S3 Bucket Policy Backdoor Discussion Log

Environment: Stratus Red Team sandbox; AWS CLI v2

OS: Ubuntu

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Objective:

Demonstrate how a malicious actor could introduce a backdoor into an S3 bucket by modifying the bucket policy to grant read access to an external principal, validating that the policy is present and effective, and then reverting the changes.

Step-by-step walk-through

1) Warmup / Environment preparation

Purpose: Prepare the sandbox and confirm the base state before detonation.

Command executed:

stratus warmup aws. exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy

Outcome: Stratus reported a successful warmup, created an isolated test AWS role, and provisioned a test S3 bucket

2) Baseline policy check

Purpose: Record the initial bucket policy (baseline) before applying the backdoor.

Command executed:

aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket stratus-red-team-bdbp-zkqgfovijw

Outcome: The command returned an error indicating there is no bucket policy associated with this bucket. An error occurred (NoSuchBucketPolicy) when calling the GetBucketPolicy operation: The bucket policy does not exist

This established a clear baseline proving that the backdoor was introduced by the subsequent detonation step rather than a preexisting configuration.

3) Detonation - Application of the backdoor bucket policy

Purpose: Use Stratus Red Team to apply a malicious-style bucket policy that grants an external principal cross-account read/list permissions.

Command executed:

Stratus detonate aws. exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy

Outcome: Stratus executed the scenario and reported success. The tool output indicated that a bucket policy was written, which included an allow statement mapping s3:ListBucket and s3:GetObject to a synthetic external principal.

verification command executed:

aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket stratus-red-team-bdbp-zkqgfovijw

Result: The command returned JSON containing the new bucket policy.

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With this policy in place, an attacker with access to the external principal would be able to list and read objects in the bucket, enabling exfiltration even if prior credentials were rotated.

4) Functional probe

Purpose: Show that the allowance is effective by performing a read using a simulated external principal

Command executed

status aws. exfiltration.s3-backdoor

Outcome: The policy string contains BackdoorReadAccess and lists the permitted actions.

5) Cleanup

Purpose: Remove the backdoor policy and restore the bucket to baseline.

Command executed: stratus revert aws. exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy stratus cleanup

Screenshots

lucy_davisw@LAPTOP-RLKAL01D:~\$ stratus revert aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy 2025/10/21 18:45:01 Checking your authentication against AWS 2025/10/21 18:45:03 Reverting detonation of technique aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy 2025/10/21 18:45:03 Removing malicious bucket policy on stratus-red-team-bdbp-xyasrrcdfh		
ID	NAME	STATUS
aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy	Backdoor an S3 Bucket via its Bucket Policy	WARM
lucy_davisw@LAPTOP-RLKALO1D:~\$ aws s3api get-bucket-policybucket stratus-red-team-bdbp-ivudhrxaat An error occurred (NoSuchBucket) when calling the GetBucketPolicy operation: The specified bucket does not exist lucy_davisw@LAPTOP-RLKALO1D:~\$ stratus cleanup aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy 2025/10/21 18:45:28 Cleaning up aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy 2025/10/21 18:45:28 Cleaning up technique prerequisites with terraform destroy		
ID	NAME	STATUS
aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy	Backdoor an S3 Bucket via its Bucket Policy	COLD