

在美中经济与安全评估委员会
关于“‘中国模式’？北京推动替代性的国际规范和标准”听证会上
的证词

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“习近平的‘新时代’该让美国有关北京当局野心的争论终结了”

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尊敬的 Talent 参议员、Goodwin 参议员、尊敬的委员们，感谢你们邀请我就中国推动替代性的国际规范和标准的问题作证。很感谢有机会提交以下声明以供参考。

由于我在国家情报大学(NIU)任教，该大学隶属于美国国防部(DoD)，因此，我首先要说明的是，以下陈述的所有事实和观点完全是我个人的观点，不代表 NIU、DoD 及其任何部门或美国政府的观点。

你们要求我讨论中国是否在寻求另一种国际秩序，这种秩序会是什么样子，目标是什么，北京如何看待自己未来的角色，这种角色与美国今天的角色有什么不同，同时，也讨论一下在谈论其领导全球治理改革的雄心壮志时中国共产党的意识形态和及其调用的中国文化分别扮演了哪些角色。¹我想通过剖析 2017 年 10 月习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会（后称“中共十九大”）上宣布的“中国特色社会主义进入新时代”的内涵来切入这些问题。

我们为什么要关注这个具体的讲话？在中国的列宁主义式的政治体制中，现任总书记在每五年一次的党代会上所作的报告——这一会议同时会选出新一届中央委员会、政治局、政治局常委会和其他党的高层机关的领导——构成了党的宗旨的最权威表述。它首先评估中国过去五年来的进步（如果现任总书记在这一次党代会上卸任，则评估他的整个任期）。然后评估中国面临的内外环境，根据新的情况调整党的指导思想，并提出目标，不仅是未来五年的目标，而且还经常提出更长期的目标，并随着时间的推移进一步明确和调整。最后，报告从九大政策领域论述党的战略。²

说习近平在中共十九大上的报告比之前的大多数报告更加激烈是不

实之词。在中国自 1987 年开始实施的“现代化建设三步走战略计划”中³，临近 2020 年的中期发展目标时，习近平不仅将原来提出的本世纪中叶的目标提前 15 年至 2035 年，还提出了新的本世纪中叶目标。⁴这些目标包括中国要成为“综合国力和国际影响力领先的国家”⁵，习近平进一步指出，中国最近成为世界第二大经济体⁶，是党在执政期间始终如一的“振兴中华民族”的雄心壮志的一个里程碑。他形容中国“日益走近世界舞台中央”。⁷在这一讲话中，习近平进一步认为，中国特色社会主义正在为其他谋求现代化建设和维护主权的发展中国家“拓展了发展中国家走向现代化的途径”。⁸习近平的讲话发表时，正值华盛顿讨论中国问题的气氛变得阴郁之际，已经有许多人改而将美中关系描述为战略对手，而他的讲话无疑会给战略对手这一截然有别的讨论添砖加瓦。⁹然而，在此后的近两年里，习近平的讲话中的几个关键主题一直没有在英文世界得到清楚阐述，这些主题应该既能澄清我们对北京对全球秩序的野心的理解，也能使中国的专业观察家们重新审视几十年来主导我们讨论美中关系的范式。¹⁰在讲话中最重要的一段话中，习近平宣称：

中国特色社会主义进入新时代，在中华人民共和国发展史上、中华民族发展史上具有重大意义，在世界社会主义发展史上、人类社会发展史上也具有重大意义。¹¹

下面，我就习近平讲话涉及的中共战略及其对世界秩序的雄心壮志在他所指出的三个方面，做逐一简要剖析：(1)作为党国主要目标的改变中华民族世界地位的发展计划，(2)社会主义在中共的战略中的作用，(3)党要为全人类的未来做出具体的中国贡献的愿望(或者用习近

平报告中的另一句话来说，就是“不断为全球治理贡献中国智慧和力量”）。¹²

一、中共一直以来的目标是把中国发展成为全球领导者

几十年来，特别是在苏联解体后，外部观察家们把中国共产党的主要目标描述为仅仅是为了继续执政。¹³在中国研究相关的几个学科中，占主导地位的研究方案一直是我所说的“问题导向”议程。他们认为，中国共产党的执政由于采用了历史学家 John W. Garver 所说的苏联的“一个功能严重失调的政治经济体制”，并在毛泽东死后抛弃了这一体制的经济体制，但保留了政治体制，他们从而认为这使得中国不能很好地应对市场改革所带来的巨大经济和社会变化。¹⁴这制造了中国领导人被围困和被动的形象，显得他们只想保持经济发展，以平息沸腾的国内问题。中国研究领域的人于是倾向于问：“中国治理方面存在的问题是什么以及中共如何试图解决和无力解决这些问题？”一个必然推论是，中国的外交政策也是受这些相同的国内要求所驱动，即维护经济增长和政治稳定。

我对中国共产党的历史——尤其是毛泽东之后的中共历史——的解读，恰恰与现存学者的观点相反。党对中国的现代化、权力和国际地位的追求不是被动的、防守的、被围困的，而是战略性的、主动的、有目的的。习近平在党的十九大演讲中最显著的特点之一，就是将中国的雄心壮志在全球层面进行了明明白白地阐述（突然地偏离于近几十年的作法）与中共统治下的执政目标的延续性的断言结合在一起。习近平用了很长的篇幅将其标志性的“民族复兴的中国梦”作为党的“初心”和“使命”¹⁵来重塑。一言以蔽之，从毛泽东、邓小平及其

后继者的讲话中解读习近平的讲话——习近平的讲话意在援引他们的语言——就是要认识到，北京的目标是在全球秩序中的卓越地位。党的一贯目标是把中国变成一个“世界上最重要的国家”。

一个现代化的、强大的社会主义现代化国家¹⁶，在世界范围内取得与中国的人民、土地和过去的文化成就相称的领导地位。¹⁷习近平（和他的前辈们）不断强调，他们的目标是发展中国，使中国能够——用毛泽东的话说（习近平自觉地呼应了这句话）——“屹立于世界民族之林”。¹⁸“民族复兴”之所以是一个有效的政治口号，正是因为它代表了 19 世纪中叶鸦片战争以来中国精英阶层的共同心愿。¹⁹这一愿望不仅要把中国变成一个现代化的、强大的国家，而且要把中国变成一个因其在人类所有领域的成就而受人尊敬的国家，而这些领域都是大国衡量自己的标准，如繁荣、军事力量、文化影响、科学发现等。

