


# The Automated but Risky Game: Modeling Agent-to-Agent Negotiations and Transactions in Consumer Markets

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## Abstract

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we investigate a future setting where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to automate the negotiations and transactions in consumer settings. We aim to address two main questions: (1) Do different LLM agents exhibit varying performances when making deals on behalf of their users? (2) What are the potential risks when we use AI agents to fully automate negotiations and deal-making in consumer settings? We design an experimental framework to evaluate AI agents' capabilities and performance in real-world negotiation and transaction scenarios, and experimented with a range of LLM agents. Our analysis reveals that deal-making with LLM agents in consumer settings is an inherently imbalanced game: different AI agents have large disparities in obtaining the best deals for their users. Furthermore, we found that LLMs' behavioral anomaly might lead to financial loss for both consumers and merchants when deployed in real-world decision-making scenarios, such as overspending or making unreasonable deals. Our findings highlight that while automation can enhance transactional efficiency, it also poses nontrivial risks to consumer markets. Users should be careful when delegating business decisions to LLM agents. All the code and data are available at <https://github.com/ShenzheZhu/A2A-NT>.



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# 1 Introduction

Business negotiation and deal-making lie at the heart of the modern economy, yet achieving agreement is rarely straightforward. It requires effective information gathering, strategic reasoning, and, above all, skilled negotiation and decision-making [Lewicki and Hiam, 2011, Agndal et al., 2017]. Recently, large language model (LLM) powered AI agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities and are increasingly being adopted for real-world tasks [Xu et al., 2024, Masterman et al., 2024]. Given the importance of negotiation and deal-making in business operations, researchers and practitioners have begun exploring ways to leverage AI agents to automate shopping and sales processes for both consumers and merchants [Kong et al., 2025, Chen et al., 2024], mostly with an assumption that the agents are interacting with real human users. However, with the rapid adoption of AI agents in consumer markets, both consumers and merchants might delegate their negotiation and decision-making to AI agents and direct agent-to-agent interactions may soon be commonplace. Given the natural capability differences of AI agents in negotiation settings [Bianchi et al., 2024] and unique agent-to-agent negotiation dynamics [Vaccaro et al., 2025], it becomes important to understand **what will happen when consumers and merchants use AI Agents with different capabilities to automate their negotiation and transactions in consumer settings.**

In this study, we propose a comprehensive framework to investigate the opportunities and risks associated with fully automated, user-authorized agent-to-agent negotiation and transaction. Inspired by real-world shopping and sales workflows, we design an experimental setting in which a buyer agent attempts to negotiate a lower price for a product based on a user-defined budget, while a seller agent, aware of the wholesale cost, aims to maximize its profit. Each agent independently makes its own decisions throughout the negotiation, simulating a fully autonomous, end-to-end transaction between AI agents. To evaluate the negotiation behaviors and capabilities of AI agents in realistic consumer scenarios, we compile a dataset of 100 real-world products across three major categories: electronic devices, motor vehicles, and real estate, covering a diverse set of consumer scenarios with different price ranges. For each item, we collected the actual retail prices and estimated wholesale values, which were then provided to the seller agents to simulate real market dynamics. We conducted negotiation and transaction experiments using several advanced language models, including GPT series [Hurst et al., 2024], Qwen-2.5 series [Yang et al., 2024a], and DeepSeek series [Liu et al., 2024, Guo et al., 2025]. Our analysis reveals substantial performance gaps across models. More capable agents consistently outperform their counterparts – earning higher profits when acting as sellers and achieving greater savings as buyers. These disparities emerge not only across different model families but also among models with varying parameter sizes. This suggests that agent-to-agent trading inherently becomes an imbalanced game when agents possess unequal capabilities.

Beyond performance differences, we identify several key risks associated with delegating negotiation and transactional authority to AI agents: (1) Constraint violation risk: Buyer agents may disregard user-imposed budget constraints, completing purchases that the user cannot afford. Similarly, seller agents may accept prices below wholesale costs, leading to sizeable financial losses; (2) Excessive payment risk: buyer agents sometimes offer higher prices than retail price, resulting in unnecessary overpayment; (3) Negotiation deadlock risk: agents may become stuck in prolonged negotiation loops without reaching an agreement; (4) early settlement risk: in high budget settings, the buyer agents tend to compromise more readily despite they are instructed to obtain the lowest possible price. On the contrary, buyer agents with a lower budget are able to obtain significantly more discounts for the same sets of products.

Our findings have important implications for automated decision-making with AI agents. Access to more powerful AI models can lead to better deals, potentially reinforcing economic disparities among users. Furthermore, weaknesses in LLMs—such as limited numerical reasoning and occasional failures in instruction-following—can expose both consumers and businesses to systemic financial risks. As fully autonomous agent-to-agent interactions become more common, users should be cautious when delegating high-stakes decisions to AI agents. This paper makes the following contributions:

- We propose a novel and realistic setting for agent-to-agent negotiation and transaction, with clear practical implications for future consumer markets.
- We design a comprehensive experimental framework to evaluate agent-to-agent negotiation and decision-making.
- We conduct a large-scale analysis of several LLM-based agents and identify key risk factors that can lead to economic losses in autonomous real-world transactions.

## 2 Modeling Agent-to-Agent Negotiations and Transactions

The goal of this paper is to systematically investigate the outcomes and risks when AI agents are authorized to negotiate and make decisions on behalf of consumers and business owners. To this end, we introduce an experimental setting that closely reflects real-world negotiation and transaction scenarios in consumer markets. More specifically, we instruct LLM agents to engage in price negotiations over real consumer products, with one agent acting as the buyer and the other as the seller. By observing model behaviors in these structured and realistic scenarios, we aim to forecast potential behaviors, strategies, and risks that may arise as such agent-mediated transactions become more prevalent in future consumer environments.




Figure 1: Overview of our Agent-to-Agent Negotiations and Transaction Framework. The framework is instantiated with a real-world product dataset, two negotiation agents, and two auxiliary models, followed by a core automated agent negotiation architecture.

