

# Youths, Radicalization and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria

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# Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria



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## Preface

The outbreak of domestic terrorism instanced by the violent activities of groups such as the Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad (aka Boko Haram) and the Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (aka Ansaru) is generally viewed as the 'mother' of all violent conflicts currently afflicting Nigeria. Although the sect's name has changed over the years – Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, – its core mission is to overthrow the Nigerian state and impose strict Islamic Sharia law on Northern Nigeria. Its ideology is rooted in Salafi jihadism and its actions driven by Takfirism.

Since July 2009 when it provoked a short-lived anti-government uprising in northern Nigeria, the sect has mounted serial attacks that have placed it in media spotlight, both locally and internationally. The sect is now feared for its ability to mount both 'low-scale' and audacious attacks in Nigeria. It has staged attacks targeting mainly security and law enforcement agents, in addition to attacks on civilians, critical infrastructure, community or religious leaders, centres of worship, markets, schools, and media houses, among others. Its tactics include use of improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings. By December 2013, the sect is reported to have carried out over 300 attacks in Northern Nigeria. These attacks are estimated to have cost several lives since 2009, including deaths caused by the security forces. The 26 August 2011 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja that killed 23 people was devastating evidence that the group aims to internationalize its acts of terror.

This research comes at a critical point in Nigeria's history when the activities of violent extremist groups have resulted to different degrees of insecurity in the country particularly in the northern region. The solution to the situation has remained daunting, as the government in its efforts to bring solution, continues to use the most prevalent approach, which is hinged on the use of the military to contain the crisis. The much-desired outcome of peace and stability seems to elude Nigeria as a country as Nigerians continue to be killed and displaced by their deadly activities. The Boko Haram group seems to be expanding on its network through its recruitment of young Nigerians.

On this premise, CLEEN Foundation conducted a research to understand why young Nigerians are prone to joining the Boko Haram group. The aim of the study is to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis.



## Acknowledgement

The CLEEN Foundation is grateful to the many individuals, groups and organizations who contributed to this publication. First, we are grateful to the United States Institute of Peace (most especially David R. Smock, Vice President, Governance, Law & Society and Director, Religion and Peace-making Centre) for making this project and publication possible through its funding support.

We acknowledge the invaluable contribution of the lead researcher, Dr. Freedom Onuoha, Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Abuja, for his commitment and expertise throughout the study and this publication.

We wish to thank our researchers from the six focal states who worked tirelessly for the success of the study that led to this publication.

We appreciate the support of the CLEEN Foundation team led by the Executive Director, 'Kemi Okenyodo for their commitments and dedication to the realisation of the project's objectives and Valkamiya Ahmadu, Senior Program Officer, CLEEN Foundation, who closely managed the entire process.

## Executive Summary

The violent activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which draws its members largely from the youth, have underpinned growing concern over youth radicalisation and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. Radicalisation as it is understood here entails the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. Against this backdrop, this study examined the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The aim of the study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study were to:

- ❖ Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria;
- ❖ Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalisation to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and
- ❖ Proffer actionable recommendations on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis.

The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, and primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires and focus group discussions. Commissioned consultants and researchers conducted the field study in two towns in six states in Northern Nigeria – Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe – selected for the study.

It found that ignorance of the true teachings of the religion (Islam) provides the most important source through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental

upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by extremist or terrorist groups. The study also found that the excesses of security forces are not a 'major' factor in youth radicalisation, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. However, obvious shortcomings of security forces deployed in counter Boko Haram operations need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities.

In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the study recommended, among others, better monitoring and regulation of religious preaching in Nigeria; creation of job opportunities for the youth; delivery of robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children; expansion of access to quality education; and promotion of peace education.

In view of some limitations encountered, the study concluded that there was still much to be done in unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisation, particularly in relation to the specificities of each state where the phenomenon of radicalisation has and is taking place in Northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the utility of the study lies in the fact that it has taken the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria through an empirical research. The distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and sustainable solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria.



# Chapter 1

## BACKGROUND

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## INTRODUCTION

The return to democracy in Nigeria in May 1999 brought hopes of rapid development and political stability to Nigeria. However, the last decade has experienced an upsurge in violent conflicts and criminality, which tended to undermine those expectations. The violence and criminality have come in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and militancy among others. Particularly worrisome is the frequency and intensity of violent conflicts.

Nigeria's internal security has been significantly undermined by violent activities of armed non-state actors, largely made up of radicalised youth groups as foot soldiers. Prominent among these groups are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the O'Odia Peoples Congress (OPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Kato', and Ombatse, among others.

While these groups have evolved and transformed over time and have equally engaged in different forms of violent activities, what is common among them is the role of the youth as critical actors. In particular, the Boko Haram has leveraged on the vulnerability of the Nigerian youth to deepen their process and drive for recruitment

and radicalisation. Many believe that the sympathizers of the group are mostly disaffected and unemployed youths who live in hostile environment, with challenges spanning economic, social, and political deprivations.

The emergence of the Boko Haram has caused the climate of fear and insecurity. Although the movement had incubated in Northern Nigeria since the early 2000s, it however attracted worldwide attention beginning from 26 July 2009, when it waged a violent anti-government uprising that killed over 800 people, including civilians, group's members, and security personnel. The revolt attracted one of the heaviest security crackdowns in Nigerian history. The five-day revolt ended on 30 July when Boko Haram's charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was captured and subsequently executed by the police while in their custody.

Since the 2009 uprising, the group's tactics have evolved from poorly planned open confrontations with state security forces to increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, ambush, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings (Onuoha 2012a). Although its operation focused primarily on Maiduguri, Borno State, various depressing episodes of their attacks have also occurred in other states in the North East, like Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi and Adamawa. They have also been recorded in some states in the North West such as Kaduna and Kano and in Abuja, Niger, Kogi and Plateau States in the North Central. To date, exact statistics on the death toll resulting from their attacks is hard to count, however, a recent article claimed that violence linked to the group's insurgency has resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2013 (Odeh, 2014:22).

The Nigerian government has responded with 'hard security' or kinetic measures to weaken the group, in the form of deportation of illegal immigrants, capacity building of security forces on counter terrorism, closure of international borders, and deployment of a joint military task force, among others. Of note are the deployment, in June 2011, of a Joint Task Force (JTF) to help restore order to Borno State and the setting up of Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North- East Zone of Nigeria. In January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 15 local governments across four states in the North. By July 2012 when the state of emergency ceased, the security crisis had not been addressed. In May 2013, President Jonathan again declared a state of emergency in the three most-affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The military surge initially reduced the frequency of attacks in major towns and cities in the North, prompting the military to claim that its offensive in the North-East had put Boko Haram in disarray. The recent spate of violence however suggests otherwise.

Although security forces have been able to arrest or kill some of the sect's known commanders, the ability of the group to continue to mount brutal isolated attacks as well as recruit followers to replace killed members have raised questions over the efficacy of military or kinetic response to the four-year insurgency in Northern Nigeria. More so, it has raised concerns over the resilience of the group in fuelling radicalisation of Nigeria's youth, especially in Northern Nigeria.

It is against this background that the CLEEN Foundation undertook this mapping study to examine the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The study aims at providing a better understanding of the issues involved and proffering alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- ❖ Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria;
- ❖ Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalisation to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and
- ❖ Proffer actionable recommendations based on reliable field reports on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis.

## **RADICALISATION: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

The concept of radicalisation is not only central to this mapping study, but is also a subject that has gained significant currency in usage by government officials, media practitioners, scholars and security officials in discourses on terrorism and violent extremism. It is apposite to clarify the way it is understood and applied to this study, before delving into the diverse discourses in the six northern states that the study was carried out.

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, attention on this phenomenon continues to increase. Yet there is no single definition of the term that is generally agreed upon by its diverse users. As Schmid has rightly noted, "the terms 'radicalisation' and 'de-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists, is a frustrating experience" (Schmid 2013:1).

Ashour, for instance, posits that radicalisation is "a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the

rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals” (Ashour 2009:4). For Sodipo, radicalisation is “a process by which an individual or group adopts extreme political, social, or religious ideals that reject the status quo, undermine contemporary ideas regarding freedom of choice and expression, and condone violence to achieve ideological ends, including undertaking terrorist acts” (Sodipo 2013:4). It typically starts with changes in one’s self-identification. Grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well as international events, fuel this change. In the view of Schmid, radicalisation entails:

an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialisation away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate (Schmid 2013:18).

Although there is no unanimity among scholars on the definition of the term, analysts are almost in agreement that radicalisation is a process. Factors that engender the radicalisation of individuals or groups have remained a subject of debate among experts. It has been argued that the causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are abundant. In other words, experts believe that there is no single factor that leads an individual or even a group to become radicalised, but rather, it is the complex overlap of concurring and mutually reinforcing factors (see Evans and Neumann 2009; Kirby 2007; Ferrero 2005; Stern 2003).

To this end, a study on causal factors of radicalisation concludes that a complex interaction between factors at three levels – individual, external and social – is likely to be crucial for the intensity of the readiness for radicalisation (Danish Institute for International Studies 2008). External factors manifest themselves independent of the individual. They shape and constrain people’s environment, but individuals have only



minor influence on their environment. External factors can be subdivided into political, economic and cultural dimensions. Social factors refer to mechanisms that position the individual in relation to relevant others and hence can include people from in-groups as well as out-groups.

Wiktorowicz has identified four interrelated stages of the radicalisation process as follows: i) cognitive opening whereby individuals conditioned by both internal and external factors like economic and social circumstances become receptive to new ideas; ii) religious seeking during which individuals seek religious understanding of the issues; iii) frame alignment where the new ideas which are often radical in nature become meaningful to them, and iv) Socialisation during which individuals internalise radical ideas that enable them to join extremist groups (Beutel 2007). This process may not entirely explain the circumstances for all radicalised people and Islamic groups but certainly illuminates how youths get radicalised in the West and other parts of the world.

These factors can manifest in different forms depending on the individual and context. However, agreement tends to revolve around a broad set of parameters that act as ingredients in the radicalisation process: grievance, ideology, mobilisation, and tipping points. While grievance is understood to be the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening, ideology entails the extreme set of ideas that provides the individual with a new outlook and explanation for the world an individual finds him or herself. Mobilisation captures the process by which the individual is slowly integrated into a community of individuals who are like-minded and create a self-reinforcing community, and finally, tipping points are the specific events that push an individual or group from rhetoric to action (Beutel 2007). External forces can also facilitate and reinforce these factors.

While these varying definitions and explanatory frameworks illuminate our understanding of radicalisation, it is important to bear in mind that what attracts young people to radical behaviour differs from person to person with the most important being the individual factor. As experts have argued, "the part to radicalisation is a highly individualised one, with very different characteristics from a person to person" (Vidino, Pantucci and Kohlmann 201:230). According to the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end-state (Danish Institute for International Studies 2008: 6). Rather, radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.

This study, therefore, defines radicalisation as the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism.

In the light of the foregoing, the critical challenge is to uncover the reason young people are inclined to being part of insurgent groups in Northern Nigeria, particularly Boko Haram. Since youth radicalisation within the context of Nigeria is best demonstrated by the activities of the Boko Haram, an overview of the origin, philosophy and activities of the group is appropriate here to foreground the discourse on the drivers of radicalisation interrogated in the six states in Northern Nigeria – Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe.

## UNDERSTANDING THE BOKO HARAM

As Adibe has recently noted, “though Boko Haram has dominated the security discourse in Nigeria since early 2010, nearly everything about the sect still remains contested – from the meaning of its name to the reasons for its emergence and radicalisation, and whether it has connection with foreign terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” (Adibe2013:10).

It is not clear when the Boko Haram came into being. A common account of the origin of the Boko Haram often offered by the media traces it to 2002, when a charismatic preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, became the leader of the group. To the intelligence community in Nigeria, however, its true historical root dates back to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the *Ahlulsunnawal’jama’ahhijra* or *Shabaab* group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State (Taiwo and M. Olugbode 2009:4; Adisa2012). The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf assumed leadership of the sect. Over time, the group has incarnated under various names like the *Muhajirun*, *Hijrah*, *AhlisSunnahwalJama’a*, *Yusufiyyah* sect and *Nigerian Taliban*, among others (Onuoha 2013a).

The ideology of the sect is premised on the orthodox Islamic teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which treats anything western as completely un-Islamic (Sani 2011). It abhors conventional banking system, taxation, jurisprudence, civil service and western education as infidel or inimical with the tenets of Islam. It is the rejection of these [Western] institutions that earned the group its popular name—Boko Haram, literally meaning ‘Western education is

forbidden'. The term *Boko Haram* is derived from a combination of the Hausa word *boko*, meaning 'book', and the Arabic word *Haram*, which means forbidden. However, the group prefers to be called by its real name--*Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awatiwal Jihad*, meaning a "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad".

Its core objective is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a strict Islamic Sharia law, applicable throughout the entire country. The Boko Haram draws its members mainly from disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and destitute children, mostly from but not limited to Northern Nigeria. Members also come from neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Sudan. The sect's membership also includes some wealthy, educated and influential people. For instance, it is alleged that Alhaji Buji Foyi, an ex-commissioner in Borno State; Kadiru Atiku, a former university lecturer; and Bunu Wakil, a very rich Borno-based contractor, are members of BH (Agbo 2011).

The Boko Haram group is known to sustain its operations through diverse sources of funding. Of these, four major financing streams stand out: membership dues, donation from some politicians, financial assistance from foreign terrorist groups; raiding of banks; and ransom from kidnapping (Onuoha 2013a). The group is also alleged to engage in extortion of money from local residents of areas it had controlled as well as from wealthy persons who they intimidate into paying 'protection fee' to avoid being attacked by them.

Although the exact date of the sect's emergence still remains a subject of debate among security agents, commentators and writers, there is near consensus that the sect's resort to violence in pursuit of its objective dates back to 24 December 2003, when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State. Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan's Taliban movement over the camps. A joint "operation of soldiers and police dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members" (Suleiman 2007:25). The sect had earlier established a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State.

Around this period, Mohammed Yusuf was already becoming charismatic to the youths in Maiduguri for his preaching about the excesses of government officials culminating in his frequent declaration of secular education as *haram* (Arabic word meaning forbidden) to Muslims. However, it must be understood that the ideology that secular education is forbidden [to Muslims] is not new in Northern Nigeria but those with such beliefs have never been violent to enforce such beliefs on others. The group under Yusuf's spiritual leadership and command "strove for self-exclusion of its members

from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualise and radicalise the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state” (Isa 2010:333). His preaching attracted unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states, and even from neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad.

The activities of his group became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, who constituted the sect’s members, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group. By disassociating from the large society, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. On 21 September 2004 members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition (Onuoha 2012b). It maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe States until the famous July 2009 anti-government uprising in Nigeria.

The remote cause of the July 2009 revolt is often traced to the fatal shooting of members of the sect on 11 June 2009, by men of the *Operation Flush* following a clash with members of the sect for not wearing crash helmet while on their motorbike for a funeral process. The leader, Mohammed Yusuf, threatened to revenge the killing of his members (Sani 2011). When security operatives later received a tipoff that the sect was planning to strike from their base in Dutse-Tanshi in Bauchi State, they invaded the place and made an arrest of nine members of the group (Ohia 2009). In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the DutsenTanshi police station on 26 July.

The attack on the Dutsen Tanshi police station was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest that manifested in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe States. The revolt ended on 30 July 2009, when their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in a goat pen in his residence in Maiduguri. After few hours in police custody, the Police murdered Yusuf extra judicially; although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape (Onuoha 2010). Over 800 persons, mainly the sect’s members, were killed during the revolt, and hundreds of its members were also arrested and detained for formal trial. The way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the Nigerian State proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram violent attacks.

Following the 2009 riot and the death of Yusuf, the sect went underground and re-strategized in two ways. First, was the adoption of Yusuf’s hard-line top deputy, Abubakar Shekau, as the sect’s new spiritual leader. Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run tactics and adding new

flexible violent tactics such as bombings, targeted assassinations, ambush, and drive-by shootings (Onuoha 2013a).

