The Drivers of Resemblance in Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets[*†]

Under Review

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Abstract

Recent studies have drawn attention to the importance of pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty presidential democracies. Despite this, much scholarship has neglected the period marked by the transition of pre-electoral coalitions into governing coalitions. Through a systematic cross-case analysis of Latin American cases, this paper examines why some coalition governments largely resemble the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them while others do not. The findings give weight to different combinations of five conditions, albeit with more prominence for the legislative status granted by pre-election coalition members to the government, the low polarisation among pre-electoral coalition members and the high ideological polarisation in the legislature. In so doing, this study contributes to the still-growing literature on pre-electoral coalitions in presidential democracies by shedding light on the complex causation behind the pathway from pre-electoral bargaining to fully developed coalition governments.

Keywords: Coalitional Presidentialism, Government Formation, Latin America, Pre-Electoral Coalitions, Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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1 Introduction

In 2010, the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) launched Rousseff's presidential candidacy with an eye on extending its streak of presidential election victories in Brazil. In order to increase its candidate's odds, the PT built a broad pre-electoral coalition, encompassing not less than ten parties. However, even if the PT ultimately won the presidential contest, not all pre-electoral coalition party members were invited to take a seat in the cabinet when Rousseff was sworn into office. Despite still providing informal support for the government, the Social Christian Party (PSC, *Partido Social Cristão*) publicly voiced its dissatisfaction with being excluded from the coalition cabinet. The PSC's party leader emphatically complained that they did not have a single portfolio seat despite being a former member of the pre-electoral alliance and having a legislative contingent similar to other coalition party members (Azevedo, 2012).

In a similar story, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR, *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*) formed a pre-election alliance so as to back its candidate in the 1989 Bolivian presidential election. Once again, notwithstanding the alliance's victory, the president-elect party broke up with the pre-electoral pact and gave birth to a government not envisioned by the original multiparty coalition. This case is especially symbolic as the MIR did not assign any top office position to the former electoral coalition party members, thereby favouring the construction of a brand-new post-electoral coalition arrangement.[1]

Together, these cases raise the question as to what drives the translation of pre-election alliances into coalition governments in multiparty presidential democracies. This question features prominently as the literature frequently adopts an unexamined assumption that pre-electoral coalitions are automatically transformed into coalition cabinets. Even though pre-electoral coalitions exert notable influence on the government formation process (Borges, Turgeon and Albala, 2021; Carroll, 2007), recent scholarship has argued that, at least in presidentialism, the process from electoral alliances to cabinet formation is not as straightforward as it seems (Couto, 2025). Hence, the main aim of this study is to contribute to this burgeoning literature by shedding light on why some coalition

governments closely match the pre-electoral pacts that brought them forth while others do not.

Studying the process by which pre-election coalitions are turned into coalition cabinets is pertinent for several reasons. Looking at non-*formateur* parties first, their strategies rely to some extent on the knowledge of whether they will be in the government. Even though parties have different approaches to making their organisations grow (Borges, Albala and Burtnik, 2017; Panebianco, 1988), pre-coalition party members may be counting on the fact that they will have access to the spoils of being in the cabinet if the pre-election alliance succeeds in the national contest. As such, being excluded from the government potentially undermines parties' objectives in the short and long run, especially if they aimed to control portfolios to channel pork barrel resources to their constituencies (Batista, 2023; Meireles, 2024) or expected to hold a highly regarded portfolio, which could boost their votes in the next elections in return (Batista, Power and Zucco, 2024). In addition, although elected governments have plausible reasons for not deviating grossly from policy commitments made prior to the elections (Kellam, 2017; Naurin, Soroka and Markwat, 2019), government membership leverages parties' odds of implementing policies close to their likings. The experience of coalition governments in parliamentary democracies tells us that parties may even use the portfolio allocation process to keep tabs on which policies are to be implemented by the government (Fernandes, Meinfelder and Moury, 2016), and there is no reason why this should not be replicated in presidential democracies. As a result, even if parties can resort to alternative methods to promote the oversight of the government's policy-making (Silva and Medina, 2023; Thijm and Fernandes, 2024; Thijm, 2024), losing cabinet participation can have deleterious consequences for pre-electoral coalition parties when it comes to the degree to which the policy-making process is attuned to their policy preferences. On the flip side of the coin, finding out why *formateurs* stick to their pre-electoral coalitions contributes to the stream of studies interested in gauging to what extent presidents use their institutional powers for their own benefit (Ariotti and Golder, 2018; Silva, 2023).

I argue that the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble pre-electoral coalitions

depends on the blend of five conditions: i) the pre-electoral coalition's legislative status, ii) the level of polarisation within pre-electoral coalitions, iii) the ideological polarisation in the legislature, iv) the temporal constraint between election results and the inauguration day, and v) presidents' constitutional powers. In so doing, my claim draws on several but different theories of government formation, namely explanations based on office, policy and institutional assumptions. In this way, this article strives to further add to the discussion about when and why presidential parties make credible office commitments when building pre-election alliances.

To do so, this paper subscribes to a configurational approach to dealing with the dynamics of coalition governments. To be sure, research on coalition cabinets based on set-theoretic methods is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Albala, 2021; Viatkin, 2023). Even still, it bears noting that set theory appears to be especially appropriate for the research question at hand for two reasons. In the first place, coalition formation seems to have its roots in causal complexity, as shown by the fact that the effects of pre-electoral coalitions are not independent of the levels of legislative polarisation (Couto, 2025). Consequently, the reasons behind government formation appear to lie in the combination of conditions rather than in the independent effects of each. Second, as set-theoretic methods have an intrinsic link to qualitative approaches, employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (henceforth, QCA) allows me to handle better my case selection than resorting to a purely quantitative approach. This implies that I purposefully select on the dependent variable to both ensure that all cases derive from pre-electoral coordination and that they result in multiparty governments. Substantially, the case-centred nature of this research is not only a strength in itself but also fundamentally sets it apart from existing studies (e.g. Albala, Borges and Silva, 2024).

I start in the next section by briefly presenting the literature on government formation in presidentialism and raising empirical expectations to explain the similarity of coalition cabinets with their pre-electoral inception. Thereafter, the third section showcases my research design. More specifically, this section is divided into three parts, in which I first discuss the advantages of QCA to the study of coalition formation, then I detail my case

selection, and lastly, I show the calibration process of the outcome and the conditions. In the fourth section, I conduct and reveal the results of necessity and sufficiency analyses. The fifth section briefly refers to the robustness tests, and the sixth illustrates the QCA findings with case-based discussions. Finally, the last section presents my concluding remarks along with suggestions for future research.

2 The High Road between Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Coalition Cabinets

In presidential and parliamentary democracies alike, *formateur* parties do not easily attain a parliamentary majority on their own in fragmented party systems. Not coincidentally, coalition governments have become increasingly more common in European parliamentarian democracies (Müller, Bäck and Hellström, 2024). Likewise, in recent years, multiparty governments have risen in presidential democracies historically text-colorredruled by single-party governments, such as Costa Rica (Hernández-Naranjo and Guzmán-Castillo, 2018). As a consequence, even if minority governments are not necessarily doomed to have poor governability (Figueiredo, Canello and Vieira, 2012; Thürk, 2022) and presidents have a wide array of tools to garner support in the legislature (Raile, Pereira and Power, 2011), cabinet management is one of the main tools available to presidents for securing a legislative majority and, therefore, preventing troublesome deadlocks in the legislature (Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power, 2018; Chasquetti, 2001; Cheibub, 2007). Pre-election coalitions, in particular, help presidents in this task (Borges et al., 2021; Carroll, 2007).

In this context, the coalition bargaining process entails a quid-pro-quo between the president-elect party and the remaining parties with legislative representation. In this study, as mentioned above, I assume that parties strive for cabinet participation in order to push their goals related to office, policy, and vote. In fact, evidence from Western European countries suggests that the longer the period parties stay out of government, the more willing they become to relinquish some coalition payoffs just to be part of

the government (Falcó-Gimeno, 2012). This behaviour is especially appealing if held in presidential democracies. This is so because presidential parties search to increase their coalition share of seats when the pre-electoral alliance fails to reach a majority in one or both chambers after election results (Albala, 2017). In a context where coalition parties rarely produce and disclose publicly written coalition agreements to the electorate, should presidential parties look for new coalition partners before assuming the presidency, the government formation process is not necessarily plagued by the process of putting down the terms of the coalition compromise as it is in parliamentary democracies (Bergman, Angelova, Bäck and Müller, 2024; Moury, 2013). Of course, this may still carry some costs for governance later.

Against this backdrop, the expectation is that the composition of post-electoral governments should differ from that of pre-electoral pacts when the latter falls short of securing a minimal winning coalition. Reversing the argument, *formateur* parties ought not to look out for new partners when pre-electoral coalition members successfully hold a majority in the legislature. By adopting a purely office-seeking premise, this would happen because none of the parties would be willing to share the spoils of being in power with parties needless in terms of securing enough legislative support for the government (Leiserson, 1966; Riker, 1962). Yet, as parties have other motivations beyond attaining office, the majority status of pre-electoral coalitions is hypothesised as a causally relevant factor, though not sufficiently to explain why coalition cabinets build on their pre-election coalitions. This is a prime example of an INUS condition, where the condition is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about the outcome on its own, but it is nevertheless an indispensable part of a specific combination that accounts for the outcome (Mello, 2021).[2]

H1: Majority pre-electoral coalitions operate as INUS conditions to yield coalition cabinets with a similar composition relative to their pre-electoral composition.

High within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is another potential trigger for changes in the composition of pre-electoral alliances in their way of forming coalition governments. Even if parties tend not to coalesce when the ideological distance among them is significant

(Kellam, 2017), some pre-electoral alliances are still composed of parties from different ends of the political spectrum (Indridason, 2011). When this happens, pre-electoral coalition members potentially disagree over several issues on coalition governance, such as who gets which portfolio, which policy is to be prioritised, and whether and which party should be invited to be part of the coalition cabinet. As a consequence, high levels of ideological polarisation may ultimately lead to the fracture of pre-election pacts, while low levels may account for coalition cabinets that preserve their pre-election foundation.

Crucially, however, the government formation stage does not revolve exclusively around policy congruence among eventual governing parties. As discussed above, concerns about the government seat share, among other conditions, come into play in coalition formation. Thus, I also expect ideological homogeneity among pre-election coalition partners to contribute to forming coalition governments grounded in their pre-election roots, but I do not expect it to paint the whole picture.

H2: Low within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is an INUS condition to render coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins.

