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Emily: Pareto - Plurality Suppose every voter prefers x to y. Then y can never be in first place since at a minimum & beats 4. So 4 has a first place yoles and is in last place. It may tie with X if X receives first place yores but it cannot place over (1) X. Emily: Parcto - Dictators hip Supposing every voter prefers x to y then the dictator also prefers x to y so x beats y instant runoff - conducet - counter Coombs - condorcel - counter B B DCCD D A A A 0 Kit Kat: Coombs - IIA - counter ACAC A BC C В C A B B 2-A/B 1-C 3-B 2-C 1-A ALC B moves. CLA Eric: IIA - instant runoff - counter Y wins -> y x y an tie * A lot of this criteria are contradictory Arrows theorem: the only system that is IIA and up muno, is dictatorship. + you cannot conduccet and IIA at the same time (another theorem)