Since the July 2009 revolt, the sect has evolved into a more dynamic and decentralised organisation, capable of changing and combining tactics as well as expanding or reordering target selection (Onuoha 2013b: 20). Boko Haram has attacked a variety of groups including security agents, Christians, traditional rulers, politicians, school children and teachers, Islamic scholars, public servants, traders and lately all non-members of the group. Most of the attacks occurred in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State. In addition, the group has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The insecurity resulting from the insurgency of Boko Haram has led to a declaration of state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States since May 2013.

Several reports have shown that the foot soldiers of this sect consist predominantly of young people who are not only ready to fight, but also lay down their lives for the new cause they have been made to believe in. Based on analysis of 144 arrested Boko Haram members, a recent study has shown that the median age of the group members is 30 years (Salami 2013). Its young followers who previously used local and sophisticated arms in attacks, have become highly radicalised individuals willing to undertake suicide bombing in pursuit of martyrdom - a phenomenon that never manifested in Nigeria until the 16 June 2011 suicide attack on Police Headquarters, Abuja, by a 35-year-old Boko Haram member, Mohammad Manga (Salkida 2011). This reinforces the concern over why young people are willing to join a group such as the Boko Haram. It is in this light that the next part of this study grapples with some of the issues underpinning youth radicalisation in northern states of Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe.

## CHAPTER 2

# METHODOLOGY

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
The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review and empirical research. The overall methodology comprised desk review of secondary materials such as available media reports, databases, policy reports, newspapers and academic literature, and primary research involving conduct of interviews and focus group discussion (FGD).

Commissioned consultants and experts conducted the field study in two towns in each of the six States in Northern Nigeria selected for the study. While table 1 details the States and towns where field work was carried, Figure 1 shows the location of the States. The field research was carried out between June and November 2013, by each respective State researcher. Key informant interviews (KII) were conducted with traditional leaders (District/Village/Ward or Hakimi), religious leaders (all religious groups), security officials, women leaders, and political leaders.

S/No.	State	Towns Selected
1	Borno State	Maiduguri Town and Biu Town
2	Gombe State	Gombe Town and Billiri LGA
3	Kano State	Nasarawa, and Tarauni LGA
4	Kaduna State	Zaria Town and Kaduna Town
5	Yobe State	Damaturu and Potiskum Town
6	Sokoto State	Sokoto Town and Shagari Town

More so, local level field research involved FGDs held with youth, women and faith groups. Semi-structured questionnaire was also administered to teachers (Primary, Secondary and University), community leaders, religious leaders, youths, civil society organisations, security agents (Police, SSS, Immigration, NSCDC, Prisons, Customs, Army, and vigilante groups), and women groups. Appendix 1 contains a sample of the questionnaire, while Appendix 2 contains the KII guide used for the field study. The sample size used for the questionnaire as well as the number of key informant interviews and FGD conducted by the State researchers varied significantly, owing basically to the unique challenges and limitations faced by them in their respective states. It could be said, therefore, that this is the major limitation of this study – the inability to have the standard sample size for questionnaire, KII and FGD across the six States.

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing States where fieldworks were carried out



A stakeholder validation workshop was held on 19 December 2013, where preliminary results were presented and feedback received from participants. The comments, observations and suggestions made during the validation workshop were also used to enrich the final report.

## CHAPTER 3

### BORNO STATE

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#### INTRODUCTION

Borno State, until 2009, was rated among the most peaceful states in Nigeria hence its epithet 'Home of Peace' which has been generally acclaimed by the indigenes and migrant settlers alike. So peaceful and prosperous has been the state that many dry season migrants from Hausaland find it difficult to go back home for their rainy season farming chores for which reason the term *Bornokaji* (a Kanuri term meaning 'Borno is sweet') is used to describe these migrants. To some extent the same may be true for settlers from other parts of Nigeria who have regarded Borno as a second home through ownership of landed properties. This is nowhere better exemplified than the heavy presence of Igbo people (from South-East Nigeria) as landlords in Pompomari quarters of Maiduguri, the state capital. This long term peace enjoyed in Borno suddenly became threatened in 2009 when members of *Jama'atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda'wa'ati wal Jihad* (literally, "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad") launched an attack on Maiduguri. Borno State, which is seen as one of the birthplaces and strongholds of the sect has borne much of the brunt of Boko Haram attacks. The escalation of attacks by the sect since 2009 marks the re-emergence of another phase of religious youth radicalism in Nigeria generally considered being counterproductive to the nation's quest for integration and development.

The effect of youth radicalisation epitomised by Boko Haram's insurgency in Borno State has been quite enormous with heavy human and material losses, massive displacement of people at a scale never witnessed before from any natural or man-made



disaster in the state. The effect on the state's education has equally been worrisome; an estimated 6,000 classrooms have been destroyed and many schools were temporally closed down due to insecurity. Given that many factors are implicated within the context of radicalisation in Nigeria, uncovering the most probable causes to explain its occurrence will inform policy while also serving to advance academic discourse.

## **BORNO STATE: THE STUDY SETTING**

Borno State lies in the extreme North-Eastern corner of Nigeria on latitudes 10° 30' and 13° 50' north and longitudes 11.00° and 13° 45' east (fig. 1). It is bordered by Niger Republic in the north, Chad and Cameroun Republics to the east, Adamawa and Gombe States to the south, and Yobe State in the west. This makes Borno the only state bordered by three countries in Nigeria with enormous implications on the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the state's development and governance. A discussion on the development of present day Borno is incomplete without reference to the past Kanem-Borno region, a region which extends beyond the present boundary of Borno State to include a large section of Nigeria's northeast region and indeed parts of Niger, Cameroun and Chad Republics. There is a consensus of opinion among scholars to Kanem-Borno as the gateway of Islam in Nigeria, Islam being declared the state religion of the Empire c.1096 AD (Alkali 1978). Colonial partitioning of the erstwhile Kanem-Borno Empire and subsequent state creations in post-colonial Nigeria have reduced it to the present Borno State's size of 75,481 square kilometres, though there still exists strong cultural linkages between its people irrespective of the boundaries. Borno State's population is predominantly Muslim though a sizeable proportion of Christians are found in the south near the border with Adamawa State. Ethnically, the northern and central part of the state is Kanuri while the population in the south is mixed with Babur/Bura being the dominant group. Other ethnic groups include Marghi, Glavda, Kibaku, Fulani, Shuwa Arab, Mandara, etc. Despite this rich history as well as religious and cultural diversity in the state, the people have coexisted peacefully without any major conflict until 2009.

### **Data Sources and Sampling Procedure**

As discussed in Chapter 2, three instruments were used to obtain data for this study. The main instrument was a questionnaire that sought to identify aspects of the socio-cultural, political and religious orientation of young people on a five-point Likert scale. Specifically, it covers young people's cultural beliefs and practices viz-a-vis their parents, vulnerability to violence, factors giving rise to religious violence, sources of extreme messages, etc. The questionnaire also contained a few open-ended options for

respondents to freely express their opinions. Qualitative data was generated through focus group discussion (FGD) and key informant interviews (KIIs).

120 participants were selected and administered with the questionnaire through a convenient sampling technique in two major towns of Borno State. 70 questionnaires were administered in Maiduguri, the state capital, and 50 in Biu, due to its smaller population. The participants include teachers, security agents, youths, community and religious leaders, civil society organisations and women. In view of the volatile security nature of the state, participants were identified purposively with willingness to participate as the most important criterion. Since many of those who volunteered were literate, some of the questionnaires were self-completed. Two research assistants (one each in Maiduguri and Biu) were trained on the questionnaire administration and helped the researcher to generate data. Six FGDs were held in Maiduguri (two each for youth, religious, and women's group). No FGD was held in Biu due to a security breach at the time of research. Sixteen key informant interviews were held (five in Biu and eleven in Maiduguri) with participants from a wide range of backgrounds including traditional, religious, women, and political leaders as well as security officials. Data were analysed through the use of percentages, totals and charts.

## **LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

Conducting a research bordering on security in an area as volatile as Borno may not be an easy task hence a few issues that may impinge on data quality need to be borne in mind. First, in spite of the simple selection procedure adopted, many respondents were uncomfortable with the interviews, especially Christians and security agents who in a few cases turned down the request understandably for fear of victimisation (many Christians have in the past been targets of Boko Haram insurgency). Second, the sample size of 120 people used may not be adequately representative of the state's population. And third, the fact that FGD could not be held in Biu may be a drawback to the qualitative data generated. That no tape recorder was used could also introduce some bias but is in line with Loimeier's view that interviewees were more forthcoming in a less formal atmosphere during interviews (Loimeier, 1997). This research did not focus on the members of any radical group or their targets but what a broad spectrum of the citizens of Borno State perceives about radicalisation. At best this may be called a perception study of radicalisation. While these issues may impinge on data quality, the information gathered overall us gives a 'ground-breaking' assessment of youth radicalisation in the state at the moment.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### Value Differences between Young People and their Parents

Data obtained indicate overwhelming differences between young people and the older generation in their socio-cultural and political values. Table 2 shows that greatest difference between the young and older generation lies in their religious beliefs where 83% of respondents believe the difference is Much/Very Much. This is followed by difference in terms of social values (71% VeryMuch), cultural values (53%), and political values (47%). The largest difference in their religious beliefs is very instructive which partly explains why youths in the state are restive. This large value difference between young people and their parents was corroborated during the FGDs where all groups agreed to the difference and only 7% of the KIIs disagreed. In the latter it was gathered in particular that cultural and political differences are only minimal between young people and older generations, but difference was more apparent in religious matters.

The picture that emerged from the survey about whether youths are more or less conservative about religion than their parents does not seem to agree with the large difference between the two groups in their religious beliefs. Only 38% of respondents agreed that youths are more conservative about religion than older people. Qualitative data however suggests otherwise i.e. that youths are more conservative of religion than their parents. According to a respondent in one of the FGDs: 'They copied it (fundamentalism) from their parents and is overdoing it.'<sup>1</sup>

Table 2. Value Differences between Youths and their Parents (%)

Response	Cultural	Religious	Political	Social
Little/VeryLittle	43	17	50	29
Much/VeryMuch	53	83	47	71
Don't know	4	0	3	1

Source: Field data, 2013

### Religious Extremism and Violence among Youths

Youths are generally most likely to use violence for the enforcement of their religious beliefs. Data obtained shows that opinion on the use of violence to promote religion in Borno State is nearly equally divided. About 43% of respondents believe that few young people are likely to use violence while 40% believe that most young people think it is proper to use violence to enforce religion. Quantitative data unfortunately was not

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<sup>1</sup> A female participant during a focus group discussion with Muslim women on 26<sup>th</sup> August 2013.

disaggregated on the basis of respondents' religious affiliations to enable us understand which religious groups perceived youths as more fundamentalist. It is however instructive to note that in the FGDs conducted, five out of the six groups (including a Christian youth group) suggested that there are not many youths who use violence to promote their religious beliefs. The only group that believes many youths engage in religious violence was a women's professional group (all teachers). This may be due to the peculiar nature of their job i.e. close to the youths, which places them at a more vantage position to have information on the youths.

Whether or not youths hold more fundamental views than their parents could be less important than their present level of involvement in violence for religious ends, so the reason for such involvement was also investigated. Data collected showed that youths engage in religious violence for a multiplicity of reasons, which mostly centre on economic and social motivations (Fig. 2). By far the most important reason given by 40% of respondents is the belief that youths engage in religious-based violence primarily due to ignorance of the full teachings of their religion. This was followed by unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state (15%) and manipulation of religion by extremist religious leaders. This pattern of response is also not quite different from the opinion of respondents in both the key informant interviews and the FGDs. While opinion was divided in most FGDs on poverty, ignorance of the teachings of the religion (also mentioned by a Christian group), and poor parental upbringing were the most important reasons identified. Nine out of the fifteen key informants (56%) also cited economic reasons for violence. The opinion of a female respondent in one of the FGD groups (teachers) which summarises the economic motivation was striking:

'Poverty is the most important cause for violence to promote belief. A child who cannot feed well sees a 60-year-old man celebrating his birthday lavishly. He later thinks the person is responsible for his problems.'<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>A female participant during a focus group discussion with teachers on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2013.




Fig. 2. Reasons for Youth Involvement in Religious Violence

Source: Field data, 2013

While youth involvement in extremism and religious violence may be caused by social and economic circumstances in which the youths find themselves, the avenues through which they get recruited into such violence is necessary for understanding restiveness. Although there is hardly any conscious or deliberate plan for one to become radicalised, youth extremism in Borno State was identified to be acquired through a variety of sources that include independent (roaming) preachers, audio and video messages, homes (parents), foreign countries and regular worship centres. The most important source identified by 35% of respondents was independent preachers (Fig 3). This category of preachers may be best described as those who have not been recognised as [Islamic] preachers by the Borno State Council of Ulama but nevertheless engage in public preaching, often shifting venues from one location to another. Needless to say Mohammed Yusuf was uncertified by the Council of Ulama but for many years engaged in this type of preaching in Maiduguri and other major towns in Borno.

About 21% of the respondents identified recorded audio and video messages as the source through which youths become exposed to religious extremism. This source serves as an extension of the first in the sense that youths who may not have come in direct contact with extremist preachers acquire such views through recorded messages even though they could be thousands of kilometres away. Parents, recruitment for religious training abroad, and regular places of worship constitute 18%, 15% and 13% of sources identified by respondents respectively. This finding departs from similar studies conducted in western countries and in Kenya where the Internet constitutes a significant source through which youths acquire extremist views (see, for instance, by Schmid 2013; Botha 2013). A striking opinion during one of the KIIs was the issue of

forced recruitment, which was identified as another avenue through which Boko Haram in particular gets youths into radicalism.<sup>3</sup>




Fig. 3. Sources of Religious Extremism by Youths in Borno State  
Source: Fieldwork, 2013

Vulnerability of the youths to religious extremism and violence in Borno State differs between groups, but the pattern being similar to the reasons for youth involvement in religious violence discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Respondents identified children from poor homes as the most vulnerable group that may be used to perpetrate religious violence. This was identified by 61% of respondents followed by children who have not been brought up by their biological parents (33%) (Table 3). The latter includes children from broken homes, abandoned/orphaned children and children who are in the custody of relatives or other individuals into whose care they were entrusted. Children of religious leaders and those whose parents are rich were perceived to be least vulnerable to engage in extremism and religious violence by respondents. This finding requires further explanation especially in the case of Boko Haram insurgency in Maiduguri. It is interesting to observe that from 2009 to date all the insurgency that took place were all concentrated in poor neighbourhoods within the city. Thus while places like Shehuri North, Bulabulin, Ngarannam, Mafoni and Lamisula wards recorded the highest rate of insurgency, high income neighbourhoods like GRA and its extension, the New GRA recorded none at all. Findings from KIIs also revealed that vulnerability is tied to economic conditions as 30% of interviewees identified both children of the poor and the unemployed as most vulnerable.

<sup>3</sup> Although this was mentioned by only one respondent, stories have been told in Maiduguri where youths were threatened by Boko Haram if they refuse to join the group.

