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## **Formalizing ROS2 security configuration with Alloy**

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## **Formalizing ROS2 security configuration with Alloy**

Master dissertation

Integrated Master's in Informatics Engineering

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December 2021

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## ABSTRACT

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Automation developments are becoming essential to industrial restructuring, as it brings more efficient and accurate processes with less associated cost. Consequently, robots are rapidly being deployed in a wide range of scenarios, especially where security is demanded. In such cases, it is critical to employ appropriate procedures to verify both the system's quality and its security.

Following the current growth of cyber-physical system, as well as their usage into various technology domains, the development of software applications is demanding due to the complexity behind the integration of needed services, beyond those provided by the operating system. Hereupon, middleware software to abstract systems hardware are constantly evolving, while offering services that support application development and delivery.

One of the most popular open-source software platforms for building robotic systems is the Robot Operating System (ROS) [3] middleware, where highly configurable robots are usually built by composing third-party modules. A major factor behind its popularity and widespread adoption is its flexibility and interoperability. One drawback of this flexibility, however, lies in the increased security risks that ROS applications face. Alongside security risks, the arising of performance and scalability issues related to the ROS middleware specification, forced the creation of a new version of ROS.

Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2), which continues to provide a simple, uniform message passing interface to allow components to communicate with each other, now implemented using the Data Distribution Service (DDS) [2] communication protocol, where security guarantees are ensured by DDS-Security specification. Using DDS-Security, it is possible to configure ROS2 to run with security guarantees using the SROS2 toolset [4]. However, improper configuration can still lead security problems.

This thesis proposes a technique, based on the software verification perspective, to automatically verify system-wide properties related to the security configuration of ROS2-based applications. The intended purpose is to model the ROS architecture, as well as the network communication behaviour, in Alloy [1], a formal specification language and analysis tool supported by a model-finder over which, system-wide properties are subsequently model-checked.

**KEYWORDS**     Robotics, ROS, ROS2, DDS, SROS2, Security, Software Verification, Alloy

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## RESUMO

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A constante implementação da ideia de automização de processos tem motivado a reestruturação nos mais diversos setores industriais, com o objetivo de aumentar a eficiência e precisão nos processos integrados, consequentemente, reduzindo os custos associados. Consequentemente, impulsionam a integração robótica nos mais amplos domínios tecnológicos, especialmente em domínios onde a segurança é exigida. Nestes casos, é fundamental adotar técnicas apropriadas de forma a verificar tanto a qualidade do sistema, como a segurança do mesmo.

Como resultado do atual crescimento de sistemas ciber-físicos, nomeadamente sistemas robóticos, bem como sua utilização em vários domínios tecnológicos, o desenvolvimento de aplicações é exigente devido à complexidade da integração dos serviços necessários, tipicamente não fornecidos pelo sistema operativo. De forma a acompanhar o aumento na complexidade destes sistemas, middlewares que permitem abstrair hardware têm sido adoptados, oferecendo serviços que oferecem suporte ao desenvolvimento de aplicações robóticas.

Uma das plataformas considerada como *standard* no que toca ao desenvolvimento sistemas robóticos é o middleware Robot Operating System (ROS) [3], onde robôs altamente configuráveis são construídos através da composição modular de *software* externo, oferecendo características como flexibilidade e interoperabilidade aos sistemas integrados. No entanto, a flexibilidade resulta num aumento de vulnerabilidades de segurança, pondo em causa a integridade das aplicações. Além da falta de segurança apresentada, existem também problemas de desempenho e escalabilidade relacionados com a especificação do middleware. Assim, era necessário uma mudança na estruturação do ROS, resultando na criação do Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2).

A nova versão do ROS, o Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2) implementa um protocolo de comunicação de nome Data Distribution Service (DDS) [2], onde para além de garantir serviços de comunicação, fornece diversas especificações, sendo uma delas a especificação DDS-Security, que através de uma metodologia de *plugins*, oferece diferentes métodos de adoção de segurança. Através do uso desta especificação, juntamente com o uso do SROS2 *toolset* [4], é possível configurar o ROS2 de forma a adotar estas medidas de segurança.

Esta tese propõe uma técnica para a verificação automática de *system-wide properties* em aplicações ROS. Esta técnica apresentada baseia-se na formalização estrutural de arquiteturas ROS em Alloy [1], com o objetivo de modelar o comportamento associado à comunicação dentro do sistema, tendo em consideração configurações associadas às propriedades de segurança.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE**     Robótica, ROS, ROS2, DDS, SROS2, Segurança, Verificação de Software, Alloy

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Part I

INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL

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## INTRODUCTION

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The concept behind automation development is being incorporated into the industrial world, through the use of flexible tools to assist in the most various scenarios, as it brings efficiency and accuracy to the industry's processes. Robots have emerged into our world as they are used routinely to perform quests done traditionally by human beings. The decreasing cost of robots is one of the main reasons for their increased use. [14] Economics aside, the usage of robots brings increased productivity, safety and more manufacturing production work back to developed countries. [9] Robotics is already the key driver of competitiveness and flexibility in large scale manufacturing industries. [8] Robotics is significantly reliant on a variety of technologies, connected into the same robotic system. Due to the continuous growth of technology in these different domains, robots can be used in a wide range of applications. [29]

Despite the advances in technology, dealing with hardware-level applications becomes highly impractical as the complexity systems increases. Thereupon, developing and writing software code for robot applications is demanding, where multiple aspects must be considered properly [31], as robots became to be integrated into distributed systems through separated components distributed through the network, connecting different hardware and software modules raises interoperability and communication issues. To solve this issue, modular architectures based on message-passing communication patterns are continually emerging as a middleware layer, offering services to the application layer, easing the development cost, while providing interoperability and communication facilitation. [29, 27]. The requirement for a middleware layer that meets different robot's specification is a novel approach to enable the creation of robot applications over robotic systems, while supporting features such as robustness and modularity.

