The Drivers of Resemblance in Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets[*]

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Abstract

Recent studies have drawn attention to the importance of pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty presidential democracies. Despite this, much scholarship has neglected the period marked by the transition of pre-electoral coalitions into governing coalitions. Through a systematic cross-case analysis of Latin American cases, this paper examines why some coalition governments largely resemble the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them while others do not. The findings give weight to different combinations of five conditions, albeit with more prominence for the legislative status granted by pre-election coalition members to the government, the low polarisation between pre-electoral coalition members and the high ideological polarisation in the legislature. In so doing, this study contributes to the still-growing literature on pre-electoral coalitions in presidential democracies by shedding light on the complex causation behind the pathway from pre-electoral bargaining to fully developed coalition governments.

1   Introduction

In 2010, the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) launched Rousseff's presidential candidacy with an eye on extending its streak of presidential election victories in Brazil. In order to increase its candidate's odds, the PT built a broad pre-electoral coalition, encompassing not less than ten parties. However, even if the PT ultimately won the presidential contest, not all electoral coalition party members were invited to take a seat in the cabinet when Rousseff was sworn into office. Despite still providing informal support for the government, the Social Christian Party (PSC, *Partido Social Cristão*) publicly voiced its dissatisfaction with being excluded from the coalition cabinet. The PSC's party leader emphatically complained that they did not have a single portfolio seat despite being a former member of the pre-electoral alliance and having a legislative contingent similar to other coalition party members (Azevedo, 2012).

In a similar story, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR, *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*) formed a pre-election alliance so as to back its candidate in the 1989 Bolivian presidential election. Once again, notwithstanding the alliance's win, the president-elect party broke up with the pre-electoral pact and gave birth to a government not envisioned by the original multiparty coalition. This case is especially symbolic as the MIR did not assign any top office position to the former electoral coalition party members, thereby favouring the construction of a brand-new post-electoral coalition arrangement.[1]

Together, these cases raise the question as to what drives the translation of pre-election alliances into coalition governments in multiparty presidential democracies. This question features prominently as the literature frequently adopts an unexamined assumption that pre-electoral coalitions are automatically transformed into coalition cabinets. Even though pre-electoral coalitions exert notable influence on the government formation process (Borges, Turgeon **and** Albala, 2021; Carroll, 2007; Peron, 2018), recent scholarship

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has argued that, at least in presidentialism, the process from electoral alliances to cabinet formation is not as straightforward as it seems (Couto, 2024). Hence, the main aim of this study is to contribute to this burgeoning literature by shedding light on why some coalition governments closely match the pre-electoral pacts that brought them forth while others do not.

Studying the process by which pre-election coalitions are turned into coalition cabinets is pertinent for several reasons. Looking at non-*formateur* parties first, their strategies rely to some extent on the knowledge of whether they will be in the government. Even though parties have different approaches to making their organisations grow (Borges, Albala **and** Burtnik, 2017; Panebianco, 1988), pre-coalition party members may be counting on the fact that they will have access to the spoils of being in the cabinet if the pre-election alliance succeeds in the national contest. As such, being excluded from the government potentially undermines parties' objectives in the short and long run, especially if they aimed to control portfolios to channel pork barrel resources to their constituencies (Batista, 2022; Meireles, 2024) or expected to hold a highly regarded portfolio, which could boost their votes in the next elections in return (Batista, Power **and** Zucco, 2023). In addition, although elected governments have plausible reasons for not deviating grossly from policy commitments made prior to the elections (Kellam, 2017; Naurin, Soroka **and** Markwat, 2019), being a member of the coalition government leverages parties' odds of implementing public policies close to their likings. The experience of coalition governments in parliamentary democracies tells us that parties may even use the portfolio allocation process to keep tabs on which policies are to be implemented by the government (Fernandes, Meinfelder **and** Moury, 2016), and there is no reason why this should not be replicated in presidential democracies. As a result, even if parties can resort to alternative methods to promote the oversight of the government's policy-making (Silva **and** Medina, 2022; Thijm, 2024), losing cabinet participation can have deleterious consequences for pre-electoral coalition parties when it comes to the degree to which the policy-making process is attuned to their policy preferences. On the flip side of the coin, finding out why *formateurs* stick to their pre-electoral coalitions contributes to the

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stream of studies interested in gauging to what extent presidents use their institutional powers for their own benefit (Ariotti **and** Golder, 2018; Silva, 2023).

I argue that the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble pre-electoral coalitions depends on the blend of five conditions: i) the pre-electoral coalition's legislative status, ii) the level of polarisation within pre-electoral coalitions, iii) ideological polarisation in the legislature itself, iv) the temporal constraint between the end of the elections and the inauguration day, and v) presidents' legislative power. In so doing, my claim draws on several but different theories of government formation, namely explanations based on office, policy and institutional assumptions. In this way, this article strives to further add to the discussion about when and why presidential parties make credible office commitments when building pre-election alliances.

To do so, this paper subscribes to a configurational approach to dealing with the dynamics of coalition governments. To be sure, research on coalition cabinets based on set-theoretic methods is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Albala, 2021; Viatkin, 2023). Even still, it bears noting that set theory appears to be especially appropriate for the research question at hand for two reasons. In the first place, coalition formation seems to have its roots in causal complexity, as shown by the fact that the effects of pre-electoral coalitions are not independent of the levels of legislative polarisation (Couto, 2024). Consequently, the reasons behind government formation appear to lie in the combination of conditions rather than in the independent effects of each. Additionally, the research design suffers from the lack of variety in the dependent variable, which can be seen by the fact that all cases derive somehow from pre-electoral coordination. Substantially, this work differs from Albala, Borges **and** Silva (Forthcoming) especially for the case-centred nature of the research. As set-theoretic methods have an intrinsic link to qualitative approaches, employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (henceforth, QCA) allows me to handle better my case selection than resorting to a purely quantitative approach.

I start in the next section by briefly presenting the literature on government formation

in presidentialism and raising empirical expectations to explain the similarity of coalition cabinets with their pre-electoral inception. Thereafter, the third section showcases my research design. More specifically, this section is divided into three parts, in which I first discuss the advantages of QCA to the study of coalition formation, then I detail my case selection, and lastly, I show the calibration process of the outcome and the conditions. In the fourth section, I conduct and reveal the results of necessity and sufficiency analyses. The fifth section briefly refers to the robustness tests, and the sixth is concerned with illustrating the QCA findings based on the discussion of some cases. Finally, the last section presents my concluding remarks along with suggestions for future research.

2 The High Road between Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Coalition Cabinets

In presidential and parliamentary democracies alike, *formateur* parties do not easily attain a parliamentary majority on their own in fragmented party systems. Not coincidentally, coalition governments have become increasingly more common in the European parliamentarian democracies (Müller, Bäck **and** Hellström, 2023). Likewise, in recent years, multiparty governments have risen in presidential democracies historically marked by single-party governments, such as Costa Rica (Hernández-Naranjo **and** Guzmán-Castillo, 2018). As a consequence, even if minority governments are not necessarily doomed to have poor governability (Figueiredo, Canello **and** Vieira, 2012; Thürk, 2022), the power-sharing in the form of coalition governments arises as a commonplace tool to grant majority status to the government and, therefore, prevent troublesome deadlocks in the legislature (Chasquetti, 2001; Cheibub, 2007; Warwick, 1996). Thus, it is not by accident that one of the reasons for forming pre-electoral coalitions is to foster the legislative support of the incoming government (Borges et al., 2021; Golder, 2006; Ibenskas, 2016).

In this context, the coalition bargaining process entails a quid-pro-quo between the president-elect party and the remaining parties with legislative representation. In this

study, as mentioned above, I assume that parties strive for cabinet participation in order to push their goals related to office, policy, and vote. In fact, evidence from Western European countries suggests that the longer the period parties stay out of government, the more willing they become to relinquish some coalition payoffs just to be part of the government (Falcó-Gimeno, 2012). Contrariwise, presidential parties should search to increase their coalition share of seats when the pre-electoral alliance fails to reach a majority in one or both chambers after election results (Albala, 2017). This behaviour is particularly amenable in presidential democracies, where coalition parties rarely produce and disclose publicly written coalition agreements to the electorate. Consequently, should presidential parties look for new coalition partners before assuming the presidency, the government formation process is not necessarily plagued by the process of putting down the terms of the coalition compromise as it is in parliamentary democracies (Bergman, Angelova, Bäck **and** Müller, 2024; Moury, 2013).

Against this backdrop, the expectation is that the composition of post-electoral governments should differ from that of pre-electoral pacts when the latter falls short of securing a minimal winning coalition. Reversing the argument, *formateur* parties ought not to look out for new partners when pre-electoral coalition members successfully hold a majority in the legislature. By adopting a purely office-seeking premise, this would happen because none of the parties would be willing to share the spoils of being in power with parties needless in terms of securing enough legislative support for the government (Leiserson, 1966; Riker, 1962). Yet, as parties have other motivations beyond attaining office, the majority status of pre-electoral coalitions is hypothesised within an INUS condition[2]:

H1: Majority pre-electoral coalitions operate as INUS conditions to yield coalition cabinets with a similar composition relative to their pre-electoral composition.