### 2.1 Basic Notations and Definition

We define the key symbols used in this paper. The total number of negotiation rounds is denoted as  $T$ , which may be fixed or dynamically inferred. Let  $p_r$  be the retail price,  $p_w$  be the wholesale price,  $\beta$  be the buyer’s budget, and  $\phi$  be the product features. The proposed price  $p_a$  at round  $t$  is  $p_a^t$ , and the price trajectory is  $\mathcal{P} = \{p_a^t\}_{t=1}^T$  with  $p_a^T$  as the final round proposed price<sup>2</sup>.

### 2.2 Negotiation Scenario

In our negotiation simulation, buyer-seller interactions form an information-incomplete and zero-sum game [Harsanyi, 1955, Raghavan, 1994, Bianchi et al., 2024]. Both parties observe the item’s retail price  $p_r$ , but only the seller has access to the wholesale cost  $p_w$ . The buyer is permitted to accept, reject offers or continue to next round negotiation based on its budget  $\beta$ , while both agents are subject to strict feasibility constraints: No agreement may be reached if the final transaction price falls below the wholesale cost  $p_w$  (for the seller) or exceeds the buyer’s budget  $\beta$ . We introduce the buyer’s budget  $\beta$  to mirror real-world delegation scenarios, where users authorize buyer agents to act on their behalf within specified financial limits, such as account balances or spending caps. Within this setting, agents iteratively exchange offers and counteroffers to reach an agreement. The seller aims to keep the price close to retail, while the buyer attempts to maximize their discount.

### 2.3 Negotiation Pipeline

The negotiation is initiated by the buyer agent, who is required to open the conversation with an expression of interest in the product and a first offer (see greeting prompt for buyer in Appendix C.2). Then the two agents take turns to continue this negotiation until a termination condition is met. We use GPT-4o as the judge to decide whether a deal has been made by the buyer and the seller.

<sup>2</sup>The proposed price denotes a temporary offer put forward by one party during a given negotiation round, reflecting a willingness to compromise in pursuit of agreement.

At each round  $t$ , this judge model analyzes the buyer’s response and outputs a decision  $d_t$ , where  $d_t \in \{\text{accept}, \text{reject}, \text{continue}\}$ , indicating whether the buyer accepts the deal, rejects the negotiation entirely, or proceeds to the next round. The negotiation terminates immediately once  $d_t$  is either `accept` or `reject` (see detailed prompt in Appendix C.4). To prevent excessively long interactions, we impose a maximum round limit of  $T_{\max}$ . Negotiations that reach this limit without resolution are treated as rejections, with the final decision  $d_T$  set to `reject`. Moreover, if the final decision  $d_T$  is `accept`, the proposed price in that round is recorded as the final transaction price.

## 2.4 Real-World Product Dataset

We construct a dataset  $\mathcal{D}$  with 100 real consumer products drawn from three categories: *motor vehicles*, *electronic devices*, and *real estate*. To mimic real-world consumer settings, we collect the real retail price  $p_r$  and key features  $\phi$  for each item from trustworthy sources. As the wholesale cost  $p_w$  may not be directly available on the public internet, we prompt GPT-4o with item-specific information and current market conditions to estimate a reasonable wholesale cost  $p_w$  based on industry norms. More details of dataset creation are shown in Appendix A.

## 2.5 Agents Roles Design

To design agents that mimic real business negotiation settings, we construct the system prompts for each agent with the following four types of information: **(1) Background:** The background information of the agent. The seller is given  $\{p_r, p_w, \phi\}$ , while the buyer receives  $\{p_r, \beta, \phi\}$ . **(2) Goal:** Both agents are asked to optimize the final price  $p_a^T$  with respect to the retail price  $p_r$ . The seller seeks to maximize the profit, while the buyer is instructed to obtain the highest discount rate. **(3) Constraint:** The agents are instructed to follow certain constraints depending on their roles. For the seller agent, if the final decision  $d_T$  is `accept`, the seller must comply with  $p_a^T \geq p_w$ , ensuring the final accepted price stays above the wholesale cost. The buyer is constrained by  $p_a^T \leq \beta$  to follow budget limitations. Also, agents are instructed to reject a deal when facing an invalid agreement. **(4) Guideline:** A rule set governs interaction protocols that ensures agents follow realistic negotiation conventions. For example, buyers should avoid revealing their maximum budget in most situations, while sellers should avoid disclosing their wholesale price directly. Detailed system prompts of both agents can be found in Appendix C.1 & C.3.

**Background:** You are a negotiation assistant helping to purchase a product: {product["Product Name"]}; Retail Price: {product["Retail Price"]}; Features: {product["Features"]}. Your budget is {budget:.2f}.  
**Goal:** 1. Obtain the lowest possible price within budget; 2. Apply effective negotiation strategies.  
**Constraint:** Only accept the deal if it's within budget; otherwise, reject the offer.  
**Guideline:** 1. Be natural and conversational; 2. Respond with a single message; 3. Don't reveal internal thoughts or strategy; 4. Avoid placeholders like [Your Name]; 5. Be concise but complete; 6. Don't reveal your budget unless necessary.

Figure 2: Core part of system prompt for buyer agent setup.

## 2.6 Metrics

To quantify model negotiation performances, we created two primary metrics: **(1) Price Reduction Rate (PRR)**, which measures a buyer model’s ability to negotiate discounts from the retail price  $p_r$ . Given the zero-sum nature of the game,  $PRR$  also reflects seller performance, as a lower  $PRR$  suggests greater success in resisting price reductions. **(2) Relative Profit (RP)**, which directly measures a model’s capability to generate profit given a fixed set of products. Due to the large price difference among the three product categories, we present each model’s profit relative to the lowest-profit seller in the same setting. To further analyze sellers’ negotiation tendency, we also report two auxiliary metrics: Profit Rate (the average revenue per completed transaction) and Deal Rate (the proportion of negotiations that end successfully). These two metrics do not directly reflect an agent’s negotiation capability. Detailed mathematical formulas of metrics can be found in Appendix B.1.

