

# **GV217 - Conflict Analysis**

University of Essex - Department of Government

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Lorenzo Crippa

Week 23 – 6 March, 2020

# 2020 Department of Government Student Conference



University of Essex

**DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT  
9TH ANNUAL STUDENT CONFERENCE**

## **POLITICS IN THE PRESENT:**

**CHALLENGES OF TODAY**



**Saturday 25th April 2020,  
9.30am - 5.45pm,  
Lecture Theatre Building and  
Tony Rich Teaching Centre**

**f @essexgovconf    @uniessexgovt**  
Email **govconf@essex.ac.uk**

# Ethnic conflicts

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# What is ethnicity?

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The answer we give to this debate has relevant implications for the solution to ethnic conflicts



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- “Ethnic conflict encompasses all forms of small- and large-scale acts of violence between and among different ethnic groups.”
- “An ethnic group is a group of people that belong to a certain ascriptive category, such as race, ethnicity, language, tribe, religion, and so forth.”

(Brancati 2006: 654)

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  - New, weak democracy
  - Opportunities for ethnic divisions to emerge

## Security dilemma

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
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
- Two rational players can Arm or Disarm
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		Group 1	
		Disarm	Arm
Group 2	Disarm	6,6	-1,7
	Arm	7,-1	1,1

# Causal interconnections




# Causal interconnections



Example: Iraq after 2003


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Example: Iraq after 2003

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
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
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- This created a security dilemma among ethnic groups
- The two causes combined contributed to the ethnic conflict



# Security dilemma and marginalization, Baghdad 2003





Figure 1: Source: NY Times

# Security dilemma and marginalization, Baghdad 2009

xed areas



**2009: Violence Fuels Segregation**

**Figure 2:** Source: NY Times

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H2.a Weak democracies in contexts of ethnic divisions increases the probability of ethnic conflicts

H2.b New democracies in contexts of ethnic divisions increases the probability of ethnic conflicts



## Case study: Rwanda

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  2. How would you explain the onset of the conflict and its escalation to genocide?
  3. What role did ethnicity play?
  4. Does the explanations we have proposed apply?

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# Solutions of ethnic conflict

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- Decentralization of national government (Brancati 2006)
- Power-sharing; granting group rights (Gleditsch et al. 2017)

All clear? More questions?  
See you next week!