

Brazilian Foreign Policy

Brazilian Foreign Policy

1. Introduction to Brazilian foreign policy
2. Foreign policy post-WW2
3. PEI, the coup and the first military governments
4. Ecumenic tendencies during the military regime
5. Democracy, renewal of credentials and contemporary issues

1. Introduction to Brazilian foreign policy

- 1.1. Continuity of goals and adaptability to systemic forces as main themes
- 1.2. Diplomatic tradition and the role of Itamaraty
- 1.3. Fundamental pillars

Continuity


- Foreign policy is a State policy and not a government policy.
 - Foreign policy should not fluctuate too much.
- Brazilian Foreign Policy is deeply rooted in the notion of continuity (moments of rupture in the Brazilian Foreign Policy are extremely rare)
 - Diplomatic language avoids the term "change" and instead seeks to use "course correction" more frequently.
- Brazil underwent a profound institutional change when it transitioned to a democratic regime in 1985 and, despite this, the objectives of Brazilian Foreign Policy remain unchanged
 - The tradition and legacy left by Baron of Rio Branco are highly respected

Pragmatic adaptability to systemic forces

- Foreign policy is a State's policy that aims to leverage external opportunities in favor of internal needs.
- As a result, the systemic context plays a significant role in defining the foreign policy of a country.
 - Brazil has no "excess of power" or "power surpluses" (Gelson Fonseca).

Diplomatic Tradition

- Some key *individuals* in Brazilian Foreign Policy
 - **Alexandre de Gusmão** was the negotiator of the Treaty of Madrid and is considered the first great Brazilian diplomat.
 - The **Baron of Rio Branco** is regarded as the father of Brazilian diplomacy and the patron of Brazilian Foreign Relations (Brazilian Foreign Ministers are referred to as "successors of the Baron")
 - **San Tiago Dantas** is recognized as one of the key formulators of Brazilian foreign policy (Independent Foreign Policy, also known as PEI)



The role of Itamaraty

- In Brazil, the formulation of foreign policy is the responsibility of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty
- Itamaraty is seen as a super-institution in terms of foreign policy, as it is the body responsible for both formulating and executing foreign policy
- This perception of Itamaraty as an isolated and hermetic institution hinders the view of Brazilian foreign policy as a public policy
- Lula (first and second government) and Bolsonaro have been highly engaged in foreign matters
 - However, this does not invalidate the position of Itamaraty as a super-institution in charge of foreign policy

Fundamental pillars of Brazilian Foreign Policy

- Historically, Brazil claims some concepts as fundamental pillars of its foreign policy:
 - Development
 - Sovereignty and non-intervention
 - Peaceful insertion
 - Multilateralism
 - Universalism
 - Pragmatism
 - Autonomy

Development

- Development is Brazil's major internal need (however, the understanding of development can vary over time)
- Unlike countries like the USA, Brazil has never needed to use its foreign policy to project power or consolidate its territory
 - Brazil was born large, and its main concern was territorial maintenance
 - The Brazilian army has historically been trained to combat internal revolts rather than external threats
- Brazil has always had more than sufficient resources — a condition of "congenital sufficiency."

Sovereignty and non-intervention

- Traditionally, Brazil opposes the use of force and sanctions
- The argument commonly defended by Brazil is that there is no justification for interventions in other countries' territories and that the use of force and sanctions do not help solving the problem
- The principle of sovereignty is a corollary of non-intervention (however, this principle has increasingly become the exception, with arguments like humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect being used to justify interventions)

Peaceful insertion and Multilateralism

- The emphasis on peaceful insertion in International Relations can be attributed to Brazil's value for peace as a principle, or the fact that Brazil does not have power surpluses
- Multilateralism is important for Brazil, primarily because it lacks power surpluses
- Multilateralism reduces power asymmetries, leading to lower transaction costs (when more countries contribute, individual contributions decrease, but the overall gains increase)

Autonomy and Pragmatism

- **Autonomy:**
 - It means acting independently of any alignment, alliance, or special relationship
 - Brazilian foreign policy gained an autonomous dimension in the 1960s, especially with the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart.
- **Pragmatism:**
 - Involves calculating costs and opportunities to maximize national interests
 - **Pragmatism in autonomy:** Autonomy is a long-established concept in Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil seeks to assert itself on the international stage, considering its own interests rather than the demands of other actors.
 - The worst criticism of Brazilian foreign policy is to label it as "ideological"

Universalism

- According to universalism, Brazil should be genuinely integrated with world, not limited to any particular country or group of countries
- Universalism was relevant during Lula's first government
- Brazil is one of only 11 countries in the world to have diplomatic relations with all UN member states
 - Brazil has embassies in a significant number of African countries, even more than the United Kingdom, which once owned more than half of Africa for over 70 years (Brazil is second only to the USA, France, and China in terms of the number of embassies in Africa)

A note on universalism

- Brazilian Foreign Policy has been influenced by two fundamental paradigms – americanism and universalism
- Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the oscillation between americanism and universalism has lost importance

Americanism

- According to the Americanist paradigm, the relationship with the United States is at the center of Brazilian foreign policy priorities
- From the beginning of the First Republic until the 1950s, Brazilian foreign policy was predominantly guided by the Americanist paradigm.

"Pragmatic" Americanism

- Academics have identified are two types of Americanism - *pragmatic* and *ideological*.
- **Pragmatic Americanism:** According to pragmatic Americanism, an alliance or alignment with the United States is considered the best way to guarantee national interests and maximize gains
 - **Example:** Baron of Rio Branco as Chancellor sought closer ties with the United States as a way to promote Brazil's interests.
 - **Pragmatic Measures of Baron of Rio Branco:**
 - Protection from European neocolonialism or imperialism.
 - Commercial benefits due to the United States being the largest buyer of Brazilian coffee, which was Brazil's main export product.
- **Vargas:** Investments in the steel industry in exchange for support during WW2.

"Ideological" Americanism

- **Ideological Americanism:** although Baron of Rio Branco acted pragmatically in approaching the United States, there was also an ideological bias.
- The best example of ideological alignment with the United States concerns the Dutra government (this alignment during Dutra's government did not result in significant economic, strategic, or political benefits for Brazil).
 - In the post-World War II context, the United States' concerns were not focused on Brazil or Latin America).

Universalism and Diversification

- **Diversification of Partnerships:**
 - It refers to seeking a broader international insertion and building relationships with a large number of States

2. Foreign policy post-WW2

2.1 Dutra (1946-1951)

2.2 Vargas Second Government (1951-1954)

2.3 Café Filho (1954-1955)

2.4 Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1960)



2.1 Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951)

- Ministers of Foreign Affairs
 - João Neves da Fontoura (1946)
 - Raul Fernandes (1947-50)
- PS. Creation of the Rio Branco Institute (1946): Formation of a professional diplomatic staff

International context:

- **Cold War**: the post-WWII divided the world into two blocs and Dutra's government strategy was to align with the United States.
- **Containment Doctrine (1947)**: a political and ideological division in the world announced by George Kennan, an American diplomat stationed at the US embassy in Moscow (Kennan sent the "long telegram" proposing a policy of containing communism and warning that coexistence between capitalism and communism was impossible).

International context:

- **Truman Doctrine (1947)**: announced when Greece was on the brink of falling to communism.
 - The United States took the responsibility of protecting any state facing the Red Threat, as they believed it was necessary to take an active stance in defense of liberal democracy and capitalism
 - The situation was concerning because communism and leftist parties could potentially expand in Europe. The credits granted to Greece and Turkey prevented these countries from "succumbing to communism".
- **Marshall Plan (1947)**: plan to provide economic assistance to European countries affected by the crisis resulting from World War II.
 - It was based on the argument that the economic crisis in Europe would pave the way for socialism.

Raul Fernandes – "Automatic Alignment"

- It was not possible to observe a clear alignment with the United States during João Neves da Fontoura's term. The alignment became more evident during Raul Fernandes' term.
 - Some authors consider Dutra's alignment with the United States as an automatic alignment
 - Brazil was politically, ideologically, and militarily engaged with the United States, believing to have a special alliance with the United States.

US influence over Latin America

- The majority of Latin American countries were aligned with the United States in the immediate post-World War II period.
- Argentina remained a "stray sheep"

TIAR

- **Rio Treaty – TIAR (1947):** the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was proposed by Harry Truman in the context of the Truman Doctrine.
 - It was based on the concept of collective defense.
 - The American states would respond collectively to any aggression against the territories of the Americas.
 - Raul Fernandes was one of the authors of the TIAR text.

Exchange of visits

- The TIAR was signed at the Petrópolis Conference and to sign the TIAR, Harry Truman and his Secretary of State, George Marshall, visited Brazil in 1947.
- To reciprocate Truman's visit to Brazil, Dutra visited the United States in 1949 (**Dutra was the first Brazilian president to visit the United States**).

Alignment with respect to China (PRC)

- Brazil did not recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the UN after the Chinese Revolution, and recognized Taiwan as the legitimate China, where Chiang Kai-Shek of the Kuomintang had been exiled.
- This was the same position held by the United States and most other UN countries.

Military Cooperation

- The **Superior War College (ESG)** was created in 1949 and inspired by two American institutions: the Industrial College, focused on military-industrial complex, and the War College, focused on strategic studies.
- The ESG trained officers according to the doctrine of international security.

Brazil vs. USSR

- The decision to break off diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947 resulted from the deterioration of relations with the USSR and internal political issues, not from alignment with the United States
 - Anti-communism in Brazil predated the Cold War
- Brazil received significant criticism from the United States for breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR.
- The United States never broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR and kept its embassy in Moscow active.