High within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is another potential trigger for changes in the composition of pre-electoral alliances in their way of forming coalition governments. Even if parties tend not to coalesce when the ideological distance between them is signifi-

cant (Kellam, 2017), some pre-electoral alliances are still composed of parties from different ends of the political spectrum (Indridason, 2011). When this happens, pre-electoral coalition members potentially disagree over several issues on coalition governance, such as who gets which portfolio, which policy is to be prioritised, and whether and which party should be invited to be part of the coalition cabinet. As a consequence, high levels of ideological polarisation may ultimately lead to the fracture of pre-election pacts, while low levels may account for a smooth conversion into coalition cabinets.

H2: Low within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is an INUS condition to render coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins.

Turning to the party system level, Couto (2024) has recently argued that the effects of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation are moderated by the degree of existing legislative polarisation. In a similar vein, I argue here that legislative polarisation also plays a role in the process of pre-electoral coalitions becoming coalition cabinets. The key point is that lower levels of legislative polarisation make multiparty bargaining more straightforward for the *formateur* parties insofar as they have more leeway to break from the pre-electoral alliance if they wish to do so.

Nevertheless, it bears noting that the impact of legislative polarisation on government formation does not occur in a vacuum. In other words, ideological polarisation in the legislature does not influence the government formation process *per se*; rather, polarisation matters only when accompanied by other conditions. To see how this is the case, consider a pre-electoral coalition in a context where parties are not too ideologically different from one another. Even though the presidential party arguably has more freedom for rearranging with whom to ally in this scenario, why would it change the composition of the pre-electoral alliance in the first place? Conversely, if *formateur* parties have an underpinning reason to break from their original pre-electoral commitments, legislative polarisation should facilitate or complicate the endeavours of *formateur* parties.

In summary, just as in H1, I expect legislative polarisation to be an INUS condition for explaining the similarity between pre-electoral pacts and coalition cabinets in multiparty

presidential regimes. Thus:

H3: Elevated levels of legislative polarisation are an INUS condition to make coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origin.

One of the main characteristics of presidential regimes is that presidents serve constitutionally fixed terms, thereby not being responsible to an elected assembly (Cheibub, 2007; Samuels **and** Shugart, 2010). Based on this, the literature draws attention to the fact that constitutional or electoral rules clarify when the presidents' tenure must end. However, scholars more often than not overlook that the same institutions are also explicit when presidents are to be sworn into office (Albala, 2017). That is, presidential regimes, unlike their parliamentary counterparts (Ecker **and** Meyer, 2015; Golder, 2010), cannot have several rounds of multiparty bargaining before the *formateur* gets into office because there is a temporal bound between the end of the elections and the beginning of their tenure.

Overall, institutional claims have found mixed support in research on coalitional presidentialism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Freudenreich, 2016). Still, past scholarship has pointed out that pre-electoral pacts are influenced by institutional settings (Ferrara **and** Herron, 2005; Spoon **and** West, 2015). In this way, I argue that the temporal distance between the end of the elections and the inauguration day of the next government influences the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble pre-electoral pacts. A shorter distance constraints president-elect parties from drastically changing coalition members, encouraging them to build the government around pre-electoral alliances. By contrast, a longer distance between elections and the inauguration day allows presidents to think more thoughtfully about the composition of the coalition government.

However, again, it is not expected that presidents change the partisan composition of their pre-election arrangements just because they have fewer constraints to do so. This is similar to legislative polarisation at the party system level. Just like different levels of legislative polarisation do not lead presidents to make changes in their coalitions on their own, neither does a short temporal distance until the inauguration day. Hence,

the effects of the time-related boundness should not appear alone but in tandem with other conditions to explain the transformation of pre-election commitments into coalition cabinets. As such:

H4: A short distance between the end of the elections and the first day in office is an INUS condition to the alikeness between pre-electoral alliances and subsequent coalition cabinets.

As the last piece of the puzzle, the transition of pre-electoral pacts to coalition cabinets may also be contingent on the extent to which presidents are granted tools to promote the governability of their governments. Indeed, previous empirical studies have shown that presidential powers influence overall patterns of coalition formation (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012; Silva, 2023). More specifically, presidents with extensive powers to influence the lawmaking process may care less about fulfilling office pre-electoral commitments than those without substantive legislative powers. This is because the former can still govern by issuing decree-laws, dictating legislative agenda or vetoing undesired bills, while the latter must come to terms with the legislature to guarantee their governability. This is especially true for the transition period between pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets, as presidents are prone to enjoy the honeymoon in their first year in office, thus further discouraging constitutionally weak presidents from disturbing executive-legislative relations at the outset of their tenure. In this regard:

H5: Low presidential powers are sufficient for engendering coalition cabinets similar to the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them.

3   Research Design

To evaluate the claims around the process by which pre-electoral coalitions become coalition cabinets, I make use of QCA. In broad terms, QCA is a set-theoretic method and technique which aims to approximate variable- and case-oriented approaches (Berg-Schlosser,

De Meur, Rihoux **and** Ragin, 2009; Ragin, 2008; Schneider **and** Wagemann, 2012). By doing so, QCA puts cases in the limelight while also allowing the detection of empirical patterns (Mello, 2022). As mentioned in the introduction, despite not being ubiquitous, QCA has been applied to the study of coalition politics. In the scholarship, the primary motivation for its application lies in the fact that QCA provides further leverage to causal inferences by allowing researchers to explore causal complexity.

In this study, I am most interested in grasping the conjunctural causation involved in government formation under presidentialism. That is, I rely on QCA to investigate whether conditions can individually account for a given outcome. The difference is that I do not throw them away if they do not, as it is plausible that they can be meaningful only when interacting with other conditions. This aspect of causal complexity is precisely in line with some empirical expectations of the last section.

My case selection is slightly particular, as I deliberately select my observations based on the dependent variable. Despite being a criticised approach following the standards of the conventional quantitative literature (Geddes, 2003; King, Keohane **and** Verba, 1994), this strategy makes sense depending on the researcher's aims (Ragin, 2008). In this study, I do not intend to generalise my findings to all instances of government formation in Latin America. Rather, I am most concerned with coalition cabinets derived from pre-electoral alliances. Given that most coalition governments emerge from some sort of interparty pre-electoral coordination in multiparty presidential democracies (Albala **and** Couto, 2023), this research design still enables me to cover a substantial portion of the landscape concerning the formation of coalition cabinets in Latin America. As a result, to reflect this paper's main interest, the case selection must cover only coalition cabinets that result from multiparty pre-electoral bargaining. In the Supplementary Material, I discuss in greater detail which cases are left out of the analysis.

Table 1 presents the pre- and post-electoral coalition composition of the 31 cases to be analysed in this chapter.

The calibration process of the conditions and the outcome provides the basis for run-

Table 1: Pre- and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America

Country (N)	Government	Start of the term	Pre-Electoral Coalition Composition	Coalition Cabinet Composition
Argentina (2)	De La Rúa	1999	UCR - Frepaso	UCR - Frepaso
	Macri	2015	PRO - UCR - ARI	PRO - UCR - ARI
Bolivia (3)	Siles	1982	MNRI - MIR - PCB	MNRI - MIR - PCB - PDC
	Paz Zamora	1989	MIR - MNR-V - PCML	MIR - ADN
	Banzer	1997	ADN - NFR	ADN - CONDEPA - MIR - NFR - UCS
Brazil (6)	Cardoso I	1995	PSDB - PFL - PTB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PMDB
	Cardoso II	1999	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB - PMDB - PPS
	Lula I	2003	PT - PL - PCdoB	PT - PL - PCdoB - PDT - PPS - PSB - PTB - PV
	Lula II	2007	PT - PCdoB	PT - PCdoB - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PTB - PV
	Rousseff I	2011	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PRB - PSB - PSC	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PSB - PSC - PP
	Rousseff II	2015	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD - PTB
Chile (7)	Aylwin	1990	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch
	Frei	1994	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Lagos	2000	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Bachelet I	2006	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD
	Piñera I	2010	RN - UDI	RN - UDI
	Bachelet II	2014	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC
	Piñera II	2018	RN - UDI - EVOP	RN - UDI - EVOP
Colombia (2)	Uribe II	2006	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD - PDA
	Santos II	2014	PU - CR - PLC	PU - CR - PLC - PCC
Dom. Republic (1)	Medina II	2016	PLD - PRD	PLD - PRD
Panamá (7)	Endara	1990	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA
	Balladares	1994	PRD - LIBRE - PALA	PRD - LIBRE - PALA - SOLID
	Moscoso	1999	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD
	Torrijos	2004	PRD - POPULAR	PRD - POPULAR
	Martinelli	2009	PPA - MOLIRENA- PCD - UP	PPA - PCD
	Varela	2014	PPA - POPULAR	PPA - POPULAR - PCD
	Cortizo	2019	PRD - MOLIRENA	PRD - MOLIRENA
Venezuela (3)	Lusinchi	1984	AD - URD	AD - URD
	Caldera	1994	CN - MAS	CN - MAS
	Chávez	1999	MVR - MAS - PPT	MVR - MAS - PPT - PCV

