

Macroprudential Policy Interactions in a Sectoral DSGE Model with Staggered Interest Rates


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Overview

- ▶ Model summary
- ▶ Estimation highlights
- ▶ Macroprudential Policy (CAR, SCR, LTV & CCyB)
- ▶ Interest rate pass-through & Macroprudential policy

Model Overview




Estimation-I

- ▶ Quarterly data for the U.K. economy over 1998Q1-2016Q4.
- ▶ 10 observables in:
 - ▶ Interest rates (Official bank rate, mortgage & corporate rates)
 - ▶ Real growth rates (output, investment, consumption and wages)
 - ▶ Credit growth rates (mortgage & corporate sectors)
 - ▶ House price growth
- ▶ Model (partially) estimated using Bayesian likelihood methods.

Estimation-II



Figure: Example: estimated interest-rate pass through




- Average Bank Rate pass-through is [4.73, 5.93] months on corporate rates and [8.21, 11.1] months on mortgage rates.

Estimated shocks over 1998Q1-2016Q4.


- Sequence of shocks over the estimation sample.



Historical Variance Decomposition: Household Lending Growth







Historical Variance Decompositions: Output Growth



Some key unobservables estimated by the model

- ▶ Household defaults are dominant during the crisis period.
- ▶ Welfare of both household types have an upward trend before the crisis, and downward afterwards.




Macroprudential Policy

- ▶ Available tools in the model:
 - ▶ Minimum and sectoral capital requirements (Benchmark: 11 % CAR, no SCR)
 - ▶ LTV limit on businesses and households (Benchmark: 86 %)
 - ▶ CCyB (Benchmark: 0)

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- ▶ Steady-state welfare analysis
- ▶ Counterfactuals
- ▶ Interest rate stickiness & Macroprudential tools interaction

Example: Sectoral Capital Requirements on Mortgage Lending and Key Variables in Steady-state



Optimal Policies

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Table: Optimal macroprudential parameters, one at a time. Results with $\omega = 0.1$. Benchmark values are: 11 % for CAR, 86 % for LTV limit, no SCR.

Parameter	Optimal Value	Welfare Improvement
LTV Limit	86.6 %	0.001 %
SCR-Mortgage	17.6 % (11 % CAR, 6.6 % add-on)	4.26 %
SCR-Corporate	16.7 % (11 % CAR, 5.7 % add-on)	3.22 %
CAR	14.5 %	3.82 %

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
Table: Optimal joint SCRs and LTV

Parameter	
LTV	94.06 %
SCR-Mortgage	15.88 %
SCR-Corporate %	12.5 %
Welfare Improvement	4.8 %

- ▶ **Larger improvement with lower SCRs when macroprudential tools are coordinated.**
- ▶ LTV limit can be relaxed if SCRs are sufficiently high.
- ▶ CCyB is not as effective as CAR & SCRs.

Counterfactual with optimized policies

Figure: Counterfactual I with optimized values: $\phi_H = 15.8\%$, $\phi_F = 12.5\%$, $\epsilon_H = 94\%$.



Counterfactual with CCyB

