

Beyond “Horizontal” and “Vertical”: The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration*

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Abstract

We use a standard vertical supply-chain model to study the welfare impacts of mergers that have both horizontal and vertical aspects. The model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four types of mergers: (1) vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, (2) mixed downstream horizontal/vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler pair, (3) mixed upstream horizontal/vertical mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler pair, and (4) integrated mergers between two previously integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. The breadth of options we include better captures the variety of merger structures observed in practice, compared to the typical “horizontal vs. vertical” dichotomy. We further extend our analysis to accommodate preexisting vertical integration by third-party firms and linear marginal costs.

Keywords: bargaining models; merger simulation; vertical markets; vertical mergers

JEL classification: L13; L40; L41; L42

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1 Introduction

Given the many different ways a firm may be organized, it is rare that any particular merger can be neatly categorized as purely “horizontal” or “vertical.” Indeed, as the 2020 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Vertical Merger Guidelines (henceforth, the “VMG”) state, mergers often have both horizontal and vertical aspects. However, the theories and models used to analyze mergers often fail to address these complexities. Horizontal mergers are cast in terms of whether they create significant upward pricing pressure (UPP), while the focus for vertical mergers is on assessing the net effects of the elimination of double marginalization (EDM) versus raising rivals’ costs (RRC). Yet, a given merger may combine all of these effects simultaneously, which raises the necessity of balancing their impacts in a unified framework.

In this paper, we use a standard merger simulation model to assess the welfare implications of these complex mergers. Our model is drawn directly from Sheu and Taragin (2021), and features a Bertrand logit downstream setup alongside a Nash Bargaining wholesale negotiation upstream. We use this model to numerically simulate four types of mergers: (1) vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, (2) mixed downstream horizontal/vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler pair, (3) mixed upstream horizontal/vertical mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler pair, and (4) integrated mergers between two previously integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. In each of these simulations, we calculate the impacts on consumer welfare and firm profits. Furthermore, we examine how the presence of additional integrated rivals in the market changes our results. Our baseline simulations assume that units are produced with constant marginal costs, but we later extend our analysis to linear upward-sloping marginal costs.

We then provide a case study (in progress) from an industry, solid waste management, that has seen a large number of mergers with both horizontal and vertical elements. Broadly

speaking, the supply chain of this sector involves haulers at the downstream level that bring trash to disposal facilities at the upstream level. A variety of firms participate in these services, with some owning their own hauling and disposal assets, while others are active in only a segment of the market.

2 Theory

We begin by describing our basic framework, which uses a downstream Bertrand logit model embedded in an upstream Nash Bargaining setup, taken from Sheu and Taragin (2021). This framework allows us to study a variety of merger configurations.

2.1 Downstream and Upstream Competition

Assume there is a set of consumers who each choose to buy a product sold by a single retailer. Retailers are indexed by r , while the wholesalers that supply these retailers are indexed by w . Prior to any mergers taking place, each wholesaler offers only one product, although each retailer can purchase from multiple wholesalers. We denote the set of all retailers by $\mathbb{R} = \{1, \dots, |\mathbb{R}|\}$, and the set of all wholesalers by $\mathbb{W} = \{1, \dots, |\mathbb{W}|\}$. We divide the set \mathbb{W} into overlapping subsets, each labeled \mathbb{W}^r , to indicate which wholesalers' products are carried by which retailers. Similarly, we divide the set of retailers \mathbb{R} into overlapping subsets, each labeled \mathbb{R}^w , to indicate the retailers that carry the product sold by each wholesaler.

The share of consumers that choose product w sold by retailer r has the logit form,

$$s_{rw} = \frac{\exp(\delta_{rw} - \alpha p_{rw})}{1 + \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^t} \exp(\delta_{tx} - \alpha p_{tx})}, \quad (1)$$

where δ_{rw} is a quality parameter and α captures sensitivity to price p_{rw} . There is an outside good whose quality parameter and price have been normalized to zero. The retailer's profit

is given by $\pi^r = \sum_{w \in \mathbb{W}^r} [p_{rw} - p_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] s_{rw} M$, where p_{rw}^W is the unit fee charged by wholesaler w to retailer r , c_{rw}^R captures any additional marginal costs borne by the retailer, and M is the market size. Downstream prices are set in Bertrand equilibrium, according to

$$\sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \frac{\partial s_{rx}}{\partial p_{rw}} + s_{rw} = 0, \quad (2)$$

which is the first order condition for product w sold by retailer r .

Wholesale prices are set via Nash Bargaining between retailers and wholesalers. We assume that the negotiation for a given input price treats other input prices and all downstream prices as given.¹ Profits for wholesaler w are given by $\pi^w = \sum_{r \in \mathbb{R}^w} [p_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^W] s_{rw} M$, where c_{rw}^W is the wholesale marginal cost when dealing with retailer r . The first order condition for the negotiation between retailer r and wholesaler w is

$$\overbrace{[p_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^W] s_{rw} - \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\})}^{\text{wholesaler GFT}} = \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \left(\underbrace{[p_{rw} - p_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] s_{rw} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \Delta s_{rx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\})}_{\text{retailer GFT}} \right), \quad (3)$$

where $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ captures the bargaining power of the retailer relative to the wholesaler. The $\Delta s_{tx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}) \equiv s_{tx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}) - s_{tx}$ is the difference in the share of good x sold by retailer t when good w is not offered by retailer r versus when good w is offered by retailer r . Thus, the wholesale price p_{rw} is set such that the payoff to wholesaler w when it sells to retailer r less the payoff when it does not (that is, the gains from trade or “GFT”), divided by the payoff to retailer r when it buys from wholesaler w less the payoff when it does not, equals the ratio of wholesaler to retailer bargaining power.

¹As explained in Sheu and Taragin (2021), this assumption is equivalent to a situation where all negotiations and choices for downstream prices happen simultaneously.

Together the series of downstream and upstream first order conditions determine market equilibrium. This model can be solved and calibrated as described in Sheu and Taragin (2021). In our baseline configuration, we assume that wholesale and retail marginal costs are constant. We loosen this restriction to allow for linear increasing marginal cost as a robustness check.

