Surreaction - StarHackademINT 2023

Introduction

This post is about an interesting forensic challenge that I solved during the StarHackademINT 2023 CTF. We were given a *quarantine* folder coming from Windows Defender, and we had to find back the original filename on the internet.

The structure of the given folder looks like this:

If we look on the internet, we can find some blog post that gives a lot of useful information on how to get the original files back. We can find the quarantine directory structure:

- The Entries folder contains information about the quarantined files, such as the reason of the quarantine, the original full path, timestamp, etc. The files are encrypted in a particular way that we will see later.
- The ResourceData folder contains the encrypted original binary.
- The Resources folder won't be used here, but it contains information such as a GUID and a hash used to link the Entries and the ResourceData folder.

We can also find the hardcoded RC4 key used to encrypt the files (it is common for AV vendors to have a single RC4/XOR hardcoded key) used for the quarantine process. So we can use this small python script in order to decrypt the files:

```
from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4
import sys
with open(sys.argv[1], "rb") as encrypted_file:
   print(f"Reading {sys.argv[1]}")
   data = encrypted_file.read()
key = b"\\x1E\\x87\\x78\\x1B\\x8D\\x80\\x88\\x44\\xCE\\x69\\x70\\x2C\\x0C\\x78\\x87\\x86\\xA3\\xF6\\x23\\x87\\x38\\xF5\\xED\\xF9\\xAF\\x83\\x53\\x0F\\x8B
E4\x8E\x23\xD0\x53\x71\xEC\xC1\x59\x51\xB8\xF3\x64\x9D\x7C\xA3\x3E\xD6\x8D\xC9\x04\x7E\x82\xC9\xBA\xAD\x97\x99\xD0\xD4\x58
\xCB\x84\x7C\xA9\xFF\xBE\x3C\x8A\x77\x52\x33\x55\x7D\xDE\x13\xA8\xB1\x40\x87\xCC\x1B\xC8\xF1\x0F\x6E\xCD\xD0\x83\xA9\x59\xC
F6\xC5\x6C\xE7\x3D\x24\xBD\xD0\x29\x17\x71\x86\x1A\x54\xB4\xC2\x85\xA9\xA3\xDB\x7A\xCA\x6D\x22\x4A\xEA\xCD\x62\x1D\xB9\xF2
\xA2\x2E\xD1\xE9\xE1\x1D\x75\xBE\xD7\xDC\x0E\xCB\x0A\x8E\x68\xA2\xFF\x12\x63\x40\x8B\xC8\x08\xDF\xFD\x16\x4B\x11\x67\x74\xC
1A\x95\xCB\x7C\xA4\xC3\xDD\xAB\xDD\xBF\xF3\x82\x53"
cipher = ARC4.new(key)
decrypted = cipher.decrypt(data)
with open(sys.argv[1]+".decrypted", "wb") as dec:
   print(f"Writing decrypted file to {sys.argv[1]}.decrypted")
   dec.write(decrypted)
```

Many scripts are avaibles on the internet, but they were not working properly for me.

Entries folder

The first thing that I wanted to do was to decrypt the file in the **Entries** folder. The main issue is that the file is separated in 3 chunks, encrypted separately using the RC4 key.

If we take a look at this document, we can see that the first chunk has a fixed size:

```
seq:
    - id: header
    type: rc4encrypted_header
    size: 0x3C
    process: util.custom_arc4.custom_arc4(<RC4 key>)
    - id: data1
    size: header.len1
    type: encrypted_data1
    process: util.custom_arc4.custom_arc4(<RC4 key>)
    - id: data2
    size: header.len2
    type: encrypted_data2
    process: util.custom_arc4.custom_arc4(<RC4 key>)
```

So we can just truncate the first chunk (I used HxD in order to display the data efficiently, but you can do it with python), and decrypt it using our script. We get the following data:

We have our magic bytes, ox18 null bytes, 2 sizes (4 bytes each), and then oxoc bytes:

```
size: 0x10
contents: [0xdb, 0xe8, 0xc5, 0x01, 0x01, 0, 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
- id: unknown1
size: 0x18
- id: len1
type: u4
- id: len2
type: u4
- id: unknown2
size: 0x0C
```