Acting Outside of the Alignment

- Brazil adopted its own positions on some issues, especially economic and commercial matters.
- The United States had a liberal approach to foreign investment flows (ex. Bretton Woods Conference – 1944), however Dutra regulated foreign investments as he believed they should be invested in areas related to industrialization and the country's development, rather than extractive industries
- **Havana Conference (1947) – International Conference on Trade and Employment:** Brazil agreed with free trade but advocated for some degree of protectionism for peripheral countries undergoing industrialization (Brazil pressured wealthy countries to provide special and differential treatment to developing countries).

Acting Outside of the Alignment

- **Bogotá Conference (1948):** in the creation the Organization of American States (OAS)
 - The OAS was the institutional framework for relations among American nations in the post-World War II period
 - Brazil was enthusiastic about a Pan-American system and positioned itself at the conference as a "special ally" of the US
 - The Brazilian delegation requested something akin to a Marshall Plan for Latin American countries
 - As a result, an Economic Agreement was produced, which attempted to reconcile the impossible task of combining economic freedom and international assistance for development projects

Frustration

- “**Alignment without rewards**” (concept created by Gerson Moura) – the concept refers to Brazil's alignment with the United States during Dutra's government
- Brazil was not able to replicate the successful alignment strategy from Getulio Vargas's first government, which led to rewards for Brazil due to its alignment with the United States
- During Dutra's government, Brazil lacked bargaining power, and despite aligning itself, it did not receive the expected rewards, leading to a sense of frustration

Frustration

- Dutra asked for financing from Truman during the Petrópolis Conference. This request resulted in the **Abbink Mission** (1948), led by John Abbink, a representative of the Truman administration, and Otávio Gouveia de Bulhões, a Brazilian representative
- **Technical cooperation without investment:** The Abbink Mission proved to be a great disappointment for Brazil since it sought financing and not just reports on development.
 - CEPAL, created in 1948 under the UN to coordinate Latin American development, had already produced studies and reports, making the Abbink Mission of limited usefulness for Brazil

Memorandum of Frustration

- The "**Memorandum of Frustration**" (1950) was handed over by Raul Fernandes to Herschel Johnson, the US ambassador at the end of Dutra's government (the memorandum conveyed a feeling of frustration over Brazil's expectations).

Outside the geopolitical focus

- Truman's 14 Points Speech (1949): the United States developed the Marshall Plan in 1947 for the reconstruction of Europe, however, peripheral areas like Latin America did not have a Marshall Plan.
- Latin America benefited from the Point Four Program, which was less significant than the Marshall Plan but aimed to help peripheral countries with loans.

A new attempt – transition to Vargas

- The **Brazil-US Joint Commission for Development** (1950-1953) replaced the Abbink Mission during Dwight Eisenhower's government
 - The Brazil-US Joint Commission for Development was more successful because it committed to launching practical projects aimed at national development in various sectors and seeking funding for these projects.
 - The Brazil-US Joint Commission for Development was approved at the end of Dutra's government but began its activities in 1951, during the second Vargas government.



2.2 Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - João Neves da Fontoura (1951-53)
 - Vicente Rao (1953-54)

Attempt at a "Negotiated Alignment"

- During his second government, Vargas tries to resume the negotiated alignment with the United States that characterized Brazil's stance during his first term
- Alignment in the first Vargas government:
 - Brazil was neutral at the beginning of World War II but abandoned neutrality and broke ties with the Axis powers in 1942
 - The Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) fought in Italy in 1944
 - Brazil aligned with the United States in exchange for benefits, including financing from the EXIMBANK for the construction of CSN (National Steel Company) and the Lend-Lease Agreement to reequip its armed forces.

Attempt at a "Negotiated Alignment"

- João Neves da Fontoura was very influential and pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy.
 - But Brazil no longer had significant bargaining power.
 - João Neves da Fontoura and Getúlio Vargas had a clear strategy, but it was not as successful as in the first government.
 - Vargas was able to maintain a more subtle alignment with the United States.

Negotiations

- The Mixed Commission's (1951) main result was the **creation of BNDE** (National Bank for Economic Development)
- The United States promoted bilateral agreements with Brazil for the sale of strategic minerals, such as monazite sands (these agreements generated \$300 million for Brazil)
- The **1952 Military Agreement** confirmed the negotiated alignment with the United States.
 - Brazil gained access to modern military equipment, used during World War II, which was essential for the reequipping of the Brazilian Navy
 - The 1952 Military Agreement polarized Brazilian society, as it triggered a strong reaction from more nationalist segments

Criticisms to the 1952 Military Agreement

- The Brazilian military's profile was not war-oriented.
 - The United States and the UN pressured Brazil to participate in the Korean War since it was authorized by the UN Security Council. Brazilian officials had just returned from Italy and did not want to get involved in another war
- The military feared becoming dependent on the United States in military matters and worried that the agreement might lead Brazil to engage in military actions, such as the Korean War.
- Civilians criticize the agreement since it did not provide any economic counterpart for national development.
- PS. The 1952 Military Agreement came to an end in 1977 during Geisel's government

Intervention in Guatemala

- Brazil voted in favor or the United States' intervention in Guatemala (1954)
 - The United States' intervention in Guatemala was a response to the nationalist policies of Jacobo Arbenz, who had nationalized the United Fruit Company.
 - Brazil voted in favor of the US military intervention due to its aligned stance, but did not directly participate in the intervention.

Disagreements with the United States

- Disagreements with the United States increased from 1952 onwards
 - **Economic Policy:** To maintain support from nationalist sectors, Vargas took measures that alarmed the United States and foreign investors.
- The United States also took actions that displeased Brazil, especially after Eisenhower's election.

Instruction No. 70

- Instruction No. 70 issued by the Superintendence of Currency and Credit (SUMOC) in 1952 limited the entry of foreign-made manufactured goods with national equivalents
- The objective was to protect and stimulate the emerging domestic industry
- Instruction No. 70 from SUMOC was contrary to the interests of those advocating open markets and contrary to the interests of the United States
- The SUMOC acted as the Central Bank, regulating Brazil's monetary policy (BACEN was only created in 1965 during the military governments)

Decree on remittances of 1952

- A decree aimed to limit profit remittances abroad to 10% was issued in 1952
- The objective was to encourage foreign companies to invest in Brazil and not hinder foreign investment
- It was a typically anti-liberal measure that directly contradicted the interests of the United States

Petrobras as a state monopoly

- Law No. 2.004 (1953) was a result of the "O Petróleo É Nosso" ("Oil is Ours") campaign.
- This law created Petrobras and established a state monopoly over oil exploration, contrary to foreign interests.
 - The monopoly on oil remained in place until the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2001).

End of the Mixed Commission of 1950

- Eisenhower, elected in 1953, disagreed with Truman on the role of the United States in providing technical assistance to the periphery
- Eisenhower revoked Truman's Point IV and ended the Mixed Commission of 1950 (the Commission had only captured half of the financing for the ongoing projects – 50 projects were left unfinished)
 - This generated frustration once again in Brazil

Vargas and Perón

- Vargas and Perón had similar political bases (both were considered "fathers" of the workers).
 - Vargas's laborism was analogous to Perón's justicialism.
- Despite this similarity, Vargas' 2nd government was not a good moment for Brazil-Argentina relations.
 - Vargas was aligned with the United States, while Perón adopted the so-called "third position".

Argentina's heterodox autonomy

- Perón advocated for an intermediate position, that is, heterodox autonomy
 - "Ni Yankees, ni marxistas, peronistas" ("neither Yankees nor Marxists, but Peronists")
- In reality, Argentina leaned more towards the United States, as Perón detested communism and the Soviet Union
- Argentina's alignment with the United States was superficial – for instance, Argentina rejected the Bretton Woods organizations in 1944 but joined the TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in 1947

ABC Pact

- After the 1952 Military Agreement was signed between Brazil and the United States, Perón proposed the ABC Pact between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
- Perón suggested this pact because he was concerned about very strong ties between Brazil and the United States.
- The ABC Pact was well-received by Vargas but was rejected by Itamaraty
 - The concern of Itamaraty, composed of a more conservative elite, was a growing alliance between Vargas and Perón to form syndicalist republics in Latin America.
 - Perón wrote a letter expressing his disappointment with Itamaraty regarding the deterioration of Brazil-Argentina relations



2.3 Café Filho (1954-1955)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - Raul Fernandes (1954-55)

Reversal of Vargas nationalistic policies

- Liberal domestic measures reverse Vargas' nationalism and favor international capital (alignment with the United States)
- SUMOC Instruction 113 (1955) revokes Vargas government's Instruction No. 70 and allows the entry of foreign manufactured goods, even with national equivalents.
- This reassures the United States and attracts foreign investments.

Bandung Conference

- At the Bandung Conference in Indonesia (1955), the concept of “third world” is consolidated
- Countries question the existing international order
- Brazil does not participate, but Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes attended the conference on a personal basis (not representing Brazil)



2.4 Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960)

- Ministers of Foreign Relations:
 - Macedo Soares (1956-58)
 - Negrão de Lima (1958-59)
 - Horácio Lafer (1959-61)

"Associated Development"

- JK sets aside a nationalist stance and adopts an economic model oriented towards foreign capital.
 - The JK government is marked by an influx of foreign investments.
- The investments were not only from the United States (examples of foreign capital entering the country were the automobile manufacturers Volkswagen, Toyota, and Ford).

