 125, 126, 131, 132, 151, 152, 165, 166
 and the Soviet Union, 8–9, 29, 96, 98, 151, 228
 and the United States, 29
 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 86
 Cuito Cuanavale. *See* Angola
 Czechoslovakia, 7, 63, 90, 175
 arms deals, 39
 Dacko, David, 184–185. *See also* Central African Republic
 Dahomey. *See* Benin
 Dakar, 174
 Darfur, 12, 194, 220–221. *See also* Sudan
 and the African Union, 219–221
 ethnic cleansing, 194
 human rights abuses, 208
 and the United Nations, 220

- Dayal, Rajeshwar, 75. *See also* Congo (Belgian); United Nations
- de Gaulle, Charles, 51, 52, 168, 173–174, 183, 184. *See also* France
- Déby, Idriss, 187, 216–217. *See also* Chad
- decolonization 1, 2, 3, 6–7, 8, 12–13, 18, 19, 24, 25–26, 27, 29, 30–31, 44, 66–68, 83, 84, 134, 143, 150, 179, 222, 227–229. *See also* liberation movements
- Defense Appropriations Bill (1976). *See* Tunney Amendment
- democracy, 6, 10, 218. *See also* good governance; prodemocracy movements
- Democratic Movement for Malagasy Restoration (MDRM), 170. *See also* Madagascar
- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). *See* Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Denmark, 82, 90, 92. *See also* Nordic countries
- diamonds, 57, 92, 95, 122, 133, 182, 184, 201, 202, 210, 212
- Diego Garcia, 147
- Dien Bien Phu, 46. *See also* Indochina; Viet Minh; Vietnam
- Diori, Hamani, 182–184. *See also* Niger
- Djibouti, 148, 153, 168, 180, 189, 215, 218
- Doe, Samuel, 198–200, 201, 203. *See also* Liberia
- drug trafficking. *See* illicit activities
- Dulles, John Foster, 157. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- East Africa, 4, 57, 206–207, 215
- East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), 215–216. *See also* global war on terror
- Eastern Bloc, 7, 47, 92, 134, 154, 166, 172, 175, 182
- Eastern Europe, xi, 31, 152, 153, 172
aid to liberation movements, 31, 93, 104, 113, 122
- Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 200, 201, 202. *See also* Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 200, 201, 219–220. *See also* Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
- economy, 166. *See also* African Financial Community (CFA); capitalism; colonialism; International Monetary Fund (IMF); neocolonialism; World Bank
- balance of trade, 9
- colonial, 5–6, 8–9, 11
- commodity prices, 9, 196, 208
- corruption, 1, 8–11, 195, 197–198, 218
- debt crisis, 1–2, 10–11, 196, 206–208
- economic crisis, 2, 6–7, 8–11, 13–14, 166, 178, 188, 193, 195–198, 203, 206, 208, 213, 217, 218, 221, 228
- oil price increase, 9, 196
- unequal exchange, 9, 11
- Egypt, 4, 13, 28, 42, 43, 51. *See also* Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez; United Arab Republic
- aid to liberation movements, 53, 113
- and Algeria, 40, 44
- arms deal, 38–39
- Aswan High Dam, 39–40, 44
- and Baghdad Pact, 37–38, 44
- and Bandung Conference, 36, 38
- and Britain, 30, 35, 37, 38–42
- and France, 40, 42, 44
- Islamic militants, 37, 46, 214

- Egypt (*cont.*)
 and Israel, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44
 and Lebanon, 42
 and Palestine, 54
 radical nationalism, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 53–54
 and the Soviet Union, 26, 30, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43–44
 and the United States, 30, 37, 38–42, 44, 187, 207, 214, 217–218
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 22. *See also* United States
 administration, 22, 24, 37–38, 39–40, 45, 46, 49–50, 51, 52, 58, 62, 65, 68, 83, 113
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 42–43
- Elisabethville, 210. *See also* Lubumbashi
- empire. *See* Britain; France
- Eritrea, 21. *See also* Ethiopia
 annexation by Ethiopia, 21, 31, 145, 157, 160
 and Britain, 21, 157
 Christians, 158
 and Cuba, 144, 158, 228
 federation with Ethiopia, 21, 145, 157, 160
 human rights abuses, 160
 independence referendum, 157, 160
 independence struggle, 21, 31, 143, 145, 154, 156–160
 and Israel, 158
 Italian colony, 21, 144, 156–157
 liberated areas, 158
 Muslims, 157, 158
 and the Soviet Union, 143, 157, 158
 and the United Nations, 21, 145, 157, 160
 and the United States, 21, 145, 157, 215–216, 217–218
- Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 157, 158, 159. *See also* Eritrea
 external assistance, 157–158
- Eritrean Liberation Movement, 157
- Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), 158, 159, 160. *See also* Eritrea
 external assistance, 158, 159
 Marxism, 158, 159
- Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998–2000), 160
- Ethiopia, 4, 21, 22, 26, 149. *See also* Eritrea; Somali-Ethiopian War (1977–1978)
 aid to liberation movements, 113, 157, 206
 and Britain, 21, 144–145, 150, 152
 and China, 153, 157
 Christians, 145, 151
 coup d'état, 26, 143, 146
 and Cuba, 31, 158
 Derg, 146–147, 149, 153, 158
 economic crisis, 146
 empire, 144, 150, 151, 156, 157
 and Eritrea, 144–145, 151, 156–160
 ethnic minorities, 151
 famine, 145–146, 154
 feudalism, 21, 143, 145, 146
 human rights abuses, 145–146, 147, 153, 154, 160
 insurgencies, 31, 151, 154, 159
 internal dissent, 145, 146, 151
 and Israel, 152, 158, 159
 and Italy, 21, 144–145, 152
 Kagnew communications station, 145, 147
 Marxism-Leninism, 26, 143, 146, 149, 151, 153, 154, 158, 159
 Muslims, 145, 151
 and the OAU, 150–151
 Ogaden and Haud, 21–22, 144–145, 149–150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 158–159
 overthrow of Haile Selassie, 146
 overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam, 154
 prodemocracy movement, 146
 Red Terror, 146, 153, 154
 separatist movements, 31, 143–144, 145

- socialism, 146, 153
 and Somalia, 21, 31, 143, 150–153
 and the Soviet Union, 26, 31, 143, 147, 149, 151–152, 153–154, 155, 158–159, 206, 228
 and the United Nations, 21
 and the United States, 26, 30–31, 143, 144–147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156, 159–160, 207, 215, 216, 217–218
 and World War II, 21, 144–145, 150
- Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, 146
- Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 159. *See also* Ethiopia
- ethnic conflict, 1, 186, 193, 198
- ethnic cleansing, 12, 193, 194, 209
- European Community, 114
- European Economic and Monetary Union, 189
- European Economic Community, 177
- European Union, 220
- Evian Accords (1962). *See* Algeria
- External Documentation and Counterespionage Service (SDECE), 175, 176, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185. *See also* France
- failed states. *See* state collapse
- Faisal II, King, 37–38. *See also* Iraq
- Fanon, Frantz, 52. *See also* Algeria
- Farouk, King, 37. *See also* Egypt
- Fashoda complex, 181. *See also* France
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 216
- Federal Republic of Germany. *See* Germany, West
- Finland, 82, 90. *See also* Nordic countries
- First Congo War (1996–1997), 209–211. *See also* Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL); Hutu; Rwanda; Tutsi; Uganda; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Flintlock 2005, 216. *See also* global war on terror; Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI)
- Foccart, Jacques, 176, 183, 184, 185. *See also* France
- Foote Mineral, 118. *See also* Rhodesia lobby
- Ford, Gerald, 214–215. *See also* Kissinger, Henry; United States administration, 23, 83, 92, 94, 98, 109, 147
 and Rhodesia, 119–120
- foreign intervention, 18, 19. *See also* African Union; Belgium; Cuba; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Ethiopia; France; Libya; Rwanda; Somalia; South Africa; Soviet Union; Uganda; United Nations; United States
- economic, 5–6, 8–11
- extracontinental, xi–xiii, 1–3, 7, 12, 13, 227–228, 229–230
- humanitarian, xiii, 2, 12, 221, 227–228, 229–230
- intracontinental, xi–xiii, 2, 3, 13–14, 227–228, 229
- military, 1, 2–3, 4–5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 19, 31–32, 227–230
- peacekeeping, 2, 3, 227–228, 229–230
- political, 1, 2–3
- precolonial, 4–5, 12
- proxy forces, xii–xiii, 7, 13–14, 23, 94, 125–126, 130, 131, 186, 187, 198, 210–211, 212, 227, 228
- Four Freedoms, 169. *See also* Roosevelt, Franklin D.
- Fourteen Points, 169–172. *See also* Wilson, Woodrow
- franc zone. *See* African Financial Community (CFA)

