



Vera C. Rubin Observatory
Data Management

CUI Rubin Observatory Data Security Standards Response

William O'Mullane, Russ Allbery, Yusra AlSayyad, Eric Belm, Andy Clements, Richard Dubois, Joshua Hoblitt, Cristián Silva, Ian Sullivan, Kian-Tat Lim

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Abstract

This is a response to the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) document from the agencies.

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CUI Rubin Observatory Data Security Standards Response

1 Introduction

The agencies have provided a set of requirements for security which we assess here and provide initial cost impact analysis for.

The summary requirements (from the start of the document) are :

1. Encrypt data using strong, approved encryption standard, following NIST 800-171 standard for CUI at non-federal organizations.
2. Install firewalls to prevent unauthorized network access, guided by NIST 800-171 standard for CUI at non-federal organizations.
3. Delay public release of focal plane scientific data for at least 80 hours following the observation, with Alert Vetting System allowed to withhold up to 4 images per month for up to 10 days with need only for notification to be given to NSF/DOE. Delay public release of engineering and commissioning imaging data for at least 30 days.
4. Eliminate artificial Earth-orbiting satellites from prompt alerts by (a) automatically alerting only on streaks corresponding to motions slower than 30 deg/day relative to sidereal tracking, and (b) alerting on longer (faster) streaks only after the Alert Vetting System has determined that the streak does not correspond to an artificial satellite.
5. Perform Earth-orbiting satellite processing in a separate facility operated by a “trusted broker” that has access to appropriate satellite catalogs.
6. Publish nominal collection schedules for regular sky survey 24 hours in advance.
7. Request and receive advance approval of large sky regions for use without sidereal tracking prior to initial on-sky test observations; then, approved regions (for use without sidereal tracking) will be supplied to the Rubin Observatory operations team in advance of their use.

Section 3 provides a subsection response for each of these bullets.

2 Cost Summary

Costs are detailed in each section below Table 1 gives a summary.

Table 1: This table provides an overview of all the costs associated with this change.

Item	Cost	Operations Cost
Encryption (Table 2)	\$3,324,000	\$3,924,000
Firewalls and physical security (Table 3)	\$1,391,894	\$4,800,000
Delayed Data Store (Table 4)	\$800,000	\$800,000
Alert Vetting System (Table 5)		\$14,481,000
Total Construction	\$5,515,894	
Total Operations Cost		\$24,005,000

To be effective for commissioning the construction part of this this change is best done before the end of FY22. This implies rapidly approving an SFR and starting work ASAP to be ready for ComCam on sky.

3 Response to the requirements

There is an implication that we should follow NIST.SP.800-171. As for any standard that is open to some interpretation. We will have to show how we comply to the standard. This may take the form of a compliance matrix as shown in Appendix A. In this matrix and in this document we assume the requirements apply to embargoed images before release to the collaboration and the derived difference image sources. Hence it applies to Prompt Processing, the embargoed data store(s), and the summit in Chile. It does not apply to DACs nor the actual alert stream.

We note SLAC should comply with NIST.FIPS.200, FIPS.99, 800-53 and 800-60 as a Federal agency. We assume our NIST 800-171 will also apply to SLAC since NIST 800-171 is derived from exactly these documents.

From Section 2.1 of NIST.SP.800-171 we note that the confidentiality impact value for the data

is no less than moderate. So we may assume our NIST.FIPS.200 security category would be {moderate, low, low}¹.

3.1 Encrypt Data

As outlined in DMTN-108 we propose to buy four routers which can perform IPsec AES-256 bit encryption between Chile and SLAC. We will not transfer embargoed images to France - hence we should keep a secure data store at Chile and at SLAC for redundancy. The router cost in Table 2 is based on a quotation from Cisco as one of the vendors explicitly specified in the agency document. While we have shown that TLS with AES-256 can provide sufficient performance to meet our Alert timing budget, we have not yet measured performance with the specified routers using IPsec. We assume that performance will be adequate.

NIST also suggests out of band access - an independent network for access to the Summit systems in case the main network is down. A quote for Telconor to give a backup control link is included in Table 2.

See Table 2 for the cost breakdown. The OOB access is in Chile only and the routers and cabling are an even split.

Table 2: This table provides cost estimates for encrypted data transfer.