²⁰同样关键的是，毛泽东和邓小平确定的目标不仅仅是“追赶”“最先进的国家”，而是要超越他们。²¹中共在过去的战略文件和领导讲话中都强调，几十年来²²，党通过国家主导确定长期目标、将目标嵌入计划、进行投资，并在推进过程中对目标进行调整和细化²³，追求全面现代化。在毛泽东领导下，可怕的政策实验造成了数百万人的死亡，但今天的中共领导人却宣称中共的功劳是在四十年内将中国从贫穷落后的国家带入了世界第二大经济体（并且隐含了权力上的）。²⁴

在我的研究中，让我感到惊讶的是，虽然西方大多数观察中国的学者都承认中国共产党寻求使国家现代化和强大，但英文的学术研究却在很大程度上忽略了中共、国家和军队的目标设定和长期规划过程。相反地，关于中国政治的优秀教科书都在探讨日常治理和危机应对的挑

战、国内控制机制以及党的政治继承过程，但却没有向学生和美国政府官员提供中共领导人在战略上的能动性意义方面的理解。²⁵这种忽视可能反映了一种映射效应（mirror imaging）。我们的政治制度不是为了把美国带向一个特定的方向而设计的。如果是为了什么，它的设计是为了防止当下的政治奇思妙想导致的暴政。相比之下，对北京来说，政治的目的是为全面现代化和发展中国的民族主义工程服务。我们现在是时候关注中共推动这一努力思想和制度过程了。我们需要一个关于中国的“目的性”研究项目，研究北京如何在多个领域内构思大国竞争，拆解它所采取的理论、目标和战略，然后评估它们的进展和前景。²⁶

在这里，习近平在党的十九大上的讲话的核心前提是，中国作为第二大国的崛起，需要一套完整的新的国内外政策来应对未来三十年内北京面临的新挑战。²⁷习近平的“新时代”意味着，中国正处在未来三十年实现民族复兴的门槛上，并将在接下来的三十年内迈过这一门槛。对中共来说，虽然从人均水平来看，中国仍然是一个发展中国家，但从整体上看，中国在很多领域都在追赶最先进的国家。此外，今天的经济、技术和军事竞赛提供了一个难得的机会，中共可以在网络、空间、人工智能、深海、北极等新兴领域抓住主动权，参与制定国际规范。²⁸

那么，中国共产党希望在全球秩序中占据主导地位的愿望对华盛顿意味着什么？²⁹事实上，过去几十年来，美国的一些国际关系理论家和一些美国政策制定者都明确主张采取一种战略，既要寻求加强当前的秩序，又要在中国崛起时将其束缚在秩序中，这样，即使美国相对衰

落，秩序的本质也会得到维护。³⁰还有人认为，北京所希望的变化与秩序的最重要特征无关，真正的威胁主要是美国的自尊心(即华盛顿失去地位后的适应能力)。³¹还有人告诫说，历史事例中涉及一个崛起的大国和一个现存的大国的竞争经常会导致战争。³²我认为，这些观点将中国的地位或其在秩序中的参与程度作为关键问题，低估了美中战略竞争的本质，因为它不仅是由对相对权力变化的担忧所驱动，而且更重要的是由在道义上不相容的价值观组成的国内治理体系的竞争所驱动。此外，这些相互竞争的体系之间的竞争，由于它们争相界定那些管理一个单一的、一体化的世界的主导规范和价值观而加剧。为了开始了解原因，我们需要接下来谈谈社会主义在北京战略中的作用。

二、马克思列宁主义社会主义在中共战略中的作用

虽然习近平的报告明确指出，民族复兴是中共一贯的首要目标，但报告也强调了“社会主义”的核心作用——特别是党的特殊品牌的马克思列宁主义，即“中国特色社会主义”。

西方观察家经常从具体的意识形态承诺或关于经济和社会应该如何组织和管理的想法来思考社会主义。在这个词所勾勒出的意象中，有计划经济、经济的国有制或欧洲式的社会福利国家。然而，中共始终将社会主义视为实现国家主权、发展、现代化、强国等民族主义目标的综合工具。事实上，北京认为，社会主义是唯一能够恢复中国的大国地位的工具。2012年11月，习近平在担任总书记的政治局集体学习会上的首次讲话中，通过主张“只有社会主义才能救中国，只有中国的社会主义才能领导我们国家的发展”³³，再现了后毛时代的每一

位中共领导人的声音。

今天，中共对“中国特色社会主义”的定义是由道路，理论（字面意思是“理论体系”），制度（融合了政治和经济体制的系统制度），和文化组成。³⁴ 尽管自 1982 年以来³⁵，中国共产党对“中国特色社会主义”的定义一直在调整，但目前的四个主题都与毛泽东时期对社会主义的理解一致，也与中国共产党反复向自己和中国人民讲述的关于其有权执政的故事一致。

从毛泽东到习近平，中共的领导人都认为，20 世纪中国的其他爱国者试图复兴中国，但都失败了。1919 年的巴黎和会上，德国在中国的殖民特权给了帝国主义日本，事实证明资本主义民主太弱了。相比之下，中共认为，只有走社会主义道路（即党的专政），才能在 1949 年后驱逐帝国主义列强，恢复中国的主权，并在此后的几十年中保护中国的安全。³⁶

中共论证其理论体系作为救国工具，是马克思列宁主义的历史唯物主义主张能够对世界作出“科学的判断”，并根据这些判断来构建政策。³⁷ 在主要的竞争领域，从文化到军事，北京的战略和规划都建立在它精心构建的理论基础上。

中共为其制度体系所做的一贯论证包括：社会主义更善于凝聚集体力量促进发展，这是习近平今天经常引用的说法。事实上，北京甚至宣称其制度的集结力量的能力使其能够更好地对抗 COVID-19 新型冠状病毒。³⁸ 中共还认为，公有制经济的主导作用是必要的，因为 1949 年以前的中国社会遭受了一种资本主义形式的折磨，这种形式的资本主义与帝国主义列强的剥削混杂在一起，延缓了中国的现代化和发展，

