Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Third World Quarterly

ISSN: 0143-6597 (Print) 1360-2241 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20

Boko Haram: understanding the context

Wisdom Oghosa Iyekekpolo

To cite this article: Wisdom Oghosa Iyekekpolo (2016): Boko Haram: understanding the context, Third World Quarterly, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1177453

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1177453

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1177453

Boko Haram: understanding the context

Wisdom Oghosa Iyekekpolo

School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, Australia

ABSTRACT

Boko Haram insurgency has caused the death and displacement of thousands of Nigerians. Its means of terror has evolved from the use of crude weapons to bombs, kidnappings and the use of children as suicide bombers. Its reach has expanded beyond Nigeria into neighbouring West African countries and it has pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida and Islamic State. To address this security concern, its cause should first be ascertained. This paper argues that to do this, Boko Haram should be located in northern Nigerian historical context/environment. This paper reviews economic greed and grievance, extreme religious ideology and political opportunity in historic insurgencies in northern Nigeria. It finds that while the interplay of different factors shaped these insurgencies; it was political opportunity that ignited their onsets. Finally, the article submits that as long as these factors remain the same, military quelling of Boko Haram will not prevent a re-emergence of its likes.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 17 November 2015
Accepted 8 April 2016

KEYWORDS
Boko Haram
insurgency
Nigeria
terrorism
Chibok girls

Introduction

What is the cause of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? 'Boko Haram' has evolved from a non-violent group professing hatred for Western culture and values to a violent sect that has become a threat to Nigeria and to the West African sub-region in a few years, especially with its pledge of allegiance to terror groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It has been involved in series of terrorist acts mainly in northern Nigeria, which include the abduction of 276 girls from a secondary boarding school in Chibok, a rural town in Borno State on 14 April 2014.[1] The group's means of attack has evolved from the use of machetes to guns, improvised explosive devices (IED) and suicide bombings, which have recently involved the use of female children.[2] Suicide attacks have been carried out in diverse public location like markets, schools, religious worship places, motor parks, police stations, military barracks, etc. Some of the most publicised of these include those on the UN building in Abuja, the Nigerian Police headquarters and Nyanya Motor Park. Boko Haram has also evolved from using guerrilla tactics, which saw it operating from the Sambisa forest, to the capturing of territories in similar fashion to Islamic State. However, the Nigerian military has recently recaptured some of these territories.[3]

The Assessment Capacities Project reports that 7711 deaths occurred as a result of Boko Haram attacks in 2014 alone and there were 2146 deaths between 1st and 11th January

CONTACT Wisdom Oghosa Iyekekpolo wisdom.iyekekpolo@griffithuni.edu.au; Wisdom Oghosa Iyekekpolo http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5957-3976

2015. Also, 9,000,000 people have been affected directly and 24,500,000 people affected indirectly by the activities of this sect; of these 4,600,000 were in acute need of humanitarian assistance.[4] The United Nations Refugee Agency has put the total number of people killed in Boko Haram attacks at over 15,000, with countless number of others, including children and women, targeted for diverse forms of horrific abuse, including sexual enslavement.[5] Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger have been put at 66,000, 18,000 and 100,000, respectively.[6] The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre puts Boko Haram displaced persons at 1,538,982 as of April 2015[7]; UNICEF puts the number of children among them at 800,000.[8]

Research projects on the Boko Haram insurgency seem to focus more on the extreme acts of violence perpetrated by this sect than on the proximate circumstances causing its rise. While in no way overlooking the relevance of these works, it is important to know the cause of this insurgency. The underlying question this article intends to answer is the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. The article argues that, to know the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian historical context or environment must be understood, so the first argument is that the causes of the insurgency are embedded in the Nigerian historical context. Second, I argue that, while debates have emphasised economic factors nurtured by grievances and greed, religious ideological factors and political opportunity factors as the cause of the insurgency,[9] the overriding cause is political opportunity. Finally, I argue that, as long as the Nigerian political context remains the same, even the use of coercion in crushing the sect will not be able to prevent insurgency recurrence. The article employs the historical approach to explain these three factors in relation to three insurgencies in northern Nigeria. A historical background is provided to show that this form of insurgency and the environment that caused its evolution are not new to northern Nigeria. The Uthman dan Fodio insurgency in 1804 was one of the early ones. There was also the Maitatsine insurgency in the 1980s before the Boko Haram insurgency. There is a need for a good understanding of the development of these insurgencies and of how deeply their evolution is rooted in its environment. So Boko Haram needs to be seen in the context of recurring insurgencies in northern Nigeria in order to decipher its environmental causes. The paper is divided into two main parts: the first provides a background on Boko Haram; the second reviews the three causes and eras highlighted above. This is followed by a summary of the article.

The evolution of Boko Haram

Boko Haram is the alias given to Jama'at Ahl us-Sunnah li'd-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad (the Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle) by non-members of the group as a result of its antecedents. The name 'Boko Haram' is a compound name comprising both Hausa and Arabic languages. 'Boko' in the Hausa language means 'Western education' while 'Haram' means 'sinful or forbidden' in Arabic. So 'Haram' is appended to 'Boko' to mean 'Western education is sinful'.[10] The exact date Boko Haram emerged has remained a subject of speculation,[11] but the sect was largely a low-profile movement until the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf in 2002,[12] whose death led to a new leadership under Abubakar Shekau.[13] Scholars like Agbiboa and Azumah have traced this form of insurgency in northern Nigeria to the 1804 Uthman dan Fodio-led jihad.[14] Fodio led a violent resistance against the political class of his day, whom he accused of un-Islamic vices whose consequences were death. He therefore declared jihad against them, resulting in the

creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, from where he superintended over northern Nigeria. Fodio is seen as a reformer and this psyche dominates the present-day narrative of his deeds, although it is 'difficult to locate his reformist legacy in the region'.[15] This same reformist idea also guided the Maitatsine sect led by Muhammad Marwa. The sect emerged from Kano state in northern Nigeria with a message of purification against Western values and culture in the 1970s. The Maitatsine insurgency ended after the sect was overwhelmed by the Nigerian security forces in the early 1980s. The Boko Haram sect has also advanced the message of reform and purification of the Nigerian political system against Western values and culture, which it argues are the cause of corruption and economic hardship. In its place, the sharia system has been violently advocated, especially under the leadership of Shekau. The following analysis discusses the three environmental factors advanced as causes of insurgency.

