

# The Relationship between Monetary Incentives, Social Status, and Physical Activity.

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## Abstract

We conduct a field experiment to better understand the role of social status and monetary incentives as motivation to increase physical activity. We find that social status alone does not induce a change in physical activity. When social status is combined with monetary incentives, however, we find an effect in the number of daily steps. This effect is heterogeneous. Individuals with low physical activity increase their number of steps by 12%, while those with high physical activity decrease the number of steps by 25%. An income treatment with exogenous social status—uncorrelated with physical activity—provides robustness to our findings and, together with the control treatment, rules out potential experimenter demand effects and other factors driving the results. Our results call for a cautionary approach for analyzing the role of social status, in many cases unobserved, for physical activity intervention programs.

## 1 Introduction

Insufficient physical activity is recognized as one of the contributing factors for various health risks – mortality and morbidity (Philipson and Posner 2008). Albeit increased cardiorespiratory fitness can reduce health related risks, in the United States, for example, only 23% of adults meet the federal physical activity guidelines for aerobic and muscle-strengthening activity (Gaesser et al. 2015, Ross et al. 2015, Gaesser et al. 2011).<sup>1</sup> People are more sedentary today, likely due to structural changes in their living and working environments (Finkelstein et al. 2005). Previous literature has documented successful interventions that increase physical activity through self-funded commitment (Royer et al. 2015), nudges (Calzolari and Nardotto 2017, Beatty and Katare 2018), financial incentives (Charness and Gneezy 2009, Katare 2021), and community efforts (Kahn et al. 2002, Luepker et al. 1996). We explore a different channel for promoting physical activity through social status and monetary incentives.

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/exercise.htm>  
<https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/obesity-overweight.html>

The influence of social status on human behavior in purchasing goods and services has been well documented (Arrow and Dasgupta 2009, Mandel 2009, Bagwell and Bernheim 1996, Veblen 1899). One of the key components of social status is that a desirable status has to be visible to others. In this regard, social media provide potential channels to showcase a desirable physical activity status with an increasing number of media posts related to physical activity, including walking, running, biking, and so on. Prior studies explore the influence of status on physical activity and any potential drivers for physical inactivity among low socioeconomic status (Ford et al. 1991, Stalsberg and Pedersen 2010, Meltzer and Jena 2010, Kämpfen and Maurer 2016, Giles-Corti and Donovan 2002, Tucker-Seeley et al. 2009). Few studies explore social effects such as receiving feedback about activity or the gamification of physical activity as a group (Beatty and Katare 2018, Kurtzman et al. 2018). However, it is unclear how social status may affect the most vulnerable populations (i.e., those with low physical activity, low income, poor health, etc.) though some studies have explored the effect of non-status incentives on those with poor health (Petry et al. 2013, Andrade et al. 2014, Patel et al. 2016). In this study, we implement a controlled field experiment to evaluate the effects of social status and monetary incentives on physical activity. The main objective of this study is to understand whether social status and monetary incentives may differentially incentivize or erode the motivation of different subgroups in the domain of physical activity based on their assigned social status.

We conducted a field experiment over a three-day period with the same cohort of participants. On their initial visit, we distributed pedometer watches that participants used to record the number of steps they took during the experiment. The number of steps was collected 24 hours later (Period 1) as a baseline for each participant. Then, subjects were randomly assigned to a social status treatment. We manipulated the mechanism of assigning social status into four randomly assigned conditions: 1) a control condition with no social status and no monetary incentives; 2) a social status treatment with fixed payments where social status was awarded based on the physical activity level during Period 1; 3) a social

status treatment where social status was based on physical activity during Period 1 and that carried a monetary reward; and 4) an income treatment with exogenous social status based on the scores of a general knowledge quiz, with monetary incentives unrelated to physical activity. In the Social Status Fixed Payment treatment, social status (high or low) was determined by the number of steps participants walked during the baseline Period 1. There were no additional monetary incentives associated with high social status on this treatment. In the Social Status with Monetary Incentives treatment, social status also was determined by the number of steps, but there was a higher monetary reward for the high-status group. In the Income with Exogenous Social Status treatment, monetary incentives and social status were determined by participant scores on a general knowledge quiz (Clingsmith and Sheremeta 2018). In this case, the conferred social status was exogenous (uncorrelated) with the level of physical activity, thus providing us an income treatment but also ruling out experimenter demand together with the control treatment. In all three treatment groups, the social status of each participant was publicly announced, and the high-status group received recognition following a procedure inspired by Ball et al. (2001), who used gold stars to award social status. After the random treatment assignment, the number of steps taken the following day was collected to observe the effect of the assigned social status on subsequent physical activity (Period 2).

In general, exercise treatments with and without monetary incentives do not change the average number of steps between Period 1 (baseline) and Period 2 (treatment). Additionally, subjects do not change their average number of steps in the Control and the Income with Exogenous Social Status treatment because of monetary incentives. That is, we do not find evidence of experimenter demand effects. The result in the Control group implies that using the pedometer itself does not change the average number of steps taken, which aligns with previous studies (Kim et al. 2018, Rote 2017, Takahashi et al. 2016, Butler and Dwyer 2004). When we separate participants based on their physical activity during the baseline Period 1, we find two opposite effects when participants are offered a combination of social status

and monetary incentives. We find that those who are less active increase their step count by 12.1 percent when they are awarded status with monetary incentives ( $p = 0.1371$ ). This result is generally consistent with the previous literature on physical activity interventions, which found a positive effect of monetary incentives, particularly among low-activity people (Carrera et al. 2020, Hajat et al. 2019). Meanwhile, the high physical activity types in the exercise treatment with monetary incentives showed a crowding-out effect by decreasing the average number of steps by 25.2 percent ( $p = 0.0006$ ). We speculate that the extrinsic rewards in the form of monetary gains may crowd out the intrinsic motivation to exercise (or engage in other activities) for those who are already physically active (James Jr 2005, Frey and Jegen 2001, Heyman and Ariely 2004, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Kreps 1997, Deci and Ryan 1985) . Specifically, higher monetary incentives may decrease the participants' enjoyment of physical activity (Moller et al. 2014).

The findings from our exploratory study suggest that utilizing monetary incentives to reward physical activity should be carefully considered when applied to certain subgroups. Social status awarded for physical activity with monetary incentives could encourage those who are less active to exercise more, whereas this intervention discourages the intrinsic motivation to exercise among those who are highly active. Thus, the same intervention works in the opposite direction in different subgroups of people, which may potentially weaken the intervention effects (Sunstein 2016). When considering potential policy implementation for encouraging physical activity, decision-makers should proceed with caution when designing customized financial incentives along with the status corresponding to the health behavior under a public setting, especially for highly active individuals. Social status could be a potential (unobservable) nuisance, given the extensive use of social media that may affect the outcomes of physical activity intervention programs.

