# Andsec Security Conference 4th Editon

R3MF - R3v3rs1ng on Mach-O File

# \$Whoami

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Security Specialist with over 15 years of experience, malware research enthusiastic, pentest and reverse engineering. I've a solid knowledge on topics like network security, hardening and tuning across multiple platforms such as Windows, Linux, OS X and Cisco.

Beginner in programming languages as Python, C and Assembly.

At the Brazil, I contribute with some security conferences organizations such as SlackShow Community, bSides SP and Hackers to Hackers Conference (H2HC).

Member # RTFM ♀ Co|\|cL/\V€ #

### Long live Open Source - Use Linux (Slackware) ###

### Agenda


```
0x00 Motivation of Research
0x01 The Mach-O Format
0x02 Demo I (crackme)
0x03 Tricks for Reversing
0x04 Demo II (malware)
0x05 Conclusions / Q & (MAYBE \0/) A
```

### 0x00 Motivation Of Research

```
For Fun ;) \0/
```

- malware
- crackmes

### 0x00 Motivation Of Research



#### 0x00 Motivation Of Research

#### Mac.BackDoor.OpinionSpy.3

Names: MacOS X/OpinionSpy.A (Microsoft),

Mac.BackDoor.OpinionSpy.3 (F-Secure),

Mac.BackDoor.OpinionSpy.3 (Trend)

#### .OSA --> ZIP:

- PremierOpinion
- upgrade.xml

#### OSX KAITEN.A

Names: MacOS X/Tsunami.A (Microsoft),

OSX/Tsunami (McAfee), OSX/Tsunami-Gen (Sophos), OSX/Tsunami.A (F-Secure), Binary: /tmp/.z

#### OSX CARETO.A

Names: MacOS:Appetite-A [Trj] (Avast)

OSX/BackDoor.A (AVG)

Trojan.OSX.Melgato.a (Kaspersky)

OSX/Backdoor-BRE (McAfee)

Backdoor:MacOS X/Appetite.A (Microsoft)

OSX/Appetite-A (Sophos)

itunes212.{BLOCKED}pdt.com

The mach-o is a Universal (fat) binaries (for i386 x86\_64 ppc ppc64 armv6 armv7), this format was adopted as the standard in OS X from version 10.6 on.

We are currently in version 10.11.5 (El Capitan).

bash-3.2\$ pwd
/opt/local/lib
bash-3.2\$ vim libmagic.dylib

bash-3.2\$ pwd
/usr/share/file/magic
bash-3.2\$

#### Binary (Linux)

```
→ reversing file cal
cal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked
  (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, stripped
  → reversing
```

#### Binary (Windows)

```
→ reversing file calc.exe
calc.exe: PE32+ executable for MS Windows (GUI) Mono/.Net assembly
→ reversing
```

#### Binary (OS X)

```
→ reversing file /usr/bin/cal
/usr/bin/cal: Mach-0 64-bit executable x86_64
→ reversing
```

Magic Number: File Signatures

CA FE BA BE - Mach-O Fat Binary

FE ED FA CE - Mach-O binary (32-bit)

FE ED FA CF - Mach-O binary (64-bit)

CE FA ED FE - Mach-O binary (reverse byte 32-bit)


CF FA ED FE - Mach-O binary (reverse byte 64-bit)

Mach-O (Mach Object)

HEADER LOAD COMMANDS SECTIONS

Architecture of object code

ppc ppc64 i386 x86\_64 armv6 armv7 armv7s arm64



```
Structs on File:
loganbr ~ $ vim /usr/include/mach-o/loader.h
```

- Code is located in TEXT section.
- Linked libraries in LC\_LOAD\_DYLIB commands.
- The entrypoint is defined at LC\_UNIXTHREAD or LC\_THREAD.