### 3 Experiments

#### 3.1 Experimental Setup

We run our evaluations using nine LLM agents, including GPT series (o3, o4-mini, GPT4.1, GPT-4o-mini and GPT-3.5) [Hurst et al., 2024], DeepSeek series (DeepSeek-v3 [Liu et al., 2024] and DeepSeek-R1 [Guo et al., 2025]), and Qwen2.5 series (7B and 14B) [Yang et al., 2024a]. To eliminate positional bias, we design the experiments with each model playing both the buyer and seller roles, interacting with every other model—including itself. To mimic real consumer settings, we define five discrete buyer budget levels, as shown in Table 1. These budget levels are intentionally varied to capture a wide spectrum of negotiation conditions—including under-constrained settings (where the buyer has ample budget), tightly constrained settings, and even economically irrational scenarios where the budget  $\beta$  falls below the wholesale cost  $p_w$ . For evaluation, we randomly sample 50 products, and for each product, we run five trials, one per budget configuration. Furthermore, we set the maximum number of negotiation rounds,  $T_{\max} = 30$ .

Budget Levels	Amounts
High	$p_r \times 1.2$
Retail	$p_r$
Mid	$\frac{p_r + p_w}{2}$
Wholesale	$p_w$
Low	$p_w \times 0.8$

Table 1: Budget levels

#### 3.2 Main Results




Figure 3: **Left:**  $PRR$  for both buyer and seller. Models located in the top-right region exhibit stronger relative negotiation performance, characterized by greater ability to push prices down when acting as buyers and to maintain higher prices when acting as sellers, reflecting overall bargaining power. **Right:** Seller agents’ relative profit rate, deal rate, and total profits.

**Disparity in Negotiation Capability Across Models** Given the zero-sum nature of our setting, the  $PRR$  serves as a direct indicator of a model’s negotiation strength, capturing its performance both as a buyer and a seller. As illustrated in Figure 3 (Left), models exhibit substantial disparities in negotiation capabilities. Notably, o3 stands out with the strongest overall negotiation performance—demonstrating exceptional price retention as a seller and achieving the highest discount rate as a buyer. GPT-4.1 and o4-mini follow closely behind. In contrast, GPT-3.5 consistently underperforms across both roles, indicating the weakest negotiation ability among the models evaluated.

**The Trade-off Between Deal Rate and Profit Rate** To further assess models’ performance and behavior as seller agents, Figure 3 (Right) presents the seller-side metric—Relative Profit ( $RP$ )—the models’ total profit relative to the weakest model in our setting (i.e., GPT3.5), as well as the models’ average profit rate and deal rate. Most models outperform GPT-3.5 by approximately 9.6 $\times$  in total profit, with GPT-4.1 and DeepSeek-R1 achieving 13.3 $\times$  and 12 $\times$ , respectively, leading all models. Notably, high-performing sellers such as o4-mini, GPT-4.1, and DeepSeek-R1 effectively balance profit margins with deal success rates, resulting in superior  $RP$  scores. In contrast, other models struggle to manage this trade-off: GPT-4o-mini achieves the highest profit rate but suffers from low deal completion, while Qwen2.5-7B/14B and GPT-3.5 complete more deals but at the cost of thin profit margins—ultimately yielding lower total profits.

**Asymmetric Impacts of Agent Roles** As shown in Figure 4, the heatmap illustrates the  $PRR$  across all pairwise combinations of buyer and seller agents. Our analysis reveals a clear asymmetry in agent roles: the choice of the seller model has a significantly larger impact on negotiation outcomes




Figure 4: Average Price Reduction Rate ( $PRR$ ) for each agent pair.




Figure 5: Average Deal Rate of seller agents over 5 budget settings.

than the choice of the buyer model. For example, when we fix the seller as GPT-3.5 and vary the buyer agents, the difference between the highest and lowest  $PRR$  is only 2.6%. In contrast, when we fix the buyer as GPT-3.5 and vary the seller agents, the  $PRR$  gap reaches up to 14.9%. This asymmetry also explains the observation in Figure 3 (Left), where the average  $PRR$  across different buyer agents shows relatively small variance: models’ capabilities have a larger impact on seller agents, but have a smaller impact on buyer agents.

**Deal Rates in Different Budget Settings** Does the buyer’s budget affect the seller’s strategy and the deal rates? As shown in Figure 5, stronger models like GPT-4.1, o4-mini, and DeepSeek-R1 dynamically adapt to different budget scenarios and effectively adjust deal rates based on negotiation dynamics. Conversely, GPT-4o-mini and o3 consistently underperform with below-average deal rates across all budget levels. Low transaction volume undermines total revenue despite any profit margin advantages (as shown in Figure 3) (Right). GPT-3.5 and Qwen2.5-7b maintain above-average deal rates in all settings, indicating aggressive trading strategies that secure deals but yield lower profit rates.




Figure 6: Qwen models with more parameters obtain better deals as both sellers and buyers when they are negotiating with each other (Left) and DeepSeek-R1 (Right).

**Agents’ Negotiation Capability Scales with Model Size** The scaling law of LLM suggests that model capabilities generally improve with increasing parameter sizes [Kaplan et al., 2020, Hoffmann et al., 2022, Bi et al., 2024, Zhang et al., 2024]. Do LLMs’ negotiation capabilities also exhibit a similar scaling pattern in our setting? We design two experiments using the Qwen2.5-Instruct family across six parameter scales (0.5B to 32B): (1) We conduct an in-family tournament where all six Qwen2.5-Instruct variants compete against each other as both buyers and sellers; (2) We benchmark against DeepSeek-R1 [Guo et al., 2025], one of the strongest negotiation models, and each Qwen2.5-Instruct variant competes against DeepSeek-R1 as both buyer and seller. As shown in Figure 6, we observe a clear  $PRR$  scaling pattern that models with more parameters are able to obtain more discounts as the buyer agent and higher profits as the seller agent.

## 4 Understanding Economic Risks for Real-World Users

Autonomous AI agents could potentially bring huge economic value to the users in many settings. However, they may also introduce systematic risks when being deployed at scale [Feliu, 2001,

Jabłonowska et al., 2018, Rohden and Zeferino, 2023, Deng et al., 2025, Hammond et al., 2025, Chen et al., 2025]. In this section, we discuss the potential risks when both buyers and sellers delegate their negotiations and decision-making to AI agents and how models’ capability gaps and anomalies may translate into tangible economic losses for real users.