如果中国经济完全私有化，这种情况可能会恢复。³⁹

最后，社会主义承诺提供，即提供毛泽东所说的“先进文化”，使中国能够成为现代化的、受国际尊重的中国——超越并反对当时许多中国知识分子所认为的中国传统文化的迷信和腐败——这仍然是中共军事化的世俗信念、现代主义信念的核心组成部分。这一点可以从持续到现在中共高层对文化的讨论中看出，即使北京现在也在寻求利用中国传统文化中那些它认为没有威胁性的部分，并利用它们来抵御挑战中共治理体系的西方政治价值观的影响。⁴⁰

中国共产党在我刚才所概述的马列主义的社会主义上的承诺有两方面的影响，迫使它寻求改变全球秩序。

首先，现行秩序并不能为其政治体制提供安全保障。北京一直认为“西方”试图通过“和平演变”推翻中国的社会主义制度，并担心“西方敌对势力”与中国国内的势力结合起来“分裂”中国，改变中国的政治体制。⁴¹习近平多次重申了这些观点，并在中共十九大上使用了几个旨在涉及这些观点的短语，其中包括中国的谚语“居安思危”（对苏联解体的委婉说法）。⁴²由于这些担心，中国最高领导人几十年来一直主张，国际经济政治新秩序应建立在“和平共处五项原则”的基础上。这些原则可以追溯到1953-1954年与印度的谈判，其内容如下：

“互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处”。⁴³这些原则的核心是国家主权不受侵犯。⁴⁴对北京来说，建立在五项原则基础上的秩序将取消民主化的规范以及美国的全球和地区安全联盟和伙伴关系体系，而这一体系赋予了这一准则潜在的强制力。中共称，美国的这些安全联盟是建立在“冷战思维”的基础

上，实实在在对国际安全构成了威胁。⁴⁵所以，习近平在中共十九大上呼吁将国际关系建立在伙伴关系而不是联盟的基础上。⁴⁶

其次，北京所希望的那种秩序，并不是其社会主义制度仅仅是安全的秩序，而且也是披着光环的秩序。习近平的目标并不是简单地用一些西方学者所使用的粗鲁说法，即“一个专制的世界是安全的。”⁴⁷相反，中国共产党所追求的是一种秩序，在这种秩序中，中国作为一个大国的成就不仅得到承认，而且还被归功于其特殊的社会主义品牌，并被赞誉为社会主义和中华民族的道德胜利。⁴⁸在这里，中国外交官频频向美国发出劝告要求美国尊重中国的“社会制度和发展道路”，不仅是要求美国对中国宽容，也是要求对中国要有道德认同。⁴⁹

习近平在党的十九大的讲话中，对新时代内涵的论述，从中国发展地位的变化立即转到了中国社会主义的威望的影响：

意味着科学社会主义在二十一世纪的中国焕发出强大生机活力，在世界上高高举起了中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜；意味着中国特色社会主义道路、理论、制度、文化不断发展，拓展了发展中国家走向现代化的途径，给世界上那些既希望加快发展又希望保持自身独立性的国家和民族提供了全新选择，为解决人类问题贡献了中国智慧和中国方案。⁵⁰

许多观察家注意到，习近平说中国的社会主义“拓展了发展中国家走向现代化的途径”，这些国家“既希望加快发展又希望保持自身独立性”。这种声称已经确定了自由民主的资本主义现代化道路的替代方案的说法具有巨大的意义。在苏联解体后的几十年里，北京只是坚持认为社会主义是适合中国特定的“国情”。⁵¹正如其他许多人所指出

的那样，这反映出对中共的治理体系的信心在不断增强，这既是由于中国的财富和国力不断增长的记录⁵²，也是由于 2008 年全球金融危机后，中共领导层认为西方发达国家正在蹒跚而行。⁵³

然而，如果说公众的信心是新的，那么党的历史表明，北京在这方面的目标是一贯的。即使在邓小平提出的、江泽民和胡锦涛执行的外交政策方针中，考虑到中国当时的脆弱和苏联解体后社会主义“处于低潮”的地位⁵⁴，中国应该“韬光养晦”，但毛泽东之后的每一位领导人都都信誓旦旦地表示，中国共产党最终将证明社会主义的“优越性”。⁵⁵这一点，而不是像一些人所希望的那样与西方接轨，一直是邓小平的“改革开放”中的“改革”⁵⁶部分的目的，而这仍然是中共“基本路线”⁵⁷的一部分。在其第一个任期开始时，习近平在一次讲话中坚持（讲话全文直到 2019 年 3 月才公布）：

在相当长时期内，初级阶段的社会主义还必须同生产力更发达的资本主义长期合作和斗争，还必须认真学习和借鉴资本主义创造的有益文明成果，甚至必须面对被人们用西方发达国家的长处来比较我国社会主义发展中的不足并加以指责的现实。我们必须有很强大的战略定力，坚决抵制抛弃社会主义的各种错误主张，自觉纠正超越阶段的错误观念。最重要的，还是要集中精力办好自己的事情，不断壮大我们的综合国力，不断改善我们人民的生活，*不断建设对资本主义具有优越性的社会主义，不断为我们赢得主动、赢得优势、赢得未来打下更加坚实的基础。*⁵⁸[斜体强调是本文作者所加]

由于我知道委员会中还有其他人正在就中国共产党是否以及如何在国外推广其模式的问题作证，所以我只想说，如果北京的明确目标是

到本世纪中叶成为国际影响力的全球领导者，那么在 2020 年就断定北京不会输出其模式还为时过早。⁵⁹我请学者们参考一下中共在 1980 年代末 1990 年代初在多个领域提出的现代化目标。⁶⁰如果我们在 1993 年或 1995 年评估他们的进展，可能不会有太大的进步，但中国过去几十年来的成就，使我认为否定中共党代会上提出的这种战略意图的表述是不明智的。⁶¹在论述社会主义在中共战略中的作用时，我最后将用两个理由来结束我的论述：我们应该清楚地认识到，我们与中国的战略竞争是一场意识形态的较量，而不是简单的权力之争。

