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The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policymaking: Congressional Voting and American Mass Attitudes Toward South Africa

KEVIN A. HILL

University of Florida

This paper places an individual's attitude toward South African sanctions into a causal belief system model. Specifically, the model posited here hypothesizes that Americans primarily use two general postures to orient their attitudes toward South African sanctions: general racial postures, derived from knowledge and attitudes about *domestic* race relations, and general foreign policy postures. Further, I hypothesize that these racial and foreign policy postures are supported and structured by partisanship, ideology, and three contextual variables: cognitive abilities, income, and region of residence. The paper finds that general racial postures eclipse all other variables in their ability to predict respondents' attitudes toward anti-apartheid sanctions. Further, members of Congress based their South African sanctions voting in 1985 and 1986 on similar domestic racial considerations. The theoretical implications of domestic racial postures structuring foreign policy attitudes are seriously addressed, both specifically for the South African case, and for other issues and the broader implications for belief system modeling, and especially mass-elite communication.

Few foreign policy issues captured more media, political, and public attention in the 1980s than the problem of apartheid in South Africa. This world attention especially intensified in 1985 and 1986, when Pretoria imposed a state of emergency, adding even harsher political and military controls to a nation already stifled by centuries of political repression. Reacting to this crackdown, and to substantial pressure from domestic lobbying groups, Congress passed major sanctions legislation in 1985 and 1986. Why did anti-apartheid sanctions pass the Congress with enough support to override the president's veto? Was this strictly a human rights and foreign policy issue, or were the sources of this overwhelming foreign policy vote actually *domestic*?

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I propose that representatives made a link between the apartheid issue and domestic race relations and voted accordingly, a parallel frequently drawn during floor debate on the sanctions bills, as well as in the news media.

If congresspeople did vote on sanctions based on a domestic race relations framework, were they "correct" in doing so? To an elected representative, such a connection between South Africa and domestic race relations only makes political sense if he or she perceives that that connection is *also* made by his or her own constituency. Even if the lobbying groups and the media did try to frame the debate over sanctions in a civil rights perspective, the mass public did not *necessarily* do the same. Thus, this question about the domestic antecedents of elite and mass opinion on foreign policy is a question about the belief system structures of two very different groups of people: the mass public, and elites charged with making foreign policy.

Philip Converse, in his 1964 article "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," was interested in this congruence (or disjuncture) of mass and elite belief system structure and constraint. The study of belief systems over the past thirty years has largely neglected this important mass-elite belief system congruence and communication, both practically and theoretically. Indeed, the study of mass belief systems on the one hand, and that of constituency-Congressional communication on the other, have become distinct subfields in the study of political behavior.

This paper seeks to partially remedy this separation by testing the following dual propositions from the South African case study: the mass public uses a domestic race relations belief system to structure its attitudes toward South Africa in general, and anti-apartheid pressure in particular. Further, this race relations orientation has a stronger partial effect on these attitudes toward South Africa than do general foreign policy and partisan belief system components. More crucial for the student of foreign policy, I also propose that members of Congress voted along the same lines of reasoning, and that their sanctions votes were functions of their *perceptions* of district racial attitudes. Thus, I propose that elites and masses not only used similar belief systems to structure the same foreign policy attitude, but also that both used essentially *domestic* postures to do so.

This question lends itself to theoretical and empirical exploration under the general rubric of the belief system structure literature. But the research question does not merely seek to establish that a general belief system exists in the aggregate public. Rather, the task of this research is to discover *which components* of a belief system best structure and predict one's attitude toward anti-apartheid pressure. Further, the paper looks for mass-elite linkages of opinion and policy, with an eye toward generalizing theoretically not only about the neglected issue of mass-elite belief system congruence (whether elite persuasion or mass representation), but also about the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, this paper seeks to bring the study of belief systems back to the mass-elite connections explored by Converse in 1964, and broaden that important study theoretically by looking across issue domains for evidence of domestic influences on mass foreign policy attitudes, and elite policymaking. So, three important theoretical questions will be addressed here:

1. For both elites and masses, can ostensibly foreign policy attitudes be structured by domestically derived attitudes, in this case racial postures?
2. Are these mass and elite belief systems *parallel,* the mass-elite belief system congruence sought by Converse as an indicator of communication? Are these belief systems structured similarly, with the same independent variables structuring the same dependent variable?

3. Can one establish a causal relationship between these mass and elite belief systems? Do mass opinions, or elite perceptions of those opinions, structure elite policymaking? Is issue congruence between masses and elites enough to establish the existence of representation, as it was for the Miller-Stokes study (Miller and Stokes, 1963)? Alternatively, of course, mass-elite opinion congruence could be evidence of elite persuasion, with the more politically attentive particularly susceptible to elite persuasion on foreign policy issues (Gamson and Modigliani, 1966).

These questions all tackle substantively different topics, but converge under the theoretically crucial rubric of belief system structure: how do elites and masses think about foreign policy, and how are these belief patterns parallel and connected?

The Belief System Debate

The current literature on belief system owes its existence to the theoretical juxtaposition of Robert Lane's *Political Ideology* (1962), and Philip Converse's "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964). The belief system debate also carries a normative component of democratic theory, since it has become a near truism in political science that "structure" and "constraint" are highly desirable components of mass ideology (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1985, 1987; Stimson, 1975). In his seminal 1964 essay, Converse defined mass belief systems in terms of constraint and scope, and as objects of centrality. For Converse, "constraint" meant an internal consistency of issue positions along a grand, underlying liberal-conservative unidimension. Thus, he found little evidence of belief system constraint in the 1950s American electorate, since specific issue attitudes were only loosely correlated using Tau-c measures of association. Lanes' analyses in *Political Ideology,* however, examine how individuals structure their belief systems vertically from abstract principles to specific policy and issue attitudes.