Source: Amorim Neto (2019); Borges et al. (2021); Freudenreich (2016); Lopes (2022); Silva (2023); and the countries' respective electoral committees.

ning QCA analyses. As a set-theoretic method, the calibration accounts for whether cases are in or out of a given set. Notwithstanding the proliferation of QCA variants in recent years (Mello, 2022), QCA has three more well-known specifications (crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy-set QCA), each holding specific ways for calibrating conditions (Medina, Castillo-Ortiz, Álamos Concha **and** Rihoux, 2017). The fuzzy-set QCA (henceforth, fsQCA) is the most suitable QCA variant for current purposes, as it

allows to consider to what extent cases belong or not to a set by inputting a continuous value membership between 0.0 and 1.0 (Ragin, 2008). The great asset of fsQCA, thus, resides in the fact that it relies on more grain-fined information and, consequently, provides us with better tools to deal with more complex concepts. Below, I briefly discuss the decision-making process to calibrate conditions and the outcome.[3]

To begin with, the outcome *Coalition Resemblance* captures to what extent coalition cabinets are similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that preceded them. To calculate membership in the outcome, I take into account the percentage of the share of seats preelectoral coalition members contribute to the coalition's total share of seats in the lower house. In this measure, I disregard the president-elect party's legislative contingent, as very few presidential parties fail to make part of the upcoming government (Amorim Neto, 1998). If *formateur* parties' share of seats had remained in the calculation in the first place, *Coalition Resemblance* would have inflated values and, thus, unduly lessen the contribution of pre-electoral coalition members to the upcoming governing coalition.

Overall, this measure is very similar to the one developed and employed by Albala, Borges **and** Couto (2023) to study the effects of pre-electoral coalitions on cabinet duration in Latin America. In fact, this measure is straightforward if coalition cabinets keep the same partners from the electoral period or are enlarged. However, this calculus fails to incorporate coalition reductions, as pre-electoral coalition members would still account for all the coalition's seats of share. In order to hold a holistic view of all the possible changes a pre-election alliance can undergo, I slightly change the formula to also account for such occurrences by inverting the relationship between pre-election and coalition cabinets. That is, when pre-electoral coalition members are expelled from the coalitional pact, I measure the percentage of the post-electoral coalition cabinet's share of seats from the total share of seats pre-election coalitions would have if their composition had not changed.[4]

Regardless of whether pre-electoral coalitions are changed or not, full set membership in the set of Coalition Resemblance indicates that coalition cabinets thoroughly resem-

ble pre-electoral coalition members — meanwhile, full non-membership points out that coalition cabinets and pre-electoral coalitions are entirely different from each other.

Moving on to explanatory conditions, *Majority* indicates whether pre-electoral coalitions hold legislative majority status after the election results. To be more in than out of this set, I consider that pre-election coalitions should have at least a semi-majority (more than 45% of the share of seats) in one of the legislative chambers. In this circumstance, cases are assigned a 0.6 score, while cases with a legislative contingent more robust receive higher set membership scores. Conversely, pre-electoral pacts that fail to reach at least a semi-majority are more out than in the Majority set and receive lower scores according to their seat share.

Next, *Low Within Polarisation* refers to the ideological distance between pre-election coalition members, while *High Legislative Polarisation* concerns the ideological polarisation in the legislature. The qualitative anchors across both sets are not exactly reversed to one another, albeit they are based on the same polarisation index developed by Dalton (2008). The reason is that legislative polarisation naturally tends to be higher than polarisation found within pre-electoral alliances. The former bear in mind all parties of party systems, including extremist parties, whereas the latter, more often than not, revolve around parties with close ideological preferences (Kellam, 2017).

Low Temporal Constraint corresponds to the distance, in days, between the end of the election and the day presidents are sworn into office. The empirical anchors of this set are established mostly by looking at observed patterns found in the data, since the time lapse that separates the end of elections from the beginning of a new government in presidential democracies has not been profoundly studied yet. The use of days as an explanatory condition should not come as a surprise, since such a measure has been employed elsewhere in the literature on coalition politics (e.g. Meyer, Sieberer **and** Schmuck, 2023). Either way, set full membership is defined as 55 days, which is equivalent to a one-month-a-half period, whereas full exclusion is set at 85 days, which is a long period even by the standards of parliamentary democracies (Golder, 2010).

At last, *Low Presidential Power* is associated with the degree to which presidents are powerful actors in the political scene. While indexes of presidential powers abound, the calibration rests specifically on Doyle **and** Elgie's (2016) measurement. This is so because this measure considers presidential powers as a whole instead of choosing to focus on a single particular dimension. For example, rather than using decree and veto power as proxies for presidential powers, this measurement entails encompassing all the president's prerogatives, such as their capability to introduce bills, appoint and dismiss ministers at their discretion, and so on. To locate empirical anchors, I once again rely on empirical gaps found in the data, positioning full membership at 0.3, the cross-over point at 0.405,[5] and the full exclusion from the set at 0.5.

To summarise, the calibration process, an overview of the conditions and the outcome, along with their calibration, are displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Overview of the Calibration of the Outcome and the Conditions

Set	Definition	Procedure	Calibration
Coalition Resemblance (CR)	The degree to which pre-electoral coalitions resemble coalition cabinets	Direct Assignment	Percentage to which pre-electoral coalitions reflect post-electoral cabinets' composition in terms of seat share.
Majority (MAJ)	Pre-electoral coalition legislative status	Direct Assignment	1 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative status in both chambers 0.8 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative in at least one of the chambers 0.6 = Pre-electoral parties grant a semi-majority legislative in at least one of the chambers 0.4 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in both chambers 0.2 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in at least one of the chambers 0 = Pre-electoral parties grant less than 35% in both chambers
Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL)	To what extent pre-electoral coalition members are far apart on the left-right ideological dimension	Direct Method	FM = 1.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 3.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL)	Ideological dividedness in the party system	Direct Method	FM = 4.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.7 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 1.5 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
Low Temporal Constraint (LTEMP)	The temporal distance between the end of the elections and the inauguration day	Direct Method	FM = 55 days CO = 70 days FE = 85 days
Low Presidential Power (LPP)	The strength of presidents	Direct Method	FM = 0.3 in Doyle and Elgie (2016) CO = 0.405 in Doyle and Elgie (2016) FE = 0.5 in Doyle and Elgie (2016)

Source: Borges, Lloyd **and** Vommaro (forthcoming); Dalton (2008); Doyle **and** Elgie (2016); Freudenreich (2016); Silva (2023); and the countries' respective electoral committees.
Note: FM stands for full membership in the set, CO for cross-over point, and FE for full exclusion in the set.

4   Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis of configurational comparative research is based on statements of necessity and sufficiency. On the one hand, when one says that certain conditions are necessary to bring forth an outcome, it means that they are indispensable for the occurrence of that outcome (Ragin, 2008). That is, the outcome does not come into existence without these specific conditions. On the other hand, when a condition (or a combination thereof) is sufficient for an outcome, it should be interpreted that this condition suffices to render the outcome on its own (Medina et al., 2017; Mello, 2022).

Unless the interest lies in finding minimally necessary disjunctions of minimally sufficient combinations (Haesebrouck **and** Thomann, 2022), QCA empirical analysis operates analyses of necessity and sufficiency separately. In order not to produce untenable assumptions in the analysis of sufficiency, it is advised that the analysis of necessity must be conducted beforehand (Schneider **and** Wagemann, 2012). In the analysis of necessary conditions, the literature argues that a 0.9 consistency threshold and a 0.6 relevance of necessity score should be in place to find meaningful non-trivial necessary relations between conditions and the outcome (Oana, Schneider **and** Thomann, 2021; Schneider, 2018; Schneider **and** Wagemann, 2012). By applying these recommendations, Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the resemblance of post-electoral coalition governments vis-à-vis their pre-electoral composition.

Table 3: Necessity Test for Coalition Resemblance

Disjunction	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
MAJ + LTEMP	0.916	0.858	0.600

Note: In configurational rationale, the sign "+" is equivalent to the logical OR.

The necessity test points out that only a single combination of conditions is necessary to explain the commonalities, in terms of coalition composition, between pre-electoral pacts and post-electoral governments. The analysis reveals that either achieving a majority status (MAJ) or facing a short period until the government officially is set in motion (LTEMP) is pivotal for a smooth transition from pre-electoral to post-electoral

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coalitions.[6]

Closely following the necessity test, the next stage in a typical QCA framework involves engaging in sufficiency analysis. Much of the analysis of sufficient conditions boils down to the construction of the truth table and its subsequent minimisation process. This is so because the truth table lays out all possible combinations of conditions in different rows, assigns empirical cases to them according to their degree of membership to every set, and shows to what extent each row is associated with a sufficient relation with the outcome. In turn, based on the truth table information, the minimisation process is charged with applying Boolean algebra to generate a recipe that supposedly explains the outcome of interest.