- France, 6, 7, 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 22, 150. *See also* Bank of France; Brazzaville Conference (1944); Cameroon, French; Central African Republic; Chad; Communist Party; External Documentation and Counterespionage Service (SDECE); Fashoda complex; Franco-African summits; French Community; French Union; Gabon; Guinea; Indochina; Madagascar; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Socialist Party; South Africa; Vichy; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- 1946 Constituent Assembly, 170
- 1946 constitution, 168–169, 170
- 1958 constitution, 20, 51, 173
- Africa Cell, 176–177
- Africa policies, 31, 79, 165, 166, 176–177, 188–189
- Anglophone menace, 13, 165, 166, 172, 180–181, 182–183, 184, 188, 200–201, 208, 210
- Arab threat, 180, 181, 185
- and Britain, 180–181
- chasse gardée, 181
- civilizing mission, 168
- colonial development, 173, 185
- communism, 8–9, 165, 166–167, 170, 171, 172, 180, 181, 182–184, 185, 187, 188
- and Congo (Belgian), 59, 69, 71–72
- cooperation agreements, 20, 31, 176–180, 184
- coup attempt, 51
- decolonization, 7, 19, 20, 30, 68, 79, 165, 166–168, 169–175, 179–180, 228
- democracy, 166, 188–189
- dictators, 166, 176, 182–189
- economic agreements, 13, 20, 31, 175, 176, 177–178, 184, 228
- economic interests, 46, 106, 117, 122, 123, 176, 177, 178, 181–182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189
- economy, 166–167, 173, 189
- empire, 20, 46, 49, 51, 167–168, 173, 175, 181
- Fifth Republic, 20
- and Germany, 45, 53
- loi-cadre, 173
- mercenaries, 60, 72, 188, 210–211
- military agreements, 13, 20, 31, 175, 176, 178–180, 184
- military aid, 93, 186, 187, 189, 208
- military bases, 180, 183, 184, 189
- military intervention, 13, 31, 40, 42, 50, 59, 165–166, 176, 177, 178, 180–188, 210–211, 228
- Nazi occupation and resistance, 166
- neocolonialism, 165, 175–180, 228
- overseas territories, 51, 168–169, 171, 173
- personalization of politics, 176, 177
- and Portugal, 82, 84, 86
- pré carré, 181
- referendums, 51, 170, 173–174
- reforms, colonial, 20, 46, 51, 165, 168, 173
- repression, colonial, 18, 46, 49–50, 165, 167, 170, 171–173
- soldiers in Africa, 165, 179–180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187–188, 189
- and the Soviet Union, 45, 52, 185, 187–188
- Treasury, 177–178
- UN trust territories, 168, 170–172, 175–176
- and the United Nations, 61, 84, 86, 108
- and the United States, 44–45, 46, 49–50, 51–52, 54, 108, 165, 166, 167–168, 169–170, 179–181, 184, 185

- and World War II, 166, 167–168, 169
- Franco-African summits, 176, 188–189
- Francophone Africa, 13, 22, 35, 40, 165, 170, 173, 176–177, 181, 187–189, 208. *See also* prodemocracy movements
- francophonie, la. *See* Francophone Africa
- Free French, 51, 168. *See also* France
- Free South Africa Movement, 25, 104, 135. *See also* anti-apartheid movement
- French Community, 51, 173, 174, 175, 177. *See also* France
- French Equatorial Africa, 20, 168, 170, 175
- French Guiana, 168
- French Guinea. *See* Guinea
- French North Africa, 44
 - and the Soviet Union, 45
 - and the United States, 45, 46
- French Republic. *See* French Union
- French Somaliland. *See* Djibouti
- French Soudan. *See* Mali
- French Union, 46, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175. *See also* France
 - associated territories and states, 168–169, 170
 - French Republic, 46, 168, 170–171
 - metropolitan France, 168
 - overseas departments, 168
 - overseas territories, 51, 168–169, 171, 173
 - secession, 168–169, 173–174
- French West Africa, 20, 168, 170, 175
- Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 28, 80–81, 131, 158. *See also* Mozambique
 - and Britain, 131
 - and China, 28, 91, 92
 - and the Soviet Union, 28, 92
 - and the United States, 86, 92
- Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, 93. *See also* Angola
- Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT), 185. *See also* Chad
- Frontline States, 104, 119, 120, 129
 - aid to liberation movements, 104, 119, 129
- Gabon, 175, 176–177, 180, 189
 - and Biafran secession, 184
 - coup d'état, 184
 - dictatorship, 184
 - French military intervention, 165, 180, 181–182, 184
 - national conference, 188
 - oil, 181–182, 184
 - uranium, 181–182, 184
- Gambia, 200
- Gaza Strip, 37
- Gbenye, Christophe, 71. *See also* Congo (Belgian); Simba rebellion
- General Confederation of Labor (CGT), 171. *See also* African Democratic Rally (RDA); Communist Party; France
- General Motors, 106. *See also* South Africa; United States
- Geneva Conference. *See* Rhodesia
- genocide, xii, 2–3, 11–12, 181, 193, 194, 195, 208–209. *See also* crimes against humanity; human rights; war crimes
- German Democratic Republic. *See* Germany, East
- Germany, 5–6, 11, 45, 121, 167, 168
- Germany, East, 7, 73, 95, 122, 149, 152, 158, 159
- Germany, West, 52, 53, 82, 89, 91, 92, 105, 106, 115, 122, 123, 125, 148, 152, 175. *See also* Berlin Crisis (1961)

- Ghana, 28, 175
 aid to liberation movements, 53–54, 90, 173, 182
 and Congo (Belgian), 61, 63–64, 65–66, 73
 and ECOWAS, 200
 and neocolonialism, 9
- Gio, 199–200. *See also* Liberia
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, 186. *See also* France
- Gizenga, Antoine, 68–69. *See also* Congo (Belgian)
 deputy prime minister, 68
 rebel regime, 68, 69
 and the Soviet Union, 68
- global war on terror, 1, 2, 3, 12, 13–14, 195, 212–219, 227–229. *See also* Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA); East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); Flintlock 2005; Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS); Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP); terrorism; terrorist attacks; U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM); U.S. Special Operations Command
- assassinations, 214–215
 executive orders, 214–215
 impact on local populations, 12, 13–14, 215, 216–217, 218–219
 militarization of U.S. aid, 13–14, 195, 213, 215–219, 228–229
 U.S. counterterrorism initiatives, xiv, 195, 207–208, 213, 214–219, 221–222, 228–229
- good governance, 178, 197, 216, 218, 219. *See also* democracy; Franco-African summits; International Monetary Fund (IMF); prodemocracy movements; World Bank
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 154. *See also* Soviet Union
- Goukouni Oueddei, 186–187. *See also* Chad
- Great Britain. *See* Britain
- Great Lakes countries, 209, 211, 212–213
- Greater Zaire, 93
- Greece, empire, 3–5
- Guadeloupe, 168
- guerrilla warfare. *See* armed struggle; liberation movements
- Guevara, Ernesto “Che,” 71, 73, 74. *See also* Congo (Belgian); Cuba; Kabila, Laurent; Simba rebellion
- Guinea, 28, 201–206
 aid to liberation movements, 90–91, 173
 and Congo (Belgian), 61, 63–64, 73
 and ECOWAS, 200
 French retaliation, 165, 174–175
 independence referendum, 173–174, 175
 and Liberia, 200, 201
 and PAIGC, 89–91
 Portuguese invasion, 90
 and the Soviet Union, 26, 90
- Guinea-Bissau, 91. *See also* Portuguese Guinea
- Gulf of Aden, 147, 149, 150, 215
- Gulf Oil, 88. *See also* Angola
- Habré, Hissène, 186–187. *See also* Chad
- Haig, Alexander, 110–111, 124–125. *See also* United States
- Hammarskjöld, Dag, 62, 64. *See also* Congo (Belgian); United Nations
- Haud. *See* Ethiopia
- Hawiye, 203. *See also* Somalia
- Herero, 122. *See also* Namibia

- HIV/AIDS pandemic, [11](#)
- Ho Chi Minh, [169–172](#). *See also* [Viet Minh](#); [Vietnam](#)
- Horn of Africa, [4](#), [13](#), [26](#), [31](#),
[143–145](#), [148](#), [151](#), [153](#), [154](#), [160](#),
[206](#), [207](#), [215](#), [218](#), [229](#). *See also*
[Djibouti](#); [Eritrea](#); [Ethiopia](#);
[Somalia](#)
- al-Qaeda, [206–207](#)
- Cold War intervention, [13](#),
[142–143](#), [144](#), [160](#), [205–206](#)
- destabilization, [13](#), [144](#), [160](#)
- Marxist-Leninist confederation,
[153](#)
- militarization, [144](#)
- regional rivalries, [13](#), [143](#), [144](#),
[156](#), [160](#)
- Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, [171](#), [200](#).
See also [African Democratic Rally \(RDA\)](#); [Côte d'Ivoire](#)
- human rights, [135](#), [155](#). *See also*
[crimes against humanity](#);
[genocide](#); [humanitarian intervention](#); [United Nations](#);
[war crimes](#)
- abuses, [xiii](#), [12](#), [110](#), [145–146](#), [147](#),
[154](#), [170](#), [171](#), [172–173](#), [182](#), [187](#),
[193](#), [201](#), [202](#), [203](#), [209](#),
[216–217](#), [221](#), [222](#), [229](#)
- and French policy, [188–189](#)
- and U.S. policy, [109](#), [110](#), [111](#),
[147](#), [167–169](#), [213](#), [218–219](#)
- humanitarian intervention, [xiii](#), [2](#),
[12](#), [221](#), [227–228](#), [229](#)
- Hungary, [40](#)
- Hutu, [181](#), [208–210](#). *See also*
[Rwanda](#); [Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo \(DRC\)](#)
- Idi Amin, [xii](#), [32](#). *See also*
[Uganda](#)
- illicit activities, [133](#), [193](#), [194](#), [197](#),
[201–202](#), [209](#), [211–213](#),
[215–216](#), [217](#), [219–221](#)
- imperial powers, [xi–xii](#), [1–2](#), [6–7](#),
[8–9](#), [13](#), [18](#), [19](#), [20](#), [21](#), [22](#), [30](#),
[31](#), [35](#), [40](#), [60–61](#), [69](#), [83](#), [167](#),
[168](#), [176](#), [179](#), [202](#), [228](#). *See also*
[Belgium](#); [Britain](#); [France](#);
[Portugal](#)
- imperialism, [5–6](#), [10](#), [27](#), [35](#), [38](#), [48](#),
[59](#), [60](#), [66](#), [83](#), [112](#), [166](#), [168](#),
[173](#). *See also* [Belgium](#); [Britain](#);
[France](#); [Portugal](#)
- U.S., [48](#)
- Western, [25–26](#), [27](#), [38](#), [60](#), [65](#)
- independence, African, [6–7](#), [8](#), [18](#),
[19](#), [20](#), [21](#), [24](#), [61](#), [66–68](#), [77](#), [79](#),
[83](#), [88](#), [94](#), [103](#), [104](#), [109](#), [121](#),
[145](#), [147](#), [157](#), [165](#), [166](#), [168](#), [170](#),
[172](#), [173–174](#), [175–176](#), [179](#), [180](#),
[182–189](#), [219–220](#)
- India, [3–5](#), [75](#), [134](#), [221](#), [229](#)
- Indian Ocean, [3–5](#), [143](#), [147](#), [149](#),
[150](#), [157](#), [169–170](#), [180](#), [215](#),
[217–218](#). *See also* [Comoros](#);
[Diego Garcia](#); [Madagascar](#);
[Réunion](#); [slave trades](#); [trade](#)
- Indochina, [20](#), [27](#), [46](#), [60](#), [166](#), [167](#),
[168](#), [169–172](#), [173](#). *See also*
[Vietnam](#)
- Indonesia, [4](#), [27](#), [51](#)
- Indus Valley, [4](#)
- industrial revolution, [5–6](#)
- Intergovernmental Authority on
 Development (IGAD), [219–221](#)
- internal settlement. *See* [Namibia](#);
[Rhodesia](#)
- International Court of Justice, [122](#)
- international law, [12](#), [117–118](#), [123](#),
[194–195](#)
- International Monetary Fund
 (IMF), [8–10](#), [178](#). *See also*
[capitalism](#); [neocolonialism](#);
[World Bank](#)
- neoliberal norms, [9–10](#)
- and South Africa, [111–112](#)
- structural adjustment programs,
[9–10](#), [196–197](#), [206](#), [228](#)
- and Zaire, [208](#)
- International Security Assistance
 and Arms Export Control
 Act (1976). *See* [Clark Amendment](#)

