

Chapter 9 The RSA Algorithm

9.1 The RSA Algorithm

Alice wants to send a message to Bob, but they have not had previous contact and they do not want to take the time to send a courier with a key. Therefore, all information that Alice sends to Bob will potentially be obtained by the evil observer Eve. However, it is still possible for a message to be sent in such a way that Bob can read it but Eve cannot.

With all the previously discussed methods, this would be impossible. Alice would have to send a key, which Eve would intercept. She could then decrypt all subsequent messages. The possibility of the present scheme, called a **public key cryptosystem**, was first publicly suggested by Diffie and Hellman in their classic 1976 paper [Diffie-Hellman]. However, they did not yet have a practical implementation (although they did present an alternative key exchange procedure that works over public channels; see [Section 10.4](#)). In the next few years, several methods were proposed. The most successful, based on the idea that factorization of integers into their prime factors is hard, was proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977 and is known as the RSA algorithm.

It had long been claimed that government cryptographic agencies had discovered the RSA algorithm several years earlier, but secrecy rules prevented them from releasing any evidence. Finally, in 1997, documents released by CESG, a British cryptographic agency, showed that in 1970, James Ellis had discovered public key cryptography, and in 1973, Clifford Cocks had written an

internal document describing a version of the RSA algorithm in which the encryption exponent e (see the discussion that follows) was the same as the modulus n .

Here is how the RSA algorithm works. Bob chooses two distinct large primes p and q and multiplies them together to form

$$n = pq.$$

He also chooses an encryption exponent e such that

$$\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1.$$

He sends the pair (n, e) to Alice but keeps the values of p and q secret. In particular, Alice, who could possibly be an enemy of Bob, never needs to know p and q to send her message to Bob securely. Alice writes her message as a number m . If m is larger than n , she breaks the message into blocks, each of which is less than n . However, for simplicity, let's assume for the moment that $m < n$. Alice computes

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$$

and sends c to Bob. Since Bob knows p and q , he can compute $(p-1)(q-1)$ and therefore can find the decryption exponent d with

$$de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}.$$

As we'll see later,

$$m \equiv c^d \pmod{n},$$

so Bob can read the message.

We summarize the algorithm in the following table.

The RSA Algorithm

1. Bob chooses secret primes p and q and computes $n = pq$.
2. Bob chooses e with $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.
3. Bob computes d with $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.
4. Bob makes n and e public, and keeps p, q, d secret.
5. Alice encrypts m as $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$ and sends c to Bob.
6. Bob decrypts by computing $m \equiv c^d \pmod{n}$.

9.1-1 Full Alternative Text

Example

Bob chooses

$$p = 885320963, \quad q = 238855417.$$

Then

$$n = p \cdot q = 211463707796206571.$$

Let the encryption exponent be

$$e = 9007.$$

The values of n and e are sent to Alice.

Alice's message is *cat*. We will depart from our earlier practice of numbering the letters starting with $a = 0$; instead, we start the numbering at $a = 01$ and continue through $z = 26$. We do this because, in the previous method, if the letter a appeared at the beginning of a message, it would yield a message number m starting with 00 , so the a would disappear.

The message is therefore

$$m = 30120.$$

Alice computes

$$c \equiv m^e \equiv 30120^{9007} \equiv 113535859035722866 \pmod{n}.$$

She sends c to Bob.

Since Bob knows p and q , he knows $(p - 1)(q - 1)$. He uses the extended Euclidean algorithm (see [Section 3.2](#)) to compute d such that

$$de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p - 1)(q - 1)}.$$

The answer is

$$d = 116402471153538991.$$

Bob computes

$$c^d \equiv 113535859035722866^{116402471153538991} \equiv 30120 \pmod{n},$$

so he obtains the original message.

For more examples, see Examples 24–30 in the Computer Appendices.

There are several aspects that need to be explained, but perhaps the most important is why $m \equiv c^d \pmod{n}$. Recall Euler's theorem ([Section 3.6](#)): If $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. In our case, $\phi(n) = \phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. Suppose $\gcd(m, n) = 1$. This is very likely the case; since p and q are large, m probably has neither as a factor. Since $de \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$, we can write $de = 1 + k\phi(n)$ for some integer k . Therefore,

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m^{1+k\phi(n)} \equiv m \cdot (m^{\phi(n)})^k \equiv m \cdot 1^k \equiv m \pmod{n}.$$

We have shown that Bob can recover the message. If $\gcd(m, n) \neq 1$, Bob still recovers the message. See [Exercise 37](#).

What does Eve do? She intercepts n , e , c . She does not know p , q , d . We assume that Eve has no way of

factoring n . The obvious way of computing d requires knowing $\phi(n)$. We show later that this is equivalent to knowing p and q . Is there another way? We will show that if Eve can find d , then she can probably factor n . Therefore, it is unlikely that Eve finds the decryption exponent d .

Since Eve knows $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$, why doesn't she simply take the e th root of c ? This works well if we are not working mod n but is very difficult in our case. For example, if you know that $m^3 \equiv 3 \pmod{85}$, you cannot calculate the cube root of 3, namely $1.4422\dots$, on your calculator and then reduce mod 85. Of course, a case-by-case search would eventually yield $m = 7$, but this method is not feasible for large n .

How does Bob choose p and q ? They should be chosen at random, independently of each other. How large depends on the level of security needed, but it seems that they should have at least 300 digits. For reasons that we discuss later, it is perhaps best if they are of slightly different lengths. When we discuss primality testing, we'll see that finding such primes can be done fairly quickly (see also [Section 3.6](#)). A few other tests should be done on p and q to make sure they are not bad. For example, if $p - 1$ has only small prime factors, then n is easy to factor by the $p - 1$ method (see [Section 9.3](#)), so p should be rejected and replaced with another prime.

Why does Bob require $\gcd(e, (p - 1)(q - 1)) = 1$? Recall (see [Section 3.3](#)) that $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p - 1)(q - 1)}$ has a solution d if and only if $\gcd(e, (p - 1)(q - 1)) = 1$. Therefore, this condition is needed in order for d to exist. The extended Euclidean algorithm can be used to compute d quickly. Since $p - 1$ is even, $e = 2$ cannot be used; one might be tempted to use $e = 3$. However, there are dangers in using small values of e (see [Section 9.2](#), Computer Problem 14, and [Section 23.3](#)), so something larger is

usually recommended. Also, if e is a moderately large prime, then there is no difficulty ensuring that $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$. It is now generally recommended that $e \geq 65537$. Among the data collected for [Lenstra2012 et al.] is the distribution of RSA encryption exponents that is given in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 RSA Encryption Exponents

e	Percentage
65537	95.4933%
17	3.1035%
41	0.4574%
3	0.3578%
19	0.1506%
25	0.1339%
5	0.1111%
7	0.0596%
11	0.0313%
257	0.0241%
other	0.0774%

Table 9.1 Full Alternative Text

In the encryption process, Alice calculates $m^e \pmod{n}$. Recall that this can be done fairly quickly and without large memory, for example, by successive squaring. See Section 3.5. This is definitely an advantage of modular arithmetic: If Alice tried to calculate m^e first, then

reduce mod n , it is possible that recording m^e would overflow her computer's memory. Similarly, the decryption process of calculating $c^d \pmod{n}$ can be done efficiently. Therefore, all the operations needed for encryption and decryption can be done quickly (i.e., in time a power of $\log n$). The security is provided by the assumption that n cannot be factored.

We made two claims. We justify them here. Recall that the point of these two claims was that finding $\phi(n)$ or finding the decryption exponent d is essentially as hard as factoring n . Therefore, if factoring is hard, then there should be no fast, clever way of finding d .

Claim 1: Suppose $n = pq$ is the product of two distinct primes. If we know n and $\phi(n)$, then we can quickly find p and q .

Note that

$$n - \phi(n) + 1 = pq - (p-1)(q-1) + 1 = p + q.$$

Therefore, we know pq and $p + q$. The roots of the polynomial

$$X^2 - (n - \phi(n) + 1)X + n = X^2 - (p + q)X + pq = (X - p)(X - q)$$

are p and q , but they can also be calculated by the quadratic formula:

$$p, q = \frac{(n - \phi(n) + 1) \pm \sqrt{(n - \phi(n) + 1)^2 - 4n}}{2}.$$

This yields p and q .

For example, suppose $n = 221$ and we know that $\phi(n) = 192$. Consider the quadratic equation

$$X^2 - 30X + 221.$$

The roots are

$$p, q = \frac{30 \pm \sqrt{30^2 - 4 \cdot 221}}{2} = 13, \quad 17.$$

For another example, see Example 31 in the Computer Appendices.

Claim 2: If we know d and e , then we can probably factor n .

In the discussion of factorization methods in [Section 9.4](#), we show that if we have an exponent $r > 0$ such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for several a with $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then we can probably factor n . Since $de - 1$ is a multiple of $\phi(n)$, say $de - 1 = k\phi(n)$, we have

$$a^{de-1} \equiv (a^{\phi(n)})^k \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

whenever $\gcd(a, n) = 1$. The $a^r \equiv 1$ factorization method can now be applied.

For an example, see Example 32 in the Computer Appendices.

Claim 2': If e is small or medium-sized (for example, if e has several fewer digits than \sqrt{n}) and we know d , then we can factor n .

We use the following procedure:

1. Compute $k = \lceil (de - 1)/n \rceil$ (that is, round up to the nearest integer).
2. Compute

$$\phi(n) = \frac{de - 1}{k}.$$

3. Solve the quadratic equation

$$X^2 - (n + 1 - \phi(n))X + n = 0.$$

The solutions are p and q .

Example

Let $n = 670726081$ and $e = 257$. We discover that $d = 524523509$. Compute

$$\frac{de - 1}{n} = 200.98 \dots$$

Therefore, $k = 201$. Then

$$\phi(n) = \frac{de - 1}{201} = 670659412.$$

The roots of the equation

$$X^2 - (n + 1 - \phi(n))X + n = X^2 - 66670X + 670726081 = 0$$

are $12347.00 \dots$ and $54323.00 \dots$, and we can check that $n = 12347 \times 54323$.

Why does this work? We know that

$de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$, so we write

$de = 1 + (p-1)(q-1)k$. Since

$d < (p-1)(q-1)$, we know that

$$(p-1)(q-1)k < de < (p-1)(q-1)e,$$

so $k < e$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} k &= \frac{de - 1}{(p-1)(q-1)} > \frac{de - 1}{n} = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)k}{n} = \frac{(pq - p - q + 1)k}{n} \\ &= k - \frac{(p+q-1)k}{n}. \end{aligned}$$

Usually, both p and q are approximately \sqrt{n} . In practice, e and therefore k (which is less than e) are much smaller than \sqrt{n} . Therefore, $(p+q-1)k$ is much smaller than n , which means that $(p+q-1)k/n < 1$ and it rounds off to 0.

Once we have k , we use $de - 1 = \phi(n)k$ to solve for $\phi(n)$. As we have already seen, once we know n and $\phi(n)$, we can find p and q by solving the quadratic equation.

One way the RSA algorithm can be used is when there are several banks, for example, that want to be able to

send financial data to each other. If there are several thousand banks, then it is impractical for each pair of banks to have a key for secret communication. A better way is the following. Each bank chooses integers n and e as before. These are then published in a public book. Suppose bank A wants to send data to bank B. Then A looks up B's n and e and uses them to send the message. In practice, the RSA algorithm is not quite fast enough for sending massive amounts of data. Therefore, the RSA algorithm is often used to send a key for a faster encryption method such as AES.

PGP (= Pretty Good Privacy) used to be a standard method for encrypting email. When Alice sends an email message to Bob, she first signs the message using a digital signature algorithm such as those discussed in [Chapter 13](#). She then encrypts the message using a block cipher such as triple DES or AES (other choices are IDEA or CAST-128) with a randomly chosen 128-bit key (a new random key is chosen for each transmission). She then encrypts this key using Bob's public RSA key (other public key methods can also be used). When Bob receives the email, he uses his private RSA exponent to decrypt the random key. Then he uses this random key to decrypt the message, and he checks the signature to verify that the message is from Alice. For more discussion of PGP, see [Section 15.6](#).