首先，中共的价值观植根于马克思列宁主义，提供了一种与美国及其盟国的价值观不相容的政治观。在今天的自由世界里，我们把个人视为目的，认为自由是值得优先考虑的，即使它使政治决策变得更加困难和昂贵，即使它有时会损害我们的集体安全或福祉。而列宁主义则把个人作为实现集体目标的手段。⁶²对北京来说，就像列宁一样，集体的物质福利（在党的当代官方词汇中体现为的“共同富裕”）而不是政治自由，是它判断成功与否的标准。⁶³“社会主义国家的综合国力”是一个更进一步的标准⁶⁴，这既符合马克思主义-列宁主义对集体目标而非个人目标的重视，也符合中国革命最终的民族主义工程，我们看到中国革命的“初心”是“就是为中国人民谋幸福，为中华民族谋复兴”。对北京来说，个人的人权，包括言论、集会和宗教自由，为了安全、发展和中华民族的世界地位等集体目的都是可以被践踏的。⁶⁵

然而，除了在政治目标上的不同，列宁主义对政治过程的看法也相当不同。在列宁看来，民主制度只是压迫阶级利益的工具，民主过程只

是当权集团的阶级利益的面具。相反，他主张由一个党根据其对历史规律的科学推演来统治。⁶⁶今天的北京仍然认为，代表中国人民整体利益的中共，代表中国人民整体利益的党，是对抗俘获了自由民主国家的政治进程的特殊利益的堡垒。⁶⁷对中共的领导人来说，专政依然出于镇压中国人民集体利益的敌人的需要而显得合法。⁶⁸更糟糕的是，由于列宁主义将党的思想和决定定义为“科学”和“正确”，对北京来说，异议不是个人利益或特定的小团体利益的合法表达，而是破坏党的集体、国家建设的努力。⁶⁹异议不是政治参与，而是颠覆国家。这些正是习近平的“整体国家安全观”以及他在任内颁布的越来越严格的法律和制度的特点。⁷⁰此外，在过去几年里，中国的外交官们在全球范围内采取了这种做法，力图在国外和国内都扼杀对北京的批评。⁷¹

只要北京的国际姿态是防御性的，这些根本不同的政治观点在中美关系中就可以被掩盖起来：有选择地加入国际机构，参与经济全球化，但不去评估它目前有能力在其前述的价值观之优越性的基础上来进行对抗。而新时代的情况则不同。

正如一些学者已经指出并详细讨论过的那样，北京出于防卫性的原因（消除对其执政体制的威胁）和民族主义的原因（展示中国的影响力和道德的优越性），试图推动制定与其政治价值观相适应的规范和标准（或在没有规范和标准的地方产生新的规范和标准）。⁷²中共努力将人权从政治权利重新定义为“发展权”（物质福利而非政治表达权）和建立“网络主权”的规范是两个有据可查的案例。⁷³

事实上，这就引出了我关于社会主义在中共的意识形态竞争战略中的

作用的第二点。我认为，一些观察家为了坚持认为我们与中国的较量并不是特别的意识形态竞争而提出的一个常见论点暗示的情况却完全相反。我在这里指的是，中国在融入全球经济、国际机构、国际高等教育以及与美国和我们的盟友和伙伴的许多其他形式的联系方面，都非常成功。目前的争论不是像冷战时期那样在不同的阵营或阵营之间进行的争论——每一阵营都在试图颠倒单个国家，而是在一个一体化的全球化世界层面上进行的。然而，这提高了价值观的利害风险，因为我们不能退缩到不同的世界中去，简单地比较哪种体系能带来更多的人类繁荣。对任何一方来说，这不再是 Robert Frost 式的“好的围墙造就好的邻居”。事实上，中共认为，深化世界多领域的相互依存和融合是其继续发展和实现民族复兴的必要条件。⁷⁴

三、新时代以中国为中心的一体化全球秩序

一个单一的、一体化的全球秩序，其相互关联性是以中国的标准和“智慧”为基础的，这一理念是习近平 2015 年向联合国大会提出的“人类命运共同体”愿景的核心，并被写入党章和习近平的中共十九大报告中得到认可。⁷⁵这个词的官方英文译名已经改变了好几次——现在是“Community with a Shared Future for Humanity”（共享未来的人类共同体，译者按）——但“Common Destiny”（共同的命运，译者按）更好地抓住了中文的“共同命运”。作为中共的官方对外关系理论体系的一个组成部分，命运共同体的提出，既源于对世界趋势的评估，也源于对中国地位的评估。其中包括的观点如经济全球化、信息技术革命、中国综合国力不断增强，以及使中国的发展与世界的发展更加相互依存既是中国的弱势，也是潜在影响力的源泉。⁷⁶习

近平在 2016 年新年讲话中的一段话经常被人引用，中央电视台制作的纪录片《大国外交》是中共十九大召开的前奏的一部分，在该片的开篇蒙太奇中使用了这段话，习近平宣称“世界那么大，问题那么多，国际社会期待听到中国声音、看到中国方案，中国不能缺席”。⁷⁷

人类命运共同体中共根据这些评估，对如何在社会主义的基础上形成一种能够实现民族复兴的全球秩序观的问题的回答。它自觉地借鉴了 1949 年以来北京外交的经验，但也明确地借鉴了受到中国传统哲学和治国之道称许的概念。⁷⁸

尽管西方学者指出，习近平并没有发明“命运共同体”这个名词，他最初是在区域性而非全球性的背景下提出的，而且其许多基本原则来自于中国共产党的长期立场⁷⁹，但其提出的愿景很大的偏离了胡锦涛的“和谐世界”理念。胡锦涛早于习近平，几乎正好在十年前在同一会场的一次演讲中就提出了他的愿景。两者表面上都提供了一个中国文化的框架：胡锦涛的“和谐”的哲学思想；习近平的“自古以来，中国人就相信天下一家”。⁸⁰

然而，胡锦涛的设想却强调了儒家的“和而不同”的和谐理念。⁸¹换言之，各国在共同利益上的合作，不仅可以保留各自不同的“社会制度和发展道路”，而且隐含着一定的保留和分离。相比之下，习近平的“共同命运共同体”虽然重复了这种保留差异的主张，但更强调和谐与和平其作为一个具有更深层次的连通性的更加融合的世界的产物。⁸²此外，“命运共同体”的前提不仅包括，中国日益强大的实力为其他国家提供了“使它们搭上中国发展列车”的机会，为中国的喜好建立影响力，而且中国必须开始塑造国际规范和规则⁸³，因为只要

这些规范是西方国家所青睐的自由民主的规范，中国与世界的日益融合就构成了中国的脆弱性。⁸⁴在中共的设想中，北京在从技术到国内治安等所有方面的标准，不仅在影响力上将超过西方，而且还将构成一个更加紧密联系的世界的纽带，在这个世界中，“命运共同体”的利益是如此的诱人，以至于没有一个国家愿意被排除在这个世界之外。