Trade barriers

- Brazil fails to agree on a minimum price for coffee (this leads to a decline in coffee exports to the United States, which was Brazil's main partner).
- Difficulties arise due to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (Brazil faces increasing barriers to its primary/agricultural products, as the EEC prioritizes integration and establishes the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962)
- **Diversification of partnerships** to compensate commercial losses – this was the beginning of the transition from americanism to universalism and a policy of partnership diversification consolidated by PEI.

Partnership diversification

- Eastern Europe was an untapped market for Brazil; the region was entirely dependent on imports of tropical products.
- Brazil establishes trade relations with the Soviet Union, but diplomatic relations were not restored (this trade approach does not indicate any ideological alignment with socialism; it was a pragmatic stance for Brazil)

Brazil-US relations: alignment

- Brazil issues a note congratulating the Anti-Soviet Uprising in Hungary (1956), as it supports any movement against communism.
- Agreement with the United States to install a rocket tracking base in Fernando de Noronha (1957) due to climate and atmospheric conditions (it was a scientific agreement, but in practice, the scientific base was used for a military strategy)

Brazil-US relations: difficulties

- Brazil breaks ties with the IMF to reject the recommendations (1959).
 - Brazil receives a visit from IMF technicians (1958) because the country was a significant debtor to the fund.
 - The technicians criticize JK's macroeconomic policies due to the side effects of the Goals Plan, such as inflation and debt.
 - The technicians recommend a monetarist approach involving budget cuts, credit containment, and tax increases. It was impossible for JK to follow these recommendations, especially at a time when the country was moving its capital to Brasília.
- The break was short-lived because Brazil couldn't stay outside the IMF at that time.

OPA proposal

- JK's letter to Eisenhower in 1958 proposes the Pan-American Operation (OPA)
- The OPA was conceived by Augusto Frederico Schmidt, special advisor to the Presidency for International Affairs
- The logic behind the OPA was that the United States should help develop Latin America to ensure stability in the region (the argument was that "poverty breeds subversion.")
- The OPA required more significant investments in the region, easier access to financing, lower interest rates for government loans, and technical assistance

OPA proposal

- The proposal of the OPA was made after Vice President Nixon's trip to South America for Arturo Frondizi's inauguration.
 - This was a good time to make the proposal because of the protests in Lima and Caracas against the United States' indifference to Latin America.
- The US accepted implementing the OPA (but the proposal was not enthusiastically received because the US considered that Latin America was under control).

OPA proposal

- The **Committee of 21** (1959) was an *ad hoc* committee of 21 countries in the OAS to analyze the possibilities of implementing the OPA
- Its only result was the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 1959
 - The IDB was another frustration because it was not enough to achieve all the goals of the OPA - investments, lower interest rates for loans, easier access to financing, and technical assistance.

3. PEI, the coup and the first military governments

3.1 Jânio Quadros (1961)

3.2 João Goulart (1961-1964)

3.3 Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967)

3.4 Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969)



3.1 Jânio Quadros (1961)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - Afonso Arinos (1961)



Independent Foreign Policy – PEI

- The government of Jânio Quadros was very short, but it left a relevant mark on Brazilian foreign policy
 - The PEI relates to the governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart
- The PEI is innovative and avant-garde, contrary to the conservative spirit of the Jânio Quadros government (Jânio Quadros, elected with the support of the UDN, and his chancellor Afonso Arinos had clear conservative tendencies)
- The context, since the JK government, was one of commercial difficulties with Brazil's traditional partners, i.e., the United States and Europe.
 - The main example of these difficulties is Europe's Common Agricultural Policy – CAP, inaugurated within the scope of the EEC in 1962.

Pillars of the PEI

1) Autonomy:

- Brazil defines its foreign policy outside of Americanism and the East-West dichotomy
- The PEI coincides with the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a tense period in the international context
- The **Non-Aligned Movement** was articulated by Marshal Tito (Belgrade), with leaders from Indonesia (Sukarno), Egypt (Nasser), and India (Nehru).
 - Brazil never joined the movement but *participated in the Non-Aligned Movement as an observer* (Brazil did not want to reduce its room for maneuver by committing to the political objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement).

Pillars of the PEI

2) Diversification of Partnerships:

- Brazil sets aside the idea of alignment and Americanism and adopts a universalistic bias
- Brazil approaches African, Asian, and Latin American countries.

3) Development

- Development has always been an important aspect of Brazilian foreign policy but gains more relevance with the PEI
- Brazil aligns itself with the orientation of the Third World.

Africa

- Prior to the Jânio Quadros government, there was no Africanist strategy in Brazilian foreign policy.
- Since the 1950s, Brazil supported the idea of decolonization, but only in a generic way
- Brazil did not formally participate in the Bandung Conference in 1955, promoted by Asian and African countries, where the concept of the "Third World" was created.
- With the PEI, Africa gains space and prominence in Brazilian foreign policy.

Approximation to Africa

- Opening of embassies
 - Ethiopia
 - Senegal
 - Nigeria
 - Ivory Coast
- Despite the troubled context due to the Algerian War, for the first time, a Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations (Afonso Arinos) visits the continent.
- Appointment of Souza Dantas as ambassador, the first black ambassador in the diplomatic history of Brazil.
- A Division for Africa was created by the Afonso Arinos Reform, that modernized the institutional structure of Itamaraty

Limitations in the approximation of Africa

- Until the 1990s, what sustains Brazil's relationship with Africa are cultural affinities
 - Africa gains pragmatic importance only from 1990 onwards.
- The Brazilian representative at the UN was authorized to vote against Portuguese colonialism in 1961, but on the eve of the vote, Salazar contacted Jânio Quadros directly and asked him not to tarnish Portugal's image on the international scene
- Salazar invoked the Agreement of Alliance and Friendship between Brazil and Portugal (1953), and Brazil abstained from voting on issues related to Portuguese colonialism
Africa expected a more active stance from Brazil (voting against) in this regard, but it did not happen
- Brazil did not issue any condemnations against the apartheid regime in South Africa

East/West World Division

- Jânio strongly criticized the mercenaries who invaded Playa Girón based on the violation of the principle of national sovereignty
 - Indirectly criticizes the United States and the Kennedy administration
 - This does not signify alignment between Brazil and the USSR/Cuba (Jânio Quadros did not share the revolutionary values of Cuba)

East/West World Division

- Controversial decorations
 - Yuri Gagarin from the USSR received the Order of the Southern Cross
 - Che Guevara was decorated in his position as a foreign authority (Cuba's Minister of Finance).
- This was an attempt to demonstrate Brazil's autonomy, not an alignment with the USSR/Cuba, but the United States was alarmed by Brazil's stance.

Commercial ties with Eastern Europe

- Commercial relations with Eastern Europe were formed as part of the Brazilian strategy of diversification of partnerships, due to difficulties faced with traditional partners
- João Dantas Mission
 - Hungary
 - Romania
 - Albania
 - Czechoslovakia
- Creation of COLESTE (Special Commission for Coordination of Trade with Eastern Europe) – interministerial body headquartered at Itamaraty

USSR

- Beginning of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR
 - Although there is no longer alignment with the United States, there is no tendency to align with the USSR either (Jânio Quadros is not a leftist)
 - Brazil re-establishes diplomatic relations with the USSR in November 1961, during João Goulart's government

China (PRC)

- Brazil did not seek to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, but there was commercial interest in this country
 - João Goulart was invited to make an official trip to the PRC in August 1961 (the invitation was not in his capacity as Vice-President of the Republic but as President of the Brazilian Labor Party)
 - This was the first visit of a Brazilian authority to the PRC
- The purpose of the trip was strictly to expand business with Communist China, which had 800 million inhabitants, and to diversify Brazil's commercial partnerships

Argentina

- Rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina
- **Uruguaiana Meeting (1961)** between Jânio Quadros and Arturo Frondizi in the city of Uruguaiana in Rio Grande do Sul, which is on the border between the countries
 - **"Uruguaiana spirit"**: Frondizi was a "friend" of Brazil: "everything unites us, nothing separates us".
 - The **Friendship and Consultation Agreement** between Brazil and Argentina was signed



3.2 João Goulart (1961-1964)

- Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
 - San Tiago Dantas (1961-62)
 - Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco (1962)
 - Hermes Lima (1962-63)
 - Evandro Lins e Silva (1963)
 - João Augusto de Araújo Castro (1963-64)

Political instability in Brazil

- Great political instability, including the risk of a civil war in Brazil, as attempts were made to prevent Jango from assuming the Presidency.
 - The change from presidentialism to parliamentary system, weakening the president's position, was the political solution to the issue
 - Tancredo Neves assumes as Prime Minister

San Tiago Dantas and PEI

- San Tiago Dantas becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs and refines the ideals of PEI. He is considered one of its main architects and its main ideological reference
 - Dantas left the Ministry of External Relations to become Minister of Finance

Araújo Castro – The Three D's Speech (1963):

- Considered Brazil's most important opening speech at the UN General Assembly
 - Illustrates PEI, as it points to DEVELOPMENT, DECOLONIZATION, and DISARMAMENT as the pillars of Brazil's international actions
 - A more stable world needs more developed countries
 - Colonization was a residue of European imperialism
 - Better use of money spent on weapons (if 1% of military spending were redirected to development and anti-hunger and poverty actions in the peripheral world, there would be fewer poor countries)

Diversification of partnerships

- Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR (November 1961) – relations with the USSR and later Russia were never broken again
- There was also reinforcement and advancement of economic and political relations with Eastern European countries
- Trade agreement with the PRC
 - The trade agreement had no significant results due to the military coup in 1964.