Turning to the party system level, Couto (2025) has recently argued that the effects of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation are moderated by the degree of existing legislative polarisation. In a similar vein, I argue here that legislative polarisation also plays a role in the process of pre-electoral coalitions turning into coalition cabinets. The key point is that lower levels of legislative polarisation make multiparty bargaining more straightforward for *formateur* parties insofar as they havce more leeway to break from the pre-electoral alliance if they wish to do so. That is, when ideological differences among parties are not pervasive, *formateur* parties have more incentives to build coalition cabinets that push forward their office and policy interests, even if it comes at the expense of cabinet membership for former pre-election coalition partners. Contrariwise, parties' ideological placements far from one another in the party system make bargaining dynamics beyond pre-electoral commitments increasingly costly, as presidents might struggle to accommodate office and policy priorities from other parties. Under these circumstances,

presidential parties have an extra incentive to stick with their pre-election partners.

Nevertheless, legislative polarisation does not influence government formation in isolation. More specifically, I claim that polarisation should matter only if accompanied by other conditions. To see how this is the case, consider a pre-electoral coalition in a context where parties are not too ideologically different from one another. Even though the presidential party arguably has more freedom to choose whom to ally with in this scenario, why would it change the composition of the pre-electoral alliance in the first place? Conversely, if *formateur* parties have an underpinning reason to sever ties with their original pre-electoral commitments, legislative polarisation should facilitate or complicate the endeavours of *formateur* parties.

In summary, as with the other hypotheses, the expectation is that legislative polarisation relates to the similarity between pre-electoral pacts and coalition cabinets in multiparty presidential democracies. That said, in the absence of complementary conditions, legislative polarisation would be of little use in influencing government formation. Thus:

H3: Elevated levels of legislative polarisation are an INUS condition to the similarity between coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral predecessors.

One of the main characteristics of presidential regimes is that presidents serve constitutionally fixed terms, thereby not being responsible to an elected assembly (Cheibub, 2007; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Based on this, the literature draws attention to the fact that constitutional or electoral rules clarify when the presidents' term in office must come to an end. However, scholars more often than not overlook that the same institutions are also explicit when presidents are to be sworn into office (Albala, 2017). That is, presidential regimes, unlike their parliamentary counterparts (Ecker and Meyer, 2015; Golder, 2010), cannot have several rounds of multiparty bargaining before the *formateur* gets into office because there is a temporal bound between the end of the elections and the beginning of their tenure.

Overall, institutional claims have found mixed support in research on coalitional presidentialism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Freudenreich, 2016). Still, past scholarship has pointed out that pre-electoral pacts are influenced by institutional settings (Ferrara and Herron, 2005; Spoon and West, 2015). In this way, I argue that the temporal distance between the end of the elections and the inauguration day of the next government influences the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble their pre-electoral pacts. A shorter distance constrains president-elect parties from drastically changing coalition members, encouraging them to build the government around pre-electoral alliances. By contrast, a longer distance between elections and the inauguration day allows presidents to think more carefully about the composition of their government.

However, again, we should not expect presidents to change the partisan composition of their pre-election arrangements just because they have fewer constraints to do so. This is similar to legislative polarisation at the party level. Just like different levels of legislative polarisation do not lead presidents to make changes in their coalitions on their own, neither does a short temporal distance until the president-elect assumes the presidency. Hence, time-related roundness should not cause post-election coalition cabinets to bear a resemblance to their pre-election commitments alone but in tandem with other conditions. As such:

H4: A short distance between the end of the elections and the presidents' first day in office is an INUS condition to the alikeness between pre-electoral alliances and subsequent coalition cabinets.

As the last piece of the puzzle, the transition of pre-electoral pacts to coalition cabinets may also be contingent on the extent to which presidents are granted tools to promote the governability of their governments. Indeed, previous empirical studies have shown that presidential powers influence overall patterns of coalition formation (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012; Silva, 2023). More specifically, presidents with extensive formal prerogatives may care less about fulfilling office pre-electoral commitments than those without such powers. This is because the former can appoint their ministers without

major trouble and still govern by issuing decree-laws, dictating legislative agenda or vetoing undesired bills, while the latter must come to terms with the legislature to avoid getting into a collision course and guarantee successful passage of policy.

This should especially be the case for the transition period between pre-electoral coalitions and the formation of coalition cabinets, as presidents are prone to enjoy the honeymoon in their first year in office, thus further discouraging constitutionally weak presidents from disturbing executive-legislative relations at the outset of their term. Given the high stakes in this regard, unlike the previous hypotheses, low presidential powers should lead to congruent post-election coalitions regardless of the other constellation of conditions:

H5: Low presidential powers are sufficient for engendering coalition cabinets similar to the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them.

3 Research Design

To evaluate the claims around the process by which pre-electoral coalitions become coalition cabinets, I make use of QCA. In broad terms, QCA is a set-theoretic method and technique which aims to approximate variable- and case-oriented approaches (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). By doing so, QCA puts cases in the limelight while also allowing the detection of empirical patterns (Mello, 2021). As mentioned in the introduction, despite not being ubiquitous, QCA has been applied to the study of coalition politics. In the scholarship, the primary motivation for its application lies in the fact that QCA provides further leverage to causal inferences by allowing researchers to explore causal complexity.

In this study, I am most interested in grasping the conjunctural causation involved in government formation under presidentialism. That is, I rely on QCA to investigate whether conditions can individually account for a given outcome. The difference is that I do not throw them away if they do not, as it is plausible that they are meaningful only

when interacting with other conditions. This aspect of causal complexity is precisely in line with most of the empirical expectations derived in the last section.

My case selection is slightly particular, as I deliberately select,in varied ways, my observations based on the dependent variable. Despite being a criticised approach following the standards of the conventional quantitative literature (Geddes, 2003; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), this strategy makes sense depending on the researcher's aims (Ragin, 2008). In this study, I do not intend to generalise my findings to all instances of government formation in Latin America. Rather, I am most concerned with coalition cabinets derived from pre-electoral alliances. Given that most coalition governments emerge from some sort of interparty pre-electoral coordination in multiparty presidential democracies (Albala and Couto, 2023), this research design still enables me to cover a substantial portion of the landscape concerning the formation of coalition cabinets in Latin America. Moreover, I ensure conceptual consistency by studying specifically coalitional arrangements. This happens as I remove pre-electoral coalitions that culminate in single-party governments from the analysis. In so doing, I certify that my primary variable of interest, namely the degree of correspondence between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, remains grounded throughout the process by which coalition partners pass through the electoral period. Otherwise, the underlying conceptual validity is severely put into question. In the Supplementary Material, I discuss in greater detail which cases are left out of the analysis. Table 1 presents the pre- and post-electoral coalition composition of the 31 cases to be analysed in this paper.

The calibration process of the conditions and the outcome provides the basis for QCA analyses. As a set-theoretic method, the calibration accounts for whether cases are *in* or *out* of a given set. Notwithstanding the proliferation of QCA variants in recent years (Mello, 2021), QCA has three more well-known specifications (crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy-set QCA), each holding specific ways for calibrating conditions (Medina, Castillo-Ortiz, Álamos Concha and Rihoux, 2017). The fuzzy-set QCA (henceforth, fsQCA) is the most suitable QCA variant for current purposes, as it allows to consider to what extent cases belong or not to a set by inputting a continuous value membership

Table 1: Pre- and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America

Country (N)	Government	Start of the term	Pre-Electoral Coalition Composition	Coalition Cabinet Composition
Argentina (2)	De La Rúa	1999	UCR - Frepaso	UCR - Frepaso
	Macri	2015	PRO - UCR - ARI	PRO - UCR - ARI
Bolivia (3)	Siles	1982	MNRI - MIR - PCB	MNRI - MIR - PCB - PDC
	Paz Zamora	1989	MIR - MNR-V - PCML	MIR - ADN
	Banzer	1997	ADN - NFR	ADN - CONDEPA - MIR - NFR - UCS
Brazil (6)	Cardoso I	1995	PSDB - PFL - PTB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PMDB
	Cardoso II	1999	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB - PMDB - PPS
	Lula I	2003	PT - PL - PCdoB	PT - PL - PCdoB - PDT - PPS - PSB - PTB - PV
	Lula II	2007	PT - PCdoB	PT - PCdoB - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PTB - PV
	Rousseff I	2011	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PRB - PSB - PSC	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PSB - PSC - PP
	Rousseff II	2015	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD - PTB
Chile (7)	Aylwin	1990	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch
	Frei	1994	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Lagos	2000	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Bachelet I	2006	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD
	Piñera I	2010	RN - UDI	RN - UDI
	Bachelet II	2014	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC
	Piñera II	2018	RN - UDI - EVOP	RN - UDI - EVOP
Colombia (2)	Uribe II	2006	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD - PDA
	Santos II	2014	PU - CR - PLC	PU - CR - PLC - PCC
Dom. Republic (1)	Medina II	2016	PLD - PRD	PLD - PRD
Panamá (7)	Endara	1990	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA
	Balladares	1994	PRD - LIBRE - PALA	PRD - LIBRE - PALA - SOLID
	Moscoso	1999	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD
	Torrijos	2004	PRD - POPULAR	PRD - POPULAR
	Martinelli	2009	PCD - MOLIRENA - PPA - UP	PCD - PPA
	Varela	2014	PPA - POPULAR	PPA - POPULAR - PCD
	Cortizo	2019	PRD - MOLIRENA	PRD - MOLIRENA
Venezuela (3)	Lusinchi	1984	AD - URD	AD - URD
	Caldera	1994	CN - MAS	CN - MAS
	Chávez	1999	MVR - MAS - PPT	MVR - MAS - PPT - PCV

Source: Amorim Neto (2019); Borges *et al.* (2021); Freudenreich (2016); Lopes (2022); Silva (2023); and the countries' respective electoral committees.

between 0.0 and 1.0 (Ragin, 2008). The great asset of fsQCA, thus, resides in the fact that it relies on more fine-grained information and, consequently, provides us with better tools to deal with more complex concepts. Below, I briefly discuss the decision-making process to calibrate conditions and the outcome.[3]

To begin with, the outcome *Coalition Resemblance* captures to what extent coalition cabinets are similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that preceded them. To calculate membership in the outcome, I take into account the seat share pre-electoral coalition

members contribute to the coalition's total seat share in the lower house. In this measure, I disregard the president-elect party's legislative contingent, as very few presidential parties fail to take part in the upcoming government (Amorim Neto, 1998). If *formateur* parties' share of seats had remained in the calculation in the first place, *Coalition Resemblance* would have inflated values and, thus, unduly lessen the contribution of the other pre-electoral coalition members to the future governing coalition.

