



JOHNS HOPKINS
WHITING SCHOOL
of ENGINEERING

Bayesian Networks for Interpretable and Extensible Multi-Sensor Fusion


Leete T. Skinner and Marc A. Johnson

Presentation Overview


- Problem Statement
- Review Relevant Background information
 - Review Air Defense Regime
 - Past usage of Bayesian networks and Interpretable ML
- Introduce Bayesian network prototype
- Review 5 Test Cases and Results
- Key Takeaways and Future Work

Problem Statement

- Modern Air Defense is a complex, high-stakes problem facing a myriad of advanced threats
- Legacy and Next-Generation systems need to be integrated cohesively – wide variety of available sensing units across domains need to be fused together [6,7]
- Data streams are typically fused at different levels to perform three core task stages [8]:
 - Detection, Tracking, Classification
- Then, higher level tasks can be performed [8]:
 - Intent Classification, Situational Awareness, Impact Assessment
- Joint Target Tracking, Classification, and Intent (JTTCI) Framework performs each stage **simultaneously** [8]
- Current generation, neural network-based AI solves some problems, but suffers from various limitations
- Some defense specific issues include [2,3]:
 - High volume of data, lacking labeled data
 - High compute costs (not-edge compliant)
 - Lack of explainable and interpretable outputs



Example Diagram of Sensor Systems and Communication Channels [4]



Example Sensor Fusion in Air Defense Regime [9]

Bayesian Network: Key Motifs




Figure 2. Object Classification input nodes and states.

- Objects:
 - Missiles
 - Fighter Jets
 - Bombers
 - UAVs
- CPDs developed by intuition on characteristics of each platform




Figure 4. Sensor Reliability input nodes and states.

- Conditioned by:
 - Weather: Clear, Inclement
 - Range: Far, Medium, Near
 - Altitude: High, Medium Low
- CPDs populated by intuition, but could easily use empirical or operator supplied information




Figure 1. Intent input nodes and states.

- Intents:
 - Travel/cruise mode
 - Attack mode
 - Evasive/neutralized mode
- CPDs developed by heuristic-backed routine to distribute probabilistic mass according to intuitive rule base




Figure 3. Size and Speed input nodes and states.

- Size:
 - Large
 - Medium
 - Small
- Speed:
 - Fast
 - Medium
 - Slow
- CPDs developed by intuition of characteristics for each object

Assembled Bayesian Network




Figure 5. Full Bayesian Network architecture.

- Simple Layout
- Easy to extend behind abstract Fusion Node interfaces
- All CPDs can be populated empirically, through heuristics, or by human
- Exercise through several Test Cases:
 1. Network Baselineing
 2. Network Verification
 3. Disagreement of Observables
 4. Network Sensitivity to Offline Sensors
 5. Extensibility of Network

Test Case 1: Network Baseline




Table 1. Results when no Observations present

| Observations | |
|---------------|------|
| Conditions | none |
| Range | none |
| Altitude | none |
| Size - Camera | none |
| Size - Radar | none |
| Speed - Radar | none |
| Speed - IR | none |

| Node | Class | Probability |
|--------|------------|-------------|
| Object | missile | 0.257 |
| | fighter | 0.257 |
| | bomber | 0.239 |
| | uav | 0.246 |
| Intent | cruise | 0.439 |
| | attack | 0.296 |
| | evade/neut | 0.265 |

| Object | Intent | Probability |
|---------|--------|-------------|
| Missile | attack | 0.111 |
| | cruise | 0.088 |
| | evade | 0.058 |
| Fighter | cruise | 0.112 |
| | attack | 0.073 |
| | evade | 0.073 |
| Bomber | cruise | 0.106 |
| | attack | 0.066 |
| | evade | 0.067 |
| UAV | cruise | 0.111 |
| | attack | 0.068 |
| | evade | 0.067 |

- Effectively **equal likelihood** of Objects
- **Cruise** is highest Intent
- Missile in Attack is **only** per-object case where Attack is highest