Later scholars have reacted to Converse on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Conover and Feldman (1984) argue that by focusing on the horizontal consistency between specific issue positions, Converse is not directly measuring a belief system, which they claim is logically structured from the general to the specific. Hurwitz and Peffley (1985, 1987) claim that, although Converse did *theoretically* view belief systems as vertically structured from the general to the specific, he shortchanged his own argument by using a methodology that assessed *horizontal* constraint. The way in which Converse framed the issue as a broad liberal-conservative constraint, however, probably *did* make horizontal measurement appropriate. No wonder, argue Hurwitz and Peffley, that Converse found little evidence of issue attitude constraint. Converse also found in his 1950s data that elites were better able to horizontally structure separate issue attitudes than was the general public. Thus, Converse argued, such a disjuncture in the construction of belief systems revealed few linkages between elites and masses. If we take the theoretical question about mass-elite communication which Converse posed, and couple it with a methodology that treats belief systems as being structured vertically from the general to the specific, will we arrive at a different answer to Converse's questions about mass-elite linkages?

Taking these modifications and criticisms of the original Converse belief system model, while preserving his original theoretical aim of finding the nature and scope of mass-elite belief system congruence, one can propose a more general theory of mass-elite attitudinal linkages, which not only treats belief system struc-

turing as vertical (from general to specific), but also allows structure across *issue domains*. Thus, before launching into a theoretical discussion of the nature of mass-elite belief system congruence, one must turn to the other question at hand: How does one theoretically view a belief system in which one issue domain (in this case, domestic racial attitudes) structures attitudes in a supposedly different domain (here, sanctions against South Africa)? This is best addressed as a two-part question: (1) How are foreign policy belief systems to be conceptualized? (2) What are the specific interconnections between racial attitudes, which Carmines and Stimson argue are a defining modern political question (Carmines and Stimson, 1982), and questions of foreign policy?

Conceptualizing Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes

The study of foreign policy attitudes in the American public closely parallels the development of research into belief systems generally, both in focus and method. The association of education, political interest, and foreign policy opinions has remained a theme in the literature on mass foreign policy attitudes. Free and Cantril's general study of American opinion found large-scale ignorance of foreign policy information in the 1960s (Free and Cantril, 1967). Philip Converse's seminal "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" argued that Americans fail to tightly structure their political opinions along a liberal-conservative unidimension. This lack of cognitive constraint and consistency between policy attitudes was especially acute with foreign policy opinions, which showed very little inter-correlation (Converse, 1964). Levels of inter-item cohesion on these measures of foreign policy opinion *were* found to be stronger among those with higher levels of education. Again, one finds a generally negative assessment of the public's ability to think about foreign policy in some supposedly desirable, coherent, constrained manner, although the better educated conform to this model of the enlightened, aware, engaged citizen somewhat better than their counterparts.

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) break down foreign policy attitudes into core values, general postures, and specific policy attitudes. Important for this study, Hurwitz and Peffley use ethnocentrism and militarism as core values, which in turn guide general postures, one of which is anti-communism. These three general postures and values are important to explore here, since all three can be hypothesized to affect one's attitudes toward South African sanctions in different ways. For the purposes of the present study, all three will be assumed to be at the same level of abstraction. Indeed, anti-communism is hypothesized to be of greater explanatory power than the other two postures, since over the years the South Africa question has been cast in a communist/anti-communist dichotomy by many (see Hero, 1981 [below]).

Just as cognitive abilities have been seen as predictors of foreign policy attitudes and belief system structures, so have various demographic characteristics. Almost all studies of foreign policy and public opinion, no matter what their ultimate theoretical or methodological goal, have uncovered several enduring demographic patterns. First, rural dwellers and especially Southerners have tended to adopt hard-line foreign policy positions, especially regarding military issues (Hughes, 1978; Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979; Maggiotto and Wittkopf, 1981). Second, nearly all studies find that both hawkishness and isolationism increase as age increases (Wittkopf, 1981). One must be cognizant that, aside from demographics, education, and partisanship, the foreign policy attitudes literature has sought to explain very few linkages between foreign policy opinions in the public, and domestically derived explanations for those opinions. Holsti and Rosenau (1988)

have found some moderate correlations between foreign and domestic belief patterns among elites, as did McCloskey in 1967; nevertheless, the linkages between foreign and domestic policy opinions in the public have traditionally been viewed as weak or nonexistent.

Specific Interconnections between Race and Foreign Policy Attitudes in the Mass Public

Even though a scholar intimately familiar with South African politics may find American race-relations history of only tenuous utility in deciding whether to strengthen anti-apartheid sanctions, this attitudinal connection may nevertheless exist with considerable explanatory power in the mass public. Hurwitz and Peffley found that the racial and economic domains of mass belief systems were not entirely independent (1985). Perhaps the same blurring of distinction between domestic race relations and foreign policy in mass belief systems can be found in the South African sanctions case.

Rosenau (1967) defined citizen interests in foreign and domestic politics in rational terms. Since a person is almost always more concerned about his or her immediate material needs, his or her most intense political interests will be in things domestic. Further, since rational motives in individuals are disproportionately responses to immediate stimuli, one can logically assume that foreign policy and domestic issue attitudes "evoke different motivational patterns on the part of most people" (1967).

Rosenau, however, cannot be accused of conceptualizing a stone wall between foreign and domestic political attitudes. He devotes considerable space in his book to "the demonstration effect," in which events in other countries "leap across" national boundaries and trigger issue attitudes at home. As an example, he speculates that race riots in South Africa can trigger members of the American civil rights movement to act at home for their own political rights. Here the causal chain runs from the "demonstration effect" in South Africa to attitudes and actions in the United States. The present research question seeks to answer whether the obverse can operate as well: Can past racial events in the United States prime what Americans think about events in South Africa?

Rosenau and others notwithstanding (see Shepherd, 1967; Seabury, 1970), race has not been fully explored as a domestic correlate of foreign policy attitudes. As has been the case with most forms of behavioral studies in the United States, socioeconomic status and especially education have been the best predictors of the directionality of foreign policy attitudes in bivariate and multivariate tests (Hughes, 1978). Gabriel Almond, a pioneer in so much of modern political science, did not even mention race as a variable in his classic study *The American People and Foreign Policy* (1950).

