Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance

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ABSTRACT

That democratic societies do not fall into conflict has become an axiom of contemporary international relations. Liberal societies, however, do not properly exist along the troubled margins of the global order. This absence has lent urgency to present efforts at social reconstruction. Whereas a couple of decades ago the principle of non-interference prevailed, this unfinished business has shaped a new will to intervene and transform societies as a whole. This article critically analyses the international will to govern through three interconnected themes. First, it examines accepted views on the nature of the new wars. These representations usually portray conflict as a form of social regression stemming from the failure of modernity. As such, they provide a moral justification for intervention. Second, an alternative view of the new wars — as a form of resistant and reflexive modernity — is developed. Made possible by the opportunities created by globalization, this resistance assumes the organizational form of network war. The essay concludes with an examination of the encounter between the international will to govern and the resistance of reflexive modernity. This encounter is the site of the post-Cold War reuniting of aid and politics. One important consequence has been the radicalization of development and its reinvention as a strategic tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction. The use of aid as a tool of global liberal governance is fraught with difficulty; not least, the equivocal and contested nature of its influence. Rather than reconsideration, however, policy failure tends to result in a fresh round of reinvention and reform. The increasing normalization of violence is but one effect.

INTRODUCTION

We are told that development today can no longer be left to chance. It is naïve to carry on hoping that it will materialize either spontaneously or as 'trickle down' from such extraneous activities as economic investment, technology transfer or market reform (see Stiglitz, 1998). The task at hand is so pressing as to disallow this indulgence. Erstwhile developing and transitional countries must now be consciously transformed as a whole,

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including the attitudes and beliefs of the people within them (World Bank and Carter Centre, 1997). For societies dislocated by war and political instability — the 'failed' and 'collapsed' states with which this volume is concerned — the situation is even more challenging. Besides being returned to sustainable development, these states have to be reconstructed as well. Not wishing to entrench old fault lines or repeat past mistakes, however, this reconstruction is not a linear exercise in institutional restoration (European Commission, 1996). From the political and social debris of war, it is now necessary to rebuild societies anew. Where plural polities are weak or did not exist, they have to be created; confidence between antagonistic groups established; judiciaries reformed; market economies kick-started; and civic culture encouraged to take root (OECD, 1998). According to the present aid consensus, social reconstruction is a process involving fundamental change and reordering. When set against the lurking presence of war and the suffering it brings, such urgent demands seem both appropriate and reasonable, reflecting the only realistic chance of a stable future.

If one pauses, however, it is possible to detect within calls for social reconstruction a major radicalization of development. That is, a new willingness to countenance a level of intrusion and degree of social engineering hitherto frowned upon by the international community. Indeed, it is now explicitly argued that aid, including humanitarian assistance, is essentially political (Anderson, 1996; Cutts, 1998; Weiss, 1999). If it is to be used effectively and mistakes avoided, this inner capacity has to be harnessed and brought into responsible play. Such radicalization invites us to consider aid as a relation of government: a set of technologies having the power to reorder the relationship between people and things to achieve desired aims (Dean, 1999). Aid can be seen as part of an emerging and essentially liberal system of global governance. It is embodied in public–private networks of aid practice that bring together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies, and so on. While the radicalization of aid has achieved a fair degree of coherence at a policy and, to some extent, an institutional level (Macrae and Leader, 2000), its ability to actually transform whole societies has, so far at least, achieved equivocal and uncertain results.

Other pieces in this volume give evidence of the problems that have arisen, and analyse how transformational efforts might be improved. This final contribution, in contrast, seeks to examine the radicalization of aid that has taken place. It does so by first analysing how the conventional understanding of the new wars — as a form of social regression — establishes both a justification and legitimacy for intervention. It creates, as it were, a will to govern the unstable areas of the global margins. Second, the essay outlines an alternative view of conflict as an ambivalent and reflexive form of modernity made possible by the unexpected opportunities created by globalization. Finally, it examines the encounter between an international will to govern and the resistant autonomy of a reflexive development. The encounter of global liberal governance with resistance is seen as shaping the post-Cold

War reuniting of aid and politics. The present international consensus on the pressing need to manage conflict and transform societies on the global periphery in a liberal direction is an important example of this reunification.

THE WILL TO GOVERN

It is now commonplace to claim that conflict today is different from the past. Not only has the international status accorded to sovereignty declined, the world is presented with 'fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty' and 'new assertions of discrimination and exclusion' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 41–42). Wars today, contrary to an earlier inter-state norm, are internal to states or weave back and forth across borders to form regionalized systems of instability; they are not state-based wars in the traditional sense. Moreover, unlike the national liberation struggles of yesterday, warring parties are now more likely to pursue narrow sectarian interests, including criminal ones, rather than popular or legitimate political causes (Carnegie Commission, 1997). Another often described feature of these new conflicts, is their effect on civilians. In contrast to the stipulations of the Geneva Conventions, civilians now find themselves the deliberate targets of organized violence and are killed, abused and robbed with impunity. As well as being victims, warring parties also cynically exploit their vulnerability. Displaced *en masse*, civilians become tools of regional destabilization as well as providing bait to attract humanitarian assistance (UNDP, 1994). Widespread human rights abuse is not part of the collateral damage of the new wars, it is organic to how they are fought and their aims realized. In giving evidence to a British parliamentary select committee on conflict prevention and social reconstruction, an NGO gave a good summary of this current metropolitan consensus:

> Over the past 20 years, the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflicts have been transformed. As inter-state wars have declined in number, identity/ethnicity based internal conflicts have emerged to replace them as the primary threat to the developing world. In many ways, the effects of these new conflicts are even more devastating than in the case of traditional cross-border wars. They strike at the very heart of a nation's social fabric ... laying the foundations for years of hatred and mistrust between peoples. In such conflicts, violence against civilians is now the norm not the exception ... leading to massive population displacements ... and disruption to long established patterns of economic, social and political relations. The consequence of such complete societal breakdown for overall development objectives are enormous. The collapse of state structures leads to the criminalisation of the economy, the privatisation of violence ... which prevents sustainable development. (International Alert, 1999: 74).