9.2 Attacks on RSA

In practice, the RSA algorithm has proven to be effective, as long as it is implemented correctly. We give a few possible implementation mistakes in the Exercises. Here are a few other potential difficulties. For more about attacks on RSA, see [Boneh].

Theorem

Let $n = pq$ have m digits. If we know the first $m/4$, or the last $m/4$, digits of p , we can efficiently factor n .

In other words, if p and q have 300 digits, and we know the first 150 digits, or the last 150 digits, of p , then we can factor n . Therefore, if we choose a random starting point to choose our prime p , the method should be such that a large amount of p is not predictable. For example, suppose we take a random 150-digit number N and test numbers of the form $N \cdot 10^{150} + k$, $k = 1, 3, 5, \dots$, for primality until we find a prime p (which should happen for $k < 10000$). An attacker who knows that this method is used will know 147 of the last 150 digits (they will all be 0 except for the last three or four digits). Trying the method of the theorem for the various values of $k < 10000$ will eventually lead to the factorization of n .

For details of the preceding result, see [Coppersmith2]. A related result is the following.

Theorem

Suppose (n, e) is an RSA public key and n has m digits. Let d be the decryption exponent. If we have at least the last $m/4$ digits of d , we can efficiently find d in time that is linear in $e \log_2 e$.

This means that the time to find d is bounded as a function linear in $e \log_2 e$. If e is small, it is therefore quite fast to find d when we know a large part of d . If e is large, perhaps around n , the theorem is no better than a case-by-case search for d . For details, see [Boneh et al.].

9.2.1 Low Exponent Attacks

Low encryption or decryption exponents are tempting because they speed up encryption or decryption.

However, there are certain dangers that must be avoided. One pitfall of using $e = 3$ is given in Computer Problem 14. Another difficulty is discussed in [Chapter 23](#) (Lattice Methods). These problems can be avoided by using a somewhat higher exponent. One popular choice is $e = 65537 = 2^{16} + 1$. This is prime, so it is likely that it is relatively prime to $(p - 1)(q - 1)$. Since it is one more than a power of 2, exponentiation to this power can be done quickly: To calculate x^{65537} , square x sixteen times, then multiply the result by x .

The decryption exponent d should of course be chosen large enough that brute force will not find it. However, even more care is needed, as the following result shows. One way to obtain desired properties of d is to choose d first, then find e with $de \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$.

Suppose Bob wants to be able to decrypt messages quickly, so he chooses a small value of d . The following theorem of M. Wiener [Wiener] shows that often Eve can then find d easily. In practice, if the inequalities in the hypotheses of the proposition are weakened, then Eve can still use the method to obtain d in many cases.

Therefore, it is recommended that d be chosen fairly large.

Theorem

Suppose p, q are primes with $q < p < 2q$. Let $n = pq$ and let $1 \leq d, e < \phi(n)$ satisfy

$de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. If $d < \frac{1}{3}n^{1/4}$, then d can be calculated quickly (that is, in time polynomial in $\log n$).

Proof. Since $q^2 < pq = n$, we have $q < \sqrt{n}$. Therefore, since $p < 2q$,

$$n - \phi(n) = pq - (p-1)(q-1) = p + q - 1 < 3q < 3\sqrt{n}.$$

Write $ed = 1 + \phi(n)k$ for some integer $k \geq 1$. Since $e < \phi(n)$, we have

$$\phi(n)k < ed < \frac{1}{3}\phi(n)n^{1/4},$$

so $k < \frac{1}{3}n^{1/4}$. Therefore,

$$kn - ed = k(n - \phi(n)) - 1 < k(n - \phi(n)) < \frac{1}{3}n^{1/4}(3\sqrt{n}) = n^{3/4}.$$

Also, since $k(n - \phi(n)) - 1 > 0$, we have $kn - ed > 0$. Dividing by dn yields

$$0 < \frac{k}{d} - \frac{e}{n} < \frac{1}{dn^{1/4}} < \frac{1}{3d^2},$$

since $3d < n^{1/4}$ by assumption.

We now need a result about continued fractions. Recall from [Section 3.12](#) that if x is a positive real number and k and d are positive integers with

$$\left| \frac{k}{d} - x \right| < \frac{1}{2d^2},$$

then k/d arises from the continued fraction expansion of x . Therefore, in our case, k/d arises from the continued fraction expansion of e/n . Therefore, Eve does the following:

1. Computes the continued fraction of e/n . After each step, she obtains a fraction A/B .
2. Eve uses $k = A$ and $d = B$ to compute $C = (ed - 1)/k$. (Since $ed = 1 + \phi(n)k$, this value of C is a candidate for $\phi(n)$.)
3. If C is not an integer, she proceeds to the next step of the continued fraction.
4. If C is an integer, then she finds the roots r_1, r_2 of $X^2 - (n - C + 1)X + n$. (Note that this is possibly the equation $X^2 - (n - \phi(n) + 1)X + n = (X - p)(X - q)$ from earlier.) If r_1 and r_2 are integers, then Eve has factored n . If not, then Eve proceeds to the next step of the continued fraction algorithm.

Since the number of steps in the continued fraction expansion of e/n is at most a constant times $\log n$, and since the continued fraction algorithm stops when the fraction e/n is reached, the algorithm terminates quickly. Therefore, Eve finds the factorization of n quickly.

Remarks

Recall that the rational approximations to a number x arising from the continued fraction algorithm are alternately larger than x and smaller than x . Since $0 < \frac{k}{d} - \frac{e}{n}$, we only need to consider every second fraction arising from the continued fraction.

What happens if Eve reaches e/n without finding the factorization of n ? This means that the hypotheses of the proposition are not satisfied. However, it is possible that sometimes the method will yield the factorization of n even when the hypotheses fail.

Example

Let $n = 1966981193543797$ and $e = 323815174542919$. The continued fraction of e/n is

$$[0; 6, 13, 2, 3, 1, 3, 1, 9, 1, 36, 5, 2, 1, 6, 1, 43, 13, 1, 10, 11, 2, 1, 9, 5]$$

$$= \frac{1}{6 + \frac{1}{13 + \frac{1}{2 + \frac{1}{3 + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{3 + \frac{1}{1 + \dots}}}}}}}}.$$

The first fraction is $1/6$, so we try $k = 1$, $d = 6$. Since d must be odd, we discard this possibility.

By the remark, we may jump to the third fraction:

$$\frac{1}{6 + \frac{1}{13 + \frac{1}{2}}} = \frac{27}{164}.$$

Again, we discard this since d must be odd.

The fifth fraction is $121/735$. This gives $C = (e \cdot 735 - 1)/121$, which is not an integer.

The seventh fraction is $578/3511$. This gives $C = 1966981103495136$ as the candidate for $\phi(n)$.

The roots of

$$X^2 - (n - C + 1)X + n$$

are 37264873 and 52783789 , to several decimal places of accuracy. Since

$$n = 37264873 \times 52783789,$$

we have factored n .

9.2.2 Short Plaintext

A common use of RSA is to transmit keys for use in DES, AES, or other symmetric cryptosystems. However, a naive implementation could lead to a loss of security.

Suppose a 56-bit DES key is written as a number $m \approx 10^{17}$. This is encrypted with RSA to obtain $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$. Although m is small, the ciphertext c is probably a number of the same size as n , so perhaps around 200 digits. However, Eve attacks the system as follows. She makes two lists:

1. $cx^{-e} \pmod{n}$ for all x with $1 \leq x \leq 10^9$.
2. $y^e \pmod{n}$ for all y with $1 \leq y \leq 10^9$.

She looks for a match between an element on the first list and an element on the second list. If she finds one, then she has $cx^{-e} \equiv y^e$ for some x, y . This yields

$$c \equiv (xy)^e \pmod{n},$$

so $m \equiv xy \pmod{n}$. Is this attack likely to succeed? Suppose m is the product of two integers x and y , both less than 10^9 . Then these x, y will yield a match for Eve. Not every m will have this property, but many values of m are the product of two integers less than 10^9 . For these, Eve will obtain m .

This attack is much more efficient than trying all 10^{17} possibilities for m , which is nearly impossible on one computer, and would take a long time even with several computers working in parallel. In the present attack, Eve needs to compute and store a list of length 10^9 , then compute the elements on the other list and check each one against the first list. Therefore, Eve performs approximately 2×10^9 computations (and compares with the list up to 10^9 times). This is easily possible on a single computer. For more on this attack, see [Boneh-Joux-Nguyen].

It is easy to prevent this attack. Instead of using a small value of m , adjoin some random digits to the beginning and end of m so as to form a much longer plaintext. When Bob decrypts the ciphertext, he simply removes these random digits and obtains m .

A more sophisticated method of preprocessing the plaintext, namely Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP), was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [Bellare-Rogaway2] in 1994. Suppose Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, whose RSA public key is (n, e) , where n has k bits. Two positive integers k_0 and k_1 are specified in advance, with $k_0 + k_1 < k$. Alice's message is allowed to have $k - k_0 - k_1$ bits. Typical values are $k = 1024$, $k_0 = k_1 = 128$, $k - k_0 - k_1 = 768$. Let G be a function that inputs strings of k_0 bits and outputs strings of $k - k_0$ bits. Let H be a function that inputs $k - k_0$ bits and outputs k_0 bits. The functions G and H are usually constructed from hash functions (see Chapter 11 for a discussion of hash functions). To encrypt m , Alice first expands it to length $k - k_0$ by adjoining k_1 zero bits. The result is denoted $m0^{k_1}$. She then chooses a random string r of k_0 bits and computes

$$x_1 = m0^{k_1} \oplus G(r), \quad x_2 = r \oplus H(x_1).$$

If the concatenation $x_1 \parallel x_2$ is a binary number larger than n , Alice chooses a new random number r and computes new values for x_1 and x_2 . As soon as she obtains $x_1 \parallel x_2 < n$ (this has a probability of at least $1/2$ of happening for each r , as long as $G(r)$ produces fairly random outputs), she forms the ciphertext

$$E(m) = (x_1 \parallel x_2)^e \pmod{n}.$$

To decrypt a ciphertext c , Bob uses his private RSA decryption exponent d to compute $c^d \pmod{n}$. The result is written in the form

$$c^d \pmod{n} = y_1 \parallel y_2,$$

where y_1 has $k - k_0$ bits and y_2 has k_0 bits. Bob then computes

$$m0^{k_1} = y_1 \oplus G(H(y_1) \oplus y_2).$$

The correctness of this decryption can be justified as follows. If the ciphertext is the encryption of m , then

$$y_1 = x_1 = m0^{k_1} \oplus G(r) \quad \text{and} \quad y_2 = x_2 = r \oplus H(x_1).$$

Therefore,

$$H(y_1) \oplus y_2 = H(x_1) \oplus r \oplus H(x_1) = r$$

and

$$y_1 \oplus G(H(y_1) \oplus y_2) = x_1 \oplus G(r) = m0^{k_1}.$$

Bob removes the k_1 zero bits from the end of $m0^{k_1}$ and obtains m . Also, Bob has check on the integrity of the ciphertext. If there are not k_1 zeros at the end, then the ciphertext does not correspond to a valid encryption.

This method is sometimes called plaintext-aware encryption. Note that the padding with x_2 depends on the message m and on the random parameter r . This makes chosen ciphertext attacks on the system more difficult. It also is used for ciphertext indistinguishability. See [Section 4.5](#).

For discussion of the security of OAEP, see [Shoup].

9.2.3 Timing Attacks

Another type of attack on RSA and similar systems was discovered by Paul Kocher in 1995, while he was an undergraduate at Stanford. He showed that it is possible to discover the decryption exponent by carefully timing the computation times for a series of decryptions.

Though there are ways to thwart the attack, this development was unsettling. There had been a general

feeling of security since the mathematics was well understood. Kocher's attack demonstrated that a system could still have unexpected weaknesses.

Here is how the timing attack works. Suppose Eve is able to observe Bob decrypt several ciphertexts y . She times how long this takes for each y . Knowing each y and the time required for it to be decrypted will allow her to find the decryption exponent d . But first, how could Eve obtain such information? There are several situations where encrypted messages are sent to Bob and his computer automatically decrypts and responds. Measuring the response times suffices for the present purposes.

We need to assume that we know the hardware being used to calculate $y^d \pmod n$. We can use this information to calculate the computation times for various steps that potentially occur in the process.