Item	Cost	number	Total
Cisco Router (2@Chile 2@SLAC)	\$800,000	4	\$3,200,000
Cabling	\$1,000	4	\$4,000
Out of Bounds (OOB) link install (Chile)	\$60,000	2	\$120,000
OOB Ops running cost/month	\$3,000	240	\$720,000
Misc			
Total Construction			\$3,324,000
Total Ops 1 Refresh + running			\$3,924,000

3.2 Install Firewalls and other physical security devices

This requirement is for physical and cyber security. It includes installing cameras and locks on racks. Some of this such as Firewalls is already in the project plan but much of it is not.

Items already in the plan:

¹{confidentiality, availability, integrity}

- Card access to server rooms.
- Backup network in case main link fails (though the microwave link is a new addition ..)
- Auditable process to handle onboarding/offboarding
- Some cameras are in the project but not complete coverage.

We will do as requested and cost estimates are provided in Table 3.

Important Note: We shall ring fence the Camera in its own firewall with more restricted access than the restricted control network. However we will treat it as a black box deliverable for this requirement. We shall not expect encryption of the internal disks of the camera system. Any perturbation to the camera system tends to extend the project baseline.

I am not sure how to cost signage and labeling as required in NIST 171 3.8.4 ²

NIST 1.7.1 Section 3.10.6 pulls in extra standards for remote work namely NIST.800-46 and NIST.800-114. NIST.800-114 is the broader scope and we are pretty much in line with how it is written - we note Section 5.2.1 that we use Onepassword as a vault for IT passwords - not paper in a fire proof safe as recommended. Some other suggestions are understood to be useful in general but often not suitable for developers - personal firewalls, application filtering and aggressive antivirus software often trip over developer code and tools.

Since these documents were written as guidance we will take note of them but may not always follow all recommendations in all cases. NIST.800-46 and other NIST documentation suggest threat modeling - we do this in a limited way e.g SQR-041 and SQR-037. A more exhaustive risk assessment may be best done by a third party. We should discuss with SLAC. We do not store sensitive information on the VPN nor bastion nodes. We do use NAT in a limited number of places - this will be more important in operations if/when we move to IPv6.

Table 3: This table provides cost estimates for firewalls and other physical security in Chile and at SLAC not in the project plan.

Item	Cost	number	Total
Locks SLAC	\$13	30	\$390
Cameras Detectors SLAC	\$2,000	1	\$2,000
Sensors SLAC	\$38	30	\$1,140
Sensor hub SLAC	\$448	1	\$448
Locks Chile	\$13	20	\$260
Cameras Detectors Chile	\$2,000	2	\$4,000

²<https://www.archives.gov/files/cui/20161206-cui-marking-handbook-v1-1.pdf>

Sensors Chile	\$38	20	\$760
Sensor hub Chile	\$448	2	\$896
Faster CPU to handle disk encryption on summit (node price)	\$13,000	20	\$260,000
SSD to replace some disks for encryption (cost/TB)	\$400	100	\$40,000
Labor to redeploy all summit systems (contract)	\$100	1,200	\$120,000
Labelling and signage (CUI)	\$2,000	1	\$2,000
Security related contracts/month	\$40,000	24	\$960,000
Operations Security contracts	\$40,000	120	\$4,800,000
Total Construction			\$1,391,894
Total Operations			\$4,800,000

We need to cost security contracts, its a hot area and can be expensive. It is estimated running a SOC could cost upward of \$1.4M per year³. This article⁴ outlines the pros and cons of an outsourced SOC and estimates it at between 300 and 800K per year. For costing purposed \$40K a month was put in Table 3. Such a contract (or contracts) should cover:

1. Proactive monitoring and alerting (NIST 171 section 3.3.5)
 - Write alerts for suspicious behaviors
 - Analyze collected logs for anomalies
2. Root cause analysis of any alert or anomaly
3. Incident response
 - Isolation of attacker
 - Forensic analysis leading to timeline and inventory of compromise
 - Identifying systems that will need to be rebuilt
4. Vulnerability scanning including filtering out false positives
5. Asset inventory including patch status
6. Penetration testing to proactively look for vulnerabilities

This will require extensive coordination and integration with existing IT services and processes, included as part of this cost.

³<https://expel.io/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-build-a-24x7-soc/>

⁴<https://www.linkbynet.com/outsourced-soc-vs-internal-soc-how-to-choose>

Since we will have to encrypt systems on the summit (see ITTN-014) for a list of systems) we may need to upgrade processors and buy SSD. This will require experimentation so the values in the table for this are very rough estimates.