The rest of the paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 provides the related literature regarding physical activity interventions and the influence of social status on other domains. Section 3 illustrates the experimental design and procedures of the experiment.

We discuss our hypotheses in Section 4 and present our main results in Section 5. Section 6 offers conclusions and discusses the implications of our findings.

## 2 Related Literature

Two different strands of literature exist pertaining to physical activity intervention programs: non-financial incentivized and financially incentivized programs. Non-financial incentivized programs for physical activity include providing health-related education or recommendations (Sparling et al. 2015, Luepker et al. 1996), sending reminders to go to the gym (Calzolari and Nardotto 2017), e-health interventions in which health services are provided via electronic platforms and devices such as the internet, mobile applications, or text message interventions (Kwan et al. 2020, Smith et al. 2020, Agboola et al. 2016, Martin et al. 2016, Hekler et al. 2016, Hall et al. 2015, Peels et al. 2013, King et al. 2007, Beatty and Katare 2018), the use of mobile trackers or pedometers (Lynch et al. 2020, Kang et al. 2009), or classroom-based physical activity (Watson et al. 2017, Beets et al. 2009). Previous physical activity intervention programs were found to provide moderate effects on increasing physical activity rates (Peels et al. 2013). Social comparison and peer effects has a positive effect on physical activity (Beatty and Katare 2018, Butera et al. 2022, Babcock and Hartman 2010, Agarwal et al. 2021, Patel et al. 2017).

Meanwhile, an emerging literature assesses the effects of financial commitment devices on physical activity in field experiments (Luong et al. 2021, Jones et al. 2019, Hunter et al. 2013). Several studies found that providing monetary incentives increases the number of visits to the gym (Bachiredy et al. 2019, Hajat et al. 2019, Rohde and Verbeke 2017, Acland and Levy 2015, Cawley and Price 2013, Pope and Harvey-Berino 2013). In contrast, the gym attendance rate also increases when the commitment device is based on self-funded deposits in which the money committed by subjects is donated elsewhere if they fail to achieve their gym attendance goals (Royer et al. 2015). In addition to the commitment mechanism,

subjects are more likely to visit the gym when the incentive stakes are large (Charness and Gneezy 2009) . Specifically, Charness and Gneezy (2009) show that when participants are incentivized with a high reward (\$100 for attending the gym 8 times during a 4-week period) the average attendance rate increased by 0.64 times per week relative to 0.06 per week increase in the low-stake treatment (\$25 for attending the gym once a week). However, a few studies found that the highest attendance rate is observed when the incentive is consistently provided. For example, Carrera et al. (2020) show that the attendance rate marginally increases with front-loaded incentives in which the offer is different at the beginning, such as \$25 per visit followed by \$5 per visit, compared to a constant incentive of \$10 per visit during the incentive period, but with the same maximum possible earnings with the front-loaded incentive. Bachiredy et al. (2019) found that consistent incentives increase the number of steps with pedometers more than increasing or decreasing incentives when the possible total earnings are the same in all incentive treatments.

The effect of financial commitment interventions on physical activity varies by individual characteristics, particularly by physical activity. For example, Royer et al. (2015) found that the fraction of existing gym members and non-members using the gym at least once per week increases about 20.0 and 18.2 percent, respectively, during the incentive period. Other studies document that the largest increase in gym attendance during the incentive periods is mainly contributed by participants who do not regularly go to the gym (i.e., non-members or those in the low-activity group) (Carrera et al. 2020, Hajat et al. 2019). The attendance rate increases with financial incentives for those who regularly visit the gym (i.e., existing gym members or those in the highly active group); however, the magnitude is smaller than for those who do not regularly go to the gym (Carrera et al. 2020, Hajat et al. 2019). Some concerns about crowding out intrinsic motivation by utilizing extrinsic rewards have been raised in psychology and economics studies (Esteves-Sorenson and Broce 2016, James Jr 2005, Heyman and Ariely 2004, Frey and Jegen 2001, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Kreps 1997, Deci and Ryan 1985). For instance, incentivizing an enjoyable task decreases its performance




Figure 1: Experiment Timeline

(Deci and Ryan 1985). In addition, higher financial incentives for healthy behavior may reduce enjoyment in physical activity and pursuing healthy diets (Moller et al. 2014). In that sense, the highly active group experiences less enjoyment or interest in exercising when monetary payments are implemented. A potential explanation based on expected utility theory might be that highly active individuals may derive utility from receiving monetary payments and they need less physical activity to achieve the same level of utility. In this regard, we explore the heterogeneous effect for low-activity and high-activity groups.

Overall, previous interventions showed modest increases in physical activity, particularly for low-activity individuals. To our knowledge, little is known about the mechanism in heterogeneous effects in physical activity level for low- and high-activity groups related to social status and monetary incentives. Our study utilizes social status, which reflects low- and high-activity groups, with exogenously assigned payments to explore the role of social status.

### 3 Experimental Design

The study was conducted from September 2019 to March 2020 <sup>2</sup> at a large university campus in the United States. We recruited 313 participants from the pool of students (undergraduate and graduate) and staff members on campus using bulk emails. Subjects agreed to participate in a 3-consecutive-day experiment. They were asked to attend all 3 days at the same session

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<sup>2</sup>All data was collected before the local COVID-19 lockdown mandates



Table 1: Treatments

| Treatment                              | Status Assignment | Payment                                     |
|--|-------------------|---|
| Control - No Status                    | None              | \$10 for all                                |
| Social Status Fixed Payment            | Exercise-based    | \$10 for all                                |
| Social Status with Monetary Incentives | Exercise-based    | \$10 for low status<br>\$15 for high status |
| Income with Exogenous Social Status    | Quiz-based        | \$10 for low status<br>\$15 for high status |

time. Session times were 11 am, 2:30 pm, 4 pm, and 5:30 pm.<sup>3</sup> For all 3 days, participants showed up at the lab, signed in, signed a consent form, and were seated in a classroom with two session monitors.

### 3.1 Treatments

All participants first received the same informational session where pedometers were distributed.<sup>4</sup> The first period (Period 1) provides a baseline for the number of steps without any intervention. Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions at the session level. The conditions determined how social status was assigned, as well as how this information affected their payments. The number of steps was measured again in Period 2 to identify the effects of the treatments relative to the baseline.<sup>5</sup>

In the “Control-No Status” condition, no status was assigned to any participant, and all participants earned \$10. This condition is useful to evaluate whether the experiment of the use of pedometers influences the number of steps. In the “Social Status Fixed Payment”

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<sup>3</sup>The first week featured a 9:30 am session instead of a 5:30 pm session, but using evidence from other studies at the lab, we decided to change the 9:30 am session to a 5:30 pm session in the following weeks for greater attendance and more accessibility for staff members to participate.