HEADEF

loganbr ~ \$ vim /usr/include/mach-o/loader.h

```
/*
* The 64-bit mach header appears at the very beginning of object files for
* 64-bit architectures.
struct mach_header_64 {
   uint32_t
                          /* mach magic number identifier */
               magic;
   cpu_type_t cputype;
                          /* cpu specifier */
   cpu_subtype_t cpusubtype; /* machine specifier */
               filetype; /* type of file */
   uint32_t
                          /* number of load commands */
   uint32_t
               ncmds:
               sizeofcmds; /* the size of all the load commands */
   uint32_t
                          /* flags */
   uint32_t
               flags;
   uint32_t
                          /* reserved */
               reserved:
```

LOAD\_COMMANDS

loganbr ~ \$ vim /usr/include/mach-o/loader.h

SECTIONS

### loganbr ~ \$ vim /usr/include/mach-o/loader.h

```
struct section_64 { /* for 64-bit architectures */
               sectname[16]; /* name of this section */
   char
   char
               segname[16]; /* segment this section goes in */
   uint64_t
              addr; /* memory address of this section */
              size;
                          /* size in bytes of this section */
   uint64_t
                          /* file offset of this section */
   uint32 t
              offset:
   uint32_t
               align;
                         /* section alignment (power of 2) */
   uint32_t
               reloff;
                          /* file offset of relocation entries */
                          /* number of relocation entries */
   uint32_t
               nreloc;
               flags;
                          /* flags (section type and attributes)*/
   uint32_t
   uint32_t
               reserved1; /* reserved (for offset or index) */
   uint32_t
               reserved2; /* reserved (for count or sizeof) */
               reserved3; /* reserved */
   uint32_t
```

```
logan /opt/malware/mach-o $ lipo -detailed_info sample_01
Fat header in: sample_01
nfat_arch 3
architecture x86_64
   cputype CPU_TYPE_X86_64
   cpusubtype CPU_SUBTYPE_X86_64_ALL
   offset 4096
   size 17136
   align 2^12 (4096)
architecture i386
   cputype CPU_TYPE_I386
   cpusubtype CPU_SUBTYPE_I386_ALL
   offset 24576
   size 16776
   align 2^12 (4096)
architecture ppc7400
   cputype CPU_TYPE_POWERPC
   cpusubtype CPU_SUBTYPE_POWERPC_7400
   offset 45056
   size 20652
   alian 2^12 (4096)
```

```
1 /opt/malware/mach-o $ lipo -extract x86_64 -output sample_01-x86_64 sample_01
    n /opt/malware/mach-o 🖠
     1 /opt/malware/mach-o $ file sample_01-x86_64
sample_01-x86_64: Mach-0 universal binary with 1 architecture
sample_01-x86_64 (for architecture x86_64): Mach-0 64-bit executable x86_64
    n /opt/malware/mach-o
    n /opt/malware/mach-o $ lipo -detailed_info sample_01-x86_64
Fat header in: sample_01-x86_64
fat_magic 0xcafebabe
nfat_arch 1
architecture x86_64
    cputype CPU_TYPE_X86_64
    cpusubtype CPU_SUBTYPE_X86_64_ALL
   offset 4096
    size 17136
   align 2^12 (4096)
```

```
Load command 0
      cmd LC_SEGMENT_64
  cmdsize 72
  segname __PAGEZERO
   vmaddr 0x00000000000000000
   vmsize 0x0000000100000000
  fileoff 0
 filesize 0
  maxprot 0x00000000
 initprot 0x00000000
   nsects 0
    flags 0x0
Load command 1
      cmd LC_SEGMENT_64
  cmdsize 632
  segname __TEXT
```

```
Section
  sectname __symbol_stub1
   segname __TEXT
      addr 0x000000100001402
      size 0x000000000000000c6
    offset 5122
     align 2^1 (2)
    reloff 0
    nreloc 0
     flags 0x80000408
 reserved1 0 (index into indirect symbol table)
 reserved2 6 (size of stubs)
Section
  sectname __cstring
   segname ___TEXT
      addr 0x0000001000014c8
```

```
Load command 7
       cmd LC_LOAD_DYLINKER
    cmdsize 32
       name /usr/lib/dyld (offset 12)
Load command 8
    cmd LC_UUID
cmdsize 24
   uuid 853B1C68-5F39-DF57-87AA-96A3D27064DD
Load command 9
      cmd LC_UNIXTHREAD
   cmdsize 184
    flavor x86_THREAD_STATE64
    count x86_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT
```

#### 0x02 Demo I

#### Demo 01 Crackme

Binary: cryptorev

Level: easy


Detail: cryptorev is a binary mach-o the goal

is run binary and found the flag.