Based on several arguments within coalition theories, the previous sections devised five empirical expectations to account for the convergence between pre-electoral coalitions and their post-electoral heirs, which resulted in the creation of five explanatory conditions. Against this backdrop, the truth table for coalition resemblance generates 32 logically possible combinations, as the number of rows in a truth table is given by 2^n, where n is the number of conditions in the study.

As listed in Table 4,[7] the empirical instances are distributed along 13 configurations, with all the remaining rows representing logical remainders,[8] which have been omitted for ease of interpretation. As a result, the present sufficiency analysis is confronted with limited diversity (Ragin **and** Sonnett, 2008), as logical reasoning provides a far greater number of possible combinations than those that actually exist in the real world.

However, as limited diversity is ubiquitous in empirical research, QCA does have some remedies for treating logical remainders. All in all, the answer lies in the different ways to handle them in the minimisation process. For present purposes, I opt for partially including logical remainders in the logical minimisation of the truth table. More specifically, while difficult counterfactuals are dismissed, easy counterfactuals, which are logical reminders in line with theoretical and substantive knowledge (Dusa, 2019, Chap. 8; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 9), are included in the analysis. In doing so, the counterfactual analysis

Table 4: Truth Table for Coalition Resemblance

| Condition | | | | | Outcome | | | | |
MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	LTEMP	LPP	CR	N	Consistency	PRI	Cases
1	1	1	0	0	1	5	1.000	1.000	Aylwin, Frei, Bachelet II, Piñera II, Torrijos
1	0	1	1	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Rousseff I, Rousseff II
1	1	0	0	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Cardoso II, Endara
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.997	0.995	Uribe II
1	1	1	1	0	1	6	0.991	0.989	De La Rúa, Lagos, Bachelet I, Piñera I, Martinelli, Cortizo
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.988	0.979	Siles
1	1	0	1	1	1	3	0.975	0.965	Medina II, Santos II, Lusinchi
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.934	0.903	Chávez
0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.871	0.783	Cardoso I, Balladares, Moscoso
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.804	0.661	Lula I
0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.790	0.691	Banzer, Caldera
0	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.666	0.592	Macri, Lula II, Varela
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.569	0.299	Paz Zamora

allows inputting educated hunches in the sufficiency test on what would have possibly occurred had the empty truth table rows had empirical cases. Hence, as only a fraction of the counterfactuals is in the minimisation process, the analysis of sufficient conditions rests on the intermediate solution.[9]

As the final steps before assessing set relations based on sufficiency, I employ the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) to minimise the truth table, given the existence of a necessary disjunction. I also set the inclusion score for consistency at 0.8, a value slightly above the bare minimum 0.75 consistency threshold recommended by the literature (Mello, 2022, Chap. 6; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 3). Furthermore, the directional expectations have the exact directions as the hypothesised conditions, such as *Majority* is expected to lead to coalition resemblance, as does *Low Within Polarisation* and so forth. Coupled with the previous features, this setting leads to a solution composed of four causal pathways to account for *Coalition Resemblance*, as shown in Table 5.

The first path indicates that pre-electoral coalitions marked by majoritarian status

Table 5: Enhanced Intermediate Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ *LWPOL	0.978	0.974	0.620	0.292	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
~LWPOL *HLPOL *LTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0.063	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
HLPOL *LTEMP *LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.043	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL * HLPOL *~LTEMP *~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Balladares, Bachelet II, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Piñera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.919	0.906	0.806		

and pre-coalition party members with close policy preferences engender coalition cabinets heavily based on the composition of these pre-electoral alliances. To attest to the prominence of this configuration, it has the highest scores for consistency and raw coverage, besides uniquely covering several pre-elections that ultimately led to governing coalitions. This path, thus, provides sound supportive evidence for the notion that *formateur* parties work towards preserving pre-electoral pacts that grant them a majority of the seats and are ideologically coherent through the first moments of the government.

Next, the second path highlights the combination of ideological heterogeneity within the pre-electoral pact, high legislative polarisation and a short period until the government's first day in office to the conversion of pre-electoral pacts in coalition governments. Similarly, high legislative polarisation and low temporal constraints are also components of the third path. The difference resides in the fact that, instead of low within polarisation, Path 3 envisions that this combination occurs in tandem with constitutionally weak presidents.

The last pathway poses an intriguing combination together. It tells us that, even facing a considerable time until official government formation and with constitutionally moderated to strong presidents, pre-electoral alliances serve as a basis for post-electoral governments when the party system they are embedded in is highly polarised, but their

coalition members are ideologically next to one another. This combination is particularly noteworthy for severely threatening the necessary claim between coalition resemblance and the disjunction between majority and low temporal constraint. The point is that the fourth path accounts for the outcome even without including the necessary disjunction in its mix. However, if statements of necessity require that the outcome cannot be reached without necessary conditions, then the disjunction between *Majority* and *Low Temporal Constraint* should not be considered necessary to produce coalition cabinets alike their pre-electoral coalitions.

Together, the four paths result in an overall solution formula with a high consistency score of 0.919 and a significant proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) of 0.906, covering roughly 80% of the cases in the analysis. These scores amount to a solution formula that contains very few instances which weaken its sufficiency claims[10] and covers a non-insignificant number of the cases, in addition to not being plagued by simultaneous subset relations.

The analysis of sufficient conditions simultaneously challenges one empirical expectation while rendering support to others. To start with, hypothesis 5 asserted that low presidential powers would be sufficient to make coalition cabinets resemble the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them. However, the analysis of sufficiency indicates that no condition is individually sufficient to account for the outcome, though it does not mean that the explanatory conditions are thoroughly irrelevant. Rather, the sufficiency test reinforces the conjunctural causation aspect of configurational comparative methods, in the sense that the explanatory conditions are individually uninteresting but jointly sufficient to bring about the outcome. In this way, the hypothesis testing lends support to hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4, as *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, *High Legislative Polarisation*, and *Low Temporal Constraint* only produce their effects in combination with one another and *Low Presidential Power*.

To a lesser or a greater extent, the findings indicate that every condition works as INUS conditions. Nevertheless, the combination between *Majority* and *Low Within Po-*

larisation, and the individual condition of *High Legislative Polarisation* stand out in the results for a few reasons. Not only does the former cover the most number of cases amongst the four pathways, but it also provides additional support for recent findings in the literature (Albala et al., Forthcoming). With regard to the latter, ideologically polarised party systems are in three out of the four paths leading to *Coalition Resemblance*, while other conditions, such as *Low Presidential Power*, only appear in a single alternative route. Equally importantly, the fact that legislative polarisation is a prominent condition to explain the degree to which post-electoral coalition cabinets resemble preelectoral coalitions also speaks to recent findings in the literature (Couto, 2024). Thus, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that past findings found in variable-centred research are robust upon a closer examination of the cases behind the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets.

If the set-theoretic analysis for sufficiency for coalition resemblance has yielded a wealth of findings, the results for the non-outcome (a moderate to severe dissonance in composition between pre-electoral coalitions and coalition cabinets) are largely uninteresting given their complexity and low coverage. However, this was expected to some degree, as the conditions were primarily calibrated to examine the factors behind explaining the similarity between pre-election coalitions and coalition cabinets. Consequently, a handful of potential explanatory conditions to account for the difference between the pre-electoral and post-electoral stages, such as a profound ideological difference among pre-electoral coalition members, were not adequately captured. As dictated by good practice, the necessity and sufficiency analyses for the non-outcome are nevertheless available and can be found in the Supplementary Material.

5 Robustness Tests

By default, several methodological decisions in configurational comparative methods lie in the researcher's discretion, such as which procedure should be used to calibrate conditions, which benchmark should be applied in necessary and sufficient analyses, and so on.

Naturally, these decisions raise concerns about the validity of QCA results, since they could be driven purely by researchers' decisions. To appease this issue, the literature has come up with several tests to probe the soundness of QCA results (Ide, 2015; Oana **and** Schneider, 2021), which have been widely employed in QCA recent empirical research (e.g. Paustyan, 2021). For current purposes, these tests consist of changing the study's case selection and conditions, the conditions' calibration decisions and, finally, the consistency benchmark of the analysis of sufficient conditions. Due to space constraints, these tests can be found in a dedicated section in the Supplementary Material. Overall, with the exception of the sensitiveness of ~LWPOL, the results found in the original analysis remain largely the same throughout all the tests.

