CyberSecurity: Principle and Practice

BSc Degree in Computer Science 2024-2025

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Teaching Assistants

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Basic Information



Language:

Credits: 6 ECTS (CFU)

Schedule: BSc II year, I semester

A day-by-day schedule will be available on course or group page

Course website:

https://www.math.unipd.it/~conti/teaching/CPP2425

Moodle website:

https://stem.elearning.unipd.it/course/view.php?id=10757

Course Content



You can attend the course in presence at the University.

For international students waiting for a visa, <u>lectures will be also</u> <u>recorded</u> and available in the Moodle platform.

Sleeping during the class is optional, but not recommended.



Course Content



Cyber security areas:

- Cryptography
 - Ciphers; hash functions; symmetric/asymmetric encryption
- Web Vulnerabilities
 - Bad programming practices; injections; language vulnerabilities.
- Reverse Engineering
 - Reversing techniques; patching; anti-debug.
- Pwning
 - Buffer overflow; defenses; Return Oriented Programming; Global Offset Table.

Each lesson consists in ~30' of theory and ~60' of exercises

Grading criteria



The final exam has three different formats, among which students can <u>choose one</u>

- Final Exam:
 - set of exercises covering the course topics
- Three practical exercises:
 - to be solved only during the semester course
- A research project:
 - possibly interacting also with security researcher (<u>SPRITZ group</u>)

Spritz Group Project Topic



Security/privacy in: wired/wireless networks, smartphones, social networks, distributed systems, sensor networks, RFID, cloud computing, content centric networking, vehicular networks, location based services, ...

FakeBook: Detecting Fake Profiles in On-line Social Networks

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> no experimental s (i.e., bandwidth,

to the adversary,

asures deserve an considered ready

Abstract-On-line Social Networks (OSNs) are increasingly influencing the way people communicate with each other and share personal, professional and political information. Like the cyberspace in Internet, the OSNs are attracting the interest of

prevent. The first attack in [7] is called Identity Cloning Attack (ICA), where the personal OSN information of an existing profile is used to create one or more clone accounts, claiming

NDN Interest Flooding Attacks and Countermeasures

Alberto Compagno*, Mauro Conti*, Paolo Gasti[†], Gene Tsudik[‡] *University of Padua, Italy — acompagn@studenti.math.unipd.it † University of Padua, Italy — conti@math.unipd.it *New York Institute of Technology, USA — pgasti@nyit.edu §University of California, Irvine, USA — qts@uci.edu

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSK'S AND SECURITY, VOL. 7, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2012

CRêPE: A System for Enforcing Fine-Grained Context-Related Policies on Android

Mauro Conti, Member, IEEE, Bruno Crispo, Senior Member, IEEE, Earlence Fernandes, and Yury Zhauniarovich

Abstract-Current smartphone systems allow the user to use only marginally contextual information to specify the behavior of the applications: this hinders the wide adoption of this technology

researchers have recently focused on enhancing phones' security models and their usability

One significant challenge in the security of smartphones is to









to its full potential. In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing control the behavior of appli CRêPE. a fine-grained Context-Related Policy Enforcement Innovations That Will **Change Your Tomorrow**





What "secure" means?





- 1) Security is not just "a product" (e.g. a firewall); it is rather a "process", which needs to be managed properly
- 2) Nothing is 100% secure (do we need it? How much it would cost?) Example: credit cards

"The three golden rules for ensuring computer security: do not own a computer; do not power it on; and do not use it."

- Robert (Bob) Morris (Former NSA Chief Scientist).




3) The security of a system is equivalent to the security of its less secure component (rule of the weakest link)






- 4) Security by obscurity never works
- 5) Cryptography is a powerful tool but... it is not enough!








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







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6) Do not rely on users!

"Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs everytime."

- Prof. Ed Felten (Princeton University)



"If the computer prompts him with a warning screen like: "The applet DANCING PIGS could contain malicious code that might do permanent damage to your computer, steal your life's savings, and impair your ability to have children," he'll click OK without even reading it. Thirty seconds later he won't even remember that the warning screen even existed"

- Bruce Schneier




So, what "secure" means?
A network/system is secure when...



Basic security properties






- Integrity: to prevent unauthorised modification of the information
- Availability: to guarantee access to information
- Authentication: to prove the claimed identity can be Data or Entity authentication



Auxiliary security properties







- Authorisation: "What Alice can do"
- Auditing: to securely record evidence of performed actions
- Attack-tolerance: ability to provide some degree of service after failures or attacks
- Disaster Recovery: ability to recover a safe state
- Key-recovery, key-escrow,
- Digital Forensics

Security mechanisms




- Random Numbers (e.g. for Initialization Vectors)
- Pseudo Random Numbers
- Encryption/Decryption
- Hash functions
- Hash chain (inverted)
- Message integrity code (MIC)
- Message authentication code (MAC and HMAC)
- Digital signatures
 - Non repudiation
- Key exchange (establishment) protocols
- Key distribution protocols
- Time stamping



Types of attacker







security domain and admin domain may differ

Types of attack



- Passive: the attacker can only read any information
 - Tempest (signal intelligence)
 - Packet Sniffing
- Active: the attacker can read, modify, generate, destroy any information





TEMPEST





More recent attack approaches
 Big Data => User profiling

Questions? Feedback? Suggestions?







