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Network analysis & monitoring

CYBER CHALLENGE.IT

CYBERSECURITY NATIONAL LABORATORY

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Topics

- Basic security architectural elements

- Traffic interception techniques

- Traffic Analysis tools and technologies

- Aggregated statistic traffic observations

Current Topic

- **Basic security architectural elements**
- Traffic interception techniques
- Traffic Analysis tools and technologies
- Aggregated statistic traffic observations

Domains, perimeter and attack surface

- A **security domain** is a set of entities/resources to be managed as a unique administration area according to a common security policy (security enforcement rules)

- A **security perimeter** is the secured boundary between the external and internal side of a security domain
  - e.g., an internal network and its public facing side, typically the Internet
  - The perimeter can be protected by several security devices

- The **attack surface** of a security domain is the sum of the different points ("attack vectors") where an unauthorized entity ("attacker") can try to enter data to or extract data or do any kind of unauthorized or hostile activity.
  - **Keeping the attack surface as small as possible** is a fundamental basic security measure

Perimeter   Domain

Outside

Inside

Attack Surface

Security Domains

- Each security domain is assigned a **degree of trust** or **security level**
- Such degree defines and characterizes its visibility rules (access rights) with respect to the others
  - A domain with a higher degree of trust can have fuller visibility than those with a lower degree
  - Vice versa, visibility is blocked unless specific exceptions (filtering / visibility rules) are defined
    - DMZ and INSIDE have full visibility of OUTSIDE
    - INSIDE has full visibility of DMZ
    - Any other access is not granted

A - - → B   A is granted access to B

X closed   = conditioned

Basic security architecture

Outside

switch with port mirroring towards sniffer

Firewall

Inside
Protected Network

Border router

DMZ

traffic from/to the Internet

Exposed Network

Sniffer/IDS

Sniffer analyzing traffic to DMZ and Inside

- In a common network architecture there are at least three domains:
  - **Outside** (all the world outside - the Internet): trust degree 0
  - **Inside** (the internal organization to be protected and hidden): degree of trust 100
  - **DMZ** (the set of internal machines that expose services outside): degree of trust $0 < x < 100$

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Router, Firewall and Tapping Points

- A **router** is responsible for forwarding traffic between the internal network and the Internet
    - It is the first barrier or demarcation point,
    - often owned by the provider
- A **firewall** is a passive perimeter defense component that controls traffic flowing between two or more network segments associated to distinct **security domains**:
    - Separation of administratively different areas
    - Traffic filtering between different areas through visibility rules between domains (access control)
    - Mediation of access to specific applications
- A **tapping point** ensures traffic visibility and traffic monitoring

Internet

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Watching Traffic: Sniffing

- A sniffer is a software application that is capable of acquiring packets at the datalink level

- It is able to interpret clear information relating to level 2, 3 and 4 packet headers as well as application level protocols such as: FTP, HTTP, etc.

- A network adapter (NIC / TAP) programmed ad hoc (promiscuous mode) reads all packets in transit

**Host A** **Router A** 101110 010111 000111 **Router B** **Host B**

Sniffer Host

Sniffing Applications

- **Automatic network analysis:** searching for specific patterns e.g., clear passwords and usernames: this is a common use for hackers / crackers;

- **Anomaly analysis**: in order to find out any problems within the networks, such as, why computer A cannot communicate with computer B;

- **Performance analysis**: to discover problems or bottlenecks in networks;

- **Detection of network intrusions**: to detect attacks or threats, as well as malicious activities in progress;

- **Recording of network traffic**: to create logs of network transactions available for subsequent "post-mortem" analysis.