Let's assume that $y^d \pmod n$ is computed by an algorithm given in Exercise 56 in Chapter 3, which is as follows:

Let $d = b_1b_2 \dots b_w$ be written in binary (for example, when $x = 1011$, we have $b_1 = 1, b_2 = 0, b_3 = 1, b_4 = 1$). Let y and n be integers. Perform the following procedure:

1. Start with $k = 1$ and $s_1 = 1$.
2. If $b_k = 1$, let $r_k \equiv s_k y \pmod n$. If $b_k = 0$, let $r_k = s_k$.
3. Let $s_{k+1} \equiv r_k^2 \pmod n$.
4. If $k = w$, stop. If $k < w$, add 1 to k and go to (2).

Then $r_w \equiv y^d \pmod n$.

Note that the multiplication $s_k y$ occurs only when the bit $b_k = 1$. In many situations, there is a reasonably large

variation in how long this multiplication takes. We assume this is the case here.

Before we continue, we need a few facts from probability. Suppose we have a random process that produces real numbers t as outputs. For us, t will be the time it takes for the computer to complete a calculation, given a random input y . The mean is the average value of these outputs. If we record outputs t_1, \dots, t_n , the mean should be approximately $m = (t_1 + \dots + t_n)/n$. The variance for the random process is approximated by

$$\text{Var}(\{t_i\}) = \frac{(t_1 - m)^2 + \dots + (t_n - m)^2}{n}.$$

The standard deviation is the square root of the variance and gives a measure of how much variation there is in the values of the t_i 's.

The important fact we need is that when two random processes are independent, the variance for the sum of their outputs is the sum of the variances of the two processes. For example, we will break the computation done by the computer into two independent processes, which will take times t' and t'' . The total time t will be $t' + t''$. Therefore, $\text{Var}(\{t_i\})$ should be approximately $\text{Var}(\{t'_i\}) + \text{Var}(\{t''_i\})$.

Now assume Eve knows ciphertexts y_1, \dots, y_n and the times that it took to compute each $y_i^d \pmod n$. Suppose she knows bits b_1, \dots, b_{k-1} of the exponent d . Since she knows the hardware being used, she knows how much time was used in calculating r_1, \dots, r_{k-1} in the preceding algorithm. Therefore, she knows, for each y_i , the time t_i that it takes to compute r_k, \dots, r_w .

Eve wants to determine b_k . If $b_k = 1$, a multiplication $s_k y \pmod n$ will take place for each ciphertext y_i that is processed. If $b_k = 0$, there is no such multiplication.

Let t'_i be the amount of time it takes the computer to perform the multiplication $s_k y \pmod n$, though Eve does not yet know whether this multiplication actually occurs. Let $t''_i = t_i - t'_i$. Eve computes $\text{Var}(\{t_i\})$ and $\text{Var}(\{t''_i\})$. If $\text{Var}(\{t_i\}) > \text{Var}(\{t''_i\})$, then Eve concludes that $b_k = 1$. If not, $b_k = 0$. After determining b_k , she proceeds in the same manner to find all the bits.

Why does this work? If the multiplication occurs, t''_i is the amount of time it takes the computer to complete the calculation after the multiplication. It is reasonable to assume t'_i and t''_i are outputs that are independent of each other. Therefore,

$$\text{Var}(\{t_i\}) \approx \text{Var}(\{t'_i\}) + \text{Var}(\{t''_i\}) > \text{Var}(\{t''_i\}).$$

If the multiplication does not occur, t'_i is the amount of time for an operation unrelated to the computation, so it is reasonable to assume t_i and t'_i are independent. Therefore,

$$\text{Var}(\{t''_i\}) \approx \text{Var}(\{t_i\}) + \text{Var}(\{-t'_i\}) > \text{Var}(\{t_i\}).$$

Note that we couldn't use the mean in place of the variance, since the mean of $\{-t_i\}$ would be negative, so the last inequality would not hold. All that can be deduced from the mean is the total number of nonzero bits in the binary expansion of d .

The preceding gives a fairly simple version of the method. In practice, various modifications would be needed, depending on the specific situation. But the general strategy remains the same. For more details, see [Kocher]. For more on timing attacks, see [Crosby et al.].

A similar attack on RSA works by measuring the power consumed during the computations. See [Kocher et al.]. Another method, called acoustic cryptanalysis, obtains information from the high-pitched noises emitted by the electronic components of a computer during its computations. See [Genkin et al.]. Attacks such as these

and the timing attack can be prevented by appropriate design features in the physical implementation.

Timing attacks, power analysis, and acoustic cryptanalysis are examples of **side-channel attacks**, where the attack is on the implementation rather than on the basic cryptographic algorithm.

9.3 Primality Testing

Suppose we have an integer of 300 digits that we want to test for primality. We know by [Exercise 7 in Chapter 3](#) that one way is to divide by all the primes up to its square root. What happens if we try this? There are around 3×10^{147} primes less than 10^{150} . This is significantly more than the number of particles in the universe. Moreover, if the computer can handle 10^{10} primes per second, the calculation would take around 3×10^{130} years. (It's been suggested that you could go sit on the beach for 20 years, then buy a computer that is 1000 times faster, which would cut the runtime down to 3×10^{127} years – a very large savings!) Clearly, better methods are needed. Some of these are discussed in this section.

A very basic idea, one that is behind many factorization methods, is the following.

Basic Principle

Let n be an integer and suppose there exist integers x and y with $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$, but $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$. Then n is composite. Moreover, $\gcd(x - y, n)$ gives a nontrivial factor of n .

Proof. Let $d = \gcd(x - y, n)$. If $d = n$ then $x \equiv y \pmod{n}$, which is assumed not to happen. Suppose $d = 1$. The Proposition in [Subsection 3.3.1](#) says that if $ab \equiv ac \pmod{n}$ and if $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then $b \equiv c \pmod{n}$. In our case, let $a = x - y$, let $b = x + y$, and let $c = 0$. Then $ab = x^2 - y^2 \equiv 0 \equiv ac$. If $d = \gcd(x - y, n) = 1$, then $x + y = b \equiv c = 0$. This says that

$x \equiv -y \pmod{n}$, which contradicts the assumption that $x \not\equiv -y \pmod{n}$. Therefore, $d \neq 1, n$, so d is a nontrivial factor of n .

Example

Since $12^2 \equiv 2^2 \pmod{35}$, but $12 \not\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{35}$, we know that 35 is composite. Moreover, $\gcd(12 - 2, 35) = 5$ is a nontrivial factor of 35.

It might be surprising, but factorization and primality testing are not the same. It is much easier to prove a number is composite than it is to factor it. There are many large integers that are known to be composite but that have not been factored. How can this be done? We give a simple example. We know by Fermat's theorem that if p is prime, then $2^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. Let's use this to show 35 is not prime. By successive squaring, we find (congruences are mod 35)

$$\begin{aligned} 2^4 &\equiv 16, \\ 2^8 &\equiv 256 \equiv 11 \\ 2^{16} &\equiv 121 \equiv 16 \\ 2^{32} &\equiv 256 \equiv 11. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$2^{34} \equiv 2^{32}2^2 \equiv 11 \cdot 4 \equiv 9 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{35}.$$

Fermat's theorem says that 35 cannot be prime, so we have proved 35 to be composite without finding a factor.

The same reasoning gives us the following.

Fermat Primality Test

Let $n > 1$ be an integer. Choose a random integer a with $1 < a < n - 1$. If $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then n

is composite. If $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then n is probably prime.

Although this and similar tests are usually called “primality tests,” they are actually “compositeness tests,” since they give a completely certain answer only in the case when n is composite. The Fermat test is quite accurate for large n . If it declares a number to be composite, then this is guaranteed to be true. If it declares a number to be probably prime, then empirical results show that this is very likely true. Moreover, since modular exponentiation is fast, the Fermat test can be carried out quickly.

Recall that modular exponentiation is accomplished by successive squaring. If we are careful about how we do this successive squaring, the Fermat test can be combined with the Basic Principle to yield the following stronger result.

Miller-Rabin Primality Test

Let $n > 1$ be an odd integer. Write $n - 1 = 2^k m$ with m odd. Choose a random integer a with $1 < a < n - 1$. Compute $b_0 \equiv a^m \pmod{n}$. If $b_0 \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then stop and declare that n is probably prime. Otherwise, let $b_1 \equiv b_0^2 \pmod{n}$. If $b_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then n is composite (and $\gcd(b_0 - 1, n)$ gives a nontrivial factor of n). If $b_1 \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$, then stop and declare that n is probably prime. Otherwise, let $b_2 \equiv b_1^2 \pmod{n}$. If $b_2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then n is composite. If $b_2 \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$, then stop and declare that n is probably prime. Continue in this way until stopping or reaching b_{k-1} . If $b_{k-1} \not\equiv -1 \pmod{n}$, then n is composite.

Example

Let $n = 561$. Then $n - 1 = 560 = 16 \cdot 35$, so $2^k = 2^4$ and $m = 35$. Let $a = 2$. Then

$$b_0 \equiv 2^{35} \equiv 263 \pmod{561}$$

$$b_1 \equiv b_0^2 \equiv 166 \pmod{561}$$

$$b_2 \equiv b_1^2 \equiv 67 \pmod{561}$$

$$b_3 \equiv b_2^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{561}.$$

Since $b_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{561}$, we conclude that 561 is composite. Moreover, $\gcd(b_2 - 1, 561) = 33$, which is a nontrivial factor of 561.

If n is composite and $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then we say that n is a pseudoprime for the base a . If a and n are such that n passes the Miller-Rabin test, we say that n is a strong pseudoprime for the base a . We showed in [Section 3.6](#) that $2^{560} \equiv 1 \pmod{561}$, so 561 is a pseudoprime for the base 2. However, the preceding calculation shows that 561 is not a strong pseudoprime for the base 2. For a given base, strong pseudoprimes are much more rare than pseudoprimes.

Up to 10^{10} , there are 455052511 primes. There are 14884 pseudoprimes for the base 2, and 3291 strong pseudoprimes for the base 2. Therefore, calculating $2^{n-1} \pmod{n}$ will fail to recognize a composite in this range with probability less than 1 out of 30 thousand, and using the Miller-Rabin test with $a = 2$ will fail with probability less than 1 out of 100 thousand.

It can be shown that the probability that the Miller-Rabin test fails to recognize a composite for a randomly chosen a is at most $1/4$. In fact, it fails much less frequently than this. See [Damgård et al.]. If we repeat the test 10 times, say, with randomly chosen values of a , then we expect that the probability of certifying a composite number as prime is at most $(1/4)^{10} \simeq 10^{-6}$. In practice, using the test for a single a is fairly accurate.

Though strong pseudoprimes are rare, it has been proved (see [Alford et al.]) that, for any finite set B of bases, there are infinitely many integers that are strong pseudoprimes for all $b \in B$. The first strong pseudoprime for all the bases $b = 2, 3, 5, 7$ is 3215031751. There is a 337-digit number that is a strong pseudoprime for all bases that are primes < 200 .

Suppose we need to find a prime of around 300 digits. The prime number theorem asserts that the density of primes around x is approximately $1/\ln x$. When $x = 10^{300}$, this gives a density of around $1/\ln(10^{300}) = 1/690$. Since we can skip the even numbers, this can be raised to $1/345$. Pick a random starting point, and throw out the even numbers (and multiples of other small primes). Test each remaining number in succession by the Miller-Rabin test. This will tend to eliminate all the composites. On average, it will take less than 400 uses of the Miller-Rabin test to find a likely candidate for a prime, so this can be done fairly quickly. If we need to be completely certain that the number in question is prime, there are more sophisticated primality tests that can test a number of 300 digits in a few seconds.

Why does the test work? Suppose, for example, that $b_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. This means that $b_2^2 \equiv 1^2 \pmod{n}$. Apply the Basic Principle from before. Either $b_2 \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, or $b_2 \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ and n is composite. In the latter case, $\gcd(b_2 - 1, n)$ gives a nontrivial factor of n . In the former case, the algorithm would have stopped by the previous step. If we reach b_{k-1} , we have computed $b_{k-1} \equiv a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n}$. The square of this is a^{n-1} , which must be $1 \pmod{n}$ if n is prime, by Fermat's theorem. Therefore, if n is prime, $b_{k-1} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$. All other choices mean that n is composite. Moreover, if $b_{k-1} \equiv 1$, then, if we didn't stop at an earlier step, $b_{k-2}^2 \equiv 1^2 \pmod{n}$ with

$b_{k-2} \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$. This means that n is composite (and we can factor n).

