

Defeasibility in Formal Concept Analysis

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1 Establishing Requirements

1.1 A defeasible formal context

A regular formal context \mathbb{K} is a tripple (G, M, I) of objects G , attributes M , and an incidence relation $I \subseteq G \times M$. We define a defeasible formal context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$ as a quadruple (G, M, I, \leq) with G, M, I as before, and \leq being a partial order on the objects G .

The ordering on G can be loosely thought of as expressing a preference on objects such that if $o_1 \leq o_2$ and $o_1 \neq o_2$, then o_1 is preferred to o_2 , where $o_1, o_2 \in G$.

1.2 Minimisation

In formal context analysis, two operators are defined

$$A^\uparrow := \{m \in M \mid \forall g \in A, (g, m) \in I\} \quad A \subseteq G$$

$$B^\downarrow := \{g \in G \mid \forall m \in B, (g, m) \in I\} \quad B \subseteq M$$

Much of the time it is not necessary to distinguish between \cdot^\uparrow and \cdot^\downarrow , and so A' and B' are used instead.

We introduce a variation on these two operators, which has the same set building behavior, but discards any objects which are not minimal with respect to the partial order given by $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$. The result is

$$\text{Min}(O) := \{g \in O \mid \nexists h \in O, h < g\} \quad O \subseteq G$$

$$\underline{A}^\uparrow := (\text{Min}(A))^\uparrow \quad A \subseteq G$$

$$\underline{B}^\downarrow := \text{Min}(B^\downarrow) \quad B \subseteq M$$

When applied to a set of objects $A \subseteq G$, the minimisation operator removes all non-minimal elements from A , and then takes A^\uparrow . This gives us the set of attributes common to all minimal objects from A . Conversely, when applied to a set of attributes $B \subseteq M$, the minimisation operator takes B^\downarrow , and removes all non-minimal objects, leaving the minimal objects which have all the attributes from B in their object intents.

Given a set of attributes $B \subseteq M$, we can determine $(\underline{B}^\downarrow)^\uparrow$ (although, this double minimisation is not strictly necessary, when applying the operator twice on an initial set of attributes $B \subseteq M$, we will omit the double minimisation, giving us \underline{B}'). This constructs the set of attribute which are common to all minimal objects which have B in their object intents. We make this clear with an example

1.2.1 Example

The context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}} = (G, M, I, \leq)$ with the order over G being $\{o_1 < o_3, o_2 < o_3, o_3 < o_4, o_5 < o_4\}$

Given the set of attributes $Y := \{\text{laysEggs}, \text{canFly}\}$, our first application of the minimisation operator gives us $\underline{Y}' = \text{Min}(\{o_2, o_4\}) = \{o_2\}$. Applying the operator again, to the first result, we get $\underline{Y}'' = \{\underline{o_2}\}' = \{\text{feathered}, \text{laysEggs}, \text{aquatic}, \text{canFly}\}$. Plainly, this tells us that the most preferred objects which can fly and lay eggs, also are feathered and aquatic.

	feathered	laysEggs	aquatic	canFly	hasScales
o_1		×	×		×
o_2	×	×	×	×	
o_3		×	×		×
o_4	×	×		×	
o_5	×	×			

Figure 1: Defeasible Formal Context

1.3 Properties of the minimisation-operator

The \cdot'' operator in FCA is a closure-operator, so it is monotonic, extensive, and idempotent. In the following, we show that the minimisation-operator is nonmonotonic, extensive, and idempotent over sets of M in a defeasible context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}} = (G, M, I, \leq)$.

Proposition 1.1 *The minimisation operator is nonmonotonic, extensive, and idempotent over sets of M .*

Proof: Nonmonotonicity, Extensivity, Idempotency of the minimisation operator.

Nonmonotonicity:

If \cdot'' were monotonic, we would have $A \subseteq B \Rightarrow \underline{A}'' \subseteq \underline{B}''$, with $A, B \subseteq M$.

