
## ./level4



Decompiled file with Ghidra:

```
int m;

void p(char *buffer)
{
    printf(buffer);
    return;
}

void n(void)
{
    char buffer[520];
    fgets(buffer, 512, stdin);
    p(buffer);
    if (m == 0x1025544)
    {
        system("/bin/cat /home/user/level5/.pass");
    }
    return;
}

void main(void)
{
    n();
    return;
}
```

This level bears strong resemblance to the previous one, featuring a vulnerability with **print(buffer)**.

If we successfully set the global variable **m** to 0x1025544, the program will grant access to *level5*'s .pass.

We face a challenge this time: our buffer is limited to 512 bytes, but we need to print a value over 16 million. The old method won't work.

Thankfully with printf we can leverage the **width** specifier to pad our output. This way, we can print a large number of spaces using just a concise command.

As in the last level, we need to account for the characters produced by %x specifiers.

Additionally, the m 8-character address must be factored into the padding calculation when using printf width specifier.