2.2 Mergers

Here we describe the manner in which mergers are modeled in this framework. We begin by describing vertical mergers, as all cases we examine have some vertical aspects. Suppose that retailer r and wholesaler w were to merge. Then the first order condition for profit maximization for the joint firm when setting the downstream price for product w is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \frac{\partial s_{rx}}{\partial p_{rw}} + s_{rw} + \overbrace{[p_{rw} - c_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] \frac{\partial s_{rw}}{\partial p_{rw}}}^{\text{EDM effect}} \\ & + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \frac{\partial s_{tw}}{\partial p_{rw}}}_{\text{upstream UPP effect}} = 0. \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

The pricing problem balances two effects. On the one hand, the term labeled “EDM effect” captures the impact of retailer r being able to access product w at marginal cost. This force would tend to lower the resulting price. On the other hand, the term labeled “upstream UPP effect” captures the incentive to raise prices for retailer r in order to divert sales to wholesaler w . This force would tend to raise the resulting consumer price.

Turning to input prices, when wholesaler w bargains with unaffiliated retailer s , the first

order condition becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
& [p_{sw}^W - c_{sw}^W]s_{sw} - \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r, s\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\}) \\
& \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{RRC effect}} \\
& \quad \underbrace{[p_{rw} - c_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] \Delta s_{rw}(\mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\})}_{\text{indirect EDM effect}} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \Delta s_{rx}(\mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\}) = \quad (5) \\
& \quad \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \left([p_{sw} - p_{sw}^W - c_{sw}^R]s_{sw} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}} [p_{sx} - p_{sx}^W - c_{sx}^R] \Delta s_{sx}(\mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\}) \right).
\end{aligned}$$

which reflects the change in the disagreement payoff coming from the merger with retailer r . Now when the wholesaler considers the possible loss of sales upon ceasing to trade with retailer s , these losses are softened due to a potential for diversion to retailer r , which we label the “RRC effect.” Furthermore, the margin on product w sold by retailer r is potentially higher due to EDM, as shown through the expression labeled “indirect EDM effect,” which can further compensate the firm. These impacts tend to raise the resulting input price.

When the merged firm is bargaining with the unaffiliated wholesaler v over what input price to pay as a retailer, the bargaining first order condition becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
& [p_{rv}^W - c_{rv}^W]s_{rv} - \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^v \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tv}^W - c_{tv}^W] \Delta s_{tv}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\}) = \\
& \quad \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \left([p_{rv} - p_{rv}^W - c_{rv}^R]s_{rv} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w, v\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \Delta s_{rx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\}) \right. \\
& \quad \left. - \underbrace{[p_{rw} - c_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] \Delta s_{rw}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\})}_{\text{EDM recapture effect}} - \underbrace{\sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\})}_{\text{wholesale recapture leverage effect}} \right). \quad (6)
\end{aligned}$$

In this case, the merged firm has two channels for potential additional profits should it cease to trade with wholesaler v . First, if retail sales are diverted to product w sold by retailer r , those sales will earn a higher margin due to lower marginal costs stemming from what we

call the “EDM recapture effect.” Second, the loss of product v carried by retailer r could increase sales by wholesaler w through other retailers, which we call the “wholesale recapture leverage effect.” Both of these effects would tend to lower the resulting input price.

Next consider a merger between an integrated retailer/wholesaler rw and a standalone retailer s . Such a combination has a vertical component and a horizontal component. The first order condition for setting the downstream price p_{rw} becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \frac{\partial s_{rx}}{\partial p_{rw}} + s_{rw} + \overbrace{[p_{rw} - c_{rw}^W - c_{rw}^R] \frac{\partial s_{rw}}{\partial p_{rw}}}^{\text{direct EDM effect}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \frac{\partial s_{tw}}{\partial p_{rw}}}_{\text{upstream UPP effect}} \\
& + \underbrace{[p_{sw} - c_{sw}^W - c_{sw}^R] \frac{\partial s_{sw}}{\partial p_{rw}}}_{\text{indirect EDM Effect}} + \underbrace{\sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\}} [p_{sx} - p_{sx}^W - c_{sx}^R] \frac{\partial s_{sx}}{\partial p_{rw}}}_{\text{downstream UPP effect}} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Now there is the possibility for what we call the “downstream UPP effect” in the retail market, as the merged firm can recapture sales that are diverted to retailer s when r raises its prices. EDM between w and s can actually increase this UPP impact, because when sales are diverted to product w sold by retailer s , those units earn a larger margin. This impact is what we label the “indirect EDM effect,” which comes through the interaction of EDM with UPP.

If instead an integrated retailer/wholesaler rw were to merge with a standalone wholesaler v , then the resulting first order condition for product rw would look similar to equation (7). However, the downstream UPP effect would be replaced with an additional upstream UPP effect capturing the value of sales diverted to customers of wholesaler v . The condition would also include an indirect EDM component, reflecting the ability of retailer r to obtain product v at marginal cost, which in turn would raise the value of diverted sales to that product. Whether these additional incentives to raise prices will dominate the direct EDM impact is an empirical question. When considering a merger between two integrated retailer/wholesaler

pairs, both upstream and downstream UPP effects would enter.

Turning to wholesale prices, again consider a merger between a preexisting integrated retailer/wholesaler rw and a standalone retailer s . When wholesaler w bargains with an unaffiliated retailer u we have the first order condition given by,

$$\begin{aligned}
& [p_{uw}^W - c_{uw}^W]s_{uw} - \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r, s, u\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^u \setminus \{w\}) \\
& \quad \overbrace{\hspace{10em}}^{\text{RRC effect}} \\
& - \sum_{t \in \{r, s\}} \left(\overbrace{[p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^R] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^u \setminus \{w\})}^{\text{indirect EDM effect}} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^t \setminus \{w\}} [p_{tx} - p_{tx}^W - c_{tx}^R] \Delta s_{tx}(\mathbb{W}^u \setminus \{w\}) \right) = \\
& \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \left([p_{uw} - p_{uw}^W - c_{uw}^R]s_{uw} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^u \setminus \{w\}} [p_{ux} - p_{ux}^W - c_{ux}^R] \Delta s_{ux}(\mathbb{W}^u \setminus \{w\}) \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

The RRC effect is augmented with the profits emanating from the sales of retailer s , in addition to the sales of retailer r , both of which may potentially recapture sales should retailer u lose access to product w . The merged firm has higher bargaining leverage as a result. If instead the integrated retailer/wholesaler rw were to merge with a standalone wholesaler v , then the profits earned by firm rw should the negotiation with retailer u fail are augmented with the earnings of wholesaler v rather than of retailer s . This adds a term similar to the wholesale recapture leverage effect seen in equation (6) to the left-hand side of the bargaining first order condition.² In the case of a merger between two integrated retailer/wholesaler firms, all of these effects would appear.