#### 4.1 From Model Capability Gap to Economic Loss

In Sections §3.2, we discuss the capability gap of different models and also the asymmetric influence of buyer versus seller agent roles. Although such performance gaps may seem expected in experiments, deploying such agents in consumer settings could systematically disadvantage users who rely on less capable models. In particular, we view these interactions as imbalanced games, where one party deploys a significantly stronger agent than the other. Whether a strong buyer faces a weak seller or vice versa, the party with the weaker agent suffers a strategic disadvantage. Thus, one crucial question emerges: *How does this strategic disadvantage translate into quantifiable economic loss?*

To quantify this effect, we consider three potential user settings: (1) **Strong Buyer vs. Strong Seller:** both the buyer and the seller use agents with the same level of capability. (2) **Weak Buyer vs. Strong Seller:** the buyer uses a less capable agent while the seller uses a stronger one. (3) **Strong Buyer vs. Weak Seller:** the buyer uses a strong agent while the seller’s agent is less capable. All three settings could happen in real-world agent-automated negotiations. We consider the **Strong Buyer vs. Strong Seller** setting as the baseline as it reflects a fair negotiation setting where both agents have exactly the same capabilities. Given that DeepSeek-R1 consistently outperforms GPT-3.5 and Qwen2.5-72B across key metrics in our evaluations, we therefore treat DeepSeek-R1 as the “strong” model and the others as “weak.” We focus on 39 shared successful negotiation cases that all seven model pairings completed successfully across every budget condition. As in Table 2, we compute each buyer’s average payment, its deviation from the strong–strong baseline, and the corresponding  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$ . Our results reveal clear economic disparities under imbalanced model pairings. From the perspective of the  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$ , weak sellers consistently struggle to withstand the pressure from strong buyers, which leads to substantially larger concessions. Relative to the strong-vs-strong baseline, the buyer’s price reduction rate  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$  increases by approximately 5 – 11%. This shift in negotiation dynamics directly translates into reduced seller profit: on average, weak sellers earn 9.5% less than in strong-vs-strong negotiations, with the worst case—GPT-3.5 as seller—losing up to 14.13%. When the weaker agent acts as the buyer, the impact is still sizable: across all weak models, buyers pay roughly 2% more than in the strong–strong negotiation setting. While the number may seem small, once the agents are deployed in the real world at scale, this could create systematic disadvantages for people using these agents. For example, when lay consumers use small but on-device models to make automated negotiations with big merchants who use large and capable models running on cloud services, the cumulative economic loss for lay consumers will become significant.

Buyer	Seller	$PRR_{\text{Buyer}}(\%)$	Avg Payment(\$)	$\Delta$ from Baseline (%)	Impact
<i>Strong vs. Strong</i>					
DeepSeek-R1	DeepSeek-R1	6.11	1,423,090	—	Baseline
<i>Weak-Buyer vs. Strong-Seller</i>					
GPT-3.5	DeepSeek-R1	2.99	1,452,699	<b>+2.09%</b>	Buyer overpays by 2.09%
Qwen-7B	DeepSeek-R1	3.14	1,454,633	<b>+2.09%</b>	Buyer overpays by 2.09%
Qwen-14B	DeepSeek-R1	5.08	1,438,834	<b>+1.10%</b>	Buyer overpays by 1.10%
<i>Strong-Buyer vs. Weak-Seller</i>					
DeepSeek-R1	GPT-3.5	17.35	1,221,980	<b>−14.13%</b>	Seller earns 14.13% less
DeepSeek-R1	Qwen-7B	13.09	1,314,796	<b>−7.62%</b>	Seller earns 7.62% less
DeepSeek-R1	Qwen-14B	11.27	1,325,570	<b>−6.94%</b>	Seller earns 6.94% less

Table 2: Economic impact of model imbalance in agent negotiations. We analyze seven model pairings with successful negotiation overlaps. Using DeepSeek-R1 vs. DeepSeek-R1 as baseline.

#### 4.2 From Model Anomaly to Financial Risks

Fully automated, agent-based negotiation systems are prone to various anomalies stemming from unstable decision-making and imperfect instruction following of their base LLMs [Lan et al., 2025, Zhang et al., 2025, Cemri et al., 2025]. While such failures may seem trivial or expected in research settings, they pose tangible risks to users in real-world settings. In this section, we analyze four



model behavioral anomalies, pinpoint the conditions that trigger them, and outline how they can be translated into real financial loss for users. The detailed mathematical formula for the following anomaly measurement can be found in Appendix B.2.

Metric	DeepSeek-R1	DeepSeek-V3	gpt-4.1	o4-mini	o3	GPT-4o-mini	GPT-3.5	Qwen2.5-7B	Qwen2.5-14B
Out-of-Budget Rate	1.69	<u>0.53</u>	2.18	2.98	2.73	<b>0.36</b>	6.25	11.76	4.78
Out-of-Wholesale Rate	0.50	0.87	0.71	<b>0.31</b>	<u>0.46</u>	1.79	5.75	7.91	2.14

Table 3: Overall Out-of-Budget (*OBR*) and Out-of-Wholesale Rates (*OWR*) across models. Bold values indicate the best performance, underlined values denote the second-best.




Figure 7: Heatmaps of the *OWR* (left) from the perspective of buyer agents, and the *OBR* (right) from the perspective of seller agents, across different budget types.

**Constraint Violation.** Consider scenarios where a user authorizes an AI agent to negotiate on their behalf with a fixed budget  $\beta$ . If the agent accepts a deal above the budget, the agent may overdraw the account or exceed the user’s willingness to pay. Similarly, a seller agent agreeing to prices below the seller’s cost  $p_w$  incurs guaranteed losses. In our evaluation, we quantify such anomaly using two metrics: *Out-of-Budget Rate (OBR)* and *Out-of-Wholesale Rate (OWR)*. As shown in Figure 7, for *OBR*, we find that models with stronger negotiation capabilities, such as the DeepSeek series and Latest Generation GPT Series, including GPT-4.1, o4-mini, o3 and GPT-4o-mini, generally respect budget constraints and reject infeasible deals as buyers. However, models like GPT-3.5 and Qwen-7B frequently breach constraints, accepting deals above their budget in over 10% of all cases. This issue occurs across different budget settings but becomes even more serious when the user has a relatively low budget, posing serious risks for users in bad financial situations.