Overall, this measure is very similar to the one developed and employed by Albala, Borges and Couto (2023) to study the effects of pre-electoral coalitions on cabinet duration in Latin America. In fact, this measure is straightforward if coalition cabinets keep the same partners from the electoral period or are enlarged to include additional partners. However, this calculus fails to incorporate coalition reductions, as pre-electoral coalition members would still account for all the coalition's share of seats. In order to hold a holistic view of all the possible changes a pre-election alliance can undergo, I slightly change the formula to also account for such occurrences by inverting the relationship between pre-election and coalition cabinets. That is, when pre-electoral coalition members are expelled from the coalitional pact, I *calculate what is the proportion* of the post-electoral coalition cabinet's share of seats *relative to* the total share of seats pre-election coalitions would have if their composition had not changed.[4]

Depending on the nature of the modification, the formula for *Coalition Resemblance* is, then, the combined share of seats of pre-election coalition members in relation to the coalition's overall share of seats or the other way around, as given by the following formula:

$$\text{Coalition Resemblance} = \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{p} \text{PEC's Seat Share}}{\sum_{j=1}^{c} \text{Cabinet's Seat Share}} \vee \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{c} \text{Cabinet's Seat Share}}{\sum_{j=1}^{p} \text{PEC's Seat Share}} \right)$$

where p is the number of pre-election coalition members and c corresponds to the total number of coalition partners in the post-election scenario. Presidential parties are excluded from the math in both instances.

Regardless of whether pre-electoral coalitions are changed or not, full set membership in *Coalition Resemblance* indicates that coalition cabinets thoroughly resemble pre-electoral coalition members — meanwhile, full non-membership points out that coalition cabinets and pre-electoral coalitions are entirely different from each other.

Moving on to explanatory conditions, *Majority* refers to whether pre-electoral coalitions hold a legislative majority after the election results. To belong to this set, I consider that pre-election coalitions should have at least a semi-majority (more than 45% of the share of seats) in one of the legislative chambers. Importantly, given the existence of 'parties-for-hire' across Latin America (Kellam, 2015), this threshold takes into account that presidents and their governing coalitions can still govern even if they do not secure a clear majority in the legislature. This is possible through the formation of *ad hoc* legislative majorities on individual pieces of legislation, in which presidents guarantee the passage of government policy by making use of their toolbox (Chaisty et al., 2018; Raile et al., 2011), such as through the management of budgetary transfers for pork-barrel politics (Bertholini and Pereira, 2017; Pereira, Bertholini and Melo, 2023) and partisan appointments in the bureaucracy (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor, 2023). In this circumstance, cases are assigned a 0.6 score, while cases with a seat share more robust receive higher set membership scores. Conversely, pre-electoral pacts that fail to reach at least a semi-majority are more outside than inside *Majority* and receive lower scores according to their seat share.

Next, *Low Within Polarisation* refers to the ideological distance between pre-election coalition members, whereas *High Legislative Polarisation* captures the ideological polarisation in the legislature. The qualitative anchors across both sets are not exactly reversed to one another, albeit they are based on the same polarisation index developed by Dalton (2008). The reason is that legislative polarisation naturally tends to be higher than polarisation found within pre-electoral alliances. The former bear in mind all parties of party systems, including extremist parties, whereas the latter, more often than not, revolve around parties with close ideological preferences (Kellam, 2017).

High Temporal Constraint corresponds to the distance, in days, between the end of the electoral process and the day presidents are sworn into office. The empirical anchors of this set are established mostly by looking at observed patterns found in the data, since the time lapse that separates the end of elections from the beginning of a new government in presidential democracies has not been profoundly studied yet. Most importantly, since second-round presidential elections cannot logically result in lower temporal constraints to the president-elect vis-à-vis the first round, the cross-over is set at 70 days. This places most cabinets preceded by run-off elections as being inside the set, with the exception of the Argentine cases and Bachelet II and Piñera II in Chile. Set full membership is defined as 55 days, which is equivalent to a one-month-a-half period, whereas full exclusion is set at 85 days, which is a long period even by the standards of parliamentary democracies (Golder, 2010).

At last, *Low Presidential Powers* is associated with the degree to which presidents are powerful actors in the political scene. While indexes of presidential powers abound, the calibration rests specifically on Doyle and Elgie's (2016) measurement. This is so because this measure considers presidential powers as a whole instead of choosing to focus on a single particular dimension. For example, rather than using decree and veto power as proxies for presidential powers, this measurement encompasses all presidential prerogatives, such as their capability to introduce bills, appoint and dismiss ministers at their discretion, and so on. To locate empirical anchors, I once again rely mostly on empirical gaps found in the data, positioning full membership at 0.3 and the full exclusion from the set at 0.5. However, the cross-over point is specifically set at 0.405. This ensures that the Dominican and Venezuelan cases are *in* the reference set.[5] The assignment of the Dominican case follows the discussion that, though historically strong (Belén Sánchez and Lozano, 2012), presidential powers are in decline (Marsteintredet, 2020) and presidents do not boast control over their cabinets to the same degree as other presidents in the region (Araújo, Silva and Vieira, 2016). As for Venezuela, this relates to the constitution endowing presidents with formally limited powers in the country at the time. (Crisp, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992).

To summarise, Table 1 displays an overview of the conditions and the outcome, the respective procedures for calibration, and the rules for the calibration process.

Table 1: Overview of the Calibration of the Outcome and the Conditions

Set	Definition	Procedure	Calibration
Coalition Resemblance (CR)	The degree to which pre-electoral coalitions resemble coalition cabinets	Direct Assignment	Percentage to which pre-electoral coalitions reflect post-electoral cabinets' composition in terms of seat share.
Majority (MAJ)	The pre-electoral coalition controls a majority in the legislature	Direct Assignment	1 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative status in both chambers 0.8 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative in at least one of the chambers 0.6 = Pre-electoral parties grant a semi-majority legislative in at least one of the chambers 0.4 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in both chambers 0.2 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in at least one of the chambers 0 = Pre-electoral parties grant less than 35% in both chambers
Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL)	Pe-electoral coalition members are in close proximity on the left-right ideological dimension	Direct Method	FM = 1.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 3.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL)	Parties are ideologically far apart in the party system	Direct Method	FM = 4.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.7 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 1.5 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
High Temporal Constraint (HTEMP)	A short distance between the end of the elections and the inauguration day	Direct Method	FM = 55 days CO = 70 days FE = 85 days
Low Presidential Powers (LPP)	Presidents are constitutionally weak	Direct Method	FM = 0.3 in Doyle and Elgie (2016) CO = 0.405 in Doyle and Elgie (2016) FE = 0.5 in Doyle and Elgie (2016)

Source: Borges, Lloyd and Vommaro (2024); Dalton (2008); Doyle and Elgie (2016); Freudenreich (2016); Silva (2023); and the countries' respective electoral committees.
Note: FM stands for full membership in the set, CO for cross-over point, and FE for full exclusion in the set.

4 Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis of configurational comparative research is based on statements of necessity and sufficiency. In short, necessary conditions are indispensable for the occurence of the outcome (Ragin, 2008). In turn, sufficient conditions are capable of rendering the outcome on their own (Medina et al., 2017; Mello, 2021).

Unless the interest lies in finding minimally necessary disjunctions of minimally sufficient combinations (Haesebrouck and Thomann, 2022), QCA empirical analysis operates analyses of necessity and sufficiency separately. In order not to produce untenable assumptions in the analysis of sufficiency, it is advisable that the analysis of necessity must be conducted in advance (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In the analysis of necessary

Table 2: Necessity Test for Coalition Resemblance

Disjunction	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
MAJ + HTEMP	0.916	0.859	0.601

Note: In configurational rationale, the sign "+" is equivalent to the logical OR.

conditions, the literature argues that a 0.9 consistency threshold and a 0.6 relevance of necessity score should be in place to find meaningful non-trivial necessary relations between conditions and the outcome (Oana, Schneider and Thomann, 2021; Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). By applying these recommendations, Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the resemblance of post-electoral coalition governments vis-à-vis their pre-electoral configuration.

The necessity test points out that only a single combination of conditions is necessary to explain the commonalities, in terms of coalition composition, between pre-electoral pacts and post-electoral governments. The analysis reveals that either achieving a majority status (MAJ) or facing a short period until the government officially is set in motion (HTEMP) is pivotal for a strong similarity between pre-electoral and post-electoral coalitions.[6]

Closely following the necessity test, the next stage in a typical QCA framework involves engaging in sufficiency analysis. Much of the analysis of sufficient conditions boils down to the construction of the truth table and its subsequent minimisation process. The reason for this is that the truth table lays out all possible combinations of conditions in different rows, assigns empirical cases to each row according to the cases' degree of membership to every set, and shows to what extent each row is associated with a sufficient relation with the outcome. In turn, based on the information in the truth table, the minimisation process is charged with applying Boolean algebra to generate a "recipe" that supposedly explains the outcome of interest.

Based on several arguments within coalition theories, the previous sections devised five empirical expectations to account for the convergence between pre-electoral coalitions and their post-electoral heirs, which resulted in the creation of five explanatory conditions. Against this backdrop, the truth table for coalition resemblance generates 32 logically

possible combinations, as the number of rows in a truth table is given by 2^n, where n is the number of conditions in the study.

As listed in Table 3,[7] the empirical instances are distributed along 13 configurations, with all the remaining rows representing logical remainders,[8] which have been omitted for ease of interpretation. As a result, the present sufficiency analysis is confronted with limited diversity (Ragin and Sonnett, 2008), as logical reasoning provides a far greater number of possible combinations than those that actually exist in the real world.