使这一点具有重要意义，并标志着习近平的“新时代”与过去大相径庭的是，虽然胡锦涛的“和谐世界”没有具体实现的载体，但命运共同体有“一带一路倡议”（BRI 或“一带一路”原译为“一带，一路”），它寻求建立“政策、基础设施、贸易、金融和人与人之间的互联互通”⁸⁵，将中国和海洋与陆地的亚洲大陆、非洲、欧洲、大洋洲、拉丁美洲和北极地区联系起来。⁸⁶事实上，尽管北京方面在承认这一点上一直比较谨慎，但中共的设想的是六条链的安全纽带。⁸⁷基础设施部分包括了网络（“数字丝绸之路”）和空间资产，这进一步凸显了“一带一路倡议”是如何通过北京重新连接全球的。⁸⁸可以肯定的是，一带一路只是实现习近平愿景的一个平台。正如 Nadège Rolland 和其他学者所指出的那样，北京既试图在现有的国际多边机构中获取影响力，又在近几十年来在全球多个地区稳步构建自己的区域机构。⁸⁹

鉴于“命运共同体”旨在提供“解决人类问题的中国智慧”以及一种替代性的全球治理方式，替代政治局委员杨洁篪所揶揄的当前全球治理体系中“以西方为中心”的全球治理方式⁹⁰，中国政府认为其提议将如何实现，与美国目前所扮演的角色相比，中国又将扮演怎样的角

色？

在这里，习近平为推动“命运共同体”所使用的语言似乎是为了与中国哲学家和国际关系理论家们的呼吁产生共鸣，他们受到中国古代精英们的“天下”观念的激发，援引传统理念和实践以进行“全球治理”。无可否认，由个别学者所表达的没有中共的官方认证的这些天下思想表现出了相当大的差异性，而且中国学者之间也在争论这些天下思想对中国古代历史实践的引用是否准确。⁹¹此外，虽然有越来越多的文献被翻译成英文，但对于这些天下思想与命运共同体以及北京官方对外关系理论的其他部分所包含的思想之间的智识传送带问题，更多的研究是必要的。然而，在排除了这些注意事项之后，我认为有几个初步的观察是相关的。

尽管，如 Rolland 所指出的那样，“习近平几乎率直地将他对中国掌舵下的世界新秩序的愿景形塑为天下模式的 21 世纪变体”，但命运共同体并没有公开宣称一个延伸到“天下”的以中国为中心的秩序。⁹²然而，命运共同体所阐述的关于如何建立秩序、如何运作的原则与中国学术著作中所确定的原则非常相似。此外，习近平在党的十九大报告的结尾页和每次关于命运共同体的重要讲话中，都引用了中国经典《礼记》中的一段话：“大道之行也，天下为公”，这是当代中国外交官思考天下概念如何运用的经常被援引的文化基石。⁹³在这些讲话中，习近平肯定是在对多种多样的听众讲话，很难想象他的这句话是偶然的。

在几位天下主张者的论述中，中心国家（中国）提供了一个成功的、道义上正确的治理典范，然后边缘国家由于与之相联系利益，自愿

加入到这个秩序中来，并顺应这个秩序。中国社会科学院的哲学家赵汀阳是将“天下为公”的思想作为中国对全球治理的具体贡献的最突出的倡导者之一，他将此称为中国的“漩涡模式”。⁹⁴同时，在习近平看来，作为构建命运共同体的平台，“一带一路倡议”作为支撑全球互联互通的平台，其作用正是理应如此。习近平坚持认为，“全球治理格局取决于国际力量对比，全球治理体系变革源于国际力量对比变化”，然而，中国必须在“遵循广泛协商、共同参与和利益共享的原则”下寻求改变这一体系的共识。⁹⁵

尽管一些西方观察家继续暗示中国主要寻求一个地区性的影响力范围，但习近平的命运共同体和天下理论家们都明确提出了其主张的全球范围。赵汀阳批评西方国际关系理论是建立在个体的国家概念之上（从而导致冲突），他批评西方国际关系理论反对中国的世界作为一个整体的“天下”概念，他进一步认为，如果没有一个涵盖整个世界的政治概念，当代的问题就无法解决。⁹⁶习近平关于命运共同体的论述坚持认为：

人类已经成为你中有我、我中有你的命运共同体，利益高度融合，彼此相互依存。每个国家都有发展权利，同时都应该在更加广阔的层面考虑自身利益，不能以损害其他国家利益为代价。⁹⁷

并认为：

构建人类命运共同体，需要世界各国人民普遍参与。我们应该凝聚不同民族、不同信仰、不同文化、不同地域人民的共识，共襄构建人类命运共同体的伟业。⁹⁸

事实上，在党的十九大召开后不久，习近平在北京召开的世界政党会

议上就坚持：

世界各国人民应该秉持“天下一家”理念，张开怀抱，彼此理解，求同存异，共同为构建人类命运共同体而努力。⁹⁹

这些声明与美国及其盟友将民主和其他国内治理标准作为影响关系的条件，形成了不言自明的对比。北京坚持认为命运共同体是“包容性”的，即中国愿意与各国建立伙伴关系，不论其社会制度和发展状况如何。¹⁰⁰然而，这就引出了一个问题，即这种按照“和而不同”的方式维护的多样性，和与其平行的和谐愿景（通过一带一路倡议下北京辐射出的作为实践共性的有机统一）之间是否存在矛盾？答案之一是，中共似乎认为注重经济发展是解决所有全球性问题的灵丹妙药。

¹⁰¹命运共同体的设想是，通过促进全球互联互通和相互依存，使各国从加入北京正在建立的秩序中受益良多，而非被排除在外，从而驱使它们将搁置争端（无论是与中国的争端，还是其国内的争端），并掩盖对中国的任何批评以获得共同发展的好处。假以时日，更深层次的联系既会产生“相互学习”，也会产生一些趋同。共同发展将使其他国家从中国成为领先国家中受益，而北京构建的以中共标准运行全球关系网络，将巩固中国的领导地位，向全球辐射和谐。