Returning to a merger between an integrated retailer/wholesaler rw and a standalone retailer s , when the merged firm bargains with an unaffiliated wholesaler v to supply retailer

²For simplicity, we assume that when a retailer fails to reach an agreement with wholesaler w , that retailer's contract with wholesaler v remains in place. This assumption can be loosened.

r , the first order condition becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
& [p_{rv}^W - c_{rv}^W]s_{rv} - \sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^v \setminus \{r\}} [p_{tv}^W - c_{tv}^W] \Delta s_{tv}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\}) = \\
& \frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda} \left([p_{rv} - p_{rv}^W - c_{rv}^R]s_{rv} - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{w,v\}} [p_{rx} - p_{rx}^W - c_{rx}^R] \Delta s_{rx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\}) \right. \\
& \quad - \underbrace{\sum_{t \in \{r,s\}} [p_{tw} - c_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^R] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\})}_{\text{EDM recapture effect}} - \underbrace{\sum_{x \in \mathbb{W}^s \setminus \{w\}} [p_{sx} - p_{sx}^W - c_{sx}^R] \Delta s_{sx}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\})}_{\text{retail recapture leverage effect}} \quad (9) \\
& \quad \left. - \underbrace{\sum_{t \in \mathbb{R}^w \setminus \{r,s\}} [p_{tw}^W - c_{tw}^W] \Delta s_{tw}(\mathbb{W}^r \setminus \{v\})}_{\text{wholesale recapture leverage effect}} \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Compared to equation (6), now the EDM recapture effect applies to sales of product w at both affiliated retailers r and s . Furthermore, there is also the possibility that sales will be diverted to retailer s should retailer r lose access to product v , which creates an additional “retail recapture leverage effect” alongside the wholesale recapture leverage effect. All of these additional terms tend to increase the bargaining leverage of the merged firm. If we instead examined a merger between retailer/wholesaler rw and an unaffiliated wholesaler, that would augment the EDM recapture effect with sales of retailer r for two merged wholesalers, rather than sales through two merged retailers. Similarly, the retail recapture leverage effect would be replaced with an additional wholesale recapture leverage effect for the newly merged wholesaler. For a merger between two integrated retailer/wholesaler firms, all of these effects would enter.

3 Numerical Simulations

In this section, we use a similar setup to that in Sheu and Taragin (2021), but allow for additional types of mergers beyond purely horizontal and purely vertical combinations and

allow for the presence integrated rival firms.

3.1 Data Generating Process

Broadly speaking, we consider four categories of mergers: downstream, upstream, vertical, and integrated. We define a downstream merger as a merger between two unintegrated retailers or between an unintegrated retailer and a vertically integrated wholesaler/retailer combination. Similarly, upstream mergers are those between two unintegrated wholesalers or between an unintegrated wholesaler and a vertically integrated wholesaler/retailer. We define vertical mergers as those between an unintegrated wholesaler and unintegrated retailer. Finally, we assume that an integrated merger is between two firms that are already vertically integrated pre-merger.

For downstream, upstream, and vertical mergers, we simulate markets by randomly sampling shares from a Dirichlet distribution for 2 to 5 retailers or wholesalers, respectively.³ Because integrated mergers must have two vertically integrated incumbents in the pre-merger state, for those simulations we increase the maximum allowable number of wholesalers and retailers in our simulated markets to 7. We also assume that in the pre-merger state, there are anywhere from 0 to 4 vertically integrated incumbents (6 for integrated mergers). Vertically integrated firms are not siloed: integrated wholesalers supply inputs to non-integrated retailers and vertically integrated retailers purchase inputs from non-integrated wholesalers.

Our simulations focus on mergers that are more likely to have competitive effects and to therefore come under agency scrutiny. For horizontal merger simulations, we assign the products sold by the two largest firms in the market to a single firm post-merger. Similarly, when simulating a vertical merger, we assign the products sold by the largest wholesaler and the largest retailer to a single firm post-merger.

The bargaining parameter ranges from from 0.1 (where wholesalers have the advantage)

³We parameterize the Dirichlet distribution so it is equivalent to a uniform distribution.

to 0.9 (where retailers have the advantage). We report our results in terms of relative bargaining power, $(1 - \lambda)/\lambda$, which ranges from 9 (wholesaler power is nine times greater than retailer power) to 1/9 (retailer power is nine times greater than wholesaler power). The bargaining parameter is identical for all of the retailers in each simulation. We calibrate the price coefficient α assuming that in the pre-merger world, there is a vertically integrated outside option. All other goods are differenced relative to this option, resulting in the mean zero outside good normalization. We set the market size to 1.

For each combination of number of retailers, number of wholesalers, number of incumbent integrated firms, and bargaining parameter, we draw 1,000 different sets of market primitives. This results in 1.96 million possible merger simulations. After eliminating situations where the merger is unprofitable to the merging firms, as well as markets that do not pass the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, we have 1.37 million markets remaining.⁴ Each market treats as primitives the number of retailers, the number of wholesalers, the bargaining parameter, and the wholesaler and retailer marginal costs, which we allow to be either constant or linear.

3.2 Overview of Simulated Output

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our simulations.⁵ For reference, the 2010 DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines categorize “Highly Concentrated Markets” as those with HHIs over 2,500 points. The Guidelines state that mergers with HHI changes greater than 200 points that result in Highly Concentrated markets are “presumed likely to enhance market power.”⁶

The median average wholesale pre-merger price is \$4.60, and the median average retail

⁴The Hypothetical Monopolist Test is a market definition exercise that checks whether a monopolist that owns all products in a candidate market would raise the price of at least one of the merging producers’ products by at least a “small but significant non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP), which we take to be 5%.

⁵The `antitrust` R package contains the computer code needed to run the merger simulations described here.

⁶See §5.3 of the Guidelines.

pre-merger price is \$14. Recall that the market size is set to 1, meaning that average price is equal to total pre-merger expenditures. Pre-merger HHIs range from 2,814 at the 25th percentile to 5,030 at the 75th, with a median of 3,703. HHIs for vertical mergers increase by 1,277 points at the median, resulting in a median post-merger HHI equal to 4,889.⁷ HHIs for upstream mergers increase by 2,004 points at the median, resulting in a median post-merger HHI equal to 5,231. HHIs for downstream mergers increase by 2,054 points at the median, resulting in a median post-merger HHI equal to 4,889. HHIs for integrated mergers increase by 2,746 points at the median, resulting in a median post-merger HHI equal to 7,220. Many of these markets fall into the span designated by the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines as “Highly Concentrated Markets,” with post-merger HHIs over 2,500 points and HHI Changes greater than 200 points.⁸

Figure 1 summarizes our results for welfare. Each of the four panels show how mergers impact surplus for a particular set of agents (consumers, retailers, wholesalers, or the entire market combined, respectively). Surplus is reported as a percentage change of total pre-merger expenditure in the downstream market. Each panel contains four box and whisker plots, with each plot corresponding to a different type of merger. The whiskers show the 5th and 95th percentiles of the outcome distribution, the boxes denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line marks the median. Negative outcome values imply harm, and positive values imply benefits.

