GV217 - Conflict Analysis

University of Essex - Department of Government

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Week 24 – 13 March, 2020

Online test

Online test

- The test will assess your knowledge of class content including concepts
- It is **not** designed to cause you troubles
- Multiple-choice questions
- It will be available on Moodle
- **You will not get a notification from FASER**
- The test opens next week for 24h
- Once opened you will have 30m to complete

Conflict management: resolution and maintenance of peace

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General framework

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Yet, problem of right-truncation (we don't have any information about when/if a conflict will re-ignite in the future)

What is mediation?

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"A process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991: 8).

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- Information asymmetry
- Commitment problems

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2. **Formulate talks**: setting up the meeting, controlling pace and formality, structure and agenda, suggest concession and aid in face-saving, highlight interests
3. **Manipulate talks**: change expectations, show commitments, promise resources or threaten withdrawal, threaten punishments

- Most likely when both sides agree the outcome lies within the bargaining range
- Manipulation is most likely to end in formal agreement because it creates the largest bargaining range and/or provides security guarantees.

Mediation Outcomes: Formal Agreement

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H1: Manipulative > Formulative > Facilitative > No mediation

- When outcome is likely to persist tensions are reduced
- Most likely to occur when outcome is near the centre of the bargaining range
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H2: Formulative > Facilitative > Manipulative > No mediation

- The threat of violence ends
- Strategies that increase the costs of conflict will most powerfully increase the chances of conflict abatement

Mediation Outcomes: Crisis Abatement

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H3: Manipulative > Formulative > Facilitative

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Mediation strategies and outcomes: General findings

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- Mediators should use a mix of strategies
- Most durable agreements are those achieved with as little help as possible
- Finding an agreement in line with the true bargaining range minimises risk of conflict recurrence and need for third party intervention

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Durable peace becomes more likely as more elements are included in an agreement

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
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- Negotiated settlements are more likely to produce an enduring peace when the issue at stake in the conflict is politico-economic rather than identity based
- The risk of war breaking out again following the negotiated settlement of a civil war should decline with time

All clear? More questions?
See you next week!