Outline International Relations

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Summer 2016

1 General Concepts

1.1 Levels of Analysis

1. Individual Level

   (a) Human Behavior

      i. Classical IR (Carr, Morgenthau, Neibuhr) focused on "human nature" as *the* cause of war. Rejected as reductionist by Waltz and structural theorists.

      ii. Structuralism's strength from 1980ff waning in light of evolutionary psychology, GT, constructivism

      iii. Renewed interest of individual levels and their interaction with state and system suggests potential for dynamic models of IR (IPE, systems theory, etc.) ::need citation::

   (b) Human Nature

   (c) Criticisms

      i. Arguments of human nature (cf. Morgenthau, Neibuhr) are reductionist

      ii. Individuals are not the essential actors in IR

2. State Level

   (a) Domestic politics pushing upward into the system

   (b) Examples included

      i. Open Economy Politics

      ii. Neoclassical realism

3. System Level

    (a) Anarchy is a material variable, creates incentives and constraints on state behavior

    (b) Criticisms

        i. Waltz relies on theoretical reductionism, treating the state as a microeconomic firm.

1.2 Agent-Structure Problem

1. Who influences who, *agents on structure* or *structures on agents*?

2. Rationalists emphasize the agents as those who make the system and institutions

    (a) Wagner (2010) suggests the international system is the product of international bargains between states

    (b) Milner (199?) raises the possibility that it could be *rationalism all the way down* such that important concepts, like sovereignty, thought to be firm are much more malleable.

3. Constructivists stress the constitutive ontology of agents and structures

    (a) Agents and structure emerge together

    (b) Structure shapes agents in ways that are largely imperceptible.

        i. Wendt (1999) on the culture's of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian

        ii. Ruggie (1992): Embedded liberalism thesis. Logic of free-market, global capitalism baked into the system by the framers of post-war order.

1.3 Principle-Agent Model

1.4 Strategic models

1.4.1 Interests vs. Preferences

1. Not identical

    (a) Preferences are *what* individual actors want.

    (b) Interests are *why* they want.

2. Norms, morality, or interest may drive interests (Wagner 2010; Frieden 1999 [Lake and Powell])

(a) preferences and the conflict between them are what drive strategy.

(b) NB: Hobbes on the causes of war: competition, diffidence, glory *vs* Thucydides' fear, pride, interest.

3. Interests are *shaped* by the system.

(a) Finnemore argues international politics is about defining, not defending, national interests (1996).

(b) Constructivism asks why non-like states produce like behavior and suggest the answer lies in the conditioning.

(c) Waltz's dictum that states evolve toward like units suggests normative processes at play.

1.5   Institutions

1.5.1   Rationalists Definitions

1. International regimes

(a) Laws of War

(b) International Organizations

2. Institutions as human made constraints and economic models

(a) "Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints. . . and formal rules. . . . Together with the standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and therefore determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity" (North 1991).

3. Actors (states, non-states) behave in predictable patterns and seek utility maximizing strategies for any given strategy space (Lake and Powell 1999).

1.5.2   Normative Definitions

1. The rules and patterns of behavior Keohane (1987).

2. Cultures of anarchy and norm dynamics

(a) Multiple "cultures" of enmity, competition, friendship that form a path dependency between any two (or groups) of nations (Wendt 1999)

(b) Change within and between cultures depends on entrepreneurs who bring about change in state behavior, ultimately changing the path dependency of relationships between actors (Finnemore and Sikkink).

3.

1.6   Cooperation

1.6.1   Cooperation *vs* Anarchy

1. Anarchy frustrates cooperation because states are preoccupied with security (Waltz)

   (a) Logic of security dilemma (Jervis 1976)
   (b) The system incentivizes autarky (Mearshimer)

2. Anarchy *predicts* cooperation because self-help suggests outsourcing what cannot be accomplished internally (Keohane, etc.)

   (a) Anarchy as culture and *the meaning* between two states (Wendt 1992)

3. Anarchy is called into question because cooperation suggests hierarchy and order and not Hobbesian system.

   (a) Milner and the appearance of order (????)
   (b) Cooperation is a bargaining game (Schelling 1960) and it may be within a state's interest to cooperate.

1.6.2   Cooperation and state behavior

1. Harmony and Discord require no change in behavior on the part of actors.

2. Cooperation is *contingent* change in behavior interdependent on the actions of other partners in the deal.

1.7 Audience Costs

1.7.1 Theory (Fearon 1994)

1.7.2 Criticisms

- Limited Scope

  1. The relative strength of the "changed circumstances" appeal calls into question the scope of conditions when audience cost theory holds
  2. i.e., if a leader can escape punishment by same "oh, it was prudent to raise stakes when I said it, but imprudent to carry out the threat" then we might being to wonder if audience costs has any meaning.

- Empirical challenges: Snyder and Borghard 2011 find four points of concern:

  1. Leaders prefer flexibility in crisis and are therefore more likely to prefer ambiguity.
  2. Domestic public will care more about the substance of the final policy more than whatever perceived consistency
  3. The public concern with the national honor is largely independent of whatever threats were made.
  4. Authoritarian regimes interpret the dynamics of audience costs differently than democracies, thereby weakening the strength of audience costs in practice

2 International Political Economy

2.1 OEP

2.1.1 Method and approach

2.1.2 Key findings

2.1.3 Criticisms

- Oatley 2011. Methodological reductionism produces inaccurate knowledge. Most OEP seems to drop the final step (model the system with necessary) by assuming rather than showing that the system does not have an effect.