Table 3. Youth Groups Vulnerable to Religious Violence

Group	Percentage of Respondents
Children from Very religious homes	5
Children not brought up by their parents	33
Children from poor homes	61
Children from rich homes	1
Children of religious leaders	1

Source: Field data, 2013

### Drivers of Youth Extremism and Religious Violence

The causal factors of youth extremism and possibly its manifestation into religious violence are multifarious and differ from person to person. Based on observations of the happenings in Northern Nigeria, 17 different factors that cut across economic, social, political, cultural and other factors were identified and tested on a five-point Likert scale. For ease of analysis only the response 'VeryMuch' and 'Much' which sum up respondents' opinion for each factor were interpreted as shown on Table 4. In line with the preceding discussions, economic factor appeared to be the most important factor perceived to underlie religious extremism in Borno State. Thus 72% of respondents identified unemployment and poverty among youths as the *raison d'être* for extremism in the state, which also appeared number one in the ranking of factors. The corresponding value in the KIIs was 60%. While economic factor has been rated high by respondents in this research, it is important to bear in mind Botha's distinction between poverty *per se* and economic conditions of people like unequal access to resources and uneven development in Kenya which also partly explains the situation in Borno (Botha 2013). Young people's ignorance of the full teachings of their religion, poor upbringing by their parents, illiteracy and religious leaders' failure to live by example appeared second, third, fourth and fifth in rank. Interestingly exposure to foreign extremist groups and excesses of security agents towards members of extremist groups and the public were at the bottom of the ranking. This is contrary to popular expectation since it is widely held by the public and also reported in literature that extremist groups like Boko Haram are connected to wider terrorist groups and in particular Al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Hill 2010).

### Youth Extremism and National Development

Youth extremism and violence could have far-reaching consequences on national development wherever they manifest. Ten areas of national development were thus identified to which responses were sought from respondents. An overwhelming majority of respondents (87%) identified that youth extremism and violence has Much/Very Much effect on economic development which ranks first (table 5). This was

followed by the effects of youth extremism on national integration (second in rank) identified by 83% of the respondents and threat to internal security rated third in rank identified by 82% of respondents.

Table 4. Causal Factors of Youth Extremism and Violence

S/N	Factor	%Response 'VeryMuch'	Rank
1	Unemployment and poverty	72	1
2	Ignorance of the full teachings of their religion	65	2
3	Lack of parental upbringing and care	63	3
4	Illiteracy	52	4
5	Lack of good examples by religious leaders	48	5
6	Foreign funding of religious groups and activities	41	6
7	Neglect of citizens' welfare by government	39	7
8	Misuse of religion by politicians	38	8
9	Belief that corruption and immorality are widespread	38	8
10	Manipulation by extremist religious leaders	35	10
11	Undue involvement in religious matters by government	34	11
12	Insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity	28	12
13	Rewards for involvement in religious violence	26	13
14	Exposure to foreign extremist groups	22	14
15	Desire to have a better society through religious practices	18	15
16	Actions of security agents towards religious groups	18	15
17	Actions of security agents towards members of the public	13	17

Source: Field data, 2013

Table 5. Effect of Youth Extremism on National Development

S/no.	Effect	% of Response 'Much/Very Much'	Rank
1	Economic development	87	1
2	National integration	83	2
3	Internal security	82	3
4	Education and scientific development	80	4
5	Inter-religious harmony	78	5



6	International image	74	6
7	Consolidation of democracy	67	7
8	Human right and freedom	67	7
9	Child and youth development	67	7
10	Poverty reduction	52	10

Source: Field data, 2013

Ironically, the effect of extremism on poverty was the least rated (tenth position) even though much of the problem of extremism in the state discussed earlier was attributed to economic conditions of young people. It could nevertheless be also observed that the effect of extremism on economic development was rated first which may also include poverty. In the KIIs 63% and 60% respectively identified lack of investment and loss of lives respectively as the most important effects of youth extremism and violence.

## CONCLUSION

The activities of Boko Haram in the last one decade demonstrate a clear case of religious-based extremism by youths in Borno State. Unlicensed roaming (independent) preachers provide the most important source through which youths acquire radical views of religion while economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (ignorance of the religion and poor parental upbringing) provide strong motivations for youth engagement in violent extremism. The implication of these on the development process in Borno State has been quite enormous especially on business activities and the pursuit of secular education.

## CHAPTER 4

### YOBE STATE

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#### BACKGROUND

Yobe state was part of the old Kanem-Borno Empire, which has a history of crises and aggression in the past with the sacking of Birnin Ngazargamu by the Jihadists in 1808, the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and Rabeh invasion and occupation in 1993. They were destructive and vicious in their own ways, but their uprising never degenerated into killing of large number of people, targeting of military installations, and security personnel, public infrastructure, place of worships and even assassination of religious leaders in a sustained and protracted manner, as is sadly being witnessed with the Boko Haram insurgency.

#### YOBE STATE: THE STUDY SETTING

Yobe State came into being on the 27 August 1991. It was carved out of the old Borno State by the past military head of State, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida. The circumstances that led to the splitting of former Borno State into Yobe and Borno are mainly twofold: viz. the former Borno State being one of the largest in terms of land area, was simply too large for easy administration and meaningful development; and, ethnic rivalry. A total of nine additional states were created at that time, bringing the total number of states in the country to thirty from twenty-one. There are 17 local government councils in the State. However, this study focused on the State capital, Damaturu, and Potiskum town.

The climate condition of Yobe State varied over the years. Rainfall is notably seasonal, concentrated in the three months of July, August and September. Since the early 1970s, the climate tended to be drier. The current annual rainfall is (250mm), fell to 15 and

20mm over the last 40 years, with the 2012 as an exception due to the heavy rainfall compared to the previous years.

The main ethnics groups in the areas under study (Damaturu and Potiskum) are: Kanuri, Fulani, Balewa, Karekare, Gizimawa, Hausa, and Gamu. However, majority of the populace are predominantly farmers and engaged in it as means of subsistence. Besides, herders had long co-existed with farmers in the area. While crops produced on the area are millet, Melon (guna) guinea corn, beans (cow pea) usually as cash crops and a sizeable quantity of beniseed (ridi).

## **LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The nature of the subject of research necessitates the need to delve into the history of youth violence in Yobe State. Nevertheless, the limitations of the study are that there is “no much easy “access to information on it. Besides, individuals and perhaps groups would not want to provide needed answer at the point of questionnaires administered and/or interview conducted. In other words, they either withheld or refused to answer for the fear of what could happen to them. The security challenges in the State was grappling, as such this hindered Focus Group Discussion (FGD) could not be conducted. Similarly, the study is constrained by time and financial requirements in spite of the effort by the CLEEN Foundation, which would have allowed for an extensive study of the subject matter.

## **MAJOR FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

As indicated earlier, a major trust of this study is to uncover why young people are ready to join extremist groups like Boko Haram. It is noteworthy that the outcome of the research through the data obtained and the comparison made between the young people and their parents in terms of social practices, cultural belief and practices, religious beliefs and practices and political beliefs and practices shows a great divide. This is evidently shown in Table 3 where religious beliefs and practices have the largest respondents with 75% believing that there is Much/Very Much to the divide, followed by the cultural beliefs with 60% of respondents that said Little /Very Much, political beliefs 51% of respondents said Little/ Very Little and social practices 50% of respondent said it is Much/ Very Much. As such, the great divide between the young people and the older generation in their religious belief is to some extent the reason for youth extremism and violence in Yobe State. There is not so much division between the

young and the older people in terms of cultural and political beliefs as discovered during the key informant interview (KII).

Table: 3 The Differences between Young People and the Older Generation


Response	Cultural beliefs	Religious Beliefs	Political Beliefs	Social practice
Little /Very Little	60	25	51	49
Much/Very Much	36	75	46	50
Don't Know	4	0	3	1

Source: field data, 2013

### **Youth, Religious Extremism and Violence**

Youths are prone to the use of violence to enforce their religious beliefs. This is evident by the data obtained which shows that 47% of the respondents said most young people are likely to use violence while 39% said few young people are likely to apply violence to enforce their religious beliefs. However, it is noteworthy, that out of the different groups that were interviewed during the **KII** especially in Potiskum, which has a large number of Christians, respondents were of the view that many of the youths believe in violence to enforce their religious beliefs. This may be as a result of a long time mistrust that exists between both sides of the religious divides i.e. Christians and Muslims.

Similarly, the reason for groups of young people involvement in violence for religions purpose was surveyed and the outcome indicated that the young people involve in religious violence for obvious reasons such as, economic and social. This is evident by the 45% of the respondents whose opinion is that youths are involved in religious violence due to ignorance of the full teaching of their religion, while 16% said it is due to misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest and only 4% said it is unemployment and poverty.



Based on the outcome of the survey conducted in respect to youth extremism and violence in Yobe State, the causative factors adduced for it are economic and social in nature and content. Most respondents (36%) were of the view that recruitment for religious training in foreign countries is a prominent means through which young people imbibe extremist religious views. This is followed by independent (roaming) preachers, accounting for 29% of the views of the respondents. This is a growing trend in religious practice in Nigeria, where such preachers move from one place to the other within and outside the state of their residence to conduct sermon in some open spaces (village square, markets or roadside) or sometimes to different mosques on invitation of their colleagues. Whereas 26% of the respondents said it is parents, 7% said it is recorded audio and video messages and 3% said it is acquired through regular worship centres.

Indeed, it is noteworthy, that during the KII in Damaturu where one of the respondents said apart from the causative factors already mentioned above for youth extremism and violence, drug abuse also contribute immensely to the resort to violence by the youth in some communities. As such, drug abuse alters the state of the user's mind and predisposes it to violence (Ifaturote 1994).




Figure 3 Source of youth religious extremism in Yobe State  
Source: field data 2013

The tendency to be involved in youth extremism and violence in Yobe State differs in terms of individual and groups, but the form is the same to the causative factors for youth involvement in extremism and violence advanced above. As such, the outcome of the research indicated that 39% of the respondents are of the opinion that children who were not brought up by their parents have the highest tendency to be involved in youth religious extremism and violence. This class of children are exemplified by those whom both parents divorced or from broken homes, children that are entrusted in the hands of relatives or individuals for care, and perhaps abandoned orphans. Furthermore, about 31% of the respondents are of the view that the children from poor homes have the tendency to be involved in violence. While 11% of the respondents said children of religious leaders have fewer tendencies to be involve in youth extremism and violence. In spite of the outcome of the survey it is noteworthy, that most of the youth violent activities were carried out in Damaturu the state capital in areas that are inhabited by poor people such as Sabon Fegi, Nayinawa, and Jerusalem which is a Christian-dominated area, where churches, school, and houses were burnt. While at Waziri Ibrahim and Shehu Shagari Quarters and GRA are the affluent Areas that were not touched

#### Categories of Youth with the Tendency to be involved in Religious Extremism and Violence

Categories	Percentage of Respondents
Children from very religious homes	7
Children who were not brought up by their parents	39
Children from poor homes	31

Children from rich homes	11
Children of religious leaders	11

Source: Field Data, 2013

### **The Driving Force for Youth Extremism and Violence**

The driving force for youth extremism and violence are numerous but for the purpose of this survey some causative factors such as the economic, social, political, cultural, etc, were identified on a five-point Likert scale. As such, the responses of the respondents' views were captured in this form. Very much and Much as indicated in table 4 below. Based on the discussion made above economic is argued as the main driving force for youth extremism and violence in Yobe State. This is why 60% of the respondents said unemployment and poverty among young people is the main reasons for extremism and violence.

Furthermore, 57% of the respondents view illiteracy as the second in the rankings of causative factors for youth extremism and violence. Whereas third and fourth rank are ignorance of the full teaching of their religious said by 55% of respondents and Misuse of religious by politicians to promote their interest said by 45% of the respondents. However, it is to be noted that other causative factors for youth extremism and violence mentioned by respondents include the rate of corruption and immoral behaviours, neglect of the welfare of the citizens by the Governments and lack of parental upbringing of children.

Table 4: The Driving Forces for Youth Extremism and Violence

S/N	Driving Force	% Response 'Very Much'	Rank
1.	Unemployment and poverty	60	1
2.	Illiteracy	57	2
3.	Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion	55	3
4.	Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest	45	4
5.	Belief that corruptions and immoral behaviours are widespread	41	5
6.	Undue involvement in religious matters by the government	36	6
7.	Exposure to foreign extremist group	35	7
8.	Lack of good examples by religious	34	8

	leaders		
9.	Neglect of the welfare of the citizens by the government	33	9
10.	Manipulation by extremist religious leaders	33	9
11.	Insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity	33	9
12.	Lack of parental upbringing, care and examples	32	12
13.	Desire to have a better society through religious practices	31	13
14.	Reward for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion	29	14
15.	Action of the security agents towards members of the public	27	15
16.	Action of the security agents towards members of the extremist religious groups.	26	16

Source: field data, 2013

## CONCLUSION

The consequences of youth extremism and violence can be devastating, especially on the development of the immediate community and indeed the larger society. Youth extremism and violence have resulted in damage not only against private and public property, but also resulting in grievous bodily harm and in extreme cases, deaths. With the above record of violent acts in Yobe State, hundreds of people mostly youths have been killed, many injured and properties worth millions of naira destroyed. The analysis in this research shows that the manifestations of youth extremism and accompanied violence are driven by poverty, unemployment, ignorance of religious texts, lack of good parental upbringing, drug abused, unnecessary indoctrinations and other causative factors. Such violence often poses serious challenges to personal, private and common development and its sustainability. Hence, the need for urgent measures to address the menace has to be in motion.



## CHAPTER 5

### GOMBE STATE

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#### INTRODUCTION

Gombe State was created out of the then Bauchi State in 1996, with Gombe town as the capital. It shares a common boundary with all the other five States in the North East geo-political zone, namely: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Taraba and Yobe. The State consists of eleven (11) Local Government Areas (LGAs) and 114 Wards. The local government areas are: Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Shongom and Yamaltu/Deba.

When the population census was conducted in 2006, the State's population figures stood at 2,353,000. Major tribes in the State include Waja, Tangale, Tera, Fulani, Bolewa, Kanuri, Jukun, Cham, Tula, Pero/Shonge and Kamo/Awak; however, Hausa language is widely spoken all over the State. Although Gombe has 11 LGAs, only one town can be termed as truly urban (Gombe). The headquarters of other LGAs are mainly semi-urban, with lesser population and development. Gombe town is the administrative and commercial capital of the State. In fact, long before the State was created; Gombe was seen as more of a commercial and trading centre, which has drawn business-minded people from all over Nigeria, especially from Kwara and Kano States. Moreover, the unique location of Gombe town at the centre of the North East has made it a resting and meeting point for travellers and traders from different parts of the geo-political zone and beyond.

The people of Gombe State are not only commercially- oriented, but also large scale farmers, especially of beans, maize, rice, sorghum, bambara nut, groundnut and

sesame, which are basic raw materials in high demand by industries within and outside the State. Indeed, agriculture engages about 80% of Gombe's active population.

Gombe State originated from the fusion of two distinct large groups: the Gombe Emirate in the North and the ethnic grouping in the South, known as Tangale-Waja. Gombe emerged as part of a larger state-building force of the 19th Century Sokoto jihad under the leadership of Buba Yero who was among the 11 people given flags by Usman Dan Fodio to propagate Islam. It had its original headquarters at Gombe Abba, until the advent of the British in the 20th century who began to administer the area under two Native Authorities (NA): Gombe and Tangale-Waja Native Authorities.

Looking at the rich historical, agricultural and commercial significance of Gombe State, there is little wonder then that it continues to attract a wide range of people from far and near as not only visitors pursuing one interest or the other, but also settlers who have found its atmosphere very conducive.

### **Religious Extremism in Gombe State**

In 1980 Muhammadu Marwa (Maitatsine), a radical Cameroonian Islamic scholar who had settled down in Kano, together with his followers commenced series of attacks on other religious leaders and the police, following which the military was called in to quell the uprising in view of the fact that the situation seems to have overwhelmed the police. This led to armed clashes that resulted in the deaths of hundreds, including the leader of the sect – Muhammadu Marwa.

The riots spread to other parts of Northern Nigeria in the following years. By 1984, the violence erupted in Yola, this time around led by one Musa Mekaniki a close disciple of Marwa, who claimed to be the interim leader of the sect. Heavy military intervention followed, forcing Mekaniki and his followers to flee to his hometown, Gombe to take refuge. By April 1985, Mekaniki spearheaded series of attacks and religious riots in Gombe town during which it was claimed that about 100 people were killed and security agents arrested 146. Mekaniki however escaped arrest and fled to Cameroon until 2004 when he quietly slipped back into the country, and was later arrested by security agents. This incident was the first major manifestation of religious extremism in Gombe. Violent religious radicalism of this magnitude did not take place again for a long time in Gombe, until the State was created and the country returned to democratic rule.