In practice, if n is composite, usually we reach b_{k-1} and it is not $\pm 1 \pmod{n}$. In fact, usually $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. This means that Fermat's test says n is not prime.

For example, let $n = 299$ and $a = 2$. Since $2^{298} \equiv 140 \pmod{299}$, Fermat's theorem and also the Miller-Rabin test say that 299 is not prime (without factoring it). The reason this happens is the following. Note that $299 = 13 \times 23$. An easy calculation shows that $2^{12} \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$ and no smaller exponent works. In fact, $2^j \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$ if and only if j is a multiple of 12. Since 298 is not a multiple of 12, we have $2^{298} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{13}$, and therefore also $2^{298} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{299}$. Similarly, $2^j \equiv 1 \pmod{23}$ if and only if j is a multiple of 11, from which we can again deduce that $2^{298} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{299}$. If Fermat's theorem (and the Miller-Rabin test) were to give us the wrong answer in this case, we would have needed $13 \cdot 23 - 1$ to be a multiple of $12 \cdot 11$.

Consider the general case $n = pq$, a product of two primes. For simplicity, consider the case where $p > q$ and suppose $a^k \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ if and only if $k \equiv 0 \pmod{p-1}$. This means that a is a primitive root mod p ; there are $\phi(p-1)$ such $a \pmod{p}$. Since $0 < q-1 < p-1$, we have

$$n-1 \equiv pq-1 \equiv q(p-1) + q-1 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p-1}.$$

Therefore, $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ by our choice of a , which implies that $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Similar reasoning shows that usually $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for many other choices of a , too.

But suppose we are in a case where $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. What happens? Let's look at the example of $n = 561$.

Since $561 = 3 \times 11 \times 17$, we consider what is happening to the sequence $b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3 \bmod 3, \bmod 11$, and $\bmod 17$:

$$\begin{array}{llll} b_0 & \equiv & -1 & (\bmod 3), \equiv -1 & (\bmod 11), \equiv 8 & (\bmod 17), \\ b_1 & \equiv & 1 & (\bmod 3), \equiv 1 & (\bmod 11), \equiv -4 & (\bmod 17), \\ b_2 & \equiv & 1 & (\bmod 3), \equiv 1 & (\bmod 11), \equiv -1 & (\bmod 17), \\ b_3 & \equiv & 1 & (\bmod 3), \equiv 1 & (\bmod 11), \equiv 1 & (\bmod 17). \end{array}$$

Since $b_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{561}$, we have $b_2^2 \equiv b_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{\text{all three primes}}$. But there is no reason that b_3 is the first time we get $b_i \equiv 1 \pmod{\text{a particular prime}}$. We already have $b_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$ and $\bmod 11$, but we have to wait for b_3 when working $\bmod 17$. Therefore, $b_2^2 \equiv b_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{3, \bmod 11, \text{ and } \bmod 17}$, but b_2 is congruent to 1 only $\bmod 3$ and $\bmod 11$. Therefore, $b_2 - 1$ contains the factors 3 and 11, but not 17. This is why $\gcd(b_2 - 1, 561)$ finds the factor 33 of 561. The reason we could factor 561 by this method is that the sequence b_0, b_1, \dots reached 1 \bmod the primes not all at the same time.

More generally, consider the case $n = pq$ (a product of several primes is similar) and suppose $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. As pointed out previously, it is very unlikely that this is the case; but if it does happen, look at what is happening $\bmod p$ and $\bmod q$. It is likely that the sequences $b_i \pmod{p}$ and $b_i \pmod{q}$ reach -1 and then 1 at different times, just as in the example of 561. In this case, we will have $b_i \equiv -1 \pmod{p}$ but $b_i \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$ for some i ; therefore, $b_i^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ but $b_i \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$. Therefore, we'll be able to factor n .

The only way that n can pass the Miller-Rabin test is to have $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and also to have the sequences $b_i \pmod{p}$ and $b_i \pmod{q}$ reach 1 at the same time. This rarely happens.

Another primality test of a nature similar to the Miller-Rabin test is the following, which uses the Jacobi symbol (see [Section 3.10](#)).

Solovay-Strassen Primality Test

Let n be an odd integer. Choose several random integers a with $1 < a < n - 1$. If

$$\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) \not\equiv a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n}$$

for some a , then n is composite. If

$$\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) \equiv a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n}$$

for all of these random a , then n is probably prime.

Note that if n is prime, then the test will declare n to be a probable prime. This is because of Part 2 of the second Proposition in [Section 3.10](#).

The Jacobi symbol can be evaluated quickly, as in [Section 3.10](#). The modular exponentiation can also be performed quickly.

For example,

$$\left(\frac{2}{15}\right) = -1 \not\equiv 2^3 \equiv 2^{(15-1)/2} \pmod{15},$$

so 15 is not prime. As in the Miller-Rabin tests, we usually do not get ± 1 for $a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n}$. Here is a case where it happens:

$$\left(\frac{2}{341}\right) = -1 \not\equiv +1 \equiv 2^{(341-1)/2} \pmod{341}.$$

However, the Solovay-Strassen test says that 341 is composite.

Both the Miller-Rabin and the Solovay-Strassen tests work quickly in practice, but, when p is prime, they do not give rigorous proofs that p is prime. There are tests that actually prove the primality of p , but they are somewhat slower and are used only when it is essential

that the number be proved to be prime. Most of these methods are probabilistic, in the sense that they work with very high probability in any given case, but success is not guaranteed. In 2002, Agrawal, Kayal, and Saxena [Agrawal et al.] gave what is known as a deterministic polynomial time algorithm for deciding whether or not a number is prime. This means that the computation time is always, rather than probably, bounded by a constant times a power of $\log p$. This was a great theoretical advance, but their algorithm has not yet been improved to the point that it competes with the probabilistic algorithms.

For more on primality testing and its history, see [Williams].

9.4 Factoring

We now turn to factoring. The basic method of dividing an integer n by all primes $p \leq \sqrt{n}$ is much too slow for most purposes. For many years, people have worked on developing more efficient algorithms. We present some of them here. In [Chapter 21](#), we'll also cover a method using elliptic curves, and in [Chapter 25](#), we'll show how a quantum computer, if built, could factor efficiently.

One method, which is also too slow, is usually called the **Fermat factorization** method. The idea is to express n as a difference of two squares: $n = x^2 - y^2$. Then $n = (x + y)(x - y)$ gives a factorization of n . For example, suppose we want to factor $n = 295927$. Compute $n + 1^2, n + 2^2, n + 3^2, \dots$, until we find a square. In this case, $295927 + 3^2 = 295936 = 544^2$. Therefore,

$$295927 = (544 + 3)(544 - 3) = 547 \cdot 541.$$

The Fermat method works well when n is the product of two primes that are very close together. If $n = pq$, it takes $|p - q|/2$ steps to find the factorization. But if p and q are two randomly selected 300-digit primes, it is likely that $|p - q|$ will be very large, probably around 300 digits, too. So Fermat factorization is unlikely to work. Just to be safe, however, the primes for an RSA modulus are often chosen to be of slightly different sizes.

We now turn to more modern methods. If one of the prime factors of n has a special property, it is sometimes easier to factor n . For example, if p divides n and $p - 1$ has only small prime factors, the following method is effective. It was invented by Pollard in 1974.

The $p - 1$ Factoring

Algorithm

Choose an integer $a > 1$. Often $a = 2$ is used. Choose a bound B . Compute $b \equiv a^{B!} \pmod{n}$ as follows. Let $b_1 \equiv a \pmod{n}$ and $b_j \equiv b_{j-1}^j \pmod{n}$. Then $b_B \equiv b \pmod{n}$. Let $d = \gcd(b - 1, n)$. If $1 < d < n$, we have found a nontrivial factor of n .

Suppose p is a prime factor of n such that $p - 1$ has only small prime factors. Then it is likely that $p - 1$ will divide $B!$, say $B! = (p - 1)k$. By Fermat's theorem, $b \equiv a^{B!} \equiv (a^{p-1})^k \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, so p will occur in the greatest common divisor of $b - 1$ and n . If q is another prime factor of n , it is unlikely that $b \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$, unless $q - 1$ also has only small prime factors. If $d = n$, not all is lost. In this case, we have an exponent r (namely $B!$) and an a such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. There is a good chance that the $a^r \equiv 1$ method (explained later in this section) will factor n . Alternatively, we could choose a smaller value of B and repeat the calculation.

For an example, see Example 34 in the Computer Appendices.

How do we choose the bound B ? If we choose a small B , then the algorithm will run quickly but will have a very small chance of success. If we choose a very large B , then the algorithm will be very slow. The actual value used will depend on the situation at hand.

In the applications, we will use integers that are products of two primes, say $n = pq$, but that are hard to factor. Therefore, we should ensure that $p - 1$ has at least one large prime factor. This is easy to accomplish. Suppose we want p to have around 300 digits. Choose a large prime p_0 , perhaps around 10^{140} . Look at integers of the

form $kp_0 + 1$, with k running through some integers around 10^{160} . Test $kp_0 + 1$ for primality by the Miller-Rabin test, as before. On the average, this should produce a desired value of p in less than 400 steps. Now choose a large prime q_0 and follow the same procedure to obtain q . Then $n = pq$ will be hard to factor by the $p - 1$ method.

The elliptic curve factorization method (see [Section 21.3](#)) gives a generalization of the $p - 1$ method. However, it uses some random numbers near $p - 1$ and only requires at least one of them to have only small prime factors. This allows the method to detect many more primes p , not just those where $p - 1$ has only small prime factors.

9.4.1 $x^2 \equiv y^2$

Since it is the basis of the best current factorization methods, we repeat the following result from [Section 9.4](#).

Basic Principle

Let n be an integer and suppose there exist integers x and y with $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$, but $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$. Then n is composite. Moreover, $\gcd(x - y, n)$ gives a nontrivial factor of n .

For an example, see Example 33 in the Computer Appendices.

How do we find the numbers x and y ? Let's suppose we want to factor $n = 3837523$. Observe the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
9398^2 &\equiv 5^5 \cdot 19 \pmod{3837523} \\
19095^2 &\equiv 2^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 19 \pmod{3837523} \\
1964^2 &\equiv 3^2 \cdot 13^3 \pmod{3837523} \\
17078^2 &\equiv 2^6 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 11 \pmod{3837523}.
\end{aligned}$$

If we multiply the relations, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
(9398 \cdot 19095 \cdot 1964 \cdot 17078)^2 &\equiv (2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 11 \cdot 13^2 \cdot 19)^2 \\
2230387^2 &\equiv 2586705^2.
\end{aligned}$$

Since $2230387 \not\equiv \pm 2586705 \pmod{3837523}$, we now can factor 3837523 by calculating

$$\gcd(2230387 - 2586705, 3837523) = 1093.$$

The other factor is $3837523/1093 = 3511$.

Here is a way of looking at the calculations we just did.

First, we generate squares such that when they are reduced mod $n = 3837523$ they can be written as products of small primes (in the present case, primes less than 20). This set of primes is called our **factor base**.

We'll discuss how to generate such squares shortly. Each of these squares gives a row in a matrix, where the entries are the exponents of the primes 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19. For example, the relation

$17078^2 \equiv 2^6 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 11 \pmod{3837523}$ gives the row 6, 2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0.

