

# Cryptography 1

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# Challenge 1: Secret encoding

Please deliver this message to Alice as soon as possible. Don't bother trying to read it, I protected it with advanced enco..encryption!

546d64695455636c4e304a515958496c4e  
555a774d45347864795531526a456c4e55  
5a34627a4e4c4a545647626d777a4a5456  
474e435531526d52346369553352413d3d

# Challenge 1 solution



The screenshot shows the CyberChef web application interface. On the left, there is a sidebar with several tool sections: 'From Hex' (Delimiter: Auto), 'From Base64' (Alphabet: A-Za-z0-9+/, Remove non-alphabet chars: checked, Strict mode: unchecked), 'URL Decode', and 'ROT13' (Rotate lower case chars: checked, Rotate upper case chars: checked, Rotate numbers: unchecked, Amount: 7). At the bottom of the sidebar is a 'BAKE!' button with a chef icon and an 'Auto Bake' checkbox. On the right, the 'Output' section displays the result of the operations: `UnitN{why_w0U1d_1_ev3R_us3_4_key}`. The top of the interface shows a hex input field with the value `546d64695455636c4e304a515958496c4e56474e435531526d52346369553352413d`.

Use CyberChef!

1. base16/HEX
2. base64
3. URL/percent encoding
4. ROT 7

## Challenge 2: Random pictures

Encoding wasn't secure enough for the secret conversations between me and Alice... Now we agreed on a single key, so we can perform real encryption with XOR!



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### Hints:

- The images have been XORred with the same key
- The challenge can be solved with a single line of code

## Challenge 2 solution


- Both images have been XORred with k:  
flag = orig\_flag ^ k  
peppers = orig\_peppers ^ k  
 $\Rightarrow \text{flag} \wedge \text{peppers} = \text{orig\_flag} \wedge \text{orig\_peppers} \quad (\wedge k \wedge k = \wedge 0)$

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- We can XOR the images with **imagemagick** from command line  
magick flag.png peppers.png -evaluate-sequence xor result.png
- Or in Python we can use `PIL.ImageChops.logical_xor()`
- Or many other methods...



## Challenge 2 solution



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- Receive output:

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conn.recvall(timeout=1)
conn.recvuntil(b'something')
conn.recvline()
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conn.recvline()
```

- Send bytes:

```
conn.sendlineafter(b'something', b'your_bytes')
```

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```

- Create a new cipher

```
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
```

- Create a new cipher

```
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
```

- Encrypt and decrypt:

```
ciphertext = aes.encrypt(plaintext)
```

```
plaintext = aes.decrypt(ciphertext)
```

# Challenge 3: pwntools and PyCryptodome

Now it's your turn to use pwntools and PyCryptodome!

```
print("Here is a key (hex):", key.hex())
print("Here is a message (hex):", message.hex())

input("What is the AES encrypted message using the given key (hex)? ")
input("What is the the MD5 hash digest of the message (hex)? ")

print(FLAG)
```

# Challenge 3 solution

```
import pwn
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Hash import MD5
```

*# connect to the remote shell, this is the equivalent of:*

*# nc cyberchallenge.disi.unitn.it 10003*

```
r = pwn.remote("cyberchallenge.disi.unitn.it", 10003)
```

*# use this instead, if you want to run the challenge locally and test there*

```
r = pwn.process(["python3", "challenge.py"])
```

## Challenge 3 solution

```
# receive and discard everything until ": "
r.recvuntil(b": ")
# read the line and drop the \n, decode the received bytes to string,
# then obtain bytes from the hex-encoded string
key = bytes.fromhex(r.recvline(keepends=False).decode())
r.recvuntil(b": ")
message = bytes.fromhex(r.recvline(keepends=False).decode())

# construct an AES cipher based on the given key
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
# use the cipher to encrypt the message, then obtain the corresponding
# hex-encoded string
encrypted = aes.encrypt(message).hex()
# encode the encrypted string to bytes and send it after "? " is received
r.sendlineafter(b"? ", encrypted.encode())
```

# Challenge 3 solution

```
# construct an MD5 hash, and hash the message
md5 = MD5.new(message)
# obtain the hex digest from the hash object
digest = md5.hexdigest()
# encode the digest to bytes and send it after "? " is received
r.sendlineafter(b"? ", digest.encode())

# print the flag!
print(r.recvline())
```

## Challenge 4: EncMachinery™

Our EncMachinery™ algorithm is so secure that we even let you look at encrypted company secrets...