Cuban crisis – Brazilian autonomy

- Brazil was part of the "**Outer Six**" in the vote for the suspension of Cuba from the OAS
 - San Tiago Dantas represented Brazil in this vote (January, 1962).
 - The argument for abstention was the absence of any provision in the Bogotá Charter justifying the suspension of Cuba from the OAS. The democratic clause was only included in the OAS in the 1990s.
- It was not an isolated stance of Brazil; it was a concerted effort to prevent the United States from obtaining the 14 votes required to approve the suspension.
 - Seven countries pledged to abstain (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Haiti); Haiti eventually voted in favor of the suspension, so only 6 countries abstained
- In 2009, Cuba's suspension was revoked by the OAS

Cuban crisis – Brazilian autonomy

- Support for quarantine during the missile crisis (October 1962)
 - Brazil supported the naval blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis
- This represented adherence to the principle of peaceful resolution, as the other options would be invading the island or bombing Soviet positions there
 - The USSR would not break the naval blockade, leaving room for negotiation
- PEI represented a foreign policy orientation outside the East-West dynamics and more focused on the North-South logic

Brazil-US relations

- Deterioration in relations with the United States due to concerns about João Goulart's nationalist measures
- Limitation of profit remittances (something that had already been attempted by Vargas)
- Land reform project, a measure that seemed socialist in nature

Brazil-US relations

- Bilateral disputes due to nationalized American companies
- **Dantas Bell Agreement (1963)**
 - American companies had been nationalized since the 1950s by regional governments, such as Leonel Brizola's government. **Examples:** AMFORP, Hana Mining Company, and an ITT subsidiary. Nationalization was possible, but compensation had to be paid, which was not done.
 - **US Demands:** orthodox macroeconomic reforms to stabilize the economy; payment of compensations; revocation of nationalist measures.
 - In exchange, Brazil would receive investments and financing.
 - The agreement was signed but not complied with by neither side

Operation Brother Sam

- João Goulart worried John Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969); the US supported and helped orchestrate the military coup (Operation Brother Sam)
 - Operation Brother Sam was a US Navy task force sent to Brazil, aiming to support the coup movement with fuel and ammunition.
 - The task force did not have an effective role, as the coup succeeded before the American ships reached the Brazilian coast.
 - The American support should not be overstated, as the coup in Brazil did not involve the direct participation of US soldiers, as in other Latin American countries
 - João Goulart had already fled to Uruguay

Operation Brother Sam

- The recognition of the government after the coup (April 2, 1964)
 - It was the main signal of American support
 - The Lyndon Johnson government issued a note just two days after the March 31 coup, recognizing the new government
- The US recognition served as a basis for other countries to recognize the new government as well



3.3 Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967)

- Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
 - Vasco Leitão da Cunha (1964-66)
 - Juracy Magalhães (1966-67)

A return to alignment with the United States

- Alignment was a common theme from the Dutra government until the JK government, but it was interrupted during the PEI period
- Castelo Branco returns to alignment with the United States, but the alignment was not as automatic as during the Dutra government
- **"Step out of cadence"** (period of alignment when the cadence was autonomy and universalism)

Deep alignment

- Castelo Branco participated in the “tenentista” movement and was part of the ESG (Superior War College)
- Juracy Magalhães was Brazil's ambassador to Washington at the beginning of the Castelo Branco government (while serving as the Brazilian ambassador to Washington, he stated: "What is good for the United States is good for Brazil.")

Economic Policy

- The two main exponents of economic policy in the Castelo Branco government were liberals:
 - **Roberto Campos** - Minister of Planning; a career diplomat and ambassador to the United States during João Goulart's government (had the confidence of the United States)
 - **Otávio Gouvêa de Bulhões** - Minister of Finance; Bulhões previously chaired the Abbink Commission on the Brazilian side
- Roberto Campos and Otávio Gouvêa de Bulhões developed an economic policy that pleased the United States and the IMF
 - Reversal of nationalist initiatives (payment of indemnities related to nationalized companies), orthodox monetary policy (PAEG)

Military alignment

- Participation in the FIP (1965): Inter-American Peace Force
 - OAS military intervention in the Dominican Republic (Juan Bosch) due to U.S. pressures
- More than 1,000 Brazilian military personnel were sent
 - Brazil's participation in the FIP contradicted Brazil's pacifist spirit and principles of sovereignty and non-intervention
- Brazil proposed the creation of a permanent FIP as a military arm of the OAS (Brazil wanted to strengthen its armed forces and gain prestige)
 - The Brazilian proposal did not receive support even from the United States, which did not want to commit its military forces

Non-Participation in the Vietnam War (1955-1975):

- The Castelo Branco government coincided with the period of the highest intensity of US offensives in the Vietnam War
 - The United States sought to legitimize its action in Vietnam by involving a Latin American country
- The Castelo Branco government rejected participation in that military action
 - This was similar to what happened in the Korean War – although the Dutra and Vargas governments were very aligned with the United States, Brazil never accepted participation, despite the Korean War being authorized by the UN.
 - The most Brazil did in these two conflicts was to send medicines and food.

Security Over Development

- Castelo Branco was from the ESG (Brazilian Army elite)
- The teachings of the ESG had a strong ideological and doctrinal influence from the National War College
- Castelo Branco adopted a view that placed great emphasis on national security, abandoning a more developmental perspective
- Castelo Branco was the only one of the military governments that placed security above development; the other governments balanced these two variables more, as they realized that emphasizing security did not serve the national interest as much.

Limited relations with the "Third World"

- There was no room for developmental logic in Brazilian foreign policy given the significant alignment with the United States. Initiatives towards Asia, Africa, and even Latin America were very limited.
 - Brazil had a generic and limited participation in I UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in 1964.
 - A significant participation by Brazil in I UNCTAD was expected, as promised by João Goulart before the coup.
 - Brazil did not want to engage with the peripheral world because that would question the economic policy of the United States and the logic of GATT trade

USSR - commercial ties in the "peaceful co-existence" context

- The 1960s were marked by peaceful coexistence (post-Cuban Missile Crisis)
- What worried the United States was not maintaining relations with the USSR, but rather relations with Cuba and the PRC ("pariahs")
- **Joint Brazil-Soviet Commission**
 - Roberto Campos made an official trip to the USSR

Cuba and China

- During Castelo Branco's government, Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Cuba
 - Ideological convergence with the United States
- Relations between Brazil and Cuba would be resumed only in 1986, during the Sarney's government (first democratic government after the coup)
- Castelo Branco cut off any contact with the PRC to leave no doubt about his political stance. Brazil did not want to associate with a pariah, even if it was a strictly commercial relationship.



3.4 Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs:
 - Magalhães Pinto (1967-69)

Political unrest

- The Costa e Silva government is marked by the tightening of the military regime and the establishment of the foundations of repression (Costa e Silva was not from the Superior War School (military elite), he was a hardliner military official)
 - Main example: AI-5 (1968)
- It was expected that the military coup would establish a short and transitional period of military government, and Castelo Branco's government would be succeeded by a civilian government
 - The Costa e Silva government, which initiated the perpetuation of the military dictatorship, was considered by many as a "coup within the coup"



Economic Policy

- With Costa a Silva, there is a change in orientation compared to Castelo Branco's policies
- Delfim Neto and Hélio Brandão (Ministers for the Economy) reintroduce a nationalist orientation to Brazilian economic policy, moving away from the policy that was closely aligned with the United States
 - Costa e Silva returns to a developmental perspective, putting an end to the security-focused approach

Developmental logic

- Magalhães Pinto was one of the wealthiest businessmen in Brazil
 - His developmental logic contrasts with the previous government
- Diplomacy of prosperity
 - The best strategy for Brazil was to expand markets, diversify trade partners, and break free from IMF impositions

Diplomacy of prosperity

- This policy was critical of inequalities
- Magalhães Pinto promoted a relaxation of alignment with the United States and a partial return to the principles of PEI (autonomy, development and diversification of partnerships)
- During Costa e Silva's government, the ideological alignment with the United States was considerably relaxe. Security concerns were focused more on domestic policy, combating the so-called "subversives".

II UNCTAD (1968)

- Brazil emerged as a leader of the **G-77** alongside India, adopting a developmental and third-world-oriented discourse as the basis of its international presence
- This challenged some of the United States' commands in the commercial order since Brazil advocated for international trade that took into consideration the aspirations and needs of the peripheral world
- If trade was to be the driver of development, it should consider the differences and allow some protectionism for peripheral countries
- With Magalhães Pinto, Brazil allowed itself greater maneuverability while not completely turning its back on Washington

Rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- Brazil rejected the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (a strong sign of autonomy)
- The countries that most strongly supported the TNP were the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union

Arguments for rejecting the NPT

- Brazil's official discourse was never about wanting to possess nuclear weapons
- The argument for Brazil to reject the NPT was that the NPT was unjust and unequal since it treated non-nuclear-weapon states extremely rigorously, prohibiting them from developing any type of nuclear device, while being extremely lenient with nuclear-weapon states, which were addressed with a vague and weak article on disarmament, not imposing any obligations in that regard.
- Brazil also argued that it had already signed the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, a Latin American treaty that banned nuclear weapons, making it unnecessary to sign a new treaty on the same topic
 - This argument was not very strong because the Tlatelolco Treaty was not yet in force (it would only enter into force for Brazil in 1994)

Relations with India

- Brazil wanted to diversify partnerships and not be restricted to traditional allies
- India was of great importance to Brazil because it was a partner within the third-world logic, the G-77, and the questioning of the GATT
- Indira Gandhi visited Brazil in 1968, and Magalhães Pinto visited India in the same year (it was the first visit of a Brazilian chancellor to an Asian country).