The present task, then, is to piece together a logical connection of race and foreign policy from the race relations and attitudinal literature. The best place to start is with the salience of race in belief systems. Carmines and Stimson (1982) are unambiguous; they assert that racial issues were the crucial component of issue evolution, and ultimately belief system constraint, in the 1970s electorate. According to their interpretation of a principal component analysis, partisanship, racial issues, and the classic New Deal welfare state issues had become mutually reinforcing by the 1970s. Could it be possible that these mutually reinforcing components also affect the structuring of foreign policy attitudes? Kinder and Sears (1981) offer information relevant to the *different types* of racial attitudes that operate in mass belief systems. In their study of the Los Angeles mayoral races of 1969 and 1973,

the authors tested two competing theories of racial prejudice: realistic group conflict (racial threat) and symbolic racism. The former deals with the economic "threat" whites perceive from blacks, examples being affirmative action, crime, and blacks moving into white neighborhoods. The symbolic racism theory holds that racial attitudes are learned early in life, and come from a blend of anti-black affect and the notion that blacks are lazy and persistent "violators" of the Protestant work ethic. Symbolic racism is thus replete with stereotyping. Intuitively, this stereotyping is the kind of racial posture that could orient mass attitudes toward South Africa. However, Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick (1991) have questioned the validity of separating racial attitudes into these spheres, and a considerable controversy has swirled around the symbolic racism vs. racial threat dichotomy. For example, Krosnik (1991) questions whether symbolic attitudes *are* more long-enduring than other attitudes, thus potentially undermining the validity of separating racial threat vs. symbolic racial attitudes into different spheres. Since this paper does not wish to add fuel to this long-standing debate, it will conceptualize racial attitudes (or "the new racism," as Sniderman *et al.* label it) in terms of stereotyping, and will make no assumptions about the symbolic or threat-based nature of those attitudes. This does *not* concede, however, that race is a tangential political issue. On the contrary. I agree with Carmines and Stimson (1982) that the politics of race is an incredibly powerful and salient issue in contemporary American politics. Indeed, this was a major reason for choosing the South African sanctions case study: to determine the effects of a powerful *domestic* belief system component on structuring mass and elite attitudes toward a foreign policy issue.

Finally, what of the literature **specifically** linking domestic racial attitudes to perceptions of Africa? Alfred Hero, in his massive study *The Southerner and World Affairs* (1965), although limiting his analysis to white Southerners, offers some relevant hypotheses. The two major findings relevant to the present study were that, first, the more conservative a Southerner was on racial integration, the more inclined he or she was to be sympathetic to the white colonists in Africa. And second, Southerners did not tend to apply domestically derived stereotypes of blacks to Asians or North Africans, but did apply them to black Africans. Clearly, Hero's 1965 analysis of Southerners and their foreign policy attitudes begs to be tested here, since we are investigating questions of race in foreign policy thinking, and also a foreign policy concept which has in the past been associated with anti-communism.

Elite Belief Systems: The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policymaking

Even if these hypotheses are accepted in the following analyses, what is their significance for foreign policymaking? True, if one accepts a broad liberal theory of democracy, then the attitudes of citizens about foreign policy issues *should* weigh on their elected representatives who ultimately make those policies. Remembering Converse's 1964 work on the *correlation* of elite and mass attitudes, however, one is reminded that the issue attitudes of the two groups are rarely highly intertwined. It is crucial, therefore, not only to establish empirically that constituent-elite attitudinal links exist, but also to put those links into a theoretically derived model of mass-elite communication. If members of Congress did base their 1985–1986 anti-apartheid votes on their *perceptions* (whether true or false) of domestic racial politics and their constituents' racial attitudes, then the analyst must explain: (1) the place of such linkages in representative theory and practice (are the constituents directly influencing voting patterns in Congress, or are the elites forming the opinions of an attentive public?); and (2) the implications of such overtly domestic linkages for foreign policymaking.

Mass-Elite Attitudinal Linkages and Parallels

Achen succinctly presents the liberal view of representation as the correlation between constituency attitudes and elite views and vote. This kind of relationship has been measured and conceptualized as one that varies from issue to issue (Achen, 1978). The classic Miller and Stokes 1963 study of representation simply took mere correspondence of elite and mass attitudes as *prima facie* evidence of the transmission of preferences from masses to elites. According to a traditional liberal model, then, representation can best be measured by a congressperson's issue consistency with his or her constituency's aggregate mean attitude on that issue. In the Miller-Stokes tradition, then, the closer the representative's attitudes and actions are to the constituency mean, the better that district is represented. Following this point, Fowler and Shaiko theoretically question an exclusive analytical search for constituent-representative *issue* linkages (1987). Taking a broad theoretical view of mass-elite communication, could we not expect to find non–issue specific congruences between masses and elites, such as through shared partisan identification and abstract political concepts like general ideological orientation? For our present purposes, could not the racial attitudes of constituents be causally correlated with their representatives' South African–related votes? Since this is definitely *not* simple issue-for-issue agreement, would we still be justified in establishing mass-elite links between the two groups, given such an issue configuration? Taking Converse's original concern with mass-elite belief system *congruence*, is this enough? Is the existence of similar, domestically derived foreign policy belief systems in *both* masses and elites enough to justify the existence of effective mass-elite linkages? Of course, theory should be our guide to answering this question, as causation can never be proved by mere empirical evidence. The fact remains, though, that the existence of parallel belief systems toward foreign policy between masses and elites *would* be evidence of mass-elite communication in the Conversian sense.

Pressures on Mass-Elite Linkages

Obviously, representatives have more pressures upon their time, attention, and votes than a strict delegate model would allow. Besides representing constituency preferences in general, members of Congress may respond to their party's leadership, interest group lobbyists based in Washington, the desires of the president, the interests of the nation *as a whole*, and, of course, their personal issue positions (Matthews and Stimson, 1975; Fowler and Shaiko, 1987; Jackson and King, 1989; Lindsay, 1991). On foreign policy issues (at least those not involving defense procurements), one would expect such non–constituency based influences to have a particularly strong effect on representatives' votes, since foreign policy issues are often of remote interest to most citizens (see Converse, 1964). Jackson and King (1989) argue that, whereas representatives and constituencies may be well linked attitudinally on specific payoff issues, such as the building of a dam in a district, the linkages between individual representatives and their constituents on *collective* goods are much more tenuous and symbolic. Since foreign policy can easily be considered a collective good, because it is consumed by the nation as a whole, one could expect to find little issue-based direct representational linkage between voters and their members of Congress.

