

Presentation As a Malware

Description

Can ppt file be malware?

Research Objectives

1. What was the general name/category of the malicious file in the analyzed ppt file?
2. Which is the url addresses it communicates with has been detected as harmful by sandboxes?
3. What is the name of the htm file that drops to disk?
4. Which process is running to persistent under mshta.exe after relevant malware runs?
5. If there was a short IDS in the environment at the time of the incident, which rules would it match?

Walkthrough

File hashsum

Firstly, need to get hash of the malware sample. And you too, if you want to examine sample closely through VirusTotal, AnyRun or, exctactly, download it from the Bazaar.

- powershell.exe Get-FileHash .\filename.extension

Here it is:

```
md5sum P0#00187.ppt
```

```
1dadb4c3fe45566d28b7156be2e2aa6b P0#00187.ppt
```

Examining with VirusTotal

Our objectives refer to malware activities when it was executed. So, if the run malware on our environment, we will infect our own machine. Also i think we cant oversee full behaviour analysis when run it on labstand cause it is isolated.

Security vendors' analysis ⓘ		Do you want to automate checks?	
Acronis (Static ML)	🚩 Suspicious	AhnLab-V3	🚩 Downloader/PPT.Generic.S1397
AliCloud	🚩 Trojan[downloader]:MSOffice/Obfuse.P...	ALYac	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR
Antiy-AVL	🚩 Trojan[Downloader]/MSOffice.Agent	Arcabit	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR
Avast	🚩 MO97:Downloader-VH [Trj]	AVG	🚩 MO97:Downloader-VH [Trj]
BitDefender	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR	CTX	🚩 Ppt.trojan.generic
DrWeb	🚩 P98M.Downloader.5	Elastic	🚩 Malicious (high Confidence)
Emsisoft	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR (B)	eScan	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR
ESET-NOD32	🚩 A Variant Of VBA/TrojanDownloader.Age...	Fortinet	🚩 VBA/Agent.BJQ!tr
GData	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR	Google	🚩 Highly Suspicious
Huorong	🚩 HEUR:TrojanDownloader/VBS.Agent.hf	Ikarus	🚩 Trojan.VB
Kaspersky	🚩 HEUR:Trojan.MSOffice.SAgent.gen	Lionic	🚩 Trojan.MSPPoint.SAgent.4lc
Microsoft	🚩 TrojanDownloader:O97M/Obfuse.PKT1MTB	NANO-Antivirus	🚩 Trojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druvzi
QuickHeal	🚩 O97M.Trojan.Agent.41693	Rising	🚩 Downloader.Agent/VBA!8.109E7 (TOPIS:...
Sangfor Engine Zero	🚩 VBA.Sus.Obf	SentinelOne (Static ML)	🚩 Static AI - Malicious OLE
Skyhigh (SWG)	🚩 BehavesLike.OLE2.Suspicious.cr	Symantec	🚩 Trojan.Gen.NPE
Tencent	🚩 Heur.Macro.Generic.h.8242c1d3	Trellix ENS	🚩 W97M/Downloader.dlt
TrendMicro	🚩 Trojan.P97M.POWLOAD.AN	TrendMicro-HouseCall	🚩 Trojan.P97M.POWLOAD.AN
Varist	🚩 VBA/ABTrojan.INPC-	VIPRE	🚩 VB:Trojan.VBA.Agent.BJR
VirIT	🚩 P97M.Aggah.CTR	Xcitium	🚩 Malware@#2t8qyyq4s9guw

So the category is the VB:Trojan - first goal

To see the contacted URLs, we need go to relations page and examine that

Contacted URLs (15) ⓘ			
Scanned	Detections	Status	URL
2024-05-19	0 / 94	302	https://draft.blogger.com/blogin.g?blogspotURL=https://iknowyoudidntlikeme.blogspot.com/p/ice2.html
2025-06-11	0 / 97	200	https://www.blogger.com/img/share_buttons_20_3.png
2022-12-12	0 / 91	200	https://draft.blogger.com/dyn-css/authorization.css?targetBlogID=9116518222795791100&zx=54c0b77c-281a-4194-9747-0650936bc20b
2025-06-11	0 / 97	200	https://resources.blogblog.com/blogblog/data/1kt/simple/body_gradient_tile_light.png
2025-06-11	0 / 97	200	https://resources.blogblog.com/img/icon18_edit_allbkg.gif
2024-03-03	0 / 91	200	https://www.blogger.com/static/v1/jsbin/3858658042-comment_from_post_iframe.js
2025-03-11	13 / 96	-	http://onedrive.linkpc.net/Ali/Yasine/IDMan.Link
2025-06-05	0 / 97	200	https://resources.blogblog.com/img/icon18_wrench_allbkg.png
2024-02-28	0 / 91	200	https://www.blogger.com/static/v1/widgets/2473628150-widgets.js
2024-05-09	4 / 92	404	http://j.mp/hdkjashdkasbctdgjsa

One of them have the bigger detections rate - it is our second goal

To overview dropped files go to same segment

Dropped Files (44) ⓘ			
Scanned	Detections	File type	Name
2021-10-04	0 / 57	SVG	53B03BEE40C746E8FC70731BA2B6902C0FA65CEA.svg
2025-10-05	0 / 62	JavaScript	cookie.notice.js

And look for .htm document:

[hdkjashdkasbctdgjsa[1].htm] The next step we need to examine part of process tree: ![[Pasted image 20251118000236.png]] schtasks.exe used to persist To examine the IDS rules: ![[Pasted image 20251118000421.png]] EVENT_CTE_HEADER` is our goal

Let's summarize

1. VB:Trojan

2.

`http[://]onedrive[.]linkpc[.]net[/]ali[/]yasine[/]idman[.]lnk`

3. `[hdkjashdkasbctdgjsa[1].htm]`

4. `schtasks.exe`

5. `EVENT_CTE_HEADER`