Table 3: Truth Table for Coalition Resemblance

Condition					Outcome				
MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	HTEMP	LPP	CR	N	Consistency	PRI	Cases
1	1	1	0	0	1	5	1.000	1.000	Aylwin, Frei, Bachelet II, Piñera II, Torrijos
1	0	1	1	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Rousseff I, Rousseff II
1	1	0	0	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Cardoso II, Endara
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.997	0.995	Uribe II
1	1	1	1	0	1	6	0.995	0.994	De La Rúa, Lagos, Bachelet I, Piñera I, Martinelli, Cortizo
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.988	0.979	Siles
1	1	0	1	1	1	3	0.975	0.965	Medina II, Santos II, Lusinchi
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.934	0.903	Chávez
0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.871	0.783	Cardoso I, Balladares, Moscoso
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.804	0.661	Lula I
0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.790	0.691	Banzer, Caldera
0	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.666	0.592	Macri, Lula II, Varela
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.569	0.299	Paz Zamora

However, as limited diversity is ubiquitous in empirical research, QCA does have some remedies for treating logical remainders. All in all, the answer lies in the different ways to handle them in the minimisation process. For present purposes, I opt for partially including logical remainders in the logical minimisation of the truth table. More specifically, while difficult counterfactuals are dismissed, easy counterfactuals, which are logical reminders in line with theoretical and substantive knowledge (Dusa, 2019, Chap. 8; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 9), are included in the analysis. Accordingly, the counterfactual analysis allows including educated hunches in the sufficiency test on what would have possibly

occurred had the empty truth table rows had empirical cases. Hence, as only a fraction of the counterfactuals is in the minimisation process, the analysis of sufficient conditions rests on the intermediate solution.[9]

As the final steps before assessing set relations based on sufficiency, I employ the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) to minimise the truth table, given the existence of a necessary disjunction. I also set the inclusion score for consistency at 0.8, a value slightly above the bare minimum 0.75 consistency threshold recommended by the literature (Mello, 2021, Chap. 6; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 3). Furthermore, the directional expectations have the exact directions as the hypothesised conditions, such as *Majority* is expected to lead to coalition resemblance, as does *Low Within Polarisation* and so forth. Coupled with the previous features, this setting leads to a solution composed of four causal pathways to account for *Coalition Resemblance*, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Enhanced Intermediate Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ ∗LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.292	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
˜LWPOL ∗HLPOL ∗ HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0.063	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
HLPOL ∗ HTEMP ∗LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.043	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL ∗ HLPOL ∗˜HTEMP ∗˜LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Balladares, Bachelet II, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Piñera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.920	0.907	0.807		

The first path indicates that pre-electoral coalitions with a legislative majority and composed of parties with close policy preferences result in coalition cabinets heavily based on their initial configuration. To attest to the prominence of this configuration, it has the highest scores for consistency and raw coverage, besides uniquely covering several pre-election coalitions that ultimately lead to governing coalitions. This path, thus, provides sound supportive evidence for the notion that *formateur* parties work towards preserving pre-electoral pacts that grant a majority in the legislature to the government and are

ideologically coherent.

Next, the second path highlights the combination of ideological heterogeneity within the pre-electoral pact, high legislative polarisation and a short period until the government's first day in office to the conversion of pre-electoral pacts into coalition governments. Similarly, high legislative polarisation and high temporal constraints are also components of the third path. The difference resides in the fact that, instead of low within polarisation, Path 3 envisions that this configuration occurs in tandem with constitutionally weak presidents.

The last pathway poses an intriguing combination together. It tells us that, even facing a considerable time until official government formation and with constitutionally moderate to strong presidents, pre-electoral alliances serve as a basis for post-electoral governments when the party system they are embedded in is highly polarised, but their coalition members are ideologically next to one another. This combination is particularly noteworthy for severely threatening the necessary claim between coalition resemblance and the disjunction between *Majority* and *High Temporal Constraint*.

Together, the four paths result in an overall solution formula with a high consistency score of 0.920 and a significant proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) of 0.907, covering roughly 80% of the cases in the analysis. These scores amount to a solution formula that contains very few instances which weaken its sufficiency claims[10] and covers a non-insignificant number of the cases, in addition to not being plagued by simultaneous subset relations.

The analysis of sufficient conditions simultaneously challenges one empirical expectation while rendering initial support to the others. Specifically, *Low Presidential Powers* was theorised to be sufficient to the similarity between coalition cabinet and their preceding pre-electoral pacts. However, the analysis of sufficiency indicates that no condition is individually sufficient to account for the outcome, though it does not mean that the explanatory conditions are thoroughly irrelevant. Rather, the sufficiency test reinforces the conjunctural causation aspect of configurational comparative methods, in the sense

that the explanatory conditions are individually uninteresting but jointly sufficient to bring about the outcome. Consequently, there is provisory support to MAJ, LWPOL, HLPOL, and HTEMP to be causally important factors for *Coalition Resemblance* when combined with one another and LPP

To a lesser or a greater extent, the findings indicate that every condition works as INUS conditions. Despite this, later case analysis raises questions about the degree to which *High Temporal Constraint* contributes to inducing the resemblance between coalitional arrangements across the electoral period. In any case, the combination between *Majority* and *Low Within Polarisation*, and the individual condition of *High Legislative Polarisation* stand out in the results for a few reasons. Not only does the former cover the most number of cases amongst the four pathways, but it also provides additional support for recent findings in the literature (Albala et al., 2024). With regard to the latter, ideologically polarised party systems are in three out of the four paths leading to *Coalition Resemblance*, while other conditions, such as *Low Presidential Power*, only appear in a single alternative route. No less importantly is that this also resonates with recent findings in the literature (Couto, 2025). Accordingly, the first timely contribution of this study to the literature is to demonstrate that some past findings found in variable-centred research are robust upon a closer examination of the cases behind the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets. At the same time, however, it provides a much-needed refined portrait by highlighting how the process between pre- and post-electoral coalitions is not explained by any individual explanatory factor but rather by the interplay among several contextual and institutional conditions.

If the set-theoretic analysis for sufficiency for coalition resemblance has yielded a wealth of findings, the results for the non-outcome (a moderate to severe dissonance in the composition between pre-electoral coalitions and coalition cabinets) are largely uninteresting given their complexity and low coverage. However, this was expected to some degree, as the conditions have primarily been calibrated to explaining the similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. Consequently, a handful of potential explanatory conditions to account for the difference between pre- and post-electoral stages, such

as a deep ideological difference among pre-electoral coalition members, have not been adequately captured. As recommended by best practices, the necessity and sufficiency analyses for the non-outcome are nevertheless available and can be found in the Supplementary Material.

5 Robustness Tests

By default, several methodological decisions in configurational comparative methods lie in the researcher's discretion, such as which procedure should be used to calibrate conditions, which benchmark should be applied in necessary and sufficient analyses, and so forth. Naturally, these decisions raise concerns about the validity of QCA results, since they could be driven purely by the researchers' decisions. To appease this issue, the literature has come up with several tests to probe the soundness of QCA results (Ide, 2015; Oana and Schneider, 2024; Skaaning, 2011), which have been widely employed in QCA recent empirical research (e.g. Janzwood, 2020). For current purposes, these tests consist of changing the case selection, modifying the rules surrounding the calibration of conditions and the outcome, performing a variety of cluster analyses, and finally, altering the consistency benchmark of the analysis of sufficient conditions. Due to space constraints, these tests can be found in a dedicated section in the Supplementary Material. Overall, the results found for the first three pathways in the original analysis remain largely consistent throughout all the tests. That said, Path 4 has shown to be largely sensitive to model specifications and ~LWPOL is replaced in Path 2 in a couple of diagnostic tests.

6 Discussion and Case Studies

Even if QCA excels at bringing the cases to the fore, the present study has been much closer to a condition-oriented QCA than a case-oriented QCA so far.[11] To fill this gap, I now pass on to the discussion of how the solution derived in the second-to-last section applies to some cases. From reading the solution formula, the explanation of what makes coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins resides in four paths. Thus, I select

a few cases from each configuration to represent how conditions operate as gears towards *Coalition Resemblance*.

The first route towards coalition resemblance is marked by majority pre-election coalitions composed of ideologically like-minded members. This path is neatly exemplified by most of the Chilean coalition cabinets present in the analysis, such as Bachelet I and II, Frei, and Lagos. By securing a legislative majority in one chamber and at least a semi-majority in the other, there was little reason to expel someone from the alliance or to bring in a new partner. Moreover, the closeness between pre-electoral coalition members on the left–right scale further reinforces the reasons for maintaining the pre-electoral pact. Despite bringing the Chilean cases as examples, it is worth mentioning that this combination is not a unique feature of Chilean coalitions. In Colombia, the right-wing pre-election coalitions led by Uribe and Santos, in their re-election attempt, share the same features: despite minor changes, pre-electoral coalitions that held close to a majority in the legislature and were composed of parties with similar points of view on policy issues served as the bedrock for the upcoming governments.

In stark contrast, the second path combines the absence of policy congruence among pre-electoral coalition members with high overall ideological polarisation in the legislature and a short period until the government's inauguration. This configuration mostly resonates with Rousseff I and II in Brazil, where the ideological distance between pre-election coalition members on the left-right dimension should have resulted in the outright dismantling of the agreements after the elections. Even still, pre-electoral coalitions still formed the basis of the first coalition cabinets following each election, resulting in a remarkably low ideological distance between government and opposition in both governments (Borges, 2021). Why was this the case? According to the second path, the explanation for this resides in the fact that the polarisation at the party system level was quite high, thereby implying that rearranging interparty negotiations would be costly. In fact, not including major centre-right parties in the ministerial allocation process would not only most likely have triggered a political crisis earlier than expected in Rousseff II (Hunter and Power, 2019) but was practically out of the question given that the vice-presidency

was handed to a key right-of-centre party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB, *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*). In this context, it seems rather unlikely that Rousseff would have drastically promoted a change even if she had more time to reconsider the partisan composition of her cabinets. As this same story applies to Lula I, our confidence in the importance of *High Temporal Constraint* should considerably be reduced. Thus, the conclusion is that a contextual condition (i.e. legislative polarisation) eased the move from pre-election alliances into governing coalitions even though pre-election coalition members were ideologically far apart from one another.

High legislative polarisation and low within polarisation are at the core of the third and fourth paths, but in conjunction with different conditions. In broad terms, legislative polarisation is combined with formally weak presidents in the third path, whereas the fourth path connects it to non-weak heads of government and the absence of high temporal constraint. The first government of Chávez in Venezuela is an example of the former path. Even if he proceeded to take his first steps towards an autocratic rule in the coming years by concentrating power in his hands following a constitution-making process (Landau, 2019), at the time of his election, the then constitution did not grant Chávez enough power to defy the existing order on his own. Coupled with the fact that the parties were far from one another regarding economic policies and the ideological distance within the pre-election coalition was rather insignificant, it made little sense for Chávez to not base his government on the pre-electoral pact (Handlin, 2017).

By contrast, the latter path diverges precisely for not counting on presidents with low presidential powers,[12] together with *formateurs* facing medium to long periods until they officially hold office. The cases of Cardoso I and Moscoso, which deviate from the results of the necessity test, are two cases covered by the fourth scenario. In both cases, high legislative polarisation and policy congruence among pre-election coalition members were responsible for exerting significant influence on the post-electoral coalition cabinets, in the sense that they were heavily based on the composition of pre-electoral pacts. Even though Cardoso and Moscoso had roughly three months before taking office and would soon be relevant actors in the law-making process, Cardoso opted only to enlarge the

original pact by inviting the median party to the government, whereas Moscoso preferred to maintain the same composition as before the elections.

However, the causal link of the fourth configuration should be questioned for two reasons. Different tests either prompt substantial changes in the combinatorial composition of the route or completely remove it from the results. Moreover, this is the only path that covers a deviant case in consistency for the sufficiency analysis.[13] This case is the Balladares government in Panama in 1994. In theory, the case is not overly complicated: the pre-election pact was composed of rather small parties and the presidential party sought out another partner to secure a majority in the legislature, thereby making the post-electoral coalition cabinet not appear so much alike the pre-electoral alliance. However, the junior pre-election parties were *incorporated* into the presidential party. In this context, it is unclear to what extent pre-election partners had a say in post-election coalition affairs. This suggests that we should be extremely caution in interpreting this last configuration.