Test Case 2: Network Verification




Table 2. Test Case 2 Observations and Results

| Observations | |
|---------------|--------|
| Conditions | clear |
| Range | near |
| Altitude | medium |
| Size - Camera | large |
| Size - Radar | large |
| Speed - Radar | medium |
| Speed - IR | medium |

| Node | Class | Probability |
|--------|------------|-------------|
| Object | missile | 0.203 |
| | fighter | 0.203 |
| | bomber | 0.348 |
| | uav | 0.245 |
| | | |
| Intent | cruise | 0.233 |
| | attack | 0.466 |
| | evade/neut | 0.301 |
| | | |

| Object | Intent | Probability |
|---------|--------|-------------|
| bomber | attack | 0.201 |
| uav | attack | 0.100 |
| fighter | attack | 0.091 |
| uav | evade | 0.084 |
| bomber | evade | 0.079 |
| missile | attack | 0.075 |
| missile | evade | 0.070 |
| bomber | cruise | 0.068 |
| fighter | evade | 0.067 |
| uav | cruise | 0.061 |
| missile | cruise | 0.058 |
| fighter | cruise | 0.045 |

- Define characteristics of Bomber in Attack – all sensors agree
- As expected, **Bomber in Attack** is highest Object-Intent Pair
- Easy to interpret results:**
 - Bomber receives **35% of probabilistic mass** (10.9% abs increase, 145% relative increase)
 - Bomber in Attack **2x of next class**, receiving **20% more probabilistic mass** (13.5% abs increase, 304.5% relative increase)

Test Case 3: Disagreement of Observables




Table 3. Test Case 3 Observations and Results



| Observations | |
|---------------|-----------|
| Conditions | inclement |
| Range | near |
| Altitude | medium |
| Size - Camera | large |
| Size - Radar | small |
| Speed - Radar | medium |
| Speed - IR | medium |

| Node | Class | Probability |
|--------|------------|-------------|
| Object | missile | 0.234 |
| | fighter | 0.234 |
| | bomber | 0.261 |
| | uav | 0.271 |
| Intent | cruise | 0.235 |
| | attack | 0.452 |
| | evade/neut | 0.313 |

| Object | Intent | Probability |
|---------|--------|-------------|
| bomber | attack | 0.149 |
| uav | attack | 0.111 |
| fighter | attack | 0.105 |
| uav | evade | 0.093 |
| missile | attack | 0.087 |
| missile | evade | 0.082 |
| fighter | evade | 0.078 |
| uav | cruise | 0.067 |
| missile | cruise | 0.065 |
| bomber | evade | 0.060 |
| fighter | cruise | 0.052 |
| bomber | cruise | 0.051 |

- **Size sensors disagree** (Radar mis-reading)
- Bomber is **not** the highest likelihood Object
- Attack is highest Intent
- Object-Intent pair is Bomber in Attack, at 1.3x probabilistic mass over UAV in Attack
- **Network reasonings through disagreement**

Test Case 4: Sensitivity to Offline Sensors



- Two tests for each Fusion Node:
 - Size: Radar online, Camera offline (and vice versa)
 - Speed: Radar online, IR offline (and vice versa)
- Run against every combination of Weather, Range, Altitude values
- Network is very stable:**
 - Maximum Mean Absolute Difference (MAD) is 0.625 (of 100)
 - In 8 of 12 object-intent pairs, less than 1% probabilistic mass shift, aka **99% consistency of predictions** as long as one producer for each fusion node is producing observables

Test Case 5: Extensibility




Table 5. Observations and inferred Size and Intent when integrating ATR Object observations


| Observations | | Inferred Size Value, by Object from ATR | | | | Inferred Intent | | | |
|---------------|--------|---|-------|-------|-------|-----------------|--------|--------|-------|
| Conditions | clear | Object | Large | Med | Small | Object | Cruise | Attack | Evade |
| Range | near | uav | 0.197 | 0.428 | 0.374 | missile | 0.532 | 0.442 | 0.025 |
| Altitude | medium | bomber | 0.311 | 0.441 | 0.247 | fighter | 0.515 | 0.333 | 0.152 |
| Speed - Radar | medium | fighter | 0.187 | 0.426 | 0.387 | bomber | 0.435 | 0.535 | 0.030 |
| Speed - IR | medium | missile | 0.187 | 0.426 | 0.387 | uav | 0.403 | 0.349 | 0.248 |