For buyer agents, all models correctly adhere to the budget limits in retail and high-budget scenarios, achieving 0% *OBR*. When designing the budget range, we deliberately set a relatively low budget (below the cost) to test whether agents can reject offers instead of completing transactions where buyers spend over their budget or sellers sell at a loss to accommodate buyers’ low budget. On the left, Figure 7 shows that most sellers exhibit higher *OWR* under low-budget scenarios compared to other budget scenarios, with Qwen2.5-7b reaching almost 18.5%. It is worth noticing that even o4-mini—otherwise flawless across all other budget levels—occasionally capitulates under extreme price pressure, agreeing to below-cost deals in the low-budget scenario. Such a result suggests that while not following instructions has been considered a common but trivial issue in many scenarios, it can pose serious financial risks to both the buyer and seller in real consumer settings.

**Excessive payment.** Our experiments uncover a surprising anomaly: in some cases, buyer agents pay more than the listed retail price. We quantify this behavior with *Overpayment Rate (OPR)*—the proportion of successful deals in which the final transaction price is higher than the retail price despite the buyer’s budget affording a lower amount. As shown by Figure 8 (Left), overpayment often occurs under high-budget settings. Except for the DeepSeek family and Latest Generation GPT Series (GPT-4.1, o4-mini and o3), every model overpays to some degree when buyers have large  $\beta$  values. To further investigate this issue, we qualitatively examined a sample of the negotiation history. As illustrated in Figure 8 (Right), overpayment often occurs after sellers ask buyers to reveal their budget early in the conversation. Despite our system prompt explicitly instructing buyers not to disclose their budget unless strictly necessary, many buyer agents reveal their budget easily. Sellers






Figure 8: **Left:** Overpayment Rate (OPR) from perspective of buyer agents across all budgets; **Right:** Two examples of dialogue that occurs overpayment due to high-budget disclosure.

then try to anchor their offers to the disclosed number, even when it is higher than the listing price, and buyers accept the inflated deal without any objection.

**Negotiation Deadlock.** Imagine a user who uses an API-based buyer agent for negotiation, expecting it to operate efficiently within reasonable bounds. A lay user would typically assume the agent will either reach a deal or end the negotiation in proper situations. However, in our experiment, we observe that agents might continue bargaining even when the seller has clearly stated a firm bottom line, leading to unnecessarily long negotiations. This behavior wastes computational resources and undermines the practical utility of automation. Here we name this issue as “Negotiation Deadlock” and formally define a negotiation deadlock as any dialogue that reaches the maximum number of rounds  $T_{\max}$  without a final agreement or explicit rejection.




Figure 9: **Left:** Deadlock Rate (DLR) from perspective of buyer agents, presenting both overall performance and budget-stratified breakdowns; **Right:** Example of dialogue that occurs negotiation deadlock due to buyer refuse to reject the deal.

We qualitatively examined a range of real negotiation histories and found that most of the negotiation deadlocks are behavioral, arising when agents become overly fixated on continuing the negotiation. For example, buyer agents often obsessively pursue price reductions even after sellers state their minimum acceptable price (Figure 9 (Right)). To quantitatively investigate this issue, we manually analyzed all the negotiation history and calculated the *Deadlock Rate (DLR)* for each model. We found that this issue is particularly prevalent among weaker buyer models operating under low-budget conditions, especially Qwen2.5-7B (see heatmap in Figure 9 (Left)). Due to the inherent capability gaps, these models may struggle to recognize when further negotiation is futile or when rejecting an offer would be more optimal, resulting in unnecessary turn-taking and resource waste.




Figure 10: Average  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$  of all models across different budget settings. Buyer agents are more likely to negotiate better deals in low-budget settings.

**Early Settlement.** When analyzing buyer agents under different budget constraints, we observe a notable phenomenon that may cause the buyer to overpay: as the budget increases, particularly at or above the retail price, models tend to accept the seller’s proposed price as soon as it is below the budget rather than striving for better prices. In contrast, lower budgets (i.e., below retail price) appear to stimulate stronger bargaining behaviors, resulting in higher average price reduction rates  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$ . As shown in Figure 10,  $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$  exhibits a clear downward trend as the buyer budget increases, with a gap of nearly 9% between the highest and lowest price reduction rates. In practical deployments, buyer agents may derive their negotiation strategy from user-provided financial context, such as account balances or spending limits. If higher available funds systematically reduce the agent’s bargaining effort, users with generous budgets could end up consistently overpaying, not due to market necessity but because the agent passively accepts prices without seeking better deals.

## 5 Related work

### 5.1 AI Negotiations

Negotiation plays a key role in modern society, and many researchers have studied negotiations from different perspectives [Rubinstein, 1982, Nash, 2024, Hua et al., 2024, Mensfelt et al., 2024]. Due to the potential business value and the rising capabilities of deep neural networks, researchers and practitioners have explored methods to build automated negotiation models [Zhou et al., 2016, Lewis et al., 2017, He et al., 2018, Bakker et al., 2019]. More recently, large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities in contextual understanding and strategic generation, leading to a growing interest in prompt-based LLM agents for complex negotiation tasks [Abdelnabi et al., 2024, Schneider et al., 2024, Bianchi et al., 2024, Shea et al., 2024, Yang et al., 2024b, 2025].

### 5.2 AI Agent in Consumer Settings

A growing body of research examines AI agents in consumer-facing contexts, focusing on trust, decision delegation, and behavioral responses. Prior work has studied how agent intelligence and anthropomorphism shape consumer trust [Song and Lin, 2024, Zhao et al., 2025], and how task type affects willingness to delegate decisions [Frank et al., 2021, Fan and Liu, 2022, Yao et al., 2025]. Chatbots and similar agents have also been explored as service intermediaries that influence consumer experience and perceived agency [Chong et al., 2021]. While these studies offer important insights, they largely view agents as passive advisors or interfaces. Recent work begins to explore more active roles: ACE [Shea et al., 2024] introduces a negotiation training environment for LLM agents, and FishBargain [Kong et al., 2025] develops a seller-side bargaining agent for online flea markets. However, few studies systematically analyze how consumer-side agents negotiate with business agents, or how agent capabilities shape negotiation outcomes in real scenarios.

