MITRE

- research in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, health informatics, space security
- US based non-profit Corporation
- · some projects are
 - ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge)
 - CAR (Cyber Analytics Repository) Knowledge Base
 - ENGAGE
 - D3FEND (Detection, Denial, and Disruption Framework Empowering Network Defense)
 - AEP (ATT&CK Emulation Plans)

BASIC TERMINOLOGY

- APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) team or country that engages in long term attacks against organizations or countries
 - not called advanced due to superweapon/zero day exploit
 - techniques used are common and can be detected using right implementations
 - APT28 (FancyBear) Russia's GRU
 - APT33 (Elfin) Iranian group
 - APT34 (OilRig) Iranian group
- TTP Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
 - Tactic adversary's goal or objective
 - Technique how adversary achieves goal
 - Procedure how technique is executed

ATT&CK FRAMEWORK

- globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations
- due to need to document common TTPs and APTs used against enterprise Windows networks
- started with internal project known as FMX (Fort Meade Experiment)
 - security professionals asked to emulate TTPs against network and collect data from the attack on the network
 - used to create ATT&CK Framework
- initially focused on Windows but now covers macOS and Linux
- contributed by security researchers and intelligence reports
- useful for both red and blue teamers
- 14 stages
 - Reconnaisance gathering target information (scanning, social engineerin)
 - Resource Development acquiring infrastructure tools and credentials
 - Initial Access gaining entry (phishing, exploits, credential theft)
 - Execution running malicious code on target
 - Persistence maintaining access through backdoors (rootkits)
 - Privilege Escalation gaining higher privileges within system

- Defense Evasion avoid detection using obfuscation and disabling security tools
- Credential Access stealing passwords, hashes
- Discovery learn about network, users, security measures used
- Lateral Movement expand access to multiple systems
- Collection gather sensitive data from compromised systems
- Command and Control establish remote control over network
- Exfiltration Transferring stolen data
- Impact disrupting, modifying, destroying systems
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator used for basic navigation and annotation of ATT&CK matrices

CAR KNOWLLEDGE BASE

- knowledge base of analytics developed by MITRE based on the MITRE ATT&CK adversary model
- provides analytics for identifying TTPs used by attackers
 - Analytics predefined detection rules for identifying suspicious activities based on logs
 - Mapping to ATT&CK links each analytic to specific ATT&CK technique
 - Provides pseudocode or structured queries to implement detection in SIEM (Splunk)
 - defines log sources required for detection (Sysmon, Windows Event Logs)
- full analytic list to see what implementations are available for any analytic
- eg. Scheduled Task FileAccess

MITRE ENGAGE

- framework for active cyber defense focusing on adversary engagement through deception and manipulation
 - prepare prepare and deploy deception techniques to mislead attackers
 - expose identify adversaries when they interact with the deception
 - affect perform action with negative impact on the attackers operations
 - elicit gather intelligence about the attackers TTPs
 - understand the outcomes of the operational activities

MITRE D3FEND

- knowledge graph of cybersecurity countermeasures
- currently in beta
- funded by Cybersecurity Directorate of NSA
- eg. Decoy File

MITRE ATT&CK EMULATION PLANS

- Center of Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
 - various companies and vendors across globe
 - o conduct research on cyber threats and their TTPs and share research to improve cyber defense
 - Verizon, Splunk, Microsoft (founder), Red Canary (founder), AttackIQ (founder)
- Adversary Emulation Library and ATT&CK Emulation Plans

- public library of free emulation plans for blue/red teamers
- contribution from CTID
- step by step guide to mimic specific threat group

THREAT INTELLIGENCE

- information or TTPs attributed to adversary
- use TI for better decision making regarding defense strategy
- teams in organizations dedicated to gathering TI for others teams in organization
- can be open source or through subscription with vendor like CrowdStrike
- goal is to make TI actionable

YARA

- help researchers identify and classify malware samples
- create descriptions of malware families based on textual or binary patterns
 - a rule; consists of set of strings a boolean expression which determines logic
- typical yara command contains
 - the rule file (myrule.yar)
 - target file (file, directory, process)
 - yara myrule.yar somedirectory
- every yara rule has a name and condition
 - the rule describes patterns to search for in files, directories, processes
 - rule examplerule { condition: true }
 - name: examplerule
 - o condition true
 - Simply, the rule we have made checks to see if the file/directory/PID that we specify exists via condition: true. If the file does exist, we are given the output of examplerule

YARA Keywords

- Meta reserved for descriptive information by author of rule
 - desc short for description, summarize what your rule checks for
 - like commenting code
- Strings usign strings to search for specific text or hexadecimal in files or programs
 - case sensitive

CONDITIONS

- <= or >= or != can be used
- condition: #hello_world <= 10
 - matches if there are less than or equal to ten occurrences of the "Hello World"
- and, not, or
 - to combine multiple conditions
 - condition: \$hello world and filesize < 10KB

YARA TOOLS

- LOKI open-source IOC (Indicator of Compromise) scanner
 - File Name IOC Check scans files for names that match known IOCs as malicious software often uses specific file names
 - Yara Rule Check use Yara rules to scan files for patterns or signautres associated with malware
 - Hash Check compare file hashes against database of known malicious hashes
 - C2 Back Connect Check detect attempts made by compromised systems to connect to external C2 serers
- THOR multi-platform IOC and YARA scanner
 - precompiled for Windows, Linux and macOS
 - scan throttling to prevent excessive CPU usage
- FENRIR address limitations of previous tools

- bash script tool
- works on any system supporting bash including Windows
- YAYA Yet Another Yara Automation
 - open source tool for managing YARA rule repoisitories
 - allows users to import, modify, disable rules and scan files with custom/existing YARA rules

NOTE: IOCs - hashes, IP addresses, domain names, etc

- typically we need to add our own rules based on our Threat Intelligence from incident response engagement
 - Yara has rules we can use to start scanning for evil straightaway
- yarGen tool that helps generate YARA rules for detecting malware by removing strings from suspicious files and removing common goodware strings to reduce false positives
- yarAnalyzer another tool for analyzing and refining YARA rules
- Valhalla online Yara feed; collection of thousands of hand-crafted high quality YARA rules for enhanced detection
 - users can search based on
 - keywords
 - tags
 - ATT&CK techniques
 - SHA-256 hashes
 - rule names
 - centralized repository of YARA rules
 - easier to identify suspicious activity with community driven rules

ZERO LOGON

- allowed an attacker to go from zero to domai admin in one minute
 - dubbed zero logonPP
- statistics based attack
- abuses feature within MS-NRPC (Microsoft NetLogon Remote Protocol)
 - authentication component of Active Directory for User and Machine accounts
 - focuses on poor implementation of cryptographu
 - Microsoft chose AES-CFB* for ComputeNetlogonCredential
 - this is usually fine but they hardcoded Initialization Vectort to use all zeroes instead of random string
 - a message of all zeroes and IV zero has 1/256 of having ciphertext as zero
- machine accounts 64+ alphanumeric password, difficult to break into

- no lockout attempts
- not meant for end user access
- can use Mimikatz to dump password but at this point we want persistence not lateral movement
- by abusing ZeroLogon, you can bypass Domain Controller's machine account and extract credentials
- steps in exploiting zero logon vulnerability
 - client sends NetServerReqChallenge to Domain Controller
 - DC
 - target (which is also DC)
 - nonce (16 bytes of zero)
 - server receives and generates its own nonce called server challenge and send it back
 - client computes netlogon credentials with server challenge using NetServerAuthenticate3
 - server validates authentication request
 - if calculation matches, responds with required info
 - repeated till it works (1/256 chance)