7 Concluding Remarks

Thirty years ago, there was barely any study interested in examining how pre-election coalitions impact government formation processes, with the notable exception of Strøm, Budge and Laver (1994). Fortunately, the literature has undergone a tremendous shift, as a large body of research today is dedicated to studying the relationship between pre-electoral alliances and coalition formation, governance and survival across different systems of government (e.g. Ferrara and Herron, 2005; Ibenskas, 2016; Spoon and West, 2015).

In presidential democracies, in particular, pre-election coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition governments, as executive-legislative relations derive from the independent election of the executive and the legislative branches. Against this backdrop, the main aim of this paper was to take a closer look at the process by which pre-electoral pacts become post-electoral coalitions in Latin American presidential democracies. *This*

was done especially from a more case-centric perspective on causality. Instead of relying on conventional statistical methods, I subscribe to a configurational approach to study under which conditions post-electoral coalition mirror their pre-electoral antecessors.

The findings point out that we require a combination of contextual and institutional factors to understand the degree of stability between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. In varying ways, the seat share granted by pre-electoral coalition members, their alignment on policy goals, the general ideological polarisation in the legislature and low presidential powers are all pertinent conditions to explain the conversion of pre-electoral into post-electoral coalitions. The most important aspect is that no condition is individually sufficient to account for this process; rather, the explanation resides in different combinations of conditions.

As a consequence, three main takeaways can be retrieved from this work. First, pre-electoral coalition majority status clearly matters for post-electoral coalition formation; however, only in combination with low ideological differences among pre-election coalition members. Second, the findings suggest that pre-election coalitions are not necessarily bound to dissipate in the post-electoral scenario if their members have many differences in their policy preferences. If the party system is characterised by irreconcilable policy divergences, then pre-election coalitions are well-positioned to serve as the foundation for the incoming government. While these two contributions further corroborate existing findings in the literature, this article also defies current knowledge about coalition politics in presidential democracies, more generally, and the transformation of pre-election coalitions into multiparty governments, in particular. More specifically, although presidential powers matters for the portfolio allocation process (Silva, 2023), I have found very limited support for the causal relevance of low presidential powers to high resemblance between pre- and post-election coalitions. More critically, case analysis reveals even less evidence for the role of the institutional time constraint of presidential elections for coalition resemblance. No matter how long the distance between election results and the government's inauguration day, the cases covered in this study would most likely have still based their government on the pre-election coalition anyway.

While recent years have witnessed a wealth of research on pre-electoral coalitions, there still remains, of course, significant potential for further developments. Departing from this study, future research would greatly benefit from differentiating types of conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into full-fledged coalition governments. In this paper, despite analysing the reasons behind the similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, all changes in pre-electoral coalitions were treated as if they were equivalent to one another, though bringing in another party is very different from expelling a member from the alliance. As a consequence, the different changes that pre-electoral coalitions suffer from the electoral to the post-electoral period are worthy of future consideration.

In addition, another potential avenue for future research is examining the translation of pre- to post-electoral coalitions from the perspective of within-case studies. This is especially the case in the literature on coalitional presidentialism, a field desperately in dire need of more qualitative studies. Despite throwing light on some cases, the discussion brought up here is bounded by the typical cross-case nature of QCA and limited to typical cases of each causal pathway. What is more, this analysis features a limitation in not fully exploring the richness of QCA's different types of cases, each of which is associated with a specific aim in relation to providing causal explanations of social phenomena (Oana and Schneider, 2018). Thus, future case studies can be conducted to complement (or cast doubt on) this paper's findings.

Lastly, the coalition literature would be greatly enriched by case studies also conducted at the party level. While this paper has been limited to studying the multiparty aspect of pre-electoral coalitions, it is indisputable that intra-party tensions play a role in party fates. Even if coalition governments result from interparty bargaining, case studies on intraparty politics can help us better understand the processes by which pre-electoral coalitions are formed, enlarged and dissolved, even before presidents are sworn into office.

Notes

1. The original multiparty alliance was composed of two minor parties, namely the Vanguard Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR-V, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Vanguardia*) and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCML, *Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista*), besides the MIR itself. The ensuing coalition cabinet, however, was comprised of the MIR and the right-wing party Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista*).

2. The acronym INUS stands for Insufficient condition but still Necessary to an Unnecessary but Sufficient path towards explaining the outcome of interest (Mackie, 1965).

3. I present some particularities of QCA in more detail in the Supplementary Material.

4. To illustrate the procedure in the case of coalition shrinkage, let us consider the formation of the Martinelli cabinet in Panama in 2009, in which a pre-electoral alliance of four parties resulted in a post-electoral coalition of only two parties. Initially, the pact was composed of the Democratic Change Party (PCD, *Partido Cambio Democrático*), the Panameñista Party (PPA, *Partido Panameñista*), the National Renewal Movement (MOLIRENA, *Movimiento de Renovación Nacional*), and the Patriotic Union (UP, *Unión Patriotica*). However, in the wake of the electoral process, the coalition was reduced to only two parties, namely the PCD and the PPA. To measure the extent to which the post-electoral cabinet resembles the pre-electoral alliance, I calculate the percentage of the PPA's share of seats relative to the combined share of seats of the MOLIRENA, the PPA, and the UP. Note that the legislative contingent of the presidential party, the PCD, is not included in this calculation.

5. This line is deliberately drawn not be at 0.4 to avoid placing the Dominican case, namely Medina II, on the maximum point of indifference. A calibration process resulting in instances with set value memberships of exactly 0.5 represents a grave pitfall in configurational comparative methods, thus being important to be circumvented. For more details, see Oana et al. (2021, Chap. 2).

6. To further leverage claims of necessity relations, the necessary disjunction, here composed of MAJ + HTEMP, should fit into a higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness and have few cases violating the necessity statement (Mello, 2021; Oana et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). This additional examination is available in the Supplementary Material and calls into question the existence of the necessary relation.

7. A raw data matrix and the ensuing calibrated data are available in the Supplementary Material.

8. Logical remainders are simply truth table rows devoid of empirical cases. Without a counterfactual analysis, these rows do not take part of the minimisation process of the truth table, as it is impossible to calculate their membership in the outcome set given their lack of empirical evidence.

9. For the differences between solution terms, see Medina et al. (2017, Chap. 2), Mello (2021, Chap. 7) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012, Chap. 6). Following good practices in the QCA literature, I report both conservative and parsimonious solutions in the Supplementary Material.

10. Available in Figure A.2 in the Supplementary Material

11. For more on the discussion between approaches to cases and causality in configurational comparative methods, see Haesebrouck and Thomann (2022).

12. I am extremely cautious with statements based on the negation of conditions, as these do not always represent the opposite concept from the original set (Goertz, 2020, Chap. 1; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 3) To see how this can be the case, the opposite of weak presidents are not necessarily strong and powerful presidents, since the negation also includes presidents with intermediate levels of power.

13. The XY Plot for sufficiency in the Supplementary Material also reveals that the results fail to explain the cases of Caldera and Macri. Despite having pre-electoral and post-electoral coalition cabinets alike, these cases are not exemplary of any causal pathway. Hence, they serve as perfect cases for an *a posteriori* in-depth analysis to complement or cast doubts on the arguments developed in this study.

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Supplementary Material for "The Drivers of Resemblance in Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets"

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Contents

Section 1: Case Selection

The paper is mainly interested in coalition cabinets preceded by pre-electoral coalitions in Latin American presidential democracies. As a consequence, several presidential cabinets are not inserted into the analysis. In what follows, I present why some cases are not examined.

To begin with, my case selection entails that coalition governments without any pre-electoral inception are outright excluded from the analysis. To provide a couple of examples, in Colombia, Samper and Pastrana won their presidential elections without building any pre-electoral alliance. For such a reason, these cases, and others with similar trajectories, are not analysed here.

Moreover, this work focuses exclusively on coalition governments and, as a consequence, single-party cabinets are also ruled out, even if the president-elect party had committed to a multiparty pact prior to the elections. One example of this is the Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee (COPEI, *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*) prior to the 1978 Venezuelan presidential election. Even if the party had built a pre-electoral coalition with the Democratic Republican Union (URD, *Unión Republicana Democrática*), the alliance was ultimately broken, and URD did not receive a single cabinet position in the COPEI administration. Similar cases, where pre-election coalitions were broken to give birth to single-party governments, are excluded from the analysis to ensure conceptual accuracy.

I also distinguish between *pre-electoral* and *electoral* alliances (Allern and Aylott, 2009), thereby leaving the latter out of the analysis at first. This is because electoral alliances are comprised chiefly of run-off agreements in presidential regimes, when the first-round losers provide support for one of the two main contestants left in the dispute (Albala, 2021; McClintock, 2018). The point is that since talks take place amidst elections, run-off agreements do not fit precisely into the concept of *pre-electoral* coordination. Despite this, as scholarship on run-off agreements is still emergent and has not taped into how they influence the government formation process, I include electoral

alliances made between the first and second rounds of presidential elections in a second moment in order to test the soundness of my results.

Lastly, once the main goal of the study is to capture the conversion of pre-election pacts into coalition cabinets, the analysis covers solely the first cabinet formed in each government. In this way, even though the effects of pre-electoral pacts may surpass the first stage of coalition governments, as suggested by coalition theories (Albala et al., 2023; Chiru, 2015; Freudenreich, 2016), the long-lasting impacts of pre-electoral pacts on government formation are out of this work's length.

Section 2: QCA in Details

Some details of QCA merit further discussion. I discuss some of them in this section. To begin with, it is worthwhile to make clear that the calibration process is not enmeshed in probabilistic thinking (Ragin, 2008, Chap. 5; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 1). Set membership scores do not reveal the probability that cases have to belong to a set; instead, they reflect whether cases are (more) *in* or *out* of the reference set.

A closely related aspect is that cases are an instance (or not) of a set, which is, in turn, linked to an underlying concept. Consequently, set conceptualisation cannot be detached from the calibration process. Rather than referring to broad terms, sets have to mirror and be in accordance with the part of the concept which is of interest to the researcher (Goertz, 2020; Mello, 2021). Accordingly, besides the outcome of Coalition Resemblance (CR), I derive five conditions from my theoretical framework in the main text: Majority (MAJ), Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL), High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL), High Temporal Constraint (HTEMP), and Low Presidential Power (LPP).