The ideas in this passage can be found in countless UN reports, consultancy documents, NGO briefings and academic works. It reflects the mainstream or generic view of the new wars. However, rather than reading such passages as if they were fact to be memorized, one should examine them critically by looking for what is suggested or implied rather than being

said openly. Conventional descriptions create a series of implicit 'them' and 'us' dichotomies. *Their wars*, for example, are internal, illegitimate, identity-based, characterized by unrestrained destruction, abuse civilians, lead to social regression, rely on privatized violence, and so on. By implication, *our wars* are between states, are legitimate and politically motivated, show restraint, respect civilians, lead to social advancement and are based upon accountable force. In describing their wars, by implication, such statements suggest a good deal about how we like to understand our own violence. They establish, for want of better terms, a formative contrast between *borderland* traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality, and *metropolitan* characteristics of civility, restraint and rationality.

The terms 'metropolitan' and 'borderlands' are metaphors for the opposing characteristics of order and chaos. While the representation of borderland barbarity may help to animate aid policy, arouse public attention or urge us into action, the borderlands do not exist in reality; they are an imagined geographical space. In those shifting zones of political instability where we may think the borderlands exist — Sierra Leone, Congo, Kosovo, Colombia, Chechnya, East Timor, and so on — the situation on the ground invariably proves to be more complex and ambivalent than the images of regression suggest. When subject to close examination, the reflexive systems that support conflict have a tendency to fracture and reveal hidden and unexpected realities. The ethnography of organized violence, for example, frequently brings out its ambivalence and multi-levelled character (Keen, 1994; Richards, 1996; Schierup, 1999).

In pointing out that the borderlands are an imagined space, in a sense, no criticism is implied. Metropolitan–borderland distinctions are not supposed to be empirically accurate. Indeed, if they attempted to incorporate the complexity, ambivalence and reflexive character of the real world they would lose the essential mobilizing functions they exist to perform. In creating a 'them' and 'us' division based on the opposing characteristics of excess and rationality, the conventional understanding of the new wars draws a totally unwarranted veil of civility over the history of metropolitan inter-state warfare. Rather than seeing elements of similarity — for example, our shared capacity for genocide — the metropolitan–borderland distinction acts as a means of veiling and separating. Any similarities and responsibilities that we may share are concealed and pushed from view.

Central to the process of concealment and distancing is the representation of the new wars as a failure of modernity. Out of the loosening of civilization's grip and a weakening of the ameliorative effects of social organization, various forms of social regression, excess and irrationality spring forth. Such failures cry out for fresh attempts to reform, reinvent and remodel social organization so as to stem the regressive tide and prevent future breakdown. Present attempts at social reconstruction in war-affected regions are an example of a long-established reforming urge within liberal societies arising from the tendency to view social problems as a failure of

modernity (Bauman, 2001). From the Holocaust, through public health scares, to drug abuse, breakdowns occur due to the shallowness of modernity's grip, the inconsistent application of its principles and, especially, the underdevelopment or absence of the institutions necessary to counter the problem. Regarding a reforming urge, descriptions of borderland conflict destroying a nation's social fabric, entrenching generations of hatred, targeting civilians, and so on, provide a powerful *justification*. At the same time, the veiling and separating of 'their' irrational violence from the restraint of 'ours' provides a *legitimation*. Together, such forms of justification and legitimation combine to establish *a will to govern* the borderlands. The borderlands are thus imagined spaces of breakdown, excess and wont that exist in and through a reforming urge to govern, that is, to reorder the relationship between people and things, including ourselves, to achieve desired outcomes. A will to govern animates the public–private networks of aid practice. Indeed, without a reforming urge, these networks have little justification for their existence. Even Robert Chambers's self-effacing injunction that the last must be placed first (Chambers, 1983) requires an external presence — the existence of an enabling organizational interlocutor — to ensure that this happens: putting the last first requires a will to govern.

Political Economy and Social Regression

There is a generic division within the literature on the new wars between a majority view that regards them as symptomatic of failure and social regression and a minority perception that interprets them in terms of social transformation. Among the networks of aid practice, as the imagery of borderland excess suggests, the perception that conflict leads to social regression predominates. This position finds a resonance within political economy in arguments concerning the end of capitalism as a geographically expansive and economically inclusive world-system. As sources of cheap labour and raw materials, it is held that the peripheral areas of the international economy were valued in the past and incorporated within an expansive world-system as colonies or semi-colonies (Rodney, 1972). During the 1970s, this pattern of expansion and incorporation came to an end (Hoogvelt, 1997). Since this period, the trend has been for investment, trade, finance, production and technology networks to concentrate in and between the metropolitan regional blocs centred on North America, Western European and East Asia at the expense of the outlying areas. If globalization has an economic meaning in this context, it is in relation to the core of the modern informational economy consolidating itself within and between the main metropolitan regional trading zones. While there are exceptions, in general, commercial investment in areas not fully integrated into these zones has declined. Manuel Castells has argued that rather than expansion and inclusion, the present logic of capitalist development is that

of consolidation and exclusion (Castells, 1996; see also Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 68–69). The implications of this exclusion are profound. It suggests that raw materials and cheap labour on their own are no longer sufficient to guarantee a place within the dominant networks of the global economy. A thirst for cheap labour *per se* (Wallerstein, 1974), if it ever did, no longer drives international capitalism.

