


区块链技术与应用



Chapter 8 其他挖矿算法

苏 明



Puzzle requirements


- Cheap to Verify
- Adjustable difficulty

...

- Chance of winning is proportional to hashpower
 - Large players get only proportional advantage
 - Even small players get proportional compensation

Bad puzzle: a sequential puzzle

Consider a puzzle that takes N steps to solve
a “Sequential” Proof of Work





Bad puzzle: a sequential puzzle

Problem: fastest miner **always** wins the race!



 **Solution Found!**

Good puzzle → Weighted sample



**This property is sometimes called
"progress-free"**



ASIC resistance - Why? (1 of 2)

Goal: Ordinary people with idle laptops, PCs, or even mobile phones can mine!

Lower barrier to entry

Approach: **reduce the gap** between custom hardware and general purpose equipment

ASIC resistance - Why? (2 of 2)


Goal: **Prevent** large manufacturers from **dominating** the game

“Burn-in” advantage

In-house designs




Approach: reduce the “gap” between future hardware and the custom ASICs we already have



Memory hard puzzles

Premise: the cost and performance of **memory is more stable** than for processors





Colin Percival, 2009

⌘ Memory hard hash function

Constant time/memory tradeoff

⌘ Most widely used alternative Bitcoin puzzle

⌘ Also used elsewhere in security (PW-hashing)

1. Fill memory with random values
2. Read from the memory in random order

script - step 1 of 2 (write)

Input: x


$$V_1 = H(X)$$

$$V_2 = H(V_1) = H(H(X))$$

$$V_3 = H(V_2) = H^3(X)$$

...

$$V_N = H^N(x)$$



script - step 2 of 2 (read)

Input: X


$A := H^{N+1}(X)$

For N iterations:

$i := A \bmod N$

$A := H(A \text{ xor } V_i)$


Output: A



script - time/memory tradeoff

Why is this memory-hard?

Reduce memory by half, 1.5x the # steps



Need to access V_i where i is even?

Access V_{i-1}

Compute $V_i = H(V_{i-1})$



script

Disadvantages:

Also requires N steps, N memory to check

Is it actually ASIC resistant?

script ASICs are already available

Future: PW-hashing research



<http://zeusminer.com/>

Cuckoo hash cycles

John Tromp, 2014

Memory hard puzzle that's cheap to verify

Input: X


For $i = 1$ to E :


$a := H_0(X + i)$

$b := i + H_1(X + i)$

edge ($a \bmod N, b \bmod N$)

Is there a cycle of size K ? If so, Output: X, K
edges





Even more approaches

- More complicated hash functions
X11: 11 different hash functions combined
- Moving target
Change the puzzle periodically



Recovering wasted work

Recall:

between 150 MW - 900 MW power **(as of mid-2014)**
consumed

Natural question:

Can we recycle this and do something useful?

Primecoin

Sunny King, 2013




Puzzle based on finding large prime numbers

Cunningham chain:

p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n where $p_i = 2 p_{i-1} + 1$

Each p_i is a large (probable) prime

For instance: p_1 is divisible by $H(\text{prev} || \text{mrkl_root} || \text{nonce})$



Primecoin



- & Many of the largest known Cunningham chains have come from Primecoin miners**
- & Hard problem? Studied by others (e.g., PrimeGrid)
- & Usefulness? Maybe - at least one known use

Permacoin - Mining with storage

Bitcoin



Permacoin

Miller et al.,
2014



Side effect:

Massively distributed, replicated storage system



Permcoin

Assume we have a **large** file **F** to store

For simplicity: **F** is chosen globally, at the beginning, by a trusted dealer

Each user stores a *random subset* of the file

Storage-based puzzle

1. Build a Merkle tree, where each leaf is a segment of the file

2. Generate a public signing key pk , which determines a random subset of file segments

F_1 F_2 F_4 F_5

3. Each mining attempt:

F_2 F_4

a) Select a random nonce

b) $h1 := H(\text{prev} || \text{mrkl_root} || PK || \text{nonce})$

c) $h1$ selects k segments from subset

d) $h2 := H(\text{prev} || \text{mrkl_root} || PK || \text{nonce} || F)$

e) Winner if $h2 < \text{TARGET}$