- international terrorism. *See* global war on terror; terrorism; terrorist attacks
- Invisible Children, 221. *See also* Kony, Joseph; Lord's Resistance Army; Uganda
- Iran, 152, 155. *See also* Mossadegh, Mohammad
 American hostages, 155
 and Britain, 36–37
 coup d'état, 36–37
 oil, 36–37
 revolution, 155
 Shah, 155
 and the United States, 36–37, 155
- Iraq, 51, 157–158
 anticommunism, 43
 Ba'ath Party coup d'état, 43
 Baghdad Pact, 37–38, 43, 44
 and Britain, 43
 Egypt, rivalry with, 37
 and Israel, 43
 monarchy, 37–38
 oil, 43
 opposition movements, 43
 pro-Nasser coup d'état, 43
 pro-Western regime, 37–38, 42, 43
 and the United States, 43, 214
- Ireland, 113
- Islam, 4, 216–217. *See also* Islamism
 Algeria, 48
 Egypt, 46
 Somalia, 153, 155, 156, 203
 Sudan, 206–208
- Islamic Courts Union, 214. *See also* Somalia
- Islamism, 46, 156, 160, 201, 203, 206–208, 213–214, 215, 216, 217, 218–219, 227–228. *See also* jihad
- Israel, 7, 30, 32, 40, 44, 54, 72–73. *See also* Egypt; France; South Africa
 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 88, 106, 179–185
 and Egypt, 7, 37, 38–39, 40–42, 44
 and Ethiopia, 152, 158, 159
 occupied territories, 214
 Six-Day War (1967), 7, 44, 106
 and South Africa, 7, 31, 106–107
 Suez War (1956), 7, 30
- Italian East Africa. *See* Italy
- Italian Somaliland. *See* Somalia
- Italy, 18, 21, 72, 91, 113, 132, 148, 150, 152. *See also* Eritrea; Libya; Somalia; World War II
 African colonies, 5–6, 18, 21–22, 144–145, 147, 150, 151, 157
 decolonization, 21–22, 31, 157
 and Ethiopia, 21, 144–145, 152
- Japan, 105, 114, 168, 169, 202
- jihad, 205, 206–207. *See also* Islamism
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 22. *See also* United States
 administration, 22, 24–25, 70–71, 83, 86–87, 92, 108, 116
 and Congo (Belgian), 70–74
 and Portugal, 83, 86–87
- Jordan, 37–38, 51
 opposition movements, 42–43
 pro-Western regime, 42–43
- Judaism, 4
- Kabila, Laurent, 71. *See also* Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL); Congo (Belgian); Simba rebellion; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
 corruption, 211
 dictator, 211
 and First Congo War, 209–211
 Guevara's assessment of, 73
 overthrow of Mobutu, 74, 211
 rebel leader, 71, 73, 209, 210–211
 and Second Congo War, 211–212
 and the United States, 211

- Kagnew communications station.
See Ethiopia
- Kamerun. *See* Cameroon;
 Cameroon, British; Cameroon,
 French
- Kasavubu, Joseph, 63, 64. *See also*
 Congo (Belgian)
- Katanga lobby, 69, 70, 85, 118. *See also*
 Congo (Belgian)
- Katanga secession. *See* Congo
 (Belgian); Katanga lobby
- Kaunda, Kenneth, 134. *See also*
 Zambia
- Kennedy, John F., 50. *See also*
 United States
 administration, 22, 24–25, 43, 52,
 64–65, 66–69, 82, 83–86, 87, 90,
 92, 107–108, 111, 115, 148
 Africa policy, 66–68, 83, 86, 87,
 92, 107, 108, 109, 115
 and Algeria, 50
 and Congo (Belgian), 64–65,
 68–69, 70, 83
 and Portugal, 83–86, 87, 90
 and South Africa, 107–108
- Kenya, 19, 32, 73, 148, 150, 207,
 215, 216, 217–218
- Khartoum, 207
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 25, 38, 40, 60.
See also Soviet Union
 peaceful coexistence, 27
- Kinshasa, 208, 211. *See also*
 Léopoldville
- Kisangani, 210. *See also* Stanleyville
- Kissinger, Henry, 86–87, 88–89, 94,
 147. *See also* United States; U.S.
 Department of State
 and Angola, 94
 National Security Study
 Memorandum 39, 87
 and Rhodesia, 119–120
- Kolingba, André, 185. *See also*
 Central African Republic
- Kolwezi, 187–188
- Kony, Joseph, 221. *See also* Lord's
 Resistance Army; Uganda
- Korea, North, 51, 93, 122
- Korean War, 153
- Kosygin, Alexei, 26. *See also* Soviet
 Union
- Krahn, 198–200, 201. *See also*
 Liberia
- Kremlin. *See* Soviet Union
- Kuwait, 149
- La Baule. *See* Franco-African
 summits
- Lake Tanganyika, 73–74
- Lancaster House Agreement. *See*
 Rhodesia
- Lancaster House Conference. *See*
 Rhodesia
- land, xii, 6, 221, 229
- Latin America, xi–xii, 8, 22, 25, 27,
 29, 36, 61, 181
- law, international. *See* international
 law
- League of Nations, 121. *See also*
 Cameroon, British; Cameroon,
 French; Namibia; Togo
 mandates, 121–122, 168, 172
- Lebanon, 38, 51
 Christians, 42–43
 domestic unrest, 42–43
 Muslims, 42–43
 opposition movements, 42–43
 pro-Western regime, 42–43
 U.S. invasion, 42–43, 51, 84
- Leopold II, King, 5–6. *See also*
 Belgium
- Léopoldville, 63. *See also* Kinshasa
- Lesotho, 128–129
- liberation movements, 7, 8, 21, 26,
 27, 79–82, 87, 89, 92–94, 103,
 104, 105, 109, 112, 113, 119, 122,
 128, 129, 130, 134, 135, 154, 157,
 158, 168
 external assistance, 7–8, 30–31, 51,
 53–54, 89, 103, 104, 118–119,
 128, 129, 134
 and the OAU, 8, 83, 90, 92, 113,
 119

- Liberia, 175, 195, 197–198
 Americo-Liberians, 198–199
 army, 198–199, 202
 Christians, 199–200
 civil war, 11–12, 199–203
 class conflict, 199
 corruption, 198–199, 201–202, 228–229
 coup d'état, 198–199
 dictatorship, 198–199, 228–229
 economic crisis, 195, 198–199, 202–203
 and ECOWAS, 200–201, 202
 elections, 202
 ethnic conflict, 198–200, 201–202
 and France, 200–202
 and Francophone countries, 200–201
 Muslims, 199, 200
 and Nigeria, 200–201, 202
 peace agreement, 202
 rebel groups, 199–202, 203
 religious conflict, 199–200
 repression, 198–200
 resources, 200, 201–202, 228–229
 and the United States, 198, 199–200, 201–202, 213, 217–218, 228–229
- Libya, 51, 185. *See also* Chad; Sudan; World War II
 aid to African insurgencies, 185–187, 199, 200
 Cold War, 21
 coup d'état, 185
 independence, 21, 145, 157
 and Italy, 21
 NATO air strikes, 195, 217
 oil, 36
 overthrow of Qaddafi, 217
 pan-Arabism, 185–186
 and the Soviet Union, 21, 186
 and the United Nations, 21, 157, 195
 and the United States, 44, 186, 187, 199, 205–206, 216
 linkage. *See* Reagan, Ronald
 Lobito, 132
- local autonomy. *See* self-government
 loi-cadre. *See* France
 Lord's Resistance Army, 221. *See also* Uganda
 Luanda, 81, 83, 94, 95, 96, 97
 Lubumbashi, 210. *See also* Elisabethville
 Lumumba, Patrice, 59, 64. *See also* Congo (Belgian)
 assassination, 58, 62–63, 64–65
 and Belgium, 58–59, 60, 62–63, 64–65, 66
 capture, 64
 coup d'état, 58, 63
 house arrest, 63, 64
 independence day speech, 59
 prime minister, 58, 59
 and the Soviet Union, 62, 63, 64, 65
 and the United Nations, 60, 61–62, 63, 64–65
 and the United States, 59, 62–63, 64
 Lumumbists, 69, 70, 71, 72
 Lunda, 95. *See also* Angola
 Lutheran church, 122, 134
- Machel, Samora, 92. *See also* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Mozambique
 Macmillan, Harold, 6. *See also* Britain
 Madagascar, 18, 168, 175, 180, 200, 218
 French military intervention, 170, 180
 French repression, 165, 167, 170
 independence struggle, 169–170
 national conference, 188
 parliamentarians, 170
 revolt, 170
 Maghreb, 4
 Malagasy. *See* Madagascar
 Malawi, 128–129. *See also* Central African Federation; Nyasaland
 Malaysia, 134