Do these brief theoretical generalizations bear out when one is considering the domestic sources of foreign policymaking? Indeed, *can* one conceptualize a stone wall between domestic mass attitudes and the communication of constituency attitudes to elected representatives? If party unity, Washington-based lobbyist pressure, and general collective goods attitudes *do* guide foreign policymaking, then one would not expect direct attitudinal linkages between elites and masses on

these issues. Thus, one may not expect that the dependent variable of a mass belief system (in this case, attitudes toward South Africa) would **directly** correlate with the dependent variable of an elite foreign policy calculus (here, sanctions voting).

Even if there is no *direct* attitudinal linkage between elites and masses on a specific question of foreign policy, this does not preclude the existence of other constituency attitudes that would be related to a representative's voting on that issue. Further, the existence of parallel, congruent belief system structures between masses and elites is definitely not precluded by such indirect links. As was discussed above, a liberal view of mass-elite communication need not restrict itself to simple issue-by-issue congruence, since representation is a phenomenon much broader than such dyadic relationships. If one predicts and observes that mass attitudes toward a foreign policy issue are significantly structured by a set of domestically derived attitudes, then theoretically such domestic attitudes should structure mass-elite connections on that issue. This type of *non-dyadic* linkage, in which a set of domestic mass attitudes links with elite actions, can be a case of foreign policy votes taking on constituency-based, rather than collectively based, characteristics, and thus a parochialization of foreign policymaking. In short, the South African votes of a member are causally structured by the same belief system components that structure public South African attitudes.

Finally, if one assumes that members of Congress did base their anti-apartheid votes on domestic racial factors, need these votes be based on mean constituency racial attitudes? Is it not possible that a congressperson actually used an easier decision rule than this, albeit based on the same linkage of domestic racial attitudes and foreign policy voting? Instead of directly polling constituency racial attitudes, or even carefully reflecting on them, could not the representative have simply taken the cognitive shortcut of basing his or her vote on a *perception* of aggregate constituent preferences? In the case of South African voting, such cue-taking could easily have been made by simply basing one's votes on the concentration of blacks in one's district. In summary, the existence of mass-elite belief system congruence involves one major component: the parallel structure of mass and elite belief systems, with the same independent variables similarly structuring the same dependent variables in both belief systems.

Data and Methods

The Nature of the Sample

An appropriate mass sample would faithfully represent the voting age population of white people in the United States who offer an opinion on anti-apartheid pressure. The sample used will be the 1988 American National Election Study (ANES), which includes questions suited to measuring independent and dependent variables in the hypothesized model. The 1988 ANES also includes a question that "screens" respondents for an opinion on South Africa, before proceeding to ask them whether they agree or disagree with continuing pressure on South Africa. Thus, some measurement error from randomized responses is avoided. Also, a "neutral" position is not offered in the question on sanctions attitudes, avoiding even more measurement error from "don't knows" who respond "neutral," but failing to capture genuine ambivalence. The question is originally asked in a traditional "agree–disagree format." Thus, the indicator for the dependent variable in the mass belief system is dichotomous, so logistic regression will be used to estimate all models involving the South Africa dependent variable.

After listwise deletion, screening on the sanctions variable, and selecting only white people, 605 respondents were left out of 2,040 respondents in the full ANES. To be cognizant of significant differences between the full ANES and the sub-

sample of 605, descriptive procedures were used to test these differences. Figure 1 presents data on the differences between people who were and were not able to offer an opinion on the South African sanctions question, and thus between those who are and are not in the sample of 605 to be used here. In sum, the subsample of 605 is somewhat biased toward: non-Southerners, people with higher political interest, people who are not moderate, and the more highly educated. It is interesting that there is no significant bias in partisan identification. One must keep these biases in mind when interpreting the following analyses, and realize the following results apply to an attentive one-third of the population. However, for the 605 cases used here, we have full information on all variables for each case. Therefore, we can be confident that a full belief system is being measured simultaneously. If Gamson and Modigliani (1966) are correct, however, these

Region

	South	Non-South
Able	32.2	67.8
Unable	44.3	55.7

Interest

	Hardly	Sometimes	Most Time
Able	14.4	44.1	41.6
Unable	30.5	48.6	20.9

Ideology

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
Able	27.8	25.4	46.8
Unable	20.2	35.2	44.5

Partisanship

	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Able	33.0	37.8	29.2
Unable	38.1	34.0	27.9

FIG. 1. Sample Biases: Differences between People Who Are Able and Unable to Offer an Opinion on South African Sanctions

attentive and more highly educated people may be predisposed to follow the foreign policy cues of elites. These sample biases must be borne in mind when analyzing data on mass-elite congruence, especially when inferring causal relationships about representation vs. elite persuasion.

For the mass-elite linkage part of the analysis, the above mass attitudes *could* be taken from the 1986 American National Election Study, and aggregated by congressional district.[1] Indeed, this would be in keeping with the Miller-Stokes tradition of aggregating district opinion, and correlating it with elite opinion and performance. However, relying on this method alone raises problems of *horrendous* measurement error, especially when small constituency N's are present, as is almost always the case with the American National Election Study. Nevertheless, this procedure does allow one to observe some empirical evidence on the congruence of mass and elite opinion, and the relationship of elite actions to mass beliefs. Fortunately, Erickson (1978) and others have done work on these measurement problems, and use proxy variables instead of aggregated district opinion to explore mass-elite attitudinal linkages. Here, one could substitute aggregated district racial opinions for district racial profiles. Data for the percentage of blacks in districts, for example, are taken from the 1980 census. This study will rely on both the "Proxy" method and the "Miller-Stokes" method of measuring mass-elite linkages, if for no other reason than data are available to measure in both ways. To measure for the effects of Washington-based lobbying, a dummy variable has been constructed for each congressperson, indicating whether he or she was lobbied by registered South African agents (Spear, 1988). Such data were taken from records obtained from the Department of Justice, and are intended to separate Washington-based influences on South African voting from domestic racial influences derived by the representative from the constituency level. The dependent variable which measures the members' South African roll calls is constructed from an additive index of support for the sixteen sanctions voted in 1985 and 1986. After the "pro-sanctions" position was assigned to each vote, these votes were counted for each member, yielding a high sanctions score of 16, and a low score of zero. To control the effects of missing votes, this sixteen-point scale was converted to a percentage scale for each member, by dividing the number of pro-sanctions votes cast by the total votes cast,[2] thus giving a percentage voting score ranging from zero for completely anti-sanctions, to 100 for completely pro-sanctions.