Three factors adduced for the rise of Boko Haram

This section reviews how economic, religious ideology and political opportunity factors have caused insurgency in Nigeria. These are discussed in relation to the three periods mentioned earlier, which have revealed how hitherto normal economic issues may be framed in a religious ideological light and then given opportunity and incentive to evolve into an insurgency by the political environment.

Economic theory of insurgency

For the sake of this study, we will review economic causes in two ways. First, from the standpoint of those who view economic conditions as sources of frustration, which leads to aggression and then insurgency; and, second, from the standpoint of those who view economic interest, opportunity and greed as reasons for insurgency. Theories that emphasise frustration as the cause of insurgency have been championed by scholars like John Dollard and Ted Robert Gurr. The frustration–aggression theory and its derivative concept of relative deprivation emphasise that aggression is caused by frustration.[16] The theory holds that a group's relative disadvantage in relation to others, which may be manifested in income inequality or hierarchical class, results in frustration which breeds grievance and aggression.[17] On the other hand, economists like Collier and Hoeffler have argued in favour of economic opportunity and greed as the cause of insurgency.[18] In their research projects they found models that focus on opportunities performing better than those that focus on grievances. They argue that the higher the feasibility of insurgency, the more likely its onset – and not because of grievances. They argue further that the factor influencing this feasibility is economic, which manifests in the form of availability of finance and cost of rebellion. They submitted that primary commodity exports substantially increase insurgency risks as they provide an opportunity for extortion, which in turn finances insurgency.[19] Greed for material gains motivates insurgency, as 'many rebels are not so much concerned with righting wrongs but with enriching themselves through looting natural resources, although rebel leaders may not admit to such motives'.[20] Although Fearon finds no independent effect of natural resources dependency on the commencement of an insurgency; he nevertheless supports the main theoretical claim that better availability of finance implies a greater risk of insurgency.[21] Fearon and Laitin expressly argued in favour of the economic theory of insurgency

when they wrote that 'what matters is…whether economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2000 young men'.[22]

Insurgent leaders in northern Nigeria from the days of Uthman Dan Fodio to the present-day Boko Haram have sought to espouse economic conditions in society in their justification of and recruitment for insurgency. One of the reasons given by Fodio for his insurgency against the governments of Hausa land was the economic hardship of the people. He criticised the government for what he referred to as unfair tax regimes on cattle raisers and farmers, indiscriminate revocation of land ownership and other forms of corruption, which he cited as the cause of economic hardship of the citizens. Fodio endeared himself to the people when he showed his concern for their economic well-being through his refusal of gifts from the Sultan of Gobir, instead requesting a better tax regime.[23] It could be deduced that the economic hardship occasioned by the unfriendly tax regimes resulted in frustration among the population, which engendered aggression. While it may not be obvious that economic greed was a cause, the frustration of the people resulted in their participation in the jihad called by Fodio. However, could this alone have caused the insurgency? This article argues that economic grievances alone did not cause the insurgency; its interaction with political factors made it significant in the onset of the insurgency. This will be discussed below.

Similarly Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, a Cameroonian residing in Kano, capitalised on the pre-existing economic situation in northern Nigerian to launch an insurgency in the 1970–80s. The first of the Maitatsine insurgencies took place in Kano in December 1980. Marwa was killed but the insurgency spread further to Bulumkutu, 15 kilometres from Maiduguri in October 1982, to Rigasa village and to Kaduna city in Jimeta-Yola in March 1984 and finally to Gombe in April 1985, leaving a total of about 10,000 deaths in the process.[24] Marwa's message was built on the widespread economic hardship permeating the environment. He centred his doctrine on purifying northern Nigeria of the ruling elites he claimed were corrupt so as to improve the economy. The mass of his followers were poor and could easily have fallen prey to any semblance of economic justice, just like those in Fodio's era. This position was buttressed by the federal government's commission of inquiry into the Kano disturbances, which acknowledged unemployment and economic hardship among the migrant youths after the harvest season as the cause of the Maitatsine insurgency.[25] Hickey also submits economic factor as Maitatsine's recruitment basis, because 'his disciples came mainly from the poor and underprivileged fringe of the Muslim population which had not benefited from the oil boom and whose distress was increasing with the high rate of inflation'.[26] Isichei believes that Maitatsine may have deliberately followed a 'policy of recruiting young men, homeless and jobless, who had just arrived from the countryside, sending his representatives to railway stations and motor parks…and they were attracted by his attacks on affluence and western materialism'.[27]

In a comprehensive analysis of the economic situation precipitating the Maitatsine insurgency Lubeck argues that the era witnessed a high number of seasonal Koranic school migrants who remained in Kano city as a result of the anticipated economic benefits of the petroleum boom but instead became worse off. These Koranic students, whom he referred to as *gardawa*, were the providers of low-level labour that was needed in the urban city and which was their source of economic survival. He argues that, while the oil boom did not eliminate their income opportunities, the 'new capital-intensive innovations surely undermined their traditional petty-income activities'.[28] The oil boom had altered tastes in Kano

city and so the skills of the *gardawa* became obsolete, thereby reducing income opportunities for them. Examples of these changes could be seen in the shift from demand for mud houses to cement houses, the ban on hand-cart carriers as petty business and changes in consumption patterns. Hiskett also argues in support of the economic view of the Maitatsine insurgency but worries about the 'tendency to select small pieces of the whole complex mosaic and blow them up into a total causation'.[29]

There seems to have been a strong representation of natural resource dependency in the era of the Maitatsine insurgency but this was geographically out of the reach of insurgents in northern Nigeria. However, this is not to say that the sudden oil boom in the 1980s and extreme dependency on oil exports had no part in the evolution of the Maitatsine insurgency. As noted by Perry, the oil boom attracted the most venal of kleptomaniacs into public service, who became detached from the population and attached to the offshore rigs that yielded more income than taxing the population. Soon the population lost the morality to demand accountability.[30] The greed of these public servants caused a widening economic gap in the citizenry, thereby creating economic frustration for the masses and the attendant aggression evident in the Maitatsine insurgency. However, other factors interacted with this economic situation before it could metamorphose into insurgency.

