

PEACE – BUILDING COMMISSION

*Study
Guide
CAMUN'14*

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The UN Peace Building Commission

Committee History:

The Peace building Commission (PBC) is a small body that the UN has initiated to provide international peace and security. The PBC was established in December 2005 by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council in their respective resolutions A/60/180 and SC 1645(2005).

It is an inter-governmental advisory body, mandated to help countries emerging from conflict make the transition from violent war to peace, through a continuum of peace building, which includes recovery and relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, institution building, and sustainable development, and the promotion of human rights to ensure lasting peace.

The purpose of the Commission:

- To bring together all relevant actors (International donors, financial institutions, national governments) and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building recovery;
- If necessary, to highlight any gaps which threaten to undermine the peace building process;
- To extend the duration of international attention on post conflict countries;
- To help provide for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long- term;
- Providing recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant parties within and outside the United Nations;
- To develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors.

The PBC works closely with the Peace building Support Office (PBSC), which is charged with providing advice on the PBC's strategies and policies and overseeing the Peace building Fund. The Peace building Fund (PBF) provides the PBC with relevant funding in regards to post- conflict reconstruction.

At the moment, the PBC is active in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic.

Topic 1: Disarmament and rehabilitation of child soldiers

Introduction:

The United Nations defines a child soldier as “any person less than 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group [acting] in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups.” The most widely accepted estimate is that there are currently 300,000 child soldiers worldwide. The recruitment of child soldiers occurs all around the world, yet their use is publicly sanctioned at varying degrees of acceptability. For instance, more developed countries allow persons under 18 with parental consent to voluntarily join government forces, but only as trainees or cadets performing in limited capacities.

Small numbers of youths (under 18) are active in forces associated with the United States, France, Germany, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Youth forces in these developed countries are often characterized as career development programs, and the utilization of youth forces for combat purposes are limited. Evidence suggests that child soldiers are active in at least 14 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, India, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand and Yemen.

The use of child soldiers becomes especially problematic when children are abducted or coerced into joining government, paramilitary or rebel forces, as happens in many third world and developing countries. Children are easy to recruit because of their vulnerability and naïveté. They are sometimes lured by the false promise of an escape from poverty, but are often neglected once the conflict is over or when they leave the group.

Both girls and boys are used in armed conflict and lay a wide variety of roles. These can involve frontline duties as fighters, but they may also be used in other roles such as porters, couriers, spies, guards, suicide bombers or human shields, and even domestic

duties. Girls and boys are also sometimes used for sexual purposes by armed forces or groups.

Wars often uproot families, driving entire populations to seek shelter in refugee camps. These camps strain local resources, putting education and jobs out of reach for many refugee children and adults. In these conditions, with a shortage of food and no meaningful activities for children, armed groups find children in refugee camps to be easy recruits. Some programs, therefore, target the situation of children in refugee camps to prevent children from recruitment, and to advance the process of rejoining society. For example, the International Rescue Committee has developed structures in Indonesia to supplement the local school system in order to provide for the influx of the displaced population.

International efforts made in the past:

Many kinds of international laws have been established to alleviate the use of child soldiers. NOTE: Although many of these conventions and declarations have been signed and ratified, they are not necessarily enforced sufficiently.

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (May 2000)

The Optional Protocol (also called the Child Soldiers Protocol) is an optional extension to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which allows for children as young as 15 to participate in armed conflict. The new protocol defines a child as a person under 18, and makes it illegal for a child to be forcefully conscripted into the army or a non-governmental militant group. It establishes 16 as the minimum for voluntary recruitment, and requires parental consent and awareness of the duties of participation in the army for children between 16 and 18. Children under 18 are not to be involved in conflict directly. The convention mandates that governments take all measures to prevent the recruitment of children, including legal action. It also requires countries to submit a report documenting their efforts to execute the provisions in the protocol within two years of the ratification, and every five years thereafter. To date, 72 nations have ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on children involved in armed

conflict. The Protocol also requires governments to provide programs for the “psychological recovery and social reintegration” of former child soldiers, where necessary (Article 6).

Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers (April 1999)

The Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers is the result of the 1999 African Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers. The Maputo Declaration states that “the use of any child under 18 years of age by any armed force or armed group is wholly unacceptable, even where that child claims or is claimed to be a volunteer.” It also calls for countries and militant groups to end their recruitment of children, demobilize current child recruits, establish rehabilitation programs for former child soldiers, create measures to prevent re-recruitment, and develop a system to verify a child’s age prior to recruitment, whether by birth documents or community elders. The declaration also recognizes the need for international media attention to both the declaration and child soldiers, and calls for other nations to support the declaration.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (est. 1998, effective 2002)

The establishment of the International Criminal Court provided a place to try international crimes against humanity. One of the provisions of the court makes the recruitment of children under 15 a war crime. Under the court, it is also illegal for children to participate in conflict by serving as port keepers, delivering supplies, etc. In 2004, the court issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and other members of the Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army for numerous human rights violations, including the recruitment of child soldiers.

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (effective 1999)

The African Organization of African States, now the African Union (AU), developed the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 1990. The charter unconditionally defines a child as someone under 18 years old, and requires all countries within the AU to take all measures necessary to prevent the in recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. In 1999, the charter came into action.

ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182 (adopted 1999, effective Nov. 2000)

This convention is the first to include using child soldiers as a type of child labor, and makes the forced recruitment of children into an army illegal for ratifying nations. The convention is the first international treaty to define a child as someone under the age of 18 in regards to the use of child soldiers.

Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977)

The Geneva Conventions are internationally recognized as a humanitarian law, established to protect the rights of those within countries at war. In 1977, additional protocol was added to the conventions, requiring all warring countries to take all measures to ensure children that under 15 are not recruited into the army.

The Paris Commitments and Principles (2007)

In February 2007, UNICEF and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers held an international conference in Paris, France to review the use of child soldiers. Representatives attended from 58 countries who assured an allegiance to the Paris Commitments and Paris Principles. The Paris Commitments outline already existing mechanisms pertaining to child soldiers; whereas, the Paris Principles “[set] forth a wide range of principles relating to the protection of children from recruitment or use in armed conflict, their release and successful reintegration into civilian life.” The Paris Principles also respect the need to prevent the use of child soldiers.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1999-2005)

The UN Security Council has passed multiple resolutions pertaining to child soldiers. The resolutions condemn the recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed conflict. These resolutions include Resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000) 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), and 1612 (2005).

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs

DDR programs focus on addressing the needs of child soldiers as individuals and are encouraged by many organizations, including the United Nations and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) intervention programs are intended to bring security and stability to a region after a conflict. However, post-conflict re-integration of former child soldiers is a complex process since many are stigmatized by their own communities, and are themselves likely to resort to violence. Furthermore, the actual implementation of DDR programs lies in the hands of the afflicted country. This poses a challenge in cases where the government denies the use of child soldiers. For instance, the government armed forces neglected to implement any DDR programs, despite having recruited 3374 soldiers under the age of 18 in 1999.

Although child soldiers have much to benefit from appropriate DDR programs, they are frequently disregarded in the planning stages of DDR programs and excluded from DDR implementation. These programs predominantly focus on adult male soldiers, rarely include women, and often exclude children.

The first part of DDR programs is disarmament, which involves removing weapons from combat zones. Disarmament usually encompasses the destruction or safe-storage of weapons and the development of arms management programs. The proliferation of small arms is a major contributor to the use of child soldiers, as the widespread availability, low price, and minimal weight of weapons such as AK-47s (which only cost about \$6 in Africa) make them easy for young children to wield. Because of this, disarmament is a very important step in addressing the use of child soldiers. The next step in DDR is demobilization, which is the removal of a child from an army. The first part of demobilization involves cooperating with the armed group to remove the child from its forces and to verify the child's age. Proving a child's age is complicated, as more than 40 million births occur without registration each year. This increases the ability of militant factions to keep children in their forces by wrongly claiming that a child is 18 or older. Once a child's age is proven, the next steps are usually finding a child's

background information to make contact with the child's family, assessing the child's situation and organizing a list of priority issues, and informing the child of what is going to happen next.

The final part of the DDR process is reintegration, which is a long process designed to help children return to normal life in a community. Children are reunited with their family or other caretakers, given access to education and psychological care, and given an agenda for economic support. A lot of cultures have reintegration processes unique to their local community. Some communities ask former child soldiers to present a formal apology and request for forgiveness to community members. Many cultures also use traditional healing practices to reintegrate former child soldiers into their community. In Sierra Leone, girls who were involved in combat are cleansed with a traditional spiritual wash to heal the impurities caused by sexual abuse. Unfortunately, it is usually hard for girls to readjust to life in the community, for some members view them as being unclean because of sexual abuse. This highlights a greater issue, as some communities and family members will not accept former child soldiers back into their culture in lieu of their past actions.

The United Nation's Security Council recognizes the importance of DDR programs for child soldiers and war-affected children, but even with the help of international aid, the responsibility and actual implementation of DDR programs ultimately lies with the government of the afflicted country.

Organizations trying to make a difference:

Invisible Children

The Invisible Children movements are focused on the Lord's Resistance Army's use and abduction of children in Northern Uganda in the midst of a 20 year war. Among the efforts put forth by the documentary's creators are Schools for Schools, a program that helps students to form clubs to raise money for a partner school in Uganda. Funds pay for the refurbishment of the war torn school, teachers, books, computers, and other educational supplies.

The Child Soldiers Project

The Child Soldiers Project serves as an outlet for the expression of former child soldiers. It offers drawings, writings, and music from former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. The website gives a unique testimony to the terrors of being a child soldier.

World Vision

World Vision is a humanitarian organization calling for humanitarian aid to child soldier in Gulu, Uganda. It offers a declaration and petition regarding child soldiers in Uganda and sponsors former child soldiers.