<sup>4</sup>Pedometer distributed was Fanmis unisex pedometer watch military multifunctional 50M waterproof digital outdoor sports watch, chosen primarily to fulfill the need for a waterproof wrist worn device that does not provide walking reminders to avoid priming our participants

<sup>5</sup>This article is part of a larger study that also measured the correlation between physical activity and food purchases. Physical activity and food purchases were recorded again in day 3, but they are not relevant to our research question. The additional measures occurred after the completion of our experimental conditions so it does not affect our results

treatment, status was assigned based on the number of steps during Period 1; that is, when the step count information was collected, the monitors split the group in half. The group with a higher step count (relative to the median) was assigned “High” status and the other half was assigned “Low” status. Participants were then asked to move to the side of the room that corresponded to their earned status, as instructed by the monitors. Regardless of status, participants in this treatment earned \$10. In the “Social Status with Monetary Incentives” treatment, status was assigned based on the number of steps as in the Social Status Fixed Payment treatment, but each status was paid differentially, such that those in the High status and in the Low status received \$15 and \$10, respectively. Finally, in the “Income with Exogenous Social Status” treatment, participants completed a 5-minute, 10-question general knowledge quiz after their step data had been collected. After they completed the quiz, the monitors graded the quiz and assigned High status to those who ranked in the top half and Low status to those who ranked in the lower half. With this treatment, we wanted to rule out the possibility that subjects changed their behavior based on a setting where social status was not tied to their physical activity or the monetary incentive associated with status, hence measuring any potential experimenter demand effects. Similar to the other two treatments, participants were asked to sit with their corresponding status group and were paid by status.

### **3.2 Day 0 (Set Up)**

The first day was an informational session. Participants were given the instructions and pedometers (which they kept after the study). They were told they would be required to participate in all 3 days to receive full payment, and would be required to wear their pedometers for the duration of the experiment. Participants received a compensation of \$10 per visit (\$30 for all three visits) plus any additional earnings according to their assigned treatment and status. The instructions were read to participants by one of the monitors. Once the instructions were read, and questions were answered, two session monitors handed

out the pedometers. Each participant was then asked to place the pedometers on their wrist, after which the monitors attached a uniquely numbered zip tie, ensuring that the pedometer could not be easily removed and that removal would be easily identified by the unique zip tie number. Once the pedometer was attached to the participant, the monitors cleared the pedometer to ensure the total step count was reset to zero and that the step function was turned on. After all the participants had their pedometer and zip tie attached, they received the \$10 daily participation fee and were dismissed until the next day.



Figure 2: Example of pedometer set up.

### 3.3 Day 1 (Baseline Measurement and Random Assignment)

When the participants returned, the monitors read a welcome message and instructed them to wait while the monitors checked the step count of each participant, which served as the baseline step count. The monitors used a covered clipboard to record the cumulative step count of every participant, associating data through the unique zip tie number. Monitors first cut off the zip tie and requested that the participant remove the pedometer. Once the baseline step count was collected for each participant, a social status was assigned based on their randomly assigned treatment and the additional payment for each status was announced. Participants had no prior knowledge that a social status would be assigned, nor how it would be assigned, until this point in the study. Participants earned additional money according to the treatment and status (if applicable) assigned, as well as their \$10 daily participation fee. At the end of the sessions, participants placed the pedometers back on their wrist and

were zip tied with a new, uniquely identified zip tie. The pedometers were also set to zero at this time by the session monitors.

### **3.4 Day 2 (Treatment Effect Measurement)**

Day 2 proceeded much the same as Day 1 for collecting the number of steps for the treatment (Period 2). We were interested in studying how the effect of assigning social status and monetary incentives affect behavior; that is, how status differentially incentivizes or erodes the motivation of different groups regarding physical activity, so it was important to study this over the two periods. Therefore, the step data collected in Period 2 served as the treatment effect on physical activity behavior from the randomly assigned treatment in Day 1. Participants received their \$10 daily participation fee plus any additional earnings. They were informed that they could keep the pedometer and were dismissed. For the 3-day period, the average compensation was approximately \$50 plus the pedometer watch.

## **4 Hypotheses**

We are interested in two key research questions: first, how assigned social status affects physical activity, and second, how assigned social status combined with monetary incentives increase or erode motivation for physical activity for low- and high-activity subgroups.

To address these two questions, we looked at the change in each participant's number of steps between the baseline (Period 1) and treatment (Period 2). Our experimental design randomly assigned people to a social status, but this was not known to the participants until Day 1. Hence, the change in the number of steps between the two periods was driven by how social status and the incentives were assigned on Day 1. By assigning social status and observing the subsequent behavior, we are also able to assess how monetary incentives affect the behavior of different types of individuals. Building from previous literature, we formulated four main hypotheses related to each treatment.

HYPOTHESIS 1. *A social status based on physical activity has a non-negative effect on step count.*

Awarding a high status with a fixed payment may motivate people to either maintain their social status or try to attain a higher status. Previous literature on social status shows that individuals in a low-status group seek to mimic the high-status group (in order to belong). Hence, we expect that people who are assigned a low status because of their low physical activity level would increase their activity in order to be part of the high-status group if social status is an incentive reward, or not react if social status incentives are not a motivation. Similarly, high-status individuals would seek to showcase their status through consumption behaviors (Clingsmith and Sheremeta 2018, Heffetz 2011, Kuhn et al. 2011, Corneo and Jeanne 1997, Bearden and Etzel 1982, Veblen 1899). We expect that those assigned high status would likely maintain their level of activity or increase it in order to remain in the high-status group. Furthermore, the literature shows that social comparison and peer effects have a positive effect on physical activity (Beatty and Katare 2018, Agarwal et al. 2021, Patel et al. 2017).

HYPOTHESIS 2A. *Low status with monetary incentives based on physical activity will motivate individuals to increase their number of steps.*

Previous studies showed that the desire for acceptance by a referenced high-social-status group induces people to mimic those with higher status (Mason 2018, Heffetz 2011, Kuhn et al. 2011, Corneo and Jeanne 1997, Bearden and Etzel 1982). In line with this notion, we conjecture that the desire to achieve a higher status combined with monetary incentives would motivate the low-status group to increase their activity to achieve a higher status. We hypothesize that with monetary incentives, the effect would be stronger. In previous studies, people—particularly low-activity individuals—responded to financial incentives by increasing their physical activity in the short-term (Acland and Levy 2015, Charness and Gneezy 2009).