- Mali, 26, 28, 175, 188
 al-Qaeda, 217
 coup d'état, 217
 Tuareg insurgency, 217
 and the United States, 216, 217
- Malinke. *See* Mandingo
- Malloum, Félix, 186. *See also* Chad
- Mandela, Nelson, 112–113, 114, 115.
See also African National Congress (ANC); South Africa; Umkhonto we Sizwe
- Mandingo, 199–200, 201. *See also* Liberia
- Mano, 199–200. *See also* Liberia
- Mao Zedong, 27. *See also* China, People's Republic of
- Maoist ideology, 28, 81, 119, 153
- Marshall Plan, 45
- Martinique, 168
- Marxism-Leninism. *See* communism
- Massawa, 145, 158, 159
- Mau Mau insurgency. *See* Kenya
- Mauritania, 175, 180, 188, 216
- M'ba, Léon, 184. *See also* Gabon
- Mbuji-Mayi, 210. *See also* Bakwanga
- Mbundu, 81. *See also* Angola
- Mecca, 44, 214
- Medina, 214
- Mediterranean Ocean, 5
- Meles Zenawi, 160. *See also* Ethiopia; Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
- Menelik II, Emperor, 144. *See also* Ethiopia
- Mengistu Haile Mariam, 146, 147, 153, 154, 160, 207. *See also* Ethiopia
- mercantilism. *See* France; neocolonialism
- mercenaries, 60, 69, 72, 73, 74, 95–97, 98, 188, 194, 210–211. *See also* Angola; Belgium; Britain; Congo (Belgian); France; Portugal; Rhodesia; Serbia; South Africa; Ukraine; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Middle Congo. *See* Congo, Republic of
- Middle East
 and Africa, 220–221, 229
 Cold War, 35, 36, 38–39, 40, 42, 44–45, 84–85, 143, 145, 198
 colonialism, 21
 decolonization, 36, 38–39, 44–45
 nationalism, 35, 42, 44, 45, 214
 oil, 36, 44–45, 143, 147, 151, 155, 213, 214
 pan-Arabism, 36, 185–186
 repressive regimes, 35, 42–43, 214
- Middle Passage. *See* slave trades
- Military Procurement Authorization Act (1971). *See* Byrd Amendment
- militias, 156, 160, 203, 204, 205, 209
- minerals. *See* illicit activities; resource wars; resources, African
- missionaries, 69
- Mitterrand, François, 186, 188–189. *See also* France
- Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré, 59, 64, 208, 211, 212. *See also* Congo (Belgian); First Congo War (1996–1997); Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
 army chief of staff, 59, 63
 corruption, 208–209
 coup d'état, 63, 69, 70, 74
 dictatorship, 74, 181, 208–209
 and FNLA, 81, 93
 and France, 187–188, 208, 209–211
 overthrow of, 209, 210–211
 and the United States, 63, 70, 73, 74, 188, 208, 210–211
- Mobutu Sese Seko. *See* Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré
- Mogadishu, 149, 151, 155, 203, 204–205
- Mohamed, Ali Mahdi, 203. *See also* Somalia; United Somali Congress

- Momoh, Joseph, 201. *See also* Sierra Leone
- Mondlane, Eduardo, 80. *See also* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Mozambique
 assassination, 92
 and the United States, 80, 86, 92
 money laundering. *See* illicit activities
- Monroe Doctrine, 181
- Monrovia, 200
- Morocco, 4, 51, 63, 168, 187–188
 aid to liberation movements, 113
 independence, 46–47
 Islamic militants, 46–47, 214
 political unrest, 46
 repression, colonial, 46
 and the Soviet Union, 46–47
 and the United States, 44, 47, 214, 216
- Mossadegh, Mohammad, 36–37. *See also* Iran
- Mozambique, 19, 21, 30, 79, 104, 117, 129. *See also* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
 and African National Congress, 130, 131
 aid to liberation movements, 118, 119, 130
 Beira oil pipeline and refinery, 130
 and Britain, 131
 destabilization, 120, 128, 129, 130–131, 193
 elections, 132
 independence, 88
 liberated zones, 91
 liberation movements, 80
 liberation struggle, 28, 80, 89, 91–92, 93
 Nkomati Accord (1984), 131
 Rome General Peace Accords (1992), 132
 settlers, 19, 103
 socialism, 130
 and South Africa, xii, 129, 130–131
 and the Soviet Union, xii, 26, 28, 131
 and the United States, xii, 87, 92, 131
- Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), 130–131. *See also* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Mozambique; RENAMO lobby
 and Rhodesia, 130
 sabotage, 130–131
 and South Africa, 130, 131
 terror tactics, 130–131
- Mubarak, Hosni, 207. *See also* Egypt
- mujahideen, 206–207. *See also* Afghanistan; al-Qaeda; bin Laden, Osama; Islamism; Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989); Sudan
 CIA support, 206–207
- Mulele, Pierre, 71. *See also* Congo (Belgian); Simba rebellion
- Muzorewa, Abel, 120–121. *See also* Rhodesia; United African National Council; Zimbabwe
- Namibia, 107, 211–212. *See also* South West Africa National Union (SWANU); South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
 African reserves, 121
 and Angola, 122, 123, 212
 apartheid, 121
 Caprivi Strip, 212
 constituent assembly, 127
 constitution, 124–125, 127
 diamonds, 121–122
 elections, 123–125, 127
 foreign investment, 121, 123
 German colony, 121

- illegal occupation, 26, 31, 92, 95,
 103, 105, 119, 122–123, 131
 independence, 104, 122, 124–128,
 134
 internal settlement, 122–124
 League of Nations mandate,
 121–122
 liberation struggle, 13, 26, 105,
 124–125, 128
 minerals, 121–122
 sanctions, 121–123
 settlers, 19, 26, 31, 104
 and South Africa, 26, 31, 92, 95,
 103, 111–112, 121–128, 131, 134
 and the Soviet Union, 26, 31, 122,
 125–126
 Turnhalle Conference (1975),
 122–123
 and the United Nations, 122–125,
 126–127, 134
 uranium, 122
 U.S. investments, 122
 U.S. policies, 31, 124–125,
 134–135
 Western Contact Group, 123–125
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 13, 37, 40, 53,
 59. *See also* Bandung
 Conference (1955); Communist
 Party; Egypt; Non-Aligned
 Movement; Suez
 anticommunism, 38, 43–44
 coup d'état, 37
 neutralism and nonalignment, 13,
 38
 pan-Arabism, 36, 46, 59
 national conferences. *See*
 prodemocracy movements
 National Front for the Liberation of
 Angola (FNLA), 81. *See also*
 Angola; Zaire/Democratic
 Republic of Congo (DRC)
 anticommunism, 81
 attack near Luanda, 83–84, 94–97
 and China, 29, 93, 97, 228
 ideology, 81
 membership, 81, 94
 and MPLA, 81–82, 85, 94
 racism, 81
 and South Africa, 95, 98
 and the United States, 29, 85, 86,
 92–95
 National Liberation Front (FLN),
 44, 47–54. *See also* Algeria
 anticommunism, 48, 54
 radical nationalism, 44
 National Patriotic Front of Liberia
 (NPFL), 199–200, 201, 202. *See*
 also Liberia; Taylor, Charles
 and Francophone countries,
 200–201
 and Libya, 199, 200
 and Revolutionary United Front,
 201
 Small Boy Units, 199
 national security advisor, 86–87, 94,
 154
 National Security Council. *See*
 United States
 National Security Study
 Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39),
 87
 National Union for the Total
 Independence of Angola
 (UNITA), 29, 81, 93–96, 210.
 See also Angola; Clark
 Amendment; Tunney
 Amendment; UNITA lobby;
 Zaire/Democratic Republic of
 Congo (DRC)
 anticommunism, 81
 and China, 29, 93, 228
 ideology, 81
 Maoism, 81
 membership, 81, 94
 and MPLA, xii, 81–82
 and Portugal, 81–82
 racism, 81
 sabotage, 132
 and South Africa, 95, 98, 125,
 131–133
 and the United States, 29, 85, 95,
 126, 132, 199, 208

- nationalism, 12–13, 197. *See also*
 Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
 Organization; Bandung
 Conference (1955); Conference
 of Nationalist Organizations of
 the Portuguese Colonies
 (CONCP); Non-Aligned
 Movement; Organization of
 African Unity (OAU);
 Organization of Solidarity with
 the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and
 Latin America; pan-African
 movement; pan-Arab
 movement; pan-Islamic
 movement; Tricontinental
 Conference (1966)
- African, 6, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 50,
 66, 81, 85, 87, 157
- radical, 7, 8–9, 13, 24, 30, 35–37,
 42–43, 44, 46, 53–54, 58–61, 68,
 71, 83, 84, 85, 103, 123, 165,
 166–175
- natural resources. *See* resources,
 African; resource wars
- Ndebele, 119. *See also* Rhodesia
- neocolonialism, 1–2, 9–10, 28, 30,
 73, 79, 165, 175–180, 228. *See
 also* capitalism; International
 Monetary Fund (IMF); World
 Bank
- neoliberalism. *See* International
 Monetary Fund (IMF); World
 Bank
- Netherlands, the, 90, 92, 113
- Neto, Agostinho, 81, 93. *See also*
 Angola; Popular Movement for
 the Liberation of Angola
 (MPLA)
- New World, 5
- Niger, 175
 coup d'état, 182
 French military intervention, 165,
 180–188, 189
 human rights abuses, 217
 national conference, 188
 rebellion, 182–183
- Tuaregs, 217
 and the United States, 216, 217
 uranium, 181–184
- Nigeria, 120, 149, 181, 187
 Biafran secession, 181, 184
 civil war, 32, 181, 184
 and ECOWAS, 200–202
 French involvement, 181, 182, 183,
 184
 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
 Partnership, 216
- Nigerien Democratic Union, 171,
 182. *See also* African Democratic
 Rally (RDA); Niger; Sawaba
- Nimeiri, Jaafar, 157, 206. *See also*
 Sudan
- Nixon, Richard M., 23. *See also*
 Kissinger, Henry; United States
 administration, 23, 82, 83, 86–88,
 109, 117–118
 and China, 29
 and Portugal, 86–89, 90
 and Rhodesia, 117–118
- Nkomati Accord. *See* Mozambique
- Nkrumah, Kwame, 9–10, 53–54, 59,
 64, 66, 150. *See also* Ghana
- Non-Aligned Movement, xi, 8, 13,
 36, 38, 42, 59, 64, 65, 92, 120,
 158. *See also* Afro-Asian Peoples'
 Solidarity Organization;
 Bandung Conference (1955);
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel;
 Organization of Solidarity with
 the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and
 Latin America
- nongovernmental organizations, 9,
 31, 80, 82, 90, 133–134, 135,
 207
 humanitarian relief, 194, 203–204,
 205, 209, 220
- Nordic countries, 129
 aid to liberation movements, 8, 31,
 82, 93, 103, 113, 119, 122, 134
 socialism, 134
- North Africa, 4–5, 13, 21, 26, 30,
 35–54, 57, 143, 169, 180

