

# Mapping Civic and Ethnic Nationalism: Nationalist Party Discourses and Immigrant Integration Outcomes in Europe’s Substate Nationalist Regions

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## Abstract

This study is a comparative analysis of European substate nationalism over time, examining whether and how civic and ethnic forms of nationalism affect immigrant integration and natives’ attitudes toward immigration in Europe’s substate nationalist regions. Drawing on theories of nationalism and boundary-making, I bring in political parties as key actors in officialising and institutionalising mass sentiment in a given region-year, together defining who belongs to the nation. I connect these to the state policy and immigrant integration literature to assess their effects on immigrant integration outcomes. The empirical analysis combines repeated cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (2002–2022) with original measures of nationalist party discourse. Using large language models (LLMs), I identify nationalist parties across 32 substate nationalist regions in Europe and scale 610 party manifestos along civic and ethnic dimensions. Two-way fixed effects models are used to estimate the association between within-region, over-time changes in civic and ethnic nationalism and a range of individual-level integration outcomes. For immigrants, these include perceived discrimination, sense of belonging, and political and labour market participation. For natives, the focus is on national identification and attitudes toward immigration. The findings provide new empirical evidence on how changes in nationalist ideologies reshape symbolic boundaries between “us” and “them” and affect integration processes in Europe’s substate nationalist regions.

**Keywords:** ethnic nationalism; civic nationalism; nationalist parties; boundary-making; immigrant integration; text as data; large language models.

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# 1 Introduction

If the current strength of nationalism in world politics has showed us anything, it is that nationalisms are ever evolving. The role political actors play in configuring the boundaries of “us” and “them” is continually reshaped, with profound consequences for who belongs to the nation, both materially and symbolically. Nationalist discourse is central to this process: it defines who is included, who is excluded, and on what grounds. The balance between its civic and ethnic forms and the implications of shifts in this balance, remains understudied in a comparative perspective over time.

This study asks whether and how, shifts between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism affect immigrant integration and native attitudes toward immigration in Europe’s substate nationalist regions? Drawing on theories of nationalism and boundary-making, I examine how political discourse both reflects and shapes the symbolic boundaries: “the lines that include and define some people, groups, and things while excluding others” (Epstein, 1992, 232). Civic nationalism, emphasising shared values, ‘living and working’ in the region (Linz, 2020) as the basis for co-national status, is often viewed as more inclusive to minorities, while ethnic nationalism, grounded in ancestry and ascriptive traits, is seen as more exclusionary (Larin, 2020). I connect these theoretical distinctions with the outcomes of the state policy and immigrant integration literature, situating political parties as key actors in officialising and institutionalising symbolic boundaries over time.

The contribution is threefold. First, where much prior work has focused exclusively on how public attitudes express symbolic boundaries (Bail, 2008). By bringing in parties’ programmatic positions to the framework, I seek to capture the joint effect of mass sentiment and party positions, for an overall measure of ‘discourse’ or exposure to the prevailing civic or ethnic ideology on integration outcomes within specific regions over time. Parties respond to mass sentiment but also officialise and institutionalise attitudes, hence I suspect greater downstream consequences than ‘public opinion’ alone. Second, I develop continuous measures of civic and ethnic nationalism from 610 party manifestos across 32 substate nationalist regions in Europe (1945–2022), using a large language model-based “scaling by classification” approach, benchmarked against expert-coded data. Finally, I link these measures to individual-level outcomes from the European Social Survey (2002–2022) to assess the association between within-region, over-time shifts in nationalist discourse and a broad set of integration-related outcomes such as national identification, perceived discrimination, political and labour market participation, and natives’ national identification and attitudes toward immigration. The study offers new evidence on how nationalist discourse functions as a boundary-making mechanism, and what these shifting boundaries mean for immigrant integration and native perceptions in Europe.

## 2 Literature Review

As (Tamir, 2019, 421) notes, much of the literature on nationalism is sociological and historical, “it follows events and tries to build a theoretical framework to fit social and political occurrences”. This “bottom-up” comparative approach typically begins with detailed studies of individual cases, which are then situated within broader typologies, rather than with abstract models to be tested across contexts. Compared with the study of other political ideologies such as liberalism or marxism, nationalism scholarship has been more reluctant to make universal claims, in part because of the highly context-dependent nature of national identity formation. Early theorists, such as Kedourie (1993), regarded nationalism as the manifestation of a primal, irrational instinct—an emotive force resistant to general theory and rooted in deep-seated loy-

alties formed in early life (see also [Tajfel and Turner \(1985\)](#), on the development of in-group attachments).

But what is a nation? [Tamir \(2019\)](#) conceives of it as the product of multiple, interacting variables: language, culture, territory, religion, history, and ethnicity, among others; none of which are either necessary or sufficient. In [Anderson \(1991\)](#)’s influential definition, nations are “imagined communities” in which its members at a given point in time perceive themselves as sharing a deep, horizontal comradeship, despite never meeting most of their fellow members. Nations may claim statehood or autonomy, but neither is a precondition for national identity. This helps explain why disputes over membership boundaries and definitions are so frequent ([Lamont & Molnár, 2002](#); [Lamont et al., 2015](#)). Substate nationalist regions such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, or Flanders demonstrate that centuries of shared language, culture, history, and territory do not necessarily translate into independent statehood.

## 2.1 Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

It is hardly surprising that, considering the early views of nationalism as a primordial, innate feeling, that it invokes images of blood ties and collective belonging. As ([Gellner, 1965](#), 149) observes, nationalism is ‘a cry of passion, a tug of war against reason.’ [Larin \(2020, 131\)](#) defines civic nationalism as a type of nationalist ideology, holding that the boundaries of national membership should be defined as follows: “all citizens are co-nationals by virtue of this status, their shared political values, and their desire to live together in order to put these values into practice”. By contrast, ethnic nationalism substitutes ancestry and other ascriptive traits such as language, religion, ethnicity—for shared political ideals. While analytically distinct, the two are not mutually exclusive; states often draw on both civic and ethnic elements in practice ([Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010](#)).

[Tamir \(2019\)](#) asks: What social, economic, and political contexts motivate each configuration? What sustains them? And what prompts change? [Tamir \(2019\)](#), proposes a dynamic, five-act model of nationalism’s evolution that shifts the analytical focus from essentialist “national character” to the structural circumstances in which nationalism is practised. This perspective recognises that the form nationalism takes at any moment is contingent: it is responsive to economic security, demographic composition, political institutions, and perceptions of threat, rather than being a fixed cultural inheritance.

These five acts—summarised below—capture the conditions under which forms of nationalism are forged, stabilised and constantly evolving:

**Stage 1** Birth of a Nation - Emergent democracies require the formation of a unifying consciousness grounded in a historical narrative, a common language, norms, culture necessary to the formation of a large-scale, industrial economy.

**Stage 2** Banal Nationalism – Once national identity is secure, its symbols fade into the background but continue to confer advantages to majority members ([Billig, 1995](#)).

**Stage 3** Multiculturalism – Minorities gain representation; majority groups support inclusivity reforms from a position of security.

**Stage 4** Diversity – The state redefines national identity as plural and inclusive, recasting itself as civic rather than ethnic.

**Stage 5** Post-Diversity – Diversity is reframed as destabilising; vulnerable majorities call for renewed homogenisation and restrictive policies, often reviving ethnic rhetoric.

Tamir (2019)’s framework suggests that states may oscillate between civic and ethnic configurations in response to shifting economic, political, and demographic pressures. Periods of formation or crisis typically provoke more homogenising, ethnic-oriented nationalism, while stability and prosperity enable more civic, inclusive forms. Importantly, however, oscillation is not inevitable, nor are the two forms mutually exclusive. Empirical evidence shows that some states maintain stable blends of civic and ethnic nationalism, while others emphasise one form consistently over time (Shulman, 2002).

These shifting boundary criteria arguably have direct implications for immigrant integration: civic frameworks offer more permeable and attainable pathways to inclusion, emphasising “living and working” in the region (Linz, 2020), while ethnic frameworks risk entrenching exclusion regardless of individual contributions. Yet, as Tamir (2019)’s model suggests, these boundaries are not fixed but responsive to broader political dynamics. A better understanding of how these boundaries are constructed, reinforced, or relaxed requires moving beyond abstract typologies to examine the mechanisms through which political discourse shapes perceptions of belonging. This calls for an engagement with the symbolic boundaries and boundary-work literature (Bail, 2008; Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Lamont et al., 2015), to understand how civic and ethnic forms of nationalism act as boundary-makers.

## 2.2 Symbolic Boundaries and Boundary-work

“Symbolic Boundaries are the lines that include and define some people, groups, and things while excluding others” (Epstein, 1992, 232). The symbolic boundaries literature is an interdisciplinary field concerned with the ways in which cultural and conceptual distinctions—such as shared traditions, interpretive strategies, or markers of identity create, maintain or contest social differences across domains such as class, gender, race, language, ethnicity or territory (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). These processes encompass a range of mechanisms, including the drawing, shifting, crossing, politicisation, and institutionalisation of boundaries, each of which shapes how social groups perceive and relate to one another.

A key conceptual distinction in this literature is that between symbolic boundaries and social boundaries (Bail, 2008; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Symbolic boundaries are the conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorise people, practices, spaces, and events. They are the cognitive tools through which individuals and groups define reality, determine group membership, and generate feelings of similarity and solidarity.

By contrast, social boundaries are the institutionalised manifestations of these distinctions, visible in unequal access to material resources, opportunities, and social relations. They are expressed in enduring patterns of association and exclusion (i.e. residential segregation, employment disparities, or marriage patterns between groups). While both forms of boundaries are “real”. symbolic boundaries exist at the intersubjective level, whereas social boundaries manifest as group divisions in practice. Crucially, “only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a constraining character [and] become social boundaries” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, 168), at which point they acquire constraining power and structure social interaction in significant ways.



This transformation is central to the present study. The discourse of elected political parties, whether driven by public opinion or helping to shape it, can amplify certain symbolic boundaries to the point where they become dominant and broadly endorsed. When this occurs, the prevailing form of nationalist discourse may harden into social boundaries with tangible material consequences for immigrant integration. In other words, symbolic boundaries constitute a necessary but insufficient condition for the formation or alteration of social boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002), but once institutionalised, they can shape real-world inequalities and opportunities.

In the domains of race, ethnicity, and immigration, boundary-work studies have documented how symbolic distinctions are negotiated and contested in everyday life. Carter (2005) finds that black and Latino youth navigate ethnic boundaries in school settings in ways that affect their educational trajectories, while Warikoo (2011) examines how second-generation Indo-Caribbean teenagers in London manage ethnic boundaries in their peer relations. Other work highlights the role of discourse in shaping these boundaries: Espiritu (2000) shows how moral narratives are used to differentiate groups internally and externally in US Filipino communities.

Other strands of the boundary-work literature emphasise the political construction of group categories and the mobilisation of collective identities. Herzfeld (1996), contrasts formal, state discourse about Greek national identity with local, everyday interpretations, demonstrating how fixed territorial borders can coexist with more fluid symbolic boundaries defining the nation as a moral community.

### 2.2.1 Immigration and the Reconfiguration of Symbolic Boundaries

As Bail (2008, 37) observes “Immigration is of natural interest to scholars of boundary-work because it reveals the symbolic boundaries deployed when social boundaries are crossed”. Immigration generates new forms of cultural diversity while also provoking anxieties in receiving societies. Bauböck and Rundell (1998) argue that international migration simultaneously blurs three types of boundaries: the territorial borders of states, the political boundaries of citizenship, and the cultural boundaries that underpin national communities. These shifts are not merely abstract, they compel both institutions and the general public to revisit the symbolic criteria of membership.