6 Discussion and Case Studies

Even if QCA excels at bringing the cases to the fore, the present study has been much closer to a condition-oriented QCA than a case-oriented QCA so far.[11] With the aim of filling this gap, I now pass on to the discussion of how the solution derived in the penultimate section applies to some cases. From reading the solution formula, the explanation of what makes coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins resides in four paths. Thus, I select a few cases from each configuration to represent how conditions operate as gears towards *Coalition Resemblance.*

The first route towards coalition resemblance is marked by majority pre-election coalitions composed of ideologically aligned members. This path is neatly exemplified by most of the Chilean coalition cabinets present in the analysis, such as Bachelet I and II, Frei, and Lagos. By securing a legislative majority in one chamber and at least a semi-majority in the other, there was little reason to expel someone from the alliance or to bring in a new partner. Moreover, the closeness between pre-electoral coalition members on the socio-economic dimension further reinforces the reasons for maintaining the pre-electoral pact. Despite bringing the Chilean cases as examples, it is worth mentioning that this combination is not a unique feature of Chilean coalitions. In Colombia, the right-wing

pre-election coalitions led by Uribe and Santos, in their re-election attempt, share the same features: despite minor changes, pre-electoral coalitions that held close to a majority in the parliament and were composed of parties with similar points of view on policy issues served as the bedrock for the upcoming governments.

In stark contrast, the second path combines the absence of low polarisation within the pre-electoral coalitions with high overall ideological polarisation in the legislature, along with a short period until the government's inauguration. This configuration resonates especially with Rousseff I and II in Brazil, where the ideological distance between pre-election coalition members on the left-right dimension should result in the outright dismantling of the agreements after the elections. Even if the distance between government and opposition figured among the lowest levels in the country in both governments (Borges, 2021), indicating high within-polarisation within Rousseff's government, pre-electoral coalitions still formed the basis of the first coalitions following each election. Why was this the case? According to the second path, the explanation for this resides in the fact that the polarisation at the party system level was quite high, thereby implying that rearranging interparty negotiations would be costly, especially with a short in-between period until the new governments took place. Despite not being present in this path, it is worth mentioning that pre-electoral coalition members had granted the *formateur* a majority basis in the parliament in both opportunities, thus providing a substantial reason not to build a cabinet from scratch. Together, these conditions increased Rousseff's utility in building cabinets around pre-election coalitions while discouraging her from seeking new partners.

High legislative polarisation and low within polarisation are at the core of the third and fourth paths, but in conjunction with different conditions. In broad terms, legislative polarisation is combined with formally weak presidents in the third path, whereas the fourth path connects it to non-weak heads of government and the absence of low temporal constraint. The first government of Chávez in Venezuela is a colourful example of the former path. Even if he proceeded to take his first steps towards an autocratic rule in the coming years by engaging in a constitution-making process (Landau, 2019), at the

time of his election, the then constitution did not grant Chávez enough power to defy the existing order on his own. Coupled with the fact that the parties were far from one another regarding economic policies and the ideological distance within the pre-election coalition was rather insignificant, it made little sense for Chávez to not base his government on the pre-electoral pact (Handlin, 2017).

By contrast, the latter path diverges precisely for not counting on presidents with low policy-making powers.[12], besides being marked by *formateurs* with medium or long periods until they officially hold office. The cases of Cardoso I and Moscoso, which deviate from the results of the necessity test, are two cases covered by the fourth scenario. In both cases, high legislative polarisation and low polarisation within pre-electoral coalitions were responsible for exerting significant influence on the post-electoral coalition cabinets, in the sense that they were heavily based on the composition of pre-electoral pacts. Even if Cardoso and Moscoso had roughly three months before taking office and would soon be relevant actors in the law-making process, Cardoso opted only for enlarging the original pact by inviting the median party to the government, whereas Moscoso preferred to maintain the same composition as before the elections.

However, as the fourth configuration is the only one with a deviant case in consistency for the sufficiency analysis, its causal link should naturally be questioned[13]. This notwithstanding, the case of Balladares is not too troublesome. Even if it fits into the path but fails to be more in than out in the outcome set, Balladares' pre-election pact was composed of small parties. Excluding the presidential party, the pre-electoral coalition parties accounted for only 4% of the parliament's total share of seats. Therefore, the explanation for this case lies in the simple fact that the *formateur* party sought out another party to secure a majority in the legislature, thereby making the post-electoral coalition cabinet not appear so much like the pre-electoral pact.

7 Concluding Remarks

Thirty years ago, there was barely any study interested in examining how pre-election coalitions impact government formation processes, with the notable exception of Strøm, Budge **and** Laver (1994). Fortunately, the literature has undergone tremendous changes, as a large body of research today is dedicated to studying the relationship between pre-electoral alliances and coalition formation, governance and survival across different systems of government (e.g. Ferrara **and** Herron, 2005; Ibenskas, 2016; Spoon **and** West, 2015).

In presidential cabinets in particular, pre-election coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition governments, as executive-legislative relations in presidential democracies are marked by the independent election of the executive and legislative branches. Against this backdrop, this paper's main aim was to take a closer look at the process by which pre-electoral pacts become post-electoral coalitions in Latin-American presidential democracies from a different perspective on causality. Instead of relying on conventional statistical methods, I subscribed to a configurational approach to study which conditions lead to building post-electoral coalitions with compositions similar to their pre-electoral origins.

The findings point out that pre-electoral coalition status and composition, the ideological polarisation in the legislature, the distance between the end of the elections and the government's inauguration day, and presidential policy-making powers are all pertinent conditions to explain the conversion of pre-electoral into post-electoral coalitions, albeit in varying ways. The most important aspect is that no condition is individually sufficient to account for this process; rather, the explanation resides in different combinations of conditions.

As a consequence, two main takeaways can be retrieved from this work. First, pre-electoral coalition majority status clearly matters for post-electoral coalition formation. However, different from what coalition theories would dictate, majority status only produces coalition cabinets similar to pre-electoral alliances that preceded them in tandem

with other conditions. Second, the conjunction between low polarisation within pre-electoral pacts and high ideological polarisation in the legislature is highly prominent in bringing out coalition resemblance, thus lending more credence to the overall argument that an increased level of legislative polarisation shrinks the president's utility to form a coalition government not based on a pre-electoral coalition.

While recent years have witnessed a wealth of research on pre-electoral coalitions, there still remains, of course, significant potential for further developments. Departing from this study, future research would greatly benefit from differentiating types of conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into full-fledged coalition governments. In this paper, despite analysing the reasons behind the similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, all changes in pre-electoral coalitions were treated as if they were equivalent to one another, though bringing in another party is very different from expelling a member from the pact. As a consequence, the different changes that pre-electoral coalitions suffer from the electoral to the post-electoral period are worthy of future consideration.

In addition, another potential avenue for future research is examining the translation of pre- to post-electoral coalitions from the perspective of within-case studies. Despite throwing light on some cases, the discussion brought up here is bounded by the typical cross-case nature of QCA and limited to typical cases of each causal pathway, thus relinquishing from fully exploring the richness of QCA different types of cases, each of which is associated with a specific aim in relation to providing causal explanations to social phenomena (Oana **and** Schneider, 2018). Thus, case studies can be conducted on different types of cases to complement (or cast doubt on) this paper's findings.

Lastly, the coalition literature would greatly enrich with case studies also conducted at the party level. While this work has been limited to studying the interparty aspect of pre-electoral coalitions, it is undeniable that intra-party tensions play their role in the fates of parties. Even if coalition governments result from interparty bargaining, case studies on intraparty politics can help us better understand the processes by which pre-electoral coalitions are formed, enlarged and dissolved, even before presidents are sworn

into office.

Notes

1. The original multiparty alliance was composed of two minor parties, namely the Vanguard Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR-V, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Vanguardia*) and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCML, *Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista*), besides the MIR itself. The ensuing coalition cabinet, however, was comprised of the MIR and the right-wing party Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista*).

2. The acronym INUS stands for Insufficient condition but still Necessary to an Unnecessary but Sufficient path towards explaining the outcome of interest (Mackie, 1965). This type of condition is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about an outcome on its own, but it is nonetheless an essential component within a specific combination that accounts for the outcome (Mello, 2022).

3. I present some particularities of QCA in more detail in the Supplementary Material.

4. To illustrate the procedure in the case of coalition shrinkage, let us consider the formation of the Martinelli cabinet in 2009 Panama, in which a pre-electoral alliance of four parties resulted in a post-electoral coalition of only two parties. Initially, the pact was composed of the Panameñista Party (PPA, *Partido Panameñista*), the National Renewal Movement (MOLIRENA, *Movimiento de Renovación Nacional*), the Democratic Change Party (PCD, *Partido Cambio Democrático*), and the Patriotic Union (UP, *Unión Patriotica*). However, in the wake of the electoral process, the coalition was reduced to only two parties, namely the PPA and the PCD. To measure the extent to which the post-electoral cabinet resembles the pre-electoral alliance, I calculate the percentage of the PCD's share of seats relative to the combined share of seats of the MOLIRENA, the PCD, and the UP. Note that the legislative contingent of the presidential party, the PPA, is not included in this calculation.