Note that compute facilities for the Commissioning Cluster at the Base as well as Alert Production and the Staff RSP at the USDF are not considered to be within the physical security area. If these systems that perform short-term, ephemeral processing of embargoed data must be treated the same as the others, this would approximately double the cost of this item for Construction.

3.3 Delay public release

The best approach here is to keep the embargoed data on a secure device separate from other systems and migrate images to the regular repository as they become *public*. This can be an object store with encryption like MinIO ⁵. We will need to have one at SLAC and one at Chile for redundancy to ensure no data loss.

With the commissioning constraint that means this needs to be a 30 day store for full images and engineering data. Looking at DMTN-135 table 40 this comes out to about 500TB of usable disk. Table 4 gives the cost calculation or this.

Table 4: This table provides costs for the embargoed data store.

Description	value	
Number of days data to store	30	
Raw data size per day (TB compressed)	16	Years data from Table 40 of DMTN-135/ 298.3 observing nights (Key Numbers Confluence)
Useable size needed (TB)	484	
Allowing for RAID (TB)	1000	
Cost for 1 store	\$400,000	Using SLAC Fast Disk Price from Table 28 of DMTN-135
Total for 2 stores	\$800,000	
Total Ops Cost at least 1 Refresh	\$800,000	

Note: If we assume the security requirements apply to commissioning i.e. we must use encrypted storage and encrypted lines, then we can not carry out commissioning activities at NCSA. This implies SLAC must be ready for ComCam.

Figure 1 depicts the encrypted storage and network. Embargoed (delayed) data would be held in the encrypted stores for the time specified. We assume temporary processing for alerts does not have to be encrypted, NIST allows ephemeral unencrypted CUI for processing.

⁵<https://min.io/product/enterprise-object-storage-encryption>




FIGURE 1: OGA architecture showing the long term encrypted storage and encrypted network from Chile to SLAC.

3.4 Eliminate earth orbiting satellites

Rubin does not publish alerts for streaks associated with artificial satellites. A subset of streaks, potentially consistent with Earth-orbiting satellites or Solar System objects, will be evaluated by the AVS. AVS is under discussion currently in terms of design and how it may be implemented. The cost here is based on FTE and non labor after initial discussions with LLNL. They are assuming a high availability service. The cost of delaying the data in an encrypted store is already covered in Section 3.3 An estimate is given in Table 5.

Table 5: The Alert Vetting System is all FTE cost - apart from unknown hardware at LLNL.

Description	Cost	Count	Total
FTE per year	\$415,000	2.8	\$1,162,000
Mission years		10	\$11,620,000
Pre operations years	\$1,000,000	2	\$2,000,000
non labor 1 off	\$611,000	1	\$611,000
non labor recurring	\$25,000	10	\$250,000
Total			\$14,481,000

3.5 Perform earth orbiting satellite processing in separate facility

This is under discussion with LLNL - initial cost estimates are given in Section 3.4. It is shown in Figure 1.

4 Conclusion

We can comply with the requirements and NIST 1.7.1 at the cost outlined in Section 2.

There are a few assumptions explicitly made above which we feel comply with given requirements but did require interpretation. To be explicit:

- Section 3 Assumes embargoed images before release to the collaboration are treated securely. After the embargo is lifted there is no longer a need to secure the images at the higher requirements.
- Section 3 Assumes NIST 1.7.1 also applies to SLAC even though NIST.FIPS.200 should be applicable.
- Section 3.2 Makes an important note about *not encrypting* internal camera storage.
- Section 3.2 Assumes NIST.800 documents were written as guidance they will be noted but we may not always follow all recommendations in all cases.
- Section 3.3 Assumes the 30 day embargo for commissioning applies to use of encrypted storage and transfers. This potentially implies NCSA could not be used for commissioning at all.
- Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 Assumes short stays of data on unencrypted machines for processing is ok (it is in line with NIST).

A Compliance with NIST Standard

Table 6: This table provides an overview of the NIST.SP.800-171 and Rubin compliance with it.