Other studies highlight how classification systems, both at the national and international levels, shape incorporation processes. For example, Soysal (1994) and Kastoryano (2002) show how minority and migrant groups are positioned within institutional frameworks of personhood that are often influenced by international organizations. These classifications can either constrain or enable the redefinition of group boundaries, depending on how they interact with domestic politics and public discourse.

Much of the empirical research on boundary-making has relied on qualitative methods (Lamont et al., 2015), offering rich insights into how symbolic boundaries are constructed and contested in specific contexts. However, this approach has limited the ability to make systematic comparisons across countries and regions. Bail (2008) addresses this gap by developing one of the few large-scale quantitative analyses of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in Europe. His central question is whether the configurations of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public, such as race, religion, language, culture, and human capital, align with the official ‘philosophies of integration’, the official state-level integration regime types: multiculturalism, assimilationism, ethnic / differentialist models, derived from laws, constitutions, and state discourse (Bail, 2008; Koopmans, 2005).

For the present study, Bail’s work provides two important takeaways. First, symbolic boundaries must be analysed on a wide comparative perspective. Second, while Bail focuses on how symbolic boundaries are deployed by the general public, looking only at native respondents’ views on immigration openness, discrimination and language boundary markers to observe which is most salient in 2002/2003, this study examines the interplay between political actors and the public in both shaping symbolic boundaries. This raises the sub-question of whether parties primarily respond to prevailing public attitudes or act independently to redefine the terms of belonging. While this question is beyond the scope of this paper, the approach adopted here observes their joint effect rather than isolating either influence.

Before turning to the main argument, I review the immigrant integration literature to clarify the types of outcomes and mechanisms through which boundary shifts may produce tangible effects.

## 2.3 State Policy and Immigration Integration

Immigrant integration is often conceptualised as a two-way process, whereby immigrants and the host society gradually adapt to one another (Fouka, 2024). This process unfolds within a structure of institutional, political, and social influences in which the state plays a central role: not only through material policies that alter incentives and opportunities, but also through symbolic signals that shape perceptions of belonging (Brubaker, 2009; Larin, 2020). Integration is thus both an outcome and an equilibrium: the attitudes and behaviours of immigrants and natives condition each other, and state policy can alter this equilibrium through a range of channels.

On the material side, state interventions can lower the ‘costs’ faced by immigrants to integrate (i.e. through active labour market programmes or language courses), create incentives (i.e. tying benefits or legal status to integration efforts), or impose requirements (i.e. civic integration contracts) (Fouka, 2024; Goodman & Wright, 2015). On the symbolic side, policies send messages about inclusion or exclusion that influence how immigrants perceive their place in society and how they are viewed by natives (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Filindra & Manatschal, 2020; Jiménez et al., 2021). Notably, symbolic and material effects may work in opposite directions (Fouka, 2024; Lochmann et al., 2018), making it necessary to analyse them separately.

However, as Larin (2020) critiques, most integration studies focus narrowly on formal state policy: citizenship laws, multiculturalism indices, civic integration requirements, while ignoring the question of what kind of nationalist ideology is actually being expressed by political parties and elites, and how might that discourse symbolically affect integration outcomes? In *Civic Nationalism and Migrant Integration*, (Larin, 2020, 127) makes the connection explicit, observing that “few authors, however, have directly addressed the fact that civic integration policies are essentially civic nationalist ideology applied to migrants”. Drawing on qualitative analysis of Canadian policy debates and public opinion data, he shows that even ostensibly civic frameworks can encode exclusionary logics.

This critique points to a broader research agenda: moving beyond the study of formal integration regimes to interrogating the ideological content and boundary-making functions of political discourse itself. Some studies have noted the role of party-political framing and rhetorical strategies in shaping integration outcomes: In Canada, Banting and Soroka (2012) find that both immigrant and non-immigrant populations’ sense of belonging varies with the presence of minority nationalism, while in Quebec, Gagnon (2023) shows that cultural conceptions of

national identity can generate both positive and negative views toward immigration depending on whether immigrants are perceived as conforming to salient cultural markers.

These findings suggest that integration outcomes are shaped not only by formal state policy but also by the cultural and political discourse through which belonging is defined. Yet systematic comparative analysis of these dynamics is rare. Building on [Larin \(2020\)](#)’s insight, the present study investigates how the dominant nationalist discourse in a region, whether more civic or more ethnic, functions as a symbolic boundary-maker, and how shifts in this discourse are associated with concrete integration outcomes for both immigrants and natives, separately.

## 2.4 Civic and Ethnic nationalism as boundary-makers

Seen through the lens of the symbolic boundaries literature, the oscillation between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism described in Section 2.1 is best understood as a continual renegotiation of the lines separating “us” from “them.” Civic and ethnic nationalisms do not simply coexist as abstract ideals; they operate as boundary-making frameworks that can be activated, reframed, and strategically deployed by political actors. When mass sentiment and public attitude are amplified by parties, the media, or institutions, they can crystallise from symbolic to social boundaries with greater integration-related consequences for immigrants in the host nation.

Research has shown that integration outcomes are shaped by a combination of public attitudes, policy positions, and formal state policies ([Fouka, 2024](#); [Goodman, 2023](#); [Goodman & Wright, 2015](#)). While existing studies often focus on boundary-making by the general public ([Bail, 2008](#)), less attention has been paid to how political parties themselves express, reproduce, and institutionalise symbolic boundaries in the political sphere. Bringing parties into the analysis highlights their role in shaping the official discourse that frames belonging. In the broadest sense, discourse refers to the language and narratives through which political actors and general public attitudes define national membership and legitimate particular boundary criteria. Party discourse may both influence and reflect prevailing public attitudes, and it is rarely possible to determine with certainty whether shifts originate from elite leadership or popular demand. The aim of this study is to estimate the joint effect, as reflected in party programmatic positions, partly responding to mass sentiment, but officialising the position in a given region-year.

In this study, the prevailing form of civic and ethnic nationalist ideology is treated as a boundary-making mechanism in its own right. Shifts toward more civic frames are expected to expand symbolic boundaries by defining membership in terms of residence, participation, and shared political values; shifts toward more ethnic frames may narrow them by tying belonging to ancestry, language, or other ascriptive traits. These effects are likely to be mediated by individual-level characteristics, such as political ideology, which can amplify or dampen the influence of nationalist discourse. The central question, then, is whether—and how—the dominant form of nationalist discourse in a region functions as a symbolic boundary-maker, and how changes in this discourse are associated with integration outcomes for both immigrants and natives.

By centring civic and ethnic nationalism as discursive mechanisms of boundary-making, and by linking them to concrete integration outcomes, this approach bridges symbolic boundary theory and the state policy and immigrant integration literature. It offers a framework for understanding the ideological dimensions of immigrant integration in contexts where minority nationalist movements shape the political agenda.

## 3 Methodology

### 3.1 Case Selection

The analysis focuses on substate nationalist regions in Europe where nationalist parties have achieved electoral representation and for which both manifesto texts and individual-level survey data are available. These regions constitute fertile ground for this study for two main reasons. First, nationalist politics are locally embedded: people live and work in specific territorial contexts, and political rhetoric around membership, belonging, and cultural boundaries often plays out at the regional rather than national level [Brancati \(2006\)](#); [Vogt \(2025\)](#). In such settings, civic nationalism, emphasising "living and working" [Linz \(2020\)](#) as the basis of belonging, can be sharply contrasted with ethnic nationalism, which emphasises ascriptive criteria such as ancestry, heritage, or cultural homogeneity often tied to a regional over national identity.

Second, the political salience of these competing forms of nationalism is likely to be greater in regions with strong nationalist movements than in general country-wide nationalist movements. Localised contexts are more likely to have regionally dominant political actors ([Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010](#)), hence the salience of discourse and the shifting nature of the dominant form of nationalist ideology is likely to resonate more strongly in these contexts [Banting and Soroka \(2012\)](#); [Gagnon \(2023\)](#). These arguably make substate regions better settings for observing whether and how shifts in civic and ethnic ideology affect immigrant integration and native attitudes toward immigration.

### 3.2 Research Design

This study adopts a comparative panel design to examine how changes in the relative prevalence of civic versus ethnic nationalist political rhetoric affect immigrant integration and natives' attitudes toward immigration within Europe's substate nationalist regions. The analysis focuses on within-region variation over time, leveraging repeated cross-sectional survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS), linked to original measures of nationalist ideology derived from party manifesto texts. The units of analysis are individuals nested within substate regions, observed in all 11 rounds of the ESS (2002-2022).

To construct the treatment variables, I first identify nationalist parties in Europe since 1945 and their associated substate regions using a large language model (LLM) classification of the Party Facts database. I then scale the manifestos of these parties on two ideological dimensions: civic and ethnic nationalism, using LLM-based text analysis. These scores are aggregated to the region-year level, weighted by party vote shares from the Manifesto Project Dataset, producing continuous measures of the prevailing form of nationalism in each electoral context.

The identification strategy relies on within-region changes in these measures over time, holding constant unobserved time-invariant differences between regions and shocks common across regions in a given year. Two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regression models are fitted separately for immigrants and natives where the mechanisms plausibly differ, allowing for group-specific covariates and interpretation.

### 3.3 Measurement and Data

#### 3.3.1 Data Collection

The independent variables, measuring ethnic and civic nationalist political discourse are constructed from party manifestos at the party-year level. Manifesto PDFs are sourced from the Manifesto Project Database (1945–2022) ([Lehmann et al., 2024a, 2024b](#)), the Euromanifesto

Study (1979–2019) (Schmitt et al., 2021a, 2021b), and the UK Political Party Manifestos collection (Benoit et al., 2016). When manifesto text files were directly available, these were used without modification. However, a substantial share of manifestos in these collections exist only as scanned PDF documents (Lehmann et al., 2024b). To ensure complete coverage, I implemented an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) pipeline using Tesseract, recovering an additional 108 manifestos from the Manifesto Project Database and 300 from the Euromanifesto Study. This process yielded a final dataset of 610 manifesto–years (party–years) suitable for text analysis.

The dependent variables, covering integration and identity outcomes such as sense of belonging, perceived discrimination, and attitudes toward immigration are sourced from individual-level data in the European Social Survey (ESS). I utilise all rounds of the repeated cross-sections from the ESS from 2002 to 2022 (European Social Survey (ESS), 2023). Using the NUTS substate regional identifiers of the ESS, I am able to nest individuals within the same substate regions I identify as part of my classification of substate nationalist regions. This allows for the construction of a  $n=62,891$  individual–year level dataset with individuals nested in the substate nationalist regions.

Furthermore, the ESS microdata allows the control of a comprehensive list of individual-level covariates which may affect both integration and attitudinal outcomes, as well as individuals’ reception of different forms of nationalist discourse. These include educational attainment, household income, citizenship status, parent’s education, profession and status. I use the variables on whether both parents were born in the country as my operational definition of ‘immigrants and ‘natives’, consistent with previous research (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020; Díez-Medrano, 1994) and assess robustness to slightly different specifications including only one parent and respondent’s place of birth.

### 3.3.2 Use of Large Language Models

In this study, I leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) to analyse the official discourse of nationalist parties, across time and space using their manifesto texts. LLMs represent a state-of-the-art methodology in the field of quantitative text analysis, offering significant improvements over traditional approaches such as dictionary-based classification, bag-of-words models, or supervised machine learning trained on limited labeled corpora.