The Robot Operating System was created by a collaborative open-source community to contribute in the advancement of robots [19] that enables locomotion, manipulation, navigation, and recognition tasks, complemented by software libraries and tools with the aim of helping build robot applications easily, without the need of building it from scratch. ROS was designed to be flexible, since working with robots requires experimentation, given the variety of different hardware and software, enabling interpolation with potential added components. However, performance and scalability issues arised due to its middleware specification. [31] Additionally, real-time constraints such as fault-tolerance, deadlines, or process synchronization were not supported by ROS, making it unsuitable for safety-critical and real-time systems. [23]

Besides having no middleware support for distributed real-time systems, security features were also not featured by ROS, which started to be demanding for deployed systems. An increasing number of real-time applications, for

instance robotic systems, requires security ensurance for protecting real-time sensitive data, against unauthorized access. [24]

This lead to the creation of Robot Operating System 2, which continues to provide a simple, uniform message passing interface to allow components to communicate with each other, now implemented using the Data Distribution Service (DDS) [2] specification protocol as its middleware, leveraging for its messaging architecture. Issues concerning system integration and scalability are mitigated by DDS various implementations, due to the several transport configurations provided, making it suitable for real-time distributed systems. DDS also provides a security specification, called DDS-Security, used by multiple implementations, and ROS2 makes use of them to provide features to the deployed robotic systems. [10]

With the extended use of robotic systems, software verification, through the use of formal methods, are necessary to prevent potentially catastrophic consequences, mainly related to security matters, as safety guards are gradually implemented into the software domain. Within this context, Alloy [20, 25] framework enables the expressness the behaviour of systems with rich configurations, due to the combination of both relational and linear temporal logic (LTL) provided by its specification language, consequently supporting model-checking techniques. Model-checking techniques enable far better levels of coverage and, as a result, more reliability than traditional testing, where the system is abstracted as a conventional model, that is automatically checked over performing property verification on finite-state machines. [11]

The proposal of this dissertation is to develop a novel technique to automatically verify system-wide safety properties using Alloy framework, confining a ROS2 system into an abstract model, in order to obtain a prototype tool that can be used by developers to easily detect security configuration issues on their respective robotic application.

## 1.1 OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS

The first goal of this thesis rests in introducing concepts around the Robot Operating System, contextualizing the evolution behind its framework towards achieving security, where the former version of ROS lacked due to the focus on flexibility. Since ROS2 has been developed over the DDS framework, as its communication middleware, DDS must be properly understood before considering the security aspects. To do so, simple examples will first be studied and introduced, in order to provide ROS-based context to the reader. The domain of autonomous systems, where security is of extreme relevance, namely the Autoware [22] ROS2 platform for self-driving vehicles will also be introduced. To understand SROS2 we intend to configure and run a realistic case study related to Autoware with security guarantees.

The DDS Security standard functionality is evaluated, as well as how security is integrated into ROS2. Since security issues, concerning public networks, are recent to the robotics domain, ROS2 security network design should be analysed structurally.

Security configuration related to SROS2 toolset will be provided in this chapter, supported by an example that accounts multiple security features, those being authentication, encryption and, most importantly, access control, applying restriction constraints to the network and its participants, that by default are not controlled.

The second goal is to extend a previously proposed [12] formalization of ROS applications in Alloy/Electrum [1, 25] to also take into consideration the security configuration defined with SROS2. Using this extension, we intend to explore the viability of verifying simple information-flow security properties. For instance, to ensure that no commands to the vehicle motor can be sent via the infotainment system.

The final goal is to automate the extraction of such formal Alloy models from the configuration files of a ROS2 application, in order to obtain a prototype tool that can be used by roboticists to easily detect security configuration issues.

## 1.2 DOCUMENT STRUCTURE

The current dissertation structure is divided into four different chapters. Chapter (2) introduces all the concepts related to Robot Operating System, and its evolution as robotic development framework towards achieving system security. The current provided work regarding ROS and security in ROS is also presented in this chapter. Chapter (3) introduces the Alloy framework, as its specification language supported by a concrete example case. Chapter (4) presents the approach developed during this work, which allows the automatic verification of system-wide safety properties in ROS2 applications. Chapter (5) presents the thesis conclusions, alongisde possible future approaches complementing the current work.

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## ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM

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As aforementioned, this thesis aims to explore the security configuration within Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2) and its security toolset Secure Robot Operating System 2 (SROS2), enabling the specification and model checking using Alloy.

Robotic systems have emerged into several scenarios, where its usage ranges between basic processes automation, up to full performance over critical tasks, consequently causing the complexity increase in these domains. Concerning the complexity behind writting software code, due to the widely variety presented in the robot's hardware as in fields of action, Robotic Operation System (ROS) presents itself as a middleware system, created to facilitate robotic systems development.

In ROS, software flexibility was valued above all else, meaning that values like security were not considered as a priority, so ROS-based applications tend to face increased security risks, compromising the whole robotic network. As ROS became a standard for many robotic systems, and due to the scale and scope of the robotics grows as they start to be integrated into the real world, security matters must be addressed as priority while developing systems involving robots. [19, 23]

The upgraded version of ROS, Robot Operating System 2 (ROS), presents itself as a framework for developing robotic systems, supported by a standard, the Data Distribution Service (DDS), where multiple middleware implementations are built over this standard, providing ROS applications multiple DDS-based specifications, as well as valued Quality of Service (QoS) settings over the transport configuration.

The DDS-Security specification [4], embedded by every DDS implementation supported by ROS, supplies multiple plugins regarding the security domain. As result, ROS2 yields a wider command toolset compared to the former version of ROS, as they bring forth to a toolset, the Secure Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2) toolset, concerning the security functionality that DDS-Security plugins offer.

This chapter introduces necessary background information over the major concepts on which this thesis rests. First, it is presented a detailed introduction to the concepts around Robot Operating System (ROS), as well as the evolution approach that ROS faced towards providing security to its deployed systems. Regarding this goal, Data Distribution Service (DDS) and its integration on Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2) must be contextualized beforehand. Thereafter, it will be presented a section dedicated to related work regarding the study of security in ROS based systems.

## 2.1 ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM

The Robot Operating System was created by a collaborative open-source community, that has undergone rapid development, to contribute in the advancement of cyber physical systems, mainly robotic systems, serving as developer enhancer for the world of robotic applications [19], complemented by software libraries and tools with the aim of helping build robot applications easily, without the need of building it from scratch.