Just as in the cases of the Fodio and Maitatsine insurgencies, economic views on the cause of Boko Haram hold that the economic hardship pervading northern Nigeria resulted in frustration and then aggression. The level of poverty pervading the region also proved to be a factor in mobilising the Boko Haram insurgency, as Mohammed Yusuf, the sect's leader spoke regularly about it. He argued that the way out of the predicament was for devout Muslims to 'migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation'.[31] The grievance perspective holds that frustration arising from economic challenges results in grievance and aggression. Ayegba argues that the continuous exploitation of the commonwealth by a few at the expense of the masses has resulted in the Boko Haram insurgency. He further suggests that the lag between the high expectations and the unimpressive economic achievements of the Nigerian government has precipitated serious discontent and hence violent responses in the form of extreme sects. This, he argues, is made complex by the perceived marginalisation of northern Nigeria in comparison to the south. The persistence of this condition makes the population feel a sense of relative deprivation which frustrates them and then causes aggressive behaviour.[32] Adegbulu and Idowu also argue separately that poverty, which is the result of corrupt leadership and poor governance, caused the Boko Haram insurgency. The populace had been deprived of their means of livelihood and that this had become frustrating and resulted in aggression.[33] In the same way, Salaam has argued against the religious narrative of the Boko Haram insurgency and advocated reforms that will address poverty, corruption and unemployment, instead of being guided by the metaphor of a 'war on terror'.[34] However, this does not explain why these same economic conditions have not resulted in the formation of similar extremist groups in other parts of Nigeria, as such harsh conditions permeate all nooks and crannies of the country, though to slightly different degrees. As shown by the National Bureau of Statistics, only three out of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory have single digit rates of unemployment. Further, one of the indices of economic hardship – unemployment – while continuing to surge in the northeast, was not unique to the region, as shown by the National Bureau of Statistics unemployment rate (2000–10).[35] Virginia Comolli has highlighted the economic causes of the Boko Haram

insurgency by brandishing an alarming differential of 75% to 27% rates of poverty between the north and south of Nigeria, respectively,[36] but a review of her source shows that 'in the north-west and north-east of the country poverty rates were recorded at 77.7% and 76.3% respectively, compared to the south-west at 59.1%',[37] which makes the northeast second to the northwest in poverty rates. Yet Boko Haram emerged from the northeast and not the poorest region. I also doubt if the difference in poverty rates between the north and south can sufficiently account for the rise of Boko Haram in the north. Comolli further argues that, if supporting insurgency is the only option to make ends meet, it become rather appealing. While I would agree with that argument, I do not agree that insurgency was the only option available specifically in Borno State, where agriculture and livestock farming are the mainstay. There is no arguing the fact that economic hardship is endemic in northeast Nigeria but the economic conditions are not significant enough to result in an insurgency; if they were, all developing states would have been experiencing insurgencies.

Religious ideology

Scholars like Barbara Harff have highlighted extreme ideology as a significant factor in the fomenting of insurgency. She argues that, wherever individuals with these extreme ideologies seek to attain political power, insurgency becomes an option. She observed that 'countries in which the ruling elite adhere to an exclusionary ideology were two and half times as likely to have state failures leading to geno-/politicide as those with no such ideology'.[38]

In recent times some insurgents have in the name of Islam called for the introduction of an extreme form of sharia in different regions of the world. Sharia is the legal system based on Islam meant to guide the daily life of a Muslim. These insurgents have employed the jihad ideology as a tool to achieve a sharia legal system. So they have classified their insurgency as jihad. Scholars have debated the correlations between Islam and sharia, on the one hand, and insurgency in the name of Islam, on the other. This debate focuses on the evidence that insurgency is actually rooted in Islam. Now, to understand what the jihad ideology stands for, a review of Marc Sageman's work explains that jihad 'translates roughly as "striving" but denotes any form of activity, either personal or communal, undertaken by Muslims in attempting to follow the path of God'. He argues that the global jihad movement is meant to restore the supremacy of Islam in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries through violence. Its global outlook advocates the 'defeat of the western powers that prevent the establishment of a true Islamist state'.[39] There is greater and lesser jihad; while the greater jihad 'is the individual nonviolent striving to live a good Muslim life, following God's will...the lesser jihad is the violent struggle for Islam'.[40] This is further categorised as either defensive or offensive jihad. While offensive jihad is a collective violent attack on non-Muslim territories for Islam, defensive jihad has to do with the individual obligation to protect Muslim territories 'either through direct fighting or through financial contributions, charity, or prayers'.[41] It has been argued that 'violent jihad is an integral part of orthodox sharia-centric Islam. The propriety of violent jihad, expressed as kinetic warfare against non-Muslims, is a matter that finds agreement in orthodox Islamic, Sharia materials and Islamic tradition.'[42]

In a 2011 survey to ascertain the correlation between sharia adherence and the perpetration of violence against non-Muslims carried out in the USA, it was observed that sharia-adherent mosques were more likely to have violent literatures on their premises, their

imams were more likely to recommend the study of these violent literatures, and these mosques were more likely to invite guest imams who were pro-violent jihad than were non-sharia-adherent-mosques.[43] These literatures could be traced to classical scholars and jurists like Ibn Kathir, Ibn Taymiyya, Abul A'la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb.[44] It has been argued that the importance of the affinity between imams and insurgents cannot be over emphasised, since the imams sometimes provide leadership or help provide these groups with the necessary moral support that justifies their activities, and then further acts as a bridges between them and sponsoring entities.[45] No wonder Hoffman argues that the religious effect has become endemic, as it 'appears to play a role in lowering inhibitions and reducing moral barriers to violence, including suicide attacks'.[46]

This explains Lauder's conclusion that religious ideology drives insurgency. In buttressing his argument, he drew similarities in insurgents' beliefs that are clearly religiously inclined. He asserts that insurgents believe they have exclusive access to the sacred and sacred knowledge; they see the outside world as both illegitimate and corrupt; they believe the world is dualistic in nature, divided into the sacred and the profane, good and evil; that salvation can only be achieved through the elimination of evil and corrupting influences, and that violence is necessary to cleanse the world. They also believe that violence is divinely willed and sanctioned; that a restructured society will be modelled on the sacred, usually in the form of an idealised and mythical past; that movements are informed and maintained by a central prophetic character; that participants see themselves as agents of the sacred and soldiers of God, and that the end-state is the implementation of divine law.[47] Sulaiman argues that:

> The idea of revolution is ingrained in Islamic thought and is perpetuated as a living tradition in all Muslim societies…Indeed, the concept of prophet-hood is synonymous with the philosophy of revolution, or of tajdid. It implies that human society should not be left in darkness and corruption…man has an obligation to overthrow systems of injustice.[48]

Scholars like Melson argue that, no matter the extreme nature of the ideology, it remains harmless until it is combined with political authority.[49] However, Boko Haram, Maitatsine and Fodio did not possess any political authority before becoming harmful. So I argue that insurgents do not need to acquire political power before becoming violent, as those extremist groups with a perverted ideology tend to employ the use of extreme violence to seek political power and, if this is achieved, also use it to advance further extreme ideology. Other insurgent sects, like the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, without political power have perpetrated extreme violence; however, these examples have not been able to achieve as much political power as they had expected.