Relations with the United States


- “Emerging rivalry”
 - NPT
 - Third-world emphasis
 - Nationalistic economic policies of Neto and Beltrão
 - Trade tensions: tensions in coffee exports to the United States, the United States started buying less cocoa and fewer textile products

4. Ecumenic tendencies during the military regime

4.1 Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974)

4.2 Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979)

4.3 João Figueiredo (1979-1985)



4.1 Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs:
 - Mário Gibson Barbosa (1969-74)

Repression and economic development

- Médici's government was the peak of repression and the fight against subversives (Médici was also a hardliner military official)
- The main aspect of the Médici government is the I PND (National Development Plan), which led to the "Brazilian Miracle", under Delfim Neto's logic of "making the cake grow before dividing it"

"The Brazilian Miracle"

- Brazil experienced significant economic expansion (with an annual growth rate of 9% to 10%)
- The Brazilian Miracle was based on a developmental logic typical of the 1970s, relying on three pillars:
- State – assumes the role of entrepreneur and agent of development through actions in infrastructure, such as large-scale projects in transportation and communication, and in heavy and basic industries (ex. Vale gained prominence during the 1970s)
- National capital – responsible for developing a non-durable consumer goods industry, such as textiles and footwear
- Foreign capital – played a fundamental role in the Brazilian Miracle, driving the durable goods industry, including the automotive and electronics sectors

Exports

- There was an increase in the Brazilian consumer market due to rising purchasing power and consumption
- However, this process occurred unevenly, not benefiting all sectors of Brazilian society equally
- The Brazilian Miracle was mainly identified with the Brazilian middle class, which saw a significant increase in demand for durable consumer goods (the lower classes consumed non-durable goods)
- As a result, there was no increase in demand for these goods, which were precisely the products produced by Brazilian national capital
- There was a surplus of non-durable manufactured goods that were exported

"Diplomacy of National Interest"

- Brazil continued to pursue its national interest
- The approach between Brazil and the United States occurred when their interests converged, but Brazil did not submit to the interests of the United States
- Brazil saw itself as a power and treated other major powers on equal terms
- The alignment never reached the level of the Castelo Branco government again

Diversification of partnerships (market expansion)

- Brazil developed a foreign policy strategy to expand its markets (strategy of partnership diversification)
- Brazil started exporting more manufactured goods than primary products
- To export manufactured goods, Brazil sought to strengthen ties with Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East
- To sell primary products, Brazil looked to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union.

Horácio Coimbra's Mission to the PRC

- Maoism and the PRC were more alarming than the USSR
- Maoism was becoming a growing factor of instability in Latin America
- Many of the guerrilla movements in the countryside (such as Araguaia) followed Maoist principles, which looked beyond the urban proletariat
Brazil voted against the recognition of the PRC in the UN in 1971
- Nevertheless, an interesting commercial approach began to emerge
- Médici was convinced that the PRC was worth pursuing because Brazil needed a large market, and China offered precisely that
- Médici authorized the trip of Horácio Coimbra, a major entrepreneur in the sugar sector, to the People's Republic of China (1971)
- In 1972, the export of Brazilian sugar to the Chinese market began as a direct result of this trip

Relations with the Middle East

- The Middle East gained importance due to the first oil shock in 1973
- Brazil sought to secure its oil supply and expand its trade bases
- Many argue that this strategy only began with Geisel, but it actually started with Médici (later on, Geisel and Figueiredo deepened the approach to the Middle East)

Relations with Africa

- Mário Gibson Barbosa visited 9 African countries (Central Coast of Africa and Gulf of Guinea) in 1972
- Gibson Barbosa did not visit Portuguese territories in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau) or African states that had gained independence through war with European countries (Algeria)

Decolonization

- Brazil had maintained a position of support for decolonization but remained silent when it came to Portugal, and this began to change with Gibson Barbosa
- Gibson met with Marcelo Caetano, Prime Minister of Portugal, to press him to facilitate the independence of Portuguese territories in Africa
 - It was the first time a Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs took partial responsibility for decolonization

Argentina – Itaipu-Corpus Crisis

- During the Castelo Branco government, Brazil had strained relations with Latin America
- From the Costa e Silva government onward, Brazil began to place more importance on Latin America (ex. signing of the Itaipu Treaty in 1973 between Brazil and Paraguay aimed to harness the electrical potential of the Paraná River and build the world's largest hydroelectric power plant)
- The treaty was problematic as it was negotiated with Paraguay without any contact with Argentina, violating the commitment to prior consultation, which was customary in international law (the Paraná River is an international river)

Argentina – Itaipu-Corpus Crisis

- Argentina protested against Brazil at the UN
- Argentina argued that the construction of Itaipu would hinder the construction of the Corpus Cristi power plant (a previous project) as Itaipu would be upstream, leaving an insufficient volume of water
- Argentina also claimed that Itaipu could act as a water bomb that could flood Buenos Aires.

Relations with the United States

- Brazil sought satisfactory and pragmatic relations with the United States, but from the Costa e Silva government onward, alignment with the United States became more flexible
- Médici requested financing from the United States, offering good returns due to Brazil's economic growth

Relations with the United States

- However, Nixon refused resources and asked for Brazil's help to ensure stability in Latin America (Nixon Doctrine)
- The Nixon Doctrine coincided with a severe economic crisis in the United States that resulted from the costs of containing communism (e.g., the Vietnam War)
- The fiscal deficit led the United States to abandon the gold standard in 1971
- Nixon believed that the costs of containing communism should be borne by regional allied leaders (e.g., Brazil in Latin America) and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State in the Nixon administration, believed that Brazil played a key role in Latin American politics.

Support for Military Coups in Latin America

- Brazil's stance of supporting coups to maintain stability in Latin America pleased the United States
 - Brazil provided political support and recognition, but no Brazilian troops were sent
 - Examples include Pinochet in Chile, Bordaberry in Uruguay, and Hugo Banzer in Bolivia
- The support for coups was not primarily aimed at pleasing Washington, the goal was to maintain a foreign policy consistent with domestic policy (the peak of repression)

Disagreements with the United States


- Brazil made a unilateral decision to extend its territorial waters from 12 to 200 nautical miles (there was no international convention on the matter)
 - This contradicted U.S. economic interests in this large area
- The Montego Bay Conference (1982) later decided that territorial waters corresponded to 12 miles and the exclusive economic zone corresponded to 200 miles.

Non-proliferation

- The PNT had already been rejected by Costa e Silva in 1968 and continued to be rejected by Brazil in 1970 when it entered into force
- Araújo Castro argued that the PNT represented a freeze of world power because it considered as nuclear possessors those states that had achieved nuclear weapons before January 1967
 - United States (1945)
 - Soviet Union (1949)
 - United Kingdom (1952)
 - France (1960)
 - Communist China (1964)

Development

- Brazil pursued a diversification strategy, but its relations with Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America were conducted on a bilateral basis, not multilateral – a significant difference from the Costa e Silva government
- Why? The Médici government pursued the Brazil-Power Project, which was not consistent with the idea of a concert with the Third World.
 - Brazil Started exporting more manufactured goods than primary products and became a significant regional power



4.2 Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs:
 - Azeredo da Silveira (1974-79)

"Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism"

- **Pragmatism:**
 - Acting to maximize national interest
- **Responsible:**
 - Pursuing national interest in a responsible manner and not based on ideology (e.g., Brazil approached countries with different ideologies, like communism, but without the risk of contamination)
- **Ecumenical:**
 - A diversifying strategy to the extreme, a feat only surpassed by the Lula government; engaging in dialogue with all, regardless of their government model, historical tradition, or religion

Relations with the Africa

- There was a great mistrust of Brazil-Portugal relations
- **The Carnation Revolution** (1974) ending Salazarism precipitates the independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa.
- A debate arises regarding Portuguese decolonization and Brazil aims to compensate for its lenient stance towards Portuguese colonization)
 - Brazil's automatically recognizes Guinea-Bissau (1974) and Mozambique (1975)
 - Brazil was the first country in the world to recognize Angola's Independence (even before Portugal), in 1975.
 - The recognition of Angola worries the United States, as Agostinho Neto, commander of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), assumes power (communist orientation).

Relations with the Middle East

- Significant deepening of relations with the Middle East
- The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, opens a representative office within the Arab League in Brasília in 1974 (this is viewed very unfavorably by the United States, as the PLO was considered a terrorist organization).
- Brazil supports UN Resolution 3379 (against all forms of racial discrimination)
 - This means a support for the "anti-Zionist vote", linking Zionism to apartheid
 - The United States votes against this resolution

Relations with the Middle East

- Increased trade flow with the region:
 - importing oil and exporting primary and manufactured goods (automobiles, weapons, combat vehicles)
 - Brazil manages to buy oil under special conditions without participating in auctions
- The Arabs vote in favor of Brazil in the Water Issue, and Brazil manages to approve the construction of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant.