HYPOTHESIS 2B. *A high status with monetary incentives based on physical activity will*

*crowd out motivation and decrease the number of steps.*

Financial incentives for engaging in a pleasurable activity are known to decrease intrinsic motivation (Esteves-Sorenson and Broce 2016, James Jr 2005, Frey and Jegen 2001, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Kreps 1997, Deci and Ryan 1985), particularly in terms of physical activity (Moller et al. 2014). The high status group may be sensitive to this phenomenon since their high-activity levels may be a sign they enjoy physical activity. Previous literature shows that when financial incentives are offered for pro-social behavior, the willingness to perform the pro-social behavior declines (Heyman and Ariely 2004). Hence, awarding a high status, which could be interpreted as a non-pecuniary incentive in the social economy, might lead to a decrease in the number of steps when combined with monetary incentives.

**HYPOTHESIS 3.** *A status with monetary incentives exogenous to physical activity will have no effect on the number of steps.*

Since social status for a knowledge quiz is exogenous to physical activity, there should be no change in physical activity behavior. This treatment is a robustness check to rule out potential experimenter demand effects and other factors driving the results. That is, physical activity should remain unchanged if experimenter demand effects are not an issue in our experiment.

## 5 Results

In total, 284 individuals completed all three visits.<sup>6</sup> As described in the experimental procedures, all participants received the same information and were given pedometers during the first visit. Table 2 features the sample characteristics. We conducted an orthogonality test and found that our sample was balanced across treatments (Appendix Table A1). Table A2 in the appendix shows the sample distribution by treatment and social status.

For all treatments, we used the step count measured during Period 1 as a baseline. We

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<sup>6</sup>313 people started the experiment; however, only 284 completed all three visits. A power calculation estimates about 55 participants based on (Hajat et al. 2019) to observe an effect of 80% power.

| Table 2: Sample Characteristics |                |                |                |                |                  |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| Characteristics                 | Sample Mean    | By treatment   |                |                |                  |
|                                 |                | Control        | Fixed Payment  | Incentives     | Exogenous Income |
| Age (mean)                      | 24.17<br>(7.3) | 25.69<br>(8.5) | 23.33<br>(6.3) | 24.34<br>(7.7) | 23.67<br>(6.67)  |
| Female                          | 0.59<br>(0.5)  | 0.69<br>(0.4)  | 0.63<br>(0.5)  | 0.53<br>(0.5)  | 0.52<br>(0.5)    |
| Household Size (mean)           | 2.5<br>(1.5)   | 2.5<br>(1.6)   | 2.5<br>(1.5)   | 2.5<br>(1.4)   | 2.6<br>(1.7)     |
| <i>Race</i>                     |                |                |                |                |                  |
| White                           | 0.31<br>(0.5)  | 0.34<br>(0.5)  | 0.3<br>(0.4)   | 0.35<br>(0.5)  | 0.25<br>(0.4)    |
| Hispanic                        | 0.21<br>(0.4)  | 0.2<br>(0.4)   | 0.2<br>(0.4)   | 0.21<br>(0.41) | 0.23<br>(0.4)    |
| Black                           | 0.06<br>(0.24) | 0.07<br>(0.3)  | 0.08<br>(0.3)  | 0.04<br>(0.2)  | 0.07<br>(0.2)    |
| Native American                 | 0.007<br>(0.1) | 0<br>(0)       | 0<br>(0)       | 0.01<br>(0.1)  | 0.01<br>(0.1)    |
| Asian                           | 0.43<br>(0.5)  | 0.41<br>(0.5)  | 0.44<br>(0.5)  | 0.4<br>(0.5)   | 0.45<br>(0.5)    |
| <i>Year in School</i>           |                |                |                |                |                  |
| First, undergraduate            | 0.18           | 0.12           | 0.15           | 0.15           | 0.28             |
| Second, undergraduate           | 0.09           | 0.14           | 0.07           | 0.12           | 0.08             |
| Third, undergraduate            | 0.13           | 0.14           | 0.16           | 0.12           | 0.12             |
| Fourth+, undergraduate          | 0.17           | 0.21           | 0.13           | 0.2            | 0.16             |
| Graduate                        | 0.35           | 0.28           | 0.44           | 0.36           | 0.32             |
| Staff                           | 0.06           | 0.12           | 0.05           | 0.05           | 0.04             |
| <i>Annual Income Category</i>   |                |                |                |                |                  |
| <\$45,000                       | 0.43           | 0.45           | 0.44           | 0.36           | 0.48             |
| \$45,000 - \$49,000             | 0.04           | 0.02           | 0.07           | 0.05           | 0.02             |
| \$50,000 - \$59,000             | 0.07           | 0.09           | 0.05           | 0.11           | 0.04             |
| >\$60,000                       | 0.34           | 0.29           | 0.36           | 0.38           | 0.38             |
| N                               | 284            | 58             | 75             | 76             | 74               |




Figure 3: Total Step Count for Periods 1 and 2, Control

provide summary statistics on the step counts in Tabe A3. In the appendix Figure A1, we present a graph showing all the baseline measurements across the randomly assigned treatments. The randomization was successful and we find no difference in these baseline measurements. Figure 3 features the total step count on Period 1 (baseline) and Period 2 (treatment) for the Control group. As we would expect, the total number of steps between those two days did not significantly change; we can therefore conclude that the activity trackers did not induce changes in physical activity in our experiment (Kim et al. 2018, Rote 2017, Takahashi et al. 2016, Butler and Dwyer 2004).

**RESULT 1.** *A status solely based on physical activity behavior does not change the number of steps.*

Figures 4 and 5 show the total step count for Period 1 and Period 2 for the Social Status Fixed Payment and the Social Status with Monetary Incentives treatments, respectively. The first two sets of bars in these graphs are the total step counts for the overall treatment, for which we observe no significant difference when social status was assigned based on physical






Figure 4: Total Step Count for Periods 1 and 2, Social Status Fixed Payment Treatment

activity but carried no monetary incentives. However, when physical activity social status was combined with monetary incentives, we observe an overall decrease in steps. The analysis showcases a differential effect by social status, which represents heterogeneous responses by low- and high-activity subgroups.

RESULT 2A. *Monetary incentives for those with low social status (i.e., low physical activity) increase the number of steps.*

RESULT 2B. *Monetary incentives for those with high social status (i.e., high physical activity) decrease the number of steps.*

When we separate the physical activity with monetary incentives treatment by the social status assignment, we observe differences. Those assigned a low status in Period 1 increased their step count 12% ( $p = 0.1371$ ). Conversely, those assigned a high status in Period 1 reduced their step count by 25% ( $p = 0.0006$ ). Hence, the overall decrease in steps is largely driven by a reduction in the number of steps among participants with high status (and high physical activity level).