In addition to the preceding relations, suppose that we have also found the following relations:

$$\begin{aligned}
8077^2 &\equiv 2 \cdot 19 \pmod{3837523} \\
3397^2 &\equiv 2^5 \cdot 5 \cdot 13^2 \pmod{3837523} \\
14262^2 &\equiv 5^2 \cdot 7^2 \cdot 13 \pmod{3837523}.
\end{aligned}$$

We obtain the matrix

9398	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1
19095	2	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
1964	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0
17078	6	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
8077	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
3397	5	0	1	0	0	2	0	0
14262	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0

Now look for linear dependencies mod 2 among the rows. Here are three of them:

1. $1\text{st} + 5\text{th} + 6\text{th} = (6,0,6,0,0,2,0,2) \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$
2. $1\text{st} + 2\text{nd} + 3\text{rd} + 4\text{th} = (8,4,6,0,2,4,0,2) \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$
3. $3\text{rd} + 7\text{th} = (0,2,2,2,0,4,0,0) \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$

When we have such a dependency, the product of the numbers yields a square. For example, these three yield

1. $(9398 \cdot 8077 \cdot 3397)^2 \equiv 2^6 \cdot 5^6 \cdot 13^2 \cdot 19^2 \equiv (2^3 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 13 \cdot 19)^2$
2. $(9398 \cdot 19095 \cdot 1964 \cdot 17078)^2 \equiv (2^3 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 11 \cdot 13^2 \cdot 19)^2$
3. $(1964 \cdot 14262)^2 \equiv (3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 13^2)^2$

Therefore, we have $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$ for various values of x and y . If $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$, then $\gcd(x - y, n)$ yields a nontrivial factor of n . If $x \equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$, then usually $\gcd(x - y, n) = 1$ or n , so we don't obtain a factorization. In our three examples, we have

1. $3590523^2 \equiv 247000^2$, but
 $3590523 \equiv -247000 \pmod{3837523}$
2. $2230387^2 \equiv 2586705^2$ and
 $\gcd(2230387 - 2586705, 3837523) = 1093$
3. $1147907^2 \equiv 17745^2$ and
 $\gcd(1147907 - 17745, 3837523) = 1093$

We now return to the basic question: How do we find the numbers 9398, 19095, etc.? The idea is to produce

squares that are slightly larger than a multiple of n , so they are small mod n . This means that there is a good chance they are products of small primes. An easy way is to look at numbers of the form $[\sqrt{in} + j]$ for small j and for various values of i . Here $[x]$ denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x . The square of such a number is approximately $in + 2j\sqrt{in} + j^2$, which is approximately $2j\sqrt{in} + j^2 \pmod{n}$. As long as i is not too large, this number is fairly small, hence there is a good chance it is a product of small primes.

In the preceding calculation, we have $8077 = [\sqrt{17n} + 1]$ and $9398 = [\sqrt{23n} + 4]$, for example.

The method just used is the basis of many of the best current factorization methods. The main step is to produce congruence relations

$$x^2 \equiv \text{product of small primes.}$$

An improved version of the above method is called the quadratic sieve. A recent method, the number field sieve, uses more sophisticated techniques to produce such relations and is somewhat faster in many situations. See [Pomerance] for a description of these two methods and for a discussion of the history of factorization methods. See also [Exercise 52](#).

Once we have several congruence relations, they are put into a matrix, as before. If we have more rows than columns in the matrix, we are guaranteed to have a linear dependence relation mod 2 among the rows. This leads to a congruence $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$. Of course, as in the case of 1st + 5th + 6th $\equiv 0 \pmod{2}$ considered previously, we might end up with $x \equiv \pm y$, in which case we don't obtain a factorization. But this situation is expected to occur at most half the time. So if we have enough relations – for example, if there are several more rows than columns – then we should have a relation that

yields $x^2 \equiv y^2$ with $x \not\equiv \pm y$. In this case $\gcd(x - y, n)$ is a nontrivial factor of n .

In the last half of the twentieth century, there was dramatic progress in factoring. This was partly due to the development of computers and partly due to improved algorithms. A major impetus was provided by the use of factoring in cryptology, especially the RSA algorithm.

Table 9.2 gives the factorization records (in terms of the number of decimal digits) for various years.

Table 9.2 Factorization Records

Year	Number of Digits
1964	20
1974	45
1984	71
1994	129
1999	155
2003	174
2005	200
2009	232

Table 9.2 Full Alternative Text

9.4.2 Using $a^r \equiv 1$

On the surface, the Miller-Rabin test looks like it might factor n quite often; but what usually happens is that b_{k-1} is reached without ever having $b_u \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$. The problem is that usually $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Suppose, on the other hand, that we have some exponent

r , maybe not $n - 1$, such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for some a with $\gcd(a, n) = 1$. Then it is often possible to factor n .

$a^r \equiv 1$ Factorization Method

Suppose we have an exponent $r > 0$ and an integer a such that $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Write $r = 2^k m$ with m odd. Let $b_0 \equiv a^m \pmod{n}$, and successively define $b_{u+1} \equiv b_u^2 \pmod{n}$ for $0 \leq u \leq k - 1$. If $b_0 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then stop; the procedure has failed to factor n . If, for some u , we have $b_u \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$, stop; the procedure has failed to factor n . If, for some u , we have $b_{u+1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ but $b_u \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then $\gcd(b_u - 1, n)$ gives a nontrivial factor of n .

Of course, if we take $a = 1$, then any r works. But then $b_0 = 1$, so the method fails. But if a and r are found by some reasonably sensible method, there is a good chance that this method will factor n .

This looks very similar to the Miller-Rabin test. The difference is that the existence of r guarantees that we have $b_{u+1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for some u , which doesn't happen as often in the Miller-Rabin situation. Trying a few values of a has a very high probability of factoring n .

Of course, we might ask how we can find an exponent r . Generally, this seems to be very difficult, and this test cannot be used in practice. However, it is useful in showing that knowing the decryption exponent in the RSA algorithm allows us to factor the modulus. Moreover, if a quantum computer is built, it will perform factorizations by finding such an exponent r via its unique quantum properties. See [Chapter 25](#).

For an example for how this method is used in analyzing RSA, see Example 32 in the Computer Appendices.

9.5 The RSA Challenge

When the RSA algorithm was first made public in 1977, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman made the following challenge.

Let the RSA modulus be

$n =$
114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362
562561842935706935245733897830597123563958705058989075
147599290026879543541

and let $e = 9007$ be the encryption exponent. The ciphertext is

$c =$
968696137546220614771409222543558829057599911245743198
746951209308162982251457083569314766228839896280133919
90551829945157815154.

Find the message.

The only known way of finding the plaintext is to factor n . In 1977, it was estimated that the then-current factorization methods would take 4×10^{16} years to do this, so the authors felt safe in offering \$100 to anyone who could decipher the message before April 1, 1982. However, techniques have improved, and in 1994, Atkins, Graff, Lenstra, and Leyland succeeded in factoring n .

They used 524339 “small” primes, namely those less than 16333610, plus they allowed factorizations to include up to two “large” primes between 16333610 and 2^{30} . The idea of allowing large primes is the following: If one large prime q appears in two different relations, these can be multiplied to produce a relation with q squared. Multiplying by $q^{-2} \pmod{n}$ yields a relation

involving only small primes. In the same way, if there are several relations, each with the same two large primes, a similar process yields a relation with only small primes. The “birthday paradox” (see [Section 12.1](#)) implies that there should be several cases where a large prime occurs in more than one relation.

Six hundred people, with a total of 1600 computers working in spare time, found congruence relations of the desired type. These were sent by e-mail to a central machine, which removed repetitions and stored the results in a large matrix. After seven months, they obtained a matrix with 524339 columns and 569466 rows. Fortunately, the matrix was sparse, in the sense that most of the entries of the matrix were 0s, so it could be stored efficiently. Gaussian elimination reduced the matrix to a nonsparse matrix with 188160 columns and 188614 rows. This took a little less than 12 hours. With another 45 hours of computation, they found 205 dependencies. The first three yielded the trivial factorization of n , but the fourth yielded the factors

$p =$
 349052951084765094914784961990389813341776463849338784
 3990820577,

$q =$
 327691329932667095499619881908344614131776429679929425
 39798288533.

Computing $9007^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ gave the decryption exponent

$d =$
 106698614368578024442868771328920154780709906633937862
 801226224496631063125911774470873340168597462306553968
 544513277109053606095.

Calculating $c^d \pmod{n}$ yielded the plaintext message

200805001301070903002315180419000118050019172105011309
 190800151919090618010705,

which, when changed back to letters using
 $a = 01, b = 02, \dots, \text{blank} = 00$, yielded

the magic words are squeamish ossifrage

(a squeamish ossifrage is an overly sensitive hawk; the message was chosen so that no one could decrypt the message by guessing the plaintext and showing that it encrypted to the ciphertext). For more details of this factorization, see [Atkins et al.]. If you want to see how the decryption works once the factorization is known, see Example 28 in the Computer Appendices.

9.6 An Application to Treaty Verification

Countries A and B have signed a nuclear test ban treaty. Now each wants to make sure the other doesn't test any bombs. How, for example, is country A going to use seismic data to monitor country B? Country A wants to put sensors in B, which then send data back to A. Two problems arise.

1. Country A wants to be sure that Country B doesn't modify the data.
2. Country B wants to look at the message before it's sent to be sure that nothing else, such as espionage data, is being transmitted.

These seemingly contradictory requirements can be met by reversing RSA. First, A chooses $n = pq$ to be the product of two large primes and chooses encryption and decryption exponents e and d . The numbers n and e are given to B, but p , q , and d are kept secret. The sensor (it's buried deep in the ground and is assumed to be tamper proof) collects the data x and uses d to encrypt x to $y \equiv x^d \pmod{n}$. Both x and y are sent first to country B, which checks that $y^e \equiv x \pmod{n}$. If so, it knows that the encrypted message y corresponds to the data x , and forwards the pair x, y to A. Country A then checks that $y^e \equiv x \pmod{n}$, also. If so, A can be sure that the number x has not been modified, since if x is chosen, then solving $y^e \equiv x \pmod{n}$ for y is the same as decrypting the RSA message x , and this is believed to be hard to do. Of course, B could choose a number y first, then let $x \equiv y^e \pmod{n}$, but then x would probably not be a meaningful message, so A would realize that something had been changed.

The preceding method is essentially the RSA signature scheme, which will be studied in Section 13.1.

9.7 The Public Key Concept

In 1976, Diffie and Hellman described the concept of public key cryptography, though at that time no realizations of the concept were publicly known (as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Clifford Cocks of the British cryptographic agency CESG had invented a secret version of RSA in 1973). In this section, we give the general theory of public key systems.

There are several implementations of public key cryptography other than RSA. In later chapters we describe three of them. One is due to ElGamal and is based on the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms. A second is NTRU and involves lattice methods. The third is due to McEliece and uses error correcting codes. There are also public key systems based on the knapsack problem. We don't cover them in this book; some versions have been broken and they are generally suspected to be weaker than systems such as RSA and ElGamal.

A **public key cryptosystem** is built up of several components. First, there is the set M of possible messages (potential plaintexts and ciphertexts). There is also the set K of “keys.” These are not exactly the encryption/decryption keys; in RSA, a key k is a triple (e, d, n) with $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. For each key k , there is an encryption function E_k and a decryption function D_k . Usually, E_k and D_k are assumed to map M to M , though it would be possible to have variations that allow the plaintexts and ciphertexts to come from different sets. These components must satisfy the following requirements:

1. $E_k(D_k(m)) = m$ and $D_k(E_k(m)) = m$ for every $m \in M$ and every $k \in K$.

2. For every m and every k , the values of $E_k(m)$ and $D_k(m)$ are easy to compute.
3. For almost every $k \in K$, if someone knows only the function E_k , it is computationally infeasible to find an algorithm to compute D_k .
4. Given $k \in K$, it is easy to find the functions E_k and D_k .

Requirement (1) says that encryption and decryption cancel each other. Requirement (2) is needed; otherwise, efficient encryption and decryption would not be possible. Because of (4), a user can choose a secret random k from K and obtain functions E_k and D_k . Requirement (3) is what makes the system public key. Since it is difficult to determine D_k from E_k , it is possible to publish E_k without compromising the security of the system.

Let's see how RSA satisfies these requirements. The message space can be taken to be all nonnegative integers. As we mentioned previously, a key for RSA is a triple $k = (e, d, n)$. The encryption function is

$$E_k(m) = m^e \pmod{n},$$

where we break m into blocks if $m \geq n$. The decryption function is

$$D_k(m) = m^d \pmod{n},$$

again with m broken into blocks if needed. The functions E_k and D_k are immediately determined from knowledge of k (requirement (4)) and are easy to compute (requirement (2)). They are inverses of each other since $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$, so (1) is satisfied. If we know E_k , which means we know e and n , then we have seen that it is (probably) computationally infeasible to determine d , hence D_k . Therefore, (3) is (probably) satisfied.