Analysts have argued that religious ideology resulted in the 1804 insurgency led by Uthman dan Fodio. Sulaiman argues that the philosophy of *tajdid* guided Fodio's insurgency, as he sought to establish the supremacy of the Quran, Sunna and Ijma in places where it was absent and to re-establish it in places where infiltration was believed to have occurred.[50] The jihad objective was declared to be the purification of northern Nigeria of un-Islamic elements.[51] The aim was to eradicate the performance of idolatrous rites, improper marriage rites, heathen divination practices, Muslim enslavements, alliance with pagan groups, drinking of alcohol, prostitution and all other practices that were not compliant with sharia law.[52] These objectives are all synonymous with the ideals of sharia law. To spread and enforce these objectives, Fodio relied on the use of jihad as an ideology that will justify his actions and make it appealing to a greater number of people, especially Muslims. The jihad brought about the Sokoto caliphate and the rule of religious scholars called Ulama.

Soon afterwards Islamic scholarship became a precondition for anyone wanting to be involved in public and political debates. The hegemony of Islamic scholarship suffered serious challenges with the advent of British colonialism in northern Nigeria, thanks to the introduction of Western education and books, otherwise referred to as *boko*.[53] Though deliberately limited by the colonialists in northern Nigeria, the newly introduced Western education soon began to produce Nigerian educated elites who clamoured to play a role in society. Their Western education soon distinguished them into a class of their own, which enabled them to function in higher societal positions than their peers, who were products of Islamic education.[54] This marked the origin of the struggle between the classes of Western-educated and Islamic-educated northern Nigerians. Those with a Western education were now defined as collaborators with the colonialists.[55] This struggle between Islamic education and Western education in northern Nigeria precipitated the rise individuals like Ahmadu Bello, the premier of northern Nigeria and his close friend and confidant, Abubakar Gumi, the inspiration behind the Izala movement. They sought a unique mix of both Islamic and Western education to allow for a kind of Islamisation of Western-styled education. This programme pitched these individuals against the traditional Muslim institution and also against a radical few, among them the likes of Mohammed Marwa and Yusuf Mohammed.[56] This partially explains the animosity that exists between these radical groups and Christianity, as Western education and Christianity are perceived as the tools with which Islam is undermined.

The Matatsine sect was advanced as a sort of religious purification group that was to purify northern Nigeria of the colonial vestiges that infiltrated Islamic society. It has been argued that the Matatsine sect should be seen as part of the Mahdi tradition, so Marwa should be viewed as a Mujaddid (reformer), of whom Fodio is regarded as one of the greatest in Africa.[57] Although some of his practices have been proclaimed to be un-Islamic, evidence abounds that he was respected and celebrated by his followers as a prophet and that he also partook in the Hajj. Obviously religion was a major part of Marwa's indoctrination, as he was able to drive his followers through his message of religious reformation and purification. The jihad ideology was also evident in the violent struggle to keep state security agents from their supposed territory, and also in the continued violent spread of their activities even after the death of Marwa. His followers saw it not as a physical struggle but as a divine assignment aimed at the preservation of the true ideals of Islam, one which guaranteed a heavenly reward either now or hereafter.

Boko Haram has also been located in the context of attempts to purify Islam in northern Nigeria. Muhammed Yusuf was a student of one of the prominent scholars in the Izala movement called Ja'far Mahmud Adam. The movement advocated an ideal Islamic society based on that of their pious ancestors but it never discouraged members from using Western education or the state system. Yusuf became a significant figure in this movement but soon deviated and took a more radical stand than that of his teacher. He advocated a withdrawal from the secular system of the Nigerian state and showed discontent with Western education. He believed that the Nigerian system represented the Western education model (*boko*) which must be discontinued, as it was forbidden for Muslims, hence the nickname given to his movement –Boko Haram.[58] This resulted in an aggravated confrontation between Yusuf and his erstwhile teacher Jaafar from 2004 until Jaafar was assassinated in 2007.[59] Analysts like Mike Smith have sought to differentiate Yusuf's movement from that of Fodio on the basis of education; he argues that, while the latter embraced education, the former abhorred it.[60] This assertion may not be totally true, as Fodio embraced Islamic education, which Yusuf

also embraces. In Yusuf's words 'Western education is destructive. We didn't say knowledge is bad but that the unbelief inside it is more than its usefulness'.[61]

Boko Haram has been located in the historic religious war, as Yusuf's messages showed his belief that the northern Nigerian states were governed by false Muslims (Westernised Muslims), who should be overthrown through jihad and the introduction of sharia.[62] Yusuf hinged this believe on the Quran and the Hadith, as interpreted by Ibn Taymiyyah. In his words:

> Our call refuses employment under the government which does not rule by what Allah has revealed such as the French law, the American law, the British law or any other constitution or system that goes against the teachings of Islam and negates the Qur'an and Sunnah.[63]

So Boko Haram was embarking on *Hijra* (a withdrawal along the lines of Prophet Muhammad's withdrawal from Mecca to Medina). It would then wage war against the northern Nigerian states specifically but with the ultimate aim of spreading their insurgency to the entire country and its central government, in order to create a 'pure' Islamic state under sharia law. Azumah in his historical analysis locates Boko Haram's evolution in the Izala movement driven by the Salafi–Wahhabi religious ideology. He sees it as a result of Islamic factionalism and extremism in northern Nigeria.[64] Voli argues that the Boko Haram insurgency is best explained in the light of religiously motivated violence which traces back to historic Islamisation in West Africa. He argues that the difference in this insurgency and others is that its style is more like that of Islamic State than that of al-Qaeda.[65] Brinkel and Ait-Hida argue that Boko Haram members believe they are carrying out a divine assignment and that they are motivated by the jihad ideology to create a sharia state.[66] In the same light, Deckard et al have argued that Boko Haram would be better understood in the context of the radical ideological tradition.[67] While religious ideology clearly plays a part in the insurgency, this is not peculiar to the northern region of Nigeria. Also, as argued by Comolli, highlighting religious ideology as the sole cause of these insurgencies implies that northern Nigeria embraces a single ideology, which is far from the reality.[68]