We focus first on the results for consumers in the left-most panel of Figure 1. Across all four types of mergers, the majority of cases show harm, though the distributions and magnitudes differ. In particular, there is a partial rank-ordering of consumer harm across types of mergers: consumer harm from integrated mergers first-order stochastically dominates consumer harm from all other merger types, while downstream and upstream mergers

⁷We compute the post-merger HHI for vertical mergers by treating the merged firms’ market share as the sum of all the shares of downstream products that either use the upstream partner’s input or are sold by the downstream partner.

⁸HHI thresholds are discussed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 5.3.

each first-order stochastically dominate consumer harm from vertical mergers, but do not stochastically dominate one other. Median consumer harm from integrated mergers is almost 14% of pre-merger total expenditures, 1.25 times the magnitude of that from downstream mergers, 2.3 times the magnitude of that from upstream mergers, and more than 4 times the magnitude of vertical mergers.

Moving on to retailers in the second panel of Figure 1, we find that whereas downstream mergers, vertical mergers, and integrated mergers always benefit retailers, upstream mergers harm retailers in about 67% of all simulations. Moreover, there is a partial rank-ordering across mergers that is distinct from the consumer rank-ordering: the retailer surplus distribution from integrated mergers first-order stochastically dominates that from downstream mergers, which dominates that from upstream mergers, but not the retailer surplus distribution from vertical mergers.

Turning to wholesaler surplus in the third panel of Figure 1, the effects seen there are largely reversed from those for retailers: wholesaler surplus increases in about 77% of all upstream mergers, 23% of vertical mergers, 20% of downstream mergers, and about 15% of integrated mergers. However, only wholesaler surplus from upstream mergers first-order stochastically dominates the wholesaler surplus of the other merger types.

As for total welfare, approximately 18% of vertical mergers and 15% of integrated mergers are beneficial, whereas only 3% of upstream mergers and 2% of downstream mergers are beneficial. Moreover, there is a partial rank ordering of mergers, with total harm from downstream mergers first-order stochastically dominating total harm from upstream mergers, which dominates total harm from vertical mergers. Median consumer harm from integrated mergers is about 9.6% of pre-merger total expenditures, 1.5 times the magnitude of that from downstream mergers, 2.5 times the magnitude of that from upstream mergers, and more than 4.3 times the magnitude of vertical mergers.

3.3 Mergers and Vertically Integrated Incumbent Firms

Here, we examine merger outcomes both with and without preexisting vertical integration among the merging firms and as the number of rival incumbent integrated firms varies. Figure 2 depicts paired box and whisker plots summarizing consumer harm (blue/darker bars on the left in each pair) and total harm (orange/lighter bars on the right in each pair) as the number of incumbent integrated firms increases from 0 to 6. The plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 0 correspond to the results depicted in Figure 1 of Sheu and Taragin (2021) and are included as reference.⁹ For vertical mergers, the plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 1 summarize market outcomes where an unintegrated wholesaler merges with an unintegrated retailer, a single third party is integrated, and any remaining rivals are unintegrated. By contrast, for downstream and upstream mergers, the plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 1 depict the outcome of a merger between an integrated firm and an unintegrated rival, with no integrated third parties. For integrated mergers, the plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 2 (the lowest number allowed in this instance) depict a merger between two integrated firms, again with no integrated rivals.

We begin with vertical mergers, as they are our simplest case, lacking preexisting integration at either merging firm. Absent incumbent integration (0 integrated firms), about 36% of vertical mergers benefit consumers and about 23% of vertical mergers are net beneficial in total surplus. The addition of a single rival integrated firm (denoted as 1 integrated firm in the figure) narrows the distribution of outcomes slightly, but leaves median harm steady. Adding more integrated rivals tends to shift some outcomes from the lower tail to the upper tail, increasing the proportion of mergers with benefits, especially for consumers. However, the interquartile range and median are largely unchanged. Thus, the presence of

⁹An important difference between the simulations depicted in Figure 2 and those in Figure 1 of Sheu and Taragin (2021) is that here we do not include downstream markets where prices are set according to a second score auction.

rival integrated firms can limit the extent of harm, particularly consumer harm, from vertical mergers, though not dramatically. Integrated rivals have sources of bargaining leverage that mirror the additional leverage a vertical merger brings to the combining firms. It appears that these rivals can therefore somewhat limit the extent of negative impacts through RRC.

By contrast, not only are upstream mergers absent incumbent vertical integration rarely beneficial, but median consumer harm from upstream mergers is about 6% of pre-merger revenues and total harm is about 3% of pre-merger revenues. A merger between an incumbent integrated firm and an unintegrated retailer when all other market participants are unintegrated (1 integrated firm) increases the proportion of beneficial mergers but does little to change median harm: consumer welfare increases in almost 16% of mergers and total welfare increases in 4.3% of mergers, but median consumer harm increases to 6.3% and median total harm increases to 4.8% of pre-merger revenues. Increasing the number of integrated 3rd parties to 1 (2 integrated firms) disproportionately shrinks the inter-quartile range—relatively more harmful mergers are eliminated than beneficial ones— but the presence of a single integrated 3rd party has little impact on median harm. Adding additional integrated 3rd parties (3,4 integrated firms) further decreases the range of outcomes while leaving median harm largely unchanged. In summary, additional incumbent integrated firms do not substantially impact median harm, but do substantially reduce the likelihood of observing extremely harmful mergers.

Like upstream mergers, downstream mergers absent incumbent vertical integration are rarely beneficial, with median consumer harm from downstream mergers equal to about 9% of pre-merger revenues while total harm is about 5% of pre-merger revenues. A merger between an incumbent integrated firm and an unintegrated retailer when all other market participants are unintegrated (1 integrated firm) increases the range of outcomes while also increasing median harm: consumer welfare increases in about 18% of mergers and total welfare increases in 5.7%, but median consumer harm increases to 14% and median total harm increases to 7.3% of pre-merger revenues. Increasing the number of integrated 3rd

parties to 1 (2 integrated firms) shrinks the inter-quartile range but has little impact on median harm. Adding additional integrated 3rd parties (3 integrated firms) further decreases the range of outcomes while also decreasing median harm to 5.6%. With 3 integrated 3rd parties (4 integrated firms), a downstream merger between an integrated and unintegrated firms benefits consumers in about 27% of markets and shrinks median consumer harm to 6.4% of pre-merger revenues. By contrast, with 3 integrated 3rd parties, the inter-quartile range of total harm shrinks, and median total harm falls to about 3.8% of pre-merger revenues. These results indicate that unlike either vertical upstream mergers, integrated downstream mergers are more harmful than unintegrated downstream mergers, and that the presence of additional integrated rival incumbents reduces harm, though slowly.