Findings

Mass Attitudes

Tables 1 and 2 present the two stages of results obtained by applying the theoretically derived model to the 1988 ANES data. Table 1 reports the influences of partisanship, region, education, political interest, and ideology on the endogenous belief system constructs: racial attitudes, anti-communism, militarism, and isolationism.

[1]The 1986 ANES contains partisan, contextual, racial, and foreign policy questions that are identical to the 1988 survey. The South African question is identical to the 1988 question, and screens out "don't knows" in the same manner. The racial and foreign policy scales used in the mass portion of the study are constructed for the 1986 data, and are aggregated for each congressional district. These aggregated variables measure the percentage of respondents in each congressional district who are more liberal than the national mean on that particular scale.

[2]Thus, a member who votes on 13 of the sanctions issues in total, and who supported the pro-sanctions position 9 times, was assigned a score of .69. Members who missed more than half the votes were excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 1. Partisan and Contextual Influences on Endogenous Predictors of Mass Sanctions Attitudes

	Racial Attitudes	*Militarism*	*Anti-Communism*	*Isolationism*
Education	.327***	.188**	.186**	.058
	(6.39)	(3.68)	(3.63)	(1.03)
Interest	.069	.035	.120**	.099
	(1.40)	(.725)	(2.42)	(1.80)
Ideology	.243***	.173**	.219***	.047
	(4.49)	(3.21)	(4.05)	(.798)
Non-South?	.111**	.119**	.172**	–.009
	(2.47)	(3.68)	(3.84)	(–.118)
Party ID	.119**	.330***	.248***	–.134*
	(2.20)	(6.11)	(4.58)	(–2.24)
R-square	.25	.25	.25	.08

Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. T-values are in parentheses.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

TABLE 2. Direct Predictors of Sanctions Attitudes: Three Models

	All	*Low Educ.*	*High Educ.*	*South*	*Non-South*
Education	-.01			.03	-.02
	(.078)			(.205)	(.180)
Interest	-.16*	–.34**	–.05	–.14	–.16*
	(4.62)	(7.06)	(.223)	(.665)	(3.38)
Party ID	-.08	–.11	–.07	.13	–.14*
	(1.79)	(1.17)	(.806)	(1.17)	(3.79)
Ideology	.07	–.06	.15	.27	.02
	(.570)	(.146)	(1.46)	(2.10)	(.065)
Non-South?	.01	–.08	.08		
	(.003)	(.153)	(.323)		
Racial attitudes	-.22***	–.18***	–.27***	–.09	–.26***
	(49.4)	(10.43)	(42.80)	(2.23)	(47.26)
Militarism attitudes	.07	.27	–.02	–.21	.13
	(.295)	(1.50)	(.029)	(.647)	(.819)
Anti-communist attitudes	.04	–.33	–.27	.05	.04
	(.119)	(2.37)	(3.23)	(.036)	(.108)
Isolationist attitudes	.01	–.17	.20	.28	–.06
	(.011)	(.730)	(1.09)	(.822)	(.184)
Model chi-square	95.61***	25.81***	78.23***	11.32 (n.s.)	95.21***
N	605	211	394	136	469

Entries are Logistic Regression coefficients for the likelihood that a respondent will oppose anti-apartheid sanctions against South Africa (coding: 0 = pro-sanctions; 1 = anti-sanctions). MLE/Squared Standard Error in parentheses.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Turning to Table 1, one realizes this ground has been covered extensively in the literature. Nevertheless, it is important to present these data here, so that the entire racial and foreign policy belief system, as it affects South African attitudes, can be understood. Higher levels of education are significantly correlated with increasing agreement with more liberal racial attitudes. Increasing levels of education are also associated with liberalism on foreign policy measures, at least for militaristic postures and anti-communism. Similarly, increasing levels of self-reported political interest are especially associated with less agreement with hard-line anti-communist attitudes. Thus, Almond's 1950 assertion that higher educational attainment is associated with foreign policy liberalism apparently still holds (Almond, 1950).

Partisan identification and self-reported ideology are both significant predictors of racial attitudes, militarism, and anti-communism, in the manner expected: being a Democrat or a liberal causes one to be more liberal on these issues. It is interesting that, for the remainder of this study, ideology has a far greater partial impact on racial attitudes (beta = .243; t = 4.49) than does partisanship (beta = .119; t = 2.20). Indeed, party identification is a far better predictor of the three foreign policy postures measured here than of racial postures, whereas ideology behaves in the inverse manner. This is an important point to keep in mind because, if the hypothesized belief system exists and racial attitudes are the strongest direct predictors of sanctions attitudes, party ID (the great cognitive shortcut, as measured in so many samples of data) has relatively little to do with those important racial postures, controlling for other important variables. The models presented in this paper are focusing on the importance of racial and foreign policy attitudes to predict a specific policy attitude: sanctions toward South Africa. As such, ideology and partisanship are being modelled as they would have been upon the publication of *The American Voter*: as largely exogenous constructs. Of course, important recent work, especially Fiorina (1981), has shown that partisanship is especially sensitive to changes in candidate and policy evaluations, and is itself often successfully modelled as a *dependent* variable. Here, however, causal ordering requires that partisanship and ideology precede the racial and foreign policy attitudinal measures. This does not in any way minimize the importance of such work.

Again, Table 1 has covered old theoretical ground, and as such is mostly confirmatory in nature. However, since most of these results and measurements are well grounded in the history of the belief system literature, they are important, and serve not only to place the potential predictors of sanctions attitudes into theoretical perspective, but also to ensure the model is properly specified theoretically and methodologically.

Moving on to multivariate analyses of these endogenous and exogenous belief system components, Table 2 presents the direct effects of the endogenous racial, foreign policy, and attitudinal postures, as well as the effects of the contextual and partisan variables, on mass attitudes toward South African sanctions. Table 2 reports the results of three models fit with logistic regression for (1) all respondents; (2) the entire sample divided into two halves by educational attainment level; and (3) Southerners vs. non-Southerners.