This demo don't have protection in your code just UPX (packer) and DEADBEEF in file;)

When talking about malwares we have a lot of techniques to make it difficult to analyze (reversing the sample) like:

- Anti-Disassembly
- Anti-Debugging
- Obfuscation
- Anti-Vm



Source: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40001873-SW1

When an app is launched, the OS X kernel loads the app's code and data into the address space of a new process.

The kernel also loads the dynamic loader ( /usr/lib/dyld ) into the process and passes control to it.

#### VMWARE FUSION / PARALLELS / VIRTUALBOX

- Keep Virtualization Software Updated
- Use System Tools Installed in VM
- Network Host-Only mode
- If you use Shared Folder(Host) leave it as "read-only"
- Disable Gatekeeper (Allow apps downloaded from: Anywhere)

#### Static Analysis

```
file
              -> determine file type
upx / binwalk -> compress or expand executable files
              -> find the printable strings in a object, or other binary, file
strings
strip
              -> remove symbols
              -> hex editor
hexEdit
Lipo
              -> create or operate on universal files
              -> object file displaying tool like a objdump and ldd
otool
              -> display name list (symbol table)
\mathsf{n}\mathsf{m}
codesign
              -> create and manipulate code signatures
machOView
              -> visual Mach-O file browser
class-dump
              -> utility for examining the Objective-C runtime information stored in
                 Mach-O files.
dtrace
              -> generic front-end to the DTrace facility
fs_usage
              -> report system calls and page faults related to filesystem activity in
                 real-time
              -> display and manipulate extended attributes
xattr
```

little Snitch

#### **Dynamic Analysis**

Xcode -> xcode is an (IDE) containing a suite of software development. -> disassembler and debugger. iDA Pro -> tool used for disassemble, and decompile your 32/64bits mach-o hopper file. 11db -> debugger fseventer -> disk activity tool with a good graphical representation and solid filter tool. -> snoop file opens as they occur. Uses DTrace. open snoop activity Monitor -> tool to help you keep your system in good shape. -> It's a simple tool like a top get information accessible procoxp by proc\_info tcpdump -> for dump and analisys traffic on a network wireshark -> for dump and analisys traffic on a network -> based on PF\_SYSTEM provider, you can get real time notifications lsock of socket activity like TCPView from SysInternals.

-> network traffic monitoring and control.

### 0x04 Demo II

# Demo 02 Ransomware Keranger

On March 2016 appear the first Ransomware writing for mach-o file on OSX System (KeRanger), Distributed by client BitTorrent Transmission (v.2.90) This threat has been fixed in version v.2.91 the client.

The latest version Gatekeeper OSX already block this ransomware since the first sample published \0/!!!

#### Reference

#### Hacking is a way of life

#### REVERSE Engineering Mac Malware - Defcon 22

https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22presentations/Edwards/DEFCON-22-Sarah-Edwards-ReverseEngineering-Mac-Malware.pdf

#### OS X ABI Mach-O File Format Reference

https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/DeveloperT
ools/Conceptual/MachORuntime/index.html

#### Calling Convention

http://www.agner.org/optimize/calling conventions.pdf

Thanks for my wife and brothers (C00ler, Slayer, Ygor Rogy, RTFM Team)

### 0x05 Conclusions

Question & (MAYBE;) \0/) Answer

Download Presentation on: https://pt.slideshare.net/l0ganbr/andsec-reversing-on-macho-file

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