Since its creation in 1996, Gombe State never experienced any major crisis despite the fact that almost all the neighbouring states were embroiled in crises, until April 17<sup>th</sup> 2011 when post-presidential election violence broke out in Gombe town with youths taking the lead in the mayhem. Although the attacks began as politically-motivated with CPC youths taking the lead of attacking the INEC office and houses of people known to be members of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), they took a different dimension later in the day as churches, Christians and their houses became the new targets. This led to the spread of the upheaval to many parts of the State capital, and it took security forces two days to bring the situation under control.

From the post-election violence of April 2011, the following is a chronicle of violent attacks in the State, believed to have been mounted by Boko Haram:

- On 16th October 2011, 3 policemen were killed by a bomb blast at the Mobile Police Barrack, Kwame LGA of Gombe State.
- In December 2011, 15 people were injured at the outskirts of Gombe town when gunmen suspected to be BH members attacked a hotel in the evening.
- January 2012: 6 people were killed when gunmen opened fire on worshippers at Deeper Life Church in Gombe town.
- February 2012: Gun and bomb attacks were launched against the prison and police station situated in Gombe town, both facing each other and almost opposite the Emir's palace.
- March 2012: 4 policemen were killed including a DPO by a bomb blast in Ashaka, Funakaye LGA of Gombe State.
- April 2012: Explosions rocked the Gombe State University situated at Tudun Wada, in Gombe town. Reports said gunshots followed the bomb blast

## **LIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

A limitation of this study was the limited scope or sample that it covered. Although Gombe State has 11 Local Government Areas (LGAs), the data collected was from two LGAs, namely: Gombe and Billiri Local Government Area. Gombe LGA is situated in Gombe North senatorial zone, and has for years been a commercial and administrative hub, since created in 1996. It is the State capital with a population of over 100,000 people. Gombe LGA is the local council that has experienced the most of the manifestation of religious extremism in Gombe State with the largest damage to lives and property. The second place from which data was sourced is Billiri Local Government Area, situated in Gombe South Senatorial zone. It is the traditional home of the Tangale people who are both Muslims and Christians, with the latter being in the majority. Billiri LGA has not experienced any manifestation of religious extremism with accompanying armed confrontations.

## MAJOR FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

It is against this backdrop that a field study to uncover the drivers of youth radicalisation was conducted in Gombe State. After a careful and thorough analysis of the data collected, the following are the major findings that this study obtained in Gombe State.

7.1. The first thing we sought to find out was to what extent do young people share the views of their parents or older generation. The table below shows the distribution of the result obtained (in percentages).

Response	Social	Cultural	Political	Religious
Little/VeryLittle	36	42	35	18
Much/VeryMuch	64	53	61	82
Don't know	0	5	4	

Source: Field data, 2013

The result tells us that there are more young people sharing the same views with their parents and older generations. However, it also came out clear that young people shared religious views with their parents and older generations more than any other views.

7.2 On the question that sought to know if young people uphold a more or less conservative and fundamentalist view of religion than older people, the following was obtained:

More conservative and fundamentalist view of religion	38
Less conservative and fundamentalist view of religion	57
Don't know	5


We thus see that young people hold a less conservative view of religion than older people. While old people hold on to what has been the practice, the young have through their quest for knowledge come to be more liberal and not willing to hold tenaciously to what they have been taught. Although progress is what is expected of people and societies, such deviation is an early warning that the liberal disposition should be closely monitored so that it is not taken to extremes.

7.3 The field result of the questionnaires administered showed that many young people believe that it is proper to use violence to enforce their religious belief:

Most/many	Few/Very few	Don't know
56	36	8

Although the findings from the questionnaire analysis showed that most/many young people believe that it is proper to use violence to enforce their religious belief, during the KIIs and FGDs conducted, most of the people were of the opinion that few or very few young people believe in the use of violence to enforce their religious belief. All those interviewed in the KIIs were adults, but the FGD groups were predominantly young people. This points out to us that although not many are embarking on violence to promote their religion, the possibility of such happening cannot be overruled. Like an interviewee said, religion is like a turf that people not only desire to guard jealously at all costs, but want to advance, sometimes to the detriment of others.

7.4 Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion ranked high as the most important factor responsible for the involvement of young people in the use of violence to promote their religious belief.




Source: Field data 2013

The first place of learning about religion should be the home. Where parents are ignorant of what their religion says, there is no way they can teach their children anything worthwhile. So to make up for it, they encourage the children to seek knowledge from the learned, and because they are ignorant, they cannot take a stand when the children are taught wrong things.

7.5 About 89% of the people responded that it is never acceptable to promote one's religious belief using violence. Yet, there are some who believe it is okay. So while it is gratifying to note the large number who find it unacceptable, we must not overlook those who find it acceptable as these may not only embark on it when the opportunity to do so presents itself; they may be in a position to influence others in this regard.

7.6 While the respondents to the questionnaires believed that parents are the most important source through which young people acquire extremist religious views, the interviews and FGDs discussions however saw the preaching of independent roaming preachers, and recorded and/or live preaching which young people access through the internet as a causative factor. Indeed, most of the people interviewed spoke strongly on how boundless access to the world and all that it offers has done more harm than good. The result from the questionnaire is presented in the graph below.



Source: Field data, 2013

7.7 The data analysed showed that the group of young people that are more likely to be involved in the use of violence to promote their religious belief are children who were not brought up by their parents, followed by children from poor homes.

Children of religious leaders	6
Children from very religious homes	12
Children who were not brought up by their parents	50
Children from poor homes	27
Children from rich homes	5

Discussants and interviewees believed such children were devoid of human compassion and because they have no one to monitor them and give them the right counselling and life skills, they easily turn aside into the wrong methods of promoting their religion. We can also see that children of religious leaders are not very likely to be involved in the use of force to promote religion. This gives us the understanding that

young people must be getting their doctrine of the use of force from elsewhere; otherwise the children of religious leaders would hold sway.

7.8.1 Looking at the factors that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, unemployment and poverty have the greatest influence. They are followed closely by illiteracy, and ignorance of the full teaching of their religion. This goes to show that despite all existing factors that could influence the young people, if they had gainful employment, those other factors will not have a strong hold on them.

Influencing Factor	% Very Much
<b>Unemployment and Poverty</b>	55
<b>Illiteracy</b>	54
<b>Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion</b>	52
<b>Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests</b>	45
<b>Neglect of welfare of citizens by the government</b>	37
<b>Lack of parental upbringing and care</b>	36
<b>Lack of good example by religious leaders</b>	34
<b>Manipulation by extremist religious leaders</b>	33
<b>Belief that corruption and immoral behaviours are widespread</b>	32
<b>Foreign funding of religious groups and propagation of extremist religious views and practices</b>	25
<b>Rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion</b>	24
<b>Exposure to foreign extremist groups</b>	24
<b>Desire to have a better society through religious practices</b>	23
<b>Undue involvement in religious matters by government</b>	20
<b>Actions of security agents towards members of extremist religious groups</b>	17
<b>Actions of security agents towards members of the public</b>	15
<b>Insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity</b>	15

Source: Field data, 2013

It is interesting to note that lack of parental upbringing and care does not come out strong as a factor that influences the young people.

7.9.1 Respondents, interviewees and discussants believed that adequate opportunities did not exist for young people. Opportunities lacking include recreational facilities, skills acquisition and employment, education as well as opportunities of mentoring.

However, the difference was not huge (59% against 41%). This shows that there are some opportunities available to a certain extent, such that 41% feel they are adequate.

We must understand however that when the capacity of the government to provide critical opportunities and dividends to the young people progressively declines against the backdrop of escalating corruption, population increase and global economic instability, there is every likelihood that increase in frustration, anger, aggression and violence will become manifest. This has led many contemporary analysts to classify the country as a failing or a failed state.


7.10. The research brought out the fact that although religious extremism is threatening Nigeria in many ways, the most important of these is in the area of economic development. Taking the response of “Much/Very Much” to the question of threats to different aspects of our lives in Nigeria, the field research gave us this finding:

<b>Threat</b>	<b>% Much/Very Much</b>
<b>Economic Development</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>Inter-religious Harmony</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>National Integration</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>Internal Security</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Consolidation of Democracy</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Human Rights and Freedom</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Education and Scientific Development</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Child and Youth Development</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Poverty Reduction</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>International Image</b>	<b>56</b>

The violence has not only caused economic stagnation, it has stopped foreign investment from coming into the country, especially the concerned region. Next to this, national integration and inter/intra religious harmony are also being threatened as there is a lot of distrust now among communities. It is really alarming to see that all these threats are more than 50%, as the least among them is 56%.

7.12 Our findings show that most young people in Gombe are not easily attracted to join extremist religious groups like Boko Haram. This may be one of the reasons why Gombe State has not been experiencing a lot of violent manifestations of religious extremism.





However, the responses of Yes, though not as high as the No, should be a source of serious concern. About 48% is undoubtedly high enough a proportion that demands that appropriate measures be taken by the authorities concerned to ensure that the number is reduced to the barest minimum.

## CONCLUSION

Although Gombe State may be termed as the most peaceful of all the six (6) States in the North East geo-political zone, the potential for an outbreak of religious violence in the State is evident. The post presidential election violence of 2011 shows that when the opportunity is available, political or other frustrations and agitations could turn into violent armed religious conflicts that can lead to the loss of lives and property.

There is an urgent need for government at all levels to join hands and collectively address the structural injustice and poverty devastating especially Northern Nigeria and the rest of the Country, and de-emphasise use of force and coercion in internal security operations, if we seek peace for ourselves and for future generations. Other nations that have used force against religious extremism do not have a success story to share with the world. Nigeria cannot hope to achieve by coercion and force (war) what has eluded the world's most sophisticated military giants like the US and its allies.

## CHAPTER 6

# KADUNA STATE

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National Human Rights Commission

## INTRODUCTION

Kaduna state is the successor to the old Northern Region of Nigeria, which had its capital in Kaduna. In 1967 the state was split up into six states, one of which was the North-Central State, whose name was changed to Kaduna State in 1976. This was further divided in 1987, losing the area now part of Katsina State. Under the governance of Kaduna is the ancient city of Zaria, which this research also covered. The capital of Kaduna State is Kaduna; it has an area of 7,626.20sq kilometres and a population of about 4,652,989 people.

Kaduna is known to be a volatile state particularly the southern and northern parts of the state. Kaduna metropolis is also susceptible to ethno-religious violence. The attempt to examine the socio-economic circumstances of religious crises in Northern Nigeria, from the *Maitatsine* Revolts of the 1980s to the current insurgency by members of the *Jama'atu Ahlil Sunnati Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, popularly known as *Boko Haram*, will be better appreciated if situated within an appropriate historical framework. However, this research does not provide room for historical framework of that nature.

Unlike most cities of Northern Nigeria, Kaduna is quite complex. The ethnic, religious and cultural diversity with Islam and Christian values sometimes inter-mixing with traditional values provides a veritable ground for differences that, if not properly mediated, could easily lead to violence. Against the exclusive nature of most old cities of Northern Nigeria, Zaria another city in Kaduna State which this research covers, has its peculiarity where "indigenous" communities are separated from "settlers"; lasting inter-penetration across ethnic and religious lines is evident in that part of the state.

Zaria on the other hand is generally believed to be one of the seven Hausa States of the early 15th century and among the largest. The other name for Zaria is Zazzau and the

inhabitants are called Zage-zage or Zazzagawa. Tradition has it that the name Zazzau is derived from a famous sword which was honoured in those days by the Zazzagawa and helped to give a kind of ethnic identity years before the recognition of any king by Zaria people. There were sixty "Habe" (the name given to Hausa people before the Fulani conquest of Hausa-land in 1804) rulers (Kings and Queens) who ruled Zaria town. The first ruler was called GUNGUMA, and the second was called Bakwa Turunku (it is still not certain whether BakwaTurunku was a male or a female). Bakwa Turunku had two daughters and their names were always linked to the history of Zazzau. The older daughter was called Amina, after whom the original wall, which has a length of about 15 kilometres round the city of Zaria was named. Zaria the younger daughter gave her name to the modern emirate and its capital.

## **LIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

The study encountered some limitations as such given that we had additional research assistance to work with us on the project. Conducting the research in Kaduna metropolis was more challenging. Some of the interviewees were not cooperative to giving information for fear that it might be used against them. It took a lot of talking and convincing for them to participate. Also focus group discussion was almost impossible due to the same challenge.

## **DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS**

The people of Kaduna State have different perspective on the issue of youth radicalisation. This also cuts across gender. It was established that 61.9% of the respondents are female while 68.1% of the respondent are male. From the survey, 17.1% of the respondents are between the ages of 14 to 17, 19.2% are between the ages of 18 to 24, 27.7% are between the ages of 25 to 35, 26.2% are between the ages of 34 to 45 and 25.2% of the respondents are between the ages of 45 to 54.


Educational level of the respondents for religious/ adult education is 4.2%, 34.4% for primary or less, 58% for secondary and 3.4% for tertiary education.

1. In your opinion, to what extent do young people share the social, cultural, political and religious views of their parents or older generations?

1 (1). Social practices

From the survey conducted, 64.7% of the respondents agreed on Very Much/Much that young people share the social views of their parents or older generations, while 30.3% believes that Little /Very Little young people share their parents' view and 5% do not know if social practices of parent and older generation are being shared by young people (Fig.1).


Fig.1



### 1 (2) Cultural Beliefs and Practices

65.6% of the respondents are of the opinion that young people believe Very Much/Much cultural beliefs and practices of their parent and older generation, 30.3% have Little/Very Little opinion of their parent while 4.2% don't know if cultural beliefs and practices of parent and older generation have any influence on young people (fig.2).


Fig.2



### 1 (3) Religious Beliefs and Practices

As revealed in the survey, 74% of the respondents share Very Much/ Much view of their parents' opinion on religious beliefs and practices, 23.5% have Little/Very Little opinion of their parents' view while 2.5% don't know if young people share their parent and older generation views on religious beliefs and practices (fig.3).


Fig.3



#### 1 (4) Political Beliefs and Practices

As established from the survey, 52.1% are of the opinion of Very Much/Much of their parents' view on political beliefs and practices, 41.2% have Little/Very Little view of their parents' opinion while 6.7% don't see political beliefs and practices of parent and older generation influencing young people (fig.4).

Fig.4




2. Do you think that young people uphold a more or less conservative and fundamentalist view of religion than older people?

1. More conservative and fundamentalist view of religion
2. Less conservative and fundamentalist view of religion
3. Don't know

It was gathered that 40.3% of respondents believe that young people uphold a more conservative and fundamentalist view of religion than older people, 49.6% of the respondents belief they are less conservative and 10.1% don't know if young people uphold a more or less conservative and fundamentalist view of religion than older people. (Fig.5).

Fig.5




3. Do you think most, many, few or very few young people in your community believe that it is proper to use violence to enforce their religious belief?

1. Most
2. Many
3. Few
4. Very few
5. Don't know

24. About 4% of the respondents are of the belief that most/many of young people in community believe in the use violence to enforce their religious belief, 64.7% are of the opinion that few/Very few use violence to enforce religious beliefs while 10.9% don't belief in the use of violence to enforce religious belief (fig.6).

Fig.6




4. What do you think is the **most** important factor responsible for the involvement of young people in the use of violence to promote their religious belief?

1. Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion
2. Illiteracy

3. Manipulation by extremist religious leaders
4. Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests
5. Unemployment and poverty
6. Lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples
7. Desire to have a better society through religious practices
8. Rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion
9. Neglect of the welfare of citizens by the government
10. Lack of good example by religious leaders

As established from the survey, 36.1% of the respondents believe ignorance of the full teaching of their religion is the most important factor responsible for the involvement of young people in the use of violence to promote their religious belief, 13.5% go for illiteracy, 7.6% for manipulation by extremist religious leaders, 8.4% believe in misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests, 14.3% went for unemployment and poverty, 8.4% are of the opinion that Lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples, 0.8% believe in the desire to have a better society through religious practices, while 0.8% of the respondents are of the views that the rewards they will get for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion, 5.9% sees the neglect of the welfare of citizens by the government as an important factor and 4.2% believe lack of good example by religious leaders (fig.7).