Once a public key system is set up, each user generates a key k and determines E_k and D_k . The encryption function E_k is made public, while D_k is kept secret. If

there is a problem with impostors, a trusted authority can be used to distribute and verify keys.

In a symmetric system, Bob can be sure that a message that decrypts successfully must have come from Alice (who could really be a group of authorized users) or someone who has Alice's key. Only Alice has been given the key, so no one else could produce the ciphertext. However, Alice could deny sending the message since Bob could have simply encrypted the message himself. Therefore, authentication is easy (Bob knows that the message came from Alice, if he didn't forge it himself) but non-repudiation is not (see [Section 1.2](#)).

In a public key system, anyone can encrypt a message and send it to Bob, so he will have no idea where it came from. He certainly won't be able to prove it came from Alice. Therefore, more steps are needed for authentication and non-repudiation. However, these goals are easily accomplished as follows.

Alice starts with her message m and computes $E_{k_b}(D_{k_a}(m))$, where k_a is Alice's key and k_b is Bob's key. Then Bob can decrypt using D_{k_b} to obtain $D_{k_b}(E_{k_b}(D_{k_a}(m))) = D_{k_a}(m)$. He uses the publicly available E_{k_a} to obtain $E_{k_a}(D_{k_a}(m)) = m$. Bob knows that the message must have come from Alice since no one else could have computed $D_{k_a}(m)$. For the same reason, Alice cannot deny sending the message. Of course, all this assumes that most random "messages" are meaningless, so it is unlikely that a random string of symbols decrypts to a meaningful message unless the string was the encryption of something meaningful.

It is possible to use one-way functions with certain properties to construct a public key cryptosystem. Let $f(m)$ be an invertible one-way function. This means $f(x)$ is easy to compute, but, given y , it is computationally infeasible to find the unique value of x

such that $y = f(x)$. Now suppose $f(x)$ has a **trapdoor**, which means that there is an easy way to solve $y = f(x)$ for x , but only with some extra information known only to the designer of the function. Moreover, it should be computationally infeasible for someone other than the designer of the function to determine this trapdoor information. If there is a very large family of one-way functions with trapdoors, they can be used to form a public key cryptosystem. Each user generates a function from the family in such a way that only that user knows the trapdoor. The user's function is then published as a public encryption algorithm. When Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, she looks up his function $f_b(x)$ and computes $y = f_b(m)$. Alice sends y to Bob. Since Bob knows the trapdoor for $f_b(x)$, he can solve $y = f_b(m)$ and thus find m .

In RSA, the functions $f(x) = x^e \pmod{n}$, for appropriate n and e , form the family of one-way functions. The secret trapdoor information is the factorization of n , or, equivalently, the exponent d . In the ElGamal system ([Section 10.5](#)), the one-way function is obtained from exponentiation modulo a prime, and the trapdoor information is knowledge of a discrete log. In NTRU ([Section 23.4](#)), the trapdoor information is a pair of small polynomials. In the McEliece system ([Section 24.10](#)), the trapdoor information is an efficient way for finding the nearest codeword ("error correction") for certain linear binary codes.

9.8 Exercises

1. The ciphertext 5859 was obtained from the RSA algorithm using $n = 11413$ and $e = 7467$. Using the factorization $11413 = 101 \cdot 113$, find the plaintext.
2. Bob sets up a budget RSA cryptosystem. He chooses $p = 23$ and $q = 19$ and computes $n = 437 = pq$. He chooses the encryption exponent to be $e = 397$. Alice sends Bob the ciphertext $c = 123$. What is the plaintext? (You know p , q , and e).
3. Suppose your RSA modulus is $n = 55 = 5 \times 11$ and your encryption exponent is $e = 3$.
 1. Find the decryption exponent d .
 2. Assume that $\gcd(m, 55) = 1$. Show that if $c \equiv m^3 \pmod{55}$ is the ciphertext, then the plaintext is $m \equiv c^d \pmod{55}$. Do not quote the fact that RSA decryption works. That is what you are showing in this specific case.
4. Bob's RSA modulus is $979 = 11 \times 89$ and his encryption exponent is $e = 587$. Alice sends him the ciphertext $c = 10$. What is the plaintext?
5. The ciphertext 62 was obtained using RSA with $n = 667$ and $e = 3$. You know that the plaintext is either 9 or 10. Determine which it is without factoring n .
6. Alice and Bob are trying to use RSA, but Bob knows only one large prime, namely $p = 1093$. He sends $n = p = 1093$ and $e = 361$ to Alice. She encrypts her message m as $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$. Eve intercepts c and decrypts using the congruence $m \equiv c^d \pmod{n}$. What value of d should Eve use? Your answer should be an actual number. You may assume that Eve knows n and e , and she knows that n is prime.
7. Suppose you encrypt messages m by computing $c \equiv m^3 \pmod{101}$. How do you decrypt? (That is, you want a decryption exponent d such that $c^d \equiv m \pmod{101}$; note that 101 is prime.)
8. Bob knows that if an RSA modulus can be factored, then the system has bad security. Therefore, he chooses a modulus that cannot be factored, namely the prime $n = 131303$. He chooses his encryption exponent to be $e = 13$, and he encrypts a message

m as $c \equiv m^{13} \pmod{n}$. The decryption method is to compute $m \equiv c^d \pmod{n}$ for some d . Find d . (Hint: Fermat's theorem)

9. Let p be a large prime. Suppose you encrypt a message x by computing $y \equiv x^e \pmod{p}$ for some (suitably chosen) encryption exponent e . How do you find a decryption exponent d such that $y^d \equiv x \pmod{p}$?
10. Bob decides to test his new RSA cryptosystem. He has RSA modulus $n = pq$ and encryption exponent e . His message is m . He sends $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$ to himself. Then, just for fun, he also sends $c' \equiv (m + q)^e \pmod{n}$ to himself. Eve knows n and e , and intercepts both c and c' . She guesses what Bob has done. How can she find the factorization of n ? (Hint: Show that $c \equiv c' \pmod{q}$ but not \pmod{p} . What is $\gcd(c - c', n)$?)
11. Let n be the product of two large primes. Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, where $\gcd(m, n) = 1$. Alice and Bob choose integers a and b relatively prime to $\phi(n)$. Alice computes $c \equiv m^a \pmod{n}$ and sends c to Bob. Bob computes $d \equiv c^b \pmod{n}$ and sends d back to Alice. Since Alice knows a , she finds a_1 such that $aa_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. Then she computes $e \equiv d^{a_1} \pmod{n}$ and sends e to Bob. Explain what Bob must now do to obtain m , and show that this works. (Remark: In this protocol, the prime factors of n do not need to be kept secret. Instead, the security depends on keeping a , b secret. The present protocol is a less efficient version of the three-pass protocol from Section 3.5.)
12. A bank in Alice Springs (Australia), also known as Alice, wants to send a lot of financial data to the Bank of Baltimore, also known as Bob. They want to use AES, but they do not share a common key. All of their communications will be on public airwaves. Describe how Alice and Bob can accomplish this using RSA.
13. Naive Nelson uses RSA to receive a single ciphertext c , corresponding to the message m . His public modulus is n and his public encryption exponent is e . Since he feels guilty that his system was used only once, he agrees to decrypt any ciphertext that someone sends him, as long as it is not c , and return the answer to that person. Evil Eve sends him the ciphertext $2^e c \pmod{n}$. Show how this allows Eve to find m .
14. Eve loves to do double encryption. She starts with a message m . First, she encrypts it twice with a one-time pad (the same one each time). Then she encrypts the result twice using a Vigenère cipher with key $NANANA$. Finally, she encrypts twice with RSA using modulus $n = pq = 7919 \times 17389$ and exponent $e = 66909025$. It happens that $e^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Show that the final result of all this encryption is the original plaintext. Explain your answer fully. Simply saying something like "decryption is the same as encryption" is not enough. You must explain why.

15. In order to increase security, Bob chooses n and two encryption exponents e_1, e_2 . He asks Alice to encrypt her message m to him by first computing $c_1 \equiv m^{e_1} \pmod{n}$, then encrypting c_1 to get $c_2 \equiv c_1^{e_2} \pmod{n}$. Alice then sends c_2 to Bob. Does this double encryption increase security over single encryption? Why or why not?

16. 1. Eve thinks that she has a great strategy for breaking RSA that uses a modulus n that is the product of two 300-digit primes. She decides to make a list of all 300-digit primes and then divide each of them into n until she factors n . Why won't this strategy work?

2. Eve has another strategy. She will make a list of all m with $0 \leq m < 10^{600}$, encrypt each m , and store them in a database. Suppose Eve has a superfast computer that can encrypt 10^{50} plaintexts per second (this is, of course, well beyond the speed of any existing technology). How many years will it take Eve to compute all 10^{600} encryptions? (There are approximately 3×10^7 seconds in a year.)

17. The exponents $e = 1$ and $e = 2$ should not be used in RSA. Why?

18. Alice is trying to factor $n = 57677$. She notices that $1234^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and that $1234^2 \equiv 23154 \pmod{n}$. How does she use this information to factor n ? Describe the steps but do not actually factor n .

19. Let p and q be distinct odd primes, and let $n = pq$. Suppose that the integer x satisfies $\gcd(x, pq) = 1$.

1. Show that $x^{\frac{1}{2}\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ and $x^{\frac{1}{2}\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$.

2. Use (a) to show that $x^{\frac{1}{2}\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

3. Use (b) to show that if $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\frac{1}{2}\phi(n)}$ then $x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{n}$. (This shows that we could work with $\frac{1}{2}\phi(n)$ instead of $\phi(n)$ in RSA. In fact, we could also use the least common multiple of $p - 1$ and $q - 1$ in place of $\phi(n)$, by similar reasoning.)

20. Alice uses RSA with $n = 27046456501$ and $e = 3$. Her ciphertext is $c = 1860867$. Eve notices that $c^{14} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

1. Show that $m^{14} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, where m is the plaintext.

2. Explicitly find an exponent f such that $c^f \equiv m \pmod{n}$. (Hint: You do not need to factor n to

find f . Look at the proof that RSA decryption works. The only property of $\phi(n)$ that is used is that $m^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1$.)

21. Suppose that there are two users on a network. Let their RSA moduli be n_1 and n_2 , with n_1 not equal to n_2 . If you are told that n_1 and n_2 are not relatively prime, how would you break their systems?

22. Huey, Dewey, and Louie ask their uncle Donald, “Is $n = 19887974881$ prime or composite?” Donald replies, “Yes.” Therefore, they decide to obtain more information on their own.

1. Huey computes $13^{(n-1)} \equiv 16739180549 \pmod{n}$.
What does he conclude?

2. Dewey computes $7^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, and he does this by computing

$$\begin{aligned} 7^{(n-1)/32} &\equiv 1992941816 \pmod{n} \\ 7^{(n-1)/16} &\equiv 19887730619 \\ 7^{(n-1)/8} &\equiv 1 \\ 7^{(n-1)/4} &\equiv 7^{(n-1)/2} \equiv 7^{n-1} \equiv 1. \end{aligned}$$

What information can Dewey obtain from his calculation that Huey does not obtain?

3. Louie notices that $19857930655^2 \equiv 123^2 \pmod{n}$.
What information can Louie compute? (In parts (b) and (c), you do not need to do the calculations, but you should indicate what calculations need to be done.)

23. You are trying to factor $n = 642401$. Suppose you discover that

$$516107^2 \equiv 7 \pmod{n}$$

and that

$$187722^2 \equiv 2^2 \cdot 7 \pmod{n}.$$

Use this information to factor n .

24. Suppose you know that $7961^2 \equiv 7^2 \pmod{8051}$. Use this information to factor 8051.

25. Suppose you discover that

$$\begin{aligned} 880525^2 &\equiv 2, & 2057202^2 &\equiv 3, & 648581^2 &\equiv 6, \\ 668676^2 &\equiv 77 \pmod{2288233}. \end{aligned}$$

How would you use this information to factor 2288233? Explain what steps you would do, but do not perform the numerical calculations.

