

Dynamic Programming

Chapter 4: Optimal Stopping

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2024

Topics

- Introduction to optimal stopping
- Theory
- Algorithms
- Applications

Optimal Stopping

Many decision making problems involve choosing when to act

- accept a job
- exit or enter a market
- bring a new product to market
- default on a loan
- exercise a real or financial option

We treat optimal stopping problems via dynamic programming

We begin with the standard theory of optimal stopping

Then we consider alternative approaches

- continuation values
- threshold policies
- etc.

One key objective: provide a rigorous discussion of optimality

This clarifies our intuitive analysis in the context of job search

Theory

Let X be a finite set

An **optimal stopping problem** with state space X consists of

- a stochastic matrix P on X
- a discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$
- a **continuation reward function** $c \in \mathbb{R}^X$ and
- an **exit reward function** $e \in \mathbb{R}^X$

Given a P -Markov chain $(X_t)_{t \geq 0}$, the problem evolves as follows:

An agent observes X_t each period, continues or stops

If she chooses to stop, she receives $e(X_t)$ and the process ends

If she continues, she receives $c(X_t)$ and the process repeats

Lifetime rewards are given by

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t \geq 0} \beta^t R_t,$$

where R_t equals

- $c(X_t)$ while the agent continues
- $e(X_t)$ when the agent stops, and zero thereafter

Example. In the infinite-horizon job search problem

- wage offer process (W_t) is $\overset{\text{IID}}{\sim} \varphi$ on finite W
- stop = accept offer
- continue = receive unemployment compensation, repeat

This is an optimal stopping problem with

- state space $X = W$
- stochastic matrix P with all rows equal to φ
- exit reward function $e(x) = x/(1 - \beta)$ and
- the continuation reward function \equiv unemployment compensation

Example. Infinite-horizon American call option

Provides the right to buy a given asset at strike price K at every future date

The market price of the asset is given by $S_t = s(X_t)$

- (X_t) is P -Markov on finite set X and $s \in \mathbb{R}^X$
- the interest rate is $r > 0$

When to exercise is an optimal stopping problem, with

- discount factor $\beta = 1/(1 + r)$
- exit reward function $e(x) = s(x) - K$ and
- continuation reward zero

A **policy function** is a map σ from X to $\{0, 1\}$

Interpretation: observe state x , respond with action $\sigma(x)$, where

- $\sigma(x) = 0$ means “continue”
- $\sigma(x) = 1$ means “stop”

State must contain enough information to decide!

Let $\Sigma = \text{all } \sigma: X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

Let $v_\sigma(x) = \text{expected lifetime value of following policy } \sigma \text{ now and forever, given current state } x \in X$

We call v_σ the **σ -value function**

Our aim:

- choose a policy that maximizes lifetime value!

In particular, $\sigma^* \in \Sigma$ is called **optimal** if

$$v_{\sigma^*}(x) = \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma} v_{\sigma}(x) \quad \text{for all } x \in X$$

Before we can compute optimal policies, we need to be able to evaluate v_{σ} for each $\sigma \in \Sigma$

- How can we do this?

Some thought will convince you that v_σ must satisfy

$$v_\sigma(x) = \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x)) \left[c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} v_\sigma(x')P(x, x') \right]$$

Case 1: $\sigma(x) = 1$

Then the above states $v_\sigma(x) = e(x)$, which is the right value

Case 2: $\sigma(x) = 0$

Then

$$v_\sigma(x) = c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} v_\sigma(x')P(x, x')$$

A natural recursion

To repeat, we need to solve

$$v_{\sigma}(x) = \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x)) \left[c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} v_{\sigma}(x') P(x, x') \right]$$

Let

- $r_{\sigma}(x) := \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x))c(x)$
- $L_{\sigma}(x, x') := \beta(1 - \sigma(x))P(x, x')$

Then the equation becomes $v_{\sigma} = r_{\sigma} + L_{\sigma} v_{\sigma}$

Ex. Show that $r(L_{\sigma}) < 1$ and hence

$$v_{\sigma} = (I - L_{\sigma})^{-1} r_{\sigma}$$

We can also view v_σ as the fixed point of the **policy operator**

$$(T_\sigma v)(x) = \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x)) \left[c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} v(x')P(x, x') \right]$$