```
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
```

```
def encrypt(m: bytes) -> bytes:
    # a bit of encoding to make hackerz more confused
    for _ in range(3):
        m = m.hex().encode("utf-8")
    m = pad(m, BLOCK_SIZE)
    return cipher.encrypt(m)
```

```
print("Our encrypted company secrets: " + encrypt(FLAG).hex())
```

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## Hints:

- Take a look at the **ECB** block cipher mode

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
## Hints:

- Take a look at the **ECB** block cipher mode
- Each AES block encodes only **two characters** from the original message at a time



# Challenge 4 solution


- The AES cipher is only able to encrypt 16 bytes at a time
- Therefore the message needs to be split in blocks



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

# Challenge 4 solution

- The AES cipher is only able to encrypt 16 bytes at a time
- Therefore the message needs to be split in blocks
- The **ECB block cipher mode** encrypts each block separately
- So if two blocks have the same plaintext, they will also generate the **same ciphertext**



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

## Challenge 4 solution

We can notice that the `encrypt()` function hex-encodes the incoming message 3 times before actually encrypting it. This means that every byte ends up using  $2^3=8$  bytes, so a pair of bytes uses a full 16-bytes AES block.

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- The number of pairs of bytes is just  $256 * 256 = 65536$  (or even less if we only consider printable characters)
- We can brute-force the flag by getting from the server the encrypted block corresponding to each possible pair of characters
- Then we can take the encrypted flag block by block, and see which character pair each block corresponds to

# Challenge 4 solution

```
import pwn
import string

def splitEvery(s: bytes, n: int) -> list:
    """splits a byte array (or a string) into chunks of length n"""
    return [s[i:i+n] for i in range(0, len(s), n)]

#r = pwn.process(["python3", "challenge.py"])
r = pwn.remote("cyberchallenge.disi.unitn.it", 10101)

# receive the encrypted flag from the server
r.recvuntil(b": ")
flag = splitEvery(r.recvline(keepends=False), 32)
```

# Challenge 4 solution

*# build a long message with all possible pairs of characters*

```
FLAG_CHARS = string.printable
```

```
message = ""
```

```
for c1 in FLAG_CHARS:
```

```
    for c2 in FLAG_CHARS:
```

```
        message += c1 + c2
```

*# send to the server our long message and obtain the encrypted blocks*

```
r.sendlineafter(b"? ", message.encode("utf-8").hex().encode())
```

```
r.recvuntil(b": ")
```

```
encrypted_char_pairs = splitEvery(r.recvline(keepends=False), 32)
```



# Challenge 4 solution

```
# decrypt the flag one pair of characters at a time
for flag_char_pair in flag:
    try:
        index = encrypted_char_pairs.index(flag_char_pair)
        print(message[index*2 : index*2+2], end="")
    except ValueError:
        print("??", end="")
print()
```

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Some history first:

- Why is DES not used anymore?  
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- Why is DES not used anymore?

Key space is very small:  $2^{56}$

- Is Double DES a solution?

```
double_encrypt(msg) =  
    encrypt(key2, encrypt(key1, msg))
```

Key space:  $2^{56 + 56} = 2^{112}$ , right?

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Yes, but there is a problem: **Meet In The Middle Attack**

- Suppose we have a message **msg** and its encryption **ct**. We can brute force the keys with the following idea:

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- Suppose we have a message **msg** and its encryption **ct**. We can brute force the keys with the following idea:

- Since

`ct = encrypt(key2, encrypt(key1, msg))`

then

`decrypt(key2, ct) = encrypt(key1, msg)`


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
Compute the *encryption* of **msg**  
with all possible **key1**




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Compute the *encryption* of **msg**  
with all possible **key1**



Compute the *decryption* of **ct**  
with all possible **key2**





# Challenge 5: DoubleDes

- If  $\text{dec}_i = \text{enc}_j$  then we must have that  
 $\text{key1} = \text{key}_j$  and  $\text{key2} = \text{key}_i$

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- If  $\text{dec}_i = \text{enc}_j$  then we must have that  
 $\text{key1} = \text{key}_j$  and  $\text{key2} = \text{key}_i$
- Total cost of the attack:  
 $2^{56}$  of space  
 $2 * 2^{56} = 2^{57}$  encryptions

# Challenge 5: DoubleDes

Now it's your turn!

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## Hints:

- The first block of plaintext is known: "The flag"

## Challenge 6: Encrypted cookies

Can you *check* if my session cookie *checks* are correct?

**try:**

```
cookie = input("Give me a session cookie to check (in hex)? ")
cookie = bytes.fromhex(cookie.strip())
iv, encrypted = cookie[:BLOCK_SIZE], cookie[BLOCK_SIZE:]

cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
decrypted = cipher.decrypt(encrypted)
decrypted = unpad(decrypted, BLOCK_SIZE)
print("TODO implement actual validity check")
```

**except** ValueError:

```
print("Invalid session cookie")
```

# Challenge 6: Encrypted cookies

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## Hints:

- We get two different responses based on whether the **padding** is correct or not, since `unpad()` throws `ValueError` if the padding is wrong. This is an **oracle**!

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- CBC is **malleable**
- The padding scheme is the default one for `pad()`: **'pkcs7'**
- The last block already ends with correct padding, which may break your logic, so be careful

# Challenge 6 solution

- We can perform a **padding oracle attack** on **CBC block cipher mode**
- Refer to the lessons slides and to the Python solution for an explanation