The shift from an inclusionary to an exclusionary capitalist logic has been noticeable in relation to Africa. Apart from a number of high value commodities (oil, gold, cobalt, diamonds, hardwoods, tropical fruits, seafood), the locations of which have taken on the appearance of enclave economies, there has been a general collapse in commercial investment since the 1970s. Many traditional or available raw materials are either no longer required due to the synthetics revolution or they are too cheap for commercial production. In addition, much of the continent lacks skilled labour, transport and telecommunications are poor, investment is risky, local markets are narrow, and governments are corrupt, inefficient and unstable. Such a story could be replicated elsewhere, including large parts of the former Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union. Castells, together with other political economists like Robert Cox (1995), has argued that the consolidation of the informational economy within Northern regional systems has rendered much of the South's population 'structurally irrelevant' from an economic point of view (Castells, 1996: 135). Their productive capacities are no longer required and those commodities they can produce have no market value.

While political economy has provided some useful insights into trends within the global economy, its contribution to analysing the new wars is less certain. The view of global exclusion developed by such writers as Castells (1996, 1998) and Hoogvelt (1997) tends to articulate with images of borderland chaos and social regression. The danger is that exclusion is interpreted literally, giving the impression of an emerging economic void: a landscape of deepening scarcity upon which one of the few possible trajectories is that of increasing resource competition leading to a downward spiral of conflict and social breakdown. Thus, 'genocidal tendencies and widespread banditry are rooted in the political economy of Africa's disconnection from the new global economy' (Castells, 1996: 135). Resulting from a self-defeating spiral of decline, poverty and breakdown, 'a new world, the Fourth World, has emerged, made up of multiple black holes of social exclusion throughout the planet' (Castells, 1998: 164). Consistent with the view that exclusion leads to a breakdown of the social order, Castells has argued that the only export from the global 'black holes' that rivals the informational economy in terms of its innovation and networked character is the 'perverse connection' of international organized crime (ibid.: 166–205). Ideas that global exclusion foments social regression clearly articulate with popular images of borderland barbarity, excess and irrationality. It is possible, however, to argue something different. That is, rather than the deleterious offspring of scarcity, the public–private networks of aid practice confront

a far more serious foe — the reflexive and resistant modernity of actual development.

Autonomy and Resistance

The critics of globalization often claim that its liberal promise of order and prosperity has yet to be achieved. Indeed, questioning the optimism of metropolitan governments and the international financial institutions, critics are wont to describe new patterns of international exclusion, the widening wealth gap between rich and poor countries, deepening poverty and growing disorder (Castells, 1998; Gray, 1998; Hoogvelt, 1997). While such evidence deserves attention, it can be argued that the paradox of globalization does not lie in juxtaposing claims of wealth and progress with a counter-narrative of increasing poverty and social conflict. At the heart of the liberal interpretation of globalization sits the open market as the archetypal self-regulating process. In its more triumphalist guise, liberal globalization aspires to interconnect the peoples of the world using the market mechanism to automatically adjust labour, production and raw materials to rationally secure the optimal benefit for all. It is conceived in terms of an irresistible and deepening process of international regulation through the power of superior forms of organization and rational calculation. It is a dream of order through the management of non-territorial processes, flows and networks of which the open market is the foundation and ultimate driving force. Rather than persistent poverty, the paradox of globalization is that instead of more effective and self-adjusting powers of regulation, the reforms and institutions necessary for its existence appear to be creating the conditions for autonomy and resistance. What is paradoxical is the trend toward independence and rejection in the face of a system that fully believes it has conquered the world by virtue of its irresistible moral, cultural and scientific superiority.

While the end of the Cold War has been seen as a triumph for liberal market values, it has also witnessed large areas of the global margins effectively uncoupling themselves from liberal forms of regulation and prediction. In response to this trend, many take comfort in the questionable assumption of criminalized and irrational forms of borderland conflict. What if, however, the new wars were not a form of social regression but a type of ambiguous 'reflexive modernisation' (Beck, 1992) in which the opportunities of liberal globalization were being critically refashioned and transformed into new (and essentially non-liberal) forms of autonomy, protection and social regulation. Rather than a failure of modernity, the new wars — or rather, the economic, political and cultural systems on which they depend — represent the realization of its hidden potentialities and capacities for adaptation and survival. Instead of separating and confining non-Western societies within a borderland ambit of tradition and irrationality,

they can be repositioned with the context of a globalization that has produced a number of different modernities and contrasting capitalisms (Pieterse, 2000); indeed, that has contributed to 'a pluralisation of modernity' (Beck, 1999: 3). From this perspective, rather than a hierarchical separation of metropolitan characteristics of civility from the chaotic traits of the borderlands, the context is one of ambiguity and horizontal interconnecting flows, networks and encounters across a plurality of modernities.