NIST 800-171	2021 Status	Intended Compliance	Note
3.1 ACCESS CONTROL			
3.1.1 Limit system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, and devices (including other systems).	Y	Y	
3.1.2 Limit system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute.	N	Y	There are many non-administrative users with unrestricted sudo access, this will be addressed.
3.1.3 Control the flow of CUI in accordance with approved authorizations.	Y	Y	
3.1.4 Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.	N	Y	Principle of least privilege is applied. Many users have access to hosts that is unneeded.
3.1.5 Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and privileged accounts.	N	Y	Targeted sudo rules are needed for common operations. IPA controls sudo centrally
3.1.6 Use non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing nonsecurity functions.	Y	Y	
3.1.7 Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and capture the execution of such functions in audit logs.		Y	This is probably sudo attempts audits. Full commands can be logged in at the cost of extra load for the servers.
3.1.8 Limit unsuccessful login attempts.	N	Y	I don't believe we do this now but we can; this is not done for ssh on hosts or network equipment. Web Services such as love, foreman, ipa console, nublado, etc. may need rate limiting [Cristian: we don't use passwords in ssh hosts, it's only ssh keys so technically we are limiting the access to a single attempt.]
3.1.9 Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules.	N	Y	Check login notices etc. A login banner can be displayed upon login
3.1.10 Use session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access and viewing of data after a period of inactivity.	Y	Y	This is our policy.
3.1.11 Terminate (automatically) a user session after a defined condition.	N	Y	ssh sessions are generally not limited on hosts; some network equipment has timeouts set; nublado has a session limit for notebooks?
3.1.12 Monitor and control remote access sessions.	N	Y	We currently check who and from where is connecting.
3.1.13 Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions.	Y	Y	VPN is in use
3.1.14 Route remote access via managed access control points.	N	Y	Bastion nodes – LHN is an open back door with no ACLs
3.1.15 Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information.	Y	Y	
3.1.16 Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections.	Y	Y	All devices attaching in Chile need to be registered by Mac address.
3.1.17 Protect wireless access using authentication and encryption.	Y	Y	
3.1.18 Control connection of mobile devices.	Y	Y	In the sense there is no open wifi, and on the summit devices must be registered.
3.1.19 Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platforms. ²³	Y	Y	CUI will not exist on mobile devices - in the case where an image may exist on say commissioning team laptop we will have disk encryption enabled.
3.1.20 Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external systems.	Y	Y	This implies vetting of devices that connect to the control network - we use mac address for laptops and personal mobile phones can not connect to the control network. [Cristian: we already have a separation with the LHN SSID and VLANs]
3.1.21 Limit use of portable storage devices on external systems.	N	Y	Can be rolled out with puppet but there are some servers that need usb.
3.1.22 Control CUI posted or processed on publicly accessible systems.	Y	Y	We do not intend to post CUI on publicly accessible systems.
3.2 AWARENESS AND TRAINING			
3.2.1 Ensure that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems.	Y	Y	
3.2.2 Ensure that personnel are trained to carry out their assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities.	N	Y	
3.2.3 Provide security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.	Y	Y	We would like to do more here like capture flag exercises for developers or blue/red teams events
3.3 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY			
3.3.1 Create and retain system audit logs and records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity.	Y	Y	
3.3.2 Ensure that the actions of individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users, so they can be held accountable for their actions.	Y	Y	
3.3.3 Review and update logged events.	P	Y	We may look for a third party contract for this.
3.3.4 Alert in the event of an audit logging process failure.	N	Y	

