Money, prices and the exchange rate II

Luis Francisco Gómez López

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- Check the message Welcome greeting published in the News Bulletin Board.
- Dear student please edit your profile uploading a photo where your face is clearly visible.
- The purpose of the virtual meetings is to answer questions and not to make a summary of the study material.
- \bullet If you want to participate, please fill out the following survey: Primer corte 30% > Learning Activities > Tu opinión sobre la economía colombiana
- This presentation is based on (Cardenas 2020, chap. 7)



Analyze the money market and introduce the concepts of inflation, nominal exchange rate and interest rate



- In the link https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/estadisticas/tasasinteres-politica-monetaria > Información sobre la(s) serie(s) on 2025-02-24 it was pointed out that:
 - "La tasa de intervención de política monetaria es la tasa de interés mínima que el Banco de la República cobra a las entidades financieras por los préstamos que les hace mediante las operaciones de mercado abierto (OMA) que se otorgan en las subastas de expansión monetaria a un día hábil (plazo overnight)."
 - "Esta tasa es el principal mecanismo de intervención de política monetaria usado por el Banco de la República para afectar la cantidad de dinero que circula en la economía."
- Also the "tasa de intervención de política monetaria" on 2025-02-24 was 9.50%






Figure 1: Monetary policy intervention rate of the Bank of the Republic (Colombia)






Figure 2: Monetary policy intervention rate, TIB and IBR






Figure 3: Monetary policy intervention rate and CDT interest rates






Figure 4: Interest rate and credit (Banrep 2022, fig. Canal de tasa de interés y de crédito: ejemplo gráfico)






Figure 5: Exchange rate (Banrep 2022, fig. Canal de la casa de cambio: ejemplo gráfico)





Figure 6: Expectations (Banrep 2022, fig. Canal de las expectativas: ejemplo gráfico)



- When inflation is high or volatile, it becomes difficult for businesses and individuals to plan for the future.
 - Low and stable inflation allows for more accurate long-term planning.
- High or volatile inflation is an obstacle for businesses to make sound investment decisions.
 - When inflation is high or volatile some resources are allocated to mitigate the effects of inflation generating an inneficient use of productive resources.
- High or volatile inflation can lead to arbitrary redistributions of resources, often harming those with fixed incomes or limited financial resources
 - Low and stable inflation helps to limit those unexpected redistributions



- Zero inflation increases the risk of deflation, which is a sustained decrease in the general price level.
 - When prices are expected to fall, consumers and businesses tend to delay purchases and investments, hoping to buy things cheaper in the future. This leads to a decrease in demand, which further drives down prices.
- Inflation statistics can overstate actual inflation due to difficulties in accurately measuring quality improvements in products.
 - If this is the case and the desire level of inflation is zero you may be targeting a negative inflation rate.



Why central bank independence is important?

- What is central bank independence?
 - "An independent central bank is one that can carry out monetary policy without political interference." (CEA 2024)
 - "An independent central bank is one that can carry out monetary policy insulated from pressures arising from other parts of government or elsewhere." (D. Kugler 2024)



- Why independence is important for a central bank?
 - Independence is a critical component for a central bank to control inflation.
 - Central bank's commitment to lower inflation needs credibility to anchor the expectations of the economic agents. Independence prevent that credibility can be undermine by political influence (CEA 2024).
 - Central bank targets, like mantaining a low and stable level of inflation, operate over a considerably longer time frame compare to politically-motivated policies. A non-independent central bank can face political pressure to change its behavior where in that situation can not achieve its targets (CEA 2024).



- According to (D. Kugler 2024) and explored in the economic literature
 a central bank is a possible solution to this problems where the
 governments delegate the monetary policy to an independent entity.
- The best analogy that represents this situation and pointed out by (D. Kugler 2024) is Ulysses and the Sirens vs short-term desires and longer-term goals.





Figure 7: Ulysses and the Sirens (1909) by Herbert James Draper



- To my family that supports me
- To the taxpayers of Colombia and the UMNG students who pay my salary
- To the Business Science and R4DS Online Learning communities where I learn R and π -thon
- To the R Core Team, the creators of RStudio IDE, Quarto and the authors and maintainers of the packages tidyverse, knitr, kableExtra, wbstats, tidyquant, and tinytex for allowing me to access these tools without paying for a license
- To the Linux kernel community for allowing me the possibility to use some Linux distributions as my main OS without paying for a license



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