Although Robot Operating System furnishes services, often perceived as operating system's services, such as hardware abstraction, low-level device control and control over message-passing between processes, ROS can not be perceived as a proper operating system, in the sense of process management and scheduling. However, it has a significant impact on the deployed application's performance, with highly complex effects on timing leading to affecting the application's runtime behaviour. In result, the impact of the underlying operating system scheduling is over exceed by ROS. [31, 13]

Fundamentally, ROS is a middleware, as it provides a custom serialization format, a custom transport protocol as well as a custom central discovery mechanism, presenting itself as a distributed layer between the top application layer, the operating systems layer and its communication capabilities.

ROS was designed to provide as much as modularity and composability to the application layer [13] as possible, allowing ROS applications to be built over several software modules, as independent computing processes called *nodes*, that compose together to fulfill the deployment characteristics of the corresponding robot. [27]

The communication approach that ROS implements to perform data exchange between nodes is based on a publish-subscribe model, based on TCPROS [6] and UDPROS [7], that makes use of TCP and UDP sockets, respectively. [27] The information exchange is done by introducing the *message* definition, which characterizes every data structure concerning the information exchange between ROS participants.




Figure 1: Robot Operating System architecture.

The former communication architecture supported by ROS focused on a centralization perspective, as it had a implementation of a *Master node*, that controlled every aspect of the communication establishment, meaning that every information exchange between nodes had to go through this master. A ROS Master node must be initialized before any node, as these nodes must also be able to address the ROS Master's location. The ROS Master was also in charge of the parameters, which offer important runtime information about the network nodes.

Due to the sheer wide capabilities controlled by the master, this centralization approach fits the purposes of a research tool, as it is simpler to monitor and analyse the system behaviour. This communication architecture, however, does not scale well since it is heavily reliant on the master node's availability, making it unsuitable for safety-critical and real-time applications. If the master fails, the entire system fails, representing a single point of failure and a huge performance bottleneck.

Many research communities tried to fix these real-time issues by proposing potential solutions, while supporting the same architecture design, that did not fully accomplished the needs of real-time applications. So, it became clear to the ROS community that the framework had architectural limitations that could not be rearranged using the same design approach. [27]

Robot Operating System 2 comes as a complete refactoring of ROS, with the aim of increase the framework's real-time capabilities, by allowing the development of time-critical control over ROS, as it moves away from the former architectural design towards the implementation of an external middleware that can support the production needs of the outgrowing robotic systems. [23, 13]

## 2.2 ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM 2

The Robot Operating System 2 (ROS2) was developed with the goal of easing the former ROS architecture. Although ROS2 continues to provide a simple, uniform message passing interface to allow components to communicate with each other, instead of implementing their own middleware specification, Data Distribution Service (DDS) communication protocol is implemented as an abstract middleware interface, through which serialization, transport and discovery is being provided. This implies that adding and integrating a new component into an existing system remains reasonably simple for a ROS developer.

### 2.2.1 Data Distribution Service

The Data Distributed System [2], simply known as DDS, is a Object Management Group (OMG) middleware standard, resulted from the need of better interoperability between different vendors middleware frameworks, directly addressing data communication between nodes that belong to a *publish-subscribe* communication architecture, for real-time and embedded systems, that relies on a data-centric approach. DDS disposes a software API supported by a rich documentation about its exact behaviour. By furnishing this specification, it enables third parties applications, such as ROS, to implement this middleware, while auditing and understanding matters are covered by its documentation.

A middleware, such as DDS, is a software layer that sits between the Platform layer, which handles both the operating system as the network transport configuration, and the Application layer, that is usually implemented by sytems that highly rely on timing-measures and efficiency, when it comes to data-delivering between nodes. DDS aims to ease the complexity behind creating each sytem's own middleware, by handling relevant aspects like network configuration, communication establishment, data sharing and low-level details. As a result, system



developers can mainly focus on their applications purposes, rather than concerning about information moving across levels.

The architecture approach is based on a concept named *Data-Centric*, that instead of focusing on the reliable transmission of the message, the distributed infrastructure takes more responsibility, where the message-data itself is the focal point. Here, the infrastructure formally defines the data and imposes rules over it, with the continuous awareness of the contents in the data space, where known structures exchange these contents. Rather than forcing each application to deal with this complexity of defining the data space, DDS directly implements and provides controlled, managed, secure data sharing. However, the Data-Centric approach does not define the full DDS architecture, but only how messaging is treated.

DDS leverages the premise of a transport-independent virtualized Data Bus, to address the distribution of network resources, in which stateful data is distributed through the network, where multiple applications can access this data in motion, representing an architecture with no single point of failure, respectively enabling a reliable way of ensuring data integrity. Consequently, by adopting this approach, the load on the network is independent of the number of applications, making it easily scalable. DDS communications are also governed with explicit *Quality of Service* settings, that allows the system to manage and monitor which applications are able to communicate in which ways with the Data Bus and with each other.




Figure 2: Data Distributed System architecture.

When it comes to easing the communication establishment, DDS features a set of discovery services, allowing the automatic discovery between participants. As to address the data transportation, DDS offers a wire specification protocol called Real-Time Publish-Subscribe Wire Protocol (RTPS) [32], allowing multiple applications, that could differ on their used DDS implementations, to interoperate with each other as network domain participants, by abstracting and optimizing transport.

Furthermore, RTPS was designed to make use of *Quality of Service* profiles, where multiple transport policies can be specified that, by default, DDS does not support. For instance, as multiple DDS vendors are built over the UDP [30] transport protocol, which does not feature reliable delivery of data, transport reliability, often required by real-time environments, can be ensured by specifying the reliability corresponding QoS policy into the RTPS communication layer. Besides, QoS profiles also enable security deployment into the transport configuration. This approach offers flexibility over communication configuration and development versatility, allowing the developer to specify whatever QoS satisfies its system communication needs.

A domain participant enables an application to participate in the global data space, either as a *data writer* or as a *data reader*, according to their role on how data, concerning their respective communications, is passed

from point to point. Moreover, concerning the RTPS protocol, the communication architecture is based on a *publish-subscribe* model. Each data writer publish data to a corresponding *topic*, acting as a data *publisher*. A *topic* represents the data space objects through which data is handled. A data reader, complementing the role of the data writer in the RTPS data transportation, declares the intent to subscribe to the topic, in which data is published by the data writer, acting as a *data subscriber*.




Figure 3: Data Centric RTPS model. Extracted from [27].

Additionally, each domain entity manages the data according to the Quality of Service profiles specified over the RTPS protocol, that is used over the transportation process as a policy. Applications within the network are then generated as DDS domain participants, with regard of the transport QoS policies.