Human Rights Watch

Representatives of the Human Rights Watch have interviewed many child soldiers from different countries regarding their situations and try to find different ways to help them. The Human Rights Watch also published *Complicit in Crime*, an overview, analysis, and recommendation regarding the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s use of child soldiers.

Amnesty International

The Child Soldiers division of Amnesty International is working to increase awareness for the use of child soldiers. It is working to urge Russia to ratify the UN Optional Protocol to UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and for other great causes.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Since the mid-1980s, UNICEF has played a key role in advocating and securing the release of children from armed forces and other combatant groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.

UNICEF offers aid to former child soldiers and helps to increase awareness for UN conventions that respect children's rights.

Countries dealing with this issue:

AFRICA



In Angola over 7,000 children, including those from neighboring Namibia, were active soldiers in Angolan armed forces until the fighting ended in 2002. In 2003, the Angolan government, UNICEF, and community partners established a framework to provide former child soldiers with physical rehabilitation, psychological recovery, and social reintegration. The government has made plans to build thousands of new classrooms and has enacted goals to increase school attendance by 2015.

In Rwanda, UNICEF has worked alongside Save the Children and the International Committee of the Red Cross for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers following rebel incursions in May and June of 2001 in the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Provinces. Over 2,000 rebels were either captured by or surrendered to the Rwandan Patriotic Army. Among them were more than 350 children who had been forcibly recruited by rebel forces. All these children and a small number of others who returned to the country afterwards benefited from a transitional period in a rehabilitation center and reintegration back into their communities of origin.

Sierra Leone: 10,000 children have been known to have fought in Sierra Leonean armed forces. In the 1990's the "child armies" established a notorious reputation for brutality. In the summer of 2001, the Revolutionary United Front rebels released 600 child soldiers. The International Rescue Committee provided education, skills training, and psychosocial care to 100 of them. In 2002, a Sierra Leonean entrepreneur began a program to teach former child soldiers computer and programming skills.

Uganda: Since 1986, 15,000 children have been abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army, an opposition group to the Ugandan government. Operation Iron Fist was launched by the Ugandan government in an effort to abolish the LRA; however, the policy merely pushed the LRA underground and in doing so, misplaced thousands of Ugandans. In 2003, the International Rescue Committee was able to successfully reunite over 1,500 former child soldiers with their families.

Sudan: Since 1983, the Southern People's Liberation Army has used child soldiers in a civil conflict with the Sudanese government. In March 2001, over 2,500 child soldiers were released. They spent four months in U.N. camps receiving education, and medical and psychological care. UNICEF estimates that another 9,000 child soldiers remain in Sudan.

Liberia: Since 1980, Liberia has seen cycles of civil war and unstable governments, creating poverty and refugees. As a result, many children have been recruited to fight for government and opposition forces. In 2004, the UN warned that Liberian DDR programs were in funding jeopardy and that camps were "overstretched", potentially preventing 21,000 former child soldiers from receiving treatment.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Over 6,000 children fight in government and opposition forces around the Congo. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Labor funded \$310,000 of an International Labor Organization program to collect vital information on child soldiers in Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.

MIDDLE EAST



Israel / Palestine: In Palestine's occupied territories, generations of children have been raised in areas of intense conflict. SOS Children, a charity organization for orphan and abandoned children, launched programs in the West Bank to help children affected by the conflict. They have made psychological support available to children in the region, treating about 2,500 children a year, as well as providing homes and primary schooling.

Afghanistan: For decades, Afghani children have been known to fight with all forms of armed militias, but exact numbers remain unknown. UNICEF helped refurbish 200 schools, and in March 2002, over 1.5 million children enrolled for school. In early February 2004, UNICEF implemented a new reintegration program for 2,000 former child soldiers, and has plans for 3,000 more by the year's end. The program will create a comprehensive care plan and information database, including psychological and medical treatment, for each soldier. UNICEF estimates a total of 8,000 child soldiers currently in Afghanistan.

Iraq: Under the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein, children aged 10-15 underwent mandatory three-week military training camps. USAID and other partners have undertaken the renovation of Iraq's education facilities while forming an Iraqi government that will be more protective of children's rights.

ASIA



Sri Lanka: In October 2003, UNICEF opened the first of three transit centers, where child soldiers released from notorious rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, can stay for up to three months and receive educational and vocational training before they are to be reunited with their families.

Bangladesh: In 1999, it was reported that 3,374 recruits in the government's armed forces had not yet reached 18 years of age. It is difficult to obtain accurate and current information on the use of children in either government armed forces or armed opposition groups. It may be that because the government denies its use of child soldiers, it has neglected to implement any DDR programs for those children that are affected by armed conflict.

Myanmar (Burma): As many as 70,000 children are involved in government and opposition armed forces despite national laws protecting children's rights and banning forcible conscription. More than 700 soldiers have been released since 2002 thanks to a program that verified soldiers' and prevented forced recruitment. The government has disbanded training camps used to hold street children and orphans until reaching recruitment age. These children were offered the opportunity to attend non-military training schools when the recruitment program was discontinued in 2000. The numbers of children participating in this program were not available.

SOUTH AMERICA



Colombia: Human Rights Watch conservatively estimates that over 11,000 children are fighting with guerilla armies like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army, the Camilist Union-National Liberation Army, and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. While in 1999, the Colombian government outlawed and prosecuted the recruitment of children in the military, in 2002, the government sought to expand the military by almost 20,000 troops. The plan called for the recruitment of "peasant

soldiers”, or in other words, poor children who were lured by economic incentives to join the violent conflict.

Brazil: In Rio de Janeiro, children are surrounded by violent drug-related gangs. The death rate due to firearms is comparable to that of a nation at war. Although there are many programs in the area that treat “at risk” children, to terminate the cycle of what has been called “Organized Armed Violence,” Brazilian children may benefit from a DDR program that emphasized enhanced education and access to profitable job markets.

Paraguay: Though laws are in place to protect children from forcible recruitment by the government, reports indicate that children as young as 12 have been conscripted to serve in the armed forces. Military recruiters have been accused of aiding underage recruits in seeking false identification documents. In 2000, 10,400 children were estimated to be involved in government forces. There has been an alarming rate of injury and death among young conscripts. In 2002 Paraguay ratified the UN Optional Protocol on child soldiers.

Conclusions and recommendations:

1. Ensuring DDR programs reach all children who need them: Stakeholders should ensure that the special needs of all children associated with fighting forces are taken into account in the release process. DDR programs could usefully consider lessons learned in Liberia and Sierra Leone about how to meet the needs of former girl soldiers. Other groups that need special consideration are older adolescents (aged 15-18), young adults (18-23) and foreign children. A more flexible approach to funding criteria and programmatic work could be developed in order to reach children who are released informally from fighting forces.
2. Child protection agencies and donors are encouraged to limit direct interventions in favor of community approaches. Communities must be engaged in the DDR exercise from the beginning, right through until successful reintegration. Programs must be designed and implemented to ensure that they do not work against children’s integration into the communities.
3. Programs must focus on prevention of re-recruitment.
4. Stakeholders should better coordinate their work in order to avoid overlaps and to provide the best service to children. Sharing information and resources and collaborating

in the monitoring and evaluation of joint efforts are crucial to prevent overlaps. In particular, there is a need to coordinate efforts across the region.

5. Local staff working for local, and international child protection agencies, need more specialized training. All staff working directly and indirectly with children should be trained in Codes of Conduct to ensure that children are protected against abuse and exploitation, and reporting and monitoring structures should be created, with measures for action when breaches are reported. Staff turnover should be limited as far as possible.

6. Training on children's rights and child protection principles should be expanded and systematized for members of the armed forces, peacekeeping forces and law enforcement structures. Specialized training for military observers should be developed in order to ensure their full and continued collaboration in any DDR process throughout the world.

7. A compilation of best practices should be systematized to ensure a transfer of knowledge from person to person and context to context. Targeted support should be given to child protection agencies to create and support systems that record this process and thus allow for a transfer of knowledge within and outside the organization and country.

8. Donors are urged to commit more funding through flexible and easily accessible programs that take into account the needs of children to be supported in a process that takes years to complete. Flexible funding should be available to cover the gaps between the registration of children and the official launch of reintegration programs. Donors can play a crucial role in supporting income-generating activities to facilitate the economic recovery and integration of children into society, a critical element in their smooth return to civilian life.

9. Massive investment is needed in the education systems of all countries in the region.

10. There is a need to support credible and independent national and regional structures capable of monitoring states' implementation of their international obligations and encouraging them to take the lead on these issues.

Topic 2: Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention

Introduction:

Civilization's central challenge today is to ensure that rapid globalization becomes a positive force for all peoples of present and future generations. Yet, the continuous striving for material welfare is threatening environmental systems as well as the supply of natural resources. Humanity's demographic and economic growth on a limited planet has devastating impacts: it creates global inequities, conflicts over scarce resources and territorial insecurity. Awareness has already been raised for a need of a radical, transformative shift— but effective political commitment needs to be renewed.

Resource conflicts are among today's greatest security risks and becoming a focus of international peacekeeping. Extreme weather conditions, price increases and food scarcity lead to competition, instability, migration flows, and finally to violent domestic and international conflicts. It is important to acknowledge the linkages between sustainable development and security issues in order to resolve conflicts and prevent wars before they occur.

Natural resources often play a role in fuelling conflicts, undermining peace building efforts and contributing to a relapse in conflict if they are not properly managed. Indeed, over the past 60 years, at least 40% of internal conflicts had a link to natural resources and since 1990 there have been at least 18 violent conflicts fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.