While early efforts in political text analysis relied on human coding (Budge, 2001), including crowd-sourcing (Benoit et al., 2016) or statistical models of word frequency such as Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) and Wordfish (Slapin & Proksch, 2008), recent advances demonstrate that LLMs can generate valid and replicable annotations and position estimates with a high degree of correspondence to human-coded benchmarks (Gilardi et al., 2023; Le Mens & Gallego, 2025; Törnberg, 2024; Ziems et al., 2024). These models can handle linguistic subtleties such as irony, sarcasm, and contextual nuance, which are often missed by lexicon-based approaches (Bamman & Smith, 2015).

Given recent advancements in the field, the capacity of LLMs to process long documents has significantly expanded. Extended context windows allow for the efficient processing of entire political texts, including full-length manifestos, in a single pass. I take advantage of this capability by directly querying LLMs to assess the ideological position of full manifesto texts. This contrasts with sentence-level or paragraph-level averaging strategies, such as the “asking and averaging” approach proposed by Le Mens and Gallego (2025), in which position estimates are derived by aggregating LLM responses to smaller text segments (see also Ornstein et al., 2025).

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The data collected in this study adheres to the Research Ethics Policy of LSE.

Table 1 below, outlines the large language models used in this study. The selected models seek a balance between replicability, performance, and accessibility. Mistral’s 7B Instruct model allows for open-source benchmarking and greater transparency. However, this comes with some trade-offs, as open-source models currently lag behind proprietary models on complex tasks. To evaluate potential gains from fine-tuning, I fine-tuned OpenAI’s GPT-3.5-Turbo model through its API, allowing for task-specific adaptation to the ideological scaling objectives of this study. Furthermore, all models selected support multilingual inputs, enabling the analysis of manifesto texts across several European languages without requiring translation.

Table 1: LLMs Used for the Comparative Analyses

LLM	Publisher	Open Source	Execution	Tuning	Context Length (Tokens)	End of Training Period
<b>Gemini-2.5-Pro</b>	Google	Closed	Cloud	Instruction-tuned	1 million	Unknown
<b>GPT-4o</b>	OpenAI	Closed	API	Instruction-tuned	128k	Oct 2023
<b>GPT-3.5-Turbo fine-tuned</b>	OpenAI	Closed	API	Fine-tuned	128k	May 2024
<b>Mistral 7B Instruct</b>	Mistral AI	Open	API	Instruction-tuned	32k	Dec 2023

*Note:* All instruction-tuned models include few-shot prompting techniques and chain-of-thought (CoT) style prompting, for the full prompts used, see Appendix .1.1 and .1.2.

The application of LLMs in this study serves two main purposes. First, I use them to classify European political parties from 1945 as nationalist or non-nationalist and, if applicable, identify the substate region they represent. Second, I apply them to scale the content of nationalist party manifestos along two key ideological dimensions: Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism.

## LLMs for Party and Region Classification

This classification task identifies which political parties in Europe can be considered nationalist, and among them, which represent specific substate regions. I draw on the Party Facts historical database, which integrates data from the Manifesto Project and ParlGov, covering 5,892 political parties in over 224 countries—primarily from 1945 onward.

I leverage the Party Facts panel data on current and historical parties—including full name, abbreviation, country, and election year—to create an LLM classification function for identifying nationalist parties in Europe since 1945. The LLM is fed all relevant Party Facts data, and its outputs are structured with the `Pydantic` validation library to ensure consistency with predefined response schemas (e.g., “nationalist party” vs. “not nationalist party”).

To enhance classification accuracy and replicability, I implement instruction-tuned prompting strategies, including chain-of-thought reasoning (where the model must justify its answer prior to classification) and few-shot prompting with multiple annotated examples. Full prompts are detailed in Appendix .1.1 and .1.2.

This method identified 610 party-year observations across 32 distinct substate nationalist regions in Europe since 1945. The complete case selection is presented in Appendix A7, and validation procedures are described in Section 3.3.3. I do not claim this list is exhaustive, as it depends on the coverage of the Party Facts dataset. Some known regionalist cases such as the Faroe Islands (Denmark) or Western Thrace (Greece) are excluded due to the absence of electoral parties recorded in this databases between 1945–2022 period.



## LLMs for Text Scaling

Once the nationalist parties in Europe are identified, I proceed to the political text scaling of these parties’ manifestos, along Civic and Ethnic Nationalist Scales.

I adopt a “scaling-by-classification” approach (Le Mens & Gallego, 2025), instructing the LLM to rate the degree to which each dimension is expressed in the manifesto using a six-point scale: from “absent” and “very weakly present” to “very strongly present,” corresponding to numeric scores from 0 to 5. This method enables structured and robust API calls through a data validation framework, enhancing consistency and interpretability.

Each prompt includes detailed definitions of civic and ethnic nationalism grounded in the political theory literature (Tamir, 2019). All instruction-tuned models include few-shot prompting techniques and chain-of-thought (CoT) style prompting. Importantly, I stress that each nationalist dimension should be assessed independently, emphasising that a high score for ethnic nationalism does not necessarily imply a correspondingly low score for civic nationalism and provide few-shot examples highlighting these cases.

### 3.3.3 Large Language Models: Validation and Replication

In this section, I outline how I benchmarked the LLM measurement results using using external ground truth data and ensured replicability, followed by a visual inspection of the original panel produced for European Nationalist parties (1945-2020).

#### Benchmarking

My benchmarking approach uses the Manifesto Project Database’s expert hand-coding of parties and manifestos. To assess the validity of the LLM-based nationalist party classification, I use the MPDS “party family” metadata—which includes a label for “Nationalist Parties”—as a proxy ground truth. Although available for only about half of the European party sample, this metadata provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the LLM’s binary output (nationalist vs. non-nationalist). These labels also serve as training data for fine-tuning OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 Turbo model, with half the labeled sample used for training and half for validation. Table 2 summarises the classification results benchmarked against MPDS labels.

Table 2: Benchmarking LLM Classification Against MPDS Party Family Labels

LLM Model	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1 Score
<b>GPT-3.5-Turbo (Fine-tuned)</b>	0.92	0.91	0.93	0.92
<b>GPT-4o</b>	0.88	0.87	0.89	0.88
<b>Gemini-2.5-Pro</b>	0.86	0.85	0.87	0.86
<b>Mistral 7B Instruct</b>	0.73	0.77	0.73	0.75

*Note:* Metrics are computed using MPDS “Nationalist Party” labels as ground truth for a subset of European parties (1945–2020). The fine-tuned GPT-3.5-Turbo model was trained on MPDS-coded examples.

The fine tuned GPT model performed best achieving a 92% F1-Score and overall Accuracy, mainly due to the large labeled dataset (half of the MPDS labeled nationalist parties). Followed by GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Pro and lastly, the open source Mistral 7B Instruct who performs reasonably well at classifying nationalist parties, with an F1-score of 0.75.

For all parties identified as nationalist, the classification function also assessed whether the party represents a specific substate region and, if applicable, returned the name of that region. To the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive database currently exists listing all substate nationalist regions in Europe. As a result, external validation using a fixed ground truth dataset was not feasible for this component of the analysis.

Instead, I conducted a manual validation process, reviewing all model outputs, cross-referencing known cases in the literature, and conducting targeted searches for lesser-known examples. The resulting 32 regions (Table A7) closely match well-documented substate nationalist movements in Europe with parties active in electoral politics. A few known regions were excluded due to missing party data in the Party Facts database, but no false positives were found. While false negatives—unidentified nationalist parties in some regions—cannot be ruled out, the identified cases align closely with established movements across Europe.

To benchmark the manifesto scaling results along the civic and ethnic nationalism dimensions, I use expert-coded data from the Manifesto Project Dataset (MPDS). Since the MPDS does not contain direct measures of civic or ethnic nationalism, I construct two proxy indicators based on multiple variables from the MPDS. MPDS variables indicate the share of quasi-sentences in a manifesto that have been assigned to one of 56 policy area categories, relative to all issue-coded content in a manifesto. In line with other MPDS composite indicators, I develop aggregated measures using variables from the “Fabric of Society” domain (Lehmann et al., 2024a, 2024b).

The civic nationalism indicator includes positive references to immigration, multiculturalism, minority integration, and inclusive citizenship policies. The ethnic nationalism indicator, by contrast, incorporates anti-immigrant sentiment, restrictive citizenship policies, negative cultural assimilation rhetoric, and subtracts pro-immigration content. Full details of the indicator construction are provided in Appendix Equations 4 and 5. Each indicator is rescaled to a 0–5 range using min-max normalization to match the output scale of the LLM-generated scores.

As shown in Table 3 below, the results demonstrate strong alignment, particularly for GPT-4o, which achieves correlations above 0.80 on both dimensions. Gemini-2.5-Pro performs moderately well, while Mistral 7B Instruct shows lower correlation levels.

Table 3: Correlation Between LLM Scores and MPDS-Based Nationalism Indicators

LLM Model	Civic Nationalism		Ethnic Nationalism	
	Pearson’s $r$	Spearman’s $\rho$	Pearson’s $r$	Spearman’s $\rho$
<b>GPT-4o</b>	0.83	0.80	0.86	0.84
<b>Gemini-2.5-Pro</b>	0.76	0.72	0.79	0.76
<b>Mistral 7B Instruct</b>	0.59	0.56	0.64	0.60

*Note:* Pearson and Spearman correlations are computed between MPDS-derived indicators (rescaled to 0–5) and LLM-based civic and ethnic nationalism scores. The fine-tuned GPT-3.5-Turbo model was not used in this part of the analysis, as fine-tuning requires categorical labels rather than continuous targets on a 0–5 scale.

Overall, these benchmarking results support the validity of LLM-based measurements for both classification and text scaling. This validation exercise is an essential step in establishing confidence in the approach, particularly as it is extended to a broader set of political texts, including those from additional manifesto sources such as the Euromanifesto Study (1979–2019) (Schmitt



et al., 2021a), UK party manifestos (Benoit et al., 2016), and non-machine-readable documents from the MPDS corpus, which can be processed using OCR methods.

## Replication

This section outlines the steps taken to ensure that the LLM-based measurements of civic and ethnic nationalism can be replicated by other researchers and yield comparable results.

Following the best practices of Barrie et al. (2024) and Ornstein et al. (2025), I position political texts with LLMs to ensure replicability. First, I set the temperature to zero for all API queries, producing deterministic outputs and minimizing variation across runs. Second, I make all prompt designs publicly available in Appendix .1.1 and .1.2, together with exact model names and execution timestamps. This documentation enables precise reproduction of the conditions under which results were generated.

In addition to these standard replication protocols, I introduce an additional safeguard: the removal of low-confidence predictions in both classification and scaling tasks. This is made possible by the use of a structured output validation framework (Pydantic), which returns confidence scores for each model response. By filtering out uncertain predictions, I enhance the robustness of the results.

The importance of temporal stability in LLM outputs has been underscored by Barrie et al. (2024) among others, who conducted a longitudinal replication study using MPDS manifestos in part and a consistent set of prompts. Running their experiment once per month for eight months, they found that while LLMs generally outperformed crowdworkers in accuracy, they also exhibited greater variability over time. Their study cautions that simply reporting the prompt used in a single instance is insufficient and potentially misleading unless temporal robustness is also assessed (Barrie et al., 2024).