Figure 5: Total Step Count for Periods 1 and 2, Social Status with Monetary Incentives Treatment

RESULT 3. *A social status exogenous to physical activity does not change physical activity even when a monetary reward is given for the conferred status.*

In Figure 6, we present the total step count of those who were randomly assigned to the Exogenous Income Social Status treatment. As expected, there is no change in physical activity overall or by social status assignment between Period 1 and Period 2. This result provides robustness to the main results as it helps to rule out any experimenter demand effects of using the pedometers or other facts driving the results. When we break down the Exogenous Income Social Status treatment by the types in the group, as seen in Figure 6, the result remains the same.<sup>7</sup>

Table A5 in the appendix reflects the results of a multiple hypothesis test (List et al. 2019), which confirm the results that the high-status group in the Monetary Incentives

<sup>7</sup>While no status was assigned in the Control treatment, we explored the difference in step count for high physical activity types and low physical activity types between the two periods. We observe no differences in step count. When separating the exogenous treatment between the two types, we see an increase in step count for the low physical activity type ( $p = 0.0017$ ), but not for the overall treatment.




Figure 6: Total Step Count for Periods 1 and 2, Exogenous Treatment

treatment did decrease their step count between Periods 1 and 2, but show now effect for the low-status group. We further explore the effect on the change in steps between Period 1 and Period 2 through a regression, as displayed in Table 3, to include control variables. The outcome variable is change in steps, and we regress it on the social status by treatment, and sociodemographic control variables. Our regression equation (1) is

$$\Delta Y = B_F * A_H + B_M * A_H + B_E * A_H + \sum_{i=3}^K \gamma_i * sociodemographiccontrols + e \quad (1)$$

where  $\Delta Y$  is  $Y_2 - Y_1$ ,  $B_R, R = F, M, E$  denotes an indicator variable for each treatment, and  $A_H$  is an indicator for high status. The results in Table 3 align with the unconditional results in figures 4 and 5, where we observe no effect in the Social Status Fixed payment treatment, the low status with monetary incentives group increases their step count by 12%, and the High Status with Monetary Incentives treatment results in over a 25% decrease in the

Table 3: Regressions on change in steps, Social Status Treatments

|                           | (1)                  | (2)                   | (3)                   |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Fixed Payment, Low        | -1218.6<br>(1230.4)  | -376.3<br>(1625.9)    | -450.3<br>(1856.4)    |
| Fixed Payment, High       | -771.1<br>(772.1)    | -125.9<br>(1252.4)    | -424.1<br>(1424.8)    |
| Monetary Incentives, Low  | 1566.6**<br>(671.1)  | 2524.1**<br>(832.3)   | 2530.7**<br>(916.9)   |
| Monetary Incentives, High | -5011.8*<br>(2497.4) | -4460.3**<br>(1972.8) | -4892.8**<br>(2004.5) |
| Exogenous, Low            | 659.6<br>(1270.1)    | 1474.0<br>(1590.9)    | 1280.8<br>(1841.9)    |
| Exogenous, High           | 805.2<br>(1145.7)    | 1014.5<br>(1141.5)    | 979.8<br>(1295.6)     |
| Constant                  | -191.1<br>(428.4)    | 4167.4<br>(3556.8)    | 4762.0<br>(3835.8)    |
| Controls?                 | No                   | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| N                         | 284                  | 265                   | 230                   |
| $R^2$                     | 0.111                | 0.176                 | 0.2095                |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

*Note: Specification (1) includes no controls while specifications (2) and (3) include them. Specification (2) does not include the high-income dummy variable as a control since approximately 15% of the sample opted to not disclose their income level; however, the magnitude and significance levels between specification (2) and (3) reflect similar results.*

number of steps. The results for the low- and high-status groups are robust to the inclusion of sociodemographic control variables. We can further confirm from Table 3 that the exogenous treatment has no effect on the number of steps, regardless of status assignment.

## 6 Discussion and Conclusions

In this experiment, we find two contrasting effects when physical activity is incentivized with both social status and monetary rewards. Those who are in the low-status group (i.e., low physical activity types) increase their step count by 12%, while those in the high-status group (i.e., high physical activity types) decrease their step count by 25%. While the low-

status group seeks to attain higher status, we observe a crowding-out effect from those in the high-status group. We find no effect when physical activity is awarded only based on social status with a fixed payment. With a study that is short-term like ours, we may expect to find a large magnitude in our effect sizes. However, we find no effect when physical activity is awarded only by status with a fixed payment or the income treatment unrelated to physical activity. The exogenous treatment provides validity to these early associations and rules out experiment demand effects or other potential drivers for the results in the main treatments.

Our findings from the Social Status with Monetary Incentives treatment are consistent with those from previous literature regarding financial incentives and incentivized activity more broadly in the social economy. Specifically, previous literature shows that when monetary incentives are offered, the intrinsic motivation for physical activity is reduced (Moller et al. 2014, Charness and Gneezy 2009). Our findings add to this line of work by exploring the combination of social status and monetary incentives in the realm of physical activity and confirming that for those who are highly active, their intrinsic motivation is reduced and this effect may be observed early in the intervention. This effect may be better observed in a longer-term study to observe intrinsic motivation. Meanwhile, we find that for those with low physical activity, the combination of social status and monetary incentives increases their physical activity. Previous literature further suggests that people with low physical activity increase their activity in response to monetary incentives (Charness and Gneezy 2009). Status based on performance does not hinder this effect for people with low physical activity. A simpler explanation could be that high performers learn that relative to others, they have a much higher step count and can attain the same level of number of steps to reach a higher status. This phenomenon has been documented in other domains when individuals receive ranking feedback on performance (Kuhnen and Tymula 2012, Ludwig and Lünser 2012)

While we observed these early associations over the span of three days, we focused solely on positively framed incentives. However, we did not explore negatively framed incentives. For physical activity, scholars have looked briefly at financial disincentives; however, in order

to implement these, justifications need to be strong and they will likely not encourage a positive behavioral change or, even worse, reduce motivation to exercise (Barte and Wendel-Vos 2017)

A limitation to our study is its short-term nature, however, this is an exploratory analysis. Furthermore, unobserved individual differences may affect how individuals respond to incentives; this variation may affect the observations that could be made in a short-term study. We also note the pedometer is not high quality; however, we mostly used it to measure relative performance. Our study provides some foundation that may prove useful for a longer-term study. Future work could explore different incentive structures in the form of nudges provided in phone apps that might also interact with social status in different contexts. For example, successful nudges could implement procedures where subjects can showcase their goal-achievement progress across social media outlets. Studies of this nature can measure the impact on the overall population and on different subgroups of individuals with varying levels of susceptibility to social status.