Fig.7



5. Do you think it is acceptable to promote one's religious belief using violence?
  1. Yes, always
  2. Yes, sometimes
  3. Never

3.3% of the respondents went for 'Always' in the use of violence to promote one's religious belief, while 12.6% went for Yes, Sometimes and 84.1% agreed on 'Never' on the use of violence to promote one's religious belief (fig.8).

Fig.8




6. What is the **most** important source through which young people acquire extremist religious views?

1. Parents
2. Regular worship centres
3. Independent (roaming) preachers
4. Recorded audio and video messages
5. Recruitment for religious training in foreign countries

16.8% of the respondents believe young people acquire extremist religious views from their parents, 23.5% from their regular worship centres, 22.7% independent (roaming) preachers, 19.3% are of the opinion that the use of recorded audio and video messages can influence young people, while 17.6% believe on recruitment for religious training in foreign countries can make young people acquire extremist religious views (fig.9).

Fig.9






7. Which groups of young people are more likely to be involved in the use of violence to promote religious belief?

As established from the survey, 5% of the respondents went for children of religious leaders, 5% went for children from very religious homes, 38.7% went for children who were not brought up by their parents, 49.6% went for children from poor homes, while 1.7% went for children from rich homes (fig.10).

Fig.10




**Factors that Influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community**

I. Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion

93.2% of the respondents believe Very Much /much that ignorance of the full teaching of their religion is a factor that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 4.2% believe Little /Very Little and 2.5% don't know (fig.11).


fig.11



## II. Illiteracy

64.7% of the respondents believe Very Much /Much that illiteracy is a factor that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 16% went for Little/Very Little and 3.4% went for I don't know (fig.12).


Fig.12



## III. Manipulation by extremist religious leaders

From the survey, 80.7% of the respondents believe Very Much /Much of manipulation by extremist religious leaders is a factor that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, while 19.3% believe Little/ Very Little and 0% went for I don't know (fig.13).


Fig.13



#### IV. Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests

74.8% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much that misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 23.5% believe Little/ Very Little and 1.7% went for I don't know (fig.14).


Fig.14



#### V. Unemployment and poverty

As established from the survey, 83.2% of the respondents accept unemployment and poverty as a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 16% went for Little/ Very Little while 0.8% went for I don't know (fig.15).


Fig.15



#### VI. Lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples

76.4% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much on lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 21.9% believe Little/Very Little and 1.7% went for I don't know (fig.16).


Fig.16



#### VII. Desire to have a better society through religious practices

46.2% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much on desire to have a better society through religious practices as factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 49.6% went for Little\ Very Little while 4.2% went for I don't know (fig.17).


Fig.17



#### VIII. Rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion

50.4% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much on the rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion as a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 31% believe in Little / Little while 18.5% went for I don't know(fig.18).


Fig.18



#### IX. Neglect of the welfare of citizens by the government

76.5% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much neglect of the welfare of citizens by the government is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 16.8% went for Little/ Very Little and 10.9% went for I don't know (fig.19).


Fig.19



#### X. Lack of good example by religious leaders

58.9% of the respondents believe Very Much/ Much on lack of good example by religious leaders is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 39.6% believe in Little/Very Little, and 1.7% went for I don't know (fig.20).


Fig20



#### XI. Belief that corruption and immoral behaviours are widespread

66.3% believe in Very Much/Much on corruption and immoral behaviours as factors that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 26% went for Little/Very Little while 7.6% went for I don't know (fig.21).


Fig.21



## XII. Undue involvement in religious matters by the government

52.1% of the respondents agree Very Much/Much on undue involvement in religious matters by the government is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 37.8% belief Little/Very Little, while 10.1% went for I don't know (fig.22).


Fig.22



## XIII. Foreign funding of religious groups and activities, including propagation of extremist religious views and practices

From the survey, 51.3% of the respondents believe Very Much/ Much on foreign funding of religious groups and activities, including propagation of extremist religious views and practices are factors that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 35.3% believe Little\ Very Little and 13.5% went for I don't know (fig.23).


Fig.23



#### XIV. Exposure to foreign extremist religious groups

50.4% of the respondents believe Very Much\Much on exposure to foreign extremist religious groups is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 37.8% went for Little/Very Little while 11.8% went for I don't know (fig.24).

Fig.24




#### XV. Actions of security agents towards members of extremist religious groups

50.5% of the respondents believe Very Much/Much on actions of security agents towards members of extremist religious groups is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 47.1% believe Little/Very Little and 2.5% went for I don't know (fig.25).

Fig.25






#### XVI. Actions of security agents towards members of the public

49.6% of the respondents believe Very Much\Much on actions of security agents towards members of the public is a factor that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 41.2% believe Little/Very Little and 9.2% went for I don't know (fig.26).


Fig.26



#### XVII. Insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity

61.3% of the respondents believe Very Much\Much on insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community, 32.8% went for Little/Very Little while 5.9% went for I don't know (fig.27).


Fig.27



When respondents were asked on their opinion of young people easily being attracted to join extremist religious groups like Boko Haram?

51.3% of the respondents think young people are easily attracted to join extremist religious groups like Boko Haram while 48.7% do not agree that young people are easily attracted to join extremist religious groups like Boko Haram (fig.33).

Fig.28



## KEY FINDINGS

This report identified the following as major findings that should be addressed to curtail future occurrences of religious intolerance in the state.

- a. Poverty and unemployment
- b. Ignorance of religious duties and obligations on the part of parents and guidance
- c. Lack of proper education
- d. Misinterpretation of religious Books by religious leaders
- e. Lack of Parental care giving Rise to child labour, destitution (Almajiri)
- f. Lack of Prompt Action by Government to Prevent Crisis Escalation
- g. Increase in the rate of Child and early marriages

## CONCLUSION

The actions of Boko Haram have not only resulted in the current climate of insecurity in Kaduna state and the country as a whole, but also showcase the consequences of religious extremism by the youth. Illiteracy, extreme poverty, misinterpretation of religious books by leaders, poor parental guidance all act as contributing factors for the involvement of the youth in violent extremism once these young people are radicalised. In Nigeria, we have always addressed crises when they occur in most cases as military operations. There is need for government to be proactive in dealing with such crises rather than resorting to use of force and deployment of the Military.

## CHAPTER 7

### KANO STATE

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#### INTRODUCTION

Kano State was created under this name on 27 May 1967, when Nigeria assumed the 12-state structure. It survived sub-division in 1976 and 1987 until 27 August 1991, when Jigawa State was excised from it. The birth was due in part to its being the most populous state. It is now composed of Kano Emirate. The three other emirates: Hadejia, Gumel and Kazaure, having been out together to form Jigawa State.

Kano State lies between latitude 130 North in the North and 110 North in the South and longitude 80 W in the West and 100 in the East. The total land area of Kano State is 20,760sq kilometres with a population of 9.4 million people based on the official 2006 National Population and Housing Census. Kano is largely Muslim, a majority of whom are Sunni. Christians and followers of other non-Muslim religions form a small part of the population, and traditionally lived in the Sabon Gari, or Foreign Quarter. Kano City has been the capital of Kano State since the earliest recorded time. The state is divided into 44 local government areas (LGAs).

#### LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The research was conducted only in two out of the 44 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Kano state, namely, Nasarawa and Tarauni LGAs which are within the Kano metropolis. The reason for this includes time constraint, shortage of enough fund to cover more LGAs and consideration of areas mostly affected by the recent unrest and series of attacks by the insurgent group of *Boko Haram* sect. Also important to mention

as part of the limitations is the issue of information sensitivity. Given the climate of fear or panic about the activities of insurgents it is very difficult to get such vital data from a wide range of respondents or area of coverage; hence limiting the survey to such areas and concentrating on few individual respondents.

## MAJOR FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Extent to which Young People Share the Social, Cultural, Political and Religious Views of their Parents and Older Generation

Table 1: Value Sharing between Youth and their Parents

Response	Social (%)	Cultural (%)	Political (%)	Religious (%)
Little/Very Little	23	41	40	12
Much/Very Much	75	58	55	88
Don't know	2	2	5	0

Source: Field data, 2013

### Social Practices

Majority of the respondents (75%) report that the social practices of the older generation influence, to a large extent, that of younger generations, while only 23% reported that young people share the social practices of their parents, only to a little extent. Also, a demographically tiny number of respondents (2%) revealed that they have no idea on the extent to which young people share the social practices of their older generation. This reveals that young people are highly influenced by the social practices of their parents and older generation.

### Cultural Belief and Practices

On the extent to which the young people share the cultural beliefs and practices, more than half of the respondents (58%) reports that young people do share Very Much, while 41% of them say they only do to a little extent. Based on the aforesaid finding, it is glaring that young people share the cultural beliefs and practices to a large extent.

### Religious Belief and Practices

An overwhelming majority of the respondents (88%) disclosed that younger people share religious belief and practices of their parents Very Much, while only 12% of them said they do little. This shows that parents do nurture their children along their religious practices, such that hardly a child jettisons his parents' religious belief.

### **Political Belief and Practices**

Slightly above a half of the respondents, precisely 55%, believe that young people share, to reasonable degree, their parents and older generation's political belief and practices, while 40% disclose they only do to a little extent, and 5% have no idea on that.

### **Upholding Conservative and Fundamentalist Views of Religion**

Table 2: Upholding Conservative and Fundamentalist View of Religion (%)

Views	Percentage
More Conservative and Fundamentalist views	31
Less Conservative and Fundamentalist views	64
Don't know	5

Source: Field data, 2013

Majority of the respondents (64%) were of the view that young people, more than older generation, uphold conservative and fundamentalist view of religion, while 31% of them reveal that the reverse of this is true. Also, 5% of the respondents do not know which of them uphold more conservative and fundamentalist view of religion. This may not be unconnected with the fact young people are more likely than the old ones to be troublesome and abuse their natural strength if not properly natured, by using it for violence instead of positive purpose.

Table 3: Use of Violence to Enforce Religious Belief

Response	Percentage
Most/Many	70
Few /Very few	22
Don't know	8

Source: Field data, 2013

Slightly more than two-third of the respondents (70%) said most/many of the young people in their community believe that it is proper to use violence to enforce their religious belief, 22% report that a few believe and 8% said they do not know.

### **Most Important Factor Responsible for the Involvement of Young People in Religious Violence**

Table 4: Factors Responsible for the Involvement of Young People in Religious Violence

	Factors	Percentage (%)
1.	Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion	37
2.	Illiteracy	24
3.	Unemployment and poverty	17
4.	Manipulation by extremist religious leaders	8
5.	Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests	7
6.	Lack of proper parental upbringing, care and	4
7.	examples	
8.	Lack of good example by religious leaders	1
9.	Desire to have a better society through religious	1
10	practices	
	Rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion	1


Source: Field Data, 2013

The major factors responsible for young people's involvement in violence to promote religious belief as outlined by the respondents were ignorance of their religious teaching (37%); illiteracy (24%) and unemployment (17%), while the least reported reasons were rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote their religious belief, desire to have a better society through religious practices and lack of example by religious leaders with 1% of respondents reporting each of the reasons.

### Promoting Religious Belief Using Violence

Table 5: Promoting Religious Belief Using Violence

Response	Percentage
Yes, always	4
Yes, sometimes	21
Never	75



The study reveals that 75% of the respondents were of the view that violence should never be used to promote religious belief, 4% said it should always be used and 21% said it is sometimes acceptable to use violence to promote religious belief. This suggests that a majority of the respondents do not see use of violence as a means of promoting religious belief as appropriate.


### Sources of Religious Extremism

Table 6: Sources of Religious Extremism

Sources	Percentage
Recruitment for religious training in foreign countries	32
Independent (roaming) preachers	22
Regular worship centres	20
Parents	17
Recorded audio and video messages	9

Source: Field Data, 2013






Recruitment for religious training in foreign countries was most cited source of extremism by the respondents (32%), followed by independent (roaming) preachers (22%). The least cited source was recorded audio and video messages (9%).

### **Involvement in Violence as a means of Promoting Religious Belief**

Table 7: Youth Involvement in Violence to Promoting Religious Belief

Means	Percentage
Children from very religious homes	11
Children who were not brought up by their parents	52
Children from poor homes	25
Children from rich homes	5
Children of religious leaders	6

Source: Field Data, 2013



The study finds that children from broken homes are most prone to using religious violence in promoting religious belief, while children from rich homes are less likely to involve in religious violence in promoting religious belief.

### Factors Influencing the Adoption of Extreme Religious View

Table 8: Ignorance of the Religious Teaching:

Response	Percentage
Very Little	4
Little	6
Much	19
Very Much	71
Don't know	0

Source: Field data, 2013

The study indicates that ignorance of the religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views. For instance, 90% of the respondents were of the view that ignorance of religious teaching is a major factor responsible for the adoption of extreme religious views among young people, while only 10% of them posit that it (ignorance of religious teaching) has little influence on the adoption of extreme religious views.

Table 9: Illiteracy

Response	Percentage
Very Little	4
Little	7
Much	41
Very Much	47
Don't know	0

Source: Field Data, 2013

Majority of the respondents (88%) disclosed that illiteracy influences, to a reasonable extent, the adoption of extreme religious view among young people, and 12% say it only has an influence. Illiterate people can easily be manipulated to accept extremist view due to their illiteracy.

Table 10: Manipulation by the Extremist Religious Leaders

Response	Percentage
Very Little	8
Little	17
Much	40
Very Much	30
Don't know	5

Source: Field Data, 2013

Slightly above two-third of the respondents say manipulation of young people by extremist religious leaders is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views. Young people, by the virtue of their exuberance (troublesomeness, physical strength, etc.), are more susceptible to manipulation.

Table 11: Misuse of Religion by Politicians to Promote Political Interest

Response	Percentage
Very Little	9
Little	9
Much	42
Very Much	34
Don't know	6

Source: Field data, 2013

Seventy- six percent of the respondents reveal that misuse of religion by political elites to promote their selfish interest has much influence on the young people's adoption of extreme religious view. Sometimes, political elites use religion as a platform for political mobilisation, which has an unintended consequence of drawing young people to extremism.

Table 12: Unemployment and Poverty

Response	Percentage
Very Little	1
Little	6
Much	24
Very Much	68
Don't know	1

Source: Field Data, 2013

An overwhelming majority (92%) of the respondents say that unemployment and poverty are foremost factors influencing adoption of extreme religious views among young people, while only 8% posit that they only have little influence. Poor and unemployed youth who are in a terrible economic condition, and whose future is characterised by uncertainty are vulnerable to religious extremism. They can easily be manipulated by the political class to mobilise religion as a basis for political action, which in turn culminates into extremism.

Table 13: Lack of Proper Parental Upbringing, Care and Examples

Response	Percentage
Very Little	8
Little	13
Much	40
Very Much	40
Don't know	0

Source: Field data, 2013

The study found that most of the respondents (80%) were of the view that lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples have serious influence on the adoption of religious extremism. This is because people who are not properly socialised at early stage of life are more likely to exhibit anti-social behaviour at later ages. When these people have contact with extremists, they get recruited easily.

Table 14: Desire to Have Better Society through Religious Practices

Response	Percentage
Very Little	17
Little	23
Much	38
Very Much	18

Don't know	3
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Source: Field Data, 2013

More than a half of the respondents (56%) say that the desire to have better society through religious practices has much influence on the adoption of religious extremism, while 40% say it has little influence.

Table 15: Reward for Involvement in the Use of Violence to Promote Religion

Response	Percentage
Very Little	16
Little	16
Much	34
Very Much	27
Don't know	0

Source: Field Data, 2013

More than half of the respondents interviewed (61%) disclose that reward for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion has much influence on adoption of extreme religious view, while 32% said it only has little influence.