To account for this, I test the temporal stability of my own results by repeating the core LLM measurements at two time points—December 2024 and April 2025—using identical prompt templates and model configurations. This allows me to evaluate the consistency of outputs over time and strengthens the case for the replicability of my findings. Detailed comparisons across runs are available in table 4, below.

Table 4: Temporal Stability of LLM Scaling Outputs Across Two Prompt Runs (Dec 2024 vs Apr 2025)

Model	Civic Nationalism			Ethnic Nationalism		
	Pearson’s $r$	Mean Abs. Diff.	Max Abs. Diff.	Pearson’s $r$	Mean Abs. Diff.	Max Abs. Diff.
<b>GPT-4o</b>	0.94	0.3	2	0.91	0.2	2
<b>Gemini-2.5-Pro</b>	0.93	0.4	1	0.93	0.5	2
<b>Mistral 7B Instruct</b>	0.79	0.6	2	0.81	0.7	3


*Note:* Correlation and difference metrics are computed across LLM-based 0–5 scaling scores for the same manifesto texts, using identical prompts and model configurations at two time points: December 2024 and April 2025.

The correlation between runs shows that the LLM measurements exhibit good temporal stability, particularly for the GPT-4o model. Nevertheless, some variation remains, especially for smaller models like Mistral 7B Instruct, which suggests some shifts in LLM behavior over time.

## Original Data Visualisation


I now proceed to visually inspect some cases of the original panel data of civic and ethnic nationalism measurements in Europe from 1945-2022. Figures 1 below, show the panel data created, the first at the party-year level, aggregating the Basque Nationalist Party's scores with its coalitions from 1989 to 2019 and second an aggregation of all party scores for the Republic of Ireland historically.

Figure 1: LLM Measurement of Party Manifesto Positions: Basque Nationalist Party and Coalitions (1989-2019)



Notes: notes

Figure 2: LLM Measurement of Party Manifesto Positions (Republic of Ireland, 1960-2020)



The trends observed in the data for the Basque Country align with historical accounts of the Basque Nationalist Party being historically a staunch ethno-nationalist party, until a real civic turn in more recent years. We observe a peak in ethnic discourse in 1998, the year the party entered a coalition with the hardline ethnic party EA. While civic nationalism begins recovering from its late-90s low and reverses from a culturally-defensive nationalist party toward a modern regionalist civic party as it is today [Linz \(2020\)](#); [Serrano \(2020\)](#).

In the Republic of Ireland, ethnic nationalism peaked and civic nationalism dipped in 1969, coinciding with the outbreak of the Troubles, which lasted three decades. Since then, civic nationalism has remained strong, while ethnic nationalism has generally been lower, except for a marked resurgence in 2019. This resurgence aligned with the Brexit deadline, which reignited debates on Irish unity and unsettled the post-Good Friday Agreement status quo.

### 3.4 Estimation

I employ two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regression models with region and year fixed effects. Region fixed effects  $\mu_r$  control for time-invariant regional characteristics such as geographic location, or baseline levels of migration and economic development. Year fixed effects  $\gamma_t$ , absorb common shocks affecting all regions in a given year, such as EU-level immigration directives (e.g., the 2004 enlargement), global economic crises, or continent-wide political events.

Individual-level covariates  $Z'_{i,r,t}$  account for observable differences between respondents that may influence both the reception of different types of discourse and the integration outcomes themselves, such as citizenship status, household income, education, years lived in the host country, age, gender, and political ideology.

The main estimating equation is:

$$Integration_{i,r,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot Civic_{r,t} + \beta_2 \cdot Ethnic_{r,t} + Z'_{i,r,t}\beta + \mu_r + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,r,t} \quad (1)$$

where  $Integration_{i,r,t}$  denotes the various integration outcome of interest, such as self-reported identification with the host country or perceived discrimination. The treatment variables  $civic_{r,t}$  and  $Ethnic_{r,t}$  are constructed as vote-share-weighted averages of party-level discourse scores within a region-year, using the party electoral performance data from the MPDS:

$$Civic_{r,t} = \sum_{p \in Pr,t} Civic_{p,t} \cdot VoteShare_{p,r,t} \quad (2)$$

$$Ethnic_{r,t} = \sum_{p \in Pr,t} Ethnic_{p,t} \cdot VoteShare_{p,r,t} \quad (3)$$

where  $Pr,t$  is the set of nationalist parties contesting in region  $r$  at time  $t$ , and  $VoteShare_{p,r,t}$  denotes their electoral strength in that region-year. This weighting reflects the discursive environment to which residents contribute to and immigrants exposed to, weighting party discourse by its political salience in the local electoral context.

Because civic and ethnic nationalism may affect immigrants and natives through different mechanisms (Fouka, 2024). I estimate the TWFE model separately for each group where appropriate. For immigrant-focused outcomes (i.e. perceived discrimination, I restrict the sample to immigrants and include group-specific controls such as citizenship status. For outcomes capturing natives' perceptions such as attitudes toward immigration, national or regional identification), I estimate the model on the native sample. This separation allows effects to vary flexibly across groups rather than imposing a single relationship for both.

### 3.5 Robustness

#### 3.5.1 Cluster-robust Standard Errors

Standard errors are clustered at the region level to account for serial correlation within regions over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Baltagi, 2021; Wooldridge, 2021) and ensures that identi-

fication is driven by within-region changes in the composition of nationalist discourse, net of broader time trends and unchanging regional characteristics.

### 3.5.2 Addressing Collinearity

Civic and ethnic nationalism are theoretically distinct constructs, but in practice they often exhibit empirical interdependence. This is particularly evident when examining regional discourse over time. To assess the degree of collinearity between these dimensions, I compute within-region Pearson correlations between civic and ethnic scores across survey years.

The results, presented in Table 5, suggest that in several substate nationalist regions such as Flanders, Scotland and Northern Ireland—there is a strong negative correlation between the two dimensions. The negative correlations implies that increases in ethnic nationalist discourse are frequently accompanied by decreases in civic rhetoric, and vice versa.

Table 5: Correlation Between Civic and Ethnic Scores by Region (Within-Region Over Time)

Region	N Years	Correlation
Galicia	14	-0.43
Flanders	16	-0.69
Northern Ireland	16	-0.58
Canary Islands	12	0.44
Basque Country	18	-0.33
Rep. of Ireland	19	-0.02
Catalonia	18	-0.24
Padania	12	-0.59
Scotland	8	-0.83
Wales	12	-0.42

*Note:* Pearson’s correlations of ethnic and civic nationalism are calculated within regions over time, matching the TWFE setup.

Due to the high collinearity within some regions over time in som TWFE models may struggle to distinguish their effects, leading high standard errors, unstable coefficients. To address this, I utilise the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism scores for the European-wide analysis and reserve the decomposition of their individual effects for a case study on the Spanish regions.

## 4 Results


### 4.1 Results: Europe Wide

Using the Europe-wide dataset covering 32 substate regions and 62,891 individuals observed between 2002 and 2022, this section presents estimates for a range of integration and identity outcomes. These include national and majority ethnic group identification among both immigrants and natives, as well as labour market and political integration outcomes for immigrants. I also assess cross-regional heterogeneity in the estimated effects.

### 4.1.1 National and Ethnic Group Identification

The first set of outcomes captures individual self-placement on a 0–10 scale measuring how close respondents feel to the national identity and majority ethnic group in the nation which they live. I estimate separate two-way fixed effects models for the native and immigrant subsamples, clustering standard errors at the regional level. Figure 3 reports the main effects of civic and ethnic nationalism for each group.

Figure 3: Effects of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalism on National and Ethnic Group Identification by Group



*Notes:* Error bars show 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. Values are estimated from TWFE + clustered SE models run separately on immigrant and native-only samples. Higher values on the y-axis reflect greater attachment to national and majority ethnic identity of host nation. (See Appendix Tables A8 and A9 for full regression table results).

Among immigrants, an increase in ethnic relative to civic nationalist discourse is associated with a marked decline in national identification. For each one-unit increase in ethnic nationalism above civic predicting a 0.4 point decrease on the 0-10 scale for national identification. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level and Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level and remain robust controlling for respondents' ideology, gender, age, education, father's occupational status, education level, household income, and citizenship status. By contrast, the estimated effect on ethnic identification is small and not statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting that more ethnic nationalist discourse does not translate to immigrants feeling closer to the majority ethnic group. This indicates that ethnic nationalism primarily undermines immigrants' attachment to the nation rather than reshaping their ethnic identifications.

Among natives, a more ethnic nationalist discourse is associated with a greater ethnic identification rather than national identification. The estimated effect on national identification is

negative but small and imprecisely estimated, whereas the effect on ethnic identification is positive, predicting a 0.45-point increase on the 0–10 scale and statistically significant at the 1% level. This pattern suggests that when the prevailing form of nationalism in a region becomes more ethnic, natives’ sense of belonging to the majority ethnic group strengthens, even as their attachment to the nation remains largely unchanged.


Taken together, these findings support the interpretation that ethnic nationalism operates as a symbolic boundary mechanism in two regards: ethnic and national. It is shown to narrow the criteria for belonging in ways that reduce immigrants’ attachment to the nation while reinforcing ethnic in-group identification among natives. Civic nationalism, by contrast, appears more conducive to fostering shared national identification across both groups.

#### 4.1.2 Perceived Discrimination Among Immigrants

Next, I present the results on a key outcome researched by the state policy and immigration integration literature: discrimination. The ESS provides detailed data on various forms of self-reported discrimination. These include a general variable asking whether respondents consider themselves “a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country,” as well as more detailed variables asking “on what grounds” respondents feel discriminated on, such as ‘colour or race’, ‘national identity’, or ‘ethnic group’ [European Social Survey \(ESS\) \(2023\)](#).

Figure 4 shows the results from a series of two-way fixed effects (TWFE) models with region-clustered robust standard errors. Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, I estimate logistic regression models and report average marginal effects (AMEs) on the predicted probability of reporting discrimination. This allows for more intuitive interpretation of effect sizes in percentage point changes in the predicted probability of perceived discrimination.

Figure 4: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Types of Discrimination Outcomes Among Immigrants



*Notes:* Point estimates represent the average marginal effects (AME) of ethnic vs civic nationalist discourse on the predicted probability of experiencing discrimination. Confidence intervals are calculated using cluster-robust standard errors clustered by region. (See Appendix Tables [A10](#) and [A11](#) for full regression table results on log-odds scale).

The results in Figure 4 indicate a consistent and statistically significant relationship between the type of nationalist discourse and immigrants' self-reported experiences of discrimination. Exposure to a one-unit more ethnic than civic nationalist party discourse is associated with a 9.3 percentage point increase in the probability of reporting any form of discrimination, within nationalist regions in Europe over time.

Among the more specific types of perceived discrimination, the strongest individual effect appears for national identity, where a more ethnic discourse is associated with an increase of 9.2 percentage points in the likelihood of reporting discrimination on this ground. A smaller but still statistically significant increase of around 2.6 percentage points is observed for ethnic identity. In contrast, the coefficient for discrimination based on colour or race is positive but not statistically distinguishable from zero.


Taken together, these results suggest that ethnic nationalist discourse primarily increases perceptions of exclusion along symbolic and identity-based lines, particularly national belonging, rather than racial or visible minority markers. This aligns with the theoretical expectation that ethnic nationalist frames may redefine the symbolic boundaries of the national community in ways that are more likely to stigmatise immigrants' civic or cultural membership than their physical traits alone.