Let $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$ be a defeasible context with two objects, o_1 and o_2 , attributes $\{m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4\}$, and an ordering $o_1 < o_2$. The intents of each objects are $\{m_1, m_2, m_4\}$ and $\{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$, respectively. If we take the sets $A = \{m_1, m_2\}$ and $B = \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$ we have that $A \subseteq B$. However, $\underline{A}'' = \{m_1, m_2, m_4\}$ and $\underline{B}'' = \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$, and so $\underline{A}'' \not\subseteq \underline{B}''$. Consequently, the minimisation operator is nonmonotonic.

Extensivity:

For $A \subseteq M$, extensivity requires that $A \subseteq \underline{A}''$.

We know that $A \subseteq \underline{A}''$, since \cdot'' is extensive. So, for all $a \in \underline{A}''$, we have that A is in a object intent $A \subseteq a'$. Since the minimisation operator simply reduces the size of \underline{A}' , then $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{A}''$. So the earlier condition holds, that for all $a \in \underline{A}'$ the object intent is a superset of A , or $A \subseteq a'$. From this, it is easy to see that $A \subseteq \bigcap \{a' | a \in \underline{A}'\}$, and equivalently $A \subseteq \underline{A}''$.

Idempotency:

The proof for idempotency follows from extensivity. Given some $A \subseteq M$, \underline{A}'' represents attributes of the minimal objects satisfying A . If $\underline{A}'' \neq \underline{(\underline{A}'')}'$, then we would have that there were some new minimal objects in $\underline{(\underline{A}'')}'$, these objects would all have A in their intents by extensivity. But this is a contradiction, since \underline{A}'' is defined to be the minimal objects with A in their intent, there can be no objects minimal \underline{A}'' which also have A in their intents.

□

2 Defeasible Implications

2.1 Normal implications

Conventionally, we define an implication $A \rightarrow B$ between two sets of attributes $A, B \subseteq M$. An implication is respected¹ in a formal context iff

- $B \subseteq A''$
- $A' \subseteq B'$

An example from Figure 1 would be that $\text{canFly} \rightarrow \text{feathered}$. The objects which satisfy the attribute canFly , namely $\{o_2, o_4\}$, are a subset of those which satisfy feathered , $\{o_2, o_4, o_5\}$. We do not have that $\text{feathered} \rightarrow \text{canFly}$ - this is obvious, and can be shown by $\text{canFly} \not\subseteq \text{feathered}''$

2.2 Borrowing the \vdash

In $\tilde{\mathbb{K}} = (G, M, I, <)$, we define a defeasible implication $A \vdash B$, where $A, B \subseteq M$ as being respected in the $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$ iff

- $B \subseteq \underline{A}''$
- $\underline{A}' \subseteq B'$

The motivation behind this style of implication is to convey a type of consequence that may not exist in the entire context, but holds for at least the preferred object(s).

2.2.1 Incomparable objects

As defined, the $A \vdash B$ relation relies on the notion of minimal objects derived through the minimisation operation \underline{A}' . This raises (at least) two important questions; how do we deal with incomparable objects? And, what happens if the set of minimal objects is empty?

The first question is straightforward, and is actually handled in the definition of the operator found in subsection 1.3. If there are incomparable objects in \underline{A}' , we take the intersection of all object intents, giving us

$$\underline{A}'' := \cap \{a' \mid a \in \underline{A}'\}$$

If the set of minimal objects \underline{A}' is empty, we say that $\underline{A}'' = M$; this holds vacuously - there are no objects in \underline{A}' , so (glossing over exact details) every object has every attribute.

From Figure 1, $\text{feathered} \vdash \text{canFly}$ is a valid defeasible implication in $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$. The set of minimal objects which satisfy feathered also satisfy canFly . Or, $\{\text{canFly}\} \subseteq \{\text{feathered}\}''$. The point here is that while it is not the case that all feathered objects can fly, we still want to be able to say that the minimal (read: typical) feathered objects do in fact fly. Or, that typical feathered objects can fly.