5. The cross-over point is deliberately chosen not to be at 0.4 to avoid placing a case, namely Medina II, on the maximum point of indifference. A calibration process resulting in instances with set value memberships of exactly 0.5 represents a grave pitfall in configurational comparative methods, thus being important to be circumvented. For more details, see Oana et al. (2021, Chap. 2).

6. To further leverage claims of necessity relations, it is argued that the necessary disjunction should fit into a higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness and that the number of cases that

violates necessity statements should not be exacerbated (Mello, 2022; Oana et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018; Schneider **and** Rohlfing, 2013). This additional examination is available in the Supplementary Material and calls into question the existence of the necessary relation.

7. A raw data matrix and the ensuing calibrated data are available in the Supplementary Material.

8. Logical remainders are simply truth table rows devoid of empirical cases. Without a counterfactual analysis, these rows do not make part of the minimisation process of the truth table, as it is impossible to calculate their membership in the outcome set given their lack of empirical evidence.

9. For the differences between solution terms, see Medina et al. (2017, Chap. 2); Mello (2022, Chap. 7); Schneider **and** Wagemann (2012, Chap. 6). Following the standard of good practices, I report both conservative and parsimonious solutions in the chapter's appendix.

10. Available in Figure A.2 in the Supplementary Material

11. For more on the discussion between approaches to cases and causality in configurational comparative methods, see Haesebrouck **and** Thomann (2022).

12. I am extremely cautious with statements based on the negation of conditions, as these do not always represent the opposite concept from the original set (Goertz, 2020, Chap. 1; Schneider **and** Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 3) To see how this can be the case, the opposite of weak presidents are not necessarily strong and powerful presidents, since the negation also includes presidents with moderate levels of power.

13. The XY Plot for sufficiency in the Supplementary Material also reveals that the results fail to explain the cases of Caldera and Macri. Despite having pre-electoral and post-electoral coalition cabinets alike, these cases are not exemplary of any causal pathway. Hence, they serve as perfect cases for an *a posteriori* in-depth analysis to complement or cast doubts on the arguments developed in this study.

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Supplementary Material for 'The Drivers of Resemblance in Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets'

1   Case Selection

The paper is mainly interested in coalition cabinets preceded by pre-electoral coalitions in Latin American presidential democracies. As a consequence, several presidential cabinets are not inserted into the analysis. In what follows, I present why some cases are not examined.

To begin with, my case selection entails that coalition governments without any pre-electoral inception are outright excluded from the analysis. To provide a couple of examples, in Colombia, Samper and Pastrana won their presidential elections without building any pre-electoral alliance. For such a reason, these cases, and others with similar trajectories, are not analysed here.

Moreover, this work focuses exclusively on coalition governments and, as a consequence, single-party cabinets are also ruled out, even if the president-elect party had committed to a multiparty pact prior to the elections. One example of this is the Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee (COPEI, *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*) prior to the 1978 Venezuelan presidential election. Even

if the party had built a pre-electoral coalition with the Democratic Republican Union (URD, *Unión Republicana Democrática*), the pact was ultimately broken, and URD did not make part of the incoming COPEI's single-party government. Having that in mind, similar cases where pre-election coalitions were broken are excluded from the analysis to ensure conceptual accuracy.

I also distinguish between *pre-electoral* and *electoral* alliances (Allern and Aylott, 2009), thereby leaving the latter out of the analysis at first. This is because electoral alliances are comprised chiefly of run-off agreements in presidential regimes, when the first-round losers provide support for one of the two main contestants left in the dispute (Albala, 2021; McClintock, 2018). However, run-off agreements do not fit precisely into the concept of *pre-electoral* coordination, as talks take place amidst elections. Even still, as scholarship on run-off agreements is still emergent and has not taped into how they impact the government formation process, I include electoral alliances made between the first and second rounds of presidential elections in a second moment in order to test the soundness of my results.

Lastly, the analysis covers solely the first cabinet formed in each government, since the main objective of the study is to capture the conversion of pre-election pacts into coalition cabinets. In this way, even though the effects of pre-electoral pacts may surpass the first stage of coalition governments, as suggested by coalition theories (Albala et al., 2023; Chiru, 2015; Freudenreich, 2016), the long-lasting impacts of pre-electoral pacts on government formation are out of this work's length.

2   QCA in Details

Some details of QCA merit further discussion. In this section, I discuss some of them. To begin with, it is worthwhile to make clear that the calibration process is not enmeshed in probabilistic thinking (Ragin, 2008, Chap. 5; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 1). Set membership scores do not reveal the probability that cases have to belong to a set; instead, they reflect whether cases are (more) in or out of the reference set.

A closely related aspect is that cases are an instance (or not) of a set, which is, in turn, linked to an underlying concept. Hence, the conceptualisation of sets is a crucial step of the calibration process. Rather than referring to broad terms, sets have to mirror and be in accordance with the part of the concept which is of interest to the researcher (Goertz, 2020; Mello, 2022). In this way, besides the outcome of Coalition Resemblance (CR), I derive five conditions from my theoretical framework in the main text: Majority (MAJ), Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL), High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL), Low Temporal Constraint (LTEMP), and Low Presidential Power (LPP).

Furthermore, the scholarship on configurational comparative methods has developed different procedures to transform raw data into fuzzy sets. In the paper, I make use of the direct assignment and the direct method.[1] Table 2 in the main text makes transparent how each explanatory condition has been calibrated.

Finally, I explicitly mention the use of the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) in the main text. I explain this decision here. In contrast to the Standard Analysis (SA), the ESA guarantees that untenable assumptions are not made during the Boolean minimisation procedure, thus preventing the counterfactual analysis from including logical remainder rows that would violate necessity claims in the analysis for sufficient conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 8). As such, in the present work, upon applying the De Morgan's law, the negation of the necessary disjunction is the conjunction set composed of ~MAJ*~LTEMP. This means that the ESA procedure excludes all counterfactual cases that lack a majority status and hold a medium to long period until the inauguration of the new government's term from the minimisation process. Due to the application of the ESA procedure, all logical remainders based on this conjunction are outright excluded from the sufficiency analysis.

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[1]For more information on the extant calibration procedures and their differences, see Dusa (2019, Chap. 4) and Mello (2022, Chap. 5).

3   Assessing Necessity Relations: A Look Into Deviant Cases

In the main text, the results for the analysis of necessary conditions show that the combination of *Majority* and *Low Temporal Constraint* is necessary to render *Coalition Resemblance*. To further investigate this statement, I turn my attention to the existence of a higher-order concept and to the number of deviant cases in kind with regard to this relationship.

Firstly, the literature strongly recommends integrating necessary disjunctions into a higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness (Mello, 2022; Schneider, 2018; Oana et al., 2021). This is not troublesome here, as the supposed necessary conditions can be referred to as the higher-order necessary condition of 'convenient manoeuvre'. The reasoning is that both the pre-election majority status and the short period until the beginning of the governments' tenure discourage the president-elect party from reformulating the pre-electoral alliance, thereby representing a convenient means to hold together the pre-electoral coalition members until the post-electoral stage.

Nevertheless, the literature also warns that the underlying set relation should not be fraught with deviant cases in kind in order to have a meaningful necessary relation (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). To inspect if this is the case here, Figure A.1 shows the XY plot between MAJ + LTEMP and the outcome CR.

In set theory, necessity relations imply that (the combination of) conditions are a superset of the outcome. In a perfect set relation, this means that all cases present in the outcome are also part of the condition set. As can be seen in Figure A.1, this is not precisely what happens with the data at hand, as some cases contradict the statement of necessity, according to which coalition resemblance cannot occur in the absence of majority status or low temporal constraining, by having a higher membership score in the outcome than in the disjunction set.[2]

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[2]There are a handful of different types of cases in QCA results. To understand their differences and, consequently, their position in an XY Plot, see Oana and Schneider (2018).

Figure A.1: XY Plot for the Purported Necessary Disjunction

Necessity Relation

Inclusion: 0.916 - Coverage: 0.858 - Relevance: 0.600

The first aspect to note is the existence of several deviant consistency cases in degree. Despite not being the most troublesome deviance for necessity claims, they have higher score values in the outcome than in the disjunction set, thereby distorting the necessity relation. More remarkably and of particular interest here, two coalition cabinets represent deviant consistency cases in kind: the first government of Cardoso in Brazil in 1994 and the Moscoso minority government in Panama in 1999. In spite of having a considerable time until government inauguration or not holding a majority of seats in the parliament, both presidents still built their respective post-electoral governments based on the multiparty bargainings that took place before the elections. In other words, these cases are in the outcome set, but are out of the disjunction set. Hence, they are not only in contrast but also undermine the statement that the 'convenient manoeuvre' is necessary to produce post-electoral governments similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that originated them. Given this, even if the disjunction has substantial consistency, coverage

and relevance scores, the statement that $MAJ + LTEMP \leftarrow CR$ must be taken with a grain of salt. Later on in the main text, these two cases are represented by a causal recipe in the analysis of sufficient conditions. Against this backdrop, I refrain from considering the 'convenient manoeuvre' a necessary way to achieve *Coalition Resemblance*.

