

GV217 - Conflict Analysis

University of Essex - Department of Government

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Week 20 – 14 February, 2020

Recap: Greed vs Grievance

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2. What are the two elements of this aspect?
3. Can you give an example of how we could operationalize (measure) both?

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- War is inefficient ex post
- Key question: What prevents states from locating a bargain both sides would prefer to a fight?

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All relate to **bargaining space**

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- Even if the Japanese had disclosed their full power, Russia would have been unlikely to believe. Why? because there are incentives to misrepresent → war.

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→ Actions that generate a **real** risk of war are most informative

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Was Russian invasion of Crimea a costly signal? Why?

Yes, arguably: “EU/NATO stay out of our back yard”. Russia risked war with the West over this territory.

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How does the commitment problem explain this?

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Some have argued that the German and Austro-Hungarian empires challenged Russia in the Balkans before WWI because they believed that Russia was a growing power and wished fight now rather than later. Of course, they did not expect France and the UK to become involved.

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Final exercise: Peace process in Colombia



- Get in groups of 2-3 people
- Read the assignment and answer the three questions
- Present your findings to the other groups
- Do you agree?

All clear? More questions?
See you next week!