Our early associations call for a cautionary approach to the role of social status in physical activity intervention programs. Over two thirds of worksites in the United States offer employees a workplace wellness program, for example; England’s government implemented a pilot to motivate exercise using financial incentives (CDC, 2019; Linnan et al., 2019; Department of Health, 2010).<sup>8</sup> In addition, various interventions in which people earn money for partaking in exercise activities (i.e., Achievement app, Lympo app, or Sweatcoin), bet on the achievement of activity goals (i.e., StepBet app), or earn money that is donated to charities (i.e., Charity Miles and PK Rewards), have been introduced.<sup>9</sup> Social status in field experiments may be a source of unobserved treatment variation that may need to be further

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<sup>8</sup>CDC: <https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2019/p0422-workplaces-offer-wellness.html>

<sup>9</sup>Achievement app: <https://www.myachievement.com/>

Lympo app: <https://lympo.com/>

Sweatcoin: <https://sweatco.in/>

StepBet app: <https://waybetter.com/stepbet>

Charity Miles: <https://charitymiles.org/>

PK Rewards: <https://www.pkrewards.com/>

studied and quantified.

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Table A1: Orthogonality (balance) test

|                       | Control | Social Status Treatments   |                                  | Exogenous | p-value |
|-----------------------|---------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|---------|
|                       |         | Exercise,<br>Fixed Payment | Exercise,<br>Monetary Incentives |           |         |
| Age                   | 25.690  | 23.338                     | 24.338                           | 23.667    | 0.276   |
| Female                | 0.690   | 0.635                      | 0.533                            | 0.527     | 0.158   |
| Household Size        | 2.500   | 2.535                      | 2.486                            | 2.644     | 0.930   |
| White                 | 0.345   | 0.293                      | 0.347                            | 0.250     | 0.541   |
| Hispanic              | 0.190   | 0.200                      | 0.213                            | 0.237     | 0.916   |
| Black                 | 0.069   | 0.080                      | 0.040                            | 0.066     | 0.785   |
| Native American       | 0.000   | 0.013                      | 0.013                            | 0.000     | 0.619   |
| Asian                 | 0.414   | 0.440                      | 0.400                            | 0.447     | 0.932   |
| Year in School        | 3.772   | 3.813                      | 3.667                            | 3.280     | 0.172   |
| Income, <\$45k        | 0.448   | 0.440                      | 0.365                            | 0.480     | 0.547   |
| Income, \$45k - \$49k | 0.017   | 0.067                      | 0.054                            | 0.027     | 0.446   |
| Income, \$50k - \$59k | 0.086   | 0.053                      | 0.108                            | 0.040     | 0.365   |
| Income, >\$60k        | 0.293   | 0.360                      | 0.378                            | 0.307     | 0.673   |

Table A2: Treatment assignments on Day 1 for whole sample

| Treatment                              |    |
|--|----|
| Control, no status                     | 58 |
| Social Status Fixed Payment            |    |
| Low                                    | 34 |
| High                                   | 41 |
| Social Status with Monetary Incentives |    |
| Low                                    | 39 |
| High                                   | 36 |
| Exogenous Social Status                |    |
| Low                                    | 37 |
| High                                   | 39 |

Table A3: Summary statistics by treatment and status

| Treatment and Status                        | Mean    | Median  | Min  | Max   |
|---|---------|---------|------|-------|
| Control                                     | 14607.3 | 13782   | 4199 | 36599 |
| Social Status Fixed Payment, Low            | 11584.7 | 11114   | 7294 | 22160 |
| Social Status Fixed Payment, High           | 18481.5 | 17045.5 | 8726 | 43341 |
| Social Status with Monetary Incentives, Low | 11345.8 | 11502   | 5541 | 20863 |
| Exogenous Social Status, Low                | 15178.6 | 14528   | 7519 | 27363 |
| Exogenous Social Status, High               | 14816.2 | 14059   | 3614 | 37134 |

Table A4: Number of participants by session time and week

|          | Week 1 | Week 2 | Week 3 | Week 4 | Week 5 |
|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 9:30 am  | 5      |        |        |        |        |
| 11:00 am | 3      | 8      | 10     | 13     | 21     |
| 2:30 pm  | 8      | 16     | 21     | 19     | 19     |
| 4:00 pm  | 4      | 15     | 17     | 24     | 16     |
| 5:30 pm  |        | 12     | 13     | 20     | 20     |

*Note: The first week featured a 9:30 am session that was replaced by a 5:30 pm session to increase participation opportunity.*




Figure A1: Total Step Count for Day 1, all treatments



Table A5: Multiple Hypotheses Test Results

|                          |                           | Coefficient |            | p-values     |            |         |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|---------|
|                          |                           |             |            | Multiplicity |            |         |
|                          |                           |             | Unadjusted | Adjusted     | Bonferroni | Holm    |
| Control                  | Fixed Payment, Low        | 1218.63     | 0.25       | 0.66         | 1          | 1       |
| Control                  | Fixed Payment, High       | 771.09      | 0.39       | 0.77         | 1          | 1       |
| Control                  | Exogenous, Low            | 659.62      | 0.57       | 0.57         | 1          | 0.57    |
| Control                  | Exogenous, High           | 805.15      | 0.45       | 0.70         | 1          | 0.9     |
| Control                  | Monetary Incentives, Low  | 1566.59     | 0.10*      | 0.37         | 0.69       | 0.49    |
| Control                  | Monetary Incentives, High | 5011.81     | 0.00***    | 0.02**       | 0.03**     | 0.03**  |
| Fixed Payment, Low       | Fixed Payment, High       | 447.54      | 0.71       | 0.92         | 1          | 1       |
| Fixed Payment, Low       | Exogenous, Low            | 1878.25     | 0.15       | 0.63         | 1          | 1       |
| Fixed Payment, Low       | Exogenous, High           | 2023.79     | 0.11       | 0.56         | 1          | 1       |
| Fixed Payment, Low       | Monetary Incentives, Low  | 2785.22     | 0.01**     | 0.12         | 0.33       | 0.19    |
| Fixed Payment, Low       | Monetary Incentives, High | 3793.18     | 0.02**     | 0.17         | 0.50       | 0.27    |
| Fixed Payment, High      | Exogenous, Low            | 1430.71     | 0.23       | 0.68         | 1          | 1       |
| Fixed Payment, High      | Exogenous, High           | 1576.25     | 0.19       | 0.72         | 1          | 1       |
| Fixed Payment, High      | Monetary Incentives, Low  | 2337.68     | 0.03**     | 0.21         | 0.73       | 0.36    |
| Fixed Payment, High      | Monetary Incentives, High | 4240.72     | 0.01**     | 0.13         | 0.33       | 0.20    |
| Exogenous, Low           | Exogenous, High           | 145.54      | 0.91       | 0.91         | 1          | 0.91    |
| Exogenous, Low           | Monetary Incentives, Low  | 906.97      | 0.90       | 0.90         | 1          | 1       |
| Exogenous, Low           | Monetary Incentives, High | 5671.43     | 0.03**     | 0.03**       | 0.07*      | 0.05**  |
| Exogenous, High          | Monetary Incentives, Low  | 761.43      | 0.54       | 0.93         | 1          | 1       |
| Exogenous, High          | Monetary Incentives, High | 5816.96     | 0.00***    | 0.04**       | 0.09*      | 0.06*   |
| Monetary Incentives, Low | Monetary Incentives, High | 6578.40     | 0.00***    | 0.000***     | 0.01***    | 0.01*** |