Conflict prevention remains one of the highest objectives of the United Nations. In today's world, preventive action extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of UN entities working across a wide range of disciplines — poverty eradication and development, human rights and the rule of law, elections and the building of democratic institutions and the control of small arms, to name just a few. The Department of Political Affairs plays a central role in these efforts: monitoring and assessing global political developments; advising the UN Secretary-General on actions that could advance the cause of peace; providing support and guidance to UN peace envoys and political missions in the field; and serving Member States directly through electoral assistance and through the support of the work of the Security Council and other UN bodies.

The Security Council has an important role in reducing the risk of conflict and instability where natural resources exploitation and management are a factor. It recognizes the security dimension of natural resources, and has taken targeted Chapter VII measures to

prevent funds derived from the illegal exploitation of such resources from further fuelling existing conflicts — for example in Liberia, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire.

“Peace building” was another broad concept that gained traction in policy circles after the end of the Cold War. At its root lay the idea that peace was more than merely an “absence of war” or violent conflict, but that it constituted a positive state of being that needed to be built and reinforced. The Peace building Commission aimed to discover and address the proximate and root causes of conflict – the intention being to address these before they led to a return to conflict after the tentative or formal conclusion of a peace agreement.

Efforts made to resolve the issue:

The UN currently has 37 special political missions, ranging from field-based offices in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, to travelling envoys working to mediate political agreements, to expert groups focused on monitoring sanctions of the Security Council. Political missions deployed in volatile environments around the world are making a proven difference in defusing tensions, bringing countries back from the brink of conflict and building sustainable peace.

Preserving world peace is a central purpose of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Member States agree to settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain from threatening or using force against other States.

Over the years, the UN has played a major role in helping defuse international crises and in resolving protracted conflicts. It has undertaken complex operations involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. It has worked to prevent conflicts from breaking out. And in post-conflict situations, it has increasingly undertaken coordinated action to address the root causes of war and lay the foundation for durable peace.

UN efforts have produced dramatic results. The UN helped defuse the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Middle East crisis in 1973. In 1988, a UN-sponsored peace settlement ended the Iran-Iraq war, and in the following year UN-sponsored negotiations led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the UN was instrumental in restoring sovereignty to Kuwait, and played a major role in ending civil wars in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique, restoring the democratically elected government in Haiti, and resolving or containing conflict in various other countries.

The UN's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building:

Conflict prevention remains one of the highest objectives of the United Nations. In today's world, preventive action extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of UN entities working across a wide range of disciplines - poverty eradication and development, human rights and the rule of law, elections and the building of democratic institutions and the control of small arms, to name just a few.

The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have been a total of 64 UN peacekeeping operations around the world.

Over the years UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape. Born at the time when the Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.

UN peacemaking expanded in the 1990s, as the end of the Cold War created new opportunities to end civil wars through negotiated peace settlements. A large number of conflicts were brought to an end, either through direct UN mediation or by the efforts of others acting with UN support. Countries assisted included El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. As the decade drew to a close, continuing crises led to new operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone and Kosovo.

The nature of conflict has also changed over the years. Originally developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, UN peacekeeping has been increasingly applied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars. Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, today's peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, through human rights monitoring and security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and demining.

The experience of recent years has also led the United Nations to focus as never before on peace building - efforts to reduce a country's risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Building lasting peace in war-torn societies is

among the most daunting of challenges for global peace and security. The United Nations established the Peace building Commission in 2005 to better anticipate and respond to the challenges of peace building.

The UN acts on behalf of peace and security in various ways:

- The Security Council establishes peacekeeping and peace-support missions.
- The Secretary-General can himself take initiatives.
- Representatives or envoys of the Secretary-General visit trouble spots to seek solutions to conflicts, preferably prior to the outbreak of violence.
- The UN can also impose sanctions if negotiation or mediation fails.
- If a conflict threatens world peace and international security, the Security Council may as a last resort authorize military intervention (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter).
- The UN Peace building Commission is able to support post-conflict States on their path to lasting peace and to facilitate the dialogue between the main actors. Switzerland actively participates in the Peace building Commission and holds the chairmanship of the Commission's Burundi Configuration, which supports the peace-consolidation process in Burundi. In order to create positive synergies between the Commission and «International Geneva», Switzerland also supports the Geneva Peace building Platform (GPP).

Over the decades, the UN has helped to end numerous conflicts, often through actions of the Security Council. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement.

When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Council has issued ceasefire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also deploys United Nations peacekeeping operations to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions for sustainable peace after settlements have been reached. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.

According to the Charter, the General Assembly can make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security,

including disarmament, and for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations. The General Assembly can also discuss any question relating to international peace and security and make recommendations, if the issue is not currently being discussed by the Security Council.

Pursuant to its “Uniting for Peace” resolution of November 1950 (resolution 377 (V)), the General Assembly may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a Permanent Member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to Members for collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Two of the General Assembly’s six main committees are involved in matters of peace and security. Besides the First Committee which is concerned with disarmament and related international security questions, the Special Political and Decolonization Committee deals with a variety of political subjects not dealt with by the First Committee, including decolonization, Palestinian refugees, human rights, peacekeeping, mine action, outer space, public information, atomic radiation and the University for Peace.

The Charter empowers the Secretary-General to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. One of the most vital roles played by the Secretary-General is the use of his “good offices” – steps taken publicly and in private that draw upon his independence, impartiality and integrity to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.

The Department of Political Affairs plays a central role in these efforts: monitoring and assessing global political developments; advising the UN Secretary-General on actions that could advance the cause of peace; providing support and guidance to UN peace envoys and political missions in the field; and serving Member States directly through electoral assistance and through the support of the work of the Security Council and

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peace building missions.

In 2007, DPKO was split up, with the establishment of the Department of Field Support (DFS), which provides dedicated support and guidance to peacekeeping and political

field missions in the areas of finance and budget; personnel and human resources; logistics and information, communication and technology.

Current Peacekeeping Operations by the UN all around the world:



United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

Western Sahara, a Territory on the north-west coast of Africa bordered by Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, was administered by Spain until 1976. Both Morocco and Mauritania affirmed their claim to the territory, a claim opposed by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO).

MINURSO was originally mandated to:

- Monitor the ceasefire;
- Reduce the threat of mines and unexploded ordnances;
- Support the confidence-building measures.

Throughout this period, MINURSO continued to fulfill its mandate by monitoring the ceasefire as well as supporting a range of assistance programs to address the plight of displaced and separated Sahrawi families. While talks resume on a mutually acceptable political settlement to the 32-year conflict, MINURSO continued to assist both parties in maintaining the ceasefire across the buffer strip (aka the 'berm'), which stretches along the entire length of the disputed territory and separates the Moroccan-administered portion (west) from the area that is controlled by the Frente Polisario (east).

The political situation in Western Sahara saw some positive developments in recent years. Under the auspices of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, representatives of the two parties together with representatives of the neighbouring countries, Mauretania and Algeria, convened for two rounds of UN-sponsored talks in suburban New York in June and August 2007.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. Under the terms of the resolution, the mission would support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.

In recent years, Mali has been confronted by a profound crisis with serious political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences. The crisis stems from long-standing structural conditions such as weak State institutions; ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities in the north of being neglected, marginalized and unfairly treated by the central Government; a weak and externally dependent, albeit vibrant, civil society; and the effects of environmental degradation, climate change and economic shocks. These conditions were exacerbated by more recent factors of instability, including corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, internal strife and deteriorating capacity of the national army.

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

United Nations involvement in Haiti started in 1990, when, at the request of the provisional Government, the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) observed the preparation and holding of elections in that

country. Following the 1991 coup and the overthrow of the legitimate President, the situation worsened. In response, a joint United Nations- OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was deployed in February 1993. In September 1993, the Security Council set up the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country—the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). However, due to non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be fully deployed at that time and carry out its mandate.

Throughout this period, there were a number of positive developments, including the restoration of some measure of democracy, with the first peaceful handover of power between two democratically elected presidents; the growth of a multifaceted civil society; and its increasing involvement in the development of a political culture based on democratic values. There were, however, also setbacks. Owing to the continuing political crisis and concomitant lack of stability in the country, serious reforms never took hold.

United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

UNOWA was established in 2002 with the purpose of supporting conflict prevention and peace building in West Africa. In pursuit of these aims, it seeks also to contribute to good governance practices, political development, and democracy. UNOWA works closely with ECOWAS (West Africa's primary multilateral instrument for economic development and cooperation), and the *WACI* (West Coast Initiative) project (an organization that tries to urge cooperation between the UN and *INTERPOL* for the purpose of combating criminal activities). The *IMO* (International Maritime Organization) identifies criminal and security issues relating to piracy and tries to promote information sharing and cooperation, partly based on enforcement of the 1988/1992 *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation*.

African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

A number of peacekeeping operations began a process of rightsizing or drawdown. After 14 years of a Security Council-mandated presence in Timor-Leste, the last United Nations mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, completed its mandate in December 2012. The United Nations and Timor-Leste will now enter into a new phase in their relationship with a focus on development and continued institution-building. In Liberia, the successful conduct of the second post-conflict election allowed the Organization to begin reducing the military component of the United Nations Mission in Liberia while increasing its police presence to enhance the capacity of the national law

enforcement institutions. Similarly, progress in consolidating peace in Côte d'Ivoire enabled the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire to withdraw one battalion in 2013. In Haiti, improved security has allowed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti to reduce its uniformed component and refocus efforts on the consolidation of political stability and the rule of law.

The capacity of special political and peacekeeping missions to address the specific needs of women and children was enhanced through deploying women advisers and child protection advisers and strengthening training. Special Representatives increased advocacy at the national level to build capacity and strengthen prevention and response, including through monitoring and reporting. With United Nations support, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan and Myanmar signed action plans to end conflict-related violations against children.

Partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, remained an important feature of United Nations peacekeeping efforts. This will continue as operations deploy to volatile environments. The United Nations continued to support the African Union's capacity to plan, deploy and manage its peace support operations, including through the United Nations Office to the African Union. In Somalia, some 17,700 troops and police officers of the African Union Mission in Somalia were deployed and sustained with the Organization's support to advance peace in the country. The United Nations also provided guidance and technical expertise to the African Union Commission on the operationalization of the African Standby Force and contributed to the development of key doctrinal and training material. The European Union's approval of a plan of action to enhance its support to United Nations peacekeeping and the revitalization of the United Nations-European Union Steering Committee on Crisis Management were particularly noteworthy.

The United Nations continued to strengthen support mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, including a strategic guidance framework for international police and generic capability standards for infantry battalions and staff officers. There were improvements to the governance and management framework of the global field support strategy and its key performance indicators to help ensure that support to the field is faster, of higher quality and more effective. Vacancy rates for international staff in peacekeeping and special political missions dropped to 12.6 per cent in March 2013, down from a high of 33.8 per cent in 2008.

Role of the Peace Building Commission:

The challenging task facing the Peace building Commission, the Peace building and the Peace building was underlined in the past year by significant setbacks in several countries, notably the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. In other cases, however, the Commission and the Fund were able to advance the consolidation of peace, lending political and financial support to the effective and peaceful participation by political parties in elections in Sierra Leone, financing the retirement of 3,928 military personnel in Guinea, contributing to the convening of the Burundi partners' conference, and supporting the first justice and security hub in Liberia. The Peace building Fund was also used to support critical political transition or peace consolidation efforts in Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, the Niger, Somalia and Yemen. It raised more than \$80 million in 2012, its highest amount since 2008.

The Relation between Natural Resources and Conflict:

The continued demand for commodities and energy is driving economic growth, trade, investment and job creation in resource-rich countries. For developing countries in particular, revenues from natural resources can fund infrastructure and boost delivery of essential services. In 2009, Africa's natural resource exports were worth \$246 billion — six times more than the total aid directed to Africa that year. Putting in place the proper systems to manage natural resources revenues can deliver benefits well into the long term.

As we all know, however, there is sometimes a correlation between natural resources and conflict. In 2007, the Council recognised part of this equation: the destabilising impact of illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources. This can fuel armed conflict, weaken state institutions and set back development. Diamond trafficking allows groups to purchase the weapons that are undermining state authority in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and sustain rebellion in the Central African Republic. And this illegal trade is a gift to transnational criminal networks, which have become increasingly adept at exploiting weak governance across states to expand their activities.

Beyond illegal activity, though, failure to manage natural resources transparently and sustainably can be a factor in exacerbating existing conflicts or provoking new ones. Mismanagement of extractive industries can entrench corruption, undermine governance and state institutions, and exacerbate tensions over revenue distribution, employment opportunities and land rights.

Role of the Security Council:

Much of the Council's agenda concerns countries in various stages of either conflict or post-conflict peace building involving natural resources. The Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia each demonstrate certain aspects of recent or current conflict linked with natural resources. In Mali, the present significance of uranium extraction is less clear, but it has been interrelated with conflict between the Tuareg community and the government in the past. Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Libya and Sierra Leone are each in different modes of post-conflict peace building largely financed by natural resource exports. Meanwhile, Iraq faces disputes over oil rights between the central government and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, and Afghanistan is on the brink of a massive expansion of mining and oil operations. Both present risks of future conflict.

On 15th April 2013, at the initiative of Rwanda, the Council had a briefing on conflict prevention with a specific focus on addressing the root causes of conflict in Africa. The presidential statement included language about the illegal exploitation of natural resources as a cause of conflict, the potential role for the UN in capacity-building toward the effective national management of natural resources, and the importance of multilateral mechanisms for commodity tracking and revenue transparency as conflict prevention tools. More specifically, the presidential statement included the following topics:

- the contribution of the illegal exploitation of natural resources toward the outbreak, escalation and prolonging of conflict;
- the need to improve the work of sanctions committees and associated panels and groups of experts;
- the potential role of peace operations to assist with natural-resource management;
- the function of the Peace building Commission in assisting transitions from natural-resource conflict;
- the importance of the private sector and the need for corporate social responsibility;
- how security sector reform could contribute to more effective customs controls;
- the regional and international dimensions of the trade in conflict commodities;
- the significance of national legislation and regulation for the effective management of natural resources; and
- the need for better coordination with regional organisations.

The Council needs to work more strategically with the regional and global initiatives that have been proven effective in helping countries establish well-regulated and transparent natural resources industries. These initiatives are the Council's natural partners. The Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which already works in partnership with several Council-mandated missions, is a prime example. The EITI Global Conference launched new, stronger EITI standards to increase the consistency and quality of information reported by implementing countries.

Another such initiative with a long-standing relationship with the Council is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The Scheme has successfully curbed the flow of conflict diamonds to rebel groups in a relatively short period of time since 2003.

The Council has also engaged the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Endorsed by the ICGLR, the Guidance provides strong and practical guidelines for resource extraction companies.

Regional organisations are also taking forward important work. The African Mining Vision, with its framework for 'transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of natural resources' is a strong example of an African-led and driven initiative. Australia is also known to be supporting the planning and development of the African Minerals Development Centre, under the Mining Vision.

Experts groups mandated by the Council are providing quality analysis by identifying flows of finances and weapons to those who may be involved in conflict linked to the extraction of natural resources.

Security Council Resolution 2098, which extended the mandate of MONUSCO, provides a strong model. It includes assistance in the establishment of state control over mining activities and equitable management of natural resources extraction and trade. The Council has included similar mandates in the past, including those relating to UNIPSIL in Sierra Leone and UNMIL in Liberia.

Natural Resources and UN Sanctions:

Country	Natural Resources	UN Sanctions on Commodities
Afghanistan	oil, minerals	None
CAR	Diamonds	None
Côte d'Ivoire	Diamonds	15 December 2005 – 30 April 2014
DRC	coltan, gold, diamonds	None
Iraq*	Oil	14 April 1995 – 21 November 2003
Liberia	diamonds, timber	7 March 2001 – 27 April 2007 (diamonds); 6 May 2003 – 20 June 2006 (timber)
Libya**	oil, gas	17 March 2011 – 16 September 2011
Mali	Uranium	None
Sierra Leone	Diamonds	5 July 2000 – 4 June 2003
Somalia	Charcoal	22 February 2012 –
South Sudan	Oil	None
Sudan	oil	None
*=Oil-for-Food Programme **=asset freeze on oil corporations		

Thus far, the Council's most common response to natural resource-related conflict has been to authorise commodity sanctions, often in conjunction with a Panel of Experts or a Monitoring Group, but this has been an imperfect solution at best. The limitations of

commodity sanctions as a tool of prevention are readily apparent as they are almost always applied after an armed conflict has already started.

EU-UN Partnership and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP):

Together with the European Union and five other UN partners –United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Peace building Support Office (PBSO), HABITAT and Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) – UNEP is working to support countries improve natural resource management for conflict prevention and peace building. Through a joint programme coordinated by the UN Framework Team for Preventive Action and financed by the EU's Instrument for Stability, technical assistance is provided to help national stakeholders, as well as UN and EU staff in conflict-affected countries, to better understand and prevent tensions over environmental issues and the management of natural resources. The partnership is also designed to enhance policy development and programme coordination between key actors at the field level.

What does the EU-Un Partnership offer?

- Conflict analysis and conflict prevention strategy formulation to respond to emerging disputes over land and natural resources;
- Rapid response to violent conflicts through the deployment of mediation and natural resource management experts to reduce tensions and develop non-violent alternatives;
- Training on the nexus between land and natural resources for different target audiences (e.g. UN, EU, World Bank, local and national authorities, bi-lateral and NGO partners);
- Support to country programme formulation on land, natural resources and conflict combined with joint fundraising, including from the Peace building Fund and the EU Instrument for Stability.

Examples of EU-UN work in the field:

- Assessing natural resource and conflict risks, developing strategies to prevent conflict and promote stability and sustainable development (Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, DRC, South Sudan);
- Natural resource concession negotiations, environmental impact assessments, implementation and compliance monitoring (Liberia, Sierra Leone);

- Local-level dispute resolution systems for land and related natural resources (DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, Somaliland, Pakistan);
- Rehabilitation of contaminated or mined sites, reforestation and environmental remediation of hotspots (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan);
- Community-based natural resource management (Afghanistan, Liberia);
- Grievances redress mechanisms – establishing mechanisms to resolve grievances between companies, communities and local governments (Liberia);
- Local economic development and “green economy” strategies and settlement planning to maximize the development impacts of resource investments and mitigate their risks (Rwanda);
- Trans boundary resource management plans, mediation and dispute resolution (Iraq-Iran, Afghanistan-Iran).

Topic 3: The War Zones of Africa – Rebuilding a Nation

Introduction:

There are currently fifteen African countries involved in war, or are experiencing post-war conflict and tension. In West Africa, the countries include Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In East Africa, the countries include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. In Central Africa, the countries include Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. In North Africa, the country is Algeria and in South Africa, the countries include Angola and Zimbabwe.

At the base of these wars is the rich natural resources each of these poor countries hold of timber, oil or diamonds, compounded in many cases by the foreign extractive industries presence, their opaque, unreported payments to the governments and the governments' opaque, unreported use of the money to create and fund wars. The wars serve the purpose of creating a distraction, as the countries and their fleeing, displaced citizens are robbed of their countries' natural resources, easily converted to cash, for the personal use and fortunes of ruling parties. Tribal conflict is deliberately antagonized, so it can be blamed for the conflict.