- Can **easily add and remove** observable producers behind **abstract interfaces**
 - Can insert Object detectors (such as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) systems)
 - Can insert new Size, Speed sensors
- "Known" values from new producers' condition **both** downstream and upstream nodes, **reducing uncertainty of entire network**


Key Takeaways & Future Research

- Bayesian networks are:
 - Intuitive to **interpret** and understand
 - Capable of **reasoning** through inconsistent sensor readings
 - **Consistent** and operationally **robust** and against subsystems going offline
 - Easy to **extend** to add new sensors and classifiers
 - Can coexist with other neural network-based black box models
- Highly useful for performing last-mile reasoning over information produced by a variety of systems



Example Cascading Control Loop containing Outer and Inner loops [14]

- In this work, only explored inference at point in time assuming all observables available
- In real world, sensor readings come at different frequencies
- Following Control Theory: higher frequency observables should be used to update priors of lower frequency "outer" loops, and when "outer" loops complete, supply that information as priors to the faster "inner" loops



Questions?

References

- [1] Danzig, R., "Technology roulette: Managing loss of control as many militaries pursue technological superiority," (2018). (Accessed: 2 August 2024).
- [2] Allen, G., "Understanding ai technology," (2020). (Accessed: 2 August 2024).
- [3] Gunning, D. and Aha, D., "Darpa's explainable artificial intelligence (xai) program," AI Magazine 40, 44–58 (Jun. 2019).
- [4] Harrison, T., "Battle Networks and the Future Force Part 1: A Framework for Debate," (2021) <https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-networks-and-future-force>
- [5] Mittal, A., "The Black Box Problem in LLMs: Challenges and Emerging Solutions," (2023). (Accessed: 8 September 2024). <https://www.unite.ai/the-black-box-problem-in-llms-challenges-and-emerging-solutions/>
- [6] Maltese, D. and Lucas, A., "Data fusion: quite silent search function in naval air defense," in [Infrared Technology and Applications XXV], Andresen, B. F. and Strojnik, M., eds., 3698, 36 – 47, International Society for Optics and Photonics, SPIE (1999).

References

- [7] Maltese, D. and Lucas, A., "Data fusion: principles and applications in air defense," in [Signal Processing, Sensor Fusion, and Target Recognition VII], Kadar, I., ed., 3374, 329 – 336, International Society for Optics and Photonics, SPIE (1998).
- [8] Zhang, W., Yang, F., and Liang, Y., "A bayesian framework for joint target tracking, classification, and intent inference," IEEE Access 7, 66148–66156 (2019).
- [9] "Sensor Fusion," (Accessed: 8 September 2024).
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensor_fusion". Attributed to:
"http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00089/2_Eurofighter_capabi_89302a.pdf
(page 24/60) Sensor fusion in the Typhoon, from Eurofighter presentation to Norway"
- [10] "A DSP For Implementing High-Performance Sensor Fusion On An Embedded Budget". (Accessed 8 September 2024). <https://semiengineering.com/a-dsp-for-implementing-high-performance-sensor-fusion-on-an-embedded-budget/>

References

- [11] Ribeiro, M., Singh, S. and Guestrin, C., "Why Should {I} Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier}. CoRR, abs/1602.04938. (2016). <http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04938>
- [12] Wan, Z., Et al., "Towards Cognitive AI Systems: a Survey and Prospective on Neuro-Symbolic AI," (2024). <https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01040>
- [13] "Introduction to Bayesian Networks". (Accessed: 8 September 2024). <https://towardsdatascience.com/introduction-to-bayesian-networks-81031eed94e>
- [14] "Importance of Control Engineering - Inner/Outer Loops". (Accessed: 8 September 2024). <http://petersengineering.blogspot.com/2019/08/importance-of-control-engineering.html>



JOHNS HOPKINS

WHITING SCHOOL *of* ENGINEERING

© The Johns Hopkins University 2024, All Rights Reserved.