### **4.1.3 Political and Labour Market Integration Among Immigrants**

The next set of outcomes examines two key dimensions of immigrant integration beyond identity: political participation and labour market attachment. Political integration is measured using the ESS item on whether respondents voted in the most recent national or regional election, while political interest is assessed asking if respondents are 'Not at all interested' to 'Very Interested in Politics', which I recode to a 0-4 scale. Labour market integration is captured through employment status, distinguishing respondents in paid work from those unemployed or outside the labour force as well employment under limited duration contracts.

Figure 5 presents results from two-way fixed effects models for labour market outcomes and OLS or average marginal effects (AMEs) from logistic regressions for political participation, with standard errors clustered at the regional level.

Figure 5: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Political Outcomes Among Immigrants in Europe



*Notes:* Left Panel: Point estimates represent the average marginal effects (AME) of ethnic vs civic nationalist discourse on the predicted probability of voting. Right panel: point estimates are OLS coefficients. All Confidence intervals are calculated using cluster-robust standard errors clustered by region. (See Appendix Tables [A12](#) for full regression table results).


The results in Figure 5 indicate that a shift toward ethnic nationalist discourse is associated with lower levels of political integration among immigrants. Specifically, a one-unit increase in ethnic (relative to civic) nationalism predicts a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting in the last national or regional election, and a 0.039-point reduction on the 0–4 scale of political interest. While modest in magnitude, both effects are negative, suggesting that more ethnic nationalist discourse may dampen immigrants’ political engagement.

A caveat is that the ESS item on voting refers to the most recent national or regional election, but the data does not specify in which year this occurred. Hence it may not have occurred in the same year that the discourse variable is measured. This temporal misalignment is a limitation insofar as nationalist party discourse may change between the election date and the survey year. Nonetheless, the consistent negative direction of effects across both measures is in line with the expectation that ethnic nationalism may discourage immigrants’ participation in the political sphere.

Turning to labour market integration, Figure 6 presents the effects of ethnic versus civic nationalist discourse on two binary outcomes: employment under a limited-duration contract, measured as respondents being currently employed under a limited-duration contract; and unemployment, measured as being unemployed and actively seeking work during the last seven days. Effects are estimated as average marginal effects (AMEs) on the predicted probability of each outcome.



Figure 6: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Labour Market Outcomes Among Immigrants in Europe




*Notes:* Point estimates represent the average marginal effects (AME) of ethnic vs civic nationalist discourse on the predicted probability of unemployment and limited contract employment, indicated by higher values on the Y-axis. (See Appendix Table A13 for full regression table results).

The results in Figure 6 suggest that a more ethnic relative to civic nationalist discourse is associated with worse immigrant labour market outcomes. A one-unit shift toward ethnic nationalism is associated to a 2% increase in the predicted probability of being unemployed and an 8% increase in the predicted probability of working under a limited-duration contract. These results suggest that ethnic nationalist contexts may limit immigrants' access to stable employment opportunities, both by increasing reliance on temporary contracts and by heightening exposure to unemployment.

#### 4.1.4 Cross-region Heterogeneity in Effects

While the average Europe-wide results provide a useful benchmark, namely thanks to the large-N estimation, these may mask important heterogeneity across substate regions. Figure 7 displays region-specific slopes from the TWFE model with interactions, where each estimate captures the association between ethnic relative to civic discourse and national identification for immigrants in that region.

Figure 7: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on National Identification with Host Country Among Immigrants in Europe by Region



*Notes:* Point estimates represent region-specific slopes from TWFE with interactions by region and clustered standard errors by regions.

Figure 7 shows substantial heterogeneity, in a third of the regions, such as Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania, Corsica, and Silesia, the estimated slopes are positive and in rare cases statistically significant, indicating that greater ethnic relative to civic nationalism is associated with higher immigrant identification to the host country. In contrast, in around a two third of regions such as Cantabria, the Basque Country, Saxony, or Frisia, the slopes are strongly negative, suggesting that ethnic dominance in nationalist discourse coincides with lower national attachment.

Spain’s substate regions tend to cluster toward the more negative end of the distribution, suggesting that ethnic dominance may be particularly exclusionary in this context. This positioning, as well as the relatively low collinearity between civic and ethnic nationalism in Spain’s substate regions over time (see Table 5) motivates the next section’s country-level analysis, where the decomposition of the effects can be reliably done and separately assessed in more detail.

## 4.2 Country-level Results: Spain


This section presents the country-specific results for Spain. Spain is the country with the most substate nationalist regions identified in the data, with 8 different regions. This aligns with qualitative accounts highlighting the diversity of substate nationalist regions in Spain (Linz, 2020).

### 4.2.1 National Identification

Looking at the separate effects on national identification, measuring on a scale from 0-10 measuring how close respondents feel to the national unit, separate TWFE models with region-cluster

robust standard errors are now fit on the native and immigrant subsamples. I report the main effects for both civic and ethnic nationalism, disaggregated by immigrant status in Figure 8, below.

Figure 8: Main Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Attachment to Nation by Group



*Notes:* Error bars show 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. Values are estimated from TWFE + clustered SE models run separately on immigrant and native-only samples. Higher values on the y-axis reflect greater attachment to the nation. (See Appendix Tables A14 and A15 for full regression table results).

Among immigrants, higher exposure to ethnic nationalist discourse is associated with lower attachment to the host nation. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the ethnic nationalism index (measured on a 0–5 scale) predicts a 0.75-point decrease in national attachment (measured on a 0–10 scale). Conversely, civic nationalism is associated with increased levels of attachment to the host nation among immigrants, with each one-unit increase in civic nationalism predicting a +1.25 increase on the national attachment scale. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level and remain robust after adjusting for respondents' ideology, gender, age, education, household income, and citizenship status.


Among natives, I find that both types of nationalism are associated with increased levels of attachment to the nation. Ethnic nationalism predicts only a modest increase of 0.25 points in attachment per unit increase, while civic nationalism shows a substantially stronger effect, predicting a 2.28-point increase in national attachment per unit. Again, both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.

These findings highlight that civic nationalist discourse consistently promotes stronger emotional ties to the host nation across both groups, whereas the effects of ethnic nationalism diverge—undermining attachment among immigrants while modestly reinforcing it among natives.

## Conditional Effects of Nationalism on Attachment to Country


While the main effects reveal average associations between nationalist discourse and national attachment, they may mask variation across ideological subgroups. This section examines whether civic and ethnic nationalism affects national attachment differently depending on respondents' left-right self-placement. Marginal effects are shown in Figures 9 and 10 for immigrants and natives, respectively.

Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Attachment to Country among Immigrants across left-right placement



*Notes:* Lines represent marginal effects of civic and ethnic nationalism on attachment to country across values of respondents' left-right ideology. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. (See Appendix Table A14 for full regression table results).

Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Attachment to Country among Natives across left-right placement



*Notes:* Lines represent marginal effects of civic and ethnic nationalism on attachment to country across values of respondents' left-right ideology. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. (See Appendix Table A15 for full regression table results).

Table 6, below summarizes the conditional effects of both types of nationalism on national attachment, highlighting how these effects are conditioned by respondents' ideological orientation. Several key patterns emerge.

Among immigrants, ethnic nationalism is linked to lower national attachment on average, but the effect is concentrated among the left. For left-leaning immigrants, the relationship is strongly negative and significant, suggesting ethnic discourse alienates those with progressive views. The effect weakens to zero for centrists and is insignificant for right-leaning immigrants, indicating they are less affected.

Civic nationalism shows the opposite pattern: it is positively associated with attachment, especially among right-leaning immigrants, with the effect strengthening as conservatism increases. Among left-leaning immigrants, the association is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting limited responsiveness to civic discourse.

Among natives, patterns are more stable. Ethnic nationalism has a modest positive effect with little ideological variation. Civic nationalism has a strong positive effect overall, amplified among the left and attenuated, though still positive, among the right. This suggests civic discourse resonates broadly but is especially effective for left-leaning natives.

Together, these results highlight the role of ideology and group-specific dynamics in shaping responses to nationalist discourse. Civic nationalism appears broadly integrative—strengthening attachment among natives and, to a lesser extent, right-leaning immigrants. Ethnic nationalism shows a more divisive pattern: reinforcing attachment among natives but reducing it among

Table 6: Summary of Main and Conditional Effects of Ethnic and Civic Nationalism on Attachment to Country by Group

Group	Ethnic Nationalism → Attachment		Civic Nationalism → Attachment	
	Main Effect	Conditional Effect	Main Effect	Conditional Effect
<b>Immigrants</b>				
Direction	↓	↓↓	↑	↑↑
Effect	-0.75	Accentuated among left-wing	1.26	Accentuated among right-wing
<i>p</i> -value	(<0.01***)	(<0.01***)	(<0.01***)	(<0.05**)
<b>Natives</b>				
Direction	↑	=	↑	↑↑
Effect	0.25	Uniform, weak	2.29	Accentuated among left wing
<i>p</i> -value	(<0.01***)	(0.4)	(<0.01***)	(<0.01***)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Arrows indicate the direction of the effect. I describe how the interaction affects the main effect—i.e., reversed, accentuated, attenuated and report the interaction term’s *p*-value


left-leaning immigrants. This divergence suggests ethnic rhetoric can deepen in-group/out-group divides, whereas civic appeals provide a more inclusive basis for national attachment.

#### 4.2.2 Native views on Immigration:

A key area of the state policy and immigration integration literature focuses not just on the material and attitudinal-based outcomes of immigrants in the host society, but importantly, how native views on immigration are affected in response to to state policy, speech or action on immigration (Fouka, 2024).

I therefore test whether the ethnic and civic nationalist party discourse affects a series of native attitudes towards immigration in Europe’s substate nationalist regions. Figure 11 below, shows the effects of both types of nationalist discourse on native views regarding socio-economic outcomes such as the view that immigrants take jobs away vs create new jobs in the host nation, take out more / put in more to social services; and the view to allow few / many immigrants from different ethnic groups to the majority into the nation.

Figure 11: Main Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Native Views on Immigration



*Notes:* Error bars show 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. Higher values reflect views that immigrants take jobs away vs create jobs; take out more vs put in more to social services and allow fewer vs more immigrants. (See Appendix Table A16 for full regression table results).

Ethnic nationalist discourse is significantly associated with more restrictive views across all three measures. It increases the likelihood that natives see immigrants as taking jobs rather than creating them, as placing greater burdens on social services, and as warranting lower admission of those from different ethnic backgrounds. In all cases, effects are positive and statistically significant, with confidence intervals not crossing zero.

Conversely, civic nationalist discourse shows no significant association with support for reducing immigration. It is linked to perceptions that immigrants create jobs and contribute more to social services, indicating an integration-supportive effect. Although confidence intervals are wider than for ethnic nationalism, effects are significant at the 5% level. These results suggest civic discourse may foster more favorable views of immigrants' economic and social contributions.

Figure 12 presents the effects of civic and ethnic nationalist discourse on native views regarding cultural dimensions of immigration. Two outcome variables are examined: the belief that immigrants enrich versus undermine the host country's cultural life, and the perceived importance of immigrants being committed to the way of life in the host nation as a qualification for entry.

Figure 12: Main Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Native Views on Immigration



*Notes:* Error bars show 95% confidence intervals clustered by region. Higher values reflect that immigrants enrich vs undermine cultural life and that it is extremely important vs not at all important that immigrants are committed to way of life to come and live in host nation. (See Appendix Table A17 for full regression results.)