Beginning with the entire subsample of 605 respondents, one sees that, of the contextual or partisan variables discussed in Table 1, only political interest has a significant *direct* impact on sanctions attitudes, with increasing levels of interest increasing the probability that a respondent will be pro-sanctions. Education level in this full model shows no significant relationship with sanctions attitudes. Taking these two results together, one is tempted to declare that the Gamson-Modigliani "Mainstream Model" is partially at work here, with more attentive and knowledge-

able people following the cues of opinion leaders on foreign policy issues. After all, sanctions *did* overwhelmingly pass the Congress in 1985 and 1986, and even passed over the President's veto with much fanfare in that latter year. The only other exogenous construct that comes closest to standard statistical or substantive significance is partisanship (b = -.08; $MLE/SE^2 = 1.79$).[3] Region itself has no significant direct relationship to one's South African attitudes. One can be confident, then, that these exogenous predictors of sanctions are not directly driving a mass belief systemic orientation toward South Africa in the United States.

Further, *none* of the three foreign policy indicators are significant direct predictors of one's support for anti-apartheid sanctions. One is left, then, with only race relations postures as a potential direct effect on South African attitudes in the mass public. As the first column of Table 2 clearly shows, racial conservatism is the most highly significant predictor of opposition to sanctions in the model (b = -.22; $MLE/SE^2 = 49.40$). Therefore, the overwhelming verdict of this first direct model must clearly be that the mass public primarily uses a racial belief system to structure its attitudes toward South Africa, as the main proposition of this paper argued. Further, the literature on foreign policy belief systems would have theoretically anticipated that the three foreign policy attitudes would have at least some influence on sanctions attitudes in the general public. The lack of correlation between these foreign policy attitudes and one's South Africa attitude makes the strong relationship between racial postures and anti-apartheid attitudes all the more compelling. Further, it gives students of public opinion and foreign policy a concrete theoretical and empirical reason to specify models of foreign policy belief systems that include salient, **domestically derived**, attitudes. Before examining the next two models, one must further speculate on the full model's theoretical significance.

Now that one sees that racial postures are overwhelmingly the best predictors of South African attitudes in the American mass public, where do those racial attitudes come from? Thinking back to Table 1, recall that racial attitudes as measured here were best structured by educational level, party ID, ideology, and region of residence (with Southerners being more conservative). Recalling that none of these exogenous variables *directly* predicted sanctions attitudes, it is reasonable theoretically and practically to assume that the effects of educational level, region, ideology, and to a lesser extent partisanship on South African attitudes are indirect. Because these contextual and partisan variables do significantly structure domestic racial attitudes they are important indirect predictors of this South African foreign policy attitude. These findings are theoretically interesting, especially when one realizes that these key contextual variables in the issue-related "funnel of causality" are mediated by domestic racial attitudes, which in turn highly structure mass attitudes toward South Africa. Clearly, important relations between domestic context, domestic issue attitudes, and foreign policy attitudes are at work. Also, the theoretical modelling of belief systems as being structured vertically from the general to the specific is further justified.

The next model in Table 2 divides the sample into two by mean educational level,[4] to test for the effects of educational attainment as a conditioning variable in the hypothesized model. Thus, one can check whether the findings of Stimson (1975) and Converse (1964) hold for the anti-apartheid issue: Do people with higher cognitive abilities use fewer belief system components to more highly

[3]MLE/SE squared refers to the Wald statistic, which assumes a Chi-square distribution for testing the hypothesis that the logistic regression coefficient equals zero.

[4]High school graduates and less, versus those with more than a high school education.

structure their issue attitudes than do other people? In a word, no. Using the criteria of statistical significance at the .05 level, better educated people use the same endogenous belief system components as do their counterparts to structure their attitudes toward South Africa. Both groups still use only racial attitudes to inform their opinions about South Africa sanctions, although those with a high school education or less also have their South African attitudes significantly structured by their level of political interest. Again, here is more evidence against an "enlightenment model" based on the idea that increasing levels of education make one more liberal on foreign policy issues. Indeed, using education as a conditioning variable, the structures of these belief systems do not change. Further, among those with lower levels of education, since increasing political attentiveness leads to an increased probability of supporting sanctions, here is more indirect evidence that a "mainstream model" may be at work, with those of lower educational attainment more susceptible to opinion leaders. Neither group uses the general ideological continuum so important to belief constraint that Stimson, Converse, and others have argued for. At the same time, both groups still exhibit racial postures as the overwhelmingly best predictors of attitudes toward South Africa.

Lastly, Table 2 stratifies the subsample by region, with "South" meaning all respondents reside in one of the eleven states of the Confederacy. There are obvious theoretical reasons for splitting the sample in this manner, since the South's experience with race relations has been unique in the nation's history. Differential racial experiences can be expected to affect racially motivated foreign policy attitudes in different ways. Also, the work of Alfred Hero (1965) stated that Southerners use racial stereotyping in their viewing of Africa. By splitting the sample into two regional groups, the analyst may observe the different racial-foreign policy belief systems that may exist in the two areas.

Several major regional differences may be discerned from these data. Beginning with the partisan and contextual exogenous influences, one can see that non-Southerners use their partisanship to significantly structure South African attitudes directly, whereas Southerners do not. Again, this may be one way of taking "cognitive shortcuts." More than likely, however, the difference in the explanatory power of partisanship may be a function of the relative lack of variance in Southern partisanship, although this must also remain speculative, and is a question beyond our current scope. Actually, *none* of the independent variables in the model for Southerners significantly predict the probability of a respondent being pro-sanctions or anti-sanctions. Although this may be due to the low N for Southerners (136), the fact remains that racial attitudes are significant at the .07 level in predicting South African attitudes. Thus, taking the three sets of models presented in Table 2, it is clear that, even though there are minor structural differences in belief systems between people by region and educational attainment, the overwhelming predictor of liberalism on South African sanctions is liberalism on racial attitudes.

Mass-Elite Belief System Linkages: Structural Parallels?

Having established that domestic racial attitudes strongly influence mass attitudes toward South Africa, the remaining task is to test the linkages and parallels of such attitudinal structures to those of foreign policymakers. For this purpose, Table 3 presents results from two models of foreign policymaking as a function of domestic mass attitudes. Each model tests these proposed linkages with a different methodological technique, both of which have roots in the literature on elite-mass communication. Each model takes as its dependent variable the anti-apartheid voting score discussed earlier, with the congressional district as the unit of analysis. Each of the two models tests a proposition about foreign policy voting and elite–constituency linkages.