ADJUSTMENT AND REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION

Rather than social regression, is it possible to see conflict in the South linked to wider processes of social transformation, autonomy and resistance? Since the end of the 1970s, structural adjustment and liberal economic reform have had a profound effect on the dynamics and trajectory of reflexive development. Rather than victims existing in a growing void of scarcity, however (see Cornia et al., 1987), Southern political actors, institutions and social groups have critically interrogated their condition and appropriated and transformed the opportunities of liberal globalization. The changes induced by reflexive action have affected all levels and social groups within the South. Rather than the 1980s being a lost decade, from a perspective of reflexive or actual development it can be seen as a period of profound social transformation in the South. Social groups, networks and institutions associated with the developmental and planning state were dissolved, reconstituted and redeployed in the expanding spaces of the non-formal economy and the emerging liberal world-system (Bayart et al., 1999). New methods of wealth creation have emerged out of the global process of privatization and deregulation. The growth of non-territorial shadow economies has involved the emergence of innovative extra-legal local–global networks linking local resources and international markets. Rather than a black hole, the marginalization from the emerging informational economy and the decline of commercial investment '[have] resulted in a drive for new forms of economic integration' (Roitman, 2001: 193). During the 1980s, much of the South transformed itself into a reflexive site of non-liberal forms of reinvention and reintegration.

In Africa, the impact of structural adjustment served to accelerate the dismantling of non-viable patronage networks based on public bureaucracies. As an alternative, the metropolitan-encouraged process of privatization has provided the opportunity for many African rulers to develop transborder networks as a new basis for political power (Reno, 1998). At the same time, while the downsizing of the public sector and standing armies has increased the ranks of the unemployed, it has also provided the necessary personnel for the expanding shadow economy of extra-legal trade. In the Chad Basin, for example, numerous sub-regional and transregional regimes of accumulation now dominate the Nigerian, Cameroonian, Nigérien, Chadian and

Central African borders. The transformation has affected all sectors of society. Rather than the public works of the developmental state, the urban merchant-class now supports the transregional networks that embody the new possibilities of wealth creation. As for those that were formerly employed in the public bureaucracies of the developmental state, many 'now work as transporters, guards, and carriers along the Nigerian and Cameroonian, and Chadian borders' (Roitman, 2001: 194).

Under the impact of economic reform, the result of this social re-deployment was to fuel a massive expansion of extra-legal parallel and transborder activity. The irony is that structural adjustment, initially introduced to curb parallel activity, has encouraged its continued growth. In relation to West Africa, where research on parallel activity is relatively extensive, structural adjustment has been shown to have stimulated the shadow economy in a number of ways. Meagher (1998: 6–11) has argued that these include the uneven and partial application of adjustment programmes across the region. Within different countries, moreover, distinct development requirements and objectives existed. Exploiting such differences became an important source of profit within the shadow economy. Structural adjustment also instigated a great upheaval in national economies and accelerated the decline in living standards. These changes encouraged all types of cost cutting by traders and customers alike through the development of evasive parallel networks. Privatization also played a role in that the state credits arising from this process were diverted into transborder trade. Not only have shadow networks grown, however, the evidence suggests that their regional penetration and transcontinental character have also deepened (Meagher, 1990). Cheap Asian textiles, clothes and manufactured goods are now widely traded throughout Africa using parallel networks.

The expansion of the shadow economy has meant reintegration with the liberal world-system on the basis of innovative local–global shadow networks. Regarding the transborder networks of the Chad Basin, for example, what Roitman (2001: 195) has called the 'economy of the bush' has grown due to the combined efforts of the 'refugee' flows resulting from structural adjustment and decreasing development assistance, together with military downsizing and the under-financed armies. The resurgence of the bush economy reverses traditional rural–urban relations. The urban networks that dominated the countryside for decades are themselves 'now subservient to the economy of the bush' (ibid.). Following the growth in transborder trade linked to the extra-legal mining of diamonds in northern Angola, the rural border regions of what is now south-western Democratic Republic of the Congo have been revitalized by young urbanites involved in the mining and diamond trade (de Boeck, 1998). Even in the decaying centres of the formal economy such as Maputo in Mozambique, the dynamic elements of the burgeoning informal sector are the younger more educated entrepreneurs (de Vletter, 1996). The new poor are predominantly

the older and less educated victims of the retrenchment of development and the downsizing of public institutions.

Non-Liberal Modernization

The shadow economy that has developed in response to adjustment now constitutes the major part of the economy over much of the South. Extra-legal transborder trade represents a lifeline and, as such, a normal way of life for many people. It draws upon and adapts resources and networks based on locality, kinship, ethnicity, religion or creed. In turn, these networks inscribe their own forms of legitimacy and regulatory codes upon shadow economies.

Although the growing literature on 'war economies' has once again brought parallel trade into a negative light, populist views of the informal economy remain important. Populist in this context implies that reflexive modernity somehow prefigures a genuine development: an extra-legal activity that can be made legal and so reinvigorate development. It is argued, for example, that parallel trade represents a reassertion of local solidarity, that it is redistributive in nature, independent of the official economy and the state and, not least, that it is gender positive. Shadow economies, however, are neither egalitarian nor are they criminalized in any meaningful sense (Meagher, 1997); actual development is ambivalent.

Parallel trade is not intrinsically associated with violence nor does it embody populist attributes. Rather than being independent of the state, shadow economies intersect the state at many levels. State actors have developed complex relations of competition, dependence and control in relation to the non-formal economy. Neither is parallel trade redistributive or egalitarian. Those nodes within parallel networks that command real influence remain under patriarchal control. In terms of how they are organized and motivated, shadow networks are essentially non-liberal. In this context, non-liberal is not a pejorative term, equating with authoritarianism and violence. It rather denotes systems of mobilization and legitimacy that are not organized in terms of liberal norms, private calculation or free market values. Transborder shadow economies, for example, tend to oppose formal attempts to promote economic regionalization and, rather than a free market ethos, are more likely to pursue informal protectionism.

