LUDOVICA CIASULLO

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Placement Director: Jaroslav Borovička jaroslav.borovicka@nyu.edu 347-899-6273 Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson ian.johnson@nyu.edu 212 998-8901

Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2019-2025 (expected)
Thesis Title: Essays on Organizational and Gender Economics.
MSc in Economics and Social Sciences, Bocconi University, 2016-2018 (with distinction)
BA in Economics, Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata (with distinction)

References

Professor Debraj Ray
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Professor Martin Rotemberg
19 West Fourth St., 7th Floor
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Professor Petra Moser 44 West Fourth St., 7th Floor New York, NY 10012-1119 212-998-0925 (office) pm119@nyu.edu

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Labor Economics

Secondary fields: Organizational Economics

Teaching Experience

Spring, 2024 Development Economics (Undergraduate), NYU, class assistant for

Professor Martin Rotemberg

Fall, 2023 Development Economics (Undergraduate), NYU, class assistant for

Professor Debraj Ray

Fall, 2023 and 2022 Applied Micro (MSc), NYU, teaching assistant for Professor Petra

Moser

Fall, 2022 Research Practicum (MSc), NYU, teaching assistant for Professor

Petra Moser

Spring 2022 Microeconomics II (PhD), NYU teaching assistant for Professors

David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Spring 2019 Statistics (Undergraduate), Università Statale di Milano, teaching

assistant for Professor Samantha Leorato

Research Experience and Other Employment

Summer 2024 NYU, Research Assistant for Professor Debraj Ray January 2022 NYU, Research Assistant for Professor David Cesarini Summer 2021 NYU, Research Assistant for Professor Dilip Abreu

Academic year 2018-2019 Harvard Business School, Research Assistant for Professor Marco

Tabellini

Academic year 2018-2019 Bocconi University, Research Assistant for Professor Satoshi Fukuda

Professional Activities

Service: NYU Applied Micro Student Lunch and Micro Theory Student Lunch organizer (academic year 2021-2022); NYU Gender Economics Workshop Organizer (Spring 2023)

Seminar and Conference presentations

Annual Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA)/American

Economic Association (AEA) Meetings (CSWEP-sponsored session), Office of Tax Analysis at the US Treasury (seminar), Society of Labor Economists (SOLE)*, COSME Gender Economics Workshop, IEA-WB Conference Gender Norms and

the Law

2023 Society of Economics of the Household (SEHO), Stanford

Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE)*

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2024-2025 NYU Department of Economics Dissertation Fellowship

2019-2024 NYU MacCracken Fellowship

2023 NYU GSAS Dean's Student Travel Grant

Research Papers

Signaling within the firm (Job Market Paper)

Within-firm promotions are a large component of wage growth, yet we do not know much about how firms decide how to allocate them. Does uncertainty about worker ability play an important role in this process? Using Portuguese administrative data, I investigate the role of overtime work on careers in retail and hospitality. In particular, I ask if overtime hours are used as a signaling device inside the firm. First, I develop a model of the principal-agent interaction within the firm that investigates overtime as a mechanism for selection: workers are heterogeneous in their cost of working overtime, and the firm wants to promote those for whom such cost is lower. As overtime pay decreases, the opportunity cost of working overtime increases: overtime hours become more informative for the employer and this improves selection of promoted workers. I show the model predictions match the data. First, long working hours are correlated with future promotions. Next, I exploit a 2012 reform that reduced the overtime pay premium, creating a quasi-exogenous shift in the signaling value of overtime. The reform lead to a decrease in the number of overtime hours, particularly among workers who were about to be promoted. Importantly, workers who are promoted after the reform

^{*} coauthor presenting

are better selected than workers who were promoted before the reform, in terms of total number of promotions, wage growth, and retention. These results confirm the model's predictions and show promotions respond, at least in part, to the firm's selection motive.

What Works for Working Mothers? (with Martina Uccioli)

We document how a change to work arrangements reduces the child penalty in labor supply for women, and that the consequent more equal distribution of household income does not translate into a more equal division of home production between mothers and fathers. The Australian 2009 Fair Work Act explicitly entitled parents of young children to request a (reasonable) change in work arrangements. Leveraging variation in the timing of the law, timing of childbirth, and the bite of the law across different occupations and industries, we establish three main results. First, the Fair Work Act was used by new mothers to reduce their weekly working hours without renouncing their permanent contract, hence maintaining a regular schedule. Second, with this work arrangement, working mothers' child penalty declined from a 47 percent drop in hours worked to a 38 percent drop. Third, while this implies a significant shift towards equality in the female- and maleshares of household income, we do not observe any changes in the female (disproportionate) share of home production.

Research In Progress

Rosie the Riveter in Science: Effects of Female Hires During WWII on the Scientific Productivity of US Firms (with Moritz Lubczyk, Petra Moser and Kazimier Smith)

Full time mothers, part time workers, (with Martina Uccioli and Valeria Zurla)