3.3.5 Correlate audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes for investigation and response to indications of unlawful, unauthorized, suspicious, or unusual activity.	N	Y	Again shall look for third party contract for this
3.3.6 Provide audit record reduction and report generation to support on-demand analysis and reporting.	N	Y	
3.3.7 Provide a system capability that compares and synchronizes internal system clocks with an authoritative source to generate timestamps for audit records.	Y	Y	
3.3.8 Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.	Y	Y	
3.3.9 Limit management of audit logging functionality to a subset of privileged users.	Y	Y	
3.4 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT			
3.4.1 Establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles.	Y	Y	We use mainly infrastructure as code approaches so the software is well tracked. IT inventory all the hardware.
3.4.2 Establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.4.3 Track, review, approve or disapprove, and log changes to organizational systems.	Y	Y	We have CCBs and code change process in place which also cover the infrastructure as code.
3.4.4 Analyze the security impact of changes prior to implementation.	Y	Y	
3.4.5 Define, document, approve, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.4.6 Employ the principle of least functionality by configuring organizational systems to provide only essential capabilities.	N	Y	
3.4.7 Restrict, disable, or prevent the use of nonessential programs, functions, ports, protocols, and services.	Y	Y	We get a lot of this by mainly containerizing the applications and having users work within deployed containers.
3.4.8 Apply deny-by-exception (blacklisting) policy to prevent the use of unauthorized software or deny-all, permit-by-exception (whitelisting) policy to allow the execution of authorized software.	N	Y	We need to implement SUDO lists to restrict access. However, this could be related to blacklisting of applications.
3.4.9 Control and monitor user-installed software.	Y	Y	
3.5 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION			
3.5.1 Identify system users, processes acting on behalf of users, and devices.	Y	Y	
3.5.2 Authenticate (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.5.3 Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts.	N	Y	Chile dont require 2FA at the moment
3.5.4 Employ replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged and non-privileged accounts.		Y	Chile dont require 2FA at the moment, but certificates are deployed to prevent mitm
3.5.5 Prevent reuse of identifiers for a defined period.	N	Y	
3.5.6 Disable identifiers after a defined period of inactivity.	Y	Y	
3.5.7 Enforce a minimum password complexity and change of characters when new passwords are created.	Y	Y	
3.5.8 Prohibit password reuse for a specified number of generations.	Y	Y	
3.5.9 Allow temporary password use for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.	Y	Y	
3.5.10 Store and transmit only cryptographically-protected passwords.	Y	Y	
3.5.11 Obscure feedback of authentication information.	Y	Y	
3.6 INCIDENT RESPONSE			
3.6.1 Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities.	Y	Y	AURA have insurance which covers this. But we really should have a contract to look over logs etc. to note when we are hit.
3.6.2 Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization.	Y	Y	
3.6.3 Test the organizational incident response capability.	N	Y	
3.7 MAINTENANCE			
3.7.1 Perform maintenance on organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.7.2 Provide controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used to conduct system maintenance.	Y	Y	
3.7.3 Ensure equipment removed for off-site maintenance is sanitized of any CUI.	Y	Y	
3.7.4 Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.7.5 Require multifactor authentication to establish nonlocal maintenance sessions via external network connections and terminate such connections when nonlocal maintenance is complete.	N	Y	Chile dont do 2FA yet. DUO has the capability to kill sessions.
3.7.6 Supervise the maintenance activities of maintenance personnel without required access authorization.	Y	Y	
3.8 MEDIA PROTECTION			
3.8.1 Protect (i.e., physically control and securely store) system media containing CUI, both paper and digital.	N	Y	

3.8.2 Limit access to CUI on system media to authorized users.	N	Y	
3.8.3 Sanitize or destroy system media containing CUI before disposal or release for reuse.	Y	Y	
3.8.4 Mark media with necessary CUI markings and distribution limitations.	N	Y	We understand we should label rooms and machines according to https://www.archives.gov/files/cui/20161206-cui-marking-handbook-v1-1.pdf
3.8.5 Control access to media containing CUI and maintain accountability for media during transport outside of controlled areas.	Y	Y	
3.8.6 Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of CUI stored on digital media during transport unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.	N	Y	
3.8.7 Control the use of removable media on system components.		Y	Can be rolled out with puppet but there are some servers that need usb.
3.8.8 Prohibit the use of portable storage devices when such devices have no identifiable owner.	Y	Y	
3.8.9 Protect the confidentiality of backup CUI at storage locations.	Y	Y	
3.9 PERSONNEL SECURITY			
3.9.1 Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to organizational systems containing CUI.	Y	Y	Only project team members will have access to CUI - all are know individuals. This doesn't suggest background security screening and it was also explicitly not required by the agencies in section 2 of the requirements document.
3.9.2 Ensure that organizational systems containing CUI are protected during and after personnel actions such as terminations and transfers.	Y	Y	
3.10 PHYSICAL PROTECTION			
3.10.1 Limit physical access to organizational systems, equipment, and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals.	Y	Y	This physical access limitations will increase with locks on server cabinets etc. but key card access is already in place.
3.10.2 Protect and monitor the physical facility and support infrastructure for organizational systems.	Y	Y	Security is in place on Cero Pachon and at the entrance to the mountain - though not only for Rubin so not permanently at the observatory.
3.10.3 Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity.	Y	Y	Actual visitors are escorted on the summit - contractors are considered more like staff.
3.10.4 Maintain audit logs of physical access.	N	Y	Chile use Noirlab key-card system, we should reach to them to inquire about their audit procedures
3.10.5 Control and manage physical access devices.	Y	Y	
3.10.6 Enforce safeguarding measures for CUI at alternate work sites.	Y	Y	This brings in NIST.800-46 and NIST.800-114. Threat analysis suggested. NAT considered bad.
3.11 RISK ASSESSMENT			
3.11.1 Periodically assess the risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals, resulting from the operation of organizational systems and the associated processing, storage, or transmission of CUI.	Y	Y	
3.11.2 Scan for vulnerabilities in organizational systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting those systems and applications are identified.	N	Y	Third party contract
3.12 SECURITY ASSESSMENT			
3.12.1 Periodically assess the security controls in organizational systems to determine if the controls are effective in their application.	Y	Y	
3.12.2 Develop and implement plans of action designed to correct deficiencies and reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities in organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.12.3 Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls.	Y	Y	
3.12.4 Develop, document, and periodically update system security plans that describe system boundaries, system environments of operation, how security requirements are implemented, and the relationships with or connections to other systems.	N	Y	Like any documentation this security documentation can get out of date.
3.13 SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION			
3.13.1 Monitor, control, and protect communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.13.2 Employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational systems.	Y	Y	We can do more here.
3.13.3 Separate user functionality from system management functionality.	N	Y	This is difficult in development and commissioning but should be ok in operations.
3.13.4 Prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.	N	Y	This will require training the operators and scientist who have access to the CUI data to not put it on their devices.
3.13.5 Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal networks.	Y	Y	