Such modes of organization, however, necessarily embody their own forms of protection, legitimacy and values. In other words, as in the case of Chechen society, despite often representing a normative 'liberal nightmare' (Lieven, 1998: 352–4), such systems do offer an alternative form of social regulation. The shadow economy is not just an unofficial mechanism for uniting disjointed official economies, or a populist coping strategy in the face of an overbearing state. To the contrary, in West Africa parallel trade is part of a struggle for advantage wherein the formal development strategies

of countries in the region are pitted against each other and vested interests 'are intrinsically opposed to economic rationalisation' (Meagher, 1997: 182). In relation to Southern Africa, Nordstrom (2001) has argued that informal markets shape economic possibilities, execute political power, establish cultures, rules of exchange, codes of conduct, and so on. Shadow networks are cultural and political instruments governed by social principles.

Autonomy and Conflict

Official statistics paint a picture of a 'lost decade' during the 1980s when many countries became 'economy-less' (Cornia et al., 1987). However, rather than a void being left, a reflexive modernity of actual development filled the space. Through shadow networks, actors in the South created alternative forms of existence while maintaining respectable flows of all types of domestic consumables, medical supplies, goods, and so on, that support millions of people. This is not because of official development efforts but despite them. Reflexive modernization is the outcome of an autonomous and self-critical process of dissolution, redeployment and reintegration on the basis of the opportunities inherent within liberal globalization.

In the process of reintegration, new non-liberal forms of protection, legitimacy and rights to wealth have been created. The threat that globalization represents for international stability is not the deepening of poverty, rather it is the emergence of autonomous forms of actual development, wealth creation and social regulation that resist liberal norms and values. Even the World Bank now acknowledges that economic growth in East Asia came about by ignoring the orthodox development paradigm (Stiglitz, 1998). Similarly, the reflexive modernization of actual development was not due to structural adjustment, market deregulation or the activities of aid agencies, but rather to the efforts of political entities that base their legitimacy on resisting, adapting and transforming these relations.

The non-liberal characteristics of shadow economies are not necessarily associated with organized political violence. However, in an institutional sense at least, the new wars are an extension of the inner capacities of reflexive modernization. Since the networks involved are part of everyday life, they impart on conflict an ambiguity in relation to the existence of 'war' and 'peace'. Rather than absolute and opposed conditions, they now represent similar relations and interconnections either speeding up or slowing down. Where networked war economies have emerged, it is not usually the case that those social groups controlling earlier forms of extra-legal trade have decided to become violent (Meagher, 1998). Instead, new groups and nodes of authority have emerged with the necessary political power to mobilize the extensive networks of the shadow economy in support of their claims. Since the end of the Cold War, warring parties can no longer rely on superpower patronage and support. In order to remain viable, they

have had little choice but to develop the supportive potential of transborder shadow trade. Compared to the Cold War, to the extent that warring parties have been successful, this autonomy has meant that, while never complete, metropolitan influence has declined within conflict zones (Jean, 1993).

Given the resource base required to conduct armed conflict, many of the enclave economies of the South — those bounded areas of high value minerals and raw materials — have become centres of contention for competing international and regional networks of control. In Africa, for example, usually on the side of the recognized government, one has the public–private networks of legitimate international commerce and official development. On the non-government side, one finds local–regional–global networks of the parallel and grey/shadow economy. Angola is a good example where, roughly speaking, international oil interests support the government while UNITA is sustained by extra-legal regional–global diamond networks (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000). Following the example of West Africa, in Central Africa transborder networks are also being militarized. In the case of the Congo, the militaries of several neighbouring countries have undergone a process of quasi-privatization, giving the war the feel of a regional corporate--military business venture. In the resulting network wars, struggles are taking place over the terms and conditions under which commodities and populations are being integrated within the global economy. The paradox of globalization is that apart from recognized states, even non-state and private associations can now exert high levels of autonomy.

Ambivalence and Network War

In attempting to counter the pervasive governmental perception of borderland regression with an argument of reflexive modernization, it is important to avoid the trap of setting up a rival claim of alternative rationality and social regulation. As with the institutions of metropolitan modernity, those of actual development are complex and ambivalent. Organized violence, for example, has a fateful duality. While devastating for its victims, those groups or that creed in whose name it is being enacted often see things differently. For them, the leaders of terror campaigns and ethnic cleansing, rather than being criminals or manipulative elites, are often perceived as saviours and the protectors of the essential elements of life itself. Within network wars, there is not a *hierarchical* or *class-like* division between a small number of 'winners' and a multitude of 'losers'. This insurrectionary representation, which associates power with wealth, dominates aid policy. From this perspective on the emergence of war economies, wealth and power flow upwards to a criminal elite while the developmental infrastructure and life chances for the majority below are destroyed (Short, 1999). Such a vision infuses the borderlands with images of excess and chaos wrought by manipulative and illegitimate leaders at the

expense of a misguided and gullible poor (Carnegie Commission, 1997; Saferworld, 1999; World Bank and Carter Centre, 1997).