- North America, 5, 113
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 7, 30, 35, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 58, 60, 79, 80, 82, 84–86, 88, 92, 108, 181, 195, 217, 228
- North Korea. *See* Korea, North
- North Vietnam. *See* Vietnam, North
- Northern Frontier District, 150. *See also* British East Africa; Kenya; Somalia
- Northern Rhodesia, 28, 58, 77. *See also* Central African Federation; Zambia
- Norway, 82, 90, 92. *See also* Nordic countries
- Nujoma, Sam, 127. *See also* Namibia; South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
- Nyasaland, 58, 80. *See also* Central African Federation; Malawi
- Nyerere, Julius, 134. *See also* Tanzania
- Obama, Barack, 215. *See also* United States
administration, 215
targeted assassinations, 215
- Ogaden. *See* Ethiopia
- oil, 91, 132, 229. *See also* Algeria; Angola; Chad; economy; Gabon; Iran; Iraq; Libya; Middle East; sanctions; Sudan
embargo, 117–118, 124, 133, 181–182
price increase, 9, 146, 196
resources, 12, 14, 36–37, 40, 42, 43, 44–45, 46, 52, 88, 92, 93, 95, 106, 130, 133, 143, 147, 151, 155, 176, 178, 181, 182, 184, 185, 196, 206, 207, 212, 213, 214, 218, 220, 221, 229
- Omega navigation station, 198. *See also* Liberia
- Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), 216. *See also* global war on terror; Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- Operation Restore Hope, 204. *See also* Somalia; United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); United Task Force (UNITAF)
- Organization of African Unity (OAU), 8, 83, 98, 108, 120, 150–151, 152, 194. *See also* African Union
charter, 150–151, 155
colonial boundaries principle, 150–151
Haile Selassie influence, 150–151
Liberation Committee, 8, 83, 90, 92, 113, 119
peacekeeping, 186–187
- Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 29, 36, 82. *See also* Tricontinental Conference (1966)
- Oromo, 154, 159. *See also* Ethiopia
- Oromo Liberation Front, 159. *See also* Ethiopia
- Ottoman Empire, 4. *See also* Turkey
- Ovimbundu, 81, 84. *See also* Angola
- Pakistan, 204
- Palestine, 42, 54, 214
- Pan Africanist Congress, 113, 115. *See also* South Africa
- pan-African movement, 59. *See also* nationalism
- pan-Arab movement, 36, 59, 181, 185–186. *See also* nationalism

- pan-Islamic movement, 158
- Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), 216. *See also* global war on terror; Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- Paris Peace Conference (1919), 169
- Patriotic Front, 120–121. *See also* Rhodesia; Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF); Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- Peace Corps, 148
- Pentagon. *See* United States
- People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. *See* Yemen, South
- People's Republic of Angola. *See* Angola
- People's Republic of China. *See* China, People's Republic of
- Persia, empire, 4
- Persian Gulf, 4, 5, 155, 206, 221, 229
- Persian Plateau, 4
- petroleum. *See* oil
- Phoenicia, 4
- Poland, 40
- political Islam. *See* Islamism
- politics of exclusion, 193
- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 81. *See also* Angola
- attack on Luanda, 83
- and China, 93
- communism, 81
- and Cuba, 93, 96–98, 126
- and FNLA, 81, 85, 94–95
- membership, 81, 94–95
- and South Africa, 95, 98
- and the Soviet Union, 29, 93–94, 95, 125
- territory controlled, 94–95, 96–97, 98
- and UNITA, 81, 95–96, 212
- and the United States, 85, 93, 94, 98
- and Yugoslavia, 93
- and Zaire, 94, 95, 187–188
- Portugal, 6, 18, 20–21. *See also* Angola; Azores; Cape Verde; Communist Party; Guinea; Mozambique; Portuguese Guinea; Socialist Party; São Tomé and Príncipe
- African colonies, 6, 13, 79–80, 88, 143
- African Wars, 13, 21, 28, 30, 79–80, 82, 83–84, 88–89, 90–91
- colonialism, 20–21, 58, 60, 68, 69, 79, 83
- coup d'état, 21, 88, 91, 92, 93
- decolonization, 7, 13, 19, 20–21, 26, 79–80, 93–94, 97, 109, 128, 132, 228
- dictatorship, 79
- economy, 79, 88
- liberation movements, 80–82
- mercenaries, 95–97
- and NATO, 30, 82–83, 84–86, 88, 92
- secret police, 82, 91–92, 130
- settlers in African colonies, 30, 81, 84
- and the Soviet Union, 82, 83, 84
- and the United Nations, 84, 86, 88, 91, 108
- and the United States, 30, 79–80, 82, 83–89, 91, 92, 94, 108
- Portuguese Africa. *See* Angola; Cape Verde; Mozambique; Portugal; Portuguese Guinea; São Tomé and Príncipe
- Portuguese Guinea, 21, 26, 30, 79–80, 158. *See also* African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC); Cape Verde; Guinea-Bissau; Portugal

- dockworkers' strike, 89
 independence, 89, 91
 liberated areas, 89–90, 91
 liberation movements, 80, 82, 89–92
 liberation struggle, 26, 80, 82, 89–91
 and the Soviet Union, 26
 private military companies. *See* mercenaries
 prodemocracy movements, 2, 166, 188, 193, 197–198, 209. *See also* democracy; good governance
 Francophone Africa, 166, 188–189, 209
 proxy wars. *See* Foreign Intervention
- Qaddafi, Muammar al-, 185–187, 199, 205–206, 217. *See also* Libya
- Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 43. *See also* Iraq
- Quiwonkpa, Thomas, 199. *See also* Liberia
- racial conflict, 87, 121, 193
 racism. *See* white minority
 rapid deployment force, 180, 206
 Reagan, Ronald, 113, 124, 132. *See also* Clark Amendment; Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO); National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); RENAMO lobby; UNITA lobby
 administration, 23, 110–114, 124–127, 131, 132, 155, 187, 199, 205
 and Angola, 125–126, 132
 constructive engagement, 111–112, 127
 linkage policy, 125–126
 and Namibia, 124–127
 and South Africa, 110–114, 124–127, 131–132
- rebel movements, xii, xiii, 3, 58, 68, 69, 71–74, 128–133, 181, 186–187, 188, 193, 194, 195, 199–203, 208–212, 217, 220, 222
- Red Sea, 21, 143, 144, 147, 150, 151, 156–157, 158, 215
- regime change, 12, 35, 43, 133–134, 160, 184, 195
- religions, 4. *See also* Christianity; Islam; Judaism
- religious conflict, 1, 193, 197–198
- religious right. *See* United States
- RENAMO lobby, 131, 132. *See also* Mozambique; Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO); Reagan, Ronald; United States
- resource wars, 3, 11, 13–14, 193–194, 198, 202, 211–212, 228–229
- resources, African, 5–6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 20, 57, 58–59, 60, 84, 92, 116–118, 121–122, 176, 181–189, 196, 202, 208, 210, 219, 229. *See also* diamonds; land; oil; resource wars; uranium
- responsibility to protect. *See* United Nations
- Réunion, 168, 180
- Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 201. *See also* child soldiers; Sierra Leone; Taylor, Charles
- Rhodesia, 19, 28, 30, 58, 60, 77, 80–81, 104. *See also* Byrd Amendment; Central African Federation; Patriotic Front; Rhodesia lobby; Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- African reserves, 115
 and Britain, 31, 105, 116–117, 120–121, 228
 Central Intelligence Organisation, 120–121, 130
 and Commonwealth, 116, 134

- Rhodesia (*cont.*)
- communist threat, 7, 115, 118–119, 130, 134
 - elections, 121
 - and France, 117
 - and Frontline States, 117, 118, 119, 120
 - Geneva Conference, 120
 - internal settlement, 120, 123
 - Lancaster House Agreement (1979), 121, 131
 - Lancaster House Conference (1979), 120–121
 - liberation struggle, 26, 28, 29, 105, 115–121
 - majority rule, 6–8, 104, 105, 116, 120, 121, 134
 - mercenaries, 60, 72
 - minerals, 116–118
 - and Portugal, 117
 - repression, 115
 - sanctions, 105, 116–119, 120–121
 - security forces, 118
 - settlers, 19, 103, 115–116, 118
 - and South Africa, 117, 119
 - and the Soviet Union, 26, 30–31
 - Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), 116–117, 119
 - and the United Nations, 105, 116–117, 119
 - and the United States, 31, 69, 115–121, 228
- Rhodesia lobby, 118, 120
- Rhodesian Front, 121. *See also* Smith, Ian
- Rhodesian Information Office, 118
- Rhodesian Security Forces. *See* Rhodesia
- Roberto, Holden, 81, 85–86, 88. *See also* Angola; National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
- Roberts Field, 198, 199. *See also* Liberia
- Romania, 93
- Rome, empire, 4
- Rome General Peace Accords (1992). *See* Mozambique
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 169. *See also* United States
- Rusk, Dean, 108. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- Russia. *See* Soviet Union
- Rwanda, 180. *See also* First Congo War (1996–1997); Second Congo War (1998–2002)
- and France, 180–181, 188, 209–210
 - genocide, xii, 12, 181, 194, 209–210
 - Hutu regime, 181, 209–210
 - intervention in Zaire/DRC, 181, 188, 211–212
 - and Uganda, 181, 209
- Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 181, 188, 209–210. *See also* Rwanda; Uganda; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Sadat, Anwar, 44. *See also* Egypt
- Saddam Hussein, 43. *See also* Iraq
- Sahara, 4–5, 45, 46, 216
- Sahel, 216–217, 229
- economic crisis, 217
 - ungoverned spaces, 216
- Sakiet Sidi Youssef, 50. *See also* Tunisia
- Salazar, António, 79, 84–85, 87. *See also* Portugal
- sanctions, 120–121, 122, 132, 207–208. *See also* African National Congress (ANC); Angola; Namibia; Rhodesia; South Africa; Sudan; United Nations; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- arms embargo, 86, 88, 104, 106, 108–110, 114, 116–118, 124, 133, 203, 207

