

SI UBStick







Arbitrary Memory Writes through Practical Software Cross-Cache Attacks within the Linux Kernel

Lukas Maar, Stefan Gast, Martin Unterguggenberger, Mathias Oberhuber, and Stefan Mangard August 15, 2024

Graz University of Technology



- Timing side channel:
 - ♣ Make software cross-cache reuse practical



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- Implement 9 PoC exploits



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- Page-table manipulation:
 - ♣ Obtain an arbitrary phyiscal r/w primitive
- Implement 9 PoC exploits
- Opensource our artifacts on:
 - https://github.com/IAIK/SLUBStick



Who am I? www.tugraz.at ■



Lukas Maar

PhD candidate @ Graz University of Technology Improve system security

Attps://lukasmaar.github.io

✓ lukas.maar@iaik.tugraz.at

Background

Kernel

Applications



System Services












Kernel

Applications



System Services






Applications



System Services



Kernel





Kernel



System Services








System Services



Kernel





Applications



System Services








System Services



Kernel





Applications




System Services









Sorry, I am empty. Kernel Lets fall back to the Buddy. SLUB Buddy **Applications Hardware System Services**


Applications



System Services



Kernel




Applications




System Services
















Credential cache

/* alloc from generic cache */
void *obj1 = kmalloc();






- □ Freed object
- Allocated object
- Newly allocated/freed object





```
/* alloc from generic cache */
void *obj1 = kmalloc();
void *obj2 = kmalloc();
```






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



```
/* alloc from generic cache */
void *obj1 = kmalloc();
void *obj2 = kmalloc();
kfree(obj1);
```






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/* alloc from file cache */
struct file *f = kmem_cache_alloc(filp_cachep);
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





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
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


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/* alloc from credential cache */
struct cred *c = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar);
```





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


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


Cross-Cache Reuse Attack [Xu+15; Lin21; WZ24]











- Exploit vulnerability
 - Obtain a write primitive






- Exploit vulnerability
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- Free all generic objects






- Exploit vulnerability
 - Obtain a write primitive
- Free all generic objects
- Its memory chunk is recycled






- Exploit vulnerability
 - Obtain a write primitive
- Free all generic objects
- Its memory chunk is recycled
- Reclaim as sensitive object
 - As struct cred





- ☐ Freed object
- Allocated object
- Write primitive



Credential cache

- Exploit vulnerability
 - Obtain a write primitive
- Free all generic objects
- Its memory chunk is recycled
- Reclaim as sensitive object
 - 🖺 As struct cred
- Trigger write primitive
 - Overwrite sensitive data



Cross-Cache Reuse Attack contd








```
pid_cachep
filp_cachep
anon_vma_cachep
```

Cross-Cache Reuse Attack contd










- seq_file io_vec
- pid_cachep
 filp_cachep
 anon_vma_cachep

SLUBStick

















































Q C1 Cross-cache attacks on generic caches are unreliable.














- **Q** C1 Cross-cache attacks on generic caches are unreliable.
- **Q** C2 Most heap vulnerabilities only grant weak write primitive.












- **Q** C1 Cross-cache attacks on generic caches are unreliable.
- **Q** C2 Most heap vulnerabilities only grant weak write primitive.
- **Q** C3 From page manipulation to an arbitrary r/w primitive.












Cross-cache reuse




• Measure timing of allocations

riangle Group according to timing Ξ/Ξ





Cross-cache reuse




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


- Measure timing of allocations
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Cross-cache reuse






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
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


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


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Cross-cache reuse




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




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Newly allocated/freed object

- Measure timing of allocations
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
Cross-cache reuse



Free memory chunk Generic cache



- □ Freed object
- Allocated object
- Newly allocated/freed object



Free memory chunk

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





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
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
Cross-cache reuse



Free memory chunk Generic cache



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- Measure timing of allocations
 - \triangle Group according to timing X/\mathbb{Z}








Free memory chunk Generic cache




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- Measure timing of allocations
 - \triangle Group according to timing Σ/Ξ








- Measure timing of allocations \triangle Group according to timing X/\mathbf{X}
- Free all objects of left memory chunk








- Measure timing of allocations
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




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




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




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




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




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




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 - riangle Group according to timing \mathbb{Z}/\mathbb{Z}
- Free all objects of left memory chunk








- Measure timing of allocations
 ♣ Group according to timing ∑/▼
- Free all objects of left memory chunk
- The memory chunk is recycled





Cross-cache reuse



- Measure timing of allocations
 ♣ Group according to timing ∑/▼
- Free all objects of left memory chunk
- The memory chunk is recycled
- Reclaim memory chunk
 - As a page table

Evaluation Results of Timing Side Channel





Generic Cache	#Pages	Success Rate		
		Idle	No CPU pinning	External noise
		%	%	%
kmalloc-8	1	99.9 ± 0.1	99.9 ± 0.1	99.6 ± 0.7
kmalloc-16	1	99.4 ± 0.6	98.9 ± 1.2	99.9 ± 0.4
kmalloc-32	1	99.4 ± 0.9	99.7 ± 0.5	99.9 ± 0.3
kmalloc-64	1	99.2 ± 1.3	99.2 ± 0.9	81.0 ± 6.4
kmalloc-96	1	99.9 ± 0.4	99.9 ± 0.1	99.8 ± 0.6
kmalloc-128	1	99.9 ± 0.4	99.8 ± 0.5	99.9 ± 0.3
kmalloc-192	1	99.9 ± 0.4	99.8 ± 0.4	99.3 ± 1.2
kmalloc-256	1	99.9 ± 0.3	99.9 ± 0.3	99.7 ± 0.7
kmalloc-512	2	90.2 ± 5.4	87.2 ± 3.1	65.2 ± 2.8
kmalloc-1024	4	88.1 ± 7.2	79.5 ± 3.3	$\textbf{70.3} \pm \textbf{8.1}$
kmalloc-2048	8	83.1 ± 9.2	70.5 ± 16	57.8 ± 5.7
kmalloc-4096	8	82.1 ± 3.4	73.3 ± 19	53.8 ± 10

Thread A

© C2
Obtain UAF write

Thread B

Convert Limited Heap Write to UAF Write



www.tugraz.at

Thread A alloc

©C2
Obtain UAF write


Thread B




















```
i32 replace_user_tlv(u32 *buf, u64 size) {
    /* allocate object */
    u32 *container = kmalloc(size);
}
container
}
```







```
i32 replace_user_tlv(u32 *buf, u64 size) {
    /* allocate object */
    u32 *container = kmalloc(size);
    /* copy data from user */
    copy_from_user(container, buf, size);
}
```











































CVE	Capability	Cache
CVE-2023-21400	DF	kmalloc-32
CVE-2023-3609	UAF	kmalloc-96
CVE-2022-32250	UAF	kmalloc-64
CVE-2022-29582	UAF	${\tt filep_cachep}$
CVE-2022-27666	OOB	kmalloc-4096
CVE-2022-2588	DF	kmalloc-192
CVE-2022-0995	OOB	kmalloc-96
CVE-2021-4157	OOB	kmalloc-64
CVE-2021-3492	DF	kmalloc-4096



https://lukasmaar.github.io

- Timing side channel:
 - ♣ Make software cross-cache attacks practical
- Primitive convertion:
 - ♣ Limited heap write to UAF write
- Uses the UAF write for page-table manipulation:
 - ♣ Obtain an arbitrary phyiscal r/w primitive
- Implemented 9 PoC exploits:
 - ♦ For Linux kernel v6.2

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