A necessary first step in the prevention of future atrocities, human rights abuses and mass waves of human displacement in Africa, it is imperative for multinational extractive industries to make public the net taxes, fees, royalties and other payments they make to the governments of the countries in which they have operations.

The UN system plays a crucial role in coordinating assistance of all kinds — to help Africa help itself. From promoting the development of democratic institutions, to the establishment of peace between warring nations, the UN is present on the ground supporting economic and social development and the promotion and protection of human rights.

In this effort, the UN works closely with Africa's regional cooperation mechanisms and has six active peacekeeping operations at present. UN peacekeepers serve in two missions in Sudan, including one in Darfur (with the African Union), in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Western Sahara.

To advance its support for Africa even further, the United Nations Africa was established in 2003 to enhance international support for African development and security and to improve coordination of UN system support. It also works to facilitate global

deliberations on Africa, particularly with respect to the New Partnership for Africa's Development — a strategic framework adopted by African leaders in 2001.

The Response of the International Community to conflicts:

The collapse of state institutions in Somalia, a coup in Haiti, and civil wars in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries have marked the distinctive contours of civil strife in the past twenty years. The international community's responses to these emergencies have been, despite sometimes major efforts, mixed at best: occasional successes in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so.

At the end of the Cold War, the member states of the United Nations (UN) expanded its agenda, defining a new revolution in the relation between what is in the legitimate realm of state sovereignty and what is subject to legitimate international intervention. From 1990 through 1993, the UN Security Council adopted a strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII, the enforcement provisions concerning international peace and security. Member states thus endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention just as a series of ethnic and civil wars erupted across the globe. Unfulfilled commitments, on the one hand, and escalating use of force, on the other, soon provoked a severe crisis in "peace enforcement." In Bosnia and Somalia "peace enforcement" amounted to "war-making" as the United Nations threatened to impose by force outcomes—ranging from disarmament, to safe havens, "no fly zones," and new state borders—on armed factions that recognized no political authority superior to their own. Elsewhere, as in Rwanda, the UN record was a failure even to attempt to exercise enforcement as peace agreements fell apart. As a consequence, more than 700,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus fell at the hands of genocidal extremists that had seized the government. The current balance sheet on UN "war-making" thus suggests that while the UN has served an effective role in legitimizing enforcement coalitions for interstate, armed collective security (as in Korea and against Iraq in Gulf War I), the United Nations has proven to be a very ineffective peace enforcer, or war-maker, in the many intrastate, civil conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War world.

At the same time, evidence from the peace operations in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), and East Timor suggests a seemingly contradictory (but actually complementary) conclusion. Here the UN succeeded in fostering peace through consent, building on an enhancement of Chapter VI-based peace-making negotiations and a creative, multidimensional implementation of the transitional authority that the peace agreements provided.

Clearly, consent does not guarantee success. The wars in Angola refuted each of the many agreements that supposedly settled them, and the Rwanda genocide belied the peace agreement signed at Arusha. Weak implementation undermines even the best of agreements. None, moreover, of the successfully implemented operations lacked challenges. In Cambodia the United Nations undertook a multidimensional peace operation—the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia—but the peace it left behind in 1993 was partial as the Khmer Rouge resumed sporadic armed resistance. Cambodia also suffered a coup in 1997 and then struggled ahead with an elected government that has been accused of numerous election irregularities. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), and Mozambique peace is firmer. But even there the long run prospects of social integration remain problematic. In Bosnia, the international community struggles to unite what emerged from the Dayton Peace process as a de facto partition. Current stability is a direct function of the coercive glue of NATO (Stabilization Force) peacekeeping. The international community intervened and assumed temporary sovereignty in Kosovo and East Timor. East Timor is now an independent state; the task of assisting the development of a viable polity in Kosovo has barely begun.

Despite overcoming many challenges and achieving many successes, the UN's future as peace-maker has been under challenge in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere from those who fail to understand how successful the UN has been and can continue to be in a "peace building" role. Obviously, multilateral peace building cannot replace national foreign policy, even in policies directed toward states in crisis. Not only does multilateral peace enforcement regularly fail, but multilateral peace-building, because of its impartial character, will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will choose. It is not the favored means to impose neo-imperial clients, acquire military bases, or garner economic concessions. Successful multilateral peace building builds functioning states that can defend their own interests. But where states seek a sustainable peace to end a festering civil war, multilateral peace building, when well designed and well managed, can produce that peace from which neighbors and the wider international community will benefit, and do so while sharing costs on a fair basis. Clearly, we should avoid "throwing the baby out with the bathwater."

Stopping civil wars has never been more important. Since the end of the Cold War period, almost all new armed conflicts have occurred within the territories of sovereign states. Repeat civil wars in Rwanda and Angola, products of failed peace agreements, alone resulted in several million casualties in the 1990s. Internal (civil or intrastate) war has replaced interstate war as the paramount concern of organizations charged with maintaining international peace and security. Civil wars have negative security and economic externalities and can destabilize entire regions. Beyond the deaths and displacements that are caused directly by the war, civil wars also cause a deterioration of

health levels for the entire region long after the fighting ends. Civil wars have regional contagion or diffusion effects, and they reduce rates of economic growth in both the directly affected countries and their neighbors. Civil wars typically do not occur between standing armies, but rather between a government army, or militia, and one or more rebel organizations. Violence is usually targeted at civilians, and the objectives of civil wars range from secession to control of the state or resource predation. Civilian deaths as a percentage of all war-related deaths increased to 90 percent in 1990 from approximately 50 percent in the eighteenth century. Internal wars have created approximately 13 million refugees and 38 million internally displaced persons.

The New Interventionism:

As Secretary-General Kofi Annan memorably described the new UN role in 1998: “Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or—when neither of those things is possible—at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading.” He was reflecting the activism of the Security Council, which between 1987 and 1994 had quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The annual peacekeeping budget skyrocketed correspondingly from \$230 million to \$3.6 billion in the same period, thus reaching to about three times the UN’s regular operating budget of \$1.2 billion. The activities of the Security Council in preventive diplomacy and sanctions, the Secretariat’s role in election monitoring, and above all, the massive growth in peacekeeping and peace enforcement all testified to the newly appreciated role the international community wanted the UN—or somebody—to play.

The international legal prohibitions against intervention were more relevant than ever given the demands for national dignity made by the newly independent states of both the Third World and the former Second World. But the rules as to what constitutes intervention and what constitutes international protection of basic human rights shifted as well. Sovereignty was redefined to incorporate a global interest in human rights protection. The traditional borders between sovereign consent and intervention were blurred. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement almost merged into “robust peacekeeping,” which signaled a willingness to use force if needed whether in consent-based peacekeeping or imposed peace enforcement. A newly functioning United Nations, moreover, was seen to be a legitimate agent to decide when sovereignty was and was not violated.

The revival of the UN Security Council led to a reaffirmation after years of Cold War neglect of the UN Charter’s Article 2, clause 7 affirming nonintervention, except as

mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII. The UN then claimed a “cleaner hands” monopoly on legitimate intervention. Although the letter of the Charter prohibited UN authorizations of force other than as a response to threats or breaches of “international” peace, the Genocide Convention and the record of condemnation of colonialism and apartheid opened an informally legitimate basis for involvement in domestic conflict. The Security Council’s practice thus broadened the traditional reasons for intervention, including aspects of domestic political oppression short of massacre and human suffering associated with economic misfeasance—the so-called failed states and the *droit d’ingerence*. Building on new interpretations advanced during the Cold War that made, for example, apartheid a matter for international sanction, the United Nations addressed the starvation of the Somali people when it became clear that its government was incapable of doing so. (In this case, however, the traditional criteria of “international” threats were also invoked—including Somali refugees spreading across international borders—in order to justify forcible intervention under Chapter VII.) The Security Council also demanded international humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, insisting, for example, that humanitarian assistance be allowed to reach the people affected in Yugoslavia and in Iraq.

Regions differed on the meaning of operational sovereignty. The Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) remained a bastion of strict sovereignty, and nonintervention is the norm. Although Cambodia and Burma’s acceptance into ASEAN were delayed by their human rights record and instability, they were both eventually accepted. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the other hand has defined standards of (1990) “Good Governance” that included democracy and declared (July 3, 1993) that internal disputes are matters of regional concern. And, more strikingly, the Organization of American States (in Res. 1080 and in the “Santiago Commitment of 1991”) has declared coups against democracy illegitimate and has adopted economic sanctions against coups in Haiti and Peru. The European Union makes democracy an element in the criteria it demands for consideration in membership.

It was also important that the “international community” had a newly legitimate means of expressing its collective will on an internationally impartial basis. The Security Council lays claim to being the equivalent of a “global parliament” or “global jury” representing not merely the individual states of which it is composed but also a collective will and voice of the “international community.” The Security Council includes five permanent members (United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) and ten nonpermanent, elected members, always including members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Its authorization for an intervention requires the affirmative vote of nine states, including no negative votes from the five permanent members (the P5) and four positive votes from the ten elected members. Such a vote would have to incorporate representatives of a variety of cultures, races, and religions. It would always include representatives of large

and small countries, capitalist and socialist economies, and democratic and nondemocratic polities. If the mandated operation is UN directed and if troops and funding are required, many other troop contributing states will be needed, and they can say no in practice. The combination makes for a genuinely international impartial intervention, and hence “cleaner hands.”