TABLE 3. Congressional Voting on South African Sanctions: Two Models of Elite-Mass Belief System Congruence

	Proxy Model		*"Miller-Stokes" Model*
Foreign policy roll call	.02	District FP attitudes	−1.9
	(.421)		(−1.29)
Party ID	−.53	District party ID	4.1
	(−.111)		(1.28)
South?	4.5	South?	5.8
	(1.19)		(.943)
Lobbied by SA agents?	−4.7	District SA attitudes	.13
	(−1.01)		(.042)
% district black	.53***	District racial attitudes	9.3**
	(5.38)		(2.37)
R-square	.26		.05
N	432		156

The "Miller-Stokes" model includes aggregate district attitudes on racial, foreign policy, partisan, and specific South Africa attitudes, and a region dummy variable, coded South/Non-South, as its independent variables. This equation tests the *dyadic* and *non-dyadic* issue linkage models discussed earlier to determine whether elite voting on this foreign policy issue is correlated directly with the mass issue attitude (on South Africa), or by the mass antecedents of this attitude (domestic racial postures). Looking at the coefficients of this Miller-Stokes model, which takes its name from the classic 1963 study because of the method of aggregating district attitudes, the district South Africa attitude is indeed of little importance in structuring congressional voting on sanctions. Conversely, the racial postures found to highly structure mass South African attitudes also significantly predict congressional voting on sanctions. This classic mass-elite linkage model of domestic influences on foreign policymaking does indicate that substantial constituency linkages to representatives exist, and are structured in the same manner as mass attitudes on the same foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, the nagging question remains: Which way do the causal links run here? Is this seeming mass-elite belief system congruence evidence of elite persuasion of an attentive audience, or do the racial attitudes of the congressional districts from which these representatives come direct voting on this issue? Since there is no evidence that a direct linkage exists between congressional and district opinion on the sanctions issue *itself,* there is very little reason to believe mass foreign policy issue persuasion is taking place. Further, since district racial attitudes correlate significantly with congressional sanctions voting, there is at least evidence that members of Congress treated this issue as one more informed by domestic race relations attitudes and expectations. Thus, whereas the theoretical question of educational and attentiveness mainstream effects vs. enlightenment cannot be directly resolved here, we nevertheless witness some striking parallels between the structure of mass belief system on the one hand, and elite foreign policy voting on the other.

Of course, the Miller-Stokes method can be replete with measurement error which usually crops up when aggregating survey data. Therefore, Table 3 also presents a "Proxy Model." This model uses proxies variables to substitute for direct, aggregated data on constituency attitudes. Further, it measures the effects of Washington-based influences on foreign policy voting. Here, the potential predictors of anti-apartheid voting are taken to be the representative's party affiliation,

his or her liberalism score on a constructed foreign policy roll call index,[5] the percentage of blacks in his or her district,[6] and whether or not he or she was lobbied by registered South African agents. Since general ideology and party have been observed as the best predictors of foreign policy voting in the past (e.g., Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; McCormick and Black, 1983), this model would, in a null hypothesis, be expected to be quite a strong predictor of sanctions voting. However, *none* of the regression coefficients for these variables are significant, with the traditionally strong party and ideology variables being abysmally low. The "lobbied" dummy variable comes closest to significance (at the $p < .11$ level in a one-tailed test), indicating that those members lobbied by South African agents had lower anti-apartheid scores than those not lobbied.

The percentage of blacks in a member's district is proposed to orient foreign policy voting, since it has been hypothesized that members of Congress used a domestic race relations rationale in their South African voting. As this model shows, the percentage of blacks in a congressional district strongly affects sanctions voting in Congress ($b = .53$; $t = 5.38$). Thus, one finds strong evidence that members of Congress based their South Africa votes on *perceived* black desires. Using this data, then, one still finds evidence that elites used fundamentally racial belief system components in their voting calculus on South African sanctions.

What do these models tell us about foreign policymaking in general, and sanctions voting in particular? First, there is no evidence of direct constituency transmission of South African attitudes to their representatives (or vice versa). Owing to the relatively low salience of foreign policy issues in the mass public, previous literature on foreign policy attitudes would have anticipated this result. Our finding that the public structures its South African (foreign policy) attitude with racial (domestic) postures, however, led us to suspect that the Congress would do the same. Indeed, the results obtained in Table 3 strongly confirm this suspicion. Such strong domestic attitudinal links to foreign policymaking have rarely if ever been observed in the past, especially on matters of race. Thus, there is strong evidence that on foreign policy issues, there is a potential for domestic constituency attitudes, and/or elite perceptions of those attitudes, to affect the making of that policy, and for belief system parallels to be found between masses and elites on these issues. These findings must surely be kept in the collective academic mind when exploring other foreign policy issues. The links between South African voting and domestic racial attitudes are indeed indirect. They are, however, evidence that domestic experiences not only structure mass foreign policy attitudes, but do the same in the minds of elites, who process these domestically derived postures in their foreign policy voting calculus. Back to Converse thirty years later, we have here evidence of mass-elite communication, albeit in a roundabout way, and probably as a two-way street. The question of foreign policy beliefs as elite persuasion vs. liberal representation must in the end remain open, and offers a rich avenue for further study, now that we have seen that at least *one* foreign policy issue was actually caught up in a domestically derived belief system.

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[5]This is an index of liberalism on several contested foreign policy votes taken during the term of each member of Congress. Full details are in the Appendix. Note that this constructed index of liberalism was used instead of the ADA score, since that measure usually does not include substantial foreign policy data. Further, many people have argued that using the ADA score as a catch-all measure of liberalism is faulty. Thus, this paper chose to construct its own index, which can be better justified theoretically than an index generated by a lobbying organization. Nevertheless, the ADA score and constructed foreign policy score are correlated at .991.

[6]Of course, the percentage of district white could have also been used in this analysis. Owing to the fact that in most districts the percentage white is simply 100—percentage black (the transitive property of equality), the model in Table 3 was also estimated with percent white. Not surprisingly, the coefficient was simply the inverse of the coefficient presented in the table.