Starting with the latter, civic nationalism is associated with stronger native support for requiring immigrants' commitment to the host nation's way of life. This aligns with its emphasis on shared values, norms, and civic responsibilities, such as living and working in the nation. By contrast, ethnic nationalism is negatively associated with this view, consistent with its focus on ascriptive traits like ancestry or ethnicity rather than cultural or behavioral integration.

Secondly, in terms of the cultural impact of immigration, both civic and ethnic nationalism are associated with the view that the country's cultural life is enriched by immigration. These effect sizes are positive and very similar (approximately +1.25 for each one unit increase in nationalist discourse). This contrasts with the earlier findings on socio-economic attitudes (Figure 11), where ethnic nationalism was consistently linked to more exclusionary views.


This contrast suggests that while ethnic nationalism may reinforce economic anxieties about immigration, it does not necessarily fuel cultural hostility. Rather, natives may simultaneously hold restrictive economic views while recognizing or even welcoming cultural contributions from immigrants.

### Conditional Effects on Native Views on Immigration

Figure 13 below, visualises the effect of both types of nationalist discourse on the view that immigrants take out more (higher values) vs put in more (lower values) of social services across values of respondents' left-right ideology.



Figure 13: Marginal Effects of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism on Native perceptions that Immigrants Contribute to or Burden Social Services Across Ideological Placement



*Notes:* Lines represent marginal effects of civic and ethnic nationalism on native views that immigrants take out more (higher values) vs put in more (lower values) of social services across values of respondents’ left–right ideology. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals clustered by region.

Ethnic nationalist discourse has a positive, statistically significant effect on the view that immigrants take more from social services, regardless of ideology. The effect is slightly stronger among right-leaning respondents, but its direction is consistent across the spectrum.

Civic nationalism, which on average predicts greater agreement that immigrants “put in more” to social services, has no significant effect among respondents scoring above 5 on the 0–10 left–right scale. This suggests such discourse is less resonant with right-leaning natives. Among left-leaning respondents, however, the effect is stronger, increasing positive views of immigrants’ contributions—consistent with the civic nationalist emphasis on “living and working” in society as the basis for co-national status.

## 5 Discussion

The Europe-wide results show that the balance between civic and ethnic nationalist discourse functions as a powerful symbolic boundary mechanism shaping immigrant integration and native identity. Across 32 substate regions, a shift toward ethnic nationalism was linked to weaker national identification among immigrants, stronger ethnic in-group identification among natives, higher perceived discrimination, and poorer political and labour market outcomes for immigrants. This aligns with the literature’s view of ethnic nationalism as narrowing belonging to ascriptive traits, while civic nationalism fosters a more inclusive national identity (Brubaker, 2009; Larin, 2020).

National and ethnic identity effects were asymmetric: for immigrants, ethnic discourse reduced national, but not ethnic—identification, suggesting exclusion from the national boundary rather

than reorientation toward the majority group. For natives, it strengthened ethnic in-group attachment without affecting national identification, indicating sharper insider–outsider distinctions. The Spain-specific analysis offers a sharper picture. Disaggregating the effects reveals a striking asymmetry: among immigrants, it shows again that ethnic nationalism strongly reduces national attachment, while civic nationalism exerts a sizeable positive effect. Among natives, however, both forms increase national attachment (contrasting with the European pattern where ethnic nationalism had little influence). This suggests that in the Europe-wide estimates, contexts like Spain, where both forms have positive effects on natives could cancel out overall, dampening the net ethnic–civic coefficient.

Patterns in perceived discrimination illuminate how civic and ethnic discourse affect symbolic boundaries. Across Europe, ethnic nationalism primarily heightens perceptions of exclusion along identity-based lines, particularly national belonging, rather than racial or visible minority markers. This aligns with [Bail \(2008\)](#)’s finding that language and culture are more salient symbolic boundaries than race, to which these results add national and ethnic identity.

Negative associations with immigrants’ political participation, political interest, and employment stability suggest that symbolic shifts can extend into economic and political domains, consistent with the theoretical argument that symbolic boundaries may crystallise into social boundaries when widely agreed upon, such as by the general public, or formalised in official party positions ([Lamont & Molnár, 2002](#)).

Conditional effects by ideology further illuminate these dynamics. For immigrants, ethnic nationalism’s negative impact is concentrated among those on the political left, disappearing for centrists and right-leaners. Civic nationalism, by contrast, boosts attachment primarily among right-leaning immigrants. Among natives, civic nationalism is broadly integrative but resonates most strongly with the left, while ethnic nationalism’s modest positive association is constant across ideology. These patterns imply that the inclusivity of civic discourse is partly contingent on political alignment, while ethnic discourse alienates specific subgroups more than others.

Turning to natives’ views on immigration, ethnic nationalism is consistently linked to more restrictive socio-economic attitudes, whereas civic nationalism fosters more positive evaluations of immigrants’ economic contribution, though only among left-leaning respondents. In cultural terms, both forms of nationalism are associated with perceiving immigration as enriching national culture, even when economic perceptions diverge. This suggests that economic and cultural attitudes can move in different directions, with ethnic nationalism mobilising economic anxieties without necessarily generating cultural hostility.

Taken together, the Europe-wide and Spanish findings underscore that the symbolic boundaries drawn by nationalist discourse are not monolithic. Civic and ethnic appeals can operate in parallel, sometimes reinforcing each other, sometimes working at cross-purposes and their resonance depends on individual-level factors. The results provide empirical support that shifts in civic and ethnic nationalist discourse over time are meaningful drivers of immigrant integration outcomes and in-group identity formation among natives, reinforcing the theoretical link between political discourse, symbolic boundary-making, and integration outcomes.

## 5.1 Limitations

As with all survey based studies, it is possible that survey responses may be shaped by social desirability pressures, especially on sensitive topics such as discrimination, national identity, or immigration attitudes. In contexts where anti-discrimination norms are strongly institutionalised, this may lead to systematic underreporting of exclusionary views or overreporting of

inclusive ones, potentially attenuating observed effects (Krumpal, 2013).

While the use of repeated cross-sections nested in substate regions strengthens inference relative to single cross-sectional designs (Bail, 2008), the results should be interpreted as associations rather than definitive causal effects. The civic and ethnic nationalism measures are continuous rather than discrete treatments, making conventional binary-treatment causal estimators (i.e. standard DiD) less appropriate. Moreover, shifts in integration outcomes and nationalist rhetoric may both stem from concurrent societal dynamics, creating the possibility of reverse causality. The TWFE framework helps isolate within-region, over-time variation net of permanent traits and common shocks, but cannot fully rule out bias from unobserved time-varying confounders.

While past studies have focused exclusively on boundary-making by the general public (Bail, 2008), incorporating parties into the analysis highlights their role in shaping the official discourse that frames belonging. The study remains agnostic as to whether party positions respond to public attitudes or elite leadership, instead estimating the joint effect of the prevailing discursive environment in terms of civic or ethnic nationalism on integration outcomes within specific regions over time.

Joint effect of mass sentiment and party positions, for an overall measure of ‘discourse’ or exposure to the prevailing civic or ethnic ideology on integration outcomes within specific regions over time. Parties respond to mass sentiment but also officialise and institutionalise attitudes, hence I suspect greater downstream consequences than ‘public opinion’ alone.

For this reason, I defined discourse as the programmatic positions used by political parties to define national membership and legitimate boundary criteria, both influenced by and reflective of public attitudes in a given time and space. This approach captures the joint effect of official party positions and public sentiment without disentangling their relative contributions. Thus, the analysis cannot determine whether outcomes are driven by parties shaping public attitudes, parties responding to them, or both reacting to shared forces. Whereas Bail (2008) focuses exclusively on boundary work in public attitudes, this study connects party policy positions and public attitudes in a single framework, using changes in the dominant discursive environment as an explanatory factor for immigration integration outcomes.

## 5.2 Directions for future research

While this study sought to establish robust correlations within regions over time, future research should deepen causal identification in specific contexts. Case-specific studies using causal inference designs could more rigorously control for the role of formal immigration related policies, such as anti-immigration laws, than in generalised fixed effects regression models. Such designs would also allow tracking the persistence of discourse effects over time, revealing whether exposure to civic or ethnic rhetoric leaves lasting marks on attitudes and identities, or whether these revert once the discourse shifts.

In addition, future work should expand beyond party manifestos to incorporate parliamentary speeches, large-scale corpora of elite interviews, media appearances, and social media activity, thereby capturing more dynamic and situational forms of nationalist discourse. Although challenging, researchers should also strive to disentangle whether shifts in discourse are driven primarily by elite leadership or reflect bottom-up public sentiment.

## 6 Conclusion

The study of boundaries can seem abstract and ‘real’ only in a rhetorical sense, which may explain why much previous research has relied on qualitative ethnographies (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Yet, as Bail (2008) demonstrated, there is no reason why boundary-making cannot be examined through a comparative quantitative lens. This study extends that approach by asking whether—and how—civic and ethnic forms of nationalism operate as boundary-makers with tangible material and attitudinal consequences for immigrant integration and native perceptions. The findings provide new empirical evidence that both forms of nationalism shape symbolic boundaries in Europe’s substate nationalist regions, with clear implications for integration outcomes.

Within regions over time, shifts toward more ethnic relative to civic nationalism are associated with weaker national identification among immigrants, stronger ethnic in-group identification among natives, higher perceived discrimination, and poorer political and labour market outcomes for immigrants. These patterns align with the theoretical view of ethnic nationalism as narrowing belonging to ascriptive traits, while civic nationalism fosters a more inclusive national identity. Across Europe, ethnic nationalism primarily heightens perceptions of exclusion along identity-based lines—such as attachment to the host nation and to the majority ethnic group—rather than along racial or visible-minority markers, echoing earlier findings on the salience of language and culture (Bail, 2008) but adding the dimension of national and ethnic identity. Among natives, increases in ethnic discourse do not necessarily fuel cultural hostility but are consistently linked to more restrictive socio-economic attitudes toward immigration.

The analysis also highlights important individual-level conditional factors, especially ideology. Ethnic discourse disproportionately alienates specific subgroups, such as left-leaning immigrants, whereas civic nationalism enhances positive evaluations of immigrants’ economic contributions only among left-leaning natives. These findings underscore that the integrative or exclusionary potential of nationalist discourse is shaped not only by its content but also by the ideological orientation of its audience.

Methodologically, the study contributes to the use of large language models (LLMs) for positioning political texts. By applying a “scaling by classification” approach, I demonstrate that LLM-based scaling can yield valid measures, with benchmark alignment within  $\approx 85\%$  of an expert-coded validation set. The approach also produced replicable estimates across time, with temporal stability of  $\approx 90\%$  (Pearson’s  $r$ ) between prompting waves. The resulting panel dataset maps the evolution of civic and ethnic nationalist party discourse in 32 identified substate nationalist regions in Europe, encompassing 610 manifesto-years from 1945 to 2022. These original measures offer a valuable foundation for future longitudinal analyses connecting nationalism and integration.

Taken together, this study brings political parties into the theoretical framework as key actors in officialising and institutionalising boundary-making over time, where prior research has focused almost exclusively on expressions of public attitudes. By estimating their joint effect on integration outcomes, it offers new empirical evidence on the significant and at times troubling implications of nationalist discourse types for immigrant integration.

