Lean's logical foundations

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Foundations of mathematics

2 The Curry–Howard correspondence

What it means in practice



Set-theoretic foundations

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Set-theoretic foundations

- Cantor: "Everything is a set"
- Zermelo-Fraenkel with choice (ZFC): particular axiomatization, believed consistent
- Sometimes include large cardinal axioms (equivalently: Grothendieck universes) – not provable from ZFC alone







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- (Who, in this room, knows what the axioms of ZFC are?)
- But if we want to formalize our proofs, we need to choose a foundation to build on.
- Some proof assistants (e.g. Mizar) do use ZFC, but there are other options.



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- Reduction rules like $(\lambda x, e) x \rightsquigarrow e$





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- Problem: it's too flexible
 - Computationally undecidable whether one λ-expression reduces to another
- Lacks notion of domain of a function: can apply a function to anything, including itself



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- Only care about well-typed expressions (terms)
- Can algorithmically check if an expression is well-typed (and determine its type)



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- Type is inhabited ↔ proposition is proved





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 - special type Nat corresponding to N
- More expressive power, but type-checking becomes harder



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- Extremely flexible: allows dependent types and quantification over types
- To avoid paradoxes, need a hierarchy of type universes
- Theorem (Carneiro): CIC has the same consistency strength as "ZFC with countably many inaccessible cardinals".





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- Conventionally: names of terms start with small Latin letters, names of types with capitals or Greek letters.

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- Theorems with hypotheses" are functions: a proof that P ⇒ Q is a function from proofs of P to proofs of Q.
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