4 Raw Data Matrix and Calibrated Data

Table A.1: Raw Data Matrix

Cases	Government Status	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Lower Chamber (%)	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Upper Chamber (%)	PEC's Within Polarisation	Legislative Polarisation	Temporal Constraint	Presidential Power	Coalition Resemblance
De La Rúa	Minority	46.3	29.1	1.267	3.262	47	0.407	1
Macri	Minority	33.85	19.44	1.256	3.894	18	0.407	1
Siles	Minority	33.84	37.03	2.087	4.155	38	0.289	0.807
Paz Zamora	Minority	25.38	29.62	0.599	3.803	91	0.289	0
Banzer	Minority	22.30	40.74	2.010	1.939	66	0.319	0.128
Cardoso I	Minority	35.28	40.74	1.850	3.150	90	0.486	0.530
Cardoso II	Minority	57.50	49.38	1.286	2.662	89	0.486	0.685
Lula I	Minority	25.14	20.98	2.795	3.225	66	0.486	0.299
Lula II	Minority	18.71	14.81	0.334	3.257	64	0.486	0.049
Rousseff I	Minority	60.42	59.26	2.969	3.333	62	0.486	0.860
Rousseff II	Minority	59.22	65.43	3.660	3.279	67	0.486	0.899
Aylwin	Minority	54.09	40.42	1.400	2.780	87	0.523	1
Frei	Minority	57.5	45.65	1.526	3.257	90	0.523	1
Lagos	Minority	57.5	48.97	1.312	3.002	55	0.523	1
Bachelet I	Minority	52.5	52.63	1.051	3.937	55	0.523	1
Piñera I	Minority	45.83	42.10	0.948	4.037	53	0.523	1
Bachelet II	Minority	52.5	50	1.847	3.906	86	0.523	1
Piñera II	Minority	46.45	44.18	1.047	4.298	84	0.523	1
Uribe II	Minority	40.49	56.86	1.956	3.746	71	0.381	0.822
Santos II	Minority	55.42	46.07	1.909	2.594	53	0.381	0.670
Medina II	Majority	66.84	90.62	0.244	1.174	62	0.400	1
Endara	Minority	82.2	Not Applicable	1.412	2.089	227	0.452	1
Balladares	Minority	44.66	Not Applicable	1.564	3.446	116	0.452	0.428
Moscoso	Minority	33.8	Not Applicable	0.755	3.615	122	0.452	1
Torrijos	Majority	55.33	Not Applicable	0.408	3.509	122	0.452	1
Martinelli	Minority	52.11	Not Applicable	1.192	3.657	59	0.452	0.761
Varela	Minority	23.93	Not Applicable	0.46	3.117	58	0.452	0.038
Cortizo	Minority	56.3	Not Applicable	1.224	2.841	57	0.452	1
Lusinchi	Majority	58	63.63	0.181	1.614	60	0.391	1
Caldera	Minority	24.63	22	3	2.337	59	0.391	1
Chávez	Minority	33.81	31.48	0.599	2.893	58	0.391	0.945

Table A.2: Calibrated Dataset

Cases	MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	LTEMP	LPP	CR
De La Rúa	0.6	0.89643	0.78123	0.98917	0.48450	1
Macri	0.2	0.89940	0.93728	1	0.48450	1
Siles	0.4	0.43630	0.96427	0.99813	0.96277	0.807
Paz Zamora	0	0.98409	0.92401	0.015950	0.96277	0
Banzer	0.2	0.49263	0.13385	0.68679	0.91771	0.128
Cardoso I	0.4	0.60865	0.73482	0.019342	0.075123	0.53
Cardoso II	0.8	0.8911	0.47670	0.023439	0.075123	0.685
Lula I	0	0.08779	0.76658	0.68679	0.075123	0.299
Lula II	0	0.99264	0.77929	0.76454	0.075123	0.049
Rousseff I	1	0.054518	0.80747	0.82783	0.075123	0.86
Rousseff II	1	0.007481	0.78774	0.64310	0.075123	0.899
Aylwin	0.8	0.85404	0.54517	0.034322	0.025153	1
Frei	0.8	0.80149	0.77929	0.019342	0.025153	1
Lagos	0.8	0.8834	0.66463	0.95	0.025153	1
Bachelet I	1	0.94236	0.94277	0.95	0.025153	1
Piñera I	0.6	0.95679	0.95383	0.96567	0.025153	1
Bachelet II	1	0.61075	0.93886	0.041457	0.025153	1
Piñera II	0.6	0.94300	0.97390	0.060191	0.025153	1
Uribe II	0.8	0.53234	0.91444	0.45108	0.66217	0.822
Santos II	0.8	0.56658	0.43534	0.96567	0.66217	0.67
Medina II	1	0.99435	0.023104	0.82783	0.53499	1
Endara	1	0.84958	0.18254	0	0.18896	1
Balladares	0.4	0.78309	0.84417	0.00011	0.18896	0.428
Moscoso	0.2	0.97505	0.88819	0	0.18896	1
Torrijos	1	0.99087	0.86204	0	0.18896	1
Martinelli	1	0.915	0.89729	0.89653	0.18896	0.761
Varela	0	0.9893	0.72000	0.91337	0.18896	0.038
Cortizo	1	0.90761	0.57916	0.92769	0.18896	1
Lusinchi	1	0.9953	0.065087	0.87685	0.59690	1
Caldera	0	0.050000	0.29096	0.89653	0.59690	1
Chávez	0	0.98409	0.60757	0.91337	0.59690	0.945

5 Alternative Solutions for Coalition Resemblance

The alternative solutions for the outcome (*Coalition Resemblance*) result in model ambiguity, for which more than one solution formula is achieved in the minimisation process. This notwithstanding, the overall findings reported in the main text are not violated. Notably, such ambiguity disappears when I make use of directional expectations. Regardless, the different paths are listed below.

Table A.3: Conservative Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
~MAJ∗HLPOL∗LTEMP∗LPP	0.942	0.919	0.135	0.035	Chavez, Siles
MAJ∗LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LTEMP	0.999	0.999	0.260	0.010	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ∗LWPOL∗~LTEMP∗~LPP	0.984	0.980	0.303	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Cardoso II Endara, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos
LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LTEMP∗~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
MAJ∗LWPOL∗~HLPOL∗LTEMP∗LPP	0.975	0.965	0.117	0.044	Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos II
First model ~MAJ∗~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗LTEMP	0.845	0.739	0.093	0	Lula I; Siles
MAJ∗HLPOL∗LTEMP∗~LPP	0.993	0.991	0.284	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Second model MAJ∗LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LPP	0.995	0.994	0.427	0	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Frei, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Torrijos
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗LTEMP∗~LPP	0.901	0.853	0.154	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Third model MAJ∗HLPOL∗LTEMP∗~LPP	0.993	0.991	0.284	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗LTEMP∗~LPP	0.901	0.853	0.154	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Solution	0.924	0.910	0.732		

Table A.4: Enhanced Parsimonious Solution for Coalition Resemblance

|	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ	0.957	0.950	0.736	0.300	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
LWPOL*HLPOL*~LTEMP*~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
First model					
~LWPOL*HLPOL*LTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
LWPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.902	0.872	0.215	0	Chavez, Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos
Second model					
~LWPOL*HLPOL*LTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
HLPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Third model					
~LWPOL*LTEMP*~LPP	0.904	0.860	0.159	0.005	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Solution	0.895	0.880	0.869		

6 Deviant Cases for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

The XY Plot presented in Figure A.2 reveals that the solution formula fails to explain a few cases: Balladares in Panamá, Caldera in Venezuela, and Macri in Argentina. The case of Balladares scores high in the set membership of the solution formula but is not representative of *Coalition Resemblance*, thus being a false positive. By contrast, the cases of Caldera and Macri represent the opposite: cases not belonging to the solution formula but present in the outcome. Therefore, they are exemplars of false negatives. I return to the discussion of these cases in the section 'Discussion and Case Studies' in the main text.

Figure A.2: XY Plot for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

7   Analysis for the non-Outcome

Table A.5: Necessity Test for the non-Outcome

Disjunction	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
~MAJ + ~LWPOL	0.952	0.426	0.625
~MAJ + LPP	0.964	0.422	0.613

Table A.6: Intermediate Solution for the non-Outcome

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
~MAJ * ~LTEMP * LPP	0.815	0.717	0.300		Paz Zamora
Solution	0.815	0.717	0.300		

8 Robustness Tests

In this section, I conduct a series of tests to determine to what extent the results reported in the main text are robust. Taken together, they involve changing the case selection, the explanatory conditions, the calibration process and the consistency benchmark of the analysis of sufficient conditions. Lastly, I also perform a cluster analysis to examine whether the results are sensitive to some similarities among the cases.