Pointwise this is

$$T_\sigma v = r_\sigma + L_\sigma v$$

We know that v_σ is the unique solution to $v = r_\sigma + L_\sigma v$

Hence v_σ is the unique fixed point of T_σ in \mathbb{R}^X

Ex. Prove that T_σ is order-preserving on \mathbb{R}^X

Ex. Show that T_σ is a contraction map on \mathbb{R}^X

Given $f, g \in \mathbb{R}^X$ and $x \in X$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |(T_\sigma f)(x) - (T_\sigma g)(x)| &= \left| (1 - \sigma(x))\beta \sum_{x'} (g(x') - f(x'))P(x, x') \right| \\ &\leq \beta \left| \sum_{x'} [f(x') - g(x')]P(x, x') \right| \end{aligned}$$

Applying the triangle inequality and $\sum_{x' \in X} P(x, x') = 1$ yields

$$|(T_\sigma f)(x) - (T_\sigma g)(x)| \leq \beta \|f - g\|_\infty$$

Hence

$$\|T_\sigma f - T_\sigma g\|_\infty \leq \beta \|f - g\|_\infty$$

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We define the **value function** of the optimal stopping problem as

$$v^*(x) := \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma} v_{\sigma}(x) \quad (x \in X)$$

Thus, $v^*(x) = \max$ lifetime value given current state x

Next steps

1. introduce **the Bellman equation**

$$v(x) = \max \left\{ e(x), c(x) + \beta \sum_{x'} v(x') P(x, x') \right\}$$

2. prove that the Bellman equation has a unique solution in \mathbb{R}^X
3. show that this solution equals v^*

The **Bellman operator** for the optimal stopping is defined by

$$(Tv)(x) = \max \left\{ e(x), c(x) + \beta \sum_{x'} v(x') P(x, x') \right\}$$

When we discuss optimality the next Ex. will be useful

Ex. Prove that T is an order preserving self-map on \mathbb{R}^X

Proof: Fix $f, g \in \mathbb{R}^X$ with $f \leq g$

Since $P \geq 0$, we have $Pf \leq Pg$

Hence $c + \beta Pf \leq c + \beta Pg$

$$\therefore Tf = e \vee (c + \beta Pf) \leq e \vee (c + \beta Pg) = Tg$$

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Ex. Prove that, for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, T dominates T_σ on \mathbb{R}^X

Proof: For all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\lambda \in [0, 1]$, we have

$$\lambda a + (1 - \lambda)b \leq a \vee b$$

Now fix $\sigma \in \Sigma$, $v \in \mathbb{R}^X$ and $x \in X$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} (T_\sigma v)(x) &= \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x)) \left[c(x) + \beta \sum_{x'} v(x')P(x, x') \right] \\ &\leq \max \left\{ e(x), c(x) + \beta \sum_{x'} v(x')P(x, x') \right\} = (Tv)(x) \end{aligned}$$

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Value function vs Bellman equation

Prop. Under the stated conditions

1. T is a contraction map of modulus β on \mathbb{R}^X and
2. the unique fixed point of T on \mathbb{R}^X is the value function v^*

In particular, v^* is the unique solution to the Bellman equation

The first step of the proof is the next exercise

Ex. Given f, g in \mathbb{R}^X , show that

$$\|Tf - Tg\|_{\infty} \leq \beta \|f - g\|_{\infty}$$

Proof: Recall the bound $|z \vee a - z \vee b| \leq |a - b|$

From this we have

$$\begin{aligned}|Tf - Tg| &= |e \vee (c + \beta Pf) - [e \vee (c + \beta Pg)]| \\&\leq |c + \beta Pf - (c + \beta Pg)| \\&= \beta |P(f - g)| \\&\leq \beta P |f - g|\end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore |(Tf)(x) - (Tg)(x)| \leq \beta \sum_{x'} |f(x') - g(x')| P(x, x')$$

$$\therefore \|Tf - Tg\|_{\infty} \leq \beta \|f - g\|_{\infty}$$

Now we know T has a unique fixed point \bar{v} in \mathbb{R}^X

Next we claim that

$$\bar{v} = v^*$$

We show

- $\bar{v} \leq v^*$ and
- $\bar{v} \geq v^*$

To prove $\bar{v} \leq v^*$, define $\sigma \in \Sigma$ by

$$\sigma(x) := \mathbb{1} \left\{ e(x) \geq c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} \bar{v}(x') P(x, x') \right\}$$

For this choice of σ , for any $x \in X$,

$$\begin{aligned} (T_\sigma \bar{v})(x) &= \sigma(x)e(x) + (1 - \sigma(x)) \left[c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} \bar{v}(x') P(x, x') \right] \\ &= \max \left\{ e(x), c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} \bar{v}(x') P(x, x') \right\} \\ &= (T\bar{v})(x) = \bar{v}(x) \end{aligned}$$

In particular,

$$T_\sigma \bar{v} = \bar{v}$$

But the only fixed point of T_σ in \mathbb{R}^X is the σ -value function v_σ !

