

Caithlin + Kit Kat suggest:

→ Near-decisive - A and B tie only if number of $A > B$ votes equals number of $B > A$ votes

→ Anonymous - exchanging votes from two voters doesn't change outcome

Eric brings up idea about candidate preference (neutrality)

→ If A starts the election with a +3 (or +something) preference, how does that get represented when switching the place of A and B

Emily suggests

→ Neutral - if all votes are reversed, the initial winning candidate should lose and the initial losing candidate should win. A tie should still be a tie.

Austin suggests

→ Monotone - if a candidate receives a vote, it does not result in them being ranked lower than they were before receiving the vote.

... back to proving the conjecture...

If anonymous, we can condense the voting list to say

$$x : A > B$$

$$n-x : B > A$$

How does monotone apply? If A wins and x increases, A should still win.

~~Benefits of plurality~~ Voting Qualities/Criterion

- all votes are equal
 - always a winner except when voters are tied
 - largest group of people getting their first choice
 - ~~best~~ all candidates are treated equally
 - more votes to a candidate translate to that cand. ^{not ranked lower} ~~doing better~~
- anonymously
near decisive
agrees with plurality
neutral
monotone

Conjecture:

A two-candidate election method that is near decisive, neutral, anonymous, and monotone is plurality.

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- antiplurality
- plurality
- instant runoff
- Borda Count
- Coombs
- Copeland
- Sequential pairwise w/ fixed agenda
- dictatorship
- pineapple

Conjecture: The only method in a two-candidate election that is neutral, anonymous, monotone, and near decisive is plurality.

Given some votes

1 $A > B$

2 $B > A$

3 $B > A$

\vdots

$n \dots$

then, using the 4 conditions, the candidate with a majority of votes wins