## 6 Discussion

In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of fully automated agent-to-agent negotiation in a realistic, customer-facing context. The risks identified extend beyond negotiation, reflecting broader concerns in delegating decision-making to AI agents, especially in high-stakes, multi-agent

settings. Despite the contributions, this study has the following limitations: (1) Prompt optimization. LLMs’ behaviors are highly sensitive to prompt design. In this study, we focus on building the experimentation setting and deliberately avoid extensive prompt tuning to reveal models’ inherent behaviors under minimal intervention and potential real-user interactions. In the future, we will expand the set of prompts and models to reveal more complex negotiation patterns in the real world. (2) Simulation environment. While we tried to set up the experiment to mimic real-world negotiations, there may still be a gap between our simulation and the real negotiation settings. In the future, we plan to develop real-world platforms with human-in-the-loop evaluation to assess agent capability under practical constraints.

## 7 Conclusion

Along with the large-scale deployment of AI agents in real consumer settings, agent-to-agent interactions will become ubiquitous in the near future. But what will happen when we fully automate negotiation and deal-making with consumer and seller authorized AI agents? In this paper, we designed an experimental framework to investigate potential issues and risks in Agent-to-Agent negotiations and transactions. Our analysis reveals that Agent-to-Agent negotiation and transaction is naturally an imbalanced game where users using less capable agents will face significant financial loss against stronger agents. Furthermore, we found that LLMs’ anomaly might be transferred to real economic loss when they are deployed in real consumer settings. Our paper highlights the potential risks of using LLM agents to automate negotiation and transactions in real consumer settings.

## Acknowledgement

We thank the generous funding support from the Project Liberty. We thank Yijia Shao, Jared Moore, Zach Robertson, Andreas Haupt, and Sophia Kazinnik for their kind feedback on the paper.

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## A Details of Dataset

### A.1 Data Structure

Our dataset consists of structured entries representing real-world consumer products. Each data sample contains information such as product name, wholesale price, retail price, and detailed specifications (e.g., volume, material, included components, and packaging type). A sample data entry is illustrated in Figure 11.

```
"Product Name": "Toyota Camry",
"Retail Price": "$26995",
"Wholesale Price": "$21596",
"Features": "203-hp mid-size sedan with 8-speed automatic.",
"Reference": "https://www.toyota.com/camry/"
```

Figure 11: Example of data structure of products.




Figure 12: The products distribution of this dataset.

## A.2 Wholesale Generation Prompt

To enable large language models (LLMs) to estimate wholesale or cost prices ( $p_w$ ), we design a natural language prompt that mimics the instructions a human procurement expert might receive. The prompt provides structured product metadata and requests an estimate along with reasoning. This prompt formulation guides the model to consider factors such as typical profit margins, industry norms, material costs, and packaging influence.

A sample prompt instance used for generation is shown in Figure 13. These prompts are constructed automatically for each product in the dataset using a consistent template, ensuring reproducibility and uniformity across the dataset.




Figure 13: Example of  $p_w$  generation prompt for each product.

## B Details of Metrics.

### B.1 Main

**Price Reduction Rate (PRR).** The Price Reduction Rate (PRR) quantifies the relative price change achieved through negotiation:

$$PRR = \frac{p_r - p_a^T}{p_r} \quad (1)$$

A higher BR indicates stronger buyer bargaining power, while the seller concedes more, reflecting weaker negotiation strength.

**Relative Profit (RP).** We define the Relative Profit (RP) as the ratio between the total profit achieved by the model and the minimum reference profit (e.g. the GPT-3.5 profit in main experiment):

$$RP = \frac{TP}{TP_{\min}} \quad (2)$$

Here, the total profit  $TP$  is calculated as:

$$TP = \sum_{i=1}^{|N_{\text{deal}}|} (p_a^{T,(i)} - p_w^{(i)}) \quad (3)$$

where  $p_a^{T,(i)}$  is the final proposed price and  $p_w^{(i)}$  is the wholesale price for the  $i$ -th successful transaction, and  $N_{\text{deal}}$  denotes the set of all successful transactions. The term  $TP_{\min}$  refers to the lowest total profit observed among all evaluated models.



**Deal Rate (DR).** The Deal Rate (DR) measures the percentage of negotiations that result in a successful transaction:

$$DR = \frac{|N_{\text{deal}}|}{|N|} \quad (4)$$

In here,  $|N_{\text{deal}}|$  is the number of successful negotiations.  $|N|$  is the total number of negotiations.

**Profit Rate (PR).** We define the Profit Rate (PR) as the average per-product profit margin across all successful transactions. For each deal, the profit margin is computed relative to the wholesale cost. Formally:

$$PR = \frac{1}{|N_{\text{deal}}|} \sum_{i=1}^{|N_{\text{deal}}|} \frac{p_a^{T,(i)} - p_w^{(i)}}{p_w^{(i)}} \quad (5)$$

Here,  $p_a^{T,(i)}$  denotes the agreed price of the  $i$ -th deal,  $p_w^{(i)}$  is its wholesale price, and  $N_{\text{deal}}$  is the set of all successfully closed transactions.

## B.2 Anomaly

**Out of Budget Rate (OBR).** The Out of Budget Rate (OBR) quantifies how often the final accepted price exceeds the buyer's budget constraint:

$$OBR = \frac{N_{\text{over}}}{N} \quad (6)$$

Here,  $N_{\text{over}}$  is the number of negotiations where the final accepted price  $p_a^{T,(i)}$  exceeds the fixed buyer budget  $\beta$ , i.e.,  $p_a^{T,(i)} > \beta$ .  $N$  denotes the total number of negotiations attempted.