The idea of winners and losers in network war is not concerned with hierarchy and spatially bounded entities, but with *non-territorial complexes*: rather than specific social groups these categories are associated with different networked systems. Network war does not oppose social groups or classes within fixed territories but entire social systems that span regions and even continents. Opposing political complexes contain their own special dynamics linking rich and poor, leaders and led, men and women. Power is not simply a matter of amassing wealth. If leaders are to survive, and most of them wish to, within their respective domains they must establish claims to legitimacy, provide protection, rights to wealth and new forms of social regulation for their followers (Callaghy et al., 2001; Keen, 1994; Verdery, 1996). When such systems fall into conflict, there is a tendency for organized violence to assume the characteristics of a species war in which social and political groups will go to extremes to secure the conditions for their existence. As Foucault has pointed out, today 'massacres have become vital' (Foucault, 1998: 137).

The necessity of massacres, however, is not restricted to the global margins; Foucault was writing about modern metropolitan warfare. The twentieth century has proven the most calamitous, destructive and blood-stained in the long annals of human suffering (Hobsbawm, 1994). Rather than warlords, weak-state rulers, criminalized elites, and so on, it was metropolitan states that, in developing the technologies of total war, first dissolved the 'trinitarian' distinctions between people, armies and government that had existed since the eighteenth century (van Creveld, 1991). Out of the hidden possibilities of modernity, total war, developed in two contiguous ways. One of these was the Holocaust (Bauman, 2001). The other, also based upon capacities of bureaucratic rationality and scientific calculation, was the mass terror bombing of civilian populations on a scale previously only glimpsed in nightmares and culminating in the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan.

In many respects, the only thing that is 'new' about today's wars is that the possibility of total war — its unrestrained brutality associated with the dissolving of the distinctions between people, armies and governments — has been transferred from metropolitan areas to the global periphery. The realization of total war is now within the reach of many autonomous private, non-state and shadow state actors in the world's conflict zones. Rather than the borderlands re-enacting primordial forms of tribal hatred and ethnic conflict, they have the hapless distinction of developing forms of organized violence that are positively modern. As Rwanda suggests, the potential for genocide has expanded beyond the institutional confines of techno-bureaucratic societies to embrace the ambivalent associations of civil society armed with the more mundane but nonetheless effective Kalashnikov, club and machete. In linking the various actors together, without the

efficiency and professionalism of the Rwandese civil administration, the 1994 genocide would not have been possible (Prunier, 1995).

The ambiguity of actual development is that while its institutions can secure the essentials of life, for example, through the development of transborder economies, they are just as capable of taking it away: in some cases on genocidal proportions. Sustained by the opportunities for autonomy afforded by liberal globalization, out of this paradox has emerged a new set of international risks and threats. In turn, they have underpinned a radical transformation in the way security is viewed by the North and the technologies that are being deployed in the interests of international order.

AID AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Over the past twenty-five years, donor governments, UN agencies, regional bodies, NGOs, commercial companies, and so on, have gained new forms of economic, social and political influence in relation to the internal affairs of contested states within zones of insecurity. The idea of 'gaining influence', however, needs some qualification. One is not talking about forms of direct or territorial control associated with colonialism. Neither can such influence be taken as universal or, indeed, particularly effective. On the contrary, it tends to be selective, unevenly distributed and of varying impact. What is under discussion here is not the technical efficiency of aid, which is the subject of innumerable evaluation reports and donor impact assessments, but rather the new possibilities for thinking about security that aid as a will to govern makes possible.

Influence is now networked and non-territorial. In relation to the borderlands, it is found within the intermediacy of the expanding public–private networks of aid practice. Beginning at the end of the 1970s, this first embraced macroeconomic policy through the reforming activities of the international financial institutions. During the 1980s, helped by the rapid growth of NGOs, it enlarged to include development, social welfare and relief (Clark, 1991; Korten, 1990). In the 1990s, through the emergence of UN system-wide humanitarian interventions and new patterns of aid subcontracting, the remit of non-state and private associations grew to embrace humanitarian, governance and security responsibilities (Weiss, 1998). From the Gulf War, through Bosnia to Kosovo, a new civilian/military interface has also emerged and broadened its scope with each successive round of borderland conflict (Williams, 1998). Non-state organizations are not only learning to work with military establishments in new ways, aid practice itself has been redefined as a strategic tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction (Duffield, 1999). Multinational companies, including private security companies, have also become part of a proliferating system of public–private networking and inter-action.

International non-state governance is not only widening, it is also taking on an appearance of permanence. While the broad aim remains that of achieving self-sustaining economic and political stability in the borderlands, there is a tendency to redefine what were initially regarded as short-term engagements as indefinite or open-ended programmes (Chandler, 1999; Karim et al., 1996). At the same time, there are increasing calls for comprehensive and strategic planning (OECD, 1998) or more coherence and 'joined up government' linking the different actors and measures involved (Macrae and Leader, 2000). In many respects, it is the trend toward permanence and comprehensiveness within the networks of aid practice themselves, rather than any unequivocal demonstration of effectiveness, that defines the present period. In what can be described as a significant internationalization of public policy since the 1970s, the growing economic, social and political role of non-state and private associations has been a central aspect of this deepening engagement. Indeed, without a significant privatization of the technologies of aid, new forms of public–private partnership and networking, together with the introduction into public institutions of systems of regulation, audit and management having their origins in private calculation, the internationalization of public policy would not have been possible.

The growing importance of non-state and private associations has not necessarily been at the expense of metropolitan states. While dependent upon private associations assuming growing operational responsibilities, metropolitan states are playing an important sponsorship, regulatory and management role in the internationalization of public policy. Through institutional reform and the extension of the techniques of new public management to the public–private networks of aid practice, donor governments are, in effect, developing the technologies and regulatory tools to govern the borderlands in new ways (Duffield, 2001). Just as the borderlands are an imagined space, these technologies establish new ways of thinking and possibilities of control. While shaping the actual world in uneven and equivocal ways, coherence has been achieved at the level of assumptions, representations and managerial tools. Although there are difficulties and many points of resistance, the networks of aid practice have been brought into service as an important part of a new public–private security framework.