### 2.2.2 DDS integration in ROS2

As previously stated, the Robot Operating System 2 was developed to address the lack of support for real-time systems that the former ROS provided, mainly due to its architecture design that relied on their own middleware specification. To address this, ROS2 middleware approach is built upon the DDS framework [27], leveraging DDS for its messaging architecture, where communication and transport configuration are handled. As a result of the DDS integration, ROS2 applications are actually considered DDS applications, meaning that is possible to interoperate both native DDS applications and ROS applications, providing flexible compatibility.

By relying on an outside middleware, the modularity approach that ROS makes use of, where multiple modules should be applied when needed, while reducing the number of dependencies attached, highly depends on the middleware implementation that is being used. As far as dependencies are concerned, DDS implementations have light sized dependencies, often related to language implementation libraries, easing the complexity behind installing and running dependencies for ROS developers. [5]

ROS2 middleware implements an interface on top of DDS, called *ROS client library* (RCL), which hides much of the complexity of DDS specification API, offering a more friendly approach for the ROS users. However, it

still provides access to the underlying DDS implementation for users that might want to integrate different DDS implementations for their use cases.




Figure 4: ROS2 framework architecture.

Towards supplying a wide range of configurations back to application layer, to vastly cover the robotic applications needs, ROS2 aims to support multiple DDS implementations, in which these implementation's API specification might differ from each other. In order to abstract from the specifics of these implementation's APIs, an abstract interface is being introduced, depicted above as *Abstract DDS Layer*, allowing portability among DDS vendors, which consequently enables ROS developers to interpolate DDS implementations, based on their application's needs during runtime. It should be noted that the DDS implementations are low-level of abstraction, strictly defined by its corresponding vendor's API. DDS only defines fundamental procedures at a higher degree of abstraction.

The former version of ROS, depicted on left hand-side of the picture 4, already provided this abstract layer, that was customized and implemented by ROS client library, which allowed the communication between the Application Layer, in which the Master node was implemented, and the communication protocols. However, the capabilities offered by this middleware are significantly lower than ROS2 middleware, due to the DDS integration, as well as the fail to support the needs of multiple systems.

As stated, ROS client library hides the complexity of the DDS specification API from the developer. As RCL works under ROS structures, to keep the passing of information through the middleware layer, a structure mapping between ROS and DDS must occur. The data structure mapping between ROS and DDS must account the preservation of the former ROS messages' structure. The RCL works under the ROS messages' `.msg` files, and explained, these messages must be converted into messages' `.idl` files, to be used by the DDS transport.

The data transformation accounts the DDS implementation that is being considered at runtime, implemented at the *Abstract DDS Layer*. The converted data is handled by the DDS wire protocol, RTPS, where the DDS publish-subscribe architecture and their respective structures comes to practice. Then, the reverse process must be ensured as well, to fully complete the information flow, where the data must be converted back to ROS structures before being returned to the ROS client library. [5]

### 2.2.3 ROS2 Graph Architecture

From a logical perspective [13], ROS applications are composed of many software modules that operate as separate computing processes, known as nodes, allowing its participation into the ROS global data space, similar to a DDS participant. The data distribution between nodes is based on a publish-subscribe model, in which each node is perceived either as a publisher or as a subscriber within the network. First, nodes must be thoroughly covered before evaluating how data is passed and treated by publishing and subscribing.

*Nodes* can be perceived as processes that will likely perform computation over the network. The network is comprised of many nodes, running simultaneously and exchanging data between them, where each node addresses its corresponding module purpose. In a nutshell, nodes are network executables, built over a package, where their software code treats data that has been exchanged to each of them.

For instance, let's consider a well-known example called `TurtleSim`, which is a simulator typically used for learning ROS, mainly composed by 2 nodes, that perform together towards moving a turtle. Additional nodes were implemented, in order to add complexity to the current network, as to later support security matters as a proper example.

The ROS2 command toolset allows node launching using the `run` keyword, in which both the node's namespace and its corresponding package must be passed as arguments. It is worth mentioning that, nodes can be connected within a single package or between multiple packages, as they are built over their corresponding packages.

```
/multiplexer/multiplexer
/random/random
/turtle_teleop_key/turtle_teleop_key
/turtlesim_node/turtlesim_node
```

The `TurtleSim` node list.

The communication between nodes is done by message-passing, where the nodes involved in a particular communication exchange information using the *message* definition. A message is defined by its data type, also known as its *interface*, which can either be primitive (integer, string, boolean), or defined by a complex data structure, where multiple data types are assigned to their corresponding variables. Considering the `Turtlesim` example, the main message that is used to trigger the turtle movement, is composed by multiple data movement variables regarding the linear and circular movement of the turtle. The interface is called `Twist` and it is a ROS predefined geometry message.

```
Vector3    linear
Vector3    angular
```

`Twist` interface that is used to trigger the turtle movement.

Messages are passed through via the pattern of publishing and subscribing over a *topic*. A node publishes the message to any number of topics, that are then subscribed by nodes that want to get access to that message.

Topics provide a multicast routing scheme, where publish data can be casted into multiple subscribers. A specific *topic* is created upon specifying its namespace over either a publisher or a subscriber instance, associated to a node executable. After building and executing the node, their associated topics are created.




Figure 5: ROS2 communication behaviour over *topics*.

Addressing data exchange through a topic over nodes implemented in the same package, the configuration is straightforward, in which their respective subscriber and publisher instances must have the same topic's namespace instantiated. Whereas, if the nodes are specified in different packages, a technique of *remapping* must be used.

```

/multiplexer/high_topic
/multiplexer/low_topic
/multiplexer/main_topic

```

The `TurtleSim` topic list.

The topic list related to the `TurtleSim` example is depicted above. The 3 listed topics are vital for the communication process, and they all correspond to the `multiplexer` node. This happens because remapping between topic names is used to establish communication between packages, as explained above.

Both launching and remapping process are done by running a ROS *launch file*, that simultaneously launches each node, providing a simpler way of monitoring the system nodes. Every node is instantiated in this file, and have each topic remapping defined in `remappings` section. Also, distinctive namespaces allow the system to start the nodes, without any name nor topic name conflicts. However this technique has some flaws attached, since it does not furnish a way of launching nodes in a separated terminal, needed for user interaction purposes, like input reading.