对华盛顿来说，中共的上述愿景说明了北京的野心主要是地区性的——要么是出于恢复帝国中国地位的文化上根深蒂固的愿望，要么是由于北京在其周边地区有许多争端和问题，在这些问题没有解决之前，它不可能有更大的野心——这一说法是对这场较量的错误解读。北京所代表的挑战不是对华盛顿在亚洲的地位的挑战，而是对全球秩序的主导价值观本质的挑战，而这一挑战的载体是努力建设支撑全球化下

一阶段的物质和智力基础设施。中国不是像毛主义盛行时期那样输出暴力革命。相反，它正在寻求从与全球秩序的联系立场出发，重新构建全球秩序。

如果北京成功实现了以中国为中心的秩序愿景，它将如何作为？看起来中国共产党对其所倡导的全球化所产生的道德与和谐愿景似乎有些天真。赵汀阳最近精确陈述其论点的文章（英文发表于 2019 年但写于 2017 年）中的内容，现在看来——鉴于 2019 年 6 月在香港爆发的大规模、持续的抗议运动，这一运动在本文写作时仍在持续——像是一个错误。他在描述天下的成功做法在管理政治和文化多样的中国古代边疆时采用了“一国多制”，这不能不说是参考了北京当局当代管理香港的“一国两制”公式。¹⁰²在这一点上，与之相似的是天下观无力应对经济发展无法掩盖的那些在真正不相容的价值观念，以及列宁主义认为异议是阴谋颠覆的不容忍态度。以中国目前的相对综合国力水平，我们已经有了一个正在显现的有关北京当局的反应的记录，那就是当北京在国外受到批评时，或者当国际机构或国际舆论或海外华人士试图制衡或反击北京当局认为有关其利益攸关之事时，北京当局是如何应对的。我不需要重述过去几年来的记录，只需要在此指出，自 2010 年代初以来，它一直是华盛顿和世界各国首都对中国的阴郁战略认知的一个主要促成因素。

四. 结论和对美国国会的建议

习近平在党的十九大上阐述的雄心壮志突出表明，华盛顿及其盟国面临着一场全球性的战略竞争，其驱动力既来自于相互竞争的国内治理体系所体现的意识形态和价值观，也来自于对不断变化的权力动力学

的看法。虽然这种竞争在许多方面与冷战时期不同，但最重要的区别之一是，它是事关界定规则和规范的一场竞争，这些规则和规范涉及治理一个一体化的、紧密联系的世界，而非一个被分割成竞争阵营的世界。

许多美国观察家对“中国挑战”的反思，都以“把我们自己的家务搞好”为开头或结尾。他们认为，华盛顿必须更好地管理其财政政策，对基础设施和教育进行更好的投资，使美国能够在 21 世纪参与竞争，改善我们的创新基础，修复我们的司法系统，等等。我同意这些建议，但在这里就不赘述了。为了在全球系统竞赛中获胜，我们的系统必须继续提供明显更好的人类繁荣发展之策。然而，仅仅解决美国的弊病是不够的，我们需要把几乎所有的努力都放在该处的理由听起来就像是这样一个论据，即我们可以无视整个中共党国体制（其以构建综合国力为目标）残酷竞争方式。我们不仅要完善我们的制度，还要积极学习和应对北京的制度，同时避免照搬北京的方法。将这一点考虑谨记于心后，在此不做全面的假设，我以一个曾在美国政府国家安全官僚机构工作过的专业中国观察家的身份，从三个方面提出相关建议。

1. *确保美国掌握的竞争对手的信息全面、有根据。*在美国政府和社会寻求提高对中国和北京当局的专业理解时，必须建立新的专业化的题材内容，这些内容要植根于中共对其意图和正在执行的政策的确证记录。寻求快速增加“中国问题的专业知识”的危险在于，我们可能会不经意间将其建立在几十年来导致我们轻视中美间的战略竞争的性质和规模的错误知识基础上。

a. 在这里，国会能够起到帮助作用的一个关键领域是审查和推

动美国政府努力翻译在中国出版的中共、国家、军队、官方媒体和学术界（经常是政府赞助的）的文件。根据我的判断，尽管政策制定者对中国的关注度越来越高，在我的职业生涯中。这方面的努力与中美竞争规模相比是远远不够的，。

b. 一个相关的领域是，国会可以寻求提高美国人对马克思列宁主义的理解，以及它怎样与我们的价值观不同。国会在 1993 年成立的共产主义受害者纪念基金会就是这种工作的一个出色例子。我们需要在大规模的基础上进行这样的工作。

2. *重塑国家安全机构及联合机制以进行制度竞争。*面对过去的竞争，有时在灾难已经发生后，美国重新安排了外交事务机构和国家安全机构，或者建立了新的机构。今天的结构反映了二战后的一系列改革。1947 年的《国家安全法》建立了执行冷战的结构。在越战和 1980 年营救伊朗人质事件失败后，1986 年的《戈德华特-尼科尔新国防部改组法》（Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986），开启了美军成为真正意义上的联合部队之路。9/11 事件后的情报改革使美国的国家安全机构重新调整，以应对暴力极端组织。¹⁰³我们现在的机构是否是为 21 世纪与习近平新时代的中国进行全球竞争而建立的？联合部队和美国的情报机构近二十年来一直以打击暴力极端主义组织为目标，而不是以世界第二大经济体和第二大军事力量（渴望成为世界第一）的对手为目标，这一对手的经济和体制与我们的经济和体制交织在一起，其领导人声称要提供一条通往现代化的替代路线。

3. *在共同价值联盟的基础上捍卫当前的国际秩序。*在过去的几十年里，我的印象是，由于担心我们的盟友和伙伴不愿意“选边站”，

所以美国没有对中国采取更强硬的竞争立场。然而，在过去几年里，北京在国内和国际上的粗暴行动使价值观的反差更加明晰，对北京的意图采取天真的看法对我们的盟国和伙伴的利益造成的危险更加明显。在某些情况下——新西兰和澳大利亚在北京扩大影响力的行动问题上——我们的盟友率先做出了表率。美国必须继续在必要时采取勇敢行动。我们还需要在“自由世界”中建立广泛的国家联盟，分享我们的价值观和利益，并交换意见和协调行动。我们不应响应北京当局的“美国对中国”的框架，我们应该强调的是中共通过在多个领域争辩其价值观和推动替代性选择，将“系统性的竞争”强加于自由世界。

¹⁰⁴ 赢取胜利的方法不是每个民主国家单独与北京竞争或谈判。捍卫冷战后民主价值观在国际秩序中的主导地位是一项团队运动。国会可以在这里发挥巨大的作用，通过与我们的盟友和伙伴的立法机构的开展拓展、教育和交流活动，这些盟友和伙伴都在寻求捍卫和维护我们共同的价值观。

谢谢。

¹ At a rare Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in June 2018, Xi urged China to “lead the reform of the global governance system.” See Xi Jinping, “Using the Thought on Diplomacy for New-Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as a Guide to Create a New Landscape in Majorcountry Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2019, p. 550.

