Intent Matching and partially fillsble orders det us consider à set à users sending swap orders with limit price. When a swap order for the i-th user is executed, we have that! Si= executed sell amount Coftamn x) Bi = executed buy amount Cof tonen y) 11:= executor price Where Tie Sie L Sim = Ti

We can think each user's intent as a directed edge connecting two nooles, which are the x and y tonens Mser 1: (X) - My - (Y) Buy 5 / Thans to Huis, finding matching intents, closed loops in such means to find intent - multigraph. User intent result M1: Duy Z Sell X 2 sfrom lez x to us Z Manual Control of the control of t J. from Uz This will be villed only it: Si = Tie & TTi lim, tie loop.
Bi Which, in an N-edged loop reads also:  $\frac{S_{i-1}^{e}}{S_{i-1}^{e}} = \pi_{i}^{e} \leq \pi_{i}^{e} \leq \pi_{i}^{e},$ where, if i=1, i-1=1Now let's scarch for the solutions.

Do Partial Pille: If no intent is partially fillable, then, for each user  $S_i^e = S_i^{uax}$ . Thus, the solution to the problem exists only it: Si L Tii Vie Coop.

Si-1 This condition can be dreamed in parallel for each i. Thus it's efficiently verifie ble. If the solution exists, then Si=Si tie loop.

All Partially Fallable If the intents will all admit partial fill, the situation is triumier. det's consider L, a N-dimensional loop. A solution to the intent-matching problem exists if  $\frac{5i}{5i-1} \leq Thin , \forall i \in L.$ This problem is self-consistent, i.e. Si will depend on Si-1. The minimal condition acceptable by each user is such that:

Let's now apply the log function:  $\left(\frac{5i}{5i-1}\right) = 0$   $\left(\frac{5i}{5i-1}\right) = 0$   $\left(\frac{5i}{5i-1}\right) = 0$ Let's coll  $lgo(a) = \tilde{a}$ . Thus we have that:  $S: - S: -1 = \frac{\pi}{u}$ . Which con be written in motive form as:  $\underline{\underline{M}} \stackrel{\sim}{\leq} = \frac{\widetilde{\Pi}}{\Pi}. \quad \text{Where } \stackrel{\sim}{\leq} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\widetilde{G}_1}{\widetilde{G}_2} \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$ 

ll is a NXN matrix, with ones on the disponal and -1 on the lower sub-disponal. However det (M) =0, tu indeed N=2,  $M=\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ . det=0. N = 3,  $M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$  deplace n det=0 olet  $(M^{N\times N}) \equiv 0$ , since  $row_1 = (-1) \cdot \sum_{i>1}^{i} row_i$ Thus our problem either Nas & or 5 slutions.

10 evaluate if at least 1 solution, and thus so, exists, we use the Roudu'- Capelli Hreoren, i.e:
Given M 3 = TT if Romu (M) = Romu ([M]), then I S. 5.t.  $\underline{M} S_0 = \underline{T}$ . Txample: 2 people: c people:  $S_{2}=Y$   $B_{2}=X$   $B_{3}=Y$ 

det res assume that they agree on the relative price of x and y.

Our systen will be:  $\begin{bmatrix}
1 & -1 \\
-1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
S_1 \\
S_2
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\widetilde{N}_1 \\
-\widetilde{U}_1
\end{bmatrix}$ Ru(M)=1, but  $R_{\mathsf{N}}\left(\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 & \widehat{\mathsf{N}}_{1} \\ -1 & 1 & \widehat{\mathsf{N}}_{1} \end{bmatrix}\right) = 1.$ Thus, there are as solutions. This makes sense, since if the dud the agree on the price to 1, then the and the can exchange whatever amount of x dud y under the only condition that Now Roudu'- Capelli can be used rather efficiently (e.p. with Python). However, once we cheaved that at least a solution exists, how can we search for the optimal one? (i.e. the solution that leaves the fewest "leftovers"?) Stay Funed.