By running the respective ROS `launch` command, will automatically compile and run the launch file related to the `TurtleSim` example. Every network node is now running simultaneously in the background. The only foreground running node is the `turtlesim` one, because it has an associated interface showing the turtle movement.

```

➔ launch ros2 launch turtle_launch.py
[INFO] [launch]: All log files can be found below /home/luis/.ros/log/2021-11-16-15-04-52-242468-mariolas-8851
[INFO] [launch]: Default logging verbosity is set to INFO
[INFO] [random-1]: process started with pid [8852]
[INFO] [multiplexer-2]: process started with pid [8854]
[INFO] [turtlesim_node-3]: process started with pid [8856]
[INFO] [turtle_teleop_key-4]: process started with pid [8858]

```

Figure 6: Nodes launched after running the launch file.



Figure 7: Turtlesim node interface.

Figure 8: Launching the TurtleSim network using a predefined launch file.

For understanding reasons, the reader may want to see how the network architecture is organized. ROS2 provides a GUI tool called *rqt*, that assists programmers in manipulating the network elements, in a more user-friendly manner. The graph visualizer, provided by this tool, allows the programmer to observe the network graph and how the elements are connected. While the nodes are running in the background, the reader may want to run the following command `rqt_graph`, in a separated terminal.

Figure 9: TurtleSim network graph presented by `rqt_graph`.

To contextualize the reader, it should be presented a quick explanation on how the presented TurtleSim network works:

The `multiplexer` node, being the main node in this particular network, subscribes to two different topics from two different nodes.

- The `turtle_teleop_key` node corresponds to a keyboard controller, that sends movement commands through the `high_topic` to the `multiplexer`.
- The `random` node sends random movement commands through the `low_topic` to the `multiplexer`.

Since the `multiplexer` has two different active subscriptions, managing two different turtle movement values, it must keep them synchronized with each other. This is achieved by setting different priorities to each subscription, where the keyboard node has priority over the random controller, meaning that when the keyboard publishes movement data through its corresponding topic, the `multiplexer` must process that received data.

**Timers** are also used, since they provide a useful way of managing these topics, by time-assigning, alternately changing the priority after the timer runs out, through its corresponding callback function.

The `multiplexer` also has a publisher instance defined, since it has an active connection through the `main_topic` connection to the `turtlesim_node` node, that is responsible for controlling and projecting the turtle movement. The `main_topic` will be in charge of the values passed to the `turtlesim` node, instructing the turtle to move.

Given the priority set at each moment, the `multiplexer` has to forward the movement command, either from the keyboard or the random controller, through the `main_topic`, enabling the turtle movement. Every aspect related to the publisher-subscriber pattern, in this ROS2 system, is treated over topic's namespace remapping.

### *Additional ROS network elements*

The `TurtleSim` application given as example above, does not address all the existing ways of data-exchanging between nodes. Even though *topics* are the most conventional way of communication, because of its multicast scheme, subscribers can not be perceived by the publishers, so logging and synchronization becomes rather difficult.

**SERVICES** *Services* allows a client, that can also be seen as a topic subscriber, to request data from a server, that likewise a topic publisher, furnish data through a service. The data is only provided when the client node makes a request. Each service is always linked to just one server node, and does not maintain active connections. To address the service stalling that the former ROS issued due to the service's synchronization nature, ROS2 services are asynchronous, since it is possible to specify a callback function that is triggered when the service server responds back to the client.

**ACTIONS** Other notable way of exchanging data is by setting goals through *Actions*. Actions, likewise services, also uses a client-server model, but they were design for other purposes rather than only processing a request and sending back a response. Actions are intended to process long-running tasks, where the client sends a goal request to the server node, that confirms the receiving of this goal. Before returning a response back to the client, the server can send feedback back to the client. Unlike services, actions can be cancelled, so the return response could not be acknowledge. A worth mentioned example, commonly used in robotic systems for navigation, is the intent of moving a robot to a position, previously requested by a client. While its traveling, it can send information about the transition state. When the robot reaches the predefined position, the server acknowledges the client by sending a result message.

**PARAMETERS** Another relevant concept behind ROS is the existence of nodes *parameters*, that allows individual configuration of the network nodes. In the former version of ROS, the node parameters were controlled by a global *parameter server*, managed by its corresponding ROS Master. However, in ROS2 each node declares and manages its own parameters, by using the predefined commands `get` and `set`. Additionally, using a parameter function callback, the node's parameters can easily be edited.

**INTERFACES** Each type of communication has its different corresponding interface, and they must be specified in different folders with unique namespaces. The folder namespace used for topic messages is `msg/`, whereas for service messages is `srv/` and for action messages is `action/`. Recall the `TurtleSim` example and its corresponding package `turtlesim`. Suppose a case where, it could be possible to add boxes

into the turtle GUI, blocking the turtle movement through those boxes. To add boxes, the topic message considered should have two different values regarding the  $x$  and  $y$  axis value related to the turtle map. This interface could be named as `Boxes`, where its full source path is `turtlesim/msg/Boxes.msg`.

**LIFECYCLED NODE** ROS2 introduces a new node definition as an addition to the traditional, called *lifecycled node*. A lifecycled node is defined by its current state, which can either be unconfigured, inactive, active or finalized, providing a structural way of setting up the node and separating all its state functionalities. Nodes that need initial configuration before exchanging data within the network can be perceived as lifecycled nodes, like sensors, where its detection must be ensured before the data reading/publishing process.

**NODE COMPOSITION** A concept that both ROS and ROS2 provides is the idea of composing nodes into a single *process* for improved performance. Usually a node is attached to a single process, but it is possible to combine multiple nodes into a single process, structurally abstracting some network parts. However, there is a slight difference about how ROS and ROS2 approaches the node composition. In the former version of ROS, node composition was done over the combination of *nodelets*, intentionally designed to ease the cost of overusing TCP for message-passing between nodes. Supported by the former idea of *nodelets*, ROS2 introduces the *components* as software code compiled into shared libraries, that can be loaded into a *component container* process at runtime in the network, ensuring node composition. Node composition could also be applied for security matters. Suppose a scenario where multiple nodes respect the same security policies. By combining them into a single process, the mapping into this set of rules would be direct, easing the usage of security enclaves.