Note: Based on List et al. (2019)

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Difference-in-difference estimations on difference in steps

|   | (1)                    | (2)                    |
|---|------------------------|------------------------|
| Fixed Payment, Low                          | -3835.1***<br>(1387.9) | -4107.3***<br>(1275.9) |
| Fixed Payment, High                         | 3129.3**<br>(1559.5)   | 2214.0<br>(1350.7)     |
| Monetary Incentives, Low                    | -550.9<br>(1830.9)     | -702.1<br>(2200.7)     |
| Monetary Incentives, High                   | 8494.3***<br>(1916.3)  | 8028.8***<br>(2300.0)  |
| Exogenous, Low                              | -445.4<br>(1417.1)     | -883.6<br>(1349.1)     |
| Exogenous, High                             | -762.7<br>(1365.8)     | 636.2<br>(1379.2)      |
| Period 2                                    | -217.8<br>(571.2)      | -488.8<br>(578.9)      |
| Fixed Payment, Low $\times$ Period 2        | -1054.2*<br>(1039.8)   | -748.7<br>(1098.8)     |
| Fixed Payment, High $\times$ Period 2       | -664.3<br>(930.8)      | -354.5<br>(966.2)      |
| Monetary Incentives, Low $\times$ Period 2  | 1593.3<br>(952.8)      | 2006.0**<br>(983.4)    |
| Monetary Incentives, High $\times$ Period 2 | -4867.7***<br>(1466.4) | -4640.7***<br>(1523.0) |
| Exogenous, Low $\times$ Period 2            | 712.2<br>(1131.2)      | 1102.8<br>(1164.6)     |
| Exogenous, High                             | 888.9<br>(1080.3)      | 351.5<br>(1038.1)      |
| Constant                                    | 1576.8***<br>(951.2)   | 18159.6***<br>(1647.1) |
| Controls?                                   | No                     | Yes                    |
| N   | 581                    | 541                    |
| $R^2$                                       | 0.206                  | 0.232                  |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

*Note: Specification (1) does not include demographic controls while specification (2) includes them. Both specifications control for session effects. Errors are clustered at the individual level.*

## Instructions for informational meeting

Welcome! Thank you for participating in our study. This experiment includes **Three visits**. You will receive a \$10 compensation fee for your participation for each visit. You may also receive additional payments depending on the outcomes of the experiment.

As a reminder before we start this study, your participation is completely voluntary. At any time, you may elect to end your participation. However, in order to receive any monetary payments, you must complete the whole study. All information collected during today's visit, and the rest of the study will be kept confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.

Before you begin, please make sure that your cellphone is turned off and all of your belongings are placed beside you on the floor. We expect and appreciate your cooperation!

The purpose of our study is to gather some general information on physical activity and decision-making process. We will now go through the instructions for the rest of the visits. The instructions will be read from a script to make sure the procedures are accurately described. There will be an opportunity for questions once we go through the information instructions.

For the rest of today's visit, it is very important that there be no further talking or other communication between participants. If you have questions or comments, please inform a session monitor. If you are not able to comply with these requests, you may be disqualified from the experiment.

If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will gladly answer them.

Again, thank you for your participation.

## **Instructions for informational meeting**

Today, we will provide you with a pedometer to track your physical activity over the next few days. For every visit, we will measure your physical activity.

The study will proceed with **Three visits** as described below.

**Visit 1:** Receive pedometers and general instructions of this study.

**Visit 2:** Your previous physical activity will be collected. You will complete a survey.

**Visit 3:** This is a follow up visit.

**PLEASE BRING THE PEDOMETERS FOR EVERY VISIT**

**and**

**YOU NEED TO WEAR THE PEDOMETER AT ALL TIMES. PLEASE DO  
NOT TAKE IT OFF UNTIL THE NEXT VISIT.**

You may keep the pedometer at the end of the study.

## Instructions for Visit 2

Welcome Back!

As a reminder before we start today's experiment, your participation is completely voluntary. At any time, you may elect to end your participation. However, in order to receive any monetary payments, you must complete the whole study. All information collected during today's visit, and rest of the study will be kept confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.

Before you begin, please make sure that your cellphone is turned off and all of your belongings are placed beside you on the floor. We expect and appreciate your cooperation!

Please return your pedometer to our session monitors. We will measure your physical activity. You will receive a \$10 show-up fee for your participation for today's visit. We will ask you to complete a survey at the end of today's session.

*(Social Status Fixed Payment and Social Status with Monetary Incentives: Today's visit will involve two statuses: High and Low status. This status will be determined based on your yesterday's physical activity. Your previous physical activity will not affect the additional payment you receive for today's visit.)*

*(Exogenous Social Status: Today's visit will involve two statuses: High and Low status. You will be asked to solve a quiz. The status will be determined based on your quiz score. Your additional payments will be determined by your quiz score.)*

For the rest of today's visit, it is very important that there be no further talking or other communication between participants. If you have questions or comments, please inform a

session monitor. If you are not able to comply with these requests, you may be disqualified from the experiment.

If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will gladly answer them.

Again, thank you for your participation.

## **Income Earnings**

*(Control)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. You will receive \$10.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

*(Social Status Fixed Payment)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of steps will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those whose step count are above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those whose step count are below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, our session monitors will walk around and collect the number of steps that you walked yesterday. Then, we will assign your status based on your number of steps.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$10. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

*(Social Status with Monetary Incentives)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of steps will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those whose step count are above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those whose step count are below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, our session monitors will walk around and collect the number of steps that you have walked yesterday. Then, we will assign your status based on your number of steps.



**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$15. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

*(Social Status with Monetary Incentives)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday.

The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of correct answers you have on a quiz will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those who score above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those who score below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, we would like you to take a short knowledge quiz. The quiz consists of 10 multiple choice questions. You will receive your score once everyone is done with the quiz and graded. Then, we will assign your status based on your score.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

Once you are ready, please turn the page to continue.