Political opportunity

This article's major argument is that, to know the cause of insurgency in northern Nigeria, we must understand the Nigerian context. As shown above, economic conditions and religious ideology in the environment play causal roles in the start of an insurgency. However, this paper argues that there must be political opportunity for insurgency to take root. Sidney Tarrow defined political opportunity as 'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure'.[69] The political opportunity view does not deny the significance of economic and ideological views of insurgency. It adds 'the probability of success, the costs of collective action, and the cost of fighting to the equation…Political opportunities provide the means through which groups translate amorphous sentiment into organized violence'.[70] This argument makes a lot of sense when viewed against Galula's argument that 'all wars are theoretically fought for a political purpose; although in some cases the final political outcome differs greatly from the one intended initially'.[71]

The political opportunity for success envisaged by the insurgent leaders in northern Nigeria has ensured the recurring insurgency in the environment. This opportunity is created by the political struggles which are framed along developmental needs and subsequent mobilisations for insurgency.[72] Fodio's insurgency was created by the political opportunity

to overthrow or 'purify' the political system of the Hausa states and replace them with an Islamic state or a Caliphate. The public frustration with the corrupt Hausa government, coupled with the introduction of an unfavourable tax regime, was framed in religious ideology and this provided the political opportunity for the insurgency to commence. Fodio had earlier raised revolutionists who would lead their cities in his envisaged new political system.[73] This also shows Fodio's political agenda from the outset, which only needed the right timing. Sulaiman argues that Fodio 'had become the real symbol of an emerging nation, the symbol of the nascent spirit of revolution, and the voice of the people'.[74] The high probability of success had reduced the cost of participation and the insurgents succeeded in dethroning the ruling elites and setting up a new political order under Fodio's leadership.

Political opportunity also clearly caused the start of the Maitatsine insurgency. This could be seen in the delayed measures taken by the ruling elites to check its activities, which were not unconnected with the political rivalry that existed between the People's Redemption Party (PRP)-governed Kano state, led by Governor Abubakar Rimi, and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)-led Federal government under the stewardship of President Shehu Shagari. The Maitatsine sect originated in Kano state; which was led by the opposition PRP, while the central government was led by NPN. There was no love lost between Kano state government and the federal government, by extension the PRP and the NPN, respectively. Each sought to play the blame game on important issues that required urgent attention, thereby allowing the rise of the insurgent sect. This clear case of a clash of political interests that provided the opportunity for insurgency is shown in Adesoji's argument that the desperate moves by the NPN to take over Kano state governance from the PRP 'led it to attempt unorthodox means to portray the PRP government as incompetent and weak, as well as create credibility problems for it'.[75] The Maitatsine sect found a favourable environment in which to grow while the political tussle lasted. Ojo suggests that the federal government may have supported the sect to grow, as he saw no other reason why the Maitatsine riots did not spread to states controlled by the NPN, but was confined to PRP-controlled states; he believes that the federal political leaders who had impoverished the country used the Maitatsine insurgency as a diversion from dealing with the scourge of poverty.[76]

While I do not yield to the argument that the federal government directly supported the sect, its refusal to do the necessary created the opportunity for the insurgency to evolve. However, Abubakar Rimi was reported to have admitted to the tribunal of inquiry set up by the federal government that he had dined with the emissaries of Maitatsine, which was suggestive of his link with the sect.[77] While this could have been an attempt to resolve causes of rising tension, it was far from effective. The federal government tribunal's conclusion indicted the governor and some of the state officials. This prompted the state government to also set up a commission of inquiry, which reached a retaliatory conclusion indicting the federal government-controlled security agencies.[78] This scenario epitomised the political struggle that created the opportunity under which Maitatsine was allowed to flourish and terrorise the population for several years, before both the state and federal government intervened.[79]

The experiences of other insurgencies seem not to have guided the political class in attending to governance in ways that would not cause a recurrence. Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf capitalised on the political environment in northern Nigeria to call the people to a jihad, just like his predecessors. Yusuf saw opportunity in the power tussle between political gladiators in Borno state. The political struggle was between the incumbent governor and a senator who sought to unseat him. A further opportunity for evolution came

about as a result of government's indecisive and ineffective counterinsurgency measures. The government's initial denial of the grave situation soon gave way to indecision on ways to deal with it, as it alternated between a hard military response and negotiation without a clear strategy.

The Boko Haram leadership found the political opportunity to oust a government that was not sympathetic to their cause by teaming up with Senator Ali Modu Sheriff to frustrate the second-term ambitions of the then governor of Borno state, Mala Kachalla, so as to pave the way for the senator to become the next governor in the 2003 elections. It is widely believed that both of them had an understanding that saw Sheriff capitalising on Yusuf's huge youth following to achieve his governorship ambitions, in the hope that Sheriff would implement a strict sharia law when he attained political power. Internal wrangling within the Boko Haram sect about Yusuf's modalities for achieving its set goals resulted in a splinter group led by Abubakar Shekau and Aminu Tashen Ilimi. They accused Yusuf of being too political and soft and claimed that he was interested in Islamic government but was not predisposed to a violent achievement of this goal. He was considered 'a reluctant fighter content in expanding his sect through preaching'.[80] Comolli, however, holds an opposing view, arguing that Yusuf favoured violence but was waiting for the perfect time.[81] While Yusuf saw opportunity in the existing political structure to achieve his goals by supporting the likes of Ali Modu Sheriff, the splinter group was more predisposed to violent change.

The splinter group members then embarked on *Hijra* to the neighbouring state of Yobe, where they sought the assistance of the state governor, Bubar Abba Ibrahim, to secure some rural land. The governor, whose son was alleged to be a member of the group, obliged them with a place in Dapchi. Soon after they settled in Dapchi, they began having issues with the villagers over fishing rights in the large dam in the village. After several mediations by the police, they requested to be resettled in Kanamma, a village on the border with Niger. Again, similar issues arose with the Kanamma community, which prompted the police to intervene again severally but the sect's relationship with the police soon degenerated to the extent that it attacked the police stations at both Kanamma and Dapchi.[82] This led to a December 2003 siege against the sect's mosque by the Nigerian army, resulting in the killing or capturing of dozens of its members, and the group was dispersed from the area.[83] Some of those who escaped the Kanamma clash returned to Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, to reunite with youths under the tutelage of Yusuf.