Table 16: Neglect of the Welfare of Citizens by Government

Response	Percentage
Very Little	4
Little	12
Much	34
Very Much	50
Don't know	0

Source: Field Data, 2013

It is also found that 84% of the respondents interviewed are of the view that neglect of the welfare of citizens by government has much influence on the adoption of extreme religious views, while 16% say it only has little influence. This suggests that where a government does not guarantee welfare for the citizen through improving access to certain social services, such as education, healthcare services, roads, power and water supplies, it creates tendencies for extremism. Extreme religious leader and political class easily garner the support and sympathy of these marginalised citizens.

Table 17: Lack of Good Examples by Religious Leaders

Response	Percentage
Very Little	11
Little	17
Much	43
Very Much	24
Don't know	3

Source: Field Data, 2013

Two-thirds of the respondents (67%) reveal that lack of good examples by religious leaders has much influence on the adoption of religious extremism by young people, while 28% say it has little influence.

Table 18: Belief that Corruption and Immoral Behaviour are Widespread

Response	Percentage
Very Little	15
Little	14
Much	41
Very Much	26
Don't know	3

Source: Field Data, 2013

Sixty-seven percent of the respondents report that believe in corruption and immoral behaviours are widespread and is a major factor responsible for the adoption of religious extremist views among the young people and 19% are of the view that belief in corruption and immoral behaviours is widespread and has little influence on the adoption of religious extremist views among the young people.

Table 19: Undue Involvement in Religious Matters by the Government

Response	Percentage
Very Little	20
Little	10
Much	38
Very Much	26
Don't know	6

Source: Field Data, 2013

More than a half of the respondents (64%) say undue involvement in religious matters by the government has a pronounced influence on adoption of religious extremist views among the young people, 30% say the influence is just little.

Table 20: Exposure to Foreign Extremist Group:

Response	Percentage
Very Little	9
Little	13
Much	37
Very Much	36
Don't know	6

Source: Field Data, 2013

Seventy-three per cent report that exposure to foreign extremist group has a strong influence on adoption of religious extremist views among the young people, 22% say that it has a little influence. This indicates that majority of the respondents are of the view that domestic extremists are highly influenced by their foreign counterparts.

Table 21: Foreign Funding of Religious Groups and Activities, Including Propagation of Extremist Religious Views and Practice

Response	Percentage
Very Little	7
Little	12
Much	33
Very Much	39
Don't know	8

Source: Field Data, 2013

A little above two-third (72%) say foreign funding of religious groups and activities, including propagation of extremist religious views and practice have a great influence on the adoption of extremist religious views among the young people, while 19% say it has little influence.

Table 22: Action of Security Agents towards Members of Extremist Group

Response	Percentage
Very Little	10
Little	16
Much	41
Very Much	27
Don't know	5

Source: Field Data, 2013

Sixty-eight per cent disclose action of security agents towards members of extremist group has Very Much influence on the adoption of religious views by young people, whereas 26% said it has little influence. Majority of the respondents reveal that the manners in which security agents handle religious extremism further exacerbate it rather than reduce it. The use of brutal approach to contain extremism by our security shows that they lack basic training required to carry out the task.

Table 23: Actions of Security Agents towards Members of the Public

Response	Percentage
Very Little	8
Little	15
Much	44
Very Much	32
Don't know	1

Source: Field Data, 2013

Seventy- six per cent of the respondents disclose that actions of security agents towards members of the public have a strong influence on the adoption of religious views by young people, whereas 23% say the influence is less pronounced. The majority of the informant reveal that the brutal approach used by the security agents has created an unfriendly relationship between them and members of the public, which makes some of the public sympathetic to extremists who have waged war against the state and it instrument of power (security agencies).

Table 24: Insensitivity to Religious and Cultural Diversity

Response	Percentage
Very Little	11
Little	29
Much	39
Very Much	18
Don't know	3

Source: Field Data, 2013

More than a half of the informants (57%) say the influence of insensitivity to religious and cultural diversity is very much, whereas 40% say it has little influence. This indicates that lack of religious and cultural diversity in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society is one of the leading factors responsible for the adoption of extreme religious views.



## Opportunities for Young People

Table 25: Access to Recreational Facilities

Response	Percentage
Yes	20
No	80

Source: Field data, 2013

It is found that adequate opportunities do not exist for young people in terms of access to recreational facilities. Only 20% of the respondents disclose that young people in the state have access to recreational facilities. Access to recreation provides solace to young people and thereby undermining their violent tendencies. Where young people are denied access to these facilities, tendencies for violence tend to be high and they can easily adopt extremism.

## CONCLUSION

The future of any society lies in the hand of young people. Where young people are emasculated and denied access to education, gainful employment and other social services, they mar the future of the society. The economic and social conditions of young people in Nigeria coupled with their biological make-up (physical strength, troublesomeness) are prone to extremism and violence. Poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, mobilisation of religious sentiments by dubious politicians, poor parental upbringing and ignorance of religious teachings make young people susceptible to the influence of extremist view and, by extension, violence. In other words, the failure of the state to address the social and economic malaise has given young people the opportunity to seek solace from religion or, to put slightly different, has raised their expectations on the efficacy of religious solutions to these issues. Also, the failure of the state to contain this extremism, proliferation of foreign extremist groups and their links with domestic religious groups exacerbates the incidence of extremism and violence in Nigeria. Religious extremism and violence in Nigeria threaten national integration, internal security, inter-religious harmony, human rights, democracy and national development.

## CHAPTER 8

### SOKOTO STATE

**Ibrahim Shuni**

Program Director,

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#### INTRODUCTION

During the 18<sup>th</sup> century the area known as Sokoto State was located on the borders of the three kingdoms of Gobir, Kebbi and Zamfara. Like the rest of Hausa-land, Islam had reached this area by the 15<sup>th</sup> century. In spite of the prevalence of Islam, non-Islamic traditions persisted and were still being followed both by the rulers and by many of their subjects. A powerful reform movement emerged in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century seeking to purify the practice of Islam and transform every aspect of government and society. The movement was led by Shehu Usmanu Fodio and included many other scholars who sought to achieve their aim through preaching Islam and calling on rulers to govern according to Islamic principles. The movement soon transformed into a jihad and by 1809, most of the rulers of the Hausa Kingdoms were toppled and replaced with Islamic governments under a unified Caliphate administration whose headquarters was at Sokoto.

This reform laid the foundation of the Sokoto “Caliphate” which covered a very large territory of present Northern Nigeria extending to the famous kingdoms of Mali, Kenem-Bornu, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Northern Cameroons and some part of old Oyo kingdom of Nigeria. These former empires and kingdoms were either swallowed up completely or their territories were taken by the caliphate and were successfully administered by the Sultan of Sokoto for the next 100 years after the jihad. It was with this arrangement that the major northern towns of Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Daura, Rano, Hadejiya, Bauchi, Kebbi, Gombe, Adamawa, Bida, Ilorin, Kontagora, Katagum, Misau,

etc were administered by Fodio's most trusted subjects in their capacities as Emirs, Flag bearers, and War commanders.

Once the British government took over the administrative and political functions of Royal Niger Company in 1899, it undertook the conquest and annexation of most of the areas that later became Northern Nigeria; Kontagora, Bida, Yola, Zaria, and Kano were taken in 1902 and Sokoto in 1903. The emirates of the former Sokoto caliphate were reconstructed as administrative units independent of the sultan whose authority was only recognised in the Sokoto province. But the title of Sarkin Musulmi (Sultan) remained and he continues till today as spiritual leader of all Nigerian Muslims, and the most influential traditional ruler in Northern Nigeria. Sokoto State in its present form came into being in October 1996, after Niger State was carved out in 1976, Kebbi State in 1991 and Zamfara State in 1996 (M B Idris 2010).

## **SOKOTO STATE**

Sokoto State is located between longitude 11°30' to 13°5' east and latitude 4° to 6°40' north. Total population of the state stands as 4,161,005, with around 49% of total population estimated to be women in the state (NPC 2010). There are 23 LGAs and 239 political wards in the state. Sokoto state is bordered by Niger Republic in the north, Kebbi State to the south and west, and Zamfara State to the east. The people of Sokoto state today includes; Zamfarawa they live mostly in areas bordering Zamfara state, Gobirawa they are found mostly in Sabon-Birni, Goronyo and Isa districts bordering Niger Republic, Kabawa they are usually found in Kebbe and Silame districts bordering Kebbi state—all these groups are indigenous Hausas and speak no other language but Hausa; Fulani- found everywhere in the state; the Tuaregs are the other minor groups mostly found in Gada and Illela districts bordering Niger republic. They are mostly found in the Sahara area driving their camels, wearing black turban; and the Zabarmawa mostly found in Kware district and some part of Gudu bordering Niger Republic. Other Nigerian groups such as Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv, Idoma, Igala, Ibira, etc are found in few numbers across the state. . The language spoken in the state is mainly Hausa (M B Idris 2010). Majority of the population in the state are Muslims, however there is a significant Christian population. The common mineral resources found in the state include silica sand, clay, salt, limestone, phosphate, gypsum, kaolin, laterite, potash, and granite (I Ekweremadu 2012). Majority of the population are subsistence farmers and with presence of Goronyo and Shagari dams most of the population residing around those areas are dry season's farmers. Over 60 per cent of the state populations are illiterate; they cannot understand the English language (World Bank Report 2012).

## VIOLENCE IN SOKOTO STATE

Sokoto State has always been known to be a peaceful state. Since after the “1989 Ba mu so” uprising<sup>4</sup> which led to loss of lives and destruction of properties, no major violence was recorded for nearly two decades. In 2007, there was a sectarian crisis between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslim groups, where many were injured and properties destroyed. In 2011, post-election violence was recorded after the general election in the country as was the case in many northern states. Properties were destroyed but no lives were recorded to have been lost. There were also instances of politicians mobilising illiterate and idle youths for campaigns especially during the 2007 general elections- supporting them with drugs and weapons to suppress and intimidate political opponents. However there was a decrease of this scenario during the 2011 general election and 2012 re-run gubernatorial election. There was no history of communal clashes among different communities or different settlers in the state (Kamba 2012). This state of relative peace and stability in Sokoto State is remarkable considering its history as the citadel of Islam in Nigeria.

Most of the perpetrators of violence in the state are youths, politicians and some religious leaders. Youths are lured into violence because of their ignorance, shallow reasoning and religious fanaticism, while politicians because of certain hidden motives or to achieve selfish political interests. Some religious leaders promote violence because of extremism and poor understanding and or partial/racial interpretation of religious laws (Maishanu 2011). The most affected population are women who became widows, lost their children and livelihoods. They are then forced to head the household and shoulder responsibilities, which they are not prepared for. Children and youths who lose their parents, siblings or colleagues at early age, often become permanently deformed, and the society in general has lost properties and potential achievers (Shamaki 2011).

In Sokoto, weapon used during the violence are light weapons, which are locally made. These weapons include axes, machetes, knives, swords, and sticks. However, with the outbreak of Boko Haram in 2010, there have been cases of violence, which were closely associated with Boko Haram in Sokoto State. For instance, the state recorded the first

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<sup>4</sup> “Ba mu so” is a Hausa expression for “We don’t want”. It was an uprising in which people in Sokoto State rejected what was perceived as the imposition of Ibrahim Dasuki as the Sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida.

suicide attack in July 2012: a twin suicide attack which targeted two police stations, and resulted to the loss of lives and destruction of properties; in the same month suspected Boko Haram members raided a police station in Shagari town and released all detainees and set ablaze the station but no life was lost. More so, in September 2012, there was a sporadic exchange of gunfire between security agents and suspected Boko Haram members in Bado Housing Estate, where the insurgents were killed with security agencies losing some men. In 2013 there were two incidences of heavy gunfire in GidanIgwe area of Sokoto leading to loss of lives and the arrest of some suspects. Also suspected members of the Boko Haram group were arrested with ammunitions and sophisticated weapons in three separate incidents, the most recent occurred in August 2013. Basically, all those killed or arrested as suspected Boko Haram members are male and Muslim youths.

Generally, the Nigeria Army, Nigeria Air Force, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, State Security Services are the institutions of government that combat violence in the state. Non-state actors such as religious aid groups do not have clear roles in combating violence in Sokoto State, but they are known to have assisted with information.

## **METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the data used in this report are mainly from primary sources, namely, field interviews conducted through administration of questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Background data on Sokoto State was sourced from desk-based literature review. A total of 120 questionnaires were distributed, one hundred (100) Key Informant Interviews and seven (7) Focus Group Discussions were conducted with respondents in five (5) LGAs of Sokoto State. The LGAs are Sokoto South, Sokoto North, Wammako, DangeShuni and Shagari. The respondents are youths (male and female), traditional and religious leaders, Muslim and Christians leaders, community leaders, CSOs/CBOs, security agents, politicians, women organisation leaders. The respondent for the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) are the same as in the questionnaire. The KIIs were administered in the Sokoto town (that houses 4 LGAs i.e. Sokoto South, Sokoto North, Wammako and Dange Shuni) and Shagari town in Shagari LGAs. All questionnaires, KIIs were returned and completed. During the FGDs, all participants were active and responded to questions asked. The key findings from the study could be discussed under the following headings.

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY


The study centred on youth radicalisation especially as it relates to the tendency of the youths to associate with the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria. The main methodology used in the study is the administration of questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The questionnaire is structured question styled. The sample size of the study consists of 120 respondents for the questionnaires; 10 interviewers; 15 participated in KII and 7 in FGD.

The study is limited by the methodology adopted in the course of the research. The focus on interviews and self-reporting implies that the perception and response of respondents are not interrogated and rigorously tested against any other source of knowledge. Additionally, the sample size of 20 drawn from 5 local governments is only a minimal representation of Sokoto State.

## MAJOR FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### 1. Extremism Between Generations

When asked of the extent to which young people share social, cultural, political and religious views which were the same with their parent or older generations, as many as 71% of the respondents agree that the views of the younger generation is very much the same with the older generation while only 21% disagree and point to a “Little” or “very Little” change between the generations. 8% are undecided.




Extent to which youths share social, cultural, political and religious views of older generations (KII)

	Much/	Very	Little/Very	Don't Know (%)
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	Much Conservative/Fu ndamentalist View (%)	Little Conservative/F undamentalist View (%)	
Whether young people uphold a more fundamental and conservative views of religion than older generation	45	50	5

From the general informant questionnaire, 45% of respondents see “Much” or “Very Much” conservatism and radicalism while 50% are opposed to this and 5% are undecided. Probing the suggested coherence and similarity between generations, the survey seeks to find out whether the views of the younger generation are more or less conservative and fundamentalist compared to the older generation.



About 7 out of 10 respondents (71%) affirm that the views of the younger generation on religion are more conservative and fundamentalist than those of their parents (or the older generation). Only 3 in 10 (29%) opine that the younger generation hold a less extremist religious outlook. On the surface, there is a seeming inconsonance between the assertion that the youth share the religious, political and cultural view of their parents (71% of respondents acknowledge this) viz-a-viz the finding that the younger generation hold more conservative and fundamentalist religious views. Yet on closer analysis, it is suggested that although youths share the views of the older generations, they also uphold a more extremist brand of these views. This would imply that indeed

successive generations have often hold extreme views, which are only becoming more extreme in the younger generation.

To what extent do young people share social, cultural, political and religious view of their parent or older generation?