We got the two chunks size (big endian, then we have 0x55 and 0x101), so let's truncate ([0x3C:0x3C+0x55] and [0x3C+0x56:END]), and decrypt them:

```
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Texte Décodé
00000000 32 97 05 80 00 00 00 00 66 67 EF 33 96 D2 35 E7 2-.€....fqï3-Ò5¢
00000010 FB CB 56 03 D6 B5 3C 45 AE 22 59 58 EE C6 04 AE ûËV.Öµ<E®"YXîÆ.®
00000020 D6 2B DA 40 43 DF D9 01 32 97 05 80 00 00 00 0 Ö+Ú@CBÙ.2-.€....
00000030 01 00 00 00 54 72 6F 6A 61 6E 3A 57 69 6E 36 34 ....Trojan:Win64
00000040 2F 4D 65 74 61 73 70 6C 6F 69 74 2E 43 52 54 44 /Metasploit.CRTD
00000050 21 4D 54 42 00
                                                           !MTB.
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Texte Décodé
                                                         ......\.\.?.\.
00000000 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 5C 00 5C 00 3F 00 5C 00
00000010 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 55 00 73 00 65 00 72 00 73 00
                                                         C.:.\.U.s.e.r.s.
00000020 5C 00 6F 00 77 00 6C 00 79 00 64 00 5C 00 44 00 \.o.w.l.y.d.\.D.
00000030 6F 00 77 00 6E 00 6C 00 6F 00 61 00 64 00 73 00 o.w.n.l.o.a.d.s.
00000040 5C 00 76 00 69 00 72 00 75 00 73 00 2E 00 65 00
                                                         \.v.i.r.u.s...e.
00000050 78 00 65 00 00 00 09 00 66 69 6C 65 00 00 00 00 x.e....file....
00000060 14 00 02 40 9F 59 8F 56 2D DC FB 69 FA 21 A0 77
                                                         ...@ŸY.V-Üûiú! w
                                                         °Ø..£ö%Ž...`...
00000070 BA D8 7F 01 A3 F6 25 8E 08 00 12 60 00 1A 00 00
00000080 00 00 00 08 00 11 60 FC 1A C4 B9 42 DF D9 01
                                                         .....`ü.ĹBßÙ.
00000090 08 00 10 60 13 91 D9 40 43 DF D9 01 08 00 0F 60
                                                         ....`Ú@C&Û....`
000000A0 6E D7 48 B5 42 DF D9 01 04 00 0A 30 20 00 00 0 n×HµBBÛ....0 ...
000000B0 46 00 0C 20 43 00 3A 00 5C 00 55 00 73 00 65 00 F.. C.:.\.U.s.e.
000000C0 72 00 73 00 5C 00 6F 00 77 00 6C 00 79 00 64 00 r.s.\.o.w.l.y.d.
000000D0 5C 00 44 00 6F 00 77 00 6E 00 6C 00 6F 00 61 00
                                                         \.D.o.w.n.l.o.a.
000000E0 64 00 73 00 5C 00 76 00 69 00 72 00 75 00 73 00
                                                         d.s.\.v.i.r.u.s.
000000F0 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 00 04 00 0E 30
                                                         ..e.x.e....0
00000100 80 00 00 00 08 00 0D 50 11 EC 02 68 67 26 00 00 €.....P.ì.hg&..
```

Well, this is interesting but star{virus.exe} is not the flag... So we will have to decrypt the original malware file.