**Out of Wholesale Rate (OWR).** The Out of Wholesale Rate (OWR) measures how often the final accepted price falls below the wholesale price, indicating unprofitable transactions from the seller's perspective:

$$OWR = \frac{N_{\text{below}}}{N} \quad (7)$$

Here,  $N_{\text{below}}$  is the number of negotiations where the final accepted price  $p_a^{T,(i)}$  is less than the wholesale price  $p_w^{(i)}$ , i.e.,  $p_a^{T,(i)} < p_w^{(i)}$ .  $N$  denotes the total number of negotiations attempted.

**Overpayment Rate (OPR).** The Overpayment Rate (OPR) quantifies how often the buyer ends up paying more than the reference retail price of the product in a successful transaction:

$$OPR = \frac{N_{\text{over}}}{N_{\text{deal}}} \quad (8)$$

Here,  $N_{\text{over}}$  is the number of successful deals where the final accepted price  $p_a^{T,(i)}$  exceeds the product's retail price  $p_r^{(i)}$ , i.e.,  $p_a^{T,(i)} > p_r^{(i)}$ .  $N$  is the total number of successful transactions.

**Deadlock Rate (DLR).** The Deadlock Rate (DLR) quantifies the proportion of negotiations that reach the maximum allowed number of rounds  $T_{\text{max}}$  without reaching any agreement:

$$DLR = \frac{N_{\text{deadlock}}}{N} \quad (9)$$

Here,  $N_{\text{deadlock}}$  is the number of negotiations that reach  $T_{\text{max}}$  rounds without a final agreement price, and  $N$  denotes the total number of negotiations.

Metric	Definition and Description
<b>Total Profit</b>	Cumulative profit across all successful negotiations: $TP = \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{deal}}} (p_a^{T,(i)} - p_w^{(i)})$
<b>Relative Profit</b>	Ratio of current model's profit to the worst-performing model's profit: $RP = \frac{TP}{TP_{\min}}$
<b>Profit Rate</b>	Average profit margin relative to wholesale price over successful deals: $PR = \frac{1}{N_{\text{deal}}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{deal}}} \frac{p_a^{T,(i)} - p_w^{(i)}}{p_w^{(i)}}$
<b>Out of Budget Rate</b>	Fraction of negotiations where final price exceeds buyer's fixed budget $\beta$ : $OBR = \frac{N_{\text{over}}}{N}$ , where $p_a^{T,(i)} > \beta$
<b>Out of Wholesale Rate</b>	Fraction of negotiations where final price falls below the wholesale price: $OWR = \frac{N_{\text{below}}}{N}$ , where $p_a^{T,(i)} < p_w^{(i)}$
<b>Overpayment Rate</b>	Fraction of successful deals where buyer pays more than the retail price: $OPR = \frac{N_{\text{over}}}{N}$ , where $p_a^{T,(i)} > p_r^{(i)}$
<b>Deadlock Rate</b>	Fraction of negotiations that reach the maximum round limit $T_{\max}$ without any agreement: $DR = \frac{N_{\text{deadlock}}}{N}$

Table 4: Summary of Evaluation Metrics

## C Details of Negotiation Implementation

### C.1 System Prompt of Buyer

The buyer agent is responsible for initiating and conducting negotiations in order to obtain a better price or deal from the seller. Its system prompt defines its persona as a cost-sensitive, realistic, and goal-driven negotiator. The prompt emphasizes budget awareness and strategic bargaining, allowing it to evaluate seller offers and either accept, reject, or counter them based on price constraints and perceived value.

#### System Prompt: Buyer Agent

You are a professional negotiation assistant tasked with purchasing a product. Your goal is to negotiate the best possible price for the product, aiming to complete the transaction at the lowest possible price.

Product Information: {products\_info}

Your Budget: - You have a maximum budget of  $\text{\$}\{\text{self.budget:.2f}\}$  for this purchase. - Do not exceed this budget under any circumstances.

Constraints: - You must not exceed your budget, otherwise you should reject the offer and say you cannot afford it.

Goal: - Negotiate to obtain the product at the lowest possible price - Use effective negotiation strategies to achieve the best deal - [IMPORTANT] You must not exceed your budget, otherwise you should reject the offer and say you cannot afford it.

Guidelines: 1. Keep your responses natural and conversational 2. Respond with a single message only 3. Keep your response concise and to the point 4. Don't reveal your internal thoughts or strategy 5. Do not show any bracket about unknown message, like [Your Name]. Remember, this is a real conversation between a buyer and a seller. 6. Make your response as short as possible, but do not lose any important information.

Figure 14: System prompt used to instruct the buyer agent in the negotiation scenario.

## C.2 Greeting Prompt

To simulate realistic and natural negotiation dynamics, we provide buyer agent with an initial greeting system prompt. This prompt is designed to help the buyer agent start the conversation with the seller in a friendly, casual, and non-robotic tone, without revealing its role as an automated negotiation assistant.

### Greeting Prompt: Buyer Agent

```
You are a professional negotiation assistant aiming to purchase a product at
the best possible price.
Your task is to start the conversation naturally without revealing your role
as a negotiation assistant.
Please write a short and friendly message to the seller that: 1. Expresses
interest in the product and asks about the possibility of negotiating the
price 2. Sounds natural, polite, and engaging
Avoid over-explaining - just say "Hello" to start and smoothly lead into your
interest.
Product: {self.product_data['Product Name']} Retail Price:
{self.product_data['Retail Price']} Features: {self.product_data['Features']}
{f"Your maximum budget for this purchase is ${self.budget:.2f}." if
self.budget is not None else ""}
Keep the message concise and focused on opening the negotiation.
```

Figure 15: Greeting system prompt used to for buyer to initiate negotiation.

## C.3 System Prompt of Seller

The seller agent simulates a vendor or representative attempting to close deals at profitable margins. The seller's system prompt guides it to present prices, justify value propositions, and respond to buyer objections in a persuasive and professional manner. It balances willingness to negotiate with profit-preserving strategies.