- economic, 87, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108–111, 114, 116–118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 132–133, 207
oil, 124, 133
Sankoh, Foday, 201. *See also* Revolutionary United Front (RUF); Sierra Leone
São Tomé and Príncipe, 79. *See also* Portugal
Sara, 185–186. *See also* Chad
Saudi Arabia, 42, 51, 149, 152, 155, 206–207, 214
American troops, 214
pro-Western regime, 42
Save Darfur Coalition, 221. *See also* Darfur
Savimbi, Jonas, 81, 96, 132–133. *See also* Angola; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
Sawaba, 182–183. *See also* Niger; Nigerien Democratic Union
Anglophone connection, 182–183
communism, 182–183
external support, 182–183
Schlesinger, James, 89. *See also* United States
Scramble for Africa, 6, 144, 150
Second Congo War (1998–2002), 211–212. *See also* Rwanda; Southern African Development Community (SADC); Uganda; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
death toll, 211
regional involvement, 211–212
resource plunder, 212
segregation. *See* United States
Selassie, Haile, 21, 26, 143, 145–146, 147, 149, 150–151, 157–158. *See also* Ethiopia
self-determination, 6, 49, 50, 52, 68, 83, 85–86, 156, 159, 167–168, 169, 220
self-government, 49, 167–168, 172
British colonies, 19, 168
French colonies, 20, 45, 46, 50–51, 52, 167–168, 171, 172, 173
Senegal, 90, 171, 175, 177, 180, 189, 216
Senegalese Democratic Union, 171. *See also* African Democratic Rally (RDA)
Serbia, 210–211
mercenaries, 210–211
settler colonies. *See* white minority
Seychelles, 218
Shaba. *See* Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
sharia, 206. *See also* Islam; Islamic Courts Union; Islamism
Shermarke, Abdirashid Ali, 148. *See also* Somalia
Shona, 119. *See also* Rhodesia
Siad Barre, Mohamed, 26, 143, 148–149, 152, 155–156, 203. *See also* Somalia
Sierra Leone, 200–201. *See also* Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Simba rebellion, 71–74. *See also* Congo (Belgian)
Sinai Peninsula, 42. *See also* Egypt; Israel; Suez
Sino-Soviet split, 7, 27, 28, 93, 228. *See also* China, People's Republic of; Soviet Union
Sithole, Ndabaningi, 120. *See also* Rhodesia
Six-Day War (June 1967), 7, 44. *See also* Egypt; Israel
slave trades, xi, xii, 12, 144
Arab, 5
East Africa, 5, 144, 148
indigenous, 5
North Africa, 5
trans-Atlantic, 5
West Africa, 5
Small Boy Units. *See* National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Smith, Ian, 116–121. *See also* Rhodesia; Rhodesian Front

- smuggling. *See* [illicit activities](#)
- socialism, 8, 25, 26, 28–29, 64, 80, 128, 130, 134, 143, 146–148, 151, 153, 154, 158, 167
- Socialist Party
 French, 167, 186
 Portuguese, 88–89
- Société Générale de Belgique, 57.
 See also [Belgium](#); [Congo \(Belgian\)](#)
- Somali Bantu, 148. *See also* [Somalia](#)
- Somalia, 21, 26, 31, 143–144, 198, 215, 218. *See also* [Operation Restore Hope](#); [Somali-Ethiopian War \(1977–1978\)](#); [United Nations Operation in Somalia \(UNOSOM\)](#); [United Somali Congress](#); [United Task Force \(UNITAF\)](#)
- and the African Union, 219–221
- and al-Qaeda, 205, 208, 214, 216
- Arab influence, 153
- and Britain, 21, 31, 147, 150
- clan rivalry, 147–148, 156, 203
- corruption, 148, 195, 228
- coup d'état, 148, 203
- and Cuba, 149, 151
- dictatorship, 148, 155–156, 203, 228
- economic crisis, 155–156, 195, 203
- and Ethiopia, 21, 31, 143, 148, 150–153
- Ethiopian invasion (2006), 205, 214–215
- ethnic minorities, 148
- expansionist aims, 143, 145, 148, 149–151
- famine, 149, 156, 203
- and France, 150
- Greater Somalia, 151
- human rights abuses, 148–149, 155–156
- humanitarian relief, 203–204, 205
- independence, 31, 145, 147, 150, 157
- insurgencies, 155–156, 160, 214
- Islam, 153, 160, 214
- Islamic militants, 156, 203, 205, 214, 216
- and Italy, 21, 144–145, 148, 150
- military facilities, 149, 151, 155
- militias, 155–156, 160, 203–205
- National Security Service, 149
- Ogaden and Haud, 22, 144–145, 149–153, 155, 158–159
- overthrow of Siad Barre, 156
- piracy, 220
- political opposition, 148–149, 156
- socialism, 26, 143, 148, 153
- and the Soviet Union, 26, 31, 143, 147–153, 154, 228
- and the United Nations, 203–205, 220
- and the United States, 31, 143, 147, 148, 150, 154–156, 159–160, 203–205, 213–214, 218, 228
- warlords, 156, 160, 203, 214
- Somali-Ethiopian War (1977–1978), 31, 150–153, 154, 155, 158–159, 228. *See also* [Ethiopia](#); [Somalia](#); [Western Somali Liberation Front \(WSLF\)](#)
- Soumaliot, Gaston, 71. *See also* [Congo \(Belgian\)](#); [Simba rebellion](#)
- South Africa, 9, 19, 31, 57–58, 60, 68, 69, 80, 103, 104, 105. *See also* [African National Congress \(ANC\)](#); [Afrikaners](#); [Angola](#); [anti-apartheid movement](#); [Commonwealth](#); [Communist Party](#); [Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act \(1986\)](#); [Constellation of Southern African States \(CONSAS\)](#); [France](#); [International Monetary Fund \(IMF\)](#); [Israel](#); [Mozambique](#); [Namibia](#); [Pan Africanist Congress](#); [Reagan, Ronald](#); [Rhodesia](#); [South African Defence Force \(SADF\)](#); [United Nations](#); [United States](#)

- African reserves, 105–109
 apartheid, 7, 9, 31, 95, 97–98,
 103–115, 121, 127–129, 132–135
 border war, 131
 and Britain, 31, 105–106, 108, 115,
 123, 124, 125
 communist threat, 103, 106,
 112–115, 119, 125, 128, 130, 134
 destabilization, xii, 30–31, 60, 72,
 104, 105, 127–133
 economic interests, regional, 60,
 117, 121–122, 127–130, 210
 economy, 105–106, 107, 115,
 127–129
 foreign investment, 105–106, 135
 and France, 31, 105–106, 108, 114,
 123–125
 and Israel, 7, 31, 106–107
 liberation movements, 54, 103,
 112–113, 128–129
 liberation struggle, 13, 26
 majority rule, 8, 104
 mercenaries, 60, 70, 72, 210–211
 military, 106–107, 108, 111, 114,
 123–127, 131–132
 minerals, 105–106, 108, 110
 National Party, 110
 Nazi sympathizers, 110
 nuclear collaboration, 106–107,
 109, 111, 114
 sanctions, UN, 105, 106, 108–110,
 115, 122–124
 sanctions, U.S., 107, 108, 110,
 114–115, 132
 settlers, 7, 19, 26, 69, 103–104
 and the Soviet Union, 21, 26, 128
 state of emergency, 114
 and the United Nations, 91, 105,
 106, 108, 109–110, 115, 121–127,
 134
 uranium, 109, 114
 U.S. bank loans, 106, 114
 U.S. collaboration, 9, 95–98,
 110–112, 123–127, 131–133
 U.S. investments, 69, 105–106,
 109, 114
 U.S. policies, 31, 103–104,
 105–115, 123–127
 South African Communist Party.
 See Communist Party
 South African Defence Force
 (SADF), 95–96, 107, 118,
 126–127. *See also* South Africa
 South Kasai. *See* Congo (Belgian)
 South Sudan, 208, 220, 221, 229.
 See also Sudan; Sudan People's
 Liberation Movement (SPLM)
 South West Africa. *See* Namibia
 South West Africa National Union
 (SWANU), 122. *See also*
 Namibia
 and China, 122
 South West Africa People's
 Organization (SWAPO), 95. *See*
 also Namibia
 and Angola, 95, 122, 125, 129,
 131–132
 armed struggle, 122, 125
 and Eastern Europe, 122
 and FNLA, 95
 and Frontline States, 125, 129
 and Lutheran churches, 122,
 134
 and Nordic countries, 122, 134
 and South Africa, 95, 125
 and the Soviet Union, 122
 and the United Nations, 122–127
 and UNITA, 95
 and the World Council of
 Churches, 122
 Southeast Asia, 169, 198
 Southern Africa, 24, 26, 79
 Cold War intervention, 30–31, 87,
 133–134, 143–144
 decolonization, 7–8, 30–31, 60,
 103, 133–135, 143
 destabilization, 30, 104, 105,
 111–112, 120, 127–133, 193
 settlers, 6–7, 13, 30, 103, 104, 109,
 118
 solidarity movements, 103,
 133–135