Furthermore, the scholarship on configurational comparative methods has developed different procedures to transform raw data into fuzzy sets. In the paper, I make use of the direct assignment and the direct method.[1] Table 2 in the main text makes transparent

[1]For more information on the extant calibration procedures and their differences, see Dusa (2019, Chap. 4) and Mello (2021, Chap. 5).

how each explanatory condition has been calibrated.

Finally, I explicitly mention the use of the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) in the main text. I explain this decision here. In contrast to the Standard Analysis (SA), the ESA guarantees that untenable assumptions are not made during the Boolean minimisation procedure, thereby preventing the counterfactual analysis from including logical remainder rows that would violate necessity claims in the analysis for sufficient conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 8). As such, in the current study, upon applying the De Morgan's law, the negation of the necessary disjunction is the conjunction set composed of ~MAJ∗~HTEMP. This means that the ESA procedure excludes all counterfactual cases that lack a majority status and hold a medium to long period until the inauguration day from the minimisation process. Logically, due to the application of this procedure, all logical remainders based on this conjunction are subsequently excluded from the sufficiency analysis.

Section 3: Assessing Necessity Relations: A Look Into Deviant Cases

In the main text, the results for the analysis of necessary conditions show that the combination of *Majority* and *High Temporal Constraint* is necessary to render *Coalition Resemblance*. To further investigate this statement, I turn my attention to the existence of a higher-order concept and to the number of deviant cases in kind with regard to this relationship.

First, the literature strongly recommends integrating necessary disjunctions into a higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness (Mello, 2021; Schneider, 2018; Oana et al., 2021). This is not troublesome here, as the supposed necessary conditions can be referred to as the higher-order necessary condition of 'convenient manoeuvre.' The reasoning is that both a legislative majority granted by the pre-election coalition and a short period until presidents are sworn into office discourage the president-elect

party from reformulating the pre-electoral alliance, representing a convenient means to hold together the pre-electoral coalition members until the post-electoral stage.

Nevertheless, the literature also warns that the underlying set relation should not be fraught with deviant cases in kind in order to have a meaningful necessary relation (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). To inspect if this is the case here, Figure A.1 shows the XY plot between MAJ + HTEMP and the outcome CR.

Figure A.1: XY Plot for the Purported Necessary Disjunction



In set theory, necessity relations imply that (the combination of) conditions are a superset of the outcome. In a perfect set relation, this means that all cases present in the outcome are also part of the condition set. As can be seen in Figure A.1, this is not precisely what happens with the data at hand — some cases contradict the statement of necessity. This is seen by higher membership scores in the outcome than in the disjunction set; that is, some cases belong to *Coalition Resemblance* despite their absence in either

MAJ or HTEMP.[2]

The first aspect to note is the existence of several deviant consistency cases in degree. Despite not being the most problematic deviance for necessity claims, they have higher score values in the outcome than in the disjunction set, thereby distorting the necessity relation. More remarkably and of particular interest here, two coalition cabinets represent deviant consistency cases in kind: the first government of Cardoso in Brazil in 1994 and the Moscoso minority government in Panama in 1999. In spite of having a considerable time until government inauguration or not holding a majority of seats in the legislature, both presidents still built their respective post-electoral governments based on the multiparty bargaining that took place before the elections. In other words, these cases are *in* the outcome set, but are *out* of the disjunction set. Hence, they are not only in contrast but also undermine the statement that the 'convenient manoeuvre' is necessary to produce post-electoral governments similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that originated them. Given this, even if the disjunction has substantial consistency, coverage and relevance scores, the statement that $MAJ + HTEMP \leftarrow CR$ must be taken with a grain of salt. Later on in the main text, these two cases are represented by a causal recipe in the analysis of sufficient conditions. Crucially, moreover, posterior case studies temper our confidence in the relationship between these two conditions. In this context, I refrain from considering the 'convenient manoeuvre' a necessary way to achieve *Coalition Resemblance*.

[2]There are a handful of different types of cases in QCA results. To understand their differences and, consequently, their position in an XY Plot, see Oana and Schneider (2018).

Section 4: Raw Data Matrix and Calibrated Data

Table A.1: Raw Data Matrix

Cases	Government Status	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Lower Chamber (%)	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Upper Chamber (%)	PEC's Within Polarisation	Legislative Polarisation	Temporal Constraint	Presidential Power	Coalition Resemblance
De La Rúa	Minority	46.3	29.1	1.267	3.262	47	0.407	1
Macri	Minority	33.85	19.44	1.256	3.894	18	0.407	1
Siles	Minority	33.84	37.03	2.087	4.155	23	0.289	0.807
Paz Zamora	Minority	25.38	29.62	0.599	3.803	91	0.289	0
Banzer	Minority	22.30	40.74	2.010	1.939	66	0.319	0.128
Cardoso I	Minority	35.28	40.74	1.850	3.150	90	0.486	0.530
Cardoso II	Minority	57.50	49.38	1.286	2.662	89	0.486	0.685
Lula I	Minority	25.14	20.98	2.795	3.225	66	0.486	0.299
Lula II	Minority	18.71	14.81	0.334	3.257	64	0.486	0.049
Rousseff I	Minority	60.42	59.26	2.969	3.333	62	0.486	0.860
Rousseff II	Minority	59.22	65.43	3.660	3.279	67	0.486	0.899
Aylwin	Minority	54.09	40.42	1.400	2.780	87	0.523	1
Frei	Minority	57.5	45.65	1.526	3.257	90	0.523	1
Lagos	Minority	57.5	48.97	1.312	3.002	55	0.523	1
Bachelet I	Minority	52.5	52.63	1.051	3.937	55	0.523	1
Piñera I	Minority	45.83	42.10	0.948	4.037	53	0.523	1
Bachelet II	Minority	52.5	50	1.847	3.906	86	0.523	1
Piñera II	Minority	46.45	44.18	1.047	4.298	84	0.523	1
Uribe II	Minority	40.49	56.86	1.956	3.746	71	0.381	0.822
Santos II	Minority	55.42	46.07	1.909	2.594	53	0.381	0.670
Medina II	Majority	66.84	90.62	0.244	1.174	62	0.400	1
Endara	Minority	82.2	Not Applicable	1.412	2.089	227	0.452	1
Balladares	Minority	44.66	Not Applicable	1.564	3.446	116	0.452	0.428
Moscoso	Minority	33.8	Not Applicable	0.755	3.615	122	0.452	1
Torrijos	Majority	55.33	Not Applicable	0.408	3.509	122	0.452	1
Martinelli	Minority	52.11	Not Applicable	1.192	3.657	59	0.452	0.785
Varela	Minority	23.93	Not Applicable	0.46	3.117	58	0.452	0.038
Cortizo	Minority	56.3	Not Applicable	1.224	2.841	57	0.452	1
Lusinchi	Majority	58	63.63	0.181	1.614	60	0.391	1
Caldera	Minority	24.63	22	3	2.337	59	0.391	1
Chávez	Minority	33.81	31.48	0.599	2.893	58	0.391	0.945

Table A.2: Calibrated Dataset

Cases	MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	HTEMP	LPP	CR
De La Rúa	0.6	0.89643	0.78123	0.98917	0.48450	1
Macri	0.2	0.89940	0.93728	1	0.48450	1
Siles	0.4	0.43630	0.96427	1	0.96277	0.807
Paz Zamora	0	0.98409	0.92401	0.015950	0.96277	0
Banzer	0.2	0.49263	0.13385	0.68679	0.91771	0.128
Cardoso I	0.4	0.60865	0.73482	0.019342	0.075123	0.53
Cardoso II	0.8	0.8911	0.47670	0.023439	0.075123	0.685
Lula I	0	0.08779	0.76658	0.68679	0.075123	0.299
Lula II	0	0.99264	0.77929	0.76454	0.075123	0.049
Rousseff I	1	0.054518	0.80747	0.82783	0.075123	0.86
Rousseff II	1	0.007481	0.78774	0.64310	0.075123	0.899
Aylwin	0.8	0.85404	0.54517	0.034322	0.025153	1
Frei	0.8	0.80149	0.77929	0.019342	0.025153	1
Lagos	0.8	0.8834	0.66463	0.95	0.025153	1
Bachelet I	1	0.94236	0.94277	0.95	0.025153	1
Piñera I	0.6	0.95679	0.95383	0.96567	0.025153	1
Bachelet II	1	0.61075	0.93886	0.041457	0.025153	1
Piñera II	0.6	0.94300	0.97390	0.060191	0.025153	1
Uribe II	0.8	0.53234	0.91444	0.45108	0.66217	0.822
Santos II	0.8	0.56658	0.43534	0.96567	0.66217	0.67
Medina II	1	0.99435	0.023104	0.82783	0.53499	1
Endara	1	0.84958	0.18254	0	0.18896	1
Balladares	0.4	0.78309	0.84417	0.00011	0.18896	0.428
Moscoso	0.2	0.97505	0.88819	0	0.18896	1
Torrijos	1	0.99087	0.86204	0	0.18896	1
Martinelli	1	0.915	0.89729	0.89653	0.18896	0.785
Varela	0	0.9893	0.72000	0.91337	0.18896	0.038
Cortizo	1	0.90761	0.57916	0.92769	0.18896	1
Lusinchi	1	0.9953	0.065087	0.87685	0.59690	1
Caldera	0	0.050000	0.29096	0.89653	0.59690	1
Chávez	0	0.98409	0.60757	0.91337	0.59690	0.945

Section 5: Alternative Solutions for Coalition Resemblance

The alternative solutions for the outcome (*Coalition Resemblance*) result in model ambiguity, for which more than one solution formula is achieved in the minimisation process. This notwithstanding, the overall findings reported in the main text are not violated. Notably, such ambiguity disappears when I make use of directional expectations. Regardless, the different paths are listed below.

Table A.3: Conservative Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
~MAJ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.942	0.919	0.135	0.035	Chavez, Siles
MAJ∗LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~HTEMP	0.999	0.999	0.260	0.010	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ∗LWPOL∗~HTEMP∗~LPP	0.984	0.980	0.303	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Cardoso II Endara, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos
LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~HTEMP∗~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
MAJ∗LWPOL∗~HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.975	0.965	0.117	0.044	Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos II
First model					
~MAJ∗~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.845	0.739	0.093	0	Lula I; Siles
MAJ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗~LPP	0.996	0.995	0.285	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Second model					
MAJ∗LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LPP	0.997	0.997	0.428	0	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Frei, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Torrijos
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗~LPP	0.901	0.853	0.153	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Third model					
MAJ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗~LPP	0.996	0.995	0.285	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗~LPP	0.901	0.853	0.153	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Solution	0.926	0.912	0.732		

Table A.4: Enhanced Parsimonious Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ	0.958	0.952	0.736	0.300	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
LWPOL∗HLPOL∗˜HTEMP∗˜LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
First model					
˜LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
LWPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.902	0.872	0.215	0	Chavez, Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos
Second model					
˜LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Third model					
˜LWPOL∗HTEMP∗˜LPP	0.904	0.860	0.159	0.005	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Solution 1	0.900	0.886	0.854		
Solution 2	0.907	0.893	0.865		
Solution 3	0.907	0.894	0.869		

Section 6: Deviant Cases for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

The XY Plot in Figure A.2 shows that the solution formula fails to explain a few cases: Balladares in Panamá, Caldera in Venezuela, and Macri in Argentina. The case of Balladares scores high in the set membership of the solution formula but is not representative of *Coalition Resemblance*. This is a typical false positive in a QCA study. By contrast, the cases of Caldera and Macri represent the opposite: cases not belonging to the solution formula but present in the outcome. In other words, these cases are elusive to the recipe devised in the main text. I return to the discussion of the case of Balladares in the section 'Discussion and Case Studies' in the main text.