### System Prompt: Seller Agent

```
You are a professional sales assistant tasked with selling a product. Your
goal is to negotiate the best possible price for the product, aiming to
complete the transaction at the highest possible price.
Product Information: {products_info}
Constraint: - You must not sell below the Wholesale Price
Goal: - Negotiate to sell the product at the highest possible price - Use
effective negotiation strategies to maximize your profit
Guidelines: 1. Keep your responses natural and conversational 2. Respond
with a single message only 3. Keep your response concise and to the point
4. Don't reveal your internal thoughts or strategy 5. Do not show any
bracket about unknown message, like [Your Name]. Remember, this is a real
conversation between a buyer and a seller. 6. Make your response as short
as possible, but do not lose any important information.
```

Figure 16: System prompt used to instruct the seller agent in the negotiation scenario.

## C.4 System Prompt of Judge

The judge is a passive agent that observes the dialogue and provides a categorical judgment on current round dialogue. The system prompt instructs it to classify negotiation status as one of three categories: ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION, or CONTINUE.

#### System Prompt: Judge

You are evaluating whether the buyer's latest message indicates agreement to a deal.  
Buyer's latest message: "{latest\_buyer\_message}" Seller's latest message: "{latest\_seller\_message}" (If none, assume 'No response yet')  
Determine the buyer's intent based on their latest message. Choose one of the following: A. ACCEPTANCE - The buyer clearly agrees to the deal B. REJECTION - The buyer clearly rejects the deal or cannot proceed C. CONTINUE - The buyer wants to keep negotiating  
In your analysis, consider: - Has the buyer explicitly accepted the offered price? - Has the buyer explicitly rejected the offer or indicated they are walking away? - Has the buyer said they cannot afford the price? - Is the buyer asking further questions or making a counter-offer?  
Please output only a single word: ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION, or CONTINUE

Figure 17: Example of a judge prompt used to classify negotiation status.

## C.5 System Prompt of Analyst

The analyst agent is designed to extract structured pricing information from natural language messages sent by the seller. Its system prompt emphasizes accurate extraction of the main product price, excluding unrelated components such as warranties or optional accessories. This prompt helps standardize unstructured seller messages into numerical data for downstream analysis.

#### System Prompt: Analyst

Extract the price offered by the seller in the following message. Return only the numerical price (with currency symbol) if there is a clear price offer. If there is no clear price offer, return 'None'.  
IMPORTANT: Only focus on the price of the product itself. Ignore any prices for add-ons like insurance, warranty, gifts, or accessories. Only extract the current offer price for the main product.  
Here are some examples:  
Example 1: Seller's message: I can offer you this car for \$25000, which is a fair price considering its features. Price: \$25000  
Example 2: Seller's message: Thank you for your interest in our product. Let me know if you have any specific questions about its features. Price: None  
Example 3: Seller's message: I understand your budget constraints, but the best I can do is \$22900 and include a \$3000 warranty. Price: \$22900  
Example 4: Seller's message: I can sell it to you for \$15500. We also offer an extended warranty for \$1200 if you're interested. Price: \$15500  
Now for the current message, please STRICTLY ONLY return the price with the \$ symbol, no other text: Seller's message: {seller\_message} Price:

Figure 18: Example of an analyst prompt used for extracting proposed prices.

## D Details of More Results

### D.1 Understanding the Negotiation Gap via Model Specifications and Common Benchmarks.

To investigate the sources of variation in negotiation capacity across models, we collect data on four commonly referenced model characteristics as potential explanatory factors.<sup>3</sup>, including

<sup>3</sup>We obtain these data from model providers' official websites or technical papers: <https://openai.com/index/hello-gpt-4o/>; <https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12948>; <https://qwenlm.github.io/blog/qwen2.5-11m/>. The parameter count for GPT-4o-mini is estimated based on analysis in <https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.19260>.




Figure 19: Scatter plots of Negotiation Capacity Score versus model performance across four evaluations. Each subplot corresponds to a distinct measurement including MMLU, GPQA, MATH, and parameter count.

one architectural attribute: model size (in billions of parameters), and three performance-based benchmarks: general task performance (MMLU [Hendrycks et al., 2020]), mathematical ability (MATH [Hendrycks et al., 2021]), and scientific ability (GPQA [Rein et al., 2024]). We combine three negotiation-relevant metrics—Buyer Price Reduction Rate ( $PRR_{\text{Buyer}}$ ), reverse of Seller Price Reduction ( $1 - PRR_{\text{Seller}}$ ), and  $RP$ —into a scalar indicator via z-score normalization followed by averaging, yielding a composite Negotiation Capacity Score ( $NCS$ ). We then compute the Pearson correlation between each model’s  $NCS$  and the four benchmark scores. As shown in Figure 19, negotiation capacity shows a very strong correlation with general task performance on MMLU ( $r = 0.93$ ), along with substantial correlations with mathematical ( $r = 0.87$ ) and scientific ability ( $r = 0.80$ ). The weakest correlation appears with model size ( $r = 0.53$ ), which we attribute to multiple factors: some high-parameter models (e.g., GPT-3.5) belong to earlier generations with less optimized architectures and performance, while for commercial models such as GPT-4o-mini, exact parameter counts are unavailable and must be estimated from external sources.

## D.2 Negotiation Capacity Gap Indicates Behavioral Robustness Gap.




Figure 20: Scatter plot of Negotiation Capacity Score versus Risk Index across six models.

Figures 7, 8, and 9 present anomaly indicators across six models analyzed in Section 3.2. The data reveals a notable pattern: the proportion of anomalies appears inversely related to the models’ negotiation capabilities. This observation motivates the research question: *Are models with stronger negotiation skills also more robust against automation-induced anomalies?*

To investigate this relationship, we reuse the previously defined *Negotiation Capacity Score* ( $NCS$ ) (see Section D.1). To quantify a model’s overall tendency toward negotiation anomalies, we construct a composite *Risk Index* by aggregating the four anomaly-related indicators introduced in Section 4.2. Each indicator is standardized using z-score normalization and averaged to produce a unified scalar value. We then compute the Pearson correlation between  $NCS$  and the Risk Index. As shown in Figure 20, the result ( $r = -0.67$ ) indicates a moderate negative association: models with higher negotiation capacity consistently exhibit lower anomaly indices, suggesting greater behavioral robustness in automated negotiation systems.