Relations with Latin America

- Amazon Cooperation Treaty – TCA (1978):
 - Brazil seeks to increase its partnerships in Latin America
 - The treaty is a Brazilian initiative
 - It was signed by 8 countries: Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname
- TCA's objective was to promote regional development through strengthened economic and trade relations among these countries

Relations with Latin America

- Historically, Brazil had stronger ties with countries in the southern region of South America - Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay
- The TCA was an attempt to reverse this trend by increasing trade with countries in the northern region of South America (it was also a way to compensate for the losses resulting from Brazil's absence from the Andean Pact in the late 1960s)

Relations with Argentina

- The Itaipu-Corpus crisis with Argentina continues
- Brazil abandons the strategy of "official cordiality" with Argentina (a weak, bankrupt, and politically unstable state)
- The Itaipu-Corpus issue is only resolved during the Figueiredo government

Relations with the PRC

- In 1974, Brazil establishes relations with the PRC after 25 years of relations with Taiwan
- This automatically leads to the termination of relations with Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China or Nationalist China (this was the model recommended by the UN)
- Brazil now views Taiwan as a Chinese province and not as a sovereign and independent state (two systems, one China)
- Ending relations with Taiwan does not make Brazil forget about Taiwan because, at this moment, Taiwan starts to emerge as a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)
- Brazil establishes trade relations with Taiwan and opens a commercial representation office in Taipei

Relations with Japan

- In 1976, Geisel makes an official trip to Japan (he was the first Brazilian president to visit Japan)
- Geisel's visit to Japan was driven by the density of economic relations between Brazil and Japan
- During this period, there is a significant volume of Japanese investments in Brazil

Relations with Japan

- The Program for the Development of the Brazilian Cerrado - PRODECER I, launched in the late 1970s
- This program was responsible for boosting agriculture in the Brazilian Cerrado, especially with the introduction of soybeans
- Today, Brazil is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of soybeans (Japan, alongside China, is one of the biggest buyers of Brazilian soybeans)
- Japan invests in the Carajás Project in Pará
- This project aimed to extract minerals in the north of Brazil
- Brazil has become one of the world's largest exporters of iron ore (again, Japan and China are major buyers of Brazil's iron ore)
- In the late 1970s, with the launch of the Second National Development Plan (II PND), Japan was an important partner for Brazil

Disagreement with the US over nuclear policy

- The relationship with the USA is marked by some friction (some of it stems from Brazil's autonomous insertion in the world, some of it comes from disagreements in bilateral relations)
- One of these disagreements concerns the US criticism of a nuclear agreement signed between Brazil and West Germany
- The USA was Brazil's natural partner in nuclear politics since the 1950s
- When Brazil created the National Research Council (CNPq), led by Admiral Álvaro Alberto, the objective was to develop a national nuclear policy, having the United States as its only partner
- This was the case with Angra I, which involved Westinghouse (the power plants would be located in Brazil but operated by the United States)

Disagreement with the US over nuclear policy

- In 1974, India conducted nuclear tests, supposedly for peaceful purposes
- India claimed that the nuclear bomb would be used for civilian purposes ("peaceful nuclear explosion")
- Brazil had a nuclear agreement with India, and this made the USA very cautious about Brazil
- The United States conditioned progress in nuclear power plants to Brazil's signing of the NPT

Nuclear Agreement with Germany

- The United States feared that Brazil would gain excessive technology in such a sensitive and strategic sector
- As a result, Brazil sought another partnership. Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with West Germany - FRG (1975), and it was this partnership that allowed the launch of Angra II
- The agreement provided for the construction of 8 nuclear power plants with technology transfer. The construction of Angra III is also based on this agreement.
- The United States pressured both Brazil and West Germany against this agreement (the US attempted to pressure Willy Brandt's government not to close the agreement with Brazil)

Termination of the 1952 Military Agreement

- Another issue that caused friction between Brazil and the United States was the pressure from President Jimmy Carter on Brazil regarding human rights
- President Carter adopted the defense of human rights as the main focus of his foreign policy, particularly in Latin America
- The United States no longer tolerated the continuation of military regimes in the region and urged the adoption of democracy
- Carter's government adopted the motto of "slow, gradual, and secure opening"
- Brazil became the main target of American pressures
- While there were some significant human rights violations in Brazil, the country did not accept external interventions and violations of its sovereignty

Termination of the 1952 Military Agreement

- The tension reached its peak when Brazil became aware of a bill in the United States proposing the termination of military and economic aid to countries that violate human rights
- Minister of Foreign Affairs Azeredo Silveira became aware of this, and President Geisel called an emergency meeting of ministers
- In response, Brazil terminated the 1952 Military Agreement
- The objective was to send a message that Brazil would not accept blackmail or pressure from the United States (there was some pragmatism in this decision, especially considering that the 1952 Military Agreement only brought scrap materials to Brazil by that time)



4.3 João Figueiredo (1979-1985)

- Minister of Foreign Affairs:
 - Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (1979-85)

Continuity during hard economic times

- Figueiredo was not responsible for any groundbreaking initiatives in foreign policy (he focused on maintaining what had been achieved during the previous decade).
 - The exception is his policy towards Latin America.

Relations with Latin America

- Figueiredo grants significant importance to Latin America (this approach had already been initiated during the Geisel government with the launch of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty)
- Under the Figueiredo administration, relations with Argentina were further deepened
- An example of this was the signing of the Tripartite Agreement in 1979, which resolved the crisis over the joint hydroelectric project (Itaipu-Corpus) initiated during the Médici government
- Saraiva Guerreiro's vision was very different from that of Azevedo da Silveira – Guerreiro recognized the importance of definitively resolving the issues with Argentina

Relations with Latin America

- From that point onwards, relations with Argentina began to deepen
- Brazil and Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1980
- Another example of deepening relations between Brazil and Argentina was Brazil's adoption, in 1982, of a position of "imperfect neutrality" during the Falklands War with Britain
- Brazil did not participate in the conflict but provided support to Argentina, including in international forums, and offered military equipment
- Brazil's support for the Argentine cause in the Falklands issue dates back to the regency period (1833) – after Argentina and the United Kingdom broke off diplomatic relations, Argentina interests were represented by the Brazilian embassy

Relations with Latin America

- Brazil played a decisive role in the creation of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) in 1980
- Brazil was a founding member of ALADI and one of its staunchest supporters
- The idea was to boost trade relations with neighboring Latin American countries, which had always been limited
- ALADI still exists today.
- President Figueiredo travels in Latin America
- Figueiredo made several trips to the region, some of them unprecedented
- President Figueiredo made his first official visits to Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela
 - *Figueiredo's objective was to correct a historical deficit resulting from the low level of relations with countries in the northern part of South America

Relations with Latin America

- In 1983, Brazil was involved in negotiations between Cuba and Suriname and offered economic assistance
- Suriname (Desiré Bouterse) asked for US investments and received a negative response from Washington
- Suriname then sought assistance from Cuba
- Brazil offered economic assistance to Suriname as it was concerned about an US intervention
- Criticism of the US intervention in Granada (1983)
- Brazil criticized interventions in Latin America (all countries were financially strapped and politically unstable)

Relations with Latin America

- **Cartagena Consensus in 1984**
- Brazil participated in the Cartagena Consensus (signed in Cartagena de Indias), which was reestablished in 1984
 - *It aimed to enable Latin American countries to act jointly in the face of the common problem of external debt
- The countries believed that acting together would give them more bargaining power against creditors
- The Cartagena Consensus did not have the desired effects, leading to significant disarray

Relations with Latin America

- Brazil supported the Contadora Group but did not participate in it.
- The Contadora Group was formed by Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela
- It aimed to stabilize Central America, an area rife with various civil wars, such as the Nicaraguan War between the Sandinistas and the U.S.-backed "contras" during the Reagan administration
- Brazil saw the initiative as important.

Relations with Latin America

*Africa held significant importance during the Figueiredo government as Brazil attempted to expand its contacts with the continent

- In 1984, Figueiredo became the first Brazilian president to visit Africa
- Brazil's focus was mainly economic and commercial, with some political aspects initiated by the Program for Economic Independence (PEI) as part of a diversification strategy
- Initially, Brazil mainly traded with South Africa, accounting for 90% of its African trade
- In the 1980s, while Brazil's overall trade with Africa remained limited, there was significant diversification, with trade with South Africa representing 6% of the total

China (PRC)

- Figueiredo made the first presidential visit to the PRC (João Goulart had also visited China, but as vice-president)
- Figueiredo's visit was to a different China – Deng Xiaoping's China, which was undergoing the Four Modernizations and economic reforms, leading to a hybrid economic model (state capitalism or market socialism)
- In 1984, China's economy grew by 15.4% (while Brazil was facing an economic crisis, China had much to offer and teach and this created greater economic interests)
- Figueiredo's visit was based on a "convergence of values" logic, as Brazil's foreign policy tradition was compatible with China's
China's foreign policy was based on the notion of peaceful coexistence and non-intervention

USSR

- Figueiredo government signed a technical-scientific agreement allowing the circulation of Soviet scientists and researchers in Brazil
- The technical and scientific dimensions continue to have a significant influence on Brazil-Russia relations

USSR

- The most important aspect of Brazil's relationship with the USSR was Brazil's autonomous stance regarding the boycott of the Moscow Olympics
- In 1980, Brazil rejected the boycott despite pressure from the Reagan administration
- Brazil also rejected the U.S. economic embargo against the Soviet Union, which was imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
- In 1983, there was a record volume of bilateral trade between Brazil and the Soviet Union at 800 million dollars (the USSR exported oil to Brazil, during the context of the Oil Crisis)

Relations with the United States

- The United States was experiencing a period of strong recovery, returning to the Cold War mindset
- Brazil was in completely different circumstances, facing the "lost decade" with a declining dictatorship
- During this time, there was no confrontational strategy, but rather a pursuit of autonomy.