Figure A.2: XY Plot for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions



Section 7: Analysis for the non-Outcome

Table A.5: Necessity Test for the non-Outcome

Disjunction	**Consistency**	**Coverage**	**Relevance**
~MAJ + ~LWPOL	0.955	0.426	0.625
~MAJ + LPP	0.967	0.422	0.613

Table A.6: Intermediate Solution for the non-Outcome

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
~MAJ ∗~HTEMP ∗LPP	0.815	0.717	0.300		Paz Zamora
Solution	0.815	0.717	0.300		

Section 8: Robustness Tests

In this section, I conduct a series of tests to determine to what extent the results reported in the main text are robust. Taken together, they involve (a) changing the set of cases under analysis, (b) altering the parameters of the calibration process, (c) performing a wide array of cluster analyses, and (d) modifying the consistency benchmark of the analysis of sufficient conditions. Collectively, this constellation of tests provides us with appropriate tools to assess the validity of the main findings.

Case Selection

Initially, the case selection rests on both majority and minority governments. This is so because the interest lies in detecting the patterns for why pre-electoral coalitions keep most of the partners in their transition to becoming coalition cabinets, regardless of the share of seats of the presidential party. However, most studies on coalition governments opt to focus on minority presidents (e.g. Freudenreich, 2016). The justification lies in the fact that majority governments have different incentives in the government formation process when compared to minority presidents. Following this trend, I thereby exclude Lusinchi, Medina II, and Torrijos cases from the empirical analysis.

Furthermore, most governments initiate a few months after the election results are known. However, the Siles government deviated from the norm, as a military coup prevented the government from taking office for roughly two years (Archondo Quiroga and Siles Ormachea, 2022). For this reason, I also disregard Siles' coalition cabinet in this first test.

I also alter the set membership score of Balladares in *Coalition Resemblance* from 0.428 to 0. I do so because the presidential party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD, *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano*), absorbed the other pre-election coalition partners after they failed to pass the electoral threshold and, as such, lost their representation in the legislature (Rodríguez Mójica, 2000). Since parties no longer exist as separate entities from the *formateur* party, the extent to which pre-election partners influence the governing coalition is debatable, thus providing reasons for further investigation.

Finally, as mentioned in the main body of the paper and the first section of this Supplementary Material, the cornerstone of the study is *pre-electoral* alliances rather than purely *electoral* alliances. As such, coalitions derived from run-off agreements have remained out of the length of the primary analysis. To assess whether their inclusion would somehow substantially change the findings, I input the Uruguayan cases into the dataset since the Colorado Party (PC, *Partido Colorado*) and the National Party (PN, *Partido Nacional*) have historically launched their own candidates for presidential elections but chosen to support each other's candidature in second rounds (Albala, 2013).[3] This results in including Batlle and Lacalle Pou coalition cabinets in the analysis.

Table A.7 shows the results after this reshaped case selection. The main difference is that Path 4 drops from the QCA table. A minor deviation also arises by possible alternatives for Path 2 and Path 3. However, this is due to the fact that Path 2 only covers cases from a single country and Path 3 only refers to a single case. Overall, except

[3]The 2019 and 2024 Uruguayan presidential elections gave rise to strikingly similar electoral movements. In both opportunities, the PC supported the PN's presidential candidacies of Lacalle Pou and Delgado in the run-off elections in 2019 and 2024, respectively. These times, however, other parties, such as the Open Cabildo (CA, *Cabildo Abierto*) and the Independent Party (PI, *Partido Independiente*), also coalesced with the PN after each first round.

for the fourth configuration, the results yield the same pathways as those reported in the main text.

Table A.7: Robustness Test: Case Selection

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.948	0.941	0.598	0.480	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Batlle, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lacalle Pou, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Uribe II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.905	0.862	0.179	0.070	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.950	0.928	0.174	0.043	Chavez
Alternatively					
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.948	0.941	0.598	0.480	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Batlle, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lacalle Pou, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Uribe II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP ~LPP	0.900	0.853	0.168	0.085	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
LWPOL ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.946	0.921	0.159	0.043	Chavez
Solution	0.925	0.913	0.734		

Next, I test the degree to which the findings are sensitive to removing every Chilean case from the analysis. The reason for this is the prevalence of the *cuoteo* in governments in Chile since the redemocratisation. The *cuoteo* is an informal institution with a self-reinforcing character in which coalition partners coordinate political nominations to top office positions in the government, sprawling both national and subnational levels (Siavelis et al., 2022). In this context, we can intuit that the existence of the *cuoteo* makes coalition resemblance between full-fledged coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral origins much more likely. On this basis, Table A.8 casts light on whether the configurations found in the main application are primarily driven by the Chilean cases.

Reassuringly, removing the Chilean cases from the analysis does not significantly alter the results. Most importantly, the first pathway (MAJ * LWPOL) is remarkably the same as the one reported in the main text. Although the first path in the original analysis explains every post-election coalition cabinet in Chile, the combination of majority status

Table A.8: Robustness Test: Removal of Chilean Cases

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ ∗LWPOL	0.968	0.959	0.572	0.206	Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ ∗HLPOL ∗HTEMP	0.978	0.970	0.305	0.077	Cortizo, De La Rua, Martinelli, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL ∗HTEMP ∗LPP	0.927	0.896	0.266	0.085	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL ∗ HLPOL ∗~HTEMP ∗~LPP	0.860	0.776	0.256	0.046	Balladares, Cardoso I, Moscoso, Torrijos
Solution	0.914	0.895	0.803		

in the legislature and few policy differences not only explains most cases in this application but still obtains good parameters of fit. The main modification, in reality, happens in the second pathway (MAJ * HLPOL * HTEMP), in which the first condition replaces the absence of low internal policy differences among pre-election coalition partners. However, this comes mostly from the impoverishment of the underlying vector space rather than from a causally relevant role of size considerations in this path.[4] In summary, this test provides strong evidence that the results are neither driven by coalition governments from Chile, in general, nor by the *cuoteo*, in particular.

Alternative Thresholds in the Calibration Process

In the next test, I feed the minimisation process with a slightly different calibration process. More specifically, I modify a few parameters for inclusion and exclusion in HLPOL, HTEMP and LPP.

To begin with *High Legislative Polarisation*, I now set the cross-over point at 3.0 and full exclusion at 2.0, contrasting with the former 2.7 and 1.5 benchmark values, respectively. As countries scoring 4.0 in Dalton's Polarisation Index are deemed to have highly polarised party systems, there is no reason to change the benchmark for full membership in the HLPOL set.

[4]See also the discussion about the causal relevance of the second path in the main text.

For *High Temporal Constrainst*, the full exclusion is increased in a few days, namely from 85 to 92 days. Moreover, the cross-over point is lowered from 70 days to 61 days, reflecting a distinction between *formateurs* who have more than two months to renegotiate their multiparty agreements and those who do not. As mentioned in the main body of the paper, the cross-over point is not raised because the 70-day mark is paramount to distinguishing elections won in the first round from the elections that went to the distance in the second round for countries that adopt a presidential two-round system.

Finally, I lower the cross-over point from 0.405 to 0.399 and increase the value for being entirely out of *Low Presidential Powers* from 0.5 to 0.6. The first modification speaks to the traditional strong invested powers in presidents in the Dominican Republic and examines whether Medina II substantially affects the findings were it to be considered marginally outside of the target set. The second change concentrates on the set membership of Chilean cases. Often, Chile has been characterised as a "hyper-presidential" democracy, in which presidents hold disproportional constitutional powers vis-à-vis the legislature, resulting in the legislature with little influence in the policy-making process (e.g. Eyzaguirre et al., 2020). Recent studies, however, have challenged this view and claimed that presidents are not the sole responsible for legislation in the country (e.g. Berbecel, 2022; Martínez and Dockendorff, 2023; Mimica and Navia, 2024). To do justice to this recent literature, I thus slightly adjust the threshold for full exclusion from LPP.

Results for the above modifications are shown in Table A.9. Together, these changes prompt marginal modifications compared to the results presented in the main text. While Path 1 and Path 2 are very similar to those in Table 5 in the main text, Path 3 emerges as a novelty, though the coverage of a deviant case in kind (Caldera) suggests that we should approach this combination with care. What is important is that *High Temporal Constraint* only appears in paths plagued by model ambiguity, where causal interpretation rests on a fragile basis (Oana et al., 2021). Together with the qualitative discussion in the main text, this represents evidence that our confidence in the institutional argument for the importance of the time restriction separating elections from presidents' inaugural day in office should be considerably diminished in examining how pre-election coalitions

come to fruition in post-electoral settings in multiparty presidential democracies.

Table A.9: Robustness Test: Alternative Calibration Rules

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.466	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LPP	0.927	0.885	0.199	0.044	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
~LWPOL∗~HLPOL∗LPP	0.901	0.828	0.151	0	Banzer, Caldera
First model ~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.972	0.952	0.144	0	Siles
Second model ~LWPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.931	0.887	0.154	0	Caldera, Siles
Alternatively First model ~MAJ∗~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.956	0.915	0.090	0	Siles
Second model ~MAJ∗~LWPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.905	0.848	0.109	0	Caldera; Siles
Solution	0.945	0.936	0.721		

Cluster Analyses

I now examine whether plausible alternative explanations are missing in my theoretical framework. Typically, the literature suggests exploring how changing the explanatory conditions might change the results at hand (Ide, 2015). However, except for the temporal boundness argument, a hitherto barely tested claim, all conditions have solid theoretical roots. Hence, excluding a condition from the analysis appears to be a fruitless exercise. Nonetheless, the cases under analysis are clustered in several different ways. Under these circumstances, we naturally have reasons to suspect the validity of the findings. This concern is graphically illustrated in Figure A.3.