- Southern African Development Community (SADC), 211, 219–220. *See also* Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
- Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), 129–130, 211. *See also* Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS); South Africa; Southern Africa
- Southern Rhodesia. *See* Rhodesia
- sovereignty, 4
- state, 9, 10, 12, 47, 49, 51, 53, 97, 194, 205
- Soviet Union, xi–xii, 2–3, 7–9, 11, 18, 21, 25–26. *See also* Afghanistan; Algeria; Angola; Communist Party; Congo (Belgian); Cuba; Egypt; Eritrea; Ethiopia; France; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); Libya; Lumumba, Patrice; Mozambique; Namibia; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); Portugal; Sino-Soviet split; Somalia; South Africa; South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); United Nations; Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- and China, 8–9, 25–29, 153
- Cold War, 2–3, 7–9, 11, 25–29, 37–38, 84–85, 115
- decolonization, 7, 8–9, 25–26, 35, 38, 65, 175
- disintegration, 11, 132, 154, 156, 159, 193, 197, 207
- economic aid, 25–26
- economic model, 8–9, 26–27
- and Ghana, 26
- ideology, 28
- military aid, 26, 29, 38, 39, 44, 90, 91, 104, 113, 119, 122, 147, 148, 149, 151–152, 153, 154, 157, 158–159, 182, 206
- military bases, 21, 44, 149, 151, 155
- and Portuguese Guinea, 26
- World War II, 25
- Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), 206. *See also* Afghanistan; mujahideen
- Spain, 6
- Spencer, John H., 157. *See also* Ethiopia; United States
- Stalin, Joseph, 38. *See also* Soviet Union
- Stanleyville, 63, 68, 72–73, 86, 210. *See also* Kisangani
- state collapse, 1, 2, 3, 11, 13–14, 193–198, 203. *See also* economy; illicit activities; International Monetary Fund (IMF); resource wars; World Bank
- popular uprisings, 11, 13–14, 197–198, 213, 218
- Stevenson, Adlai, 85–86. *See also* United Nations; United States
- structural adjustment programs. *See* capitalism; International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank
- sub-Saharan Africa, 13, 110, 149, 155, 165, 170, 173, 175–176, 180, 195–196, 199, 205, 218
- Sudan, 4, 12, 51, 73, 157–158, 195, 198. *See also* Darfur; South Sudan; Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
- and al-Qaeda, 206–208
- animists, 157–158, 206
- and Arab states, 206
- and Chad, 186
- Christians, 157–158, 206
- civil war, 206, 220–221
- coup d'état, 157–158, 206
- economic crisis, 206–207
- and Ethiopia, 157–158, 207
- Fashoda, 181
- human rights abuses, 208

- Islamic law, 206
 Islamists, 206–208, 228
 and Libya, 206
 mineral resources, 206
 Muslims, 206
 oil, 206–207, 220–221
 peace agreement, 206, 220, 229
 referendum, 206, 220, 229
 regional conflicts, 206, 221
 sanctions, 207–208
 southern secession, 157–158
 terrorism, 207–208
 and the United States, 147, 187, 205–208, 213, 218, 221, 228–229
 U.S. air strikes, 207
 Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), 206. *See also* Sudan; South Sudan
 communist support, 206
 Marxism, 206
 Suez, 40. *See also* Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel
 Canal and Canal Company, 39–41, 155
 Canal Zone, 37
 Crisis (1956), 22, 45, 59–60, 71, 84, 228
 War (1956), 7, 30, 40–42, 45
 Swaziland, 128–129
 Sweden, 82, 90, 92, 93. *See also* Nordic countries
 Syria, 38, 43, 51, 157–158
 and Lebanon, 42–43
 pro-Nasser government, 38, 42–43
 Tanganyika. *See* Tanzania
 Tanzania, xii, 28, 73, 80, 83, 91, 129, 207, 211, 215. *See also* Frontline States
 aid to liberation movements, 104, 113, 119, 134
 British military intervention, 32
 Zanzibar revolt, 32
 Taylor, Charles, 199–203. *See also* Liberia; National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
 terrorism, xiii, 14, 110, 113, 195, 213, 218–222, 229. *See also* al-Qaeda; global war on terror
 financing, 215–216
 foreign terrorist organizations, 205, 207, 213–214, 215, 217
 Islam and terrorism, 213–214
 state sponsors of terrorism, 186, 199, 207–208
 terrorist attacks, 195
 in Kenya and Tanzania, 207
 in the United States, 2, 14, 195, 207–208, 213–214
 Thatcher, Margaret, 120, 131. *See also* Britain
 Third World, 25–27, 44, 52, 154
 Tigray, 154, 159. *See also* Eritrea; Ethiopia
 Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 159–160. *See also* Ethiopia
 Tigrinya-speakers, 158–159. *See also* Eritrea; Ethiopia
 Togo, 180
 German colony, 168
 League of Nations mandate, 168
 national conference, 188
 UN trust, 168, 170, 175
 Tolbert, William, 198. *See also* Liberia
 Tombalbaye, Ngartha François, 185–186. *See also* Chad
 Touré, Sékou, 53–54, 58, 90, 150, 174. *See also* Guinea
 Trade. *See also* colonialism; economy; neocolonialism; slave trades
 ancient, 4
 “legitimate,” 5
 trade unions, 68, 104, 113, 115–116, 134, 146, 166, 171–173, 188
 trafficking. *See* illicit activities

- Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), 186.
See also Chad
- Transjordan. *See* Jordan
- Transparency International, 216–217
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 216, 218.
See also global war on terror; Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS); Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 216. *See also* global war on terror; Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS); Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI); Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI)
- Tricontinental Conference (1966), 29, 82. *See also* Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America
- Tripartite Agreement (1988), 126–127, 132. *See also* Angola; Cuba; South Africa
- Truman, Harry, 169. *See also* United States
 administration, 24, 169
- Tshombe, Moïse, 65. *See also* Congo (Belgian)
 and Belgium, 70–72
 Lumumba assassination, 65, 70
 prime minister, 70–71
 secessionist leader, 60, 65–66, 70–71
 and the United States, 70–72
- Tuareg, 217. *See also* Mali; Niger
- Tubman, William, 198. *See also* Liberia
- Tubu, 186. *See also* Chad
- Tunisia, 18, 51, 63, 168
 and Algeria, 47
 and France, 46–47, 50
 independence, 47
 Islamic militants, 46, 47, 214
 political unrest, 46–47
 reforms, colonial, 46–47
 repression, colonial, 46
 self-government, 46–47
 and the Soviet Union, 47–48
 and the United States, 47–48, 214, 216
- Tunney Amendment, 98. *See also* Angola; United States
- Turkey, 37, 221, 229. *See also* Ottoman Empire
- Turnhalle Conference (1975). *See* Namibia
- Tutsi, 181, 209, 211. *See also* Rwanda; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Tutu, Desmond, 110. *See also* South Africa
- Ubangi-Shari. *See* Central African Republic
- Uganda, xii, 73, 181, 208–212, 215.
See also First Congo War (1996–1997); Second Congo War (1998–2002)
 aid to liberation movements, 113
 British military intervention, 32
 Idi Amin coup, xii, 32
 intervention in Zaire/DRC, 181, 188, 209–212
 and Rwanda, 181
- Ukraine, 210–211
 mercenaries, 210–211
- Umkhonto we Sizwe, 112, 113. *See also* African National Congress (ANC); South Africa
 military camps, 113
- Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). *See* Rhodesia

- Union Carbide, 118. *See also* Rhodesia lobby
- Union Minière du Haut Katanga, 57. *See also* Belgium; Congo (Belgian)
- Union of Peoples of Angola. *See* National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). *See* Soviet Union
- Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), 171–173. *See also* African Democratic Rally (RDA); Cameroon, French
- Anglophone connection, 172
- armed struggle, 173, 182
- banning of, 172–173, 182
- communism, 171–172, 182
- exile, 173
- expulsion from the RDA, 171, 182
- external support, 172, 173
- program, 172
- repression of, 172–173, 182
- UNITA lobby, 126, 132. *See also* Angola; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); Reagan, Ronald; United States
- United African National Council, 120–121. *See also* Rhodesia; Zimbabwe
- United Arab Republic, 43, 64, 73, 173. *See also* Egypt; Syria
- United Kingdom. *See* Britain
- United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), 201. *See also* Liberia
- United Nations, xiii–xiv, 3, 21, 50, 203. *See also* Algeria; Britain; Congo (Belgian); Côte d'Ivoire; Eritrea; Ethiopia; France; Lumumba, Patrice; Namibia; Portugal; Rhodesia; sanctions; Somalia; South Africa; Suez; United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); United Task Force (UNITAF)
- African members, 61, 64, 108
- African troops, 63–64
- Afro-Asian bloc, 42, 49, 51, 57, 62, 63–64, 69, 84
- aid to liberation movements, 8, 31, 122
- charter, 12, 169, 172, 194
- decolonization, 21, 83, 134, 157
- General Assembly, 12, 42, 61, 62, 64, 122, 157, 172
- General Assembly resolutions, 12, 68, 83, 91, 122, 124, 172, 194–195
- peacekeeping, xiii–xiv, 3, 11–12, 127, 132, 194, 203–205, 219–220, 229
- refugee camps, 209
- responsibility to protect, xiii, 12, 194–195, 221–222
- sanctions, 86, 105–111, 115–119, 122–124, 132–133, 203, 207
- Secretariat, 63–64
- Security Council, 42, 62, 64, 116–117, 122–125, 127, 203–204, 207, 209, 211–212
- Security Council resolutions, 42, 61, 62, 69, 84, 86, 108–110, 115, 123–127, 211
- and the Soviet Union, 60–64, 69
- Special Committee against Apartheid, 134
- trust territories, 21, 168, 170–173, 175–176
- and the United States, 21–22, 30, 41–42, 52, 60–63, 69, 83–84, 86, 88, 91, 109–110, 120, 123–125, 134, 157, 202
- and the Western powers, 21, 61–62, 64, 105, 123
- United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), 203–205. *See also* Somalia; United Task Force (UNITAF)