Relations with the United States

- Brazil strongly criticized the U.S. military intervention in Grenada
- The 1980s were marked by economic instability in Brazil and Latin America as a whole (debt crisis, which escalated with the increase in interest rates – a strategy adopted by the Federal Reserve chairman).
- Brazil's relations with the United States in the 1980s were "circumstantial", as there was no planned project or relationship
- There was a considerable bilateral mistrust

5. Democracy, renewal of credentials and contemporary issues

5.1 José Sarney and the democratic transition

5.2 Renewal of credentials during the 1990s

5.3 Contemporary issues



5.1 José Sarney (1985-1990)

- Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
 - Olavo Setúbal (1985-86)
 - Abreu Sodré (1986-90)

Political challenges

- The Sarney government faced significant challenges, particularly concerning the transition to democracy
- This involved specific initiatives that needed to be promoted during this period, such as the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the establishment of a multi-party system, the end of political censorship, and the organization of free and direct presidential elections
- All of these initiatives were carried out, leading to the creation of the 1988 Constitution, and more than 20 candidates competed in the 1989 presidential elections

Economic challenges

- Brazil had to confront an economic crisis during this time
- Various measures were taken to combat the crisis, including the Plano Verão, Plano Cruzado, Plano Bresser-Pereira, and the moratorium of 1987
 - *However, none of these measures succeeded in resolving the problem, and the crisis deepened
- By March 1990, monthly inflation in Brazil had reached over 80%

Relations with Argentina

- During this period, the groundwork for the future Mercosur was laid, as Brazil sought to strengthen its relations with Argentina
- An example of this is the Iguaçu Declaration of 1985, signed by Sarney and Alfonsín, which committed to deepening economic and trade relations between Brazil and Argentina
- The Mercosur began with an analysis of the Iguaçu Declaration and involved an approximation between Brazil and Argentina (Paraguay and Uruguay joined later)

Relations with Argentina (cont'd)

- Brazil and Argentina signed a Nuclear Agreement in 1985 (building on a superficial agreement established during the Figueiredo government), which allowed for the exchange of technical visits to each other's nuclear facilities
- In 1988, they signed a Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development, setting a 10-year deadline to lift existing bilateral restrictions.

Relations with Latin America

- President Sarney made various trips to the region, visiting all South American countries, becoming the first Brazilian president to do so (Sarney also visited Mexico)
- Brazil participated in the Support Group for Contadora, established in 1985, and the Rio Group, created in 1986, demonstrating Sarney's interest in Latin America
- In 1986, Sarney reestablished relations with Cuba

Support Group for Contadora

- The Support Group for Contadora (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru) was established two years after the Contadora Group to provide political support
- Brazil played a key role in this group
- The Rio Group emerged from the merger of the Contadora Group (1983) and the Support Group for the Contadora Group (1985)

Rio Group

- In 2012, the Rio Group was replaced by CELAC
- During its 26 years of existence, the Rio Group played a crucial role in preserving stability in Latin America
- The Rio Group was important for times of instability among neighbors and promoted democracy in the region, despite Cuba's involvement
- This demonstrated that the Sarney government was genuinely interested and committed to addressing the region's problems
- Moreover, there was an increasing dialogue with neighboring countries in dealing with economic issues, such as external debt, which bore fruit in the following decade, fostering more trust and cooperation

Relations with Africa

- Sarney visited Africa in 1986, leading to a significant increase in the number of Brazilian embassies in the region
- By the end of the 1980s, Brazil had 22 embassies in Africa, shifting its strategy from having one embassy per region to one embassy per country
- The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) was launched in 1986
- The Brazilian government under Sarney became aware of the importance of Africa as Brazil's Atlantic frontier
- South Africa was initially excluded from ZOPACAS due to its possession of nuclear weapons and only joined in 1994
ZOPACAS was largely forgotten during the 1990s, along with Brazil's engagement with Africa
- It was later revitalized during President Lula's administration, which placed significant emphasis on Africa

Portuguese-Speaking African Countries

- Sarney's government also strengthened relations with the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP)
- In 1989, the first summit of Portuguese-speaking countries was held in São Luís do Maranhão, resulting in the creation of the International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IILP) in Praia, the capital of Cape Verde, which was the first step towards the future Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)
- The Minister of Culture, José Aparecido de Oliveira, played a crucial role in fostering this initiative towards the PALOP
- This initiative was not led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), but rather by the Ministry of Culture (José Aparecido de Oliveira was appointed as Brazil's ambassador to Lisbon during Itamar Franco's government as a reward for his efforts in strengthening ties with the PALOP)

Isolation of South Africa

- The distancing from South Africa began slowly, as the Brazilian government was lenient towards the apartheid regime throughout the 1960s
- Only in the late 1970s did Brazil start to criticize South Africa more strongly for its apartheid policies, and this stance deepened during the 1980s, including under Sarney's government
- In his speech at the UN General Assembly in 1985, Sarney presented a new Brazil committed to international issues, particularly human rights
- Sarney announced the suspension of all forms of cultural and sports cooperation with South Africa at that moment (all other forms of cooperation had already been suspended).

Relations with the Soviet Union

- Soviet Union: Sarney was the first Brazilian president to visit the USSR in 1987 (this visit solidified the rapprochement that began during the Figueiredo government in the 1970s)
- An agreement for long-term cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science, and technology was signed during the visit of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to Brazil in 1987
- It was rare for the Soviet Union to sign long-term cooperation agreements, and the agreement's four pillars continue to guide Brazil-Russia relations today: economy, trade, science, and technology.
- During the visit, they also signed an agreement related to the VLS (Satellite Launch Vehicle) project

Relations with People's Republic of China (PRC)

- Sarney traveled to the People's Republic of China in 1988, leading to a historic visit during which the bases of the CBERS Agreement were negotiated
- The CBERS Agreement between Brazil and China focused on satellite cooperation and the manufacturing of remote sensing satellites
- This partnership signifies a mutual trust, considering that satellite technology is dual-use (can be used for both civilian and military purposes)

Relations with Europe

- Relations with Europe were difficult due to the decline in economic and trade ties with the European Community, primarily caused by Brazil's economic crisis
- Nevertheless, there was a reinforcement of political relations with European countries due to the democratic transition process in Brazil, which was well received by European nations

Encapsulation of Crises with the United States

- During Sarney's government, commercial relations with the United States were challenging due to various asymmetries
- Sarney's administration sought to isolate these crises, preventing them from affecting overall Brazil-US relations

Encapsulation of Crises with the United States

- Problems with the US:
 - i. An issue involving pharmaceutical patents led to disagreements between Brazil and the United States because Brazil did not comply with US guidelines/legislation for patent protection (at that time, the TRIPS agreement did not exist yet)
 - ii. The Informatics Law enacted in Brazil promoted the idea of market protection for domestic production (e.g., the Cobra Project was an attempt to develop technology in Brazil), as a result, US placed Brazil under investigation in Section 301 ("free trade for free traders" blacklist) of the American Trade Act and adopted several trade restrictions against Brazil

Encapsulation of Crises with the United States

- iii. Brazil and the United States had divergent interests during the Uruguay Round (GATT), because the United States defended "new issues" in world trade (services, intellectual property, government procurement, investments), while Brazil advocated for market access for agricultural products
- iv. Brazil declared a moratorium in 1987 by caused tension in bilateral relations with the United States, mainly because most of Brazil's debt creditors were private American banks (following the declaration of the moratorium, Brazil faced difficulties in relating to the international financial system)
- v. Brazil's criticized the US military intervention in Panama in 1989 (to arrest General Noriega, who was accused of facilitating international drug trafficking) during George Bush's administration (Brazil viewed this intervention as a violation of Panama's sovereignty_

3.2. Renewal of Credentials

- Renewal of credentials was an innovation in the Sarney government
- The “renewal of credentials” is a concept meaning the approach of Brazil to international regimes

Human Rights

- Brazil has always maintained a sovereign stance regarding human rights, criticizing any attempt at external interference, even by means of multilateral mechanisms
- Brazil adhered to the Convention against Torture during President Sarney's speech in 1985.
- The process of ratification of the two UN Human Rights Covenants of 1966 and the San José Pact of 1969 (Inter-American Convention on Human Rights) began during Sarney's government but was not completed during his tenure
- The 1988 Federal Constitution includes human rights as one of the principles guiding Brazil's foreign relations.