## 2.3 SECURITY INTRODUCTION IN ROS2

A major factor behind its popularity and widespread adoption is its flexibility and interoperability. In ROS, this flexibility was valued above all else, meaning that values like security were not considered as a priority, so ROS applications tend to face increased security risks.

Also, ROS works over a publish-subscribe pattern, which is very useful, since it brings various forms of decoupling and transparency. However, because of this transparency, publishers within ROS are unable to control the consumption of their data and subscribers, most of the times, cannot identify the integrity of their received data. This means a malicious actor could potentially inject code or vulnerabilities into a library, which could then be reused by another unsuspecting developer.

These concerns about security take on particular importance, since robots are becoming more frequently used and can directly affect the physical world. **Cyber-physical** systems, commonly related to the arising of the automatizing concept of robots, feature unique vulnerabilities that exploit both cyber and physical nature of these devices, mainly by sensing and actuating. Sensing becomes relevant when it comes to the potential leak of information about the surroundings of its robot. Whereas, actuating is related to the functionality of the robot, where physical safety is the main concern.[16, 28]




ROS faces known vulnerabilities due to its architecture and model nature. ROS internal communication is built around TCP ports, allowing robots to be built using several modules, that can be distributed. However, this modularity results in the exposure of TCP ports, that usually leads to attacks that compromise the data itself. There is also a concern about how ROS manages the communication between nodes. In ROS, the node-to-node communications are settled in plain text. Despite the fact that this way of handling communications bring certain benefits, especially better performance and data recovery, it is evident that data content is vulnerable to unauthorized usage.

As discussed previously, this is mainly due to the fact that ROS had its own middleware, which didn't provide any security features. The 'centralization' behind ROS architecture, where everything was controlled and connected to the ROS Master node, was also a major fact to the need of a new implementation where the middleware could not also facilitate the establishment of communications, but also could provide security features. ROS2 adoption of middleware interface for data exchange offers a flexible way to build appropriate defenses for a given application.

DDS ensures not also communication features, but also guarantees security properties, where ROS's flexibility is preserved despite this increase on security. The **DDS-Security** is a specification that serves as an add-on to the DDS specification, defined by a set of plugins combined in a Service Plugin Interface (SPI) architecture. The main plugins provided by DDS-Security are the following ones:

- **Authentication:** Verification of each identity of a given Domain Participant, by assigning a private key and a public key to each one, as well as an certificate that relates the participant's public key to its corresponding specific name.
- **Access control:** Provides control over DDS-related operations with the support of the Authentication plugin. It requires two files per domain participant signed by a Certificated Authority, that specifies how the domain should be secured and their permissions.
- **Cryptographic:** Operations related to cryptographic purposes, such as encryption are handled by this plugin.
- **Logging:** Provides logging over events.
- **Data tagging:** Add tags to data samples.



These plugins can be customized since different applications require different needs when it comes to security. That is why, as depicted above, there must be a **Standardized Plugin API** that acts as an interface between modules and DDS security protocols, while including all aspects of secure communications. ROS2 is deployed without security mechanisms by default, but DDS can provide security guarantees such as authentication and access control with a variant called DDS-Security. Using DDS-Security it is possible to configure ROS2 to run with security guarantees using the **SROS2** toolset. Most of these tools supported by SROS2 is contained within the ROS Client Library (RCL), and includes the following features:

- Support for security files for each domain participant, where in ROS2 are seen as a process, and each process must be associated with a set of these files.
- Support for both permissive and strict enforcement of security, meaning that can be considered two approaches when it comes to dealing with security files.
- Support for a master “on/off” switch, that enables or disables every security feature.

The SROS2 has been designed to work with any secure middleware. However, not all middleware is considered open-source and highly depends on the ROS distribution in use.

Since this security process involves a lot of new technology, the user must be aware of improper configuration, that can still lead to security problems. However, SROS2 CLI include a tool, named `ros2 security`, that aims to help those who don't want to set it all up by themselves.


### *TurtleSim with SROS2*

Now that the concept behind SROS2 is introduced, the `TurtleSim` application given as an example in the previous section, can now be treated using security features related to the nodes involved.

The `multiplexer` node handled the commands responsible for the turtle movement. Note that, the turtle is implemented in the `turtlesim` node, so both `multiplexer` and `turtlesim` nodes are directly connected through a specified topic. `Multiplexer` acts as topic selector between two different subscribed

topics, where each of them was respectively associated with a priority. Based on the priority set at each moment, the `multiplexer` node forwards the command related to the selected topic into the `turtlesim` node, by topic remapping, which triggers the turtle movement. Even though the `multiplexer` handles the two specified subscribed topics that receive movement data from both `random controller` and `keyboard` nodes, its not exclusive to the `turtlesim` node, as it is still possible to directly publish commands to the topic that handles the turtle movement, since the security properties have not been implemented yet.

In order to guarantee this exclusivity where the `multiplexer` is the only node that directly publishes data to the topic that enables the turtle movement, is by specifying **access control** files. The remaining nodes should be considered as untrustworthy, denying any potential undesired turtle movement originated by these nodes that tried to publish data through the topic. The idea is to encapsulate both `multiplexer` and `turtlesim` nodes, as the `multiplexer` monitors and manages all the data intended to manipulate the turtle movement, similar to a reversed proxy server.



Note that, as it is now, the only nodes that are supervised by the `multiplexer` are the `random controller` node and the `keyboard` node. However, it can be implemented new nodes with ease, as it is only required to remap topics in the launch file and create as many subscriptions in the `multiplexer` as many implemented nodes.

So, in technically terms, a **SROS2 keystore** must be initiated. ROS2 provides a command that permits the creation of **keystores** by using the `security` keyword. This command enables features regarding security matters, that has access to the SROS2 tools related to the DDS-security artifacts.