- United Somali Congress, 203–205.
See also Somalia
- United States, 7, 18, 21, 22–23, 24, 25, 175. *See also* African Americans; Algeria; Angola; anti-apartheid movement; Byrd Amendment; capitalism; Carter, Jimmy; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Clark Amendment; Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986); Congressional Black Caucus; Congo (Belgian); Egypt; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Ethiopia; Ford, Gerald; France; global war on terror; Iran; Iraq; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Katanga lobby; Kennedy, John F.; Lebanon; Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré; Namibia; Nixon, Richard M.; Portugal; Reagan, Ronald; RENAMO lobby; Rhodesia; Rhodesia lobby; Somalia; South Africa; Sudan; Suez; Truman, Harry; UNITA lobby; U.S. Department of State; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- anticommunism, 7, 8–9, 22–23, 24, 38, 43, 46–48, 60–61, 69, 70, 71–72, 83, 85, 87, 103, 106, 108, 109, 112–114, 118, 125, 126, 130, 145, 166, 168, 169, 186, 195, 206, 213, 215
- civil rights movement, 24–25, 86, 103–104, 107–108, 109, 114, 120, 134
- Cold War, xi, 11, 21–25, 31, 35, 37, 40–42, 57–58, 60, 83, 92, 104, 106, 134–135, 145, 154–155, 166–167, 169, 195, 197–198, 205, 208, 213, 215
- Commerce Department, 23, 108
- Congress, 23–25, 39–40, 50, 70, 85, 98, 108, 114, 118, 120, 126, 131, 156
- decolonization, 7, 23, 35, 38, 45, 48–49, 60–61, 65, 66–68, 69, 116, 167–168, 169–170
- Defense Department, 23, 69, 84, 85, 87, 89, 108, 131, 155, 213–219, 222
- Democrats, 23, 50
- economic aid, 11, 23, 36, 66, 88, 129, 148, 155, 156, 166–167, 195, 197, 199, 208, 213
- economic interests, 37, 58–61, 69, 87, 88, 92, 106, 117–118, 123, 168, 210, 213, 218–219
- executive branch, 23
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, 155
- military aid, 23, 43, 48–49, 68, 72–73, 83–86, 88, 92, 94–95, 126, 145, 147–148, 153, 155–156, 187, 195, 197–200, 205, 208, 213, 215, 219, 229
- military bases, 35, 44–45, 47, 145, 147, 155, 167, 198–199, 213, 215
- military intervention, xiii, 3, 42–43, 203–205, 213–219
- National Security Council, 23, 87
- oil interests, 36, 40, 42–43, 213, 218
- religious right, 131, 199–200
- Republicans, 23, 50
- segregation, 24, 69, 85, 108, 118
- Treasury Department, 23–24, 216
- U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), 217–219. *See also* global war on terror
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 213, 216, 218–219. *See also* human rights; United States
- human security/human rights agenda, 213, 216
- security/development agenda, 216, 218
- U.S. Armed Forces, 200, 205, 214.
See also U.S. Army
 Air Force, 218

- Marine Corps, 42–43, 51, 200, 218
- Navy, 200, 218
- U.S. Army, 205–206, 217–218
 - Delta Force, 205
 - Rangers, 205
 - Special Forces, 217, 225
- U.S. Central Command
 - (CENTCOM), 218. *See also* U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
- U.S. Department of State, 22–23, 38, 86–87, 108, 110–111, 207, 216, 218
 - Africanists, 22–24, 84–87, 94, 107–108, 222
 - assistant secretaries of state for African Affairs, 85, 87, 107, 111
 - Bureau of African Affairs, 24, 69
 - Bureau of European Affairs, 69, 84
 - Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 69
 - Europeanists, 69, 84–86, 108
 - secretaries of state, 84, 87, 94, 108, 110–111, 155, 157, 213
- U.S. European Command
 - (EUCOM), 218. *See also* U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
- U.S. Pacific Command
 - (USPACOM), 218. *See also* U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
- U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 124
- U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United Nations Affairs, 50
- U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 113. *See also* African National Congress (ANC)
- U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 214
- U.S. assassination of foreign leaders, 214
- U.S. Special Operations Command, 214–215. *See also* global war on terror
- U.S. Special Operations Forces, 208, 214, 216. *See also* U.S. Army
- United Task Force (UNITAF), 204. *See also* Somalia; United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
- Upper Volta. *See* Burkina Faso
- uranium, 21, 57, 59, 109, 114, 122, 178, 181–185, 218. *See also* Central African Republic; Chad; Congo (Belgian); Gabon; Namibia; Niger; South Africa; Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Vance, Cyrus, 155. *See also* United States; U.S. Department of State
- Vichy, 168, 169. *See also* France
- Viet Minh, 46, 168, 169. *See also* Dien Bien Phu; Indochina; Vietnam
- Vietnam, 51, 83, 86, 169. *See also* Dien Bien Phu; Indochina; Viet Minh
- Vietnam, North, 51, 182
- Voice of America relay station, 198. *See also* Liberia
- Vorster, John, 110, 119, 123. *See also* South Africa
 - regional détente, 119, 122–123, 128
- war crimes, 12, 194. *See also* crimes against humanity; genocide; human rights
- war on terror. *See* global war on terror
- warlords, 3, 11, 156, 160, 166, 193–194, 197–198, 199, 201–203, 209, 212, 214, 228–229

- Washington Consensus. *See*
 International Monetary Fund
 (IMF); World Bank
- weapons influx, 5, 7, 11
- West Africa, 4–5, 26, 30, 79, 198,
 200, 202, 216, 220
- Western alliance, 7, 50, 52, 84
- Western civilization, 103
- Western Contact Group. *See*
 Namibia
- Western Europe, 5, 61–62, 129, 154.
See also anti-apartheid
 movement
- Africa solidarity movements, 103,
 104
- Western Somali Liberation Front
 (WSLF), 151. *See also* Somalia;
 Somali-Ethiopian War
 (1977–1978)
- white man's burden, 24
- white minority, 57. *See also* Algeria;
 Angola; Belgium; Central
 African Federation;
 Mozambique; Namibia;
 Portugal; Rhodesia; South
 Africa; Southern Africa
- regimes, 6–7, 25–26, 57, 58–59,
 60, 69, 87, 98, 103, 104, 105,
 109, 111–112, 116, 118, 119,
 133–134, 143
- rights, 23, 24, 59, 61, 119, 121,
 124–125, 135
- rule, 7–8, 13, 23–26, 28–31,
 103–105, 112, 115, 120–121,
 127–128, 130, 134
- settlers, xii, 23–26, 30–31, 69, 77,
 103, 105–109, 115
- Williams, G. Mennen, 85, 107, 108.
See also United States; U.S.
 Department of State
- Wilson, Harold, 116. *See also*
 Britain
- Wilson, Woodrow, 169. *See also*
 United States
- wind of change, 6. *See also*
 Macmillan, Harold
- World Bank, 9, 178. *See also*
 capitalism; International
 Monetary Fund (IMF);
 neocolonialism
- neoliberal norms, 9–10
- structural adjustment programs,
 9–10, 178, 196–197, 228
 and Zaire, 208
- World Council of Churches
 aid to liberation movements, 8, 31,
 80, 82–83, 90, 92, 113, 119, 122
 Programme to Combat Racism,
 82–83, 135
- World War I, 121, 169
- World War II, 6, 18, 22, 25, 35, 51,
 106, 110, 115, 166–169, 172, 175.
See also France; Italy; South
 Africa; Viet Minh
- African role, 6, 167–168
- Allied powers, 21, 144–145, 157
- anti-Nazi alliance, 134, 166
- Axis powers, 49
- East Africa Campaign, 21,
 144–145, 150, 157
- North Africa Campaign, 21, 44
- United States, 25, 35, 44,
 167–168
- Yaoundé Convention (1963), 177
- Yemen, 51, 215
 opposition movements, 42
 pro-Western regime, 42
- Yemen, South, 153, 157–159
- Young, Andrew, 109, 120. *See also*
 United Nations; United States
- Yugoslavia, 93, 154
 independent foreign policy, xi, 7,
 93
- Zaire/Democratic Republic of
 Congo (DRC), 92, 149, 198,
 211. *See also* Angola; Congo
 (Belgian); First Congo War
 (1996–1997); International
 Monetary Fund (IMF); Kabila,
 Laurent; Mobutu,
 Joseph-Désiré; Second Congo
 War (1998–2002); World Bank
 army, 210, 211
 and Belgium, 208

- and Britain, 210
- and Burundi, 209, 211, 212
- corruption, 208, 211–212, 228
- diamonds, 182, 210, 212
- East Kasai Province, 210, 212
- economic crisis, 195, 208
- ethnic cleansing, 209
- and FNLA, 93–97
- foreign mining interests, 210, 212
- and France, 208, 209–210
- French military intervention, 165–166, 180–182, 187–188, 208, 209–211
- human rights abuses, 209
- insurgencies, 208, 209, 228
- Kamina air base, 199, 208
- Kivu Provinces (North and South), 212
- mercenaries, 210–211
- mineral resources, 181–182, 187–188, 208, 210–212
- national conference, 188
- overthrow of Mobutu, 209, 210, 211
- prodemocracy movement, 188, 209, 211
- regional war, 209–212
- and Rwanda, 209–212
- Shaba invasions, 187–188
- Shaba Province, 208, 210
- and Uganda, 208–212
- and UNITA, 93, 95, 132, 199, 208, 210, 212
- and the United States, 93–95, 188, 199, 208, 209–210, 213, 228
- uranium, 181–182
- and Zimbabwe, 210–212
- Zambia, 28, 104, 129, 210. *See also* Central African Federation; Frontline States; Northern Rhodesia
- aid to liberation movements, 113, 118–119, 129, 134
- destabilization, 120, 128–130, 132
- Zanzibar. *See* Tanzania
- Zimbabwe, 104, 115, 120–121, 128–130, 154, 160, 210–212, 220. *See also* Rhodesia; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- independence, 121, 128, 130
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 28, 115–116, 118–119, 121. *See also* Rhodesia
- and China, 28–29, 119, 228
- and Frontline States, 119
- and Mozambique, 118–120, 129, 130
- and Nordic countries, 119
- and the OAU, 119
- sanctions, 117
- and the United States, 115–116
- and the World Council of Churches, 119
- Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 121. *See also* Rhodesia; Zimbabwe
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 115, 118–119, 121. *See also* Rhodesia
- and ANC, 118
- and Frontline States, 119
- and Nordic countries, 119
- and the OAU, 119
- sanctions, 117
- and the Soviet Union, 29, 119
- and the United States, 115–116
- and the World Council of Churches, 119
- and Zambia, 118, 120, 129
- Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. *See* Rhodesia