Conclusion

This paper has yielded several significant and interesting findings. First, congressional votes for sanctions along domestic racial lines were "rational" vis-à-vis their constituents, who, in the aggregate, thought along the same dimensions. Second, the door has been opened for future studies linking specific foreign policy issue attitudes to domestic correlates. For example, is one's policy toward Latin America structured by racial postures as well? Third, the wisdom of studying certain foreign policy and domestic attitudes separately surely has been compromised. Fourth, the normative quest by so many political scientists for constrained mass belief systems has another question with which to wrestle: Is it *good* and healthy for democracy that people actually orient their attitudes toward black people abroad similarly to the way they think about black people at home? Finally, Converse's search for mass-elite communication challenges us to further explore these questions. Do these findings indicate communication, or at least attitudinal consonance, between political leaders and the mass public? Finally, from an international relations standpoint, is such a popular ordering of attitudes functional to good democratic foreign policymaking? Can a foreign policy based on overtly domestic attitudes be rational?

These questions are all important, and will hopefully be raised by others doing research on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. Comparativists and foreign policy analysts, as well as students of mass attitudes, can benefit from such studies, albeit in different ways. For comparativists and foreign policy analysts, serious attitudinal links have been posited between the subjects they study and their fellow citizens in the United States. For Americanists studying belief system structure, more reasons to study such structures, and to study foreign and domestic politics in the same research, have possibly been advanced. Surely we must now consider broadening our theoretical modelling and empirical exploration of mass and elite foreign policy belief systems to include the salient domestic issues of our time.

Appendix

The following are operationalizations of the concepts and scales discussed in the paper. All scales are standardized and linear additive. Scales are used instead of individual items to avoid the problems of multicollinearity common in ordinary least squares regression.

- **Racial Attitudes Scale**: (1) Do you agree that blacks should look out for themselves and succeed on their own, just like the Italians, Irish, and Jews did; (2) Do you agree that if blacks would just try harder, they would be just as well off as whites; (3) Do you believe that blacks have gotten less than they deserve in the past?
- **Isolationism**: Do you agree that we would be better off if we just stayed at home and worried about things here (yes/no)?
- **Militarism Scale**: (1) Would you approve of sending U.S. troops to the Middle East (4-point agree–disagree); (2) How important is it to have a strong military (4-point)?
- **Anticommunism Scale**: (1) Do you agree that when a country goes communist, it is a vital threat to U.S. interests; (2) Do you agree that the U.S. should do everything it can to stop the spread of communism (4-point agree–disagree)?
- **Ideology**: Standard CPS 7-point liberalism–conservatism constructed scale.
- **Party ID:** Party identification (CPS 7-point scale).

- **South Africa Screening Question:** Have you read or heard enough about South Africa to have an opinion about what U.S. policy toward that country should be?
- **South Africa Question:** Do you agree that the United States should put more pressure on the South African government to end apartheid, including economic sanctions (agree–disagree)?

Sanctions Votes Used

(1985)

1. Amendment to HR 1460, to mandate corporate compliance with the "Sullivan Principles" and to exempt those firms that comply from restrictions on new investment in South Africa; FAILED 148–256. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
2. Amendment to HR 1460, to void the ban on Krugerrand imports if it violates the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT); FAILED 127–292. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
3. Amendment to HR 1460, to waive sanctions if a poll of nonwhite South Africans conducted by the Secretary of State found that a majority oppose restrictions on U.S. investment; FAILED 40–379. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
4. Amendment to HR 1460, same as the above, only with the poll internationally supervised; FAILED 30–384. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
5. Amendment to HR 1460, to establish a U.S. Commission on South Africa, mandate Sullivan compliance, and authorize funds for black organizations; FAILED 108–310. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
6. Amendment to HR 1460, similar to the above, plus imposition of sanctions if certifiable progress toward ending apartheid has not been made within two years; FAILED 112–313. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
7. Amendment to HR 1460, to substitute the language of HR 997, thereby imposing full economic and diplomatic sanctions on South Africa; FAILED 77–345. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.[7]
8. Amendment to HR 1460, to delay the date of enactment for one year, or longer if the president certifies that the African National Congress has not renounced the use of violence; FAILED 139–282. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
9. Final consideration of HR 1460; PASSED 295–127. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.
10. Motion to approve the final report of the House-Senate Conference Committee, convened to reconcile differences between HR 1460 and the Senate sanctions legislation; PASSED 349–75. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.

[7]There is, unfortunately, no roll call for a similar amendment submitted and passed in 1986. This amendment, which made HR 4868 as it originally passed the House a total trade and investment embargo of South Africa, passed on a *voice* vote.

(1986)

11. Adoption of H. Res. 478, to provide for House floor consideration of HR 4868, the bill to impose economic sanctions against South Africa; PASSED 286–127. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.
12. Amendment to HR 4868, to prohibit funds authorized in the legislation from going to the African National Congress if any members of the group's governing body belong to the South African Communist Party; PASSED 365–49. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
13. Amendment to HR 4868, to exempt from the bill's sanctions companies that comply with the Sullivan Principles relating to anti-discrimination in the workplace; FAILED 150–268. "Nay" is the pro-sanctions position.
14. Adoption of H Res. 548, to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to set policy goals and impose a series of economic sanctions on South Africa; PASSED 292–92. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.
15. Motion to concur in the Senate amendment to HR 4868 in the House-Senate Conference Committee; PASSED 308–77. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.
16. Passage of HR 4868 over the president's veto; PASSED 313–83. "Yes" is the pro-sanctions position.

The Comparative Foreign Policy Votes

In order to test the hypothesis that issues that have no major ethnic domestic constituencies (in this case, blacks) will not be as susceptible to the percentage of blacks in a district, four votes were used: (1) the 1981 vote to deny aid to El Salvador if it did not improve its human rights record; (2) the 1984 vote appropriating research funds for SDI; (3) the 1984 vote providing military aid to the contras; and (4) the 1985 vote repealing the Clark amendment, thus allowing covert aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola. Although this last vote may appear to violate the intentions of the study to find ethnically "neutral" votes, it does not; since the black lobbies and leaders made little if any effort to convert the Clark amendment issue into a domestic one; in fact, black leadership was severely divided on what course to take in supporting UNITA. As a test of the "black hypothesis," the 1981 aid to Zimbabwe vote was chosen as an issue that *was* converted into a civil rights issue, but at nowhere near the same fever-pitch and vociferousness as was the sanctions issue.

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