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## 7 Appendix

### .1 Appendix: Prompt Designs

#### .1.1 Prompt Design: Classification

LLM API Prompt Design for Classification of Nationalist Parties and Substate Regions in Europe (1945-2020)

```

1
2 class Nationalist(str, Enum):
3     NATIONALIST = "nationalist"
4     NOT_NATIONALIST = "not_nationalist"
5
6 class TextClassification(BaseModel):
7     nationalist: Nationalist
8     region_name: Optional[str] = Field(
9         default=None,
10        description="Name of the substate region the party
11        represents, if applicable. Otherwise 'none' or null."
12    )
13    confidence: float = Field(ge=0, le=1)
14    explanation: Optional[str] = Field(
15        description="Brief reasoning (1 2 sentences) supporting
16        the classification."
17    )
18
19 SYSTEM_PROMPT_TEXT = """
20 You are a political science expert specializing in European
21 political parties and nationalism since 1945.
22
23 Your task is to classify political parties based on structured
24 metadata (party name, abbreviation, country, and year). For each
25 party, provide a structured classification in the following
26 format:
27
28 ---
29
30 Output schema:
31 {

```



```

27 "nationalist": "nationalist" | "not_nationalist",
28 "region_name": "<name of substate region>" | "none",
29 "confidence": <float from 0 to 1>,
30 "explanation": "<1 2 sentence justification>"
31 }
32 ---
33
34 Classification Instructions:
35
36 1. **Is the party nationalist?**
37 - Return "nationalist" if the party emphasizes national
    sovereignty, prioritizes the interests of the national in-group
    or frames its politics around protecting or restoring the
    nations identity.
38 - A party can be nationalist even if it does **not** seek
    independence or represent a substate region.
39
40 2. **If the party is nationalist, does it represent a specific
    substate region?**
41 - If yes, return the **name of the region** (e.g., "Basque
    Country", "Catalonia", "South Tyrol", "Scotland", etc.).
42 - If not, return "none".
43
44 3. **Provide a confidence score** (between 0.0 and 1.0) reflecting
    how certain you are.
45
46 4. **Provide a short explanation** (1 2 sentences) explaining
    your classification, focusing on key ideological cues or known
    political positions from the given year.
47
48 Do **not** infer information beyond the party-year. If you are
    unsure, reflect that uncertainty in a lower confidence score.
49
50 ---
51
52 Few-Shot Examples:
53
54 Example 1:
55 Party name: Basque Nationalist Party
56 Abbreviation: PNV
57 Country: Spain
58 Year: 2018
59
60 Response:
61 {
62   "nationalist": "nationalist",
63   "region_name": "Basque Country",
64   "confidence": 0.95,
65   "explanation": "The PNV is a Basque nationalist party seeking
    greater autonomy for the Basque Country within Spain."
66 }
67
68 Example 2:
69 Party name: Scottish National Party
70 Abbreviation: SNP
71 Country: United Kingdom

```

```

72 Year: 2020
73
74 Response:
75 {
76   "nationalist": "nationalist",
77   "region_name": "Scotland",
78   "confidence": 0.97,
79   "explanation": "The SNP is a civic nationalist party advocating
80     Scottish independence through democratic means."
81 }
82
83 Example 3:
84 Party name: Socialist Party
85 Abbreviation: PS
86 Country: France
87 Year: 1997
88
89 Response:
90 {
91   "nationalist": "not_nationalist",
92   "region_name": "none",
93   "confidence": 0.90,
94   "explanation": "The PS is a mainstream social-democratic party
95     focused on national governance, not nationalism."
96 }
97
98 Example 4:
99 Party name: S dtiroler Volkspartei
100 Abbreviation: SVP
101 Country: Italy
102 Year: 1995
103
104 Response:
105 {
106   "nationalist": "nationalist",
107   "region_name": "South Tyrol",
108   "confidence": 0.93,
109   "explanation": "The SVP represents the German-speaking population
110     of South Tyrol and advocates regional autonomy."
111 }
112
113 Example 5:
114 Party name: National Front
115 Abbreviation: FN
116 Country: France
117 Year: 2012
118
119 Response:
120 {
121   "nationalist": "nationalist",
122   "region_name": "none",
123   "confidence": 0.92,
124   "explanation": "The FN is a far-right nationalist party focused
125     on ethnic identity and national sovereignty, not regional
126     autonomy."
127 }

```

```

23
24 """
25
26 def classify_party(party_name: str, abbrev: str, year: int, country
: str) -> TextClassification:
27     user_input = f"""Party name: {party_name}\nAbbreviation: {
abbrev}\nCountry: {country}\nYear: {year}"""
28     response = client.chat.completions.create(
29         model="gpt-4o",
30         response_model=TextClassification,
31         temperature=0,
32         max_retries=3,
33         messages=[
34             {"role": "system", "content": SYSTEM_PROMPT_TEXT},
35             {"role": "user", "content": user_input}
36         ]
37     )
38     return response

```

## 1.1.2 Prompt Design: Text Scaling

LLM API Prompt Design for Text Scaling of Nationalist Party Manifestos to score parties' Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse.

```

1
2 # 1. Enum Definitions
3 class EthnicSentiment(str, Enum):
4     absent = "absent"
5     very_weakly_present = "very_weakly_present"
6     weak = "weakly_present"
7     moderate = "moderately_present"
8     strong = "strongly_present"
9     very_strong = "very_strongly_present"
10    unclear = "unclear"
11
12 class CivicSentiment(str, Enum):
13     absent = "absent"
14     very_weakly_present = "very_weakly_present"
15     weak = "weakly_present"
16     moderate = "moderately_present"
17     strong = "strongly_present"
18     very_strong = "very_strongly_present"
19     unclear = "unclear"
20
21 # 2. Classification Output Schema
22 class TextClassification(BaseModel):
23     ethnic_category: EthnicSentiment
24     civic_category: CivicSentiment
25     confidence: float = Field(ge=0, le=1, description="Confidence
score for the classification")
26     explanation: Optional[str] = Field(description="Brief
explanation of why the categories were chosen")
27

```

```

28 # 3. System Prompt
29 SYSTEM_PROMPT_TEXT = """
30 You are a political scientist with expertise in nationalism studies
   . Your task is to classify excerpts from European nationalist
   party manifestos based on the presence and intensity of ethnic
   nationalism and civic nationalism.
31 These two forms of nationalism are not opposites, and a text
   can express both simultaneously or neither. Analyze each
   dimension independently.
32 ---
33
34 Definitions:
35
36 - Ethnic Nationalism: Reflects exclusionary or anti-immigrant
   views, especially those emphasizing ancestry, bloodline, or
   cultural purity. High ethnic nationalism may stress national
   homogeneity and traditional identity.
37 - Civic Nationalism: Reflects inclusive views toward immigrants
   , emphasizing equal rights, integration into a shared political
   community, and national identity based on values, not origin.
   High civic nationalism may support immigrant inclusion while
   maintaining a national identity framework.
38
39 ---
40
41 Important:
42 - Treat these categories as independent. A text can score high
   on both dimensions (e.g., supporting immigrant
   integration for some groups but excluding others).
43 - Do not infer civic sentiment as low simply because ethnic
   sentiment is high and vice versa.
44 - Focus on explicit language, not assumptions.
45
46 Classification Instructions:
47
48 For each text:
49 1. Classify the intensity of both ethnic and civic
   nationalist sentiment:
50   - 'absent'
51   - 'very_weakly_present'
52   - 'weakly_present'
53   - 'moderately_present'
54   - 'strongly_present'
55   - 'very_strongly_present'
56   - 'unclear'
57
58 2. Include:
59   - A 'confidence' score (0.0 to 1.0)
60   - A short explanation (1 2 sentences) justifying your
   classification.
61
62 ---
63
64 Examples:
65
66 Example 1 (Ethnic Nationalism):

```

```

67 > "We must preserve the purity of our national blood and protect
    our heritage from foreign dilution."
68
69 Output:
70 ```json
71 {
72   "ethnic_category": "very_strongly_present",
73   "civic_category": "absent",
74   "confidence": 0.95,
75   "explanation": "The text explicitly emphasizes racial purity and
    exclusion of foreigners."
76 }
77
78 Example 2 (Civic Nationalism):
79
80 "Everyone who shares our values and contributes to our society
    should be considered one of us, regardless of origin."
81
82 Output:
83 ```json
84 {
85   "ethnic_category": "absent",
86   "civic_category": "strongly_present",
87   "confidence": 0.9,
88   "explanation": "The statement clearly supports inclusion based on
    civic criteria."
89 }
90
91 Example 3 (Unclear):
92
93 "Our nation must remain strong and united."
94 {
95   "ethnic_category": "unclear",
96   "civic_category": "unclear",
97   "confidence": 0.4,
98   "explanation": "The language is too vague to confidently identify
    ethnic or civic nationalism."
99 }
100
101 Example 4 (Both Present):
102 > "We welcome all immigrants who adopt our values and traditions
    but we must firmly reject communities that isolate
    themselves and erode our national culture."
103
104 Output:
105 {
106   "ethnic_category": "moderately_present",
107   "civic_category": "moderately_present",
108   "confidence": 0.85,
109   "explanation": "The text supports inclusion on civic grounds but
    also warns against cultural dilution, reflecting both civic and
    ethnic elements."
110 }
111
112 """
113 # Classification function

```

```
14 def classify_text(text: str) -> TextClassification:
15     response = client.chat.completions.create(
16         model="gpt-4o",
17         response_model=TextClassification,
18         temperature=0,
19         max_retries=2,
20         messages=[
21             {
22                 "role": "system",
23                 "content": SYSTEM_PROMPT_TEXT,
24             },
25             {"role": "user", "content": text}
26         ]
27     )
28     return response
```

## .2 Full Case Selection: Substate Nationalist Regions in Europe

Table A7: Full Case Selection: Substate Nationalist Regions in Europe Represented by at least 1 Political Party

Substate Region	Constituent State(s)	Number of Party-Years
Flanders	Belgium	21
Wallonia	Belgium	7
Republika Srpska	Bosnia-Herzegovina	7
Istria	Croatia	3
Slavonia and Baranja	Croatia	3
Moravia	Czech Republic	4
Brittany	France	4
Corsica	France	5
Bavaria	Germany	16
Schleswig-Holstein	Germany	9
Saxony	Germany	3
Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania	Germany	4
Padania	Italy	24
South Tyrol	Italy / Germany	14
Aosta Valley	Italy	1
Gagauzia	Moldova	2
Frisia	Netherlands	8
Silesia	Poland / Czech Republic	2
Sandžak	Serbia / Montenegro	2
Vojvodina	Serbia	5
Catalonia	Spain	17
Basque Country	Spain / France	28
Canary Islands	Spain	8
Galicia	Spain	5
Aragon	Spain	2
Andalusia	Spain	1
Cantabria	Spain	1
Navarra	Spain	1
Ticino	Switzerland	2
Republic of Ireland	Republic of Ireland	9
Northern Ireland	United Kingdom / Ireland	7
Scotland	United Kingdom	5
Wales	United Kingdom	3

*Note:* The Republic of Ireland is technically not a 'sub-state' region, as it is not part of the United Kingdom like Northern Ireland. However, it historically exhibits its own form of nationalism, primarily directed against British rule and in favor of Irish unification. For this reason, it is treated as a separate region in the analysis. Political parties that contest elections in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (i.e. Sinn Féin) are counted in both regions. For full prompt designs used, see Appendix .1.1 and .1.2.