26. Suppose you want to factor an integer n . You have found some integers x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 such that

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^2 &\equiv 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 7 \pmod{n}, & x_2^2 &\equiv 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \pmod{n} \\ x_3^2 &\equiv 3^9 \pmod{n}, & x_4^2 &\equiv 2 \cdot 7 \pmod{n}. \end{aligned}$$

Describe how you might be able to use this information to factor n ? Why might the method fail?

27. Suppose you have two distinct large primes p and q . Explain how you can find an integer x such that

$$x^2 \equiv 49 \pmod{pq}, \quad x \not\equiv \pm 7 \pmod{pq}.$$

(Hint: Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find four solutions to $x^2 \equiv 49 \pmod{pq}$.)

28. You are told that

$$5^{945} \equiv 1768 \pmod{1891}, \quad 5^{1890} \equiv 1 \pmod{1891}.$$

Use this information to factor 1891.

29. Suppose n is a large odd number. You calculate $2^{(n-1)/2} \equiv k \pmod{n}$, where k is some integer with $k \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$.

1. Suppose $k^2 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Explain why this implies that n is not prime.
2. Suppose $k^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Explain how you can use this information to factor n .

30. 1. Bob is trying to set up an RSA cryptosystem. He chooses $n = pq$ and e , as usual. By encrypting messages six times, Eve guesses that $e^6 \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. If this is the case, what is the decryption exponent d ? (That is, give a formula for d in terms of the parameters n and e that allows Eve to compute d .)

2. Bob tries again, with a new n and e . Alice computes $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$. Eve sees no way to guess the decryption exponent d this time. Knowing that if she finds d she will have to do modular exponentiation, Eve starts computing successive squares: $c, c^2, c^4, c^8, \dots \pmod{n}$. She notices that $c^{32} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and realizes that this means that $m^{32} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. If $e = 53$, what is a value for d that will decrypt the ciphertext? Prove that this value works.

31. Suppose two users Alice and Bob have the same RSA modulus n and suppose that their encryption exponents e_A and e_B are relatively prime. Charles wants to send the message m to Alice and Bob, so he encrypts to get $c_A \equiv m^{e_A}$ and

$c_B \equiv m^{e_B} \pmod{n}$. Show how Eve can find m if she intercepts c_A and c_B .

32. Bob finally sets up a very secure RSA system. In fact, it is so secure that he decides to tell Alice one of the prime factors of n ; call it p . Being no dummy, he does not take the message as p , but instead uses a shift cipher to hide the prime in the plaintext $m = p + 1$, and then does an RSA encryption to obtain $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$. He then sends c to Alice. Eve intercepts c , n and e , and she knows that Bob has encrypted p this way. Explain how she obtains p and q quickly. (Hint: How does c differ from the result of encrypting the simple plaintext “1”?)

33. Suppose Alice uses the RSA method as follows. She starts with a message consisting of several letters, and assigns $a = 1, b = 2, \dots, z = 26$. She then encrypts each letter separately. For example, if her message is *cat*, she calculates $3^e \pmod{n}$, $1^e \pmod{n}$, and $20^e \pmod{n}$. Then she sends the encrypted message to Bob. Explain how Eve can find the message without factoring n . In particular, suppose $n = 8881$ and $e = 13$. Eve intercepts the message

4461 794 2015 2015 3603.

Find the message without factoring 8881.

34. Let $n = 3837523$. Bob Square Messages sends and receives only messages m such that m is a square mod n and $\gcd(m, n) = 1$. It can be shown that $m^{958230} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for such messages (even though $\phi(n) \neq 958230$). Bob chooses d and e satisfying $de \equiv 1 \pmod{958230}$. Show that if Alice sends Bob a ciphertext $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$ (where m is a square mod n , and $\gcd(m, n) = 1$), then Bob can decrypt by computing $c^d \pmod{n}$. Explain your reasoning.

35. Show that if $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$ and $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$, then $\gcd(x + y, n)$ is a nontrivial factor of n .

36. Bob's RSA system uses $n = 2776099$ and $e = 421$. Alice encrypts the message 2718 and sends the ciphertext to Bob. Unfortunately (for Alice), $2718^{10} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Show that Alice's ciphertext is the same as the plaintext. (Do not factor n . Do not compute $m^{421} \pmod{n}$ without using the extra information that $2718^{10} \equiv 1$. Do not claim that $\phi(2776099) = 10$; it doesn't.)

37. Let $n = pq$ be the product of two distinct primes.

1. Let m be a multiple of $\phi(n)$. Show that if $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then $a^m \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ and \pmod{q} .
2. Suppose m is as in part (a), and let a be arbitrary (possibly $\gcd(a, n) \neq 1$). Show that $a^{m+1} \equiv a \pmod{p}$ and \pmod{q} .

3. Let e and d be encryption and decryption exponents for RSA with modulus n . Show that $a^{ed} \equiv a \pmod{n}$ for all a . This shows that we do not need to assume $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ in order to use RSA.
 4. If p and q are large, why is it likely that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ for a randomly chosen a ?
38. Alice and Bob are celebrating Pi Day. Alice calculates $23039^2 \equiv 314 \pmod{79927}$ and Bob calculates $35118^2 \equiv 314 \pmod{79927}$.
1. Use this information to factor 79927. (You should show how to use the information. Do not do the calculation. The answer is not “Put the number in the computer and then relax for 10 minutes.”)
 2. Given that $79927 = 257 \times 311$ and that $166^2 \equiv 314 \pmod{257}$ and $25^2 \equiv 314 \pmod{311}$, how would you produce the numbers 23039 and 35118 in part (a)? You do not need to do the calculations, but you should state which congruences are being solved and what theorems are being used.
 3. Now that Eve knows that $79927 = 257 \times 311$, she wants to find an $x \not\equiv \pm 17 \pmod{79927}$ such that $x^2 \equiv 17^2 \pmod{79927}$. Explain how to accomplish this. Say what the method is. Do not do the calculation.
39. Suppose $n = pqr$ is the product of three distinct primes. How would an RSA-type scheme work in this case? In particular, what relation would e and d satisfy?
- Note: There does not seem to be any advantage in using three primes instead of two. The running times of some factorization methods depend on the size of the smallest prime factor. Therefore, if three primes are used, the size of n must be increased in order to achieve the same level of security as obtained with two primes.
40. Suppose Bob's public key is $n = 2181606148950875138077$ and he has $e = 7$ as his encryption exponent. Alice encrypts the message *hi eve* = 080900052205 = m . By chance, the message m satisfies $m^3 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. If Eve intercepts the ciphertext, how can Eve read the message without factoring n ?
41. Let $p = 7919$ and $q = 17389$. Let $e = 66909025$. A calculation shows that $e^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Alice decides to encrypt the message $m = 12345$ using RSA with modulus $n = pq$ and exponent e . Since she wants the encryption to be very secure, she encrypts the ciphertext, again using n and e (so she has double encrypted the original plaintext). What is the final

ciphertext that she sends? Justify your answer without using a calculator.

42. You are told that $7172^2 \equiv 60^2 \pmod{14351}$. Use this information to factor 14351. You must use this information and you must give all steps of the computation (that is, give the steps you use if you are doing it completely without a calculator).
- 43.
1. Show that if $\gcd(e, 24) = 1$, then $e^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{24}$.
 2. Show that if $n = 35$ is used as an RSA modulus, then the encryption exponent e always equals the decryption exponent d .
- 44.
1. The exponent $e = 3$ has sometimes been used for RSA because it makes encryption fast. Suppose that Alice is encrypting two messages, $m_0 = m$ and $m_1 = m + 1$ (for example, these could be two messages that contain a counter variable that increments). Eve does not know m but knows that the two plaintexts differ by 1. Let $c_0 \equiv m_0^3$ and $c_1 \equiv m_1^3 \pmod{n}$. Show that if Eve knows c_0 and c_1 , she can recover m . (Hint: Compute $(c_1 + 2c_0 - 1)/(c_1 - c_0 + 2)$.)
 2. Suppose that $m_0 = m$ and $m_1 = m + b$ for some publicly known b . Modify the technique of part (a) so that Eve can recover m from the ciphertexts c_0 and c_1 .
45. Your opponent uses RSA with $n = pq$ and encryption exponent e and encrypts a message m . This yields the ciphertext $c \equiv m^e \pmod{n}$. A spy tells you that, for this message, $m^{12345} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Describe how to determine m . Note that you do not know p , q , $\phi(n)$, or the secret decryption exponent d . However, you should find a decryption exponent that works for this particular ciphertext. Moreover, explain carefully why your decryption works (your explanation must include how the spy's information is used). For simplicity, assume that $\gcd(12345, e) = 1$.
- 46.
1. Show that if $\gcd(b, 1729) = 1$ then $b^{1728} \equiv 1 \pmod{1729}$. You may use the fact that $1729 = 7 \cdot 13 \cdot 19$.
 2. By part (a), you know that $2^{1728} \equiv 1 \pmod{1729}$. When checking this result, you compute $2^{54} \equiv 1065 \pmod{1729}$ and $2^{108} \equiv 1 \pmod{1729}$. Use this information to find a nontrivial factor of 1729.
47. Suppose you are using RSA (with modulus $n = pq$ and encrypting exponent e), but you decide to restrict your messages to numbers m satisfying $m^{1000} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

1. Show that if d satisfies $de \equiv 1 \pmod{1000}$, then d works as a decryption exponent for these messages.
 2. Assume that both p and q are congruent to 1 mod 1000. Determine how many messages satisfy $m^{1000} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. You may assume and use the fact that $m^{1000} \equiv 1 \pmod{r}$ has 1000 solutions when r is a prime congruent to 1 mod 1000.
48. You may assume the fact that $m^{270300} \equiv 1 \pmod{1113121}$ for all m with $\gcd(m, 1113121) = 1$. Let e and d satisfy $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{270300}$, and suppose that m is a message such that $0 < m < 1113121$ and $\gcd(m, 1113121) = 1$. Encrypt m as $c \equiv m^e \pmod{1113121}$. Show that $m \equiv c^d \pmod{1113121}$. Show explicitly how you use the fact that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{270300}$ and the fact that $m^{270300} \equiv 1 \pmod{1113121}$. (Note: $\phi(1113121) \neq 270300$, so Euler's theorem does not apply.)
49. Suppose Bob's encryption company produces two machines, A and B, both of which are supposed to be implementations of RSA using the same modulus $n = pq$ for some unknown primes p and q . Both machines also use the same encryption exponent e . Each machine receives a message m and outputs a ciphertext that is supposed to be $m^e \pmod{n}$. Machine A always produces the correct output c . However, Machine B, because of implementation and hardware errors, always outputs a ciphertext $c' \pmod{n}$ such that $c' \equiv m^e \pmod{p}$ and $c' \equiv m^e + 1 \pmod{q}$. How could you use machines A and B to find p and q ? (See Computer Problem 11 for a discussion of how such a situation could arise.) (Hint: $c \equiv c' \pmod{p}$ but not mod q . What is $\gcd(c - c', n)$?)
50. Alice and Bob play the following game. They choose a large odd integer n and write $n - 1 = 2^k m$ with m odd. Alice then chooses a random integer $r \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ with $\gcd(r, n) = 1$. Bob computes $x_1 \equiv r^m \pmod{n}$. Then Alice computes $x_2 \equiv x_1^2 \pmod{n}$. Then Bob computes $x_3 \equiv x_2^2 \pmod{n}$, Alice computes $x_4 \equiv x_3^2 \pmod{n}$, etc. They stop if someone gets $\pm 1 \pmod{n}$, and the person who gets ± 1 wins.
1. Show that if n is prime, the game eventually stops.
 2. Suppose n is the product of two distinct primes and Alice knows this factorization. Show how Alice can choose r so that she wins on her first play. That is, $x_1 \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ but $x_2 \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$.
51. 1. Suppose Alice wants to send a short message m but wants to prevent the short message attack of [Section 9.2](#). She tells Bob that she is adjoining 100 zeros at the end of her plaintext, so she is using $m_1 = 10^{100}m$ as the plaintext and sending $c_1 \equiv m_1^e$. If Eve knows that Alice

is doing this, how can Eve modify the short plaintext attack and possibly find the plaintext?

