

Land tenure insecurity determinants and trade-offs: A choice experiment




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
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Research Question


Various factors affect land users' tenure security, including whether they have a complete bundle of rights and whether those rights are upheld by society. However, the relative importance of each factor has rarely been studied due to the incompatibility of the measurement scales. By offering herders sets of hypothetical land contracts and analyzing their choices, we examine to what extent certain factors are favored or avoided by the land users.



- Formal contract & kinship contract
- 10% probability of early contract termination
- Contract duration
- Additional rights to receive eco-compensation
- Rental price

Methods

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Results & Implications

Our study shows that formal contracts increase herders' tenure security, highlighting the importance of having state institutions uphold the contracts. We find that kinship contracts are preferred but only when they are legally recognized.

Our study suggests entitling land renters to compensation increases their tenure security and may help incentivize better land management. So far, payment for ecosystem services programmes only incentivize *de jure* landholders. As the land rental market expands globally, payment for ecosystem services programme designers should carefully evaluate the recipients' land-use status and the land rights they may have.