Table 1

	Much/ Very Much Conservative/Funda mentalist View	Little/Very Little Conservative/Fundame ntalist View	Don't Know
Social Practices	77	23	0
Cultural Belief And Practices	70	26	4
Religious Belief And Practice	83	17	0
Political Belief And Practice	67	29	4

Source: field report 2013


From the general informant questionnaire, a disaggregation of views across the generations in Sokoto State shows a very interesting parallel. Whereas 77% saw the social practices of the younger generation as tending towards extremism, 23% disagree and see less extremism in the young. In terms of cultural practices, 70% see extremism but 26% disagree. Politically, 67% saw extremism in the youth but 29% disagreed. When it comes to religion, 83% think that the religious beliefs and practices of the younger generations are more conservative and fundamentalist than those of the older generations. Only 17% disagree. Although across these 4 indicators we see an overwhelming consensus that the younger generation was tending towards extremism, the findings on their religious beliefs and practices show a greater consensus and concern about this trend of extremism among the youth. This verdict correlates and corroborates the KII finding which reports a 71% agreement on the extremism among youths.

## 2. Use of Force in Religion

	Most/Many People (%)	Little/Very Little (%)	Don't Know (%)
Is it proper to use violence to enforced their religious beliefs	72	20	



Another angle of the survey is to probe the perception of respondents on force or compulsion in the practice of religion. Respondents are asked about their observation of their communities whether people think it is proper to use violence to enforce religious beliefs. As much as 40% of respondents agree that “Most” or “Many” people believe in using violence to enforce religion; 41% are of the opinion that few or very few people believe in the use of violence while 19% said they don’t know. However, using the KII data, as much as 72% of the respondents say only “Few” or “Very Few” people believe in the use of violence to enforce religious belief and 20% say they don’t know.



Only a small number (8%) confirm that the use of force in religion is popular with “Most” or “Many” people in their observation. The inference from this data set is illuminating; whereas there is a sense in which the use of force in religion is considered widespread (40% agreed to this among the general respondents); however, during key informant interviews, respondents argue that a vast majority (72%) are not inclined to using force in pursuit of religious objectives. There is need for further investigations and analysis on the place of force in religion in Sokoto State. When asked whether it is acceptable to promote one’s religious views using violence, majority of the respondent in the general respondents questionnaire (70%) are opposed to violence while as much as 1 in 5 (20%) say yes, sometimes ones can use violence. So, popular view among the respondent is that is not acceptable to use violence to promote one’s religion beliefs. In the KII, 95% of respondents say no to violence and 3% are undecided. While it is easy and tempting to be reassured by the overwhelming consensus against violence, there is need to reflect and raise concern about the small number who see reason to justify the use of violence in religion.


### 3. Factors Responsible for Radicalisation

The research also sought to identify the key factor, which make young people likely to use violence to promote their religious beliefs.

Factor	%
Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion	33
Misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interests	24
Illiteracy	16
Unemployment and poverty	11
Lack of proper parental upbringing, care and examples	8
Lack of good example by religious leaders	3
Manipulation by extremist religious leaders	2
Desire to have a better society through religious practices	1
Lack of good example by religious leaders	1
Rewards for involvement in the use of violence to promote religion	0

As much as a third of general questionnaire respondents, (33%) agree that ignorance of the full teaching of the religion is the most central factor. Another 24% identify the misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest as a factor; 16% identify illiteracy; 11% identify unemployment and poverty; 8% say lack of parental upbringing care and examples; 3% mention lack of good examples by religious leaders; 2% say manipulation by extremist religious leaders is a factor while 1% say it is due to the desire to have a better society through religious means.

Therefore one can draw conclusion from the discussion above that the most important factors responsible for the involvement of young people in the use of violence are the ignorance of the full teaching of religious views and misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest. There is a relationship between the 2 factors since the ignorance of the correct teaching of the religion allows politicians the leeway to misuse religion to their own means It is important to note that from the survey, none of the respondent believe that there is any reward in the use of violence to promote religion.



From the key informant interviews (KII) when asked what respondents consider the most important factor responsible for the involvement of young people in the use of violence to promote their religious beliefs; 53% point at the ignorance of religious beliefs/poor or bad religious teaching, 15% of the respondent point at illiteracy and lack of proper education while others, (12%) blame unemployment and poverty.

The survey probes further to identify the extent to which the identified causes of extremism can be linked with the acquisition of extremist views in the state. Respondent are asked how much they think “ignorance of the full teaching of religion” influences the adoption of extremist religious view by young people in the community. A majority of 67% believe “very Much” and 15% say “Much” while 12% say “Little”. For “illiteracy” 47% say very Much, 28% say Much, 12% say Little and 9% very Little. In the case of manipulation by extremist religion leaders 42% agree on Much, 30% on very Much, 12% Little and 13% very Little. Likewise on “misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest” 53% agree very Much, 25% say Much while few 8% agree that it is Little or very Little.

	Ignorance of full teaching of religion	Illiteracy	Manipulation by extremist religious	Misuse of religion by politicians	Unemployment and poverty	Lack of parental upbringing, care and	Desire to have a better society	Reward for involvement in violence	Neglect of welfare of citizen by government	Lack of good examples by religious	Widespread corruption and immoral	Insensitivity to cultural and religious
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			leade rs			exam ples				leader s	beha viour	view
Very Little	1	9	13	8	4	11	16	8	10	16	10	17
Little	12	12	12	8	10	12	28	28	9	22	15	16
Much	15	28	42	25	26	45	21	34	34	22	33	19
Very Much	67	47	30	53	59	28	33	24	43	34	37	29
I don't know	4	3	4	5	1	4	2		4	6	4	18

While there are divergence of opinion on the degree to which each factor predisposes an individual to extremism, there is sufficient affirmation on each factor to reinforce it as a driver of extremism in the state. Going forward, communities would need to see each of these factors being mitigated if the threat of extremism is to be reversed.

#### 4. Origins of Extremism

In view of the latent fundamentalist views being held by the young and old in Sokoto State, it is important that the research seeks to capture the origins of extremism and radicalisation as observed by respondents. When asked in the general questionnaire to identify the most important through which young people acquire extremist religious views, the largest number, and nearly a third (28%) of the respondent identify the recruitment for religious training in foreign country as the major source of radicalisation. Other key factors identified include recorded audio and video messages (23%); independent (roaming) preachers (22%); through the regular worship centers (16%) and through parents (12%).

source	%
Recruitment for religious training in foreign countries	28
Recorded audio and video messages	23
Independent (roaming) preachers	22
Regular worship centres	16
Parents	12

From the KIIs, respondents single out the key sources of extremism as including false religious preachers (53%); peer group and influence/parent (16%); illiteracy (7%); poverty and unemployment (5% ) and audio/media messages (4%).




Figure 5

Source: Field report 2013

There is then the consensus that in Sokoto State, roaming preachers are identified as the leading source of extremism among youths. This is likely to be because no one knows where the said preachers had trained and what they stand for. Curtailing extremism among youths will, therefore, require a mechanism through which itinerant preachers can be identified as referenced by reputable religious authorities before being allowed audience in communities. The effort is not to curtail the practice of roaming preachers, but to ensure that they are identifiable and of good standing among religious authorities.


## 5. Potential Targets of Extremism

It is understood that community members are not all susceptible to the message of radicalisation. Even among the vulnerable groups, individuals do not fall prey to radicalisation at the same level. To better guide public safety policy in Northern Nigeria, therefore, there is the need to identify the most vulnerable groups who should become priority groups to be insulated from extremism. Respondents in the general questionnaires identified children who are not brought up by their parent (45%) and children from poor homes (45%) as the most vulnerable groups and potential targets of extremists. Other groups identified are children from rich homes (27%) and children of religious leaders (15%) and children from very religious homes (8%).

Source	%
Children from very religious home	8
Children who were not brought up by their parent	45
Children from poor homes	45

Children from rich homes	27
Children from religious leaders	15

From the KII data, when asked which group is most likely to be involved in the use of violence to promote religious beliefs, 91% say young people between 19 and 25 years as opposed to young people of 26 years and older who are only indicted by 9% of the respondents.



What these findings suggest is that extremism and radicalisation is an extremely young phenomenon in Sokoto State. It is suggested that once a youth has passed the threshold of 25 years, s/he is likely to have already acquired fundamentalist views or is likely to be immune thereafter. More importantly, it is suggested that children not raised by their own parents as well as those from poor homes are the most likely targets of extremism. Noting that it is children from poor backgrounds who are most likely to be raised by other families (relations, employers of child labour and religious leaders), the risk of exposure to extremism becomes severe for children of poor backgrounds who are raised by other families.

Table 7 showing factors influencing the use extremist religious view


	Ignorance of full teaching of	Illiteracy	Manipulation by extremist religious	Misuse of religion by politicians	Unemployment and poverty	Lack of parental upbringing	Desire to have a better	Reward for involvement in violence	Neglect of welfare of citizen by	Lack of good examples by religious	Widespread corruption and imm	Insensitivity to cultural and religi
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	religi on		leader s			care and exam ples	soci ety		gove rnme nt	ous leade rs	oral beha viour	ous view
Very Little	1	9	13	8	4	11	16	8	10	16	10	17
Little	12	12	12	8	10	12	28	28	9	22	15	16
Muc h	15	28	42	25	26	45	21	34	34	22	33	19
Very Muc h	67	47	30	53	59	28	33	24	43	34	37	29
I don't know	4	3	4	5	1	4	2		4	6	4	18

Source: Field report 2013

## 6. Extremism and Social Infrastructure

When asked to express their views on whether adequate opportunity exist for young people in areas of access to recreational facilities, 68% of the respondent in the general survey say no while 32% of the respondent say yes it exists. In the KIIs respondents are asked to identify opportunities that they consider inadequate in their communities for young people.




3 out of 4 (75%) say employment and job opportunities, while 19% say education and skill opportunities and 6% say social and essential amenities such as hospitals and schools.

Consequently, when asked to identify what attracts young people to join extremist group like Boko Haram, nearly half (43%) say unemployment/ lack of job

opportunity/poverty, while 16% say lack of proper or adequate knowledge of Islamic religion/bad religious teaching, 15% say is due to criminal influence by peer groups/inducement by sect, but few 8% say illiteracy and lack of proper education. The identified lack of opportunities in the communities can therefore be seen as positively correlating with the probability of youths to join extremist groups.

## 7. Probabilities of Extremism


Using the general questionnaire, the study attempts to identify the relative probability of youths joining radical groups. The researchers subsequently asked whether it is true that young people are easily attracted to join extremist religious group like Boko Haram 51% said no while 49% said yes. On the one hand, nearly half of respondents view the youths as easily falling prey to extremism while almost an equal number (51%) hold contrary opinion; there is no consensus therefore in Sokoto State on this. Yet the prevalence of the identified causes of extremism in the state suggests that indeed it is easy for youths to join such groups.



## 8. Curbing Extremism

Finally when asked to identify three possible measures that can be adopted to prevent extremist religion beliefs and practices, 43% of the informant say education, sensitisation and clear religious teaching, 24% say create job opportunities and poverty reduction activities, 20% say job creation, youth education and peaceful coexistence strategies and 10% say accountability, good governance and control of religious preaching.





Source: Field report 2013

It is remarkable to note that respondents did not identify militarisation of the state or other such hard security measures as panacea to extremism. There is a strong emphasis that the path to confronting extremism in the state might not lie in a direct emphasis on extremism itself but instead on social and welfare policies in the community.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion religious extremism and violence have detrimental effect on economic development, national integration, consolidation of democracy, internal security, human rights and freedom, inter-religious harmony, education and scientific development, international image, poverty reduction, and child and youth development. Therefore from the foregoing discussion, it is clear that youths aged 15-25 years are likely to be involved in holding extremist religious views and can use violence to promote their religious beliefs, including the views they obtained mainly from false religious preachers is also a factor. This could be averted if they are well- educated and jobs and employment opportunities are made available by accountable and transparent government.

## CHAPTER 9

# MAJOR FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

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### KEY FINDINGS OF THE REPORT

The central focus of this study is to uncover the drivers of youth radicalisation and violent extremism. Across the six states surveyed, there are specific and generic findings that could be teased out from a closer examination of each state. Their diverse nature points to the fact that the driving force for youth extremism and violence are numerous and could largely be context-specific. From the broad survey, however, the main causative factors are economic, social, political, and religious in nature. The top findings of the study are highlighted and discussed here, focusing essentially on cross-cutting factors in the six states.

***Ignorance of the true Religious Teaching is a key Driver of Youth Radicalisation:*** In all the states where the field works are carried out, there is unanimity that ignorance of the religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views especially by the youth. The lack of deep knowledge of the true religious teaching may not be unconnected to three mutually-related dangerous ubiquitous trends in the practice of religion in the very recent times in Nigeria, namely, the proliferation of sects, both in Islam and Christianity; the proliferation of independent preachers in both religions; and the increasing reliance on preachers rather than on the text or scriptures (Holy Books). The lack of deep knowledge of the true religious teaching makes young people very vulnerable to recruitment and radicalisation by independent (roaming)

preachers, extremist groups and religious ideologues. In Borno State, for instance, 93.2% of the respondents are of the view that ignorance of the full teaching of their religion are factors that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community. In Kano and Sokoto, 37% and 33.2% of the respondents, respectively, are of the view that ignorance of the full teaching of their religions is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community. In most cases, these impressionable young persons are easily deceived by the sermon of some independent or roaming preachers or self-taught psychologists or motivational speakers who claim to be 'men of God' or Islamic scholars.

***Unemployment and Poverty Contribute to Youth Radicalisation and Extremism:***

Unemployment and poverty are socio-economic challenges that are not only intricately interconnected but glaringly manifest in Northern Nigeria in particular. Figures from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) show that Nigeria's unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 per cent until 2011. It reached an all-time high of 23.90 per cent in December 2011 and there is no evidence that the situation is getting any better. Not surprising, figures released by the NBS earlier in 2013 revealed that in spite of favourable economic growth and performance, poverty rate in Nigeria jumped from 54.7 per cent in 2004 to 60.9 per cent in 2010. It has also added that while 100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty, 12.6 million are moderately poor in 2011 (Cited in Ojo 2013: *Vanguard*, 2013). The worst hit by these afflictions are those considered as youth, especially in Northern Nigeria. The twin problem of unemployment and poverty are overstressing the moral and psychological strength of many Nigerians to remain law-abiding citizens. As a result, most young people have taken to crime for survival or easily recruited into violent criminal or terrorist groups.

In Borno State, for example, respondents identified the high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state as the second most important reason why youths engage in religious-based violence. These people remain the marginalised in terms of economic opportunities and remain highly vulnerable to behaviours inimical to peace and security in Nigeria. Given their dire socio-economic situation, they seem not to have anything at stake with the government. The large army of jobless youth, street urchins and Almajiris tell the gory story of this segment of the Nigerian population whose future appears bleak, thereby disposing them to causing and being used to cause social disruptions, religious conflicts and violent extremism. This is not to argue that unemployment and poverty are direct causative factors of youth radicalisation, but it is safe to extrapolate that destitution, privation, hopelessness and other frustrating conditions of life render people, especially idle but energetic youth, highly vulnerable or susceptible to certain degree of manipulation by extremist ideologues. As Komolafe has argued, unemployment and poverty indeed may not be

the main factors in radicalisation, but “the tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than the one in which basic needs of food, education, health, housing and sanitation are met for the majority of the people” in Nigeria (Komolafe 2012:56). Hence, poor and unemployed youth who are in a terrible economic condition and whose future is characterised by uncertainty are vulnerable to religious extremism and radicalisation.