Those developments coincided with a temporary conjunction of power and will. Following the collapse of the USSR, the United States experienced a “unipolar moment” when its power eclipsed that of all other states. At the same time the international community, including the United States, adopted a strategy of “assertive multilateralism,” which lasted from the Gulf War in January 1991 until the October 3, 1993, disaster in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council, led by the United States, provided a degree of commitment and resourceful leadership that the UN had rarely seen before. The small dissenting minority in the Security Council—which included China on some occasions and Russia on others—was not prepared to resist the United States on issues that did not affect their paramount national interests. The successful reversal of Saddam Hussein’s aggression in the Gulf and the December 1992 U.S.-led rescue of segments of the Somali population from starvation heralded what appeared to be a remarkable partnership. The Security Council decreed, the United States led, and—conveniently, for the while—many other states paid and supported.

However, the international community still needed to find a way to promote sustainable peace, one that enlisted the support of a substantial majority of the local population and embodied basic principles of human rights. This proved to be a challenge in the 1990s as massive UN interventions, warlike enforcement operations, provoked some of the same sorts of resistance as did colonial interventions in places such as Somalia and Bosnia. But in other cases the UN found a way to cultivate consent and then build a peace with genuine indigenous roots. These peace building operations rested on important innovations in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and institutional reconstruction, as well as discrete residual enforcement, all of which evolved to address particular aspects of these challenges.

Generations of UN Peace Operations:

In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the UN’s agenda for peace and security thus rapidly expanded. At the request of the UN Security Council Summit of January 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). In addition to preventive diplomacy designed to head off conflicts before they became violent, the Secretary General outlined the four

interconnected roles that he hoped the UN would play in the fast changing context of post–Cold War international politics.

1. *preventive diplomacy*, undertaken in order “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” Involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning and possibly “preventive deployment” of UN authorized forces, preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects of peaceful settlement.
2. *peace enforcement*, authorized to act with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these military forces are composed of heavily armed national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary-General.
3. *peacemaking*, designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences.
4. *peacekeeping*, established to deploy a “United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,” as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials to implement an agreed peace.
5. *post conflict reconstruction*, organized to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable peace.

The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace is the culmination of an evolution of UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945. It combines in a radical way instruments of warlike enforcement and peace like negotiation that were once kept separate and that evolved separately. A unique vocabulary separates distinct strategies that fit within the generic UN doctrine of building peace. These strategies, evolving over time, have encompassed three generational paradigms of peace building. They include not only the early activities identified in UN Charter Chapter VI *first generation* peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of *second generation* operations that rely on the consent of parties and an even

more ambitious group of *third generation* operations that operate with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties' acquiescence. In today's circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more factions in domestic civil wars, not all of whom are clearly identifiable—and few of whom are stable negotiating parties. Current peace operations thus intrude into aspects of domestic sovereignty once thought to be beyond the purview of UN activity.

Indeed, the post–World War Two UN Charter can be seen as having been designed for interstate wars (e.g., Article 39's threats to “international” peace); appropriately so, since, from 1900 to 1941, 80 percent of all wars were interstate among state armies. But from 1945 to 1976, 85 percent of all wars were on the territory of one state and internally oriented—of course with proxies.

Traditional peace operations, or *first generation peacekeeping*, were designed to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward. As F. T. Liu, an eminent peacekeeping official of the UN has noted: monitoring, consent, neutrality, nonuse of force, and unarmed peacekeeping—the principles and practices of first generation peacekeeping—constituted a stable and interdependent combination. These key principles were articulated by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in conjunction with the creation of the first peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai, which was sent to separate Israel and Egypt following the Franco-British-Israeli intervention in Suez in 1956. The principle of neutrality referred to the national origin of UN troops and precluded the use of troops from the permanent five members of the Council in order to quiet fears of superpower intervention. Impartiality implied that the UN would not take sides in the dispute and was a precondition for achieving the consent of all the parties. Enjoying the consent of all factions in turn made it easier for monitors of peacekeepers not to have to use force except in self-defense. Lastly, the Secretary-General exercised control of the force and the Security Council authorized it (or rarely, the General Assembly under the auspices of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”).

Impartiality and *neutrality* are frequently used interchangeably. Scholars and practitioners often speak of peacekeepers as “neutral,” “disinterested,” “impartial,” or “unbiased,” and they tend to mistake the need for impartiality with a policy of “strict neutrality” and a disposition of passivity. It is as important for peacekeepers to be *impartial* concerning, for example, which party in a freely conducted democratic election wins the election as it is for them to be *nonneutral* (i.e. not passive) with respect to violations of the peace and obstructions to their ability to implement their mandate. This is closely related to the interpretation of the fourth principle of peacekeeping—the nonuse of force. Peacekeeping uses soldiers not to win wars, but rather to preserve the peace. But peacekeepers must also protect their right to discharge their functions, in

accordance with the spirit of the parties' consent as extended at the outset of the operation. Raising the costs of noncooperation for the parties must, on occasion, allow the use of force in defense of the mandate. The limited use of force to protect a mandate authorized by a peace treaty or to enforce an agreed-upon cease-fire (as happened in Cyprus in 1974 or Namibia in 1989), does not equate peacekeeping with peace enforcement (which attempts to impose an overall settlement), but it does generate concerns with mission creep if the need to use force is extensive.

During the Cold War, the UN record indicated much success in interstate conflicts (while little in intrastate) and much in material and territorial settlement (while little in value or identity conflicts). The success of traditional peacekeeping was also dependent on successful *peacemaking*: a strategy designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. Traditional peacekeeping operations referred to the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and was frequently used to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace. Monitoring or observer missions had several of the same objectives as traditional peacekeeping operations, though they were typically less well armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring and reporting to the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

Both monitoring operations and traditional peacekeeping provided transparency—an impartial assurance that the other party was not violating the truce—and were supposed to raise the costs of defecting from an agreement by the threat of exposure and the potential (albeit unlikely) resistance of the peacekeeping force. The international legitimacy of UN mandates increased the parties' benefits of cooperation with the peacekeepers. The price of first generation peacekeeping, as in the long Cyprus operation, was sometimes paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved. Today these monitoring activities continue to play an important role on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria and, until recently, on the border between Kuwait and Iraq.

Monitoring and traditional peacekeeping operations were strictly bound by the principle of consent. Consent derives from the parties' "perceptions of the peacekeepers' impartiality and moral authority." It reduces the risk to the peacekeepers and preserves the sovereignty of the host state. Eroding consent can significantly diminish the peacekeepers' ability to discharge their mandate, so the peacekeepers have an incentive to enhance the parties' consent. Since eroding consent could turn PKOs into multibillion-dollar "obsolescing investments" that are easy hostages to insincere parties, it follows

that the UN should develop strategies to enhance consent. This flexibility is more easily provided in *second generation, multidimensional operations* that involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements designed to build the foundations of a self-sustaining peace and have been utilized primarily in post-civil war situations. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. These operations are based on the consent of the parties, but the nature of and purposes for which consent is granted are qualitatively different from traditional peacekeeping.

In addition to monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, the key strategy was to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable peace. Multidimensional peacekeeping is aimed at capacities expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society rebuilding). In these operations, the UN is typically involved in implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali observed in *An Agenda for Peace*, “peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace. These may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”

The UN has a commendable record of success, ranging from mixed to transformative, in “second generation,” multidimensional peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia). The UN’s role in helping settle those conflicts has been fourfold. It served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces, resettling refugees, and supervising transitional civilian authorities; as a peace builder monitoring and in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation; and in a very limited way as peace enforcer when the agreements came unstuck.

In Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s lexicon, “peace-enforcing”—effectively war-making—missions are *third generation* operations, which extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of

cease-fires and, when necessary, authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states. Like Chapter VII UN enforcement action to roll back aggression, as in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, the defining characteristic of “third generation” operations is the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or the entire UN mandate. These operations have been of three types. In the first, international forces attempt to impose order without significant local consent, in the absence of comprehensive peace agreement, and must in effect conquer the factions (as was attempted in Somalia). In the second, international forces did not have unanimous consent and have chosen to impose distinct arrangements on parties in the midst of an ongoing war (e.g., no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors of relief). In the third, international forces exercise force to implement the terms of comprehensive peace from which one or more of the parties has chosen to defect.

Enforcement operations draw upon the authority of UN Charter Article 42, which permits the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”; Article 25 under which member states “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”; and Article 43 in which they agree to “make available to the Security Council, on its call, ...armed forces, assistance and facilities.”

Insightful doctrine for these peace-enforcing operations appeared just as Somalia and Bosnia exposed their practical limitations. Recent studies have thoughtfully mapped out the logic of the strategic terrain between traditional UN peacekeeping and traditional UN enforcement action. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade, and deny. By precluding an outcome based on the use of force by the parties, the UN instead uses collective force (if necessary) to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the UN following this strategy could have established strong points to deter attacks on key humanitarian corridors. (It actually did, but the Serbs bypassed them.) Or it could threaten air strikes, as was done successfully around Sarajevo in February 1994, to dissuade a continuation of the Serb shelling of the city. Or it could have denied (but did not) the Serb forces their attack on Dubrovnik in 1992 by counter shelling from the sea or bombing from the air of the batteries in the hills above the city. Forcing a peace depends on achieving a complicated preponderance in which the forces (UN and local) supporting a settlement acceptable to the international community hold both a military predominance and a predominance of popular support, which together permit them to impose a peace on the recalcitrant local military forces and their popular supporters.

Countries provide troops to UN peace operations in various ways. Troop-contributing countries negotiate in detail the terms of the participation of their forces either under UN command and thus with the Secretary-General (as in El Salvador or Cambodia); with a regional organization authorized as delegated in Chapter VIII; or with the leader of a

multinational “coalition of the willing” authorized under Chapter VII, as was the case of U.S. leadership of Unified Task Force (UNITAF, sandwiched in between the two UN operations in Somalia). Many operations draw on a combination of authorizations: peace treaties among factions, backed up or supplemented by other measures authorized (such as arms embargoes, no-fly zones) under Chapter VII, as did the various UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) operations in the former Yugoslavia. And, as named in honor of its sponsors, “Chinese Chapter Seven” (employed to authorize the use of force for UNTAES) has emerged as a new way to signal firm intent to enforce a Chapter Six operation. In essence, however, it reaffirms the “Katanga Rule” of the ONUC operation in the Congo: the traditional principle that force can be used both in self-defense of peacekeeping troops and of the mission (mobility of the force).