Environment

- Brazil had previously taken a sovereign and defensive position regarding the environment, as seen in the 1972 Stockholm Conference
- During Sarney government, the president proposed Rio de Janeiro as a candidate city to host the 1992 UN Conference (UNCED)
- This indicates a change in Brazil's stance, as the country's candidacy demonstrated recognition of the legitimacy of such meetings
- Sarney attempted to change Brazil's negative image as an "environmental villain," mainly due to deforestation in the Amazon (the belief that the Amazon Rainforest was the "lungs of the world") and the death of Chico Mendes (an activist advocating for the Amazon)

Non-proliferation

- Deeper engagement in the non-proliferation regime occurred more in the 1990s
- However, the Brazilian Federal Constitution, promulgated during the Sarney government, already stipulated that Brazil could only develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
- Brazil is the only country in the world with this constitutional restriction

Brazil's Foreign Policy in the 1990s

- As of the 1990s, it is possible to observe continuity between governments (including from the FHC to the Lula administration)
- These three fundamental pillars are important for analyzing and explaining Brazilian foreign policy in the 1990s:
 - Continuity of the renewal of credentials
 - Regional integration
 - Multilateralism

Renewal of Credentials

- For Brazil to present itself more positively on the international stage, it was necessary to "get its house in order"
- This "tidying up" happened domestically through the consolidation of democratic political regime and macroeconomic stability (with the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994)
- The renewal of credentials is a condition for an expanded participation in the international scene as a leading actor
- Brazil sought a more positive image in its dialogues with traditional partners (Europe, United States), international financial organizations (IMF), with international regimes and international organizations

Human Rights

- In 1988, Brazil signed and in 1992 (during the Collor administration), it ratified the two UN covenants of 1966 and the Pact of San José of 1969 (initiated during the Sarney administration)
- In 1998, Brazil recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
- In 1993, Brazil actively participated as a protagonist in the UN Conference in Vienna (during the Itamar Franco administration)
- Gilberto Saboia was chosen to draft the conference's Final Declaration. This improved Brazil's image and dialogue with the United States and European countries

Environment

- Brazil hosted the UNCED (Rio 92) summit, the largest gathering on the topic at that time
- In 1997, Brazil promptly adhered to the Kyoto Protocol (Brazil cooperated actively, moving away from its defensive posture)

Non-Proliferation

- In 1990, Collor put an end to the Serra do Cachimbo nuclear test site
- In 1991, the Brazilian-Argentine Accounting and Control Agency (ABACC) was created
- ABACC is unique in the world and serves to safeguard the peaceful nature of nuclear programs developed in Brazil and Argentina
- There is no other regional safeguards mechanism (the International Atomic Energy Agency, a UN agency, is global in scope)
- In 1991, the Four-Party Agreement was signed between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA
- In 1994, Brazil fully ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America
- In 1998, Brazil adhered to the NPT (Brazil wanted to demonstrate that it did not intend to develop nuclear energy programs for military purposes).

Trade:

- Until the 1980s, Brazil was an extremely protectionist country
- It was believed that Brazil should not be obligated to comply with the same rules as developed countries
- Special trade rules were constantly demanded by peripheral countries
- Brazil abandoned third-world demands and began to advocate for the logic of competitiveness gains
- Brazil believed that the way to gain competitiveness was to expose the Brazilian industry to external competition
- The main example of this is the creation of Mercosur, composed of four traditionally protectionist states
- Another example is Brazil's engagement in WTO negotiations.

Regional Integration

- Regional integration was not a prominent theme in Brazilian foreign policy in the past
- There were some regional integration initiatives, such as Figueiredo's support for the creation of ALADI and JK's support for ALALC, however, the strategy of regional integration became more prominent in the 1990s, becoming a priority in Brazilian foreign policy, even into the 2000s
- Mercosur was launched in 1991 and remains a priority to this day
- Mercosur should be understood as a platform for competitive insertion of the country into the global economy.
- Regionalism is a global trend

*For example, in 1990, the George Bush administration proposed an initiative for the Americas; in 1991, Mercosur was created; in 1992, there was a free trade agreement within ASEAN; in 1992, the EU was established; in 1994, NAFTA was formed

Regionalism is seen as a response to globalization, which intensified during that period.

Regional Integration

- Regional integration is not limited to Mercosur
- In 1993, the Itamar Franco administration proposed a free trade area in South America (ALCSA – which didn't work out)
- In 1994, the Clinton administration proposed ALCA (which was discussed during the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s) – "Mercosur was Brazil's destiny, and ALCA was just a possibility"

Regional Integration

- Regional integration today serves different objectives than those in the 1990s
- In the 1990s, regional integration was based on the logic of open regionalism, with an excessive focus on trade
- In the 2000s on, trade is still fundamental, but integration became more complex, aiming for physical, social, and productive integration (with greater ambition)

Multilateralism

- Brazil values multilateralism, especially due to the logic of participation – Brazil believes that the best way to increase its participation is through multilateralism
- Brazil cannot sustain its position unilaterally, so it uses multilateral means
- Brazil advocates for the reform of the Security Council, participated in peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Angola, Timor Leste, and is actively involved in the WTO
- In multilateralism, there is the prospect of gaining more by offering less (many countries offer at the same time)

5.3 Contemporary issues



How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- **Brazilian emphasis on multilateralism in recent decades:** It's not something new, but it has gained weight in Brazilian foreign policy mainly over the last 2 decades.
 - **Enhances legitimacy**, giving weight to beneficial policy views, which is fundamental for States that do not have power surpluses, like Brazil.
 - **Reduces transaction costs.** This is verified in the WTO, especially on more sensitive topics: concessions given to one State are extended to others.
 - **Increases horizontality.** In the multilateral scope, there tends to be more balance. Stronger states cannot unilaterally impose their will, because smaller states organize themselves into groups to protect their interests. The principle of sovereign equality.
- One of president Bolsonaro's most controversial characteristics was his dismissal of ideals Brazil had defended on multilateral forums or as a defense of multilateralism.

How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- “**Reciprocal multilateralism**”
 - The need for effective representation, without excessive concentration of powers in the hands of a few stronger states.
 - Examples of institutions with very concentrated powers: IMF, GATT, World Bank, etc. (“embedded liberalism”).
 - Reciprocal multilateralism is the truly inclusive and representative one. Brazilian diplomacy advocates for a reform of multilateral forums, so that we can achieve a reciprocal multilateralism.

How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- "Cooperative multipolarity"
 - Reciprocal multilateralism is the basis for a cooperative multipolarity.
 - The idea of cooperative multipolarity is used by Brazilian diplomacy as a counterpoint to two other forms of multipolarity: confrontation multipolarity (marked by conflicts) and indifference multipolarity (marked by the distance between regional poles).
 - To prevent the current trend towards multipolarity from falling into vices (of indifference or confrontation), it is necessary to ensure that multilateral forums are more representative.

How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- **Interdependence**
 - Finally, another element that corroborates the need to establish a more horizontal dialogue and a reciprocal multilateralism aimed at seeking a cooperation multipolarity is the high degree of current interdependence, both geographical interdependence among the states, as well as thematic interdependence of the global agenda. Brazilian diplomacy defends the need to deal with the main global agendas in an integrated manner.

How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- **Indivisibility**
 - Multilateralism at the theoretical level points to the logic of indivisibility.
 - The system is indivisible, any part of the international system must be seen as part of a whole. Traditionally, indivisibility is associated with the idea of collective security (an attack on one is an attack on all). This is the association made by John Ruggie, a classic author on the topic of multilateralism.
 - But, Brazil associates this concept, more broadly, to other spheres, also giving a connotation of non-discrimination to the concept.
 - In addition, Brazil associates the idea of indivisibility with the global agenda itself (interdependence), as already mentioned, associating concepts such as combating poverty and protecting the environment.

How does Brazilian diplomatic discourse addresses multilateralism?

- Investment Treaties, the WTO and OECD
- In the 2000s, Brazil was reticent about establishing BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) with developed countries.
- Brazil was heavily invested in the WTO negotiations and had a very proactive engagement with the WOT's conflict resolution system.
- In recent years, Brazil is trying to diversify its approach. For example, during the Bolsonaro government Brazil began the formal process to become a OECD member.

Global South and New Geometries

- **South-South Agenda:** Again, this is not a new concept, it dates back to Bandung (1955), but Brazilian South-South cooperation in recent decades has distinct contours.
 - **New Geometries:** More pragmatic articulation. More effective forums such as BASIC, IBAS, BRICS, WTO's G-20, among others. A proactive and propositional posture.
 - Greater bargaining power and legitimacy.
 - Ex: the proposal for IMF reform through BRICS had much more weight than it would have if it had only come from Brazil.
 - **Important:** These coalitions are not necessarily anti-hegemonic coalitions.

Global South and New Geometries

- **Soft Revisionism:**
 - They don't want to subvert the existing order, they want to start from the existing order.
- **Limited Divergence:**
 - Diverge little and only when divergence is necessary. Wherever possible, seek points of convergence to strengthen mutual trust with the countries of the global north. The logic is simple: "pick your battles".

Global South and New Geometries

- **Between balancing and bandwagoning:**
 - It is not easy to characterize the contemporary strategy of the global south. It is not a traditional power balancing strategy (balancing), mainly aimed at containing the actions of the hegemon. Nor is it a bandwagoning strategy, which seeks to join the hegemon to benefit, as Brazil sought to do in the 30s, 40s and 50s.
 - It is a middle ground, a strategy that has elements of balancing and bandwagoning, without being either.
 - There are agendas where Brazil is alongside the US, and against China, for example.
 - On the environmental agenda, Brazil often joins China, India, and South Africa, adopting positions contrary to those of Russia.

Diplomatic discourse on universality

- **Reducing vulnerabilities:**
 - Diversifying partnerships reduces dependence on certain partners.
 - In the technology sector, Brazil has had partnerships in satellite launch vehicles with Russia and Ukraine. In the military field, we are buyers and sellers of weapons, and in both cases, we engage with a variety of partners. Diversifying the Brazilian trade agenda is also very important.

Diplomatic discourse on universality

- **Expanding international reach**
 - Brazil wants to have presence and influence in international forums. To achieve this, it is extremely important to have diversified ties with different countries.
 - For example, Brazil's presence in Africa was crucial in enabling the election of Roberto Azevedo as the President of the WTO, even though the United States and the European Union voted as a bloc against the election of the Brazilian.

Main challenges to the world according to the Brazilian diplomatic discourse

- Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
- Human Rights and Humanitarian Interventions
- Poverty and Economic Development
- Cybersecurity and Digital Governance
- Geopolitical Rivalries and Power Shifts
- Governance of key international issues (for example: Global Health and Pandemics)