Sheriff won the governorship election in 2003 and appointed a well-known disciple of Yusuf, Buji Foi, into his government as the Commissioner for Religious Affairs. Yusuf was also appointed onto a committee responsible for selecting Muslims for Hajj.[84] These appointments are believed to have provided Boko Haram with the opportunity to fund its activities initially. These funds are perceived to be the key sources of the sect's financing of their initial armament.[85] However, Sheriff has consistently denied ever knowing that Buji Foi was a sect member.[86] Other sources of funding included membership contributions and bank robbery, as confirmed by Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, the mastermind of the Christmas Day bombing, after his arrest.[87]

There were signs of a strained relationship between Yusuf and Sheriff after the latter became governor and reneged on the implementation of full sharia law in Borno State.[88] Members of a local gang referred to as 'ECOMOG', which Sheriff allegedly used for electioneering thuggery and afterwards dumped, soon boosted Yusuf's followership.[89] Yusuf's messages soon took a harder stance against the political elites in an apparent move to express

his dissatisfaction at the failure of the new governor to implement sharia and, second, to cater for his more radical followers. Yusuf was charged with the crime of terrorism in 2008 by the Borno state government and brought before the Federal High Court in Abuja but was later released on bail.[90]

The sect attained a higher level of notoriety in 2009, when it violently clashed with the police who were enforcing the wearing of helmets for all motorcyclists. This clash led to the death of some policemen and a subsequent crackdown on Boko Haram members by the Nigerian Police in Borno state. This escalated into a full-scale armed insurrection with the deployment of the military and the killing of about 800 people, mostly made up of Boko Haram members, and subsequent arrest and extrajudicial killing of Buji Foi, Baba Fugu and Mohammed Yusuf. Ogunlesi has argued that the 2009 killing of these key Boko Haram leaders marked the turning point in the scale, method and proportion of attacks by the sect.[91] Many of the Boko Haram survivors of the clash fled Nigeria to other African countries like Algeria, Mali and Cameroon, where some of them made contacts with al-Qaeda-linked groups and camps. In no time, these sect members had regrouped and commenced unprecedented attacks on Nigeria.[92]

Conclusion

Identifying the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency is important to ending the recurring violence in northern Nigeria. However, research projects have focussed more on the group's terrorising activities, while ignoring the Nigerian context that engendered the onset of the insurgency. Research projects that have focused on the causes have tended to emphasise economic and ideological factors. To understand the origin and development of Boko Haram, the historical development of northern Nigeria has to be understood. Research projects attempting to understand the Boko Haram insurgency by investigating the violence must understand that the insurgency has its historical reinforcement in the Nigerian environment.

This article has argued that it is political opportunity that makes these other factors significant in the onset and development of the insurgency. While the economy and ideology played important roles, it was the political opportunity created by political actors that ensured the start of the Boko Haram insurgency. The economic environment in northern Nigeria has been one of hardship since the 1804 insurgency. It ranges from the introduction of unpopular tax regimes in the 19th century to the mismanaged oil wealth and lack of proactive economic policies to better the lives of the youth surging into the cities in the 1980s to the present-day economic growth that is unreflective of the unemployment levels faced by the people. The northern Nigerian population, who are predominantly Muslims, have found succour in religious ideology like the sharia legal system, which is seen as a means to the ideal society which they long for. Insurgent leaders have also helped to entrench this belief, hence the recurring calls to jihad. All these have been consistently capped by kleptomaniac political actors who have left the population deprived, frustrated and aggrieved, thereby creating a fertile ground for religious ideological actors to give meaning and to reconstruct societal reality to create recurring insurgencies. The political class, who have promoted self- and party interest over and above the security and interests of the population whom they are supposed to govern,[93] have through their actions consistently created the political opportunity for these economic and ideological factors to metamorphose into insurgency. Thus, while other factors play roles

in causing the insurgency, it is the political actors whose practices have provided the opportunities for recurring insurgencies.

Understanding the recurring insurgency in northern Nigeria requires an understanding that the insurgency is a result of the Nigerian political environment, which gives meaning to other factors. This article locates Boko Haram's origins not in economic hardship or in religious ideology but in local political struggles. The economic situation created frustration, which was framed by sect leaders in a religious light, but this needed to find political opportunity to express itself as insurgency and this opportunity was created by the political actors, just as in previous insurgencies in northern Nigeria. This article holds that it is the availability of political opportunity that has resulted in the Boko Haram insurgency. While in no way belittling the importance of the current military attempt at quelling the Boko Haram insurgency, this will only succeed in destroying the superstructure. If the political, economic and religious ideological challenges in Nigerian society remain intact it will not be long before the insurgency recurs.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on Contributor

Wisdom Iyekekpolo is a PhD candidate at Griffith University, Australia. The focus of his research is the onset and development of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Notes

1. "With 219 girls missing, Nigeria kidnapping inquiry concludes." Inconsistent figures have been given as to the number of schoolgirls kidnapped but 276 seems to be the most consistent number.
2. "Female suicide bombers: Boko Haram's weapon of choice." Female and males of various ages are now involved but many of them are below 18.
3. "Boko Haram Crisis: Nigeria begins Sambisa ground offensive." Military activities have been intensified since early 2015.
4. For current figures, see "Nigeria"; and "Northeast Nigeria Conflict."
5. Adedapo, "UNHCR."
6. Ibid.
7. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis*.
8. United Nations Children's Fund, "800,000 Children forced to flee Violence."
9. Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram*; and Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
10. Murtada, *Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria*.
11. Onuoha, *Boko Haram*; Abimbola and Adesote, "Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram"; Adibe, "What do we really know about Boko Haram?"; and *Committee Report – Boko Haram*.
12. Onuoha, *Boko Haram*; and *Committee Report – Boko Haram*.
13. "The Boko Haram Terror Chief who came back from the Dead."
14. Agbiboa, *Sacrilege of the Sacred*; and Azumah, "Boko Haram in Retrospect," 33–52.
15. Smith, *Boko Haram*.
16. Gupta, *The Economics of Political Instability*, 52–53.
17. Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders*, 20.
18. Collier and Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes," 563–573; and Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance," 563–595.

19. Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance," 563–595.
20. Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders*, 21.
21. Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports," 483–507.
22. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnic Insurgency, and Civil War," 75–90.
23. Aremu, "The Fulani Jihad," 1–12; and Islahi, *Shehu Uthman dan Fodio*.
24. Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings," 194–208; Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram," 98–119; and Aghedo, "Old Wine in a New Bottle," 229–250.
25. Lubeck, "Islamic Protest," 369–389.
26. Hickey, "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings," 251–256.
27. Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings."
28. Lubeck, "Islamic Protest."
29. Hiskett, "The Maitatsine Riots," 209–223.
30. Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram*.
31. Onuoha, *Boko Haram*.
32. Ayegba, "Unemployment and Poverty."
33. Adegbulu, "Boko Haram," 260–273; and Idowu, "Security Laws," 118–134.
34. Salaam, "Boko Haram," 147–162.
35. For unemployment rates in Nigeria, see National Bureau of Statistics, *National Unemployment Rate*.
36. Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
37. "Nigerians living in Poverty."
38. Harff, "No Lessons Learned," 57–73.
39. Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Kedar and Yerushalmi, "Sharia Adherence Mosque Survey," 81–138.
43. Ibid.
44. Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam."
45. Muthuswamy, "Sharia as a Platform."
46. Hoffman, "Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?"
47. Lauder, *Religion and Resistance*.
48. Sulaiman, *A Revolution in History*.
49. Melson, "Genocide in the 20th Century," 161–174.
50. Sulaiman, *A Revolution in History*.
51. Smith, "The Jihad of Shehu dan Fodio," 408–424.
52. van Beek, "Purity and Statecraft."
53. Loimeier, "Boko Haram."
54. Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
55. Mohammed, "The Message and Methods."
56. Loimeier, "Boko Haram."
57. Hickey, "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings."
58. Chouin et al., "Body Count and Religion."
59. Loimeier, "Boko Haram."
60. Smith, *Boko Haram*.
61. Mohammed, "The Message and Methods."
62. Walker, *What is Boko Haram?*
63. Mohammed, "The Message and Methods."
64. Azumah, "Boko Haram in Retrospect."
65. Voli, "Boko Haram."
66. Brinkel and Ait-Hida, "Boko Haram and Jihad."
67. Deckard et al., "Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria."
68. Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
69. Meyer and Minkoff, "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity"; and Giugni, "Political Opportunities." See also Giugni, "Political Opportunity"; and Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities."

70. Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders*, 21.
71. Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare*.
72. Iyekekpolo, "The Social Movement."
73. Sulaiman, *A Revolution in History*.
74. Ibid.
75. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram."
76. Ojo, "The Maitatsine Revolution," 297–306.
77. Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings."
78. Danjibo, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence*.
79. Abubakar, *Conflict & Security Management*.
80. Smith, *Boko Haram*.
81. Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
82. International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*.
83. Human Rights Watch, *Spiraling Violence*.
84. Comolli, *Boko Haram*.
85. Walker, *What is Boko Haram?*
86. International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*.
87. Onuoha, "Boko Haram."
88. International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*.
89. Smith, *Boko Haram*.
90. International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*.
91. Ogunlesi, "The Making of Boko Haram."
92. Murtada, *Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria*; Onuoha, *Boko Haram*; *Committee Report – Boko Haram*; Walker, *What is Boko Haram?*; International Crisis Group, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*; and Blanquart, *Boko Haram*.
93. Iyekekpolo, *When Terror becomes a Political Tool*.

Bibliography

Abimbola, J. O., and S. A. Adesote. "Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Issues and Trends – A Historical Discourse." *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society* 4, no. 1 (2012): 11–29.

Abubakar, Sani. *Conflict & Security Management: A Traditional Approach to Security and Conflict Management in Hausa Land, Nigeria*. Katsina: Lugga Press, 2004.

Adedapo, Adebiyi. 2015. "UNHCR: We never said Chibok girls may have been Killed." *This DayLive*, April 29.

Adegbulu, Femi. "Boko Haram: The Emergence of a Terrorist Sect in Nigeria 2009–2013." *African Identities* 11, no. 3 (2013): 260–273.

Adesoji, Abimbola O. "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." *Africa Today* 57, no. 4 (2011): 98–119.

Adibe, Jideofor. "What do we really know about Boko Haram?" In *Boko Haram Anatomy of a Crisis*, edited by Ioannis Mantzikos, 9–15. Bristol: e-International Relations, 2013.

Agbiboa, Daniel. *Sacrilege of the Sacred: Boko Haram and the Politics of Unreason*. 2013. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/26/sacrilege-of-the-sacred-boko-haram-and-the-politics-of-unreason/.

Aghedo, Iro. "Old Wine in a New Bottle: Ideological and Operational Linkages between Maitatsine and Boko Haram Revolts in Nigeria." *African Security* 7, no. 4 (2014): 229–250.

Aremu, Johnson Olaosebikan. "The Fulani Jihad and its Implication for National Integration and Development in Nigeria." *African Research Review* 5, no. 5 (2011): 1–12.

Ayegba, Usman Solomon. "Unemployment and Poverty as Sources and Consequences of Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Insurgency Revisited." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 9, no. 3 (2015): 90–99.

Azumah, John. "Boko Haram in Retrospect." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 26, no. 1 (2015): 33–52.

van Beek, Walter E. A. "Purity and Statecraft: The Fulani Jihad and its Empire." In *The Quest for Purity*, edited by Walter E. A. van Beek, 144–182. The Hague: Mouton, 1988.

Blanquart, Gabrielle. "Boko Haram: Terrorist Organization, Freedom Fighters or Religious Fanatics? An analysis of Boko Haram within Nigeria: An Australian Perspective and the need for Counterterrorism Responses that involves proscribing them as a Terrorist Organization." Paper presented at the 3rd Australian Counterterrorism Conference, Perth, 2012.

Brinkel, Theo, and Soumia Ait-Hida. "Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 140, no. 2 (2012): 1–21.

"Boko Haram Crisis: Nigeria begins Sambisa ground offensive." *BBC*, April 22, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32416155, accessed 30 Oct. 2015

Chouin, Gérard, Manuel Reinert, and Elodie Apard. "Body Count and Religion in the Boko Haram Crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, edited by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 213–236. Nairobi: African Studies Centre, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 2014.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "On Economic Causes of Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 1 (1998): 563–573.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 1 (2004): 563–595.