Hence $\bar{v} = v_\sigma$

But then $\bar{v} \leq v^*$, by the definition of v^*

- why?

It only remains to prove $\bar{v} \geq v^*$

Fix $\sigma \in \Sigma$

Since

1. T dominates T_σ on \mathbb{R}^X and
2. T is order-preserving and globally stable

we have $v_\sigma \leq \bar{v}$

- why?

Taking the max over $\sigma \in \Sigma$ implies $v^* \leq \bar{v}$

We have now proved that v^* is the unique solution to the Bellman equation!

Finding optimal policies

For $v \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{X}}$, we call $\sigma \in \Sigma$ **v -greedy** if

$$\forall x \in \mathbf{X}, \quad \sigma(x) = \mathbb{1} \left\{ e(x) \geq c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in \mathbf{X}} v(x') P(x, x') \right\}$$

- treats v as the value function and optimizes

Ex. Show that $\sigma \in \Sigma$ is v^* -greedy if and only if $T_\sigma v^* = v^*$

Proof: We have

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma \in \Sigma \text{ is } v^* \text{-greedy} &\iff \sigma e + (1 - \sigma)(c + \beta P v^*) = e \vee (c + \beta P v^*) \\ &\iff T_\sigma v^* = v^* \end{aligned}$$

Finding optimal policies

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Prop. $\sigma \in \Sigma$ is optimal $\iff \sigma$ is v^* -greedy

Proof: For $\sigma \in \Sigma$, the following are all equivalent

1. σ is v^* -greedy
2. $T_\sigma v^* = v^*$
3. $v^* = v_\sigma$

- Why are 2 and 3 equivalent?

This result is a version of **Bellman's principle of optimality**

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Corollary. The optimal stopping problem has exactly one optimal policy

Proof: For each $v \in \mathbb{R}^X$, the greedy policy

$$\sigma^*(x) := \mathbb{1} \left\{ e(x) \geq c(x) + \beta \sum_{x' \in X} v(x') P(x, x') \right\} \quad (x \in X)$$

is uniquely defined

By the last Proposition, a policy is optimal iff it is v^* -greedy

Hence exactly one optimal policy exists

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Firm Valuation with Exit

Previously we discussed firm valuation under various scenarios

Value was defined as expected present value of profit stream

- a standard and popular methodology
- easy to apply

But it ignores an important fact

- firms have the option to exit and sell remaining assets

Now we consider firm valuation in the presence of this exit option

We consider a firm where

- $\pi_t = \pi(Z_t)$ for some fixed $\pi \in \mathbb{R}^Z$
- $(Z_t)_{t \geq 0}$ is Q -Markov on finite set $Z \subset \mathbb{R}$

At the start of each period, the firm decides whether to

- remain in operation, receiving current profit π_t , or
- exit, receiving $s > 0$ for sale of all assets

Discounting is at fixed rate r and $\beta := 1/(1+r)$

We assume that $r > 0$

Let Σ be all $\sigma: Z \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

For given $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and $v \in \mathbb{R}^Z$, the policy operator is

$$(T_\sigma v)(z) = \sigma(z)s + (1 - \sigma(z)) \left[\pi(z) + \beta \sum_{z'} v(z') Q(z, z') \right]$$

Recall that

- T_σ has a unique fixed point v_σ
- $v_\sigma(z) :=$ the value of following policy σ forever, given $Z_0 = z$

The Bellman operator is the order-preserving self-map T on \mathbb{R}^Z defined by

$$(Tv)(z) = \max \left\{ s, \pi(z) + \beta \sum_{z'} v(z') Q(z, z') \right\}$$

Pointwise, $Tv = s \vee (\pi + \beta Qv)$

Let v^* be the value function for this problem

- v^* is the unique fixed point of T in \mathbb{R}^Z
- successive approximation from any $v \in \mathbb{R}^Z$ converges to v^*
- a policy is optimal if and only if it is v^* -greedy