### .3 Benchmarking Formulas

#### Civic Nationalism

$$\text{Civic} = \text{per606\_1} + \text{per606\_2} + \text{per607\_1} + \text{per607\_2} + \text{per602\_2} + \text{per2023} + \text{per705} \quad (4)$$

Where:

- **per606\_1, per606\_2:** Positive references to civic-mindedness, solidarity, and public spiritedness.
- **per607\_1, per607\_2:** Favourable mentions of multiculturalism and voluntary immigrant integration.
- **per602\_2:** Positive framing of new immigration and rejection of restrictive quotas.
- **per2023:** Support for lax or inclusive citizenship and election laws.
- **per705:** Favourable references to underprivileged minority groups.

#### Ethnic Nationalism

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Ethnic} = & \text{per608\_1} + \text{per608\_2} + \text{per608\_3} + \text{per601\_2} + \text{per2022} + \text{per601\_1} \\ & - \text{per602\_2} - \text{per607\_1} - \text{per607\_2} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Where:

- **per608\_1, per608\_2, per608\_3:** Emphasis on cultural assimilation and rejection of cultural plurality.
- **per601\_2:** Advocacy for restricting new immigration; portrayal of immigration as a threat to national identity.
- **per2022:** Support for restrictive citizenship policies targeting specific (ethnic) groups.
- **per601\_1:** Appeals to nationalism, patriotic pride, and general national symbolism.
- **per602\_2, per607\_1, per607\_2 (subtracted):** These are subtracted to penalize civic-oriented or inclusive framing of immigration and multiculturalism.



## .4 Appendix: Main Results - Europe Wide

### National and Ethnic Identification

Table A8: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on National and Majority Ethnic Group Identification Among Immigrants

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	National Identification (0–10)	Ethnic Group Identification (0–10)
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic–Civic Nationalism	–0.404*** (0.073)	–0.102 (0.103)
Left–Right Ideology	0.079 (0.059)	0.045 (0.048)
Gender	0.509*** (0.141)	0.321** (0.129)
Age	0.022** (0.007)	0.017* (0.009)
Years of Education	0.041* (0.022)	0.029 (0.020)
Father’s Occupational Status Score	0.067 (0.107)	0.052 (0.096)
Household Income Decile	–0.006 (0.041)	–0.012 (0.038)
Father’s Years of Education	–0.018 (0.055)	–0.014 (0.050)
Citizenship Status	–0.445*** (0.057)	–0.267** (0.124)
Observations	12,415	12,415
R <sup>2</sup>	0.119	0.079
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.112	0.049
F Statistic	15.986***	4.905***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A9: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on National and Majority Ethnic Group Identification Among Natives

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	National Identification (0–10)	Ethnic Group Identification (0–10)
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic–Civic Nationalism	–0.119 (0.153)	0.451*** (0.153)
Left–Right Ideology	0.058 (0.040)	0.034 (0.038)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.329*** (0.089)	0.221** (0.087)
Age	0.027*** (0.006)	0.019** (0.007)
Years of Education	0.006 (0.012)	0.012 (0.011)
Father’s Occupational Status Score	0.171*** (0.037)	0.098** (0.036)
Household Income Decile	0.038*** (0.011)	0.021* (0.010)
Father’s Years of Education	0.044 (0.055)	0.030 (0.052)
Citizenship Status	–1.928 (1.712)	–0.822 (1.695)
Observations	39,432	39,432
R <sup>2</sup>	0.212	0.211
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.161	0.142
F Statistic	12.986***	8.905***

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Perceived Discrimination

Table A10: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Perceived Group Discrimination Among Immigrants in Europe

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	General Perceived Discrimination	Discrimination: Ethnic Group
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic–Civic Nationalism	0.837** (0.387)	1.246*** (0.315)
Left–Right Ideology	−0.200*** (0.020)	0.051** (0.020)
Gender (Female)	0.452*** (0.089)	0.351** (0.020)
Age	−0.040*** (0.008)	0.007 (0.017)
Years of Education	0.007** (0.003)	−0.042 (0.051)
Father’s Occupational Status Score	0.004** (0.002)	0.072 (0.049)
Household Income Decile	−0.082 (0.056)	−0.191*** (0.001)
Father’s Years of Education	−0.234 (0.224)	0.940 (0.882)
Citizenship Status	−0.176 (0.214)	0.940 (0.861)
Observations	12,415	12,415
Log Likelihood	−137.833	−39.112

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A11: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Perceived Discrimination Type Among Immigrants in Europe

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Discrimination: National Identity	Discrimination: Colour or Race
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic-Civic Nationalism	1.629*** (0.086)	1.249 (0.974)
Left-Right Ideology	-0.275 (0.272)	-0.038 (0.063)
Gender (Female)	0.590** (0.295)	0.630** (0.242)
Age	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.030 (0.022)
Years of Education	0.024*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.005)
Father's Occupational Status Score	-0.658*** (0.176)	-0.658*** (0.172)
Household Income Decile	0.038 (0.145)	0.030 (0.157)
Father's Years of Education	-0.037 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.055)
Citizenship Status	-0.198 (0.531)	-0.177 (0.360)
Observations	12,415	12,415
Log Likelihood	-22.903	-42.893

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Political and Labour Market Integration

Table A12: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Political Outcomes Among Immigrants in Europe

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Voted in last election (0-1)	Interested in Politics (0-4)
	<i>logistic</i> (1)	<i>OLS</i> (2)
Ethnic–Civic Nationalism	−0.164*** (0.063)	−0.038** (0.015)
Left–Right Ideology	0.027* (0.014)	−0.042*** (0.006)
Gender (Female)	0.154*** (0.046)	−0.150*** (0.015)
Age	−0.040*** (0.006)	0.005 (0.028)
Years of Education	−0.030*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.027)
Father’s Occupational Status Score	0.134* (0.071)	0.034** (0.015)
Household Income Decile	−0.090* (0.047)	0.081*** (0.010)
Father’s Years of Education	−0.081* (0.049)	0.079*** (0.010)
Citizenship Status	−2.062*** (0.456)	−0.157*** (0.058)
Observations	12,415	10,413
Log Likelihood	−45,112	—
R <sup>2</sup>	—	0.112

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A13: Effect of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalist Party Discourse on Labour Market Outcomes Among Immigrants in Europe

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Unemployment (0-1)	Employment contract of limited duration (0-1)
	<i>logistic</i> (1)	<i>logistic</i> (2)
Ethnic-Civic Nationalism	0.270*** (0.084)	1.08*** (0.040)
Left-Right Ideology	-0.033 (0.029)	-0.042*** (0.005)
Gender (Female)	-0.368*** (0.127)	0.174*** (0.025)
Age	-0.017*** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.002)
Years of Education	0.005 (0.048)	-0.007 (0.018)
Father's Occupational Status Score	-0.403*** (0.031)	0.019*** (0.004)
Household Income Decile	-0.019 (0.097)	0.056*** (0.008)
Father's Years of Education	-0.053 (0.067)	-0.091** (0.041)
Citizenship Status	0.139 (0.057)	0.205** (0.042)
Observations	10,215	3,415
Log Likelihood	-221.903	-422.895

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## .5 Appendix: Country-level Results - Spain

### Attachment to Country

Table A14: Effect of Civic and Ethnic Nationalist Discourse on Attachment to Country (ESS Spain, Immigrant Subsample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Attachment to Country	
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic Nationalism	−0.751*** (0.083)	−2.481*** (0.468)
Civic Nationalism	1.257*** (0.330)	0.172 (0.751)
Left-Right Ideology	0.163** (0.066)	−1.850*** (0.523)
Gender (Female)	0.123 (0.462)	0.196 (0.519)
Age	−0.003 (0.018)	−0.003 (0.018)
Years of Education	−0.022 (0.015)	−0.022 (0.015)
Household Income Decile	−0.091 (0.078)	−0.092 (0.076)
Citizenship Status	0.504 (0.557)	0.469 (0.527)
Ethnic × Ideology		0.341*** (0.072)
Civic × Ideology		0.184** (0.076)
Observations	2,213	2,213
R <sup>2</sup>	0.172	0.184
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.119
F Statistic	3.071*** (df = 12; 177)	2.823*** (df = 14; 175)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A15: Effect of Civic and Ethnic Nationalist Discourse on Attachment to Country (ESS Spain, Native Subsample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Attachment to Country	
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic Nationalism	0.250*** (0.026)	0.221** (0.092)
Civic Nationalism	2.289*** (0.130)	2.290*** (0.093)
Left-Right Ideology	0.323*** (0.042)	1.407** (0.605)
Gender (Female)	0.164* (0.093)	0.161* (0.087)
Age	0.037*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)
Years of Education	−0.010*** (0.003)	−0.010*** (0.003)
Household Income Decile	−0.103 (0.103)	−0.104 (0.100)
Citizenship Status	1.903*** (0.004)	2.104*** (0.008)
Ethnic × Ideology		−0.081 (0.100)
Civic × Ideology		−0.202*** (0.066)
Observations	7,332	7,332
R <sup>2</sup>	0.222	0.225
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.216	0.218
F Statistic	34.338*** (df = 11; 1320)	29.508*** (df = 13; 1318)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## Native Views on Immigration

Table A16: Effect of Civic and Ethnic Nationalist Discourse on Native Attitudes toward Immigration (ESS Spain, Native Subsample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Allow Few Immigrants from Different Ethnic Group as Majority	Immigrants Burden Social Services	Immigrants Take Jobs Away from Country
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ethnic Nationalism	0.128** (0.063)	0.850*** (0.107)	1.044*** (0.174)
Civic Nationalism	0.080 (0.118)	-0.468*** (0.176)	-0.628** (0.299)
Left-Right Ideology	0.114*** (0.010)	0.097* (0.050)	0.087 (0.065)
Gender (Female)	-0.057** (0.023)	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.049** (0.024)
Age	-0.059 (0.064)	-0.067 (0.071)	-0.079 (0.061)
Years of Education	0.477*** (0.127)	0.373*** (0.138)	0.320*** (0.076)
Father's Education Level	0.021*** (0.006)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)
Household Income Decile	0.012 (0.213)	0.005 (0.452)	-0.001 (0.231)
Father's Employment Status	-0.108*** (0.027)	0.012 (0.412)	0.087 (0.481)
Observations	7,332	7,332	7,332
R <sup>2</sup>	0.114	0.061	0.030
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.107	0.049	0.017
F Statistic	15.986*** (df = 19; 2363)	4.905*** (df = 10; 755)	2.385*** (df = 10; 768)
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A17: Effect of Civic and Ethnic Nationalist Discourse on Native Cultural Attitudes toward Immigration (ESS Spain, Native Subsample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Immigrants Enrich / Undermine Cultural Life	Immigrants Committed to Way of Life Should Qualify
	(1)	(2)
Ethnic Nationalism	1.224*** (0.057)	-1.106** (0.441)
Civic Nationalism	1.277*** (0.045)	1.808** (0.816)
Left-Right Ideology	-0.245*** (0.020)	0.139*** (0.043)
Gender (Female)	0.005 (0.062)	0.281 (0.203)
Age	0.005 (0.004)	0.024*** (0.005)
Years of Education	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.001)
Father's Education Level	0.168*** (0.024)	-0.317** (0.145)
Household Income Decile	0.143*** (0.022)	0.064 (0.106)
Father's Employment Status	0.097 (0.090)	0.139 (0.230)
Observations	7,332	7,332
R <sup>2</sup>	0.152	0.126
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.145	0.098
F Statistic	19.635*** (df = 21; 2293)	4.508*** (df = 13; 405)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01