The result of these three “generations” operating together in the post–Cold War world was an unprecedented expansion of the UN’s role in the protection of world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in countries, until recently, torn by costly civil wars. Self-determination and sovereignty were enhanced and a modicum of peace, rehabilitation, and self-sustaining self-determination was introduced in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia. Tens—perhaps, even hundreds—of thousands of lives were saved in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. But in 1993 and 1994, the more ambitious elements of “third generation” peace enforcement encountered many of the problems interventionist and imperial strategies have faced in the past, and discovered fresh problems peculiar to the UN’s global character.

The debacles in Somalia and Bosnia forced a radical rethinking of when and where the UN should get involved. Disingenuously, President Clinton told the General Assembly that it needed to learn when to say no. Many came to believe that the UN was not well suited to mounting effective peace operations—no more suited to make peace than the lobbyists who represented a trade group of hospitals would be to conduct surgery. Others thought that such operations should be delegated to regional organizations, and NATO preeminently. This last group began calling for a “fourth generation” of delegated peacekeeping.

The War in Somalia:

Somalia is similar to Afghanistan, but with more banditry and a coastline. There are two sides to the war; there is a land war against Islamic extremists, and a sea war against pirates. The capital Mogadishu went into meltdown in 1991 after rebel forces overthrew the dictator Siad Barre. The country was 100% lawless for a long time which meant drug pushing warlords were in charge. Then in amongst the mess an extremist Islamist group emerged. Today a large part of the country is ruled by a jihadist force named Al

Shabaab. Trying to take back land from the Sharia imposing hardliners is the official Somali Government with help from Ethiopia.

Like a lot of African wars, the conflict in Somalia is a civil war where powerful men are free to do as they please to make money. The biggest money making scheme is piracy.

The Somali war against the sea-faring bandits involves a massive international force, navies from the US, China, France and the UK stop machine gun wielding speedboat robbers from hijacking super tankers and demanding big ransoms.

Over the past fifteen months, Somalia achieved significant recovering from two turbulent decades of conflict. In 1990, following the fall of the Siad Barre dictatorship, the country failed to form a viable government and devolved into a civil war which lasted over twenty years. The radical Islamist group al Shabaab emerged as a major security challenge when the militants gained control of large parts of southern and central Somalia in late 2009. However in mid-2012, Kenyan forces, Ethiopian forces and the United Nations (UN) mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) succeeded in routing al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other key cities. The landmark battle of October 2012 drove al Shabaab from Kismayo, its last major stronghold. AMISOM's success and Mogadishu's security improvement paved the way for significant political achievements. Somalia installed a new parliament for the first time since the early 1990s when the Federal Government of Somalia was formed on 20 August 2012, upon termination of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) mandate 1. Somalis subsequently elected their first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, marking another political milestone. In early 2013, the United States officially recognised the Somali government for the first time in twenty years. The international community, including Western donors and regional governments, remain committed to defeating al Shabaab and rebuilding Somalia.

In February 2012, Britain hosted the first London Conference on Somalia; a meeting which focused mainly on ending the country's two decade long civil war, according to Sabahi. Fifteen months later, British Prime Minister David Cameron referred to Somalia's progress as "remarkable" in terms of politics and security. However, Cameron also described Somalia as "one of the most broken countries in the world", one that continues to top the failed states index after five years. In an effort to support peace-building efforts and augment the legitimacy of the fledgling government, Cameron and President Mohamud co-hosted the second London conference on 07 May 2013. Attended by over fifty countries and organisations to include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the conference secured well over USD 300 million to support security and reconstruction efforts in Somalia

AMISOM:

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate.

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006. IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Originally IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had recently engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism or ARPCT and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital.

Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a US-backed, western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006.

On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.

The Security Council had given a green light to the African Union to establish a mission in Somalia for six months, and requested the Secretary-General to send a technical Assessment Mission to look into the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation following the African union's deployment. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union mission to take all measures, as appropriate, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society

Its tasks include:

1. Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders.
2. Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) & key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions.
3. Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP).
4. Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.
5. Monitor the security situation in areas of operation.
6. Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
7. Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self defence

AMISOM Police:

Somalia has adopted a National Security and Stabilisation Plan which focuses on strategic policy issues relating to security and rule of law, including justice, and encompasses various civilian and military institutions that are vital to national security. It acknowledges the role of AMISOM in facilitating locally owned, comprehensive and broad-based security sector development.

The AMISOM Police component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advice the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict international standards.

In line with the National Security and Stabilisation Plan, the AMISOM Police component, with the assistance of international partners and on the basis of a comprehensive training needs assessment, has developed a training package for the Somali Police Force which includes:

- Courses for newly-promoted police lieutenants, in order to prepare them for duties as station commanders in the liberated areas of Somalia;
- Public Order training in consultation with the Angola National Police and Italian *Carabinieri*;
- A Search-Seize-Dispose of Explosives Course;

- Training to prepare the SPF to effectively perform duties in VIP protection and general law and order maintenance; and
- A number of training packages in areas such as gender-based violence, child rights and protection in conflict and post-conflict environments, training of trainers, community policing, traffic management and basic criminal investigation courses.

AMISOM Police are also involved in mentoring and advisory support to the SPF on basic police duties, such as human rights observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing and search procedures.

Humanitarian work:

In implementing its limited humanitarian mandate therefore, AMISOM has since its deployment in March 2007 effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu.

In terms of coordination and cooperation with humanitarian agencies, AMISOM Humanitarian Affairs Unit works closely with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, WFP and other UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. AMISOM also collaborates with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health and other relevant authorities. AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the deployed troops. Given the depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM Medical facilities have now become the one medical point where the civilian population around Mogadishu depend upon. The three hospital departments treat over twelve thousand (12000) patients per month on average. Their treatments vary from chronic medical diseases to surgical cases both acute and chronic. Over 90 per cent of these patients are from the local population including TFG troops and officials most of them requiring emergency surgical interventions.

The Tuareg rebellion in Mali:

Tuareg is the name of a tribal people who have rebelling against government authority since French colonialists tried to quash them in 1916. The nomadic tribe is dispersed over five nations in Northern Africa; in Mali the clan decided to form their own country. Since 1990 they have been trying to find a state to call their own. Tuareg mercenaries were employed in Gaddafi's army, after the dictator was killed in Libya, the soldiers were

out of work so they moved into Mali- with extra militant power available – it was a good opportunity for rebel commanders to try taking over the Azawad region of the country – they got their way and defeated Malian government forces. Independence was declared on April 6th 2012. At the moment it is stalemate as the Malian government is too weak to take back control of the region. However, Al Qaeda is on the prowl in the newly declared state, and the United States could send in troops to help out Malian forces to take back control the Tuareg held land at some point.

At an international conference in Brussels in May 2013, donors pledged \$4.2 billion for Mali on a range of fronts, including roads, energy and business development, hoping to help rebuild a nation that alarmed governments around the world when much of it collapsed and fell to Islamist militants last year.

Beyond the money, the United Nations has deployed 12,600 peacekeepers this summer to make sure the militants do not return, while a host of outside powers, with France and the United States in the lead, kept a watchful eye on preparations for elections that were held in July.

The Islamist militants who held sway for more than nine months in the country's north have been largely chased out defeated in a rapid French and Chadian military campaign in January and February. Hundreds of Islamists were killed; many have regrouped in lawless southern Libya, say regional officials, including Niger's foreign minister. But the separatist nomadic rebels whose 2012 uprising precipitated the takeover by Islamist extremists remain in control of the country's far north, refusing to budge from their stronghold in Kidal in spite of sabre-rattling in the capital, Bamako.

Mali, which played little role in the defeat of the militants on its own turf, remains vulnerable and incapable of defending or reconstructing itself. The militants have fled the principal towns of northern Mali — Gao and Timbuktu — but some remain in the region's villages, as evidenced by attempted suicide bombings and brief armed incursions into urbanized areas, which were repulsed after gun battles with French and Malian forces.

Outside governments are eager to forestall a repeat of last year's chaos, and two large-scale multinational efforts now under way, led by France and shepherded by the United Nations and the European Union, would effectively make this impoverished West African nation a ward of the international community.

The needs are immense. The Malians told donors that government "resources" decreased by 30 per cent after the coup. Nearly half a million people have fled their homes in the north, tens of thousands are still in refugee camps, most schools and health centres in that region remain closed and well over a million people are considered at risk of going hungry.

The Malians themselves, in their 48-page reconstruction plan, note the “fragility of the republic’s institutions” and the “poor governance and corruption riddling every area of national life.” Whether that recognition translates into a home-grown reform effort remains to be seen. The jockeying before the elections in late July resembles old-time Malian politics in the capital, with many in the discredited political class again playing prominent roles.

However, there is little disagreement that one of the most pressing needs is the country’s ineffectual military, which retreated in the face of last year’s rebel advance. The Malian report speaks of the “extreme weakness of the army,” and the United Nations is effectively proposing to step in as a substitute with what will be its third-largest peacekeeping force. Meanwhile, European Union military trainers are at work in Mali trying to reform the army.