2.3 Do defeasible implications hold through negation of antecedent?

Given the defeasible context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$, with $o_1 < o_2$

	wheels	engine	drive
o_1		×	×
o_2	×	×	

Figure 2: Defeasible Formal Context

If we refer again to Figure 2, we could see that the implication $\{\text{wheels}, \text{engine}\} \vdash \{\text{drive}\}$ is respected by o_1 , and $o_1 < o_2$, but $\tilde{\mathbb{K}}$ does not respect $\{\text{wheels}, \text{engine}\} \not\vdash \{\text{drive}\}$. This might seem unintuitive, *the implication holds in our most preferred objects, after all.*

¹being *respected* is analogous to being entailed

While this discomfort makes sense from the lens of classical logics, where we understand the material implication $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ to be equivalent to $\neg\alpha \vee \beta$, when we use \vdash we are shifting into the realm of conditional logics. Now, a conditional (\vdash) is assertable if its antecedent being true entails its consequent [1].

This is illustrated in [2], 4.2 Preferential Entailment, where preferential consequence relations are introduced:

A preferential interpretation \mathcal{P} is a tripple $\langle S, l, \prec \rangle$ with S being a set of states, $l: S \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ is a function mapping states to valuations, and \prec a preorder on S . For every $\alpha \in \mathcal{L}$ and some \mathcal{P} , let $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{\mathcal{P}} := \{s \in S, S \in \mathcal{P}, l(s) \models \alpha\}$. In other words, let $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{\mathcal{P}}$ be the set of all states in \mathcal{P} such that the valuation associated with each state satisfies α .

And also,

Given a preferential interpretation $\mathcal{P} = \langle S, l, \prec \rangle$ and $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}$, then \mathcal{P} defines a preferential consequence relation $\vdash_{\mathcal{P}}$ such that $\alpha \vdash_{\mathcal{P}} \beta$ iff for any s minimal in $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{\mathcal{P}}$, $s \models \beta$.

3 Properties of Implication using minimisation operator

3.1 KLM Postulates

These are some of the KLM postulates, described in [2]. Reflexivity is another postulate, which has been left out for now for brevity. The *Or* postulate was also omitted, since there is no notion of disjunction in FCA.

$$A \sim A \quad (\text{Reflexivity}) \quad (1)$$

Proof: All we require is that $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{A}'$, obviously we have this. \square

$$\frac{A \leftrightarrow B, A \sim C}{B \sim C} \quad (\text{Left-Logical Equivalence}) \quad (2)$$

Proof: Let $A, B, C \subseteq M$.

1. $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{C}'$ (Given: $A \sim C$)
2. $\underline{A}' = \underline{B}'$ (Given: $A \leftrightarrow B$)
3. $\underline{B}' \subseteq \underline{C}'$ (From 1 and 2)
4. Therefore, $B \sim C$ (By definition of \sim)

\square

$$\frac{A \rightarrow B, C \sim A}{C \sim B} \quad (\text{Right Weakening}) \quad (3)$$

Proof: Let $A, B, C \subseteq M$.

1. $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{B}'$ (Given: $A \rightarrow B$)
2. $\underline{C}' \subseteq \underline{A}'$ (Given: $C \sim A$)
3. $\underline{C}' \subseteq \underline{B}'$ (Transitivity of \subseteq , from 1 and 2)
4. Therefore, $C \sim B$ (By definition of \sim)

\square

$$\frac{A \cup B \sim C, A \sim B}{A \sim C} \quad (\text{Cut}) \quad (4)$$

Lemma 3.1 For any $A, B \subseteq M$, $A' \cap B' = (A \cup B)'$.

Proof: We show \subseteq in both directions.