3.13.6 Deny network communications traffic by default and allow network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).	Y	Y	We may need to bring up iptables on each host
3.13.7 Prevent remote devices from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with organizational systems and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks (i.e., split tunneling).	Y	Y	
3.13.8 Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of CUI during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.	N	Y	IPSEC and encryption coming
3.13.9 Terminate network connections associated with communications sessions at the end of the sessions or after a defined period of inactivity.	Y	Y	
3.13.10 Establish and manage cryptographic keys for cryptography employed in organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.13.11 Employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI.	N	Y	
3.13.12 Prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing devices and provide indication of devices in use to users present at the device.	Y	Y	We should take care with the new roaming camera.
3.13.13 Control and monitor the use of mobile code.	Y	Y	Currently we have no mobile code
3.13.14 Control and monitor the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies.	N	Y	Chile dont monitor voip calls
3.13.15 Protect the authenticity of communications sessions.	Y	Y	
3.13.16 Protect the confidentiality of CUI at rest.	N	Y	
3.14 SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY			
3.14.1 Identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner.	Y	Y	
3.14.2 Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems.	Y	Y	
3.14.3 Monitor system security alerts and advisories and take action in response.	Y	Y	
3.14.4 Update malicious code protection mechanisms when new releases are available.	Y	Y	
3.14.5 Perform periodic scans of organizational systems and real-time scans of files from external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed.	Y	Y	
3.14.6 Monitor organizational systems, including inbound and outbound communications traffic, to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks.	Y	Y	
Total requirements		108	
Total Rubin Intends to comply with		108	
Total Rubin Complies with in 2021		72	

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C Acronyms

Acronym	Description
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ASAP	As Soon As Possible
AURA	Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy
AVS	Alert Vetting System
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CUI	Controlled Unclassified Information
ComCam	The commissioning camera is a single-raft, 9-CCD camera that will be installed in LSST during commissioning, before the final camera is ready.
DM	Data Management
DMTN	DM Technical Note
DOE	Department of Energy
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
FY22	Financial Year 22
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
IT	Information Technology
LHN	long haul network
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LSE	LSST Systems Engineering (Document Handle)
NAT	Network Address Translation
NCSA	National Center for Supercomputing Applications
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology (USA)
NSF	National Science Foundation
OOB	Out Of Bound (Alternative network access)
OSS	Observatory System Specifications; LSE-30
RAID	Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
RSP	Rubin Science Platform
SFR	Supplemental Funding Request
SLAC	SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory
SOC	Security Operations Centre
SQR	SQuARE document handle
SSD	Solid-State Disk
TB	TeraByte

TLS	Transport Layer Security
USDF	United States Data Facility
VPN	virtual private network
deg	degree; unit of angle

Draft