The keystore is a created directory where DDS security features are stored. By creating a keystore directory, then it can be later sourced to be used by RCL to provide security to the associated ROS2 network.

```
ros2 security create_keystore turtlesim_keystore
```

The created keystore directory structure is displayed bellow:

```

security tree turtlesim_keystore
turtlesim_keystore
├── enclaves
│   ├── governance.p7s
│   ├── governance.xml
│   └── turtlesim
│       └── enclave
│           ├── cert.pem
│           ├── governance.p7s -> ../../governance.p7s
│           ├── identity_ca.cert.pem -> ../../public/identity_ca.cert.pem
│           ├── key.pem
│           ├── permissions_ca.cert.pem -> ../../public/permissions_ca.cert.pem
│           ├── permissions.p7s
│           └── permissions.xml
├── private
│   ├── ca.key.pem
│   ├── identity_ca.key.pem -> ca.key.pem
│   └── permissions_ca.key.pem -> ca.key.pem
└── public
    ├── ca.cert.pem
    ├── identity_ca.cert.pem -> ca.cert.pem
    └── permissions_ca.cert.pem -> ca.cert.pem

```

By creating the keystore, three different sub-directories will be generated.

- The `enclaves` directory contains the security tools related to each enclave created. An **enclave** is a group of ROS nodes, controlled by the same set of security rules, defined in its corresponding enclave directory. Each enclave includes files needed to enable security, such as CA certificates and their own private key (`key.pem`). Besides containing each enclave created (for instance, in the figure above, a `/turtlesim/enclave` enclave is created), this directory also has a governance policy document `governance.xml`, as well as a signed copy file related to the CA permissions, `governance.p7s`.
- The `public` directory contains material that is permissible as public. A Certificate Authority certificate, `ca.cert.pem` is stored in this directory. This file stores the CA **public key** and it is used to validate the identity and permissions of each ROS network node by the CA. Note the existence of `identity` and `permissions` folders with their respective certificate/key file. This is due to the fact that DDS supports the separation of identity and permission chains, however ROS usually uses the former `ca.cert.pem` file, meaning that only a CA is used for both these processes.
- The `private` directory contains material that is considered private. A Certificate Authority certificate, `ca.cert.pem` is stored in this directory. This file stores the CA **private key**. It is used to modify the network policies, such as access permissions, and to add new participants. Similar to the `public` directory, the CA key corresponding to its identity and permissions can be stored in their corresponding individual directories.

The reader may want to create as many keystores as needed, but RCL can only use a keystore's artifacts at once. The directory is defined by the SROS2 environment variable `ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE`, that needs to be previously sourced. Environment variables sourcing will be explained further on.

Once the keystore has been created, the respective enclaves can be implemented. By using the tag `create_key`, with the keystore namespace provided (in this case is `turtlesim_keystore`), each enclave can be created.

Although the idea of enclave has already been introduced, the full context behind it is yet to be explained. As mentioned, an enclave is a group of ROS nodes that follow the same security policy. Since an enclave is a

DDS domain term, typically a node is an abstraction of a DDS `Participant` (previously mentioned as a Domain Participant). In ROS2, the usage of an enclave is done upon running a node, which causes the creation of a running process. This means that, enclaves are used by processes, providing them security based on their artifacts and specification.

Since the mapping is between processes and enclaves, the reader may wonder, if node composition into a single process is a reliable way for matching multiple nodes simultaneously to the same enclave. Well, this is actually a good approach but nodes can not be perceived as domain participants, while considering node composition, due to the fact that composing participants results in non-negligible overhead.

There is also not convenient to compose nodes as individual participants, as far as security is concerned. That is because each participant has its own security identity related to its node, and by composing participants, they all share the same OS memory space, consequently access data is shared between them, and permission distribution becomes rather difficult to handle.

So, each participant must be matched to a node shared context, instead of being directly related to a specific node.

Each enclave security artifacts are used by each participant, meaning that each node mapped into the same context is controlled by the same enclave. Thereby, the initial given definition of an enclave is not totally correct, since a participant can either be perceived as single node or as multiple node shared context.

Usually the node **namespace** are quite relevant upon creating enclaves, since the default way of implementing enclaves creates a namespace hierarchy path depending on the node namespace, so node remapping could affect its corresponding enclave path. With the introduction of node contexts, the enclave path is now disassociated from node namespaces, having its own resource identifier. This approach is also appropriate when composing nodes from different packages (that consequently have different namespaces) scenario is considered, where the path of the shared enclave must be common to each node.

```
ros2 security create_key turtlesim_keystore /security_enclave/
```

In order to run these nodes concerning the created keys, all the packages related to the network must be re-built using the **Fast DDS** additional flag.

```
colcon build --symlink-install --cmake-args -DSECURITY=ON
```

The following exports need to be sourced to force SROS2 security features. The reader may want to put these exports into a shell script, and then add this to the `PATH` environment variable.

```
export ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE=/path/to/the/created/keystore
export ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE=true
export ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY=Enforce
```

These exports are related to relevant SROS2 environment variables, that the reader must be aware when considering the SROS2 tools.

- **ROS\_SECURITY\_KEYSTORE:** This variable sources the root of the created keystore. By sourcing this location, ROS2 knows where the security artifacts are stored.
- **ROS\_SECURITY\_ENABLE:** This variable is the SROS2 enabler.
- **ROS\_SECURITY\_STRATEGY:** As stated before, SROS2 provides two different approaches when it comes to dealing with security files. This variable handles that property, and it can be set either to `Enforce` or `Permissive`.

Now that all ROS2 security prerequisites have been successfully configured, the network can be launched.

Since SROS2 has no support for launch files, each node needs to be launched separately on its own terminal, with regard to their respective keys. Later, this process is simplified by launching a shell script.

```
ros2 run turtle_muxer multiplexer --ros-args --enclave /multiplexer
```

```
ros2 run turtlesim turtlesim_node --ros-args --enclave /turtlesim_node/tu
```

As pointed previously, DDS has several implementations that can be considered when the ROS2 network is being configured. The ROS2 distribution usually dictates what is the default middleware implementation of DDS being used. Most of these ROS2 distributions uses the same default middleware implementation, which has the name of **Fast DDS** (formerly named `Fast RTPS`). The features that stand-out the most in this implementation are the promotion of an interface generator (`Fast DDS-Gen`) and the usage of `RTPS` communication protocol, which guarantees performance, real-time behaviour, efficiency, scalability and, most importantly, security. As explained earlier, the Fast DDS security flag, `-DSECURITY=ON`, must be considered upon building the ROS2 packages. Although, the reader may want to set a different DDS implementation. In order to do this, the reader should install the DDS middleware software, following the implementation specification and dependencies, and then rebuild the workspace forcing the DDS implementation to change. ROS2 has a environment variable, `RMW_IMPLEMENTATION`, that allows the replacement of the middleware that is being used.