Finally, absent the presence of rival incumbent integrated firms, mergers between two integrated firms benefits consumers in about 7% of simulated markets and is net beneficial in 15% of simulated markets. While adding one additional rival incumbent integrated firm (3 integrated firms) has little effect on either the distribution of either outcome, adding a second integrated rival (4 integrated firms) eliminates the most harmful integrated mergers while also increasing median consumer harm to 14% and median total harm to 10.6%. The presence of additional integrated incumbents has little incremental effect on median harm.

3.4 Mergers and Bargaining Power

Sheu and Taragin (2021) show using numerical simulation that downstream and vertical mergers where wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power are less harmful than mergers where retailers have relatively more bargaining power. Here, we show that this result continues to hold when there are rival incumbent integrated firms. We also show that this relationship holds for integrated mergers as well as downstream and upstream mergers when one of the merging parties is vertically integrated.

Figure 3 depicts box and whisker plots summarizing the consumer (top) and total (bot-

tom) welfare effects for downstream, upstream, and vertical mergers as the relative bargaining power parameter increases from $1/9$ (retailers have the advantage to 9 (wholesalers have the advantage)). also depicted are three sets of box and whisker plots that correspond to the number of incumbent integrated firms included in the simulated markets: 0 (light blue), 1 (darker blue), and 4 (darkest blue) incumbent vertically integrated firms. As in Figure 2, plots when the number of integrated firms is 0 assume that pre-merger, no firms in the market are vertically integrated: these are comparable to those in Sheu and Taragin (2021). For vertical mergers (left), the plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 1 depict the outcome from an unintegrated wholesaler merging with an unintegrated retailer when a single 3rd party is integrated. By contrast, for upstream (middle) and downstream (left) mergers, the plots when the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 1 depict the outcome of a merger between an integrated firm and an unintegrated rival, and all 3rd parties are unintegrated. Finally, plots with 4 integrated firms increases the number of rival incumbent integrated firms in upstream and downstream mergers to 3 and in vertical mergers to 4 .

For vertical mergers, the presence of integrated incumbents has little impact on the strong, positive relationship between bargaining power and harm for vertical mergers. Figure 3 shows that consumer harm when there are fewer incumbent integrated firms first-order stochastically dominates consumer harm when there are more incumbent integrated firms, the difference is smallest when wholesalers and retailers have equal bargaining power and greatest as wholesaler power increases relative to retailer power. Across all three incumbent integrated firm scenarios, median consumer harm decreases from about 7% when retailers have the advantage to -24% when wholesalers have the advantage. Similarly, median total harm decreases from about 2.9% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about -14% of pre-merger expenditures when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power.

Turning to upstream mergers, when no incumbent firms are in the market (0 integrated

firms), there is a positive relationship between bargaining power and both consumer and total harm. Median consumer harm increases from 2.2% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about 29% of pre-merger expenditures when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. Likewise, median total harm increases from 0.7% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about 12% when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. By contrast, for mergers between an integrated and unintegrated upstream supplier (1 integrated firm), there is a positive relationship between bargaining power and both consumer and total surplus. Median consumer harm decreases from about 8.4% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about -24% of pre-merger expenditures when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. Likewise, median total harm increases from about 3.5% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to -8.4% when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. Adding 2 additional incumbent integrated firms (4 integrated firms) mitigates some of the adverse effects of mergers while still preserving the positive relationship between bargaining power and harm.

For downstream mergers, when no incumbent firms are in the market (0 integrated firms), there is a positive relationship between bargaining power and both consumer and total harm. Median consumer harm decreases from about 18% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about 1% of pre-merger expenditures when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. Likewise, median total harm decreases from 7.6% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about 2% when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. By contrast, mergers between an integrated and unintegrated upstream supplier (1 integrated firms), causes the box and whisker plots to rotate clockwise around equal bargaining power, strengthening the positive relationship between bargaining power and both consumer and total surplus. Increasing wholesaler bargaining power causes median consumer harm to fall from 25% of pre-

merger revenues to -33% of pre-merger revenues, while median total harm falls from 12.2% to about 1% of pre-merger revenues. Adding additional rival incumbents (4 integrated firms) has the reverse effect, rotating the box and whisker plots counter-clockwise and weakening the still positive relationship between bargaining power and surplus. Here, increasing wholesaler bargaining power causes median consumer harm to fall from 14% of pre-merger revenues to -33% of pre-merger revenues, while median total harm falls from 5.5% to 3.99% of pre-merger revenues.

Finally, Figure 4 depicts box and whisker plots summarizing consumer, retailer, wholesaler and total surplus for integrated mergers with 2, 4, or 6 integrated firms. When the number of incumbent integrated firms equals 2, Figure 4 depicts a merger between two integrated firms: all rivals are unintegrated. Plots with either 4 or 6 integrated firms depict mergers between integrated incumbents when there are either 2 or 4 rival integrated firms in the market.

In terms of the relationship between bargaining power and harm, integrated mergers are perhaps most similar to vertical mergers. Like vertical mergers, there is a strong monotonic relationship between bargaining power and harm. Median consumer harm increases from about 26% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to about 3.75% of pre-merger expenditures when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power. Likewise, median total harm increases from 16% of pre-merger expenditures when retailers have relatively more bargaining power to -14.5% when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power.

A second similarity between vertical and integrated mergers is that the presence of integrated incumbents has little impact on the strong, monotonic relationship between bargaining power and harm. However, unlike vertical mergers, consumer harm from integrated mergers when there are fewer incumbent integrated firms does not first-order stochastically dominate consumer harm when there are more incumbent integrated firms.

An important difference between vertical and integrated mergers is that while vertical mergers are often beneficial when wholesalers have relatively more bargaining power, integrated mergers are often harmful unless wholesaler relative bargaining power exceeds $7/3$. In this way, integrated mergers are more similar to downstream mergers, or upstream mergers in markets with vertically integrated incumbents.