Previous studies have pointed out that institutional designs influence the formation of pre-election coalitions (Kellam, 2017; Spoon and West, 2015). For current purposes, the key point is that some contextual conditions might be causally affected by the underlying institutional setup. For example, proportional systems are associated with higher

Figure A.3: Causal Chain toward Coalition Resemblance



Note: Causal chain to explain the resemblance between full-blown coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral predecessors. Some institutional features mostly affect the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. Crucially, however, we should be cautious with institutions that influence the conversion of pre-electoral pacts into coalition cabinets.

political polarisation at the party system level (Dalton, 2021). Alternatively, other existing institutions might facilitate or make it more difficult for pre-election coalitions to turn into coalition cabinets. Particularly important are the prior organisation of coalition primaries and the simultaneity of elections at different levels. Below, I then run four cluster analyses to identify whether there are any substantial differences across different subgroups.

I begin by considering the possible implications of underlying differing electoral rules across cases. As previously elaborated, electoral systems are a prime example of Figure A.3. This is worrying because the causal relevance of HLPOL might vanish if the different electoral systems are taken into account. To see if this is the case, I source data from Bormann and Golder (2022) and run a cluster analysis on electoral rules. The results are shown in Table A.10 and corroborate the main findings by exhibiting minor deviations between the pooled consistency scores and those from each electoral rule.

Second, in my empirical investigation, coalition cabinets also differ with regard to primaries. These elections refer to shared procedures to choose the future presidential candidate among pre-election coalition members. Despite a wide variability of formal and

Table A.10: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Electoral Rules

Parameters of Fit	**Pathways**			
Consistencies	**MAJ * LWPOL**	**MAJ * HLPOL * HTEMP**	**HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP**	**LWPOL * HLPOL * ∼HTEMP * ∼LPP**
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Mixed Electoral Systems (10)	0.955	0.991	0.901	0.868
Between Proportional Electoral Systems (21)	0.989	0.905	0.942	0.939
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.013	0.032	0.016	0.028
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Mixed Electoral Systems (10)	0.582	0.085	0.196	0.364
Between Proportional Electoral Systems (21)	0.637	0.231	0.195	0.282

informal arrangements, party primaries, in general, are regrettably still understudied in comparative research (Sandri and Seddone, 2016). To show a running example of this variability, in Latin America, party primaries are mandatory and thus indispensable for every meaningful party in Argentina. In stark contrast, there is no regulation in most other countries in the region, and the party primaries are left to the parties' discretion. Of particular relevance is that pre-electoral coalitions are, on average, more likely to hold primaries to select the identity of the presidential nominee in Latin America (Kemahlioglu et al., 2009).

Here, the main concern is whether coalition primaries plausibly make coalition cabinets more likely to resemble their pre-election composition. Theoretically, there is reason to believe that this could happen due to the heightened costs of forming pre-electoral coalitions under these circumstances and the fear of backlash by not inviting pre-election coalition members to the government after the presidential victory. First, by shifting away the candidate selection mechanism from elites to voters, parties do not know if their candidate will feature in the presidential election. As a result, to reduce the costs of pre-election coalition formation, parties may be more willing to keep their word and avoid making future collaborations more difficult. Second, presidential parties risk alienating the original pool of primary voters by disassembling the pre-electoral coalition after a successful presidential election. That said, in the wake of his presidential election win in Argentina in 2015, Macri publicly announced that his party, the Republican Proposal (PRO, *Propuesta Republicana*), would not form a coalition government with its pre-

election coalition partner, the Radical Civic Union (UCR, *Unión Cívica Radical*), despite eventually doing so (Vommaro and Gené, 2017). Interestingly, this public declaration happened even though the PRO and the UCR had held primary elections together a few months prior to the presidential election.

To gain insights about whether coalition primaries cast doubt over the paper's main findings, Table A.11 shows the results of a cluster analysis aimed at pinpointing differences across subgroups of pre-election coalitions based on the undertaking of coalition primaries. Again, the main results remain robust: none of the four pathways yields any systematic differences when clustering on coalition primaries and the distances between subgroups to the pooled consistency are minimal.

Table A.11: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Coalition Primaries

Parameters of Fit	**Pathways**			
Consistencies	**MAJ * LWPOL**	**MAJ * HLPOL * HTEMP**	**HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP**	**LWPOL * HLPOL * ∼HTEMP * ∼LPP**
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Cases without Inter-Party Primaries (25)	0.973	0.907	0.910	0.875
Between Cases Preceded by Inter-Party Primaries (6)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.011	0.034	0.033	0.047
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Cases without Inter-Party Primaries (25)	0.626	0.224	0.201	0.276
Between Cases Preceded by Inter-Party Primaries (6)	0.602	0.073	0.177	0.398

The third test examines whether the previously set out explanatory conditions should be called into question. However, as mentioned before, excluding a condition from the analysis appears to be a fruitless exercise. Nonetheless, another condition could be inserted into the QCA analysis: the concurrence of national and legislative elections.

Extant studies have elaborated on how parties coordinate strategies across different electoral levels, refraining from maximising their utility in one dispute to leverage their gains in the other(s) (Alves, 2023; Borges, 2019; Borges et al., 2017; Borges and Turgeon, 2019). By doing so, the probability that pre-electoral coalition members will not enjoy post-electoral perks should diminish considerably as the costs of coalition participation become apparent even before the elections occur. This, in turn, should make the gov-

ernment more reticent in not allocating ministerial portfolios to pre-election coalition members accordingly. Hence, theoretically, a set labelled Concurrence Elections (CE) should be derived, and the necessary and sufficiency tests should be re-run. Nevertheless, very few cases did not have concomitant elections,[5] namely Lagos in Chile, Uribe II and Santos II in Colombia, and Chávez in Venezuela. With few instances belonging to the CE set, the necessary and sufficiency analyses would mainly become meaningless. As a result, I prefer to perform yet another cluster analysis to assess whether the difference engendered by not having concurrent elections changes the results in a significant way. Table A.12 summarises the results of this test. Again, cluster diagnostics yield no meaningful consistency differences between subgroups and pooled results.

Table A.12: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Concurrent Elections

Parameters of Fit	**Pathways**			
Consistencies	**MAJ * LWPOL**	**~LWPOL * HLPOL * HTEMP**	**HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP**	**LWPOL * HLPOL * ~HTEMP * ~LPP**
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.976	0.894	0.899	0.906
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.009	0.04	0.038	0.035
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	0.552	0.296	0.439	0.148
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.632	0.168	0.154	0.334

Finally, my sample consists of coalition governments nested in eight countries. To rule out the possibility that some pathways are driven by a particular set of countries, I perform a last cluster diagnostic analysis at the country level. Table A.13 provides strong evidence that the findings in the main body of the paper are not dependent on any given country.

[5]Notwithstanding the occurrence of midterm elections in some countries, such as Argentina, the vast majority of presidential elections are still accompanied by simultaneous elections for the legislative branch.

Table A.13: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Country

Parameters of Fit	**Pathways**			
Consistencies	**MAJ * LWPOL**	**∼LWPOL * HLPOL * HTEMP**	**HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP**	**LWPOL * HLPOL * ∼HTEMP * ∼LPP**
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Argentina (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Bolivia (3)	0.880	0.969	0.840	0.689
Between Brazil (6)	0.909	0.823	0.924	0.820
Between Chile (7)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Colombia (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Dom. Republic (1)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Panamá (7)	0.969	1.000	0.734	0.858
Between Venezuela (3)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.017	0.021	0.035	0.043
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Argentina (2)	0.400	0.102	0.485	0.005
Between Bolivia (3)	0.565	0.740	1.000	0.088
Between Brazil (6)	0.345	0.542	0.095	0.363
Between Chile (7)	0.736	0.053	0.024	0.430
Between Colombia (2)	0.737	0.593	0.594	0.249
Between Dom. Republic (1)	0.994	0.006	0.023	0.023
Between Panamá (7)	0.787	0.036	0.079	0.466
Between Venezuela (3)	0.338	0.106	0.324	0.068

Benchmark for Consistency

In a final test, the consistency threshold is raised first from 0.80 to 0.85, and then to 0.9. This prompts a few modifications, such as the replacement of ~LWPOL for MAJ in the second path in Table A.14, and the collapse of a path in Table A.15. This notwithstanding, the broader picture remains the same: *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation* remain jointly important to bring about the outcome in different paths.

Table A.14: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.85

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.163	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.985	0.981	0.314	0.054	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.060	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~HTEMP∗~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.047	Aylwin, Bachelet II,Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.937	0.927	0.798		

Table A.15: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.9

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.364	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ∗HLPOL∗HTEMP	0.985	0.981	0.314	0.054	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL∗HTEMP∗LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.073	Chavez, Siles
Solution	0.964	0.958	0.751		

Summary

Though a few differences arise, the results found in the original analysis are largely robust to several different specifications and diagnostic tools. In particular, a different case selection, an extensive array of cluster analyses, the use of different calibration criteria, and more stringent consistency benchmarks substantiate the importance of *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation* as causally relevant conditions for explaining the high degree of resemblance between pre-election and post-election coalition arrangements.

Conversely, ~LWPOL has proven to be somewhat sensitive to alternative procedures. This condition drops out of the second pathway when removing Chilean coalition cabinets from the analysis and when raising the consistency benchmark to 0.85 and 0.9. Yet, case-level knowledge informs us that the cases covered by this path in the main application – Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, and Siles – were recognised by policy divergences among their members. Despite the focus on Rousseff I and Rousseff II in the main text, Lula I featured an unprecedented agreement before the elections between left-wing parties and a right-of-centre party (Carreirão, 2004) and ideological differences between moderate and extremist left-wing party organisations afflicted Siles' pre-election arrangement (Dunkerley, 1990). The key consideration is that pre-electoral coalitions still served as the centrepiece for post-electoral governments in these cases. Hence, since the results of QCA analysis should not be assessed at face value but rather interpreted through the lens of case analysis (Rönkkö et al., 2025), I caution against outright dismissal of heterogeneous ideological preferences within pre-election coalition arrangements as their combination with high party system polarisation is one of the pathways toward coalition resemblance in multiparty presidential democracies in Latin America.

In a contrasting account, HTEMP loses ground after the use of alternative calibration decisions. Crucially, a case-oriented view shows that the counterfactual world of low temporal constraint would have done little to change the post-election composition of the governments discussed in the last paragraph. For instance, considering that Siles' party,

the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of the Left (MNRI, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda*), is a splinter from the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*) (Alexander, 1985) and that the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista*) is a direct descendant of the former dictatorial regime (Dunkerley, 1986), the chances of government membership for either party were, at best, very slim, regardless of the available period for the government formation process. In this context, the robustness tests, in combination with a bottom-up case-oriented perspective, point toward discrediting the role of *High Temporal Constraint* for coalition resemblance.

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