² The nine policy areas are economics, politics, culture, social affairs, the environment, national defense, national reunification (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau), foreign affairs, and party building. Along with the report of a Party Congress, the “general program” of the Party’s constitution (revised at each Party Congress) represents the most authoritative description of its strategy for the country. The general program is even more authoritative than the report but extremely succinct. This account of the role of the Party Congress report and the approach my research adopts to reading the Party’s strategy via its authoritative, public documents build upon those outlined and advocated in Timothy R. Heath, “What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC’s National Strategy,” *Asian Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 54-72 and Alice Miller, “How to Read Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Political Report,” *China Leadership Monitor*, Issue 53, Spring 2017, available at: [hoover.org/research/how-read-xi-jinpings-19th-party-congress-political-report](https://www.hoover.org/research/how-read-xi-jinpings-19th-party-congress-political-report), accessed June 12, 2017. See also Alice Miller, “Valedictory: Analyzing the Chinese Leadership in an Era of Sex, Money, and Power” *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 57, Fall 2018, available at:

hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm57-am-final.pdf , accessed September 3, 2018.

³ See Xi Jinping, “Study, Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress,” *The Governance of China*, Foreign Languages Press, 2014, pp. 20-21, note 20.

⁴ For Xi’s affirming the Party’s 2020 goals, and enunciation of 2035 and mid-century goals, see Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, available at: xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf, accessed November 3, 2017, pp. 23-25. For the 1987 version of Beijing’s mid-century goals see Zhao Ziyang, “Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Report Delivered at the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25, 1987, in *Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (1987)*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, p. 18. The English description of modernization goals for mid-century as expressed in 1987 and for 2035 as expressed by Xi in 2017 is not an exact match, but the Chinese (基本实现现代化) is. Further, with respect to the Party’s development goals for the military (p. 48 in Xi’s report), in adopting “world-class” as the second of two long-term targets in place of the prior goal of attaining full modernization by mid-century, the 19th Party Congress explicitly

accelerated the PLA's long-term modernization targets by fifteen years. This is explained in the chapter on the PLA in the Central Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部), *习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想三十讲 (Thirty Lectures on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era)*, Beijing, Study Publishing House, 2018, p. 272.

⁵ For the quote “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” (综合国力和国际影响力领先的国家), see Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 25. The term “composite national strength” (综合国力) has elsewhere been translated “comprehensive national power.”

⁶ Ibid., p. 2

⁷ Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 2. In discussing the new era, Xi maintains (p. 9) “It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind” (我国日益走近世界舞台中央). Here “center stage” is literally “center of the world stage.”

⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

⁹ A seminal article which captures the present reevaluation of U.S.-China relations is Ely Ratner and Kurt M. Campbell, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2018, pp. 60-70. A prominent

entry on the other side of the debate that acknowledges the darkening conversation is M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swain, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel, “China is Not an Enemy,” *The Washington Post*, 3 July 2019, available at: [washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html), accessed October 7, 2019.

¹⁰ The most extensive English treatment of “the new era” in the context of Party history, which discusses the significance of the Party’s change in “the principal contradiction” but does not address the implications for China’s role in the world identified by Xi’s report is Alice L. Miller, “Only Socialism Can Save China; Only Xi Jinping Can Save Socialism” *China Leadership Monitor*, Issue No. 56 (Spring 2018), available at: [hoover.org/research/only-socialism-can-save-china-only-xi-jinping-can-save-socialism](https://www.hoover.org/research/only-socialism-can-save-china-only-xi-jinping-can-save-socialism), accessed September 3, 2018.

¹¹ Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 11.

¹² Ibid., p. 54.

¹³ See, for example, Stein Ringen, *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016, p. 3: “For the party-state, there is one single supreme determination: its own perpetuation.”

¹⁴ John W. Garver, *China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 1.

After framing his magisterial study of the history of China's foreign policy as the outworking of the Party's decision to embrace the Soviet model and then discard part of it, in the same introductory chapter Garver also maintains (p. 6) that the Party elite was able to discard the Soviet economic model after Mao's death precisely because they had embraced Marxism-Leninism for the instrumental purpose of making China "rich and strong." I agree with this view and would only add that the Party continues to cling to its dictatorship not just out of self-interest, but also out of genuine belief that "The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics provides the fundamental institutional guarantee for progress and development in contemporary China." Xi, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," p. 14.

¹⁵ Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," p. *i* (pdf has no number or label on first page, starts with "1" on second page); pp. 8-15.

¹⁶ The phrase "a modern, powerful socialist country," as the Party's aim is common to the post-Mao but pre-reform era 11th Party Congress in 1977, the 12th Party Congress (the first in the "reform era," held in 1982), and the 19th Party Congress held in 2017. Further, common to the Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee which began the reform era, the 1981 *Resolution on Communist Party History* that officially evaluated the Mao Zedong era, and then-General

Secretary Hu Yaobang's report to the 12th Party Congress in 1982 is the narrative that the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had been an aberration in an otherwise continuous effort to make China a modern, powerful socialist country. See: *Resolution on CPC History (1949-81)*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1981, pp. 73-74. The aim of modernity and power is also quite clear from Mao's speeches in the 1940s and early to mid-1950s. Mao referred to the Party's aim as a "great, socialist country" (伟大的社会主义国家) in his "Strive to Build a Great Socialist Country," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume V*, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1977, p. 149. At times, Mao also used the character "强" (strong) for example, calling for an "independent, free, prosperous, democratic, and strong" China in his opening speech to the 7th Party, Congress, "China's Two Possible Destinies," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, pp. 201. He also employed the phrase "a powerful, industrialized socialist country" in "Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume V*, p. 155. In addition to "shifting the emphasis of our Party's work" to "socialist modernization," the communique of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee ended with an expression of the Party's goal as a "modern, great, strong socialist country" (现代化的伟大社会主义强国). "Communique of the Third Plenary Session Of the 11th Central Committee of The Communist Party of China," available at: bjreview.com/nation/txt/2009-05/26/content_197538.htm, accessed August 5, 2017.