ResourceData folder

Luckily for us, the malware file is encrypted in one chunk. Some metadata are added at the beginning, and then we have our malware file:


```
rc4encrypted:
 - id: fixed
 contents: [0x03, 0, 0, 0, 0x02, 0, 0, 0]
 size: 8
 - id: length
 type: u4
 - id: padding
 size: 0x08
 - id: binarysd
 size: length
 - id: unknown1
 size: 0x08
 - id: len_malfile
 type: u8
 - id: unknown2
 size: 0x04
 - id: mal_file
 size: len_malfile
```

If we decrypt it, we can see the PE magic bytes (in green) as well as the *This program cannot be run in DOS mode*. Everything before is our metadatas. If we look at the metadata structure, we can see that the malfile size is 8 bytes long (in red). So we have a malfile size of [1400] (6656) bytes:


Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Texte Décodé
00000000	03	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000010	00	00	00	00	01	00	14	88	14	00	00	00	30	00	00	00	
00000020	A4	00	00	00	4C	00	00	00	01	05	00	00	00	00	00	05	¤L
00000030	15	00	00	00	A5	D5	2A	вв	AF	45	46	ΑO	93	E5	FE	26	¥Ő*» EF "åþ&
00000040	E9	03	00	00	01	05	00	00	00	00	00	05	15	00	00	00	é
00000050	A5	D5	2A	ВВ	AF	45	46	A0	93	E5	FE	26	E9	03	00	00	¥Õ*» EF "åþ&é
00000060	02	00	58	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	14	00	FF	01	1F	00	Xÿ
00000070	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	05	12	00	00	00	00	00	18	00	
08000000	FF	01	1F	00	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	05	20	00	00	00	ÿ
00000090	20	02	00	00	00	00	24	00	FF	01	1F	00	01	05	00	00	\$.ÿ
0A00000A0	00	00	00	05	15	00	00	00	A5	D5	2A	ВВ	AF	45	46	A0	¥Õ*»¯EF
000000B0	93	E5	FE	26	E9	03	00	00	02	00	4C	00	01	00	00	00	"åþ&éL
000000C0	12	10	44	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	D
000000D0	00	00	00	00	14	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000000E0	01	00	00	00	28	00	00	00	49	00	4D	00	41	00	47	00	(I.M.A.G.
000000F0	45	00	4C	00	4F	00	41	00	44	00	00				00		E.L.O.A.D
00000100	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	1A	00	00	
00000110	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		5A	90	00	03	00	00	00	MZ
00000120	04	00	00	0.0	FF	FF	00	00	В8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	····ÄÄ···'·····
00000130	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	@
00000140	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000150	00	00	00	00	C8	00	00	00	0E	1F	BA	0E	00	В4	09	CD	ɰ′.Í
00000160	21	В8	01	4C	CD	21	54	68	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	72	!,.LÍ!This progr
00000170	61	6D	20	63	61	6E	6E	6F	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	6E	am cannot be run
00000180	20	69	6E	20	44	4F	53	20	6D	6F	64	65	2E	0D	0D	0A	in DOS mode
00000190	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	39	24	11	DD	7D	45	7 F	8E	\$9\$.Y}E.Z
000001A0	7D	45	7 F	8E	7D	45	7 F	8E	5A	83	04	8E	7E	45	7 F	8E	}E.Ž}E.ŽZf.Ž~E.Ž
000001B0	7D	45	7E	8E	7 F	45	7 F	8E	74	3D	EΑ	8E	7C	45	7 F	8E	}E~Ž.E.Žt=êŽ E.Ž
000001C0	74	3D	EE	8E	7C	45	7 F	8E	52	69	63	68	7D	45	7 F	8E	t=îŽ E.ŽRich}E.Ž
00000100	-00	0.0							~~	0.0						0.0	

At first, I truncated from the MZ bytes to the end and sent it to Virustotal. The file was flagged as malicious by ~50 AV vendors, but I couldn't find any original name for the file.


So I ended up truncating 6656 bytes from the MZ bytes. If we take a look at the end of the file, there seems to have appended data (after the highlighted part). Thoses data looks like a Mark of the web, but I don't really know why it is here:



If we submit our new file to VT, it is still widely detected as malicious:



In the details section, we can see the name with which this files has been submitted or seen in the wild:



So the flag is Star{hrtc_false_positive.exe} !

Sources

https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW-Whitepaper-71_AV_Quarantine_signed.pdf

https://reversingfun.com/posts/how-to-extract-quarantine-files-from-windows-defender/

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/664397d3ae27f83308ac7360308d4b113d925dc769b4e4914fe596b6f06c947a/details