While political alliance and arms superiority will continue to remain an important if disputed element of international security (Rodgers, 2000), over large areas of the borderlands it has given way to new possibilities and experiments in the will to govern. Rather than forming alliances with states, the aim is now to modulate and change the behaviour of the populations within them. Given the scale of the task, the resources devoted to it and the resistance of reflexive modernization, these new possibilities of international governance often exude a Utopian air. Within the public–private networks of aid practice however, the possibility of a public–private security paradigm is widely seen as lying in the realm of the possible. Within this framework,

control is not exerted directly or territorially as in the colonial projects of the past. It exists in the management of processes and the encouragement of capacities and potentialities. Through the inclusion (or exclusion) of populations and countries in relation to the flows and networks controlled by donor governments and aid agencies, the aim is to encourage positive behaviour while discouraging the bad. Achieving security in the borderlands, and hence international stability, is now seen as lying in activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic self-sufficiency, create representative civil institutions, encourage thrift, promote human rights, gender awareness, and so on: the name of this new security framework is development.

The Reinvention of Development

If one steps back from the raft of conflict related literature and policy reports that have emerged over the past decade (Gundel, 1999), it is possible to form the impression that development itself has been rediscovered in the encounter with the violence of the post-Cold War period. Essential in this is the representation of the new wars as the failure of modernity and collapse into social regression. From this perspective, the new wars have provided an opportunity to rediscover development as a *second chance* to make modernity work. Despite decades of failure and criticism (Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1992), development has emerged reinvigorated. This rejuvenation, however, is reliant on understanding conflict in relation to the imagery of the borderlands. In relation to an autonomous, ambivalent and reflexive modernization, the claims of a rediscovered development lose their force. Development agencies and networks use the new wars as a way of re-positioning themselves as a defence against the borderland forces of chaos and anarchy. This has required the depiction of the new wars in terms of economic pathology and the cynical motivations of their perpetrators (Collier, 1999). At the same time, the new wars have been depicted in such a way that their dynamics appear responsive to the rationality of development assistance. After all, if aid used badly can create dependency and fuel conflict (Anderson, 1996), it follows that in the right hands it can also promote peace. As a consequence, development actors have found a new voice in countering isolationist tendencies in metropolitan areas, arguing against the short-sightedness of aid parsimony and championing the rights of the world's poor. It is in resisting reflexive modernization that development has discovered a will to govern.

As part of the reinvention of development, history has been reinterpreted as a mixture of unavoidable political constraints and, with hindsight, mistaken policies. On the establishment of the British government's Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997, for example, it was observed that the hopes of the 1960s that development could be secured in a

decade or two have proven illusive. The 1970s and 1980s were also marked by a number of major setbacks. Internally, many developing countries were pursuing inappropriate economic policies. At the same time, rising oil prices and the growing burden of debt meant that for many countries the 1980s became 'a lost decade' (DFID, 1997: 8). All of these difficulties were compounded by the Cold War. With its passing, however, and the distorting pressures it created, a new era has opened that provides 'a fresh opportunity to focus development efforts on poverty elimination' (ibid.: 9). A symbolic line has been drawn between the past and the present; freed from historic political constraints, development can now refocus itself anew. At the same time, since conditions were so very different and distorting, the past has no real connection with today's more rational, responsive and professional development practice. However, those who claim that the ending of super-power rivalry has allowed a more open and promising international framework to emerge, are also likely to argue that much of the optimism initially associated with the passing of the Cold War remains to be realized. In particular, although nuclear annihilation has been avoided, it has given rise to borderland violence and social regression that threaten the potential gains of the present period. Indeed, such instability is seen as the main obstacle in the path of today's more rational development regime achieving its aims. As USAID (Atwood, 1998) has pointed out, ethnic conflict and state collapse are having a wide impact on the prospects for development. More specifically, 'this chaos is threatening our national self-interest. It is undermining global stability and it is making a mockery of our efforts to promote democracy and open-market systems' (ibid.: 2).

In its confrontation with reflexive modernization, development itself has been reinvented and come to acquire a new strategic role. Development is now seen, for example, as having a capacity for conflict resolution (European Commission, 1996; Carnegie Commission, 1997). It is able to alter the balance of power between social groups in the interests of harmony (Uvin, 1999). It is also a vehicle for a post-war reconstruction that promotes plural values and the rebuilding of civil society (OECD, 1998); relations and institutions essential for holding in check leaders prone to violent and criminal activity. If the new wars have resulted from the past failure of modernity, then development agencies have shown themselves willing to redouble their energies in an attempt to put this particular genie back in its bottle.

The Reuniting of Aid and Politics

With its in-built sense of design, 'development' has always represented forms of mobilization associated with order and security. While different strategies and technologies have come and gone, the general aim has remained that of attempting to reconcile the inevitable disruption of progress with the need for order (Cowen and Shenton, 1995); an objective that, since its nineteenth

century inception, it has failed to achieve. During the 1950s and 1960s, both development and security were inter-state affairs. Aid centred on strengthening the state apparatus as a means of promoting development and, at the same time, developmental states provided strategic partners in the Cold War balance of power. By the end of the 1970s, however, this framework was already in the process of collapse. Apart from the growing hegemony of neoliberal policies, it was becoming evident that developmental states could not maintain security within their own borders. The refugee crisis of the time graphically illustrated that this insecurity was having increasing international implications (Suhrke, 1994).