1. Grand Central Terminal, Park Avenue, New York is the world's
  - (a) Largest railway station
  - (b) Highest railway station
  - (c) Longest railway station
  - (d) None of the above
2. Entomology is the science that studies
  - (a) Behavior of human beings
  - (b) Insects
  - (c) The origin and history of technical and scientific terms
  - (d) The formation of rocks
3. Eritrea, which became the 182nd member of the UN in 1993, is in the continent of
  - (a) Asia
  - (b) Africa
  - (c) Europe
  - (d) Australia
4. Exposure to sunlight helps a person improve his health because
  - (a) The infrared light kills bacteria in the body
  - (b) Resistance power increases
  - (c) The pigment cells in the skin get stimulated and produce a healthy tan
  - (d) The ultraviolet rays convert skin oil into Vitamin D
5. Each year World Red Cross and Red Crescent Day is celebrated on

- (a) May 8
  - (b) May 18
  - (c) June 8
  - (d) June 18
6. Federation Cup, World Cup, Allywyn International Trophy, and Challenge Cup are awarded to winners of
- (a) Tennis
  - (b) Volleyball
  - (c) Basketball
  - (d) Cricket
7. Germany signed the Armistice Treaty on \_\_\_\_\_ and World War 1 ended
- (a) January 19, 1918
  - (b) May 30, 1918
  - (c) November 11, 1918
  - (d) February 15, 1918
8. The Ozone layer restricts
- (a) Visible light
  - (b) Infrared radiation
  - (c) X-rays and gamma rays
  - (d) Ultraviolet radiation
9. Headquarters of UNO are situated at
- (a) New York, USA

(b) Hague, Netherlands

(c) Geneva, Switzerland

(d) Paris, France

10. During the first crusade, crusaders reached Jerusalem and captured it in

(a) 1000 AD

(b) 1200 AD

(c) 1099 AD

(d) 1515 AD

Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$15. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

## Survey

1. What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_
2. What is your gender?
  - (a) Male
  - (b) Female
  - (c) Other
3. Not counting yourself, how many people live in your household? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What is your ethnicity (ethnic heritage)? Please select all that apply
  - (a) White
  - (b) Hispanic or Latino
  - (c) African American
  - (d) Native American or American Indian
  - (e) Asian/Pacific Islander
  - (f) Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your year in school? (Please indicate the highest level that you have completed or in progress to complete)
  - (a) Freshman
  - (b) Sophomore
  - (c) Junior
  - (d) Senior
  - (e) Grad student
  - (f) Staff member

6. What is your major? \_\_\_\_\_
7. What is your approximate total family or household gross income for 2018 (please choose one)?
- (a) Less than \$45,000
  - (b) \$45,000-\$49,000
  - (c) \$50,000 - \$59,000
  - (d) More than \$60,000
  - (e) Prefer not to answer

We will now proceed to your payments for today's participation. Please do not discuss the procedures of today's study with anyone who will be participating in later rounds of the study until after they have completed their session. This will help ensure the validity of our results.

Once you have completed your survey, you will receive your payment for participation and the food product that you purchased today. Please complete the survey and wait until it is collected by a session monitor when you have completed it.

## **Concluding Remark for Visit 2**

Today's visit is complete. We will ask you to come again for the last visit. In visit 3, you will be randomly assigned to different groups and your payment will be calculated differently. You may or may not have an opportunity to earn additional payments in the next visit. However, your additional payments may or may not be determined by your physical activity.

**PLEASE BRING THE PEDOMETERS BACK TO US FOR EVERY VISIT**

**and**

**DO NOT TAKE OFF YOUR PEDOMETER.**

Thank you once again for your participation in today's session.



### Instructions for Visit 3

Welcome back! Today is the last visit of this study.

As a reminder before we start today's visit, your participation is completely voluntary. At any time, you may elect to end your participation. However, in order to receive any monetary payments, you must complete the whole study. All information collected during today's visit, and rest of the study will be kept confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.

Before you begin, please make sure that your cellphone is turned off and all of your belongings are placed beside you on the floor. We expect and appreciate your cooperation! Please return your pedometer to our session monitors. We will measure your physical activity. You will receive a \$10 show-up fee for your participation for today's visit.

*(Social Status Fixed Payment and Social Status with Monetary Incentives): Today's visit will involve two statuses: High and Low status. This status will be determined based on your yesterday's physical activity. Your previous physical activity will not affect the additional payment you receive for today's visit.*

*(Exogenous Social Status): Today's visit will involve two statuses: High and Low status. You will be asked to solve a quiz. The status will be determined based on your quiz score. Your additional payments will be determined by your quiz score.*

For the rest of today's visit, it is very important that there be no further talking or other communication between participants. If you have questions or comments, please inform a session monitor. If you are not able to comply with these requests, you may be disqualified from the experiment.

If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will gladly answer them. Again, thank you for your participation.

## **Income Earnings**

*(Control)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. You will receive \$10.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

*(Social Status Fixed Payment)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of steps will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those whose step count are above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those whose step count are below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, our session monitors will walk around and collect the number of steps that you walked yesterday. Then, we will assign your status based on your number of steps.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$10. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

*(Social Status with Monetary Incentives)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday. The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of steps will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those whose step count are above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those whose step count are below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, our session monitors will walk around and collect the number of steps that you have walked yesterday. Then, we will assign your status based on your number of steps.

**Please do not move until our session monitors come to you and check it**

Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$15. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

*(Social Status with Monetary Incentives)*

We will collect your physical activity information of yesterday.

The experiment involves two statuses which are High and Low as described in your information packet. The number of correct answers you have on a quiz will determine which of two groups you will be assigned to for this visit. Those who score above average will be assigned in the High Status. On the other hand, those who score below average will be assigned in the Low Status. Now, we would like you to take a short knowledge quiz. The quiz consists of 10 multiple choice questions. You will receive your score once everyone is done with the quiz and graded. Then, we will assign your status based on your score.

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  - (a) Behavior of human beings
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  - (d) The formation of rocks
3. Eritrea, which became the 182nd member of the UN in 1993, is in the continent of
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5. Each year World Red Cross and Red Crescent Day is celebrated on

- (a) May 8
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9. Headquarters of UNO are situated at
- (a) New York, USA

(b) Hague, Netherlands

(c) Geneva, Switzerland

(d) Paris, France

10. During the first crusade, crusaders reached Jerusalem and captured it in

(a) 1000 AD

(b) 1200 AD

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Now, those who receive a High status please move to the left side of this room. Those who receive a Low status please move to the right side of this room. The High Status group will receive \$15. The Low Status group will receive \$10.

Let's give a big hand to the High Status group!

We will now proceed to your payments for today's participation. Please do not discuss the procedures of today's study with anyone who will be participating in later rounds of the study until after they have completed their session. This will help ensure the validity of our results.

Once you have completed your survey, you will receive your payment for participation.

We thank you sincerely for participating our study!