3.5 Robustness to Alternative Cost Specifications

Here, we explore the role that the constant marginal cost assumption plays in driving merger outcomes. In theory, constant marginal costs can increase the magnitude of EDM, as the wholesaler price reduction applies equally to all units produced by the retailer. By contrast, if either the integrated wholesaler or retailer face linear marginal costs, increased output from the EDM is limited by the increased marginal costs, which in turn limits the benefit to the parties. Likewise, in theory, RRC could be more profitable for the merging parties under linear than constant marginal costs, as linear marginal costs cause the integrated wholesaler's prices to increase more rapidly.

Because EDM is plausibly greater under constant marginal costs while RRC is also plausibly less, then one might expect that on net mergers are more beneficial under constant than linear marginal costs. We explore this hypothesis in Figure 5, which displays box and whisker plots that depict the net effect of these different marginal cost specifications on consumer and total welfare under four different scenarios: constant marginal costs for all firms (top row, blue), linear marginal costs for all firms (top row, orange), constant marginal costs for the merging parties' products but linear costs for the non-merging parties products (bottom row, blue), and linear marginal costs for the merging parties' products but constant costs for the non-merging parties products (bottom row, orange).

Overall, harm is less prevalent for mergers where firms have constant marginal costs than where firms have linear costs. Mergers with constant-cost firms increases consumer surplus

in about 15% of all mergers and total surplus in 10.5% of all mergers, while mergers with linear-cost firms increase consumer surplus in only 2.3% of mergers and total surplus in 0.8% of all mergers. However, while the consumer and total harm distributions for each merger type under the all-firm linear marginal costs scenario first-order stochastically dominates their counterparts under the all-firm constant marginal costs scenario, the consumer and total harm distributions under the party linear marginal costs scenario only first-order stochastically dominates their counterparts under the party constant marginal costs scenario for vertical and integrated mergers. The median consumer harm from markets with linear marginal costs is about 9.3% of pre-merger total expenditures, about 1.3 times the magnitude of markets with constant marginal costs.

Changing the cost structure consistently yields the greatest differences in outcomes for vertical mergers. When all firms have constant marginal costs, vertical mergers increase consumer surplus in about 30% of all vertical merger simulations and total surplus in about 18% of all vertical merger simulations, but only increase consumer surplus in about 1% of vertical merger simulations and total surplus in about 0.9% of vertical merger simulations when all firms have linear costs. Moreover, qualitatively similar results hold for vertical mergers when only the merging parties' products have constant marginal costs, compared to when only the merging parties' products have linear costs.

The differences between the constant and linear cost structures is more muted for both upstream and downstream mergers. Upstream mergers with all constant marginal cost firms benefit consumers in about 12% of simulations, but only 0.2% of simulations when firms have linear costs. Downstream mergers with all constant marginal cost firms benefit consumers in about 11% of simulations, but only about 6% of simulations when all firms have linear costs. Again, qualitatively similar results hold for vertical mergers when only the merging parties' products have constant marginal costs, compared to when only the merging parties' products have linear costs.

Finally, while there is a marked difference in outcomes between the constant and linear cost structures for integrated mergers under the all-firms scenario, the differences in outcomes are more muted under the party scenario, especially for consumer surplus. In particular, median consumer harm when all firms face constant marginal costs is 13.6%, compared to the median consumer harm of 17.5% when all firms face linear marginal costs. By contrast, median consumer harm when only the merging parties’ have constant costs is 15.1%, compared to the median consumer harm of 16.5% when the parties’ have linear costs.

4 Empirical Application

The U.S. waste and recycling industry generates approximately \$80 billion in annual revenues.¹⁰ In recent years the industry has experienced significant merger activity including several large acquisitions between vertically integrated, national competitors. However, solid waste companies tend not to be homogeneous in their degree of vertical integration across geographies. As a result, each of these mergers exhibits a variety of vertical supply chain configurations both pre- and post-merger across their relevant local markets, making it an excellent application for further study of the welfare impacts of mergers that have both horizontal and vertical aspects.

The vertical supply chain in the solid waste industry is primarily comprised of waste collection operations or “haulers” and waste disposal facilities. Haulers collect municipal solid waste (MSW) from businesses and residences and must dispose of it at a lawful disposal site, predominantly landfills. Waste disposal (upstream) is a required input into waste collection services (downstream). Some haulers are vertically integrated and operate their own disposal facilities. Vertically-integrated haulers typically prefer to dispose of waste at their own disposal facilities and may also sell a portion of their disposal capacity. Disposal customers include private waste haulers without their own disposal assets (“independent

¹⁰Waste Dive, <https://www.wastedive.com/news/public-companies-increased-control-of-74b-us-waste-industry-in-2018/556079/>

haulers”) as well as local governments that collect their citizens’ waste themselves. Due to strict laws and regulations that govern the disposal of MSW, there are no reasonable substitutes for MSW disposal. Thus, mergers that combine hauling and disposal assets may incentivize the merged entity to raise its hauling rivals’ cost of disposal in order to benefit its own collection operations. Whether or not the merged entity is both able and incentivized to undertake such action depends upon the extent of its market power in the local disposal market, the merging parties’ profit margins in each line of business and their intensity of hauling competition with prospective disposal customers.

In 2020, Waste Management, the largest waste management company in the U.S., acquired Advanced Disposal Services (ADS), previously the fourth largest company, for \$4.6 billion.¹¹ GFL Environmental also acquired WCA Waste Corporation for \$1.2 billion in 2020.¹² Republic Services, the second largest waste management company in the U.S., acquired Santek Environmental in 2021.¹³ These three merged companies along with Waste Connections, the third largest waste management company in the U.S., are estimated to control over 60% of available landfill capacity nationally and also rank among the top haulers nationwide.¹⁴ Concentration in local markets varies substantially, however, in both the upstream and downstream markets.

Concerns about vertical competitive effects were raised in both the Republic-Santek and the Waste Management-ADS transactions. Both the Solid Waste Agency of Lake County, IL and the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County submitted comments in opposition to the proposed asset divestiture from Waste Management-ADS, stating that a vertically integrated competitor was needed to maintain competition in their local market post-merger.¹⁵ In the DOJ complaint filed in the Republic-Santek case, vertical competitive effects were

¹¹ Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Waste Management, Inc. and Advanced Disposal Services, Inc., <https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1330596/download>

¹² Waste 360, <https://www.waste360.com/business/breaking-gfl-acquires-wca-waste-corp-121-billion>

¹³ Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. and State of Alabama v. Republic Services, Inc. and Santek Waste Services, LLC, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1382626/download>

¹⁴ Waste Business Journal, <https://www.wastedive.com/news/public-companies-increased-control-of-74b-us-waste-industry-in-2018/556079/>

¹⁵ See Comments by SWALCO and SWANCC : U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Waste Management, Inc., and Advanced Disposal Services, Inc., <https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1377646/download>.

alleged to arise from the combination of their integrated assets in the Chattanooga area.¹⁶

Our application in progress further identifies local markets in which these acquisitions result in: 1) only horizontal combinations of assets, 2) only vertical combinations of assets, and 3) combinations of vertically integrated assets in the presence of existing integrated competitors to analyze the welfare effects from mergers with complex vertical arrangements. The next sections present preliminary results on the merger of vertically integrated assets in the presence of other integrated and unintegrated rivals in the context of Republic and Santek’s merger in the Chattanooga area.