During the 1980s, as the erstwhile Third World was remapped using the categories of the borderlands, a view of state failure leading to a breakdown in development, conflict and international insecurity began to take shape among metropolitan actors. A metropolitan consensus now exists that holds that conflict in the borderlands is the result of a regressive developmental malaise (Carnegie Commission, 1997). Poverty, resource competition, environmental collapse, population growth, and so on, in the context of failed or predatory state institutions are seen as fomenting non-conventional internal, regionalized and criminalized forms of conflict. Instead of seeing a Third World — that is, a series of sovereign states creating an arena of strategic alliance and competition — a new cartography has emerged that is dominated by the concern that underdevelopment has become dangerous (see Dillon and Reid, 2001). This is not only for the people involved but, more to the point, for the North as well.

This changing perception of international security has profound implications for international governance. Within a developmental security framework, borderland states have lost most of their relevance except as 'facilitators' or things to be 'reformed' or 'reconstructed'. Sovereignty is now widely argued by donor governments and multilateral agencies alike to be a conditional status. What has taken the place of sovereignty as the locus of security is the nature and quality of the domestic relations within borderland countries. The types of economic and social policies being pursued, levels of poverty, the degree of popular participation, the extent of corruption and criminal activity, respect for human rights, the role of women, the status of the media, psychological well-being, the quality of political institutions, and so on, have all become areas in which the borderlands as a social body have been opened up to levels of metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation unprecedented since the colonial period. The transformation of the borderlands from a series of strategic states into a potentially dangerous social body forms the basis of current understandings of 'wider' or 'human' security (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). The social diagnostics associated with ideas of human security constitute the points of intervention where metropolitan actors attempt to modulate the behaviour of the populations involved. Development is now directly concerned with attempting to transform societies as a whole, reconstructing social relations anew and, especially, changing

behaviour and attitudes (World Bank and Carter Centre, 1997). Rather than building physical things or redistributing material resources, development now means getting inside the head to govern the hand. It is a radical paradigm that, paradoxically, is not inconsistent with falling levels of total overseas development aid.

Within the new public–private security paradigm, the security concerns of metropolitan states have merged with the social concerns of aid agencies; they have become one and the same thing. If poverty and institutional malaise in the borderlands encourage conflict and undermine international stability, then the promotion of development to eliminate these problems serves a security function; in the transition to a post-Cold War international system, aid and politics have been reunited (IDC, 1999). The link between development and security is now a declaratory position within mainstream aid policy (DFID, 1997; IDC, 1999; OECD, 1998). Even humanitarian assistance has been drawn in and subordinated to the rationale that development reduces the risk of conflict. Humanitarian aid is no longer given if it is thought to encourage the wrong behaviour, such as dependency or diversion, thereby harming the prospects of development (Anderson, 1996). Those requiring humanitarian assistance must make sure that they, and especially their leaders, subscribe to the right attitudes if they are to be eligible.

The imagery of a hierarchic division of winners and losers from war provides a powerful moral justification for intervention. Opportunistic and criminal elites must be separated from the vulnerable and manipulated populace at large. For the populace, external assistance is seen as being capable of promoting co-operative integration, providing training and strengthening capacities to rebuild the confidence and trust that war has destroyed (CMI, 1997). Reflecting liberal values, supporting civil society institutions, introducing electoral systems, and so on, are meant to give ordinary people the organizational means to keep criminal elites in check. As for the latter, various forms of sanction regime have emerged to contain and prevent them augmenting their authority. These include the more traditional economic embargoes to the 'smart sanctions' that have developed, for example, in the attempt to curb the trade in African conflict diamonds. Since it is now understood that the ability to market illicit commodities keeps war economies going (indeed, for many it is the reason for their existence) turning off the fuel supply to this infernal engine, so to speak, will shut it down (Collier, 1999).

CONCLUSION

While promising coherence and stability, attempting to use the public–private networks of aid practice as a technology of international governance is fraught with difficulty. The will to govern that mobilizes aid policy is continually repulsed and frustrated by the reflexive or actual development

that it encounters in the world's conflict zones. The outcome is a history of uncertainty, equivocation and policy setback. However, rather than failure leading to reconsideration, the result is usually a fresh round of agency reinvention and repackaging. While promising something new, reinvention leaves underlying assumptions and relations unchanged. It also leads to a deepening normalization of the violence around us. The will to govern relies upon a process of veiling and separating North–South relations; it distinguishes the irrationality and excess of 'them' from the civility and reason of 'us'. However, to the extent that the will to govern denies a moral space to other modernities, its task is all the more difficult, if not impossible to achieve. An encounter between different forms of ambivalent autonomy requires a willingness to negotiate across contrasting versions of truth and, in the process, for the parties concerned to establish their own moral identities and agendas. Such negotiations, moreover, are properly conceived as occurring between social systems. This is difficult, especially for the North. Among other things, there is too much at stake. The aim of global liberal governance is to create international order; in its wake markets are consolidated, commodities incorporated and, for some at least, wealth and advantage flow. At the same time, fragmented by choice and the manufactured differences of lifestyle, it is doubtful that liberal consumer societies can negotiate as a collective social system. In terms of their cultural and historic sense-certainty many of the reflexive and ambivalent modernities that the North now encounters are more robust in this respect.

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