The core of the United Nations force is expected to be the 6,000 regional African troops already deployed, though a Pentagon official called them “completely incapable” in remarks to Congress. Soldiers from Senegal, Togo and Niger now operate in Gao and its environs. Troops from Burkina Faso are in Timbuktu. They will be backed by the 1,000 French troops who remain in the country, authorized to intervene when the peacekeepers are under “imminent and serious threat.”

The War in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

Like a lot of modern wars it’s a fight for control of resources, a conflict which is all about getting hold of copper, gold and all kinds of exotic rocks. DRC is a huge country and most of the action happens in the eastern part of the country, in a region named North and South Kivu, around a lake named Lake Kivu.

The region is lawless; warlords, militia groups – rebel groups backed by neighbouring countries – and DRC’s own government forces are all trying to take and hold power. DR Congo has major mineral reserves, and any country or organization that gets caught up in the country wants some of the wealth. Of all the current wars in Africa, the war in DRC is the most brutal; out-of-control militants swarm into villagers and rape, mutilate and kill anyone they get their hands on – on a daily basis.

Since 1996 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has helped the Democratic Republic of Congo to recover and rebuild in the aftermath of conflict and civil war. Today the IRC is one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid in the country, with more than 750 staff members (most of them Congolese) serving over 4,000,000 people in seven provinces. In addition to providing healthcare, education, and programs for women and girls, the IRC brings community-driven reconstruction initiatives to thousands of conflict-affected villages through an innovative program called Tuungane (“Let’s Unite”). Our

work emphasizes creating partnerships with local communities and providing the training, tools, and resources they need to build a prosperous and peaceful Congo.

Launched in 2007, the Tuungane program is an innovative approach to community driven reconstruction in areas affected by conflict. Just as important, Tuungane introduces participatory methods to people who previously had little influence over their own communities. rather than just being passive recipients of aid, Tuungane encourages villagers to nominate and elect local development committees that decide what reconstruction projects a village should pursue.

- To date, Tuungane has helped some 1.8 million community members build or rehabilitate 1,120 classrooms, 170 clinics, 400 wells and water systems, 130 markets and mills, and more than 240 km of roads.
- By 2014 more than 5,500 additional projects will be completed in the provinces of Maniema, Katanga, North Kivu, and South Kivu—reaching 2.6 million people across an area more than twice the size of the United Kingdom.
- Each reconstruction or development project is overseen by a democratically elected local committee that acts on the community's behalf, providing a hands-on opportunity for community members to see the principles of good governance in action

Through the Tuungane program, the IRC and its partner organization, CARE, bring together community members and local government officials to rebuild infrastructure and improve basic services using principles of good governance. Community members discuss and decide their needs and priorities, such as building clinics, schools, and roads, and the IRC provides the training, funding, and support to bring the projects to fruition. Tuungane puts decision-making power in the hands of local people and fosters civic engagement, transparency, accountability and trust—key factors in maintaining peace and stability.

The Conflict in the Niger Delta:

The Niger Delta is huge oil producing region in southern Nigeria. The population is 28 Million, there are 606 fields, 5,284 wells, 4350 of pipelines, ten export terminals, 275 flow stations, four refineries – all run by multinational oil corporations. The heavily armed militants of an angry militia group called MEND make life difficult for the oil men by wrecking industry infrastructure – attacks have been known to change the world crude oil price. The mega corporations employ mercenaries who use helicopter gunships to punish the guerrilla force for destroying pipelines and wells. Poverty and inequality are the root cause of the insurgency. Billions of dollars' worth of oil is extracted in the region, and all the profits go to the global energy firms and important men in Lagos, the capital.

Neither Nigeria nor foreign donors are investing enough to end violent conflict in the Niger Delta. While Nigerian officials opt to buy short-term cease-fires, such as the 2009 amnesty process, other governments spend too little in money and manpower to grow local civil society, engage core conflict issues, or adequately understand the region's problems.

All parties likewise fail to focus on deeper trends when planning their anti-conflict strategies. This causes them to undervalue the potential costs of on-going violence, as well as the importance of a peaceful Niger Delta to Nigeria's economic development and global energy security.

The situation in the delta remains fragile and will likely return either to intermittent conflict or full-blown insurgency within six to eighteen months if a "business as usual" approach is taken to interventions. The amnesty process opened a door for stabilization but did not reduce the long-term potential for violence or deal with root conflict issues.

Governance is both at the heart of the conflict and the best place to seek solutions. To best help catalyse peace in the region, donors should invest heavily in democratization and learn lessons from a decade of setbacks and poor investment choices. International support for governance reform in the delta must start at the grass roots. The key is to lay a foundation to support and argue for better government practices higher up.

Civil society is already having some success promoting accountability at the community level. Obstacles are high and progress is slow, making longer commitments from donors a must. Reformers in the Niger Delta also have operated too much in isolation. Local and international actors need a multilateral strategy allowing them to combine levers and use each other's momentum. They must ground this strategy in deeper analysis of the region's problems and a unified theory of change.

The War in Ivory Coast:

The war in Ivory Coast is more straight-forward than most civil wars because the country has no massive oil or mineral wealth up for grabs. Like a lot of African nations, the country is still trying to find an identity after gaining independence from colonial rule. The war is a struggle among various people and groups. It's all about powerful men who want to rule the country and ethnic groups who want the government to do more things for them.

The war has been in two parts so far; the first part of the conflict started in 2002 after rebel forces representing marginalized people tried to take control of the country. The battle lasted until 2006 when Didier Drogba, the former Chelsea player begged for peace on national TV and put in motion talks which put in place a cease-fire. In 2011 things went downhill again when the ruler Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down after he was

voted out of office. Militia groups working for Alassane Ouattara, the man who won the elections managed to take control and Laurent Gbagbo was arrested and sent to The Hague for butchering opponents. Ouattara is now in power, and the country is in a state of precarious peace and likely to fall back into a state of war soon.

Ouattara, a former International Monetary Fund technocrat, will have to prioritize reconciliation, rebuild institutions, and jump-start the country's stagnating economy. But first, experts say, he will need to gain firm control over the rival militias that could derail all other efforts.

How Ouattara handles the aftermath of the Gbagbo presidency – offering amnesty, exile, or reconciliation instead of retributive justice – can set the tone for his presidency, and determine whether Ivorian society moves to the next step of national cohesion or remains deeply divided along ethnic and political lines. Ouattara needs to reform the electoral system, and also the security sector, and the constitutional court.

Ouattara's first priority will be to choose a political and technical team to manage the transition. In the midterm, he will need to start tackling the issues that have divided the country in the first place: the newly created split between a mainly Muslim north and a mainly Christian south; between elites who own the country's resources, and those who don't; between armed factions that are united only when they face one another, but often fragment into ill-disciplined militias when left alone. However, Ouattara's greatest challenge will be security. Ouattara must merge the best-trained and least-tainted members of opposing armies into a single force.

The Sudan Conflict:

Sudan has been in a state of on-off civil war since the whole country got independence from Britain. The war is between Arab Muslims in the North and African Christians in the South. The South has wanted to be separate and autonomous since 1955 and the North did not want them to be. The first part of the conflict lasted until 1972 when a shaky peace agreement was found - 11 years after, in 1982 the Southern rebels got active again. The South Sudanese rebel army – The Sudan People's Liberation Movement fought the official Sudanese Government for independence for 22 years – until 2005 – this time they got their way.

The South Sudanese got their own state as part of a peace deal. In 2011 the country split and the southern part became known as South Sudan and the northern part remained Sudan, but smaller. Peace didn't last long, when both sides split, there wasn't a proper agreement over rights of the big oil wells on the border. Petro-dollars kept Sudan's GDP respectable. Not long after official independence a war kicked off over the oil. And in April of this year Omar Bashir, Sudan's dictator declared total war on South Sudan and told supporters of plans to storm the country and seize the capital.

Rebuild Africa and its role in Liberia:

Rebuild Africa is a non-profit organization founded by William "Bill" Massaquoi in 2007. After completing his Masters degree in International Development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Bill asked several friends to join him in starting Rebuild Africa with the aim of partnering with the people of Liberia to rebuild their war-ravaged lives and communities through education, vocational training, mentoring and the provision of opportunities and resources to create jobs and services that would benefit the poor.

Since its founding, Rebuild Africa has given over 100 scholarships to students in grades K through 12 and at universities in Liberia. In addition, dozens of young Liberians have been trained in construction trades such as brick-making, masonry and carpentry in Lofa County (NW Liberia), a primary and secondary school in the outskirts of Monrovia has been renovated and expanded, and a university student leadership conference was sponsored in 2009. Rebuild Africa is also officially registered in Liberia as a non-governmental organization with an office in downtown Monrovia.

Emboldened by faith and compassion, Rebuild Africa envisions a day when Liberians--their lives, social institutions, economy and communities--are vigorous, dynamic and thriving, having overcome the devastation of its recent civil war.

Rebuild Africa aims to contribute to the realization of this vision by empowering and equipping a new generation of Liberians to lead societal institutions, create jobs and businesses, and provide necessary goods and services.

Rebuild Africa will empower and equip Liberians to attain this mission by providing educational opportunities, vocational training and leadership mentoring.

How their plan is put forth:

1. Rebuild Africa will run a feeder scholarship program at the Action Faith Institute, vocational training centres and other Liberian institutions of higher learning to attract and prepare students with leadership potential
2. Students go through a rigorous program of education, training, mentoring, and practical hands-on experience
3. The cost of education is paid forward by direct payment of student loans, government and donor subsidies, and the student's own volunteer efforts in creating social services that benefit the under-served of Liberia
4. Our graduates are then attractive to, and are hired by, other employers due to the quality of their preparation and their output

How it will go to scale:

Through a hybrid model that utilizes government subsidies, philanthropic contributions, money-making enterprises and supply chains which will provide critical goods and community services, thus creating incentives that will encourage participants and stake holders to make it work.

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