The creation of these keys only ensures that the communication between the `multiplexer` and the `turtlesim` is authenticated, and the exchanged data is encrypted, so Access Control is yet to be implemented.

By using tools like `tcpdump`, the data packets can be displayed and this encryption can be easily verified. If no SROS2 security is regarded (no export made), the data is passed in plain-text, as expected. After sourcing the security features, using the exports specified above, the packet displayed is encrypted, and its larger since additional information is considered to increase safety.

### *SROS2 - Automatic key generation*

Before considering applying access control to the `TurtleSim` example, let this SROS2 feature be introduced. SROS2 supplies tools to automate the process of generating enclaves and their respective permissions files.

First a `policy.xml` needs to be created, while the ROS2 network is running with SROS2 security enabled, so that the file stores information about the network.

```
ros2 security generate_policy policy.xml
```

Now, the created policy file can be used as a reference to automate the process of key generation. To do this, both keystore and policy must be given as arguments to the following SROS2 command.

```
ros2 security generate_artifacts -k turtlesim_keystore -p policy.xml
```

### *Access Control*

In order to provide access control, the permission files, of the enclave that is being considered, need to be modified. This is ensured by adding security permissions to these files, with the mandatory signature of the CA.

However, a suitable way of editing the permission file, `permissions.xml`, that dictates how the enclave manages the permissions within the network, is by creating a policy file and running the following command.

```
ros2 security create_permission turtlesim_keystore /enclave policy.xml
```

Besides changing the permissions file, the CA signature is also generated, meaning that the permissions modification have been successfully implemented in the considered enclave.

This `policy.xml` passed as an input for easing the alteration of the enclave permissions, follows a restrict SROS2 **policy XML schema**. This schema makes use of a few concepts, that are relevant to understand how the schema design was conceived.

- **Mandatory Access Control:** Permissions to allow the access to an object are pre-established by a set of authorization rules, and can not be modified by any subject.
- **Principle of Least Privilege:** This principle is to guarantee that only the minimum access privileges are used to the intended purpose.
- **Privilege Separation:** The access privileges that a subject owns are separated, decreasing the possibility of a security vulnerability.
- **Separation of Concerns:** Distribution of the system security concerns into each corresponding section.

## 2.4 RELATED WORK

This section aims to present previous works that attended security matters related to the deployment of robotic systems using Robot Operating System as its application enhancer. When developing real-time systems, safety matters are often referred as critical, because of the overall integration with the real world. Security however, it is measured by evaluating different security issues by properly analysing the system model. However, due to the high nonlinearity and complexity of real-time systems, implementing such a thorough analysis method in near real-time remains a significant difficulty.<sup>[17]</sup>

The deployment of real-time systems results in the importance of concerning about safety in a performance point of view, resulting of the demanding time-critical scenarios. Many studies were made regarding the performance in both ROS and ROS2 (also regarding DDS Quality of Service policies [27]), by analysing using performance measurement approaches, providing a guided and supported review on how performance can directly affect time critical situations, where safety is involved.[27, 13]

System security concerning network exposure, often explored by unauthorized access and data leaking, can be treacherous and it is considered a complex subject, due to the abundance of different network security technologies that do not cover every security aspect, since absolute security does not exist, as new vulnerabilities arise from the technology evolution.[21] The creation and deployment of security countermeasures are essential upon configuring the network towards achieving security. Within this vast topic, several different avenues of endeavor come to mind, each deserving of a substantial study. Network security means exploring the network beforehand by computer intrusion detection, traffic analysis, network monitoring, alongside many other practical networking security aspects.[26]

The literature concerning the network security enhancement that Robot Operating System 2 furnishes, by offering the SROS2 toolset, is quite limited. Most of the existing work is on the exploration of the former version of ROS in terms of port exposure, contextualized in the approach considered to protect the system network.

Many researches were made regarding this issue that ROS faces, one in particular that explored the IPv4 address space of the Internet for instances of ROS, named *Scanning the Internet for ROS: A View of Security in Robotics Research*[16], with the goal of identifying ROS vulnerable hosts, mostly master nodes since they provide information about their related topics and node's parameters, mainly by port scanning, so that developers could be aware of the possibility of exposure of their robots. The performed scans furnished information about hosts that could either be a sensor, an actuator or even a simulator. Topics were also identified since they provide evidence of what is likely to be available to an attacker. This study is rather relevant because of how easily can attackers gather information about potential robots, and control them further on, through the public Internet, making it unavoidable to develop mechanisms concerning security.

A different approach was previously presented[18] when it comes to protecting the ROS network, which primarily focused on applying security measures on the application layer, treating ROS architecture as a black-box, by mainly running an Authentication Server, storing certificates and files related to trusted domain participants, while controlling and providing session keys related to the communication process. Even though the message data can not be perceived, unauthorized nodes can still collect information about the flow of the data, since ROS architecture is responsible for the publish-subscribe interaction, meaning that security issues still persist which cannot be handled on the application level alone.

Secure Robot Operating System (SROS)[33] was initially developed as an experimental tool (later evolved to SROS2 as a supporting tool for ROS2), which supports TLS for all socket transport, node restrictions and chains of trust, guaranteeing publishers authorization when it comes to publish to a specific topic. Another worth-mentioned tool is Rosbridge[15], which provides a WebSocket interface to ROS and corresponding server to allow interaction between applications and ROS nodes, by using TLS as support and also access control over topics and API calls.



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## ALLOY SPECIFICATION FRAMEWORK

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As aforementioned, the main problems that this thesis aims to tackle are security vulnerabilities and data processing over big workloads of streaming data. In this chapter, it is intended to explore technologies that are relevant to overcome the above-mentioned challenges (??) as well as previous developed work that has the same or similar goals as this thesis (??).

### 3.1 BACKGROUND

Enterprises, particularly startups and small and medium businesses, are gradually shifting to the Cloud to outsource data and processing. [?] As advantageous as this may be, the sharing of content with third-party systems, poses challenges about privacy and security. As previously stated (??), traditional strategies for achieving confidentiality, such as a user encrypting their data with their own key or even using techniques such as homomorphic encryption, make some computations unfeasible, hence alternative methods must be investigated.

### 3.2 RELATED WORK

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## CURRENT WORK

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## CONCLUSION

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