$A' \cap B' \subseteq (A \cup B)'$:

Let $g \in A' \cap B'$

1. $\forall m \in A, (g, m) \in I$ (Definition of A')
2. $\forall m \in B, (g, m) \in I$ (Definition of B')
3. So, $\forall m \in A \cup B, (g, m) \in I$ (1,2)
4. $g \in (A \cup B)'$ (3 is definition of $(A \cup B)'$)

$$(A \cup B)' \subseteq A' \cap B':$$

Let $g \in (A \cup B)'$

1. $\forall m \in A \cup B, (g, m) \in I.$ (Definition of $(A \cup B)'$)
2. $\forall m \in A, (g, m) \in I$ (1, $A \subseteq A \cup B$)
3. $\forall m \in B, (g, m) \in I$ (1, $B \subseteq A \cup B$)
4. So, $g \in A' \cap B'$ (2,3)

□

$$\frac{A \vdash B, A \vdash C}{A \vdash (B \cup C)} \quad (\text{And}) \quad (5)$$

Proof: Let $A \vdash B$ and $A \vdash C$ with $A, B, C \subseteq M$

1. $\underline{A} \subseteq B'$ (Given: $A \vdash B$)
2. $\underline{A} \subseteq C'$ (Given: $A \vdash C$)
3. $\underline{A} \subseteq B' \cap C'$ (1,2)
4. $\underline{A} \subseteq (B \cup C)'$ (3, Lemma 3.3)
5. $A \vdash B \cup C$ (From 4)

□


Lemma 3.2 If $A \vdash B$, then $\underline{A}' = \underline{(A \cup B)'}'$

Proof:

1. $\underline{A}' \subseteq A'$ (Definition of minimisation)
2. $\underline{A}' \subseteq B'$ (Given that $A \vdash B$)
3. $\underline{A}' \subseteq A' \cap B'$ (1,2)
4. $\underline{A}' \subseteq (A \cup B)'$ (3, Lemma 3.3)
5. $(A \cup B)' \subseteq A'$ (Set Theory)
6. $\underline{A}' \subseteq (A \cup B)' \subseteq A'$ (3,4)

With this in mind, let g be some element of \underline{A}' . By definition, there is no element h in A' such that $h < g$. Then, because of 5, there is no element h in $(A \cup B)'$ such that $h < g$. From this, it follows that $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{(A \cup B)'}'$.

What is left is to show that $\underline{(A \cup B)'}' \subseteq \underline{A}'$. Let $g \in \underline{(A \cup B)'}'$ and $g \notin \underline{A}'$. Since $\underline{A}' \subseteq \underline{(A \cup B)'}'$, $\nexists h \in \underline{A}'$ such that $h < g$.



□

$$\frac{A \sim B, A \sim C}{(A \cup B) \sim C} \quad (\text{Cautious Monotonicity}) \quad (6)$$

Proof: Let $A, B, C \subseteq M$.

1. $\underline{A'} \subseteq A'$ (Definition of minimisation operator)
2. $\underline{A'} \subseteq B'$ (Given: $A \sim B$)
3. $\underline{A'} \subseteq C'$ (Given: $A \sim C$)
4. $\underline{A'} \subseteq (A \cup B)'$ (1,2, Lemma 3.3)
5. $\underline{A'} \subseteq (A \cup C)'$ (1,3, Lemma 3.3)
6. $\underline{A'} = \underline{(A \cup B)'}$ (4, Lemma 3.5)
7. $\underline{A'} = \underline{(A \cup C)'}$ (5, Lemma 3.5)
8. $\underline{(A \cup C)'} \subseteq (A \cup C)'$ (Definition of minimisation)
9. $\underline{(A \cup B)'} \subseteq (A \cup C)'$ (6,7,8)
10. $(A \cup B) \sim C$ (9 is definition of this implication)

□

Remark 3.3 *Cautious monotonicity stipulates that when given new information, if that information could have been inferred before, then it should not be inconsistent with earlier inferences. Monotonicity requires that any new knowledge not invalidate existing knowledge; CM weakens this requirement to be that only pieces of knowledge inferred from the same existing knowledge should not invalidate one another.*

$$\frac{A \sim B, A \not\sim \neg C}{A \cup C \sim B} \quad (\text{Rational Monotonicity}) \quad (7)$$