Sniffing on switched networks

- On switched networks, traffic is routed according to the MAC address + Port association, excluding terminals not interested in traffic

- A sniffer is only able to intercept the traffic destined to its hosting

- The alternative is to configure the switch port to which the sniffer is connected in mirroring mode, from that moment it will replicate all the traffic received from specific ports on the sniffer port

SENDER

SNIFFER

A   B

SWITCH

C

RECEIVER

MIRROR A,C -> B

Mirroring configuration

Mirroring schemes:

- 1 port to 1 port
- Range of ports to 1 port
- A whole VLAN to 1 port


SNIFFER

fa0/1 fa0/2 fa0/3 fa0/4

```
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 source interface fa0/2
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 source interface fa0/1 - 3
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 source vlan 2
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 destination interface fa0/4
```

Sniffing without port mirroring

- If port mirroring capabilities is not available:

  - Use repeater devices (limited bands)

  - Use dedicated HW probes (TAP)

  - Perform traffic diversion through specific attacks (ARP Poisoning)

SNIFFER

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
Traffic Access Port (TAP)

- HW solution that provides a copy of traffic on a section between 2 devices

- Requires no power supply

- 100% Visibility of Full Duplex Traffic including Errors or Anomalies at level 1 & 2

- Total isolation and safety of the sniffer

- It operates at level 1 and is very easy to install and manage (often transparent)

- It does not require specific configurations on switches or servers

ARP Poisoning

- The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is concerned with mapping the 32 bits of IP address (version 4) into 48 bits of ETH address (MAC)

- Two main types of messages:
  - ARP request (request for IP address resolution)
  - ARP reply (reply containing an eth address)

- The replies are stored in the ARP CACHE, to limit traffic on the network

I am:
0800.0020.1111

172.16.3.1   172.16.3.2

Who has: 172.16.3.2?

ARP poisoning

- Takes advantage of the stateless behavior of the protocol

- If the attacker sends an ARP reply (spoofed) to a host, this will save it in his ARP cache

- ARP replies are saved in cache even if they were not solicited (better performance at the expense of security)

- The cache entries are timed out, so the attacker must periodically "refresh"

MAC table

ARP cache A

DEV	MAC	STATE
DEV-1	01:02:03:04:05:0A	FORWARDING
DEV-3	01:02:03:04:05:0C	FORWARDING
DEV-2	01:02:03:04:05:0B	FORWARDING
...		

ARP cache B

IP	MAC
10.0.0.1	**01:02:03:04:05:0C**
10.0.0.3	**01:02:03:04:05:0C**

Example

At startup A and B will have to exchange messages that allow their IP addresses to be associated with the physical Ethernet addresses, while the attacker will see only the packets:

```
16:38:36.501274 arp who-has 10.0.0.2 tell 10.0.0.1

16:38:36.509581 arp reply 10.0.0.2 is at 08:00:20:77:4d:db
```

To intercept bidirectional communication, the program must be launched twice:

```
#./arpspoof –i eth0 –t 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2

#./arpspoof –i eth0 –t 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1
```

In order for the packets to then return to the actual recipient, the attacker must send them back to the correct destination

```
#echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
```

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Tcpdump: a simple CLI-based sniffer

Sniffer: Software or hardware tool that by telling on promiscuous mode configuration captures and allows the analysis of all the packages that pass through a network segment

`tcpdump` : Sniffer public domain based on Berkeley packet filter (BPF)

Available for download: `ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/tcpdump.tar.Z`

<u>**23:06:37**</u> <u>**10.1.101.1**</u> **>** <u>**224.0.0.10**</u>: <u>**ip-proto-88**</u> <u>**40**</u> <u>**[tos 0xc0]**</u>

tim e	source IP	dest IP	protoc ol	bytes	type of srv

Tcpdump: a simple CLI-based sniffer

```
08:08:16.155 spoofed.target.net.7 > 172.31.203.17.chargen: udp

 timestamp              src IP         src port      dst IP        dst port  protocol
```

- hosts can be referenced by name or IP address

- the ports can be specified by number or name of the service

- to specify a range of values, specific bytes must be pointed to

Tcpdump: filtering expression

☐ Expressions define the criteria with which to choose what has to be displayed.

☐ Expressions consist of one or more primitives preceded by "qualifiers".

```
Source or destination host:          host spoofed.target.net
Destination network 172.31.x.x:      dst net 172.31
Destination networks 172.16 - 172.31:      dst net 172 and
                 (ip[17]>15) and (ip[17]<32)
Source port 7:              src port 7
Destination port 19:             dst port chargen
Source port < 20:            udp[0:2] < 20
Destination port <20:             udp[2:2] < 20
```

Tcpdump: common qualifiers

- Type: host, net e port
  - Es. 'host 155.185.54.156', 'port 22', ecc.