3 International Organization

4 Foreign Policy

4.1 History vs Social Science

1. Three major differences between IR and Diplomatic History (Dip-hist)

   (a) Chronology (history) vs Causal mechanisms (IR)

   (b) Individual events (history) vs Comparative cases (IR)

   (c) Morality: history more comfortable, IR emphasizes facts over values

2. IR can, and should, draw from history as it builds theories and hypotheses without falling into an inductive-qualitative trap.

4.2 Small group dynamics

1. How do groups perceive another actors behavior (Jervis 1978)

5 Practice outlines:

5.1 IR Fall 2015:

Suppose you are putting together a syllabus for a graduate seminar providing a survey of the field of international relations to Ph.D. students who expect to take comprehensive exams in political science. First, how would you go about organizing your syllabus and why (e.g. according to research questions? theoretical frameworks? Research approach- es? Chronologically? etc.)? Second, what are your goals for what the students should take away from the course? Explain. Third, what are some alternatives to the answers you've given to the first two questions, and why would you not adopt those alternatives?

5.2 Answer

5.2.1 How would I approach the question:

1. Organize around levels of analysis

   (a) Include discussion of major themes within the levels of analysis

   (b) Focus on problem driven debates within the field

   (c) Read works around questions chronologically so as to strengthen students understanding of theoretical and empirical development to major questions

2. Why around the levels of analysis?

   (a) Unit of analysis is largely an unspoken methodological hunch on what variable best answers a specific question.

   (b) Is it always purely pragmatic (cf. Fearon and Wendt 1992; Kydd 2008)

   (c) -isms are bad and produce pathologies of analysis (Lake 2011; 2013)

3. First image

   (a) Political psychology of decision making (Jervis 1976; 1978)

   (b) Johnson (1974) on presidential leadership styles

   (c) Rationalism all the way down (Allison and Zelikow 1999) suggests looking at utility maximizing of state agents

   (d) Preference formation of citizens (Braumoeller 2010, Scheve and Slaughter?)

   (e) Democratic theory and audience costs (Fearon 1995): i.e., are the foreign policy decision makers really bound by the commitments they make (Schelling 1960)?

4. Second image

   (a) Defining of state interests (Finnemore 1996)

      i. arguable that this is a systemic question, but our main question is how states respond and then then legitimate their interests

      ii. Frieden (1999): interests are deduced or assumed (when necessary)

     iii. Frieden and Martin (2001) on the domestic-international interaction. I.e., that domestic institutions, electoral design, and other such factors affect interest aggregation

     iv. Relaxing the assumption of the state as a unitary actor (Milner 1998; cf. Kydd 2008)

   (b) Open Economy Politics

     i. Openness as dependent variable; politics as IV (Lake 2009)

    ii. How much room do states really have (Mosely 2000,2005,2007)

       A. Influence of global finance markets strong, but narrow because fund managers look to industry-wide metrics

       B. RTB logic is flawed but persists because of ideology: critiques and champions of global capitalism have interest in narrative that the state cannot, or should not, be the legitimate arbiter of value

       C. In some areas, like FDI, a counter logic of climb to the top results because best-practice transfer, firms as advocates for rights, and domestic interests want protections

(c) Domestic causes of war

     i. Democratic Theory

       A. Oneal and Russett (1997) on interdemocratic peace and the challenges by Gartzke () and McDonald (2015)

       B. Bennet and Stam suggest that research design could affect outcome of findings, but some dv/iv relationships, like democracy, are relatively consistent (2000).

    ii. Snyder (1991) and the myths of expansionism (echoes perception problem highlighted by Jervis)

   iii. War as commitment problem (Powell 2006) and how states seem to solve it.

5. Third image

(a) Democratic theory

(b) Interstate bargaining

(c) Questions of anarchy

     i. Materialism of neorealism/neoliberalism

       A. Waltz and the TIP

       B. Order within anarchy (Morrow)

    ii. Constructivism and the agent-structure question

       A. Wendt (1992, 1999)

       B. Ruggie (1998?)

(d) IPE and the pressures on states

     i. Mosley (RTB vs CTT)

5.2.2 What are the goals for students to take away

1. Research design:

   (a) Approach methods as tool box

   (b) Model similar to "med school" wherein rationalist, qualitative, and empirical do not compete but compliment (Shapario ????).

2. Exposure to contemporary questions within the field to date

3.

5.2.3 Alternatives and why not adopt them

1. Debates around paradigms

   (a) flawed approach and generally harmful

   (b) Did signal how much was generally agreed upon (Waever 1998)

   (c) But theory driven approach to field has everyone talking past each other

      i. Trying to "prove" other theories wrong, rather than answering deepest questions about international political phenomena

      ii. Hard to adjudicate which method is appropriate to the question when grand theory is major fault-line of discourse

2. Major problems and mid-level theorizing

   (a) Strongest alternative possible

   (b) But possible to miss the forest for the trees

      i. e.g. would be democratic peace

      ii. Seeing debates over its empirical status rather than phenomenon that penetrates many other research agendas

      iii. Debate over its causal pathways cuts across levels of analysis, and we can see the various weakness and strengths of different approaches better when grouped by level of analysis.

   (c) Other research agendas situate better within discussion of levels of analysis

      i. IOs, for instance, arguably best within second image and behavior of states vis-a-vis their institutions

ii. Cooperation, e.g., could cut across both 2nd and 3rd image but the other issues at play are best treated on a per-image analysis.