4.1 Combination of vertically integrated assets: Chattanooga

The Competitive Impact Statement (CIS) filed by the DOJ in association with the Republic-Santek merger describes the alleged lost competition in the “Chattanooga, Tennessee and North Georgia area”, subsequently referred to as the Chattanooga Area, due to lost horizontal competition in MSW disposal and small-container commercial waste (SCCW) collection as well as raising rivals costs in the SCCW collection market by raising the MSW disposal costs of independent haulers. The CIS notes that Republic and Santek combined served approximately 73 percent of the SCCW collection market with three other significant competitors. In MSW disposal, the CIS identifies only one other significant competitor and Republic and Santek as serving approximately 82 percent of the market, disposed of either directly in the merging parties’ landfills within the area or passing through their transfer stations in Chattanooga before ultimately being disposed of in the parties’ landfills elsewhere. Thus, pre-merger both parties were large, vertically integrated competitors in the Chattanooga Area.

In addition, another large, vertically integrated waste company existed in the market at the time of the merger, Waste Connections, which was the parties’ sole competitor in the

¹⁶See U.S. and State of Alabama v. Republic Services, Inc. and Santek Waste Services, LLC, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1382031/download>

MSW disposal market. Waste Management and ADS owned collection assets in the area but were not vertically integrated in this market, as demonstrated by MSW disposal data discussed in Section 4.1.1.¹⁷ We treat Waste Management and ADS as a single, merged entity regardless of whether the data source predates the merger consummation since the merger was completed before the filing of the CIS for the Republic-Santek merger. The final significant participant in the SCCW collection market is a major regional firm that is not identified by name in the CIS.

4.1.1 MSW Disposal Volume Data

Data on MSW disposal comes from data collected by TDEQ (Tennessee Department of Environmental Quality) on Class 1 landfill ownership, Class 1 Solid Waste Origin Reports, and waste disposal by county for 2019. This data identifies the origin county and destination landfill, including owner and operator information, for all MSW produced in Tennessee as well as waste volumes passing through transfer stations in Tennessee. The MSW disposal market definition follows that outlined in the DOJ CIS and attributing share to the company owning the final disposal landfill (i.e., ignoring transfer stations which are an intermediate disposal site only). Thus, the total market quantity is defined as all MSW volumes originating in Hamilton county.

Disposal volumes are measured in tons and have been combined across landfills owned by the same firm. The TDEQ data identifies landfills owned or operated by Republic, Santek, Waste Connections, and three market participants each with less than 0.5% share receiving MSW volumes originating in Hamilton County.¹⁸ These three fringe participants have been excluded from the analysis. After rescaling, the resulting market shares are Republic, 28.4%,

¹⁷Firms that are national competitors and vertically integrated in other markets are known to enter contracts with each other to dispose of waste on advantageous terms that may make them effectively vertically integrated. Ignoring these contracting relationships may underestimate the number of effectively vertically integrated competitors in the market.

¹⁸The City of Chattanooga and Marion County landfills are municipally owned and operated, accounting for less than 1% combined. Global Envirotech is a privately-owned transfer station that sends its 0.03% share to an out of state landfill in GA.

Santek, 54%, and Waste Connections, 17.6%.

Using this data in conjunction with information on collection market volumes, discussed in Section 4.1.3, the supply relationships between the upstream disposal market participants (*Republic, Santek, and Waste Connections*) and downstream collection market participants (*Republic, Santek, Waste Connections, WM-ADS, and “Regional”*) can be inferred under the assumption that vertically-integrated haulers first dispose of waste at their own disposal facilities and then sell any residual disposal capacity to rival haulers. Santek and Waste Connections exhibit excess disposal capacity. However, Republic’s collection volumes are estimated to exceed their ability to self-supply disposal in the Chattanooga market. As a result, Republic will need to purchase additional disposal from Santek and Waste Connections, presumably at a higher marginal cost. We assume that this disposal is purchased from both Santek and Waste connections according to their share of available excess MSW disposal capacity of 63.8% and 36.2%, respectively. We further assume that WM-ADS and Regional purchased disposal capacity from both Santek and Republic according to these shares. The resulting relationships between the upstream and downstream market participants are captured in Figure 6.

4.1.2 MSW Disposal Price Data

MSW disposal prices are collected from the 2019 Waste Business Journal’s Directory of Waste Processing & Disposal Sites. The measure of price reflected is the “gate rate”, which is the posted price at the landfill, measured in \$/Ton.¹⁹ Republic and Santek both operate multiple landfills in the market with different prices. The price used in the analysis for each is the volume weighted average for their landfills.

¹⁹Disposal prices for large customer’s may be bilaterally negotiated instead of paying the gate rate.

4.1.3 Collection Market Share Data

The CIS states that in the Chattanooga Area the post-merger HHI for SCCW collection would be approximately 5,551 post-merger with an increase of 2,660 points and that the combined market share of the merging parties is 73%. Taking these figures as given we can recover the collection market shares under the assumptions that 1) the merging parties are of equal size, and 2) the non-merging parties are of equal size. After rescaling, this produces downstream market shares for Republic, 37.6%, Santek, 37.6%, Waste Connections, 8.3%, WM-ADS, 8.3%, and Regional, 8.3%.

However, the market shares required for implementation of the Sheu and Targain (**add ref**) framework are expressed as upstream-downstream market participant pairs. Following the discussion of supply relationships in Section 4.1.1, vertically-integrated pairs without capacity constraints (i.e., Santek disposal-Santek collection, Waste Connection disposal-Waste Connections collection) are assigned their full collection share. Capacity constrained, integrated firms (Republic disposal-Republic collection) are assigned their collection share up to their available capacity with the remainder allocated by residual disposal share to pairs with the respective upstream firms (i.e., Santek disposal-Republic collection, Waste Connections disposal-Republic collection). Unintegrated firms' collection shares are distributed among the upstream suppliers with available capacity by residual share as well.