4 Typical Concepts

The partial order over objects in a formal context was introduced as some kind of preference, or typicality between objects. It is quite intuitive that if there are typical objects, then there may be typical concepts too.

	m1	m2	m3	m4
o_1	×		×	
o_2		×	×	
o_3	×	×	×	
o_4		×		×

Figure 3: Defeasible Formal Context, with the order $o_2 < o_4, o_3 < o_4$

4.1 Restriction on the order

For a defeasible context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}} = (G, M, I, \preceq)$, the partial ordering is restricted to only those orders such that for any $B \subseteq M$, $\underline{B}' \equiv (\underline{B}')''$. We also get an improved notation for a typical concept being, for some $B \subseteq M$, $(\underline{B}', (\underline{B}')')$.

If we abstract away from concepts, this restriction on \preceq says that for any set $B \subseteq M$, let $A := \bigcap \{g' \mid g \in \underline{A}'\}$. Then \preceq is a valid partial order if there exists no $h \in G$ such that $A \subseteq h'$ and $h \notin \underline{A}'$.




Figure 4: Typical Concept Lattice $\mathcal{T}(G, M, I, \preceq)$ with $\mathcal{B}(G, M, I, \preceq)$ underlayed. Uses the order that $o_3 < o_4, o_2 < o_4$

Theorem 4.1 For a defeasible formal context $\tilde{\mathbb{K}} = (G, M, I, \preceq)$, and two typical concepts $(\underline{A}', (\underline{A}')')$ and $(\underline{B}', (\underline{B}')')$ where $A, B \subseteq M$, the greatest-common subconcept (gcs), $(\underline{A}', (\underline{A}')') \wedge (\underline{B}', (\underline{B}')')$ exists and is equal to some typical concept.

Proof: The gcs of two typical concepts $(\underline{A}', (\underline{A}')')$ and $(\underline{B}', (\underline{B}')')$ is $(\underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}', ((\underline{A}')' \cup (\underline{B}')')')$. We need to show that $\underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}'$ is equivalent to $((\underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}')')$.

First we prove $\underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}' \subseteq ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')'$. Let $g \in \underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}'$, then we have that the intent $g' \supseteq (\underline{A}')'$ and $g' \supseteq (\underline{B}')'$. It then follows that $g' \supseteq ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$. Any object $h \in ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$

We now show that $((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')' \subseteq \underline{A}' \cap \underline{B}'$. Let $g \in ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$. Clearly, $g' \supseteq (\underline{A}')'$ and $g' \supseteq (\underline{B}')'$

It is also the case that $g \in ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$. To see this assume $g \notin ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$, then there exists $h \in ((\underline{A}')' \cap (\underline{B}')')$ with $h < g$. $h \in \underline{A}'$

□

Proof: We show a counter example,

The supremum of $(\{o_4\}, \{\mathbf{m2}, \mathbf{m4}\}) \wedge (\{o_2, o_3\}, \{\mathbf{m2}, \mathbf{m3}\})$ is not a typical concept; it is $(\{o_2, o_3, o_4\}, \{\mathbf{m2}\})$.
□

So, the restriction on the order gives us a meet semi-lattice.²

4.2 A mapping from concepts to typical concepts

We have a surjective function mapping regular concepts to typical concepts,

$$\varphi : \mathcal{B}(\tilde{\mathbb{K}}) \rightarrow \mathcal{T}(\tilde{\mathbb{K}})$$

. The function is $\varphi((A, B)) = (\underline{B}', (\underline{B}')')$.

²Need to verify if we don't have the restriction on the order, do we have meet semi-lattice?

References

- [1] P. Egré and H. Rott, “The Logic of Conditionals,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2021 ed., E. N. Zalta, Ed. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021.
- [2] A. Kaliski, “An overview of klm-style defeasible entailment,” 2020.