Committee Report – Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the US Homeland. 2013. https://homeland.house.gov/boko-haram-growing-threat-us-homeland/.

Comolli, Virginia. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*. London: Hurst, 2015.

Danjibo, N. D. *Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria*. 2010. http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N-_D-_DANJIBO_-_Islamic_Fundamentalism_and_Sectarian_Violence_The_Maitatsine_and_Boko_Haram_Crises_in_Northern_Nigeria.pdf.

Deckard, Natalie Delia, Atta Barkindo, and David Jacobson. "Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria: Considering Boko Haram in the Radical Tradition." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 7 (2015): 510–528.

Fearon, James D. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 483–507.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnic Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

"Female suicide bombers: Boko Haram's weapon of choice." *France 24*, February 24, 2015. http://www.france24.com/en/20150224-nigeria-boko-haram-female-suicide-bombers, accessed 30 Oct. 2015.

Galula, David. *Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

Giugni, Marco. "Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly." *Swiss Political Science Review* 15, no. 2 (2009): 361–368.

Giugni, Marco. "Political Opportunity: Still a Useful Concept?" In *Contention and Trust in Cities and States*, edited by Michael Hanagan and Chris Tilly, 271–283. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011.

Gupta, Dipak K. *The Economics of Political Instability: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth*. New York, NY: Praeger, 1990.

Harff, Barbara. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 57–73.

Hickey, Raymond. "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria: A Note." *African Affairs* 83, no. 331 (1984): 251–256.

Hiskett, Mervyn. "The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 17, no. 3 (1987): 209–223.

Hoffman, Frank G. "Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?" *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (2007): 71–87.

Human Rights Watch. *Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria*. 2012. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence/boko-haram-attacks-and-security-force-abuses-nigeria.

Idowu, Amos Adeoye. "Security Laws and Challenges in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Insurgency." *Journal of Applied Security Research* 8, no. 1 (2013): 118–134.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. "Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis." Accessed October, 2015. http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/figures-analysis

International Crisis Group. *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency*. 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf.
Isichei, Elizabethi. "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980–85: A Revolt of the Disinherited." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 17, no. 3 (1987): 194–208.
Islahi, Abdul Azim. *Shehu Uthman dan Fodio and his Economic Ideas*. 2008. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40916/.
Iyekekpolo, Wisdom. "The Social Movement and Collective Action Theory: A Review of the Conflict of Change in Egypt." *Developing Country Studies* 3, no. 10 (2013): 117–121.
Iyekekpolo, Wisdom. *When Terror becomes a Political Tool*. 2014. https://alochonaa.com/2014/05/26/when-terror-becomes-a-political-tool/.
Kedar, Mordechai, and David Yerushalmi. "Sharia Adherence Mosque Survey: Correlations between Sharia Adherence and Violent Dogma in US Mosques." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, nos. 5–6 (2011): 81–138.
Lauder, Matthew A. *Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare*. Toronto: Defence R&D, 2009.
Loimeier, Roman. "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum* 47, nos. 2–3 (2012): 137–155.
Lubeck, Paul M. "Islamic Protest under Semi-industrial Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine' Explained." *Journal of the International African Institute* 55, no. 4 (1985): 369–389.
Melson, Robert. "Genocide in the 20th Century: Revolutionary Genocide – On the Causes of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Holocaust." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 4, no. 2 (1989): 161–174.
Meyer, David S. "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 125–145.
Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Social Forces* 82, no. 4 (2004): 1457–1492.
Mohammed, Kyari. "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, edited by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 9–32. Nairobi: African Studies Centre, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 2014.
Murtada, Ahmad. *Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria: Beginning, Principles and Activities in Nigeria*. 2013. http://download.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_BokoHaram.pdf.
Muthuswamy, Moorthy S. "Sharia as a Platform for Espousing Violence and as a Cause for Waging Armed Jihad." *Albany Government Law Review* 7, no. 2 (2014): 347–378.
National Bureau of Statistics. *National Unemployment Rate*. 2010. http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/.
"Nigeria: Boko Haram Insurgency." Assessment Capacities Project, 2014. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b-acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf.
"Nigerians living in Poverty rise to nearly 61%." BBC, February 13, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873.
"Northeast Nigeria Conflict – Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe States." Assessment Capacities Project, 2015. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/s-acaps-secondary-data-review-nigeria-24-august-2015.pdf.
Ogunlesi, Tolu. 2014. "The Making of Boko Haram." *Premium Times*, 26 May.
Ojo, M. Adeleye "The Maitatsine Revolution in Nigeria." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 2, no. 2 (1985): 297–306.
Onuoha, Freedom C. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect*. 2012. http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/2/29/201222911334179373 4BOKO%20HARAM%20NIGERIAS%20EXTREMIST%20ISLAMIC%20SECT.pdf.
Onuoha, Freedom. "Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, edited by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 9–32. Nairobi: African Studies Centre, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 2014.
Perry, Alex. *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror tearing Nigeria Apart*. London: Newsweek Insights, 2014.
Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Salaam, Abeeb. "Boko Haram: Beyond Religious Fanaticism." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7, no. 2 (2012): 147–162.

Salehyan, Idean. *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Smith, Mike. *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2015.

Smith, M. G. "The Jihad of Shehu dan Fodio: Some Problems." In *Islam in Tropical Africa*, edited by IM Lewis, 408–424. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Sulaiman, Ibraheem. *A Revolution in History: The Jihad of Usman dan Fodio*. London: Mansell Publishing, 1986.

"The Boko Haram Terror Chief who came back from the Dead." France 24, January 11, 2012. http://www.france24.com/en/20120111-terror-chief-boko-haram-imam-shekau-youtube-nigeria-goodluck-jonathan-al-qaeda-oil.

United Nations Children's Fund. "800,000 Children forced to flee Violence in Nigeria and Region." Accessed June 7, 2015. http://www.unicef.org/media/media_81518.html.

Voli, John O. "Boko Haram: Religion and Violence in the 21st Century." *Religions* 6, no. 4 (2015): 1182–1202.

Walker, Andrew. *What is Boko Haram?* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "A Genealogy of Radical Islam." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 1 (2005): 75–97.

"With 219 girls missing, Nigeria kidnapping inquiry concludes." *Voice of America*, June 20, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-wraps-up-kidnap-inquiry-with-200-girls-still-missing/1941786.html, accessed 30 Oct. 2015.