4.1.4 Cost, Margin and Elasticity Data

Collection and disposal margins are calculated for Republic from data on revenue by line of service and components of cost of operations in the company's 2019 annual report. The data is reported at the company level and is not specific to the Chattanooga Area, but revenues are reported by collection segment.

Collection costs in \$/Ton are estimated from Republic and Waste Management 2019 10k financial statements. These costs are reported at the company level across all segments.

The estimated share of these costs attributable to the Chattanooga market, based on the number of markets in which the companies operate, is divided by the tons disposed for each company. Santek, Waste Connections, and Regional do not publically produce comparable financial statements. Instead, we assume that the cost structure is the same for the vertically-integrated companies, taking into account their individual tons disposed, and that WM-ADS and Regional share the same cost structure in this market due to their lack of internal disposal capacity.

A survey of demand elasticity estimates for the collection market are present in Bel and Gradus (2016) with an average of -0.34. These estimates are not specific to the SCCW market, but available evidence suggests that the commercial segment should be more inelastic than other segments such that analysis using these estimates would tend to be conservative for estimating the size of merger induced price effects.²⁰

4.1.5 Chattanooga Area Results

5 Conclusion

This paper relaxes two strong assumptions made in Sheu and Taragin (2021): that mergers occur in vertical supply chains where in the pre-merger state, no firms are vertically integrated, and that all firms employ constant marginal cost technology. Relaxing these constraints is important as competition authorities are called upon to investigate mergers where either the merging parties or a third party are already vertically integrated, or where the presence of a scarce input could reduce the benefit from EDM or increase the harm from RRC. Here, we show using numerical simulations that relaxing these assumptions can result in merger outcomes that are markedly different from those when these assumptions are maintained. We also show using simulation that relative bargaining power can serve as a useful

²⁰Bel, G. and R. Gradus, 2016, Effects of unit-based pricing on household waste collection demand: A meta-regression analysis, *Resource and Energy Economics*, 44, 169-182.

indicia for predicting consumer and total harm from mergers where these two assumptions are relaxed. Finally, we intend to use two recent trash mergers to investigate the importance of these assumptions in predicting merger harm. Our hope is that future research will focus on some of the other strong assumptions made in Sheu and Taragin (2021), such as: how the presence of siloed firms, two-part tariffs, or large fixed costs affect the Nash bargaining game and therefore merger outcomes.

References

- Sheu, G. and C. Taragin (2021). Simulating mergers in a vertical supply chain with bargaining. *The RAND Journal of Economics* 52(3), 596–632.

Variable	Merger	Markets	Min	25th	50th	75th	Max
# Wholesalers	All	1,374,033	2	3	4	5	7
# Retailers			2	3	4	5	7
# Integrated			0	0	1	3	6
Bargaining Power			0.1	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9
Nesting Parameter			0	0	0	0	0
Avg. Upstream Price (\$)			0.23	2.4	4.6	9.8	243
Avg. Downstream Price (\$)			6.1	10	14	20	252
Market Elasticity			-48	-0.98	-0.53	-0.38	-0.23
Pre-Merger HHI	Vertical	276,965	2,102	3,664	4,469	5,716	9,973
	Upstream	367,519	2,014	2,363	2,842	3,713	10,000
	Downstream	376,340	2,011	2,568	3,165	4,233	10,000
	Integrated	353,209	2,234	3,598	4,264	5,454	9,996
Post-Merger HHI	Vertical	276,965	3,091	5,106	6,053	7,316	10,000
	Upstream	367,519	2,958	3,960	4,893	6,658	10,000
	Downstream	376,340	2,944	4,138	5,232	7,379	10,000
	Integrated	353,209	3,606	6,253	7,226	8,645	10,000
Delta HHI	Vertical	276,965	17	1,045	1,277	1,726	4,318
	Upstream	367,519	0	1,538	2,006	2,866	5,000
	Downstream	376,340	0	1,449	2,053	2,944	5,000
	Integrated	353,209	3	2,423	2,746	3,103	4,988

Table 1: Summary Statistics

The Distributions of Merger Outcomes

Outcomes are reported as a percentage of pre-merger total expenditures.




Figure 1 The figure displays box and whisker plots summarizing the extent to which mergers affect consumer, retailer, wholesaler, and total surplus. Whiskers depict the 5th and 95th percentiles of a particular outcome, boxes depict the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line depicts the median.

The Distributions of Merger Outcomes as the Number of Integrated Firms Increases

Outcomes are reported as a percentage of pre-merger total expenditures.

Horizontal mergers occur between a vertically integrated and unintegrated firm.




Figure 2 The figure displays box and whisker plots summarizing the extent to which mergers affect consumer (top row) and total (bottom) surplus as the number of vertically integrated firms present in a market change. Whiskers depict the 5th and 95th percentiles of a particular outcome, boxes depict the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line depicts the median.

How Changing Bargaining Strength Affects Consumer and Total Surplus, By Merger

Outcomes are reported as a percentage of pre-merger total expenditures.




Figure 3 The figure displays box and whisker plots summarizing the extent to which downstream, upstream, and vertical mergers affect consumer, and total surplus as the bargaining power of wholesalers relative to retailers changes. The different colored boxes display how outcomes change as the number of vertically integrated firms increases. Whiskers depict the 5th and 95th percentiles of a particular outcome, boxes depict the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line depicts the median.

How Changing Bargaining Strength Affects Surplus in an Integrated Merger

Outcomes are reported as a percentage of pre-merger total expenditures.




Figure 4 The figure displays box and whisker plots summarizing the extent to which mergers among two integrated wholesalers and retailers affect consumer, retailer, wholesaler, and total surplus as the bargaining power of wholesalers relative to retailers changes. The different colored boxes display how outcomes change as the number of vertically integrated firms increases. Whiskers depict the 5th and 95th percentiles of a particular outcome, boxes depict the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line depicts the median.

The Distributions of Consumer and Total Surplus For Different Cost Structures

Outcomes are reported as a percentage of pre-merger total expenditures.




Figure 5 The figure displays box and whisker plots summarizing the extent to which merger outcomes change according to 4 different cost scenarios. The boxes in the top row (“All”) either assume all firms face either constant marginal costs (blue, left) or linear marginal costs (orange, right). The boxes in the bottom row (“Party”) either assume that the merging parties face constant marginal costs while other firms face linear marginal costs (blue, left), or the merging parties face linear marginal costs while other firms face constant marginal costs (orange, right). Whiskers depict the 5th and 95th percentiles of a particular outcome, boxes depict the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the solid horizontal line depicts the median.




Figure 6 Chattanooga Area MSW Disposal and Collection Market