***Children with Poor Upbringing are More Vulnerable to Extremist Views:*** The growing number of children without adequate parental guidance is one of the societal conditions that have contributed to the problem of youth radicalisation and violent extremism in Northern Nigeria. Too many Nigerian children suffer from neglect, poverty, hunger, illiteracy, squalor and child labour-related hardships. Across the states in Nigeria, especially in the northern part, millions of school-age children are not enrolled in school, thereby raising the level of illiteracy in the country and making them more vulnerable to manipulation by radical groups. Obviously, the environment of widespread poverty in Northern Nigeria has contributed to the growing population of these destitute children. Most of these children live in very appalling conditions, roaming the streets and begging for alms or hawking wares in major cities. Both in states such as Borno and Yobe that have witnessed the worst cases of violent extremism and states such as Gombe and Sokoto that are relatively peaceful, respondents to questionnaire and focus group discussion strongly agree that children from poor homes or those that were not brought up by their biological parents—including children from broken homes, abandoned/orphaned children and children who are in the custody of relatives or other individuals into whose care they were entrusted – are the most vulnerable group that may be used to perpetrate religious violence. It is not surprising that terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram are tapping into this situation to achieve their violent objectives. In June 2013, for instance, young suspects who are released by the military claim they are paid ₦5,000 each (about \$30 USD) by Boko Haram to set schools in Yobe and Borno states on fire and also spy on soldiers. According to one of them, “We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out for the soldiers at their units and reported back to them. We were reporting when soldiers were at ease or enjoying themselves and when they were off guard and we were paid for doing that” (Alechenu 2013). The children, whose ages range between 9 and 15 years, have equally helped Boko Haram to carry stolen items, give information about people they want to attack and to hide their guns after attacks. Therefore, there is the urgent need for the Nigerian government, civil society groups, development agencies, and religious bodies to partner with parents to transform the present precarious situation of the Nigerian child.

***High Level of Illiteracy Contribute to Youth Radicalisation and Extremism:*** The high level of illiteracy across the six States is one of the major factors identified in the

questionnaire, KIIs and FGD that influence the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community. In Gombe State, illiteracy is ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> (54%) out of the 16 factors listed. It is also ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> (57%) in Yobe State. It is slightly lower in Borno State, where it is ranked fourth (52%) out of the 16 factors listed as causal factors of youth extremism and violence. From the data in the table below, it is evident that most people are of the view that illiteracy has ‘very Much’ influence on the adoption of extreme religious views by young people the states. Illiterate people can easily be manipulated because of their state of social deprivation to acquire basic knowledge that can enable them question some propositions, teachings and doctrines.

*Table \*\*\*\*\*: The Extent to which Illiteracy Influences the Adoption of Extreme Religious views by Young People in the Community*

State	Borno	Gombe	Kaduna	Kano	Sokoto	Yobe
Very Little	4	5	8	4	9	4
Little	13	11	8	7	12	6
Much	30	25	17	41	28	31
Very Much	52	54	47	47	47	57
Don't know	0	4	3	0	3	3

Source: Field data, 2013

Hence, their situation makes them susceptible to manipulation by religious leaders, extremist ideologues and even politicians. This is the point where poverty, illiteracy, and radicalisation are connected. In the context of the six States examined, these social issues are not mutually exclusive but are correlated. The poor people are the ones that are unlikely to send their children to school; and they are the ones likely to be illiterate, ignorant and unemployed and therefore vulnerable to recruitment and radicalisation. This is how these issues are linked to radicalisation.

***Alleged Excesses of Security Forces not a Major Driver of Youth Extremism:*** One prominent kinetic response to the Boko Haram insurgency by the Federal Government has been the deployment of state security and military forces. Their deployment however has received criticism from a segment of enraged local population, social commentators, opinion leaders, civil society organisations and media, for their harsh tactics that have injured civilians and damaged property. Such allegations include unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, extortion and intimidation by security forces. Consequently, a section of the media, especially international media, have repeatedly mentioned that the excesses of the security forces are a critical factor in youth radicalisation. Contrary to this claim, findings from this study show that “alleged excesses of security forces” is in fact the least in terms of the driving forces for youth extremism and violence. For instance, in Yobe State, the ‘action of the security agents

towards members of the public' is ranked 15th out of 16 factors identified as driving youth extremism and radicalisation. Similarly, 'action of the security agents towards members of the extremist religious groups' such as the Boko Haram, is ranked 16th out of 16 factors. The main factors identified by respondents in their order of ranking are: Unemployment and poverty (ranked 1<sup>st</sup>), Illiteracy (ranked 2<sup>nd</sup>), Ignorance of the full teaching of their religion (ranked 3<sup>rd</sup>), and misuse of religion by politicians to promote their interest (ranked 4<sup>th</sup>). The very low ranking of the actions of security and military forces suggests tacit popular support for the ongoing counterinsurgency operations against the Boko Haram, despite the obvious shortcomings on the part of some security or military personnel deployed in areas affected by Boko Haram violence. Notwithstanding, allegations of human rights violation blamed on the security forces, need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities to improve the level of confidence and trust the local people have on the security forces deployed for counter terrorism operations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the following measures are suggested.

***Better Monitoring and Regulation of Religious Preaching:*** As is done in some countries with a history of religious extremism, such as Saudi Arabia, religious preachers as well as places of worships are closely monitored so as to avoid using such avenues for propagating violent and extremist ideology or distortion of religious teachings. Given the finding that independent (roaming) preachers are key purveyors of distorted religious preaching, there is the need for a regulatory and monitoring framework in Nigeria. The recent introduction of such mechanism to regulate preaching in Gombe State offers a good case for developing and institutionalising the idea across the States of the Federation. During the 2013 Ramadan preaching in Gombe State, guidelines are brought out (as agreed upon by Muslim and Christian leaders) to regulate all preaching and teaching at that time in order to avoid the use of strong language against another religion or sect. Such regulation of preaching must be encouraged at all times, with a team set up to closely monitor compliance by Islamic sects and Christian denominations, with strict penalties stipulated and meted for non-compliance. To this end, it is necessary and appropriate that the federal government embarks on the creation of a Religious Affairs Regulatory and Monitory Commission (RARMC) comprising representative of the major religions, Department of State Security Service, credible civil society organisation with track record on promoting public safety, and the

media. The RARMC should be established through a robust national consultative forum in consultation with the relevant stakeholders to agree on its mandate, power, composition and activities, among others. The institutions will be responsible for better monitoring and regulation of the mode and content of preaching to prevent religious ideologues or mischievous preachers from misleading young people with false or distorted preaching.

***Creation of Job Opportunities for the Nigerian Youth:*** The Nigerian government must embark on effective poverty alleviation and human capital development programmes in order to empower the teeming youths who are most vulnerable to be easily recruited and radicalised for violent extremism and terrorism. To achieve this, governments at all levels – local, state and federal – need to embark on the establishment of demonstration farms or workshops to provide the youth with vocational skills or knowledge that can make them self-employed in gainful enterprises. This should be matched with the establishment of Business Development Service (BDS) Centres. Such BDS Centres should be located in each of the 776 Local Government Areas of the country and adequately funded and staffed with skilled personnel to, among others, render business development and career advice to jobless youth, facilitate young entrepreneurs access to credit facility or start-up funds, offer coaching services and provide market information data that will inform sound decision on career path for these young people. In this regard, a special youth empowerment fund or financial facility needs to be created. Such a facility should be robustly structured to enhance transparency and accountability in its management, to avoid unnecessary bottlenecks and patronage networks that prevent the youths who genuinely need such interventions from accessing such credit facility.

***Design and Delivery of Robust Programme for Destitute Children:*** The Nigerian government should fund appropriately the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute (NCWD) to enable the agency formulate and implement robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children in Nigeria. Government at all levels (federal, state and local), especially working through the NCWD should partner with credible civil society organisations to design and implement effective reorientation programmes for the destitute children to reconnect these street children with their parents or provide them the necessary training that will help them function effectively in the society. This is an area where philanthropist individuals, civil society groups and government can better put to use the skills of university graduates who studied Social Work and Social Psychology. Such rescue, rehabilitation and reintegration intervention are expedient given the finding that children who are not brought up by their parents are more disposed to using violence in propagating their religious views. Several media reports point to the fact that extremist sects such as the Boko Haram has recruited and

manipulated such children to perpetrate violence. Given their socio-economic and religious condition, such children are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and financial influences.

***Enhanced Provision of Education and Literacy Programme:*** Due to high level of illiteracy in Nigeria, most young people have become easily susceptible to manipulation and recruitment into criminal and extremist groups. Although the right to education is one of the basic rights of every Nigerians, access and entitlement to this right is hardly attained. To reduce the number of people who are likely to fall prey to radical preaching and recruitment into violent groups, education should be made free and compulsory for every child in Nigeria. The recent federal government programme aimed at remodelling the *Almajiri* educational system is a step in the right direction, but needed further robust overhauling of the curriculum to leverage on such platform to inculcate the right training and skills that will make such children relevant in the modern competitive economy driven by scientific knowledge rather than on religious or Quranic education. The issue of compulsory primary and secondary education in Nigeria should transcend mere statement to practical delivery of this basic entitlement to the Nigerian child. Thus, what is need is for the local and state governments to muster the right political will to deliver quality and accessible education to more children in Northern Nigeria through enhanced allocation and judicious utilisation of funds in the educational sector.

***Promotion of Peace Education:*** Government, religious institutions, private sector and civil society groups should invest more resources in promoting peace education. Peace education will help to redress the culture of violence and aggression and also inculcate the value of peaceful coexistence and non-violent orientation on every citizen. Through peace education, the youths will better appreciate the value of peace, thereby making it difficult for people to use them to foment violence. Peace education should be integrated in the educational curriculum of Nigeria, from primary to tertiary education. In addition, the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism could partly be curbed through proper sensitisation and enlightenment programmes using special designed radio and television programmes, jingles and group discussions. Such programmes will be aimed at discouraging youth extremism and promoting the virtue of peaceful coexistence. In this wise, a robust countering violent extremism (CVE) programme should be part and parcel of peace education in Nigeria. To this end, the Nigerian government, civil society groups and the private sector could partner with *Nollywood* to produce home movies in the three major languages (Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) designed to specifically counter the narrative, rhetoric and doctrines of violent radicalisation or religious extremism. This is an area that the private sector can play a



crucial role, especially in providing financial support for designed radio and television programmes or production of movies that promote peace education.

## CONCLUSION

This study is certainly not about the Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, the activities of the Boko Haram in the last five years demonstrate a clear case of youth radicalisation and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. The consequences can be devastating for the immediate community and indeed the larger society. Youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria have resulted in the destruction of private and public property, grievous bodily injury and death, and the displacement of thousands of people. The analysis in this study shows that ignorance of the true religious teaching provide the most important source through which youths acquire radical views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to engage in violent extremism or fall prey to violent ideologies propagated by extremist ideologues or groups.

Expectedly, some measures have been taken by government to deal with the security challenges in Northern Nigeria posed by extremist groups such as the Boko Haram. As diverse as these measures are, the deployment of security and military forces is one that has received the most attention from local and international media. The approach has received both a fair share of commendation and criticism by various citizens or commentators. The reliance on force and coercion to deal with the issue of youth radicalisation and extremism has recorded modest success, but have failed to defeat the scourge.

Therefore, any attempt to effectively and sustainably address youth radicalisation and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria, will require better understanding of its underlying drivers. This novel project is informed by this consideration, and is indeed only a modest attempt to uncover such drivers. It does not claim to have covered much ground. If anything, there is still much to be done in terms of unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisations in terms of specificities of each state where this phenomenon has and is taking place. However, the utility of this study lies in the fact that it has made the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. The findings it has made hopefully will aid in the on-going efforts to contain and roll back the spread of violent

radicalisation. However, the distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, the private sector, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and effective solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria.

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# APPENDIX 1

## QUESTIONNAIRE

### 1. INTERVIEW RECORD

- a. Start time -----
- b. End time-----
- c. Enumerator:
- d. Respondent phone number:
- e. Day/Month/Year: -----

### 2. PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENT

- a. Gender: Male ( ) Female ( )

- b. Age

13-17 ( ) 18 – 25 ( ) 26 – 33 ( ) 34 – 40 ( ) 40 – 50 ( ) 50 – above ( )

- c. Marital Status: Single ( ) Married ( ) Divorced ( ) Others ( )

- d. Religion: Christian ( ) Muslim ( ) Others ( )

- e. What Religious Sect/denomination do you belong? \_\_\_\_\_

- f. Educational level: Some Elementary ( ) Some High School ( ) Some Professional/Vocational School ( ) Elementary ( ) High School ( ) Professional/Vocational School ( ) University ( )

- g. Location of respondent: Rural ( ) Urban ( )

## QUESTIONS

- 1. What is your understanding of Radicalisation?

- 2. Does Youth Radicalisation exist?

Yes ( )



No ( )

3. What is your thought on Education for Young People?

4. Are Young People going to School?

Yes ( )

No ( )

5. If YES which gender are going to school more?

Male ( )

Female ( )

6. Which level of Educational Background do they attain more?

7. Are you in School?

Yes ( )

No ( )

8. If NO, why?

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9. What is responsible for the low interest/ high interest in education?

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10. Are there opportunities for young people in the Community/ State?

Yes ( )

No ( )

11. If YES state the opportunities (at least 5).

12. What role can the government play to create opportunities for young people?

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13. Do you think young are easily drawn to join Boko Haram?

Yes ( )

No ( )

14. If YES, why?

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15. Which gender are easily recruited and why? Give 3 reasons

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16. The role of security agencies (**Police, JTF, SSS, Customs, Prisons, Civil Defence and Road Safety**) can it be said to be a factor for recruitment?

Yes ( )

No ( )

If YES, How? Give at least 3 reasons.

17. Is lack of a livelihood a possibility of making young people to join Boko Haram?

Yes ( )

No ( )

18. If Yes, please explain.

19. Are religious organisations playing a role in getting young people to join Boko Haram?

Yes ( )

No ( )

20. If YES, how?

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\_\_\_\_\_ Do you think politics/politicians are playing a role in youth radicalisation?

21. Yes ( )

22. No ( )

23. If YES, please explain.

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\_\_\_\_\_ Do you think traditional/community leaders are playing a role in getting young people to join Boko Haram?

24. Yes ( )

25. No ( )

26. If YES, please explain.

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27. Identify 3 key elements that is used to recruit young people.

- a.
- b.
- c.

28. How do you think this issue can be addressed?

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Thank you.

## APPENDIX 2

### KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

#### 1. INTERVIEW RECORD

- f. Start time -----
- g. End time-----
- h. Enumerator:
- i. Respondent phone number:
- j. Day/Month/Year: -----

#### 2. PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENT

h. Gender: Male ( ) Female ( )

i. Age

13-17( ) 18 – 25 ( ) 26 – 33 ( ) 34 – 40 ( ) 40 – 50 ( ) 50 – above ( )

j. Marital Status: Single ( ) Married ( ) Divorced ( ) Others ( )

k. Religion: Christian ( ) Muslim ( ) Others ( )

l. What Religious Sect/denomination do you belong? \_\_\_\_\_

m. Location of respondent: Rural ( ) Urban ( )

#### 3. QUESTIONS:

1. What do you understand as youth radicalisation? Does it exist in Nigeria particularly in the north?
2. Is it predominant among Christians or Muslims?
3. Which gender is more inclined to being radicalised - male or female and why?
4. What age category among the youth is likely to be radicalised?
5. What do you think is responsible for this phenomenon in Northern Nigeria? Kindly give at least 5 - 7 reasons.
6. Of the 5 - 7 reasons, which 3 are most important?

7. Who do you think is responsible for these? Identify at least 5 key actors you think are responsible and give reasons for your answers?
8. What do you think can be done to curb youth radicalisation in Northern Nigeria and give reasons for your answers?
9. Do you think that actions of security agencies have played a role in radicalisation of young persons in the North?  
If yes, give reasons?  
If no, give reasons?
10. Do you think that actions of Government have played a role in radicalisation of young persons in the North?  
If yes, please give your reasons
11. What level of government is more culpable - Federal, State or local? Please give reasons.
12. Do you think religious institutions have a role to play? If yes, what are the roles?
13. Are there issues related to breakdown of societal norms and values which can be seen to be responsible for radicalisation of young persons?
14. Who is responsible for this?
15. In relation to the Boko Haram sect - do you think they have any particular recruitment strategy?
16. If yes, what are the strategies? Please mention at least 3 – 5
17. Do you think they capitalise on any lapses or gaps within the system? If yes what are the lapses and gaps and who is responsible?
18. What can be done to address this issue (please categorise your answers into short, medium and long term)?
19. Who should be responsible for doing what?
20. What are your suggestions on how to hold them accountable?
21. Any other comments?

Thank you