Initially, the case selection encompassed both majority and minority governments. This is so because the interest lies in detecting the patterns for why pre-electoral coalitions keep most of the partners in their transition to becoming coalition cabinets, regardless of the president-elect's party status. However, most studies on coalition governments opt to focus on minority presidents (Freudenreich, 2016), as their rationale in regard to government formation is different from those of majority presidents. Following this trend, I thereby exclude Lusinchi, Medina II, and Torrijos cases from the analysis. Furthermore, most governments initiate a few months after the election results are known. However, the Siles government deviated from the norm, as a military coup prevented the government from taking office for roughly two years. For this reason, I also disregard Siles' coalition cabinet in this first test.

Additionally, as mentioned in the main text, the cornerstone of the paper is the study of *pre-electoral* alliances rather than purely *electoral* alliances. As such, coalitions derived from run-off agreements have remained out of the length of the first analysis. To assess whether their inclusion would disturb the findings somehow, I input the Uruguayan cases into the dataset since the Colorado Party (PC, *Partido Colorado*) and the National Party (PN, *Partido Nacional*) have historically launched their own candidate for the presidential elections but chosen to support each other's candidature in the second round[3] (Albala, 2013). This results in including Batlle and Lacalle Pou coalition cabinets in the analysis.

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[3]The same story repeated in the 2019 Uruguayan presidential election, where the PC supported the PN's presidential candidacy of Lacalle Pou. This time, however, other parties, such as the Open Cabildo (CA, *Cabildo Abierto*) and the Independent Party (PI, *Partido Independiente*), also coalesced with the PN after the first round.

Table A.7 shows the results for the new case selection. In essence, the results yield the same pathways as reported in the main text.

Table A.7: First Robustness Test: Case Selection

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.975	0.971	0.604	0.280	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Batlle, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lacalle Pou, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Uribe II
~LWPOL*HLPOL*LTEMP	0.905	0.862	0.176	0.068	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.950	0.928	0.171	0.036	Chavez
LWPOL*HLPOL*~LTEMP*~LPP	0.909	0.880	0.320	0.050	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II
Solution	0.919	0.905	0.787		

The second test examines whether the previously explanatory conditions set out should be called into question. However, except for the temporal boundness argument, a hitherto barely tested claim, all conditions have solid theoretical roots. Hence, excluding a condition from the analysis appears to be a fruitless exercise. Nonetheless, another condition could be inserted into the QCA analysis: the concurrence of national and legislative elections. Extant studies have elaborated on how parties coordinate efforts across different electoral levels, refraining from maximising their utility in one dispute to leverage their gains in the other(s) (Borges, 2019; Borges et al., 2017; Borges and Turgeon, 2019). By doing so, the probability that pre-electoral coalition members will simply not enjoy the post-electoral perks should diminish considerably, as the costs of coalition participation become apparent even before the elections occur. Hence, theoretically, a set labelled Concurrence Elections (CE) should be derived, and the necessary and sufficiency tests should be re-run. However, very few cases did not have concomitant elections,[4] namely Lagos in Chile, Uribe II and Santos II in Colombia, and Chávez in Venezuela. With few instances that would belong to the CE set, the necessary and sufficiency analy-

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[4]Notwithstanding the occurrence of midterm polls in some countries, such as Argentina, the vast majority of presidential elections are still accompanied by simultaneous elections for the legislative branch.

ses would mainly become meaningless. As a result, I prefer to perform a cluster analysis to assess whether the difference engendered by not having concurrent elections changes the results in any way. An additional cluster analysis is run to investigate whether the original solution formula fails to explain the patterns of coalition formation of a country in particular. In other words, this additional clustering allows verifying whether some countries drive the results of the analysis of sufficient conditions to the detriment of others. Tables A.8 and A.9 point out that, despite some noise in coverage when performing the cluster analysis at the country level, no country in particular drives the findings.

Table A.8: Cluster Analysis: Concurrent Elections

Parameters of Fit	Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ * LWPOL	~LWPOL * HLPOL * LTEMP	HLPOL * LTEMP * LPP	LWPOL * HLPOL * ~LTEMP * ~LPP
Pooled	0.978	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.974	0.894	0.899	0.906
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.009	0.04	0.038	0.035
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	0.552	0.296	0.439	0.148
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.631	0.168	0.154	0.334

In the last batteries of tests, I slightly alter the calibration of some conditions and raise the consistency threshold for the analysis of sufficiency. More specifically, I start by modifying a few parameters for inclusion and exclusion in HLPOL, LTEMP and LPP. Beginning with *High Legislative Polarisation*, I now set the cross-over point at 3.0 and full exclusion at 2.0, contrasting with the former 2.7 and 1.5 benchmark values, respectively. As countries scoring 4.0 in Dalton's Polarisation Index are deemed to have highly polarised party systems, there is no reason to change the benchmark for full membership in the HLPOL set.

For the temporal boundness set (LTEMP), the full exclusion is increased in a few days, namely from 85 to 92 days. Moreover, the cross-over point is lowered from 70 days to 61 days, reflecting a distinction between *formateurs* having or not more than two months to renegotiate interparty affairs. The cross-over point is not raised because the 70-day

Table A.9: Cluster Analysis: Country Effects

Parameters of Fit	Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ * LWPOL	~LWPOL * HLPOL * LTEMP	HLPOL * LTEMP * LPP	LWPOL * HLPOL * ~LTEMP * ~LPP
Pooled	0.978	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Argentina (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Bolivia (3)	0.880	0.969	0.840	0.693
Between Brazil (6)	0.909	0.823	0.924	0.820
Between Chile (7)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Colombia (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Dom. Republic (1)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Panamá (7)	0.964	1.000	0.734	0.858
Between Venezuela (3)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.017	0.021	0.035	0.042
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Argentina (2)	0.400	0.102	0.485	0.005
Between Bolivia (3)	0.565	0.740	1.000	0.090
Between Brazil (6)	0.345	0.542	0.095	0.363
Between Chile (7)	0.736	0.053	0.024	0.430
Between Colombia (2)	0.737	0.593	0.594	0.249
Between Dom. Republic (1)	0.994	0.006	0.023	0.023
Between Panamá (7)	0.786	0.036	0.080	0.468
Between Venezuela (3)	0.338	0.106	0.324	0.068

mark is paramount to distinguishing elections won in the first round from the elections that went to the distance in the second round for countries that adopt a presidential two-round system. Finally, I increase the value for the complete exclusion of LPP from 0.5 to 0.6.

Table A.10: Robustness Test: Calibration Process

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ∗LWPOL	0.978	0.974	0.620	0.467	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗~LPP	0.926	0.884	0.198	0.024	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
~LWPOL∗~HLPOL∗LPP	0.903	0.832	0.154	0	Banzer, Caldera
First model ~LWPOL∗HLPOL∗LTEMP	0.972	0.952	0.144	0	Siles
Second model ~LWPOL∗LTEMP∗LPP	0.932	0.890	0.156	0	Caldera; Siles
Solution	0.944	0.934	0.722		

In Table A.10, it can be seen that the changes in calibration result in some marginal modifications compared to the results in the main text. While Path 1 and Path 2 are very similar to those in Table 5 in the main text, Path 3 emerges as a novelty, though it should be discredited for covering a deviant case in kind. The peripheral importance of *Low Temporal Constraint*, moreover, should also be noted, as it appears only in the paths of model ambiguity. Thus, except for *Low Temporal Constraint*, the robustness test derived from changing the calibration process provides support for the conditions and configurations highlighted in the main text.

In a final test, the consistency threshold is raised firstly from 0.80 to 0.85, and then to 0.9. This prompts a few modifications, such as the replacement of ~LWPOL for MAJ in the second path in Table A.11, and the collapse of a path in Table A.12. This notwithstanding, the bigger picture remains the same: *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation* remain jointly important to bring about the outcome.

In this way, though a few differences arise, the results found in the original analysis are

Table A.11: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.85

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.978	0.974	0.620	0.163	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ*HLPOL*LTEMP	0.981	0.978	0.313	0.054	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
HLPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.060	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL*HLPOL*~LTEMP*~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.047	Aylwin, Bachelet II,Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.936	0.926	0.798		

Table A.12: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.9

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.969	0.964	0.618	0.359	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ*HLPOL*LTEMP	0.966	0.959	0.317	0.055	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
~LWPOL*HLPOL*LTEMP*LPP	0.946	0.910	0.109	0.024	Siles
Solution	0.972	0.967	0.700		

largely robust. In particular, the importance of *LWPOL and LTEMP is questioned. To begin with, the lack of *Low Within Polarisation* is replaced for *Majority* in the last battery of tests. On top of that, that condition is most likely the culprit for the varied coverage of the second path in the cluster analysis at the country level, as several cases enter into the ranks of Path 2 following the successive raises in consistency thresholds. Furthermore, LTEMP barely remains in the results after the calibration of some explanatory conditions is changed. Even so, *Low Temporal Constraint* is still present in all the other tests. On a more positive note, the remaining conditions discussed in the main text, namely *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation*, are all consistently part of the different combinations that lead to *Coalition Resemblance* in the most varied robustness tests conducted here.

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