2. Suppose Alice realizes that the method of part (a) does not provide security, so instead she makes the plaintext longer by repeating it two times: $m \parallel m$ (where $x \parallel y$ means we write the digits of x followed by the digits of y to obtain a longer number). If Eve knows that Alice is doing this, how can Eve modify the short plaintext attack and possibly find the plaintext? Assume that Eve knows the length of m . (Hint: Express $m \parallel m$ as a multiple of m .)

52. This exercise provides some of the details of how the quadratic sieve obtains the relations that are used to factor a large odd integer n . Let s be the smallest integer greater than the square root of n and let $f(x) = (x + s)^2 - n$. Let the factor base B consist of the primes up to some bound B . We want to find squares that are congruent mod n to a product of primes in B . One way to do this is to find values of $f(x)$ that are products of primes in B . We'll search over a range $0 \leq x \leq A$, for some A .

1. Suppose $0 \leq x < (\sqrt{2} - 1)\sqrt{n} - 1$. Show that $0 \leq f(x) < n$, so $f(x) \pmod{n}$ is simply $f(x)$. (Hint: Show that $x + s < x + \sqrt{n} + 1 < \sqrt{2n}$.) Henceforth, we'll assume that $A < (\sqrt{2} - 1)\sqrt{n} - 1$, so the values of x that we consider have $f(x) < n$.
2. Let p be a prime in B . Show that if there exists an integer x with $f(x)$ divisible by p , then n is a square mod p . This shows that we may discard those primes in B for which n is not a square mod p . Henceforth, we will assume that such primes have been discarded.
3. Let $p \in B$ be such that n is a square mod p . Show that if p is odd, and $p \nmid n$, then there are exactly two values of x mod p such that $f(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$. Call these values $x_{p,1}$ and $x_{p,2}$. (Note: In the unlikely case that $p \mid n$, we have found a factor, which was the goal.)
4. For each x with $0 \leq x \leq A$, initialize a register with value $\log f(x)$. For each prime $p \in B$, subtract $\log p$ from the registers of those x with $x \equiv x_{p,1}$ or $x_{p,2} \pmod{p}$. (Remark: This is the "sieving" part of the quadratic sieve.) Show that if $f(x)$ (with $0 \leq x \leq A$) is a product of distinct primes in B , then the register for x becomes 0 at the end of this process.
5. Explain why it is likely that if $f(x)$ (with $0 \leq x \leq A$) is a product of (possibly nondistinct) primes in B , then the final result for the register for x is small (compared to

the register for an x such that $f(x)$ has a prime factor not in B).

6. Why is the procedure of part (d) faster than trial division of each $f(x)$ by each element of B , and why does the algorithm subtract $\log p$ rather than dividing $f(x)$ by p ?

In practice, the sieve also takes into account solutions to $f(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{\text{some powers of small primes in } B}$. After the sieving process is complete, the registers with small entries are checked to see which correspond to $f(x)$ being a product of primes from B . These give the relations “square \equiv product of primes in $B \pmod n$ ” that are used to factor n .

53. Bob chooses $n = pq$ to be the product of two large primes p, q such that $\gcd(pq, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.

1. Show that $\phi(n^2) = n\phi(n)$ (this is true for any positive n).
2. Let $k \geq 0$. Show that $(1+n)^k \equiv 1 + kn \pmod{n^2}$ (this is true for any positive n).
3. Alice has message represented as $m \pmod n$. She encrypts m by first choosing a random integer r with $\gcd(r, n) = 1$. She then computes

$$c \equiv (1+n)^{mr^n} \pmod{n^2}.$$

4. Bob decrypts by computing $m' \equiv c^{\phi(n)} \pmod{n^2}$. Show that $m' \equiv 1 + \phi(n)mn \pmod{n^2}$. Therefore, Bob can recover the message by computing $(m' - 1)/n$ and then dividing by $\phi(n) \pmod n$.
5. Let $E(m)$ and $D(c)$ denote encryption and decryption via the method in parts (c) and (d). Show that

$$D(E(m_1)E(m_2)) \equiv D(E(m_1 + m_2)) \pmod n.$$

(9.1)

Note: The encryptions probably use different values of the random number r , so there is more than one possible encryption of a message m . Part (e) says that, no matter what choices are made for r , the decryption of $E(m_1)E(m_2)$ is the same as the decryption of $E(m_1 + m_2)$.

The preceding is called the **Paillier cryptosystem**. (Equation 9.1) says that it is possible to do addition on the encrypted messages without knowing the messages. For many years, a goal was to design a cryptosystem where both addition and multiplication could be done on the encrypted messages. This property is called **homomorphic encryption**, and the first such

system was designed by Gentry in 2009. Current research aims at designing systems that can be used in practice.

54. One possible application of the Paillier cryptosystem from the previous exercise is to electronic voting (but, as we'll see, modifications are needed in order to make it secure). Bob, who is the trusted authority, sets up the system. Each voter uses $m = 0$ for NO and $m = 1$ for YES. The voters encrypt their m s and send the ciphertexts to Bob.

1. How does Bob determine how many YES and how many NO votes without decrypting the individual votes?
2. Suppose an overzealous and not very honest voter wants to increase the number of YES votes. How is this accomplished?
3. Suppose someone else wants to increase the number of NO votes. How can this be done?

55. Here is a 3-person encryption scheme based on the same principles as RSA. A trusted entity chooses two large distinct primes p and q and computes $n = pq$, then chooses three integers k_1, k_2, k_3 with $k_1 k_2 k_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Alice, Bob, and Carla are given the following keys:

Alice: (n, k_1, k_2) , Bob: (n, k_2, k_3) , Carla: (n, k_1, k_3) .

1. Alice has a message that she wants to send to both Bob and Carla. How can Alice encrypt the message so that both of them can read decrypt it?
2. Alice has a message that she wants to send only to Carla. How can Alice encrypt the message so that Carla can decrypt it but Bob cannot decrypt it?

9.9 Computer Problems

1.
 1. Paul Revere's friend in a tower at MIT says he'll send the message *one* if (the British are coming) by land and *two* if by sea. Since they know that RSA will be invented in the Boston area, they decide that the message should be encrypted using RSA with $n = 712446816787$ and $e = 6551$. Paul Revere receives the ciphertext 273095689186. What was the plaintext? Answer this without factoring n .
 2. What could Paul Revere's friend have done so that we couldn't guess which message was encrypted? (See the end of Subsection 9.2.2.)

2. In an RSA cryptosystem, suppose you know $n = 718548065973745507$, $e = 3449$, and $d = 543546506135745129$. Factor n using the $a^r \equiv 1$ method of Subsection 9.4.2.
3. Choose two 30-digit primes p and q and an encryption exponent e . Encrypt each of the plaintexts *cat*, *bat*, *hat*, *encyclopedia*, *antidisestablishmentarianism*. Can you tell from looking at the ciphertexts that the first three plaintexts differ in only one letter or that the last two plaintexts are much longer than the first three?
4. Factor 618240007109027021 by the $p - 1$ method.
5. Factor 8834884587090814646372459890377418962766907 by the $p - 1$ method. (The number is stored in the downloadable computer files (`bit.ly/2JbcS6p`) as n_1 .)
6. Let $n = 537069139875071$. Suppose you know that

$$85975324443166^2 \equiv 462436106261^2 \pmod{n}.$$

Factor n .

7. Let $n = 985739879 \cdot 1388749507$. Find x and y with $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$ but $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$.

8.
 1. Suppose you know that

$$33335^2 \equiv 670705093^2 \pmod{670726081}.$$

Use this information to factor 670726081.

2. Suppose you know that $3^2 \equiv 670726078^2 \pmod{670726081}$. Why won't this

information help you to factor 670726081?

9. Suppose you know that

$$\begin{aligned}2^{958230} &\equiv 1488665 \pmod{3837523} \\ 2^{1916460} &\equiv 1 \pmod{3837523}.\end{aligned}$$

How would you use this information to factor 3837523? Note that the exponent 1916460 is twice the exponent 958230.

Alice and Bob have the same RSA modulus n , given to them by some central authority (who does not tell them the factorization of n). Alice has encryption and decryption exponents e_A and d_A , and Bob has e_B and d_B . As usual, e_A and e_B are public and d_A and d_B are private.

- 10.
1. Suppose the primes p and q used in the RSA algorithm are consecutive primes. How would you factor $n = pq$?
 2. The ciphertext 10787770728 was encrypted using $e = 113$ and $n = 10993522499$. The factors p and q of n were chosen so that $q - p = 2$. Decrypt the message.
 3. The following ciphertext c was encrypted mod n using the exponent e :

$$\begin{aligned}n &= 152415787501905985701881832150835089037858868621211004433 \\ e &= 9007 \\ c &= 141077461765569500241199505617854673388398574333341423525.\end{aligned}$$

The prime factors p and q of n are consecutive primes. Decrypt the message. (The number n is stored in the downloadable computer files (bit.ly/2JbcS6p) as *naive*, and c is stored as *cnaive*.) Note: In Mathematica[®], the command **Round[N[Sqrt[n],50]]** evaluates the square root of n to 50 decimal places and then rounds to the nearest integer. In Maple, first use the command **Digits:=50** to obtain 50-digit accuracy, then use the command **round(sqrt(n*1.))** to change n to a decimal number, take its square root, and round to the nearest integer. In MATLAB, use the command **digits(50); round(vpa(sqrt('n')))**.

11. Let $p = 123456791$, $q = 987654323$, and $e = 127$. Let the message be $m = 14152019010605$.

1. Compute $m^e \pmod{p}$ and $m^e \pmod{q}$; then use the Chinese remainder theorem to combine these to get $c \equiv m^e \pmod{pq}$.
2. Change one digit of $m^e \pmod{p}$ (for example, this could be caused by some radiation). Now combine this with $m^e \pmod{q}$ to get an incorrect value f for

$m^e \pmod{pq}$. Compute $\gcd(c - f, pq)$. Why does this factor pq ?

The method of (a) for computing $m^e \pmod{pq}$ is attractive since it does not require as large multiprecision arithmetic as working directly \pmod{pq} . However, as part (b) shows, if an attacker can cause an occasional bit to fail, then pq can be factored.

12. Suppose that $p = 76543692179$, $q = 343434343453$, and $e = 457$. The ciphertext $c \equiv m^e \pmod{pq}$ is transmitted, but an error occurs during transmission. The received ciphertext is 2304329328016936947195. The receiver is able to determine that the digits received are correct but that last digit is missing. Determine the missing digit and decrypt the message.

13. Test 38200901201 for primality using the Miller-Rabin test with $a = 2$. Then test using $a = 3$. Note that the first test says that 38200901201 is probably prime, while the second test says that it is composite. A composite number such as 38200901201 that passes the Miller-Rabin test for a number a is called a **strong a -pseudoprime**.

14. There are three users with pairwise relatively prime moduli n_1, n_2, n_3 . Suppose that their encryption exponents are all $e = 3$. The same message m is sent to each of them and you intercept the ciphertexts $c_i \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_i}$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$.

1. Show that $0 \leq m^3 < n_1 n_2 n_3$.
2. Show how to use the Chinese remainder theorem to find m^3 (as an exact integer, *not* only as $m^3 \pmod{n_1 n_2 n_3}$) and therefore m . Do this without factoring.
3. Suppose that

$$\begin{aligned} n_1 &= 2469247531693, & n_2 &= 11111502225583, \\ n_3 &= 44444222221411 \end{aligned}$$

and the corresponding ciphertexts are

$$359335245251, \quad 10436363975495, \quad 5135984059593.$$

These were all encrypted using $e = 3$. Find the message.

- 15.
1. Choose a 10-digit prime p and an 11-digit prime q . Form $n = pq$.
 2. Let the encryption exponent be $e = 65537$. Write a program that computes the RSA encryptions of all plaintexts m with $1 \leq m < 10^4$. (Do not store or display the results.) The computer probably did this almost instantaneously.

3. Modify your program in (b) so that it computes the encryptions of all m with $1 \leq m < 10^8$ and time how long this takes (if this takes too long, use 10^7 ; if it's too fast to time, use 10^9).
4. Using your timing from (c), estimate how long it will take to encrypt all m with $1 \leq m < n$ (a year is approximately 3×10^7 seconds).

Even this small example shows that it is impractical to make a database of all encryptions in order to attack RSA.