- Dir: src, dst, src or dst
  - Es. 'src 155.185.54.156'

- Proto: ether, fddi, tr, ip, ip6, arp, rarp, decnet, tcp and udp
  - Es. 'tcp port 21', 'arp net 155.185.54'

Packet sniffing example

```
# tcpdump 'port 23'

10.6.1.9.4548 > 10.6.1.2.23: S 2115515278:2115515278(0) win 32120 <mss 1460,
    nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 0> (DF)


10.6.1.2.23 > 10.6.1.9.4548: S 1220480853:1220480853(0)
ack 2115515279 win 32120 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 0> (DF)


10.6.1.9.4548 > 10.6.1.2.23: . ack 1220480854 win 32120 (DF)
```

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- **Aggregated statistic traffic observations**

SNMP-based traffic observation

- It is possible to monitor aggregate statistical traffic data of a network through the SNMP protocol

- In the following example, a query is made to a specific element (MIB object) associated with an interface, obtaining information on incoming and outgoing traffic volumes

```
% snmpwalk -v2c -c test 10.106.65.131 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.16.7 IF-MIB::ifOutOctets.7
= Counter32: 1874894
% snmpwalk -v2c -c test 10.106.65.131 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.10.7 IF-MIB::ifInOctets.7 =
Counter32: 2275304
```

- Observing how traffic volumes vary over time can provide us with information of great interest for the security of a network

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CYBERSECURITY NATIONAL LABORATORY

SNMP-based traffic observation

- Tools such as **MRTG** or **CACTI** are responsible for automatically collecting the SNMP bandwidth usage statistics of all the interfaces of the devices present on the network.

- The interface traffic counters are read every 5 minutes (time-driven SNMP reading via cron) and saved on a log file (1 logfile / interface) so that we can obtain:

  - A graphic representation of the throughput

  - A load map allowing us to visualize at at glance the Load Level of all network devices

SNMP-based traffic observation


UNI-Salerno -- PoP Salerno-Fisciano (956200)   close

Link name	Use	BW	Side A	Side B	Target options
UNI-Salerno -- PoP Salerno-Fisciano	access	10,00 Gbps	UNI-Salerno 193.204.219.202	PoP Salerno-Fisciano rx1.sa.garr.net (MX480) irb.200 193.204.219.201	

Traffic: UNI-Salerno -- PoP Salerno-Fisciano (956200) [Day]

- Input — Max In: 440.72 Mbps — Av In: 78.82 Mbps — Last In: 23.54 Mbps
- Output — Max Out: 752.02 Mbps — Av Out: 265.26 Mbps — Last Out: 198.95 Mbps

01.55 am 29/02/20

- By observing the traffic trends over time, you can get an idea of the "normal" behavior of a network

- You can easily spot outliers!!

Automatic attack identification

- It is easy to recognize "volumetric" attacks by identifying sustained traffic plafonds that go beyond the behavior normally observed at specific times


- This activity can be easily automated through simple monitoring functions associated with MRTG or CACTI that generate alarms (mail, SMS, etc.) on the basis of exceeding specific traffic thresholds

Traffic capture through arp poisoning

- Traffic flowing between two networks must be intercepted by a third component (Man in the middle) first through an ARP spoofing attack on the 2 routers and analyzed with tcpdump to capture and examine ftp traffic and HTTP urls

Host A   **Router A**   **Router B**   **Host B**

10.0.0.1   10.0.0.2

Man in the middle Host

10.0.0.3

```
echo '1' > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
```

```
arpspoof -i eth0 -t 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 2> /dev/null &
arpspoof -i eth0 -t 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 2> /dev/null &
```

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Traffic capture through port mirroring

- Traffic flowing between two networks must be intercepted by a third component (Man in the middle) first through the configuration of port mirroring on the link switch and analyzed with tcpdump to capture and examine ftp traffic and HTTP url

Host A **Router A**   **Router B** **Host B**

Man in the middle Host

```
monitor session 1 source interface fa 1/0 - 2
monitor session 1 destination interface fa 1/15
```

```
tcpdump -n -i eth0 -s 65535 -X
```

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