¹⁷ See, for example, Mao, “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume V*, pp. 313-315. Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Party Congress, cited above, p. 9 maintains:

Today’s world is characterized by a rapidly growing revolution in technology, increasingly intense market competition and a volatile political situation. We are faced with formidable and pressing challenges. If we do not recognize this and redouble our efforts, our country and our people may fall further behind, and China will not be able to take its rightful place in the world.

See also note 20 below.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 25. Xi’s 19th Party Congress report phrase translated “The Chinese nation will become a proud and active member of the community of nations” (中华民族将以更加昂扬的姿态屹立于世界民族之林) invokes phrases of Mao’s from the mid-1930s expressing the same purpose. The official English rendering of Mao’s parallel quote is: “We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts, and the ability to stand on our own feet in the family of nations.” Mao Tse-tung, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” December 27, 1935, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume I*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 170. Both Mao and Xi use phrase “屹立于世界民族之林” (literally, “among the world forest of nations”).

¹⁹ Xi’s famous speech, just after taking power, where he first articulated his “Chinese Dream,” begins with a reference to the Opium War on the first page. See Xi Jinping, “Achieving Rejuvenation is the Dream of the Chinese People” *The Governance of*

China, pp. 37-39. For Xi's predecessors' invocation of the Opium War and the Party's recovery of China's stature where others failed, see: Mao Tse-tung "The Chinese People Have Stood Up," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume V*, pp. 16-17, and his "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," In Commemoration of the Twenty eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China, June 30, 1949, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV*, p. 411-424; Deng Xiaoping, "Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992)*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, pp. 72-75; Jiang Zemin, "Speech at a Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2013, pp. 259-260, and Hu Jintao, "Speech at a Meeting Commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," July 1, 2011, available at: chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpnationalcongress/2011-07/01/content_29714325.htm, accessed March 11, 2018.

²⁰ Chinese leaders throughout the post-Mao era have linked discussions of seeking China's transformation into a powerful, modern country and its long-term development goals with the notion of "making a greater contribution (贡献) to humanity (人类). This references two speeches by Mao Zedong in 1956. In the first, Mao lamented China's backwardness and suggested that given its size, it ought to make a greater contribution. In the second, he argued that once China became more developed, over the course of several five-year plans, by the year 2001, it would make

greater contributions. See Mao, “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions,” cited above, and “In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” both in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Volume V*, 18pp. 314-315 and pp. 330-331 respectively. For other leaders, see Hua Kuo-feng, “Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” available at: bjreview.com.cn/90th/2011-04/26/content_357494_8.htm, accessed August 4, 2017; Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at the National Conference of The Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992)*, pp. 144-150; Jiang Zemin, “Let Us Create a Better World Together,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume I*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2010, p. 470; Hu Jintao, “Speech at a Meeting Commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” cited above.

²¹ See Mao, “Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume V*, pp. 314-315 and Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-1982)*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984, pp. 174-175. See also Deng’s agenda-setting speech in 1980: “The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” in the same volume, pp. 224-258, where he talks about demonstrating the superiority of socialism “in many ways” including, “first and foremost” in the rate of economic growth (p. 236). Apart from continuously insisting that they would demonstrate the superiority of socialism (see also note 50 below), one place Chinese leaders in the reform era disclosed their desire to catch up with and pass the most advanced countries was in

their commemorations of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, where they would quote those ambitions as his (thus borrowing his voice). Jiang Zemin, for example, maintains, “He [Sun] believed that to catch up with and surpass economically developed Western countries, we should ‘open China to the outside world.’” See “In Commemoration of Sun Yat-sen,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume I, p. 580. Jiang then (p. 581) quotes Sun, “When China becomes powerful and prosperous, we should not only restore the nation to its rightful position but also assume greater responsibilities in the world” before quoting Mao’s similar language on this.

²² Mao Zedong had originally articulated the goal of modernization by the end of the 20th century. See his discussions in “On the Draft Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” *Speech at the Thirtieth Session of the Central People’s Government Council*, June 14, 1954, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, pp. 145-146, and “Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China,” March 1955, in the same volume, p. 155. In the early post-Mao era (1976-1987), the end of the twentieth century remained the explicit deadline. This is the objective identified in Hua Guafeng’s report to the 11th Party Congress in 1977 (see note 20 above for the availability of that text) and Deng Xiaoping’s agenda-setting speech in 1980 on the eve of his wresting power from Hua. See Deng, “The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume II (1975-1982), p. 226. While there is also more continuity than generally recognized across the Mao and post-Mao eras, the functional policy areas in which the Party is seeking to realize its vision of a comprehensive modernity (i.e. not

just economics and the military but also culture etc.)exhibits great consistency since the mid-1980s. Then General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's 1987 encapsulation of the mid-century end state for China as "a strong, modern, democratic, and culturally advanced socialist country" (富强、民主、文明的社会主义现代化国家) remains the Party's explicit goal as expressed in the preamble of the Party's constitution. Only three words have been added to the phrase since: the word "harmonious" (和谐, in 2007 to reflect prioritization of social welfare), the word "beautiful" (美丽, in 2017 to reflect prioritization of a clean environment), and an extra "强" (strong, powerful) added in front of country (国家), in 2017, which the official translation rendered as "great." See Zhao, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," pp 16-17. From 1992, this description was contained in the Party's constitution, amended at each Party Congress. For the texts of past Party Constitutions, see the pages for each Party Congress available at: cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html, accessed April 30, 2018.

²³ See also notes 3 and 22 above. Jiang Zemin's report to the 16th Congress in 2002 identified the goal of achieving a "moderately prosperous society in all respects" (全面建设小康社会) by the centenary of the Party's founding in 2021. This reflected a more comprehensive vision of well-being than Deng's original target of "a moderately prosperous society" by the end of the 20th century, which had been expressed solely in terms of per capita GDP. (China hit Deng's original target). For Jiang's explanation of the target, see "Explicitly Set the Objective of Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects," Excerpt from a speech at a drafting group meeting for the

Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III, pp. 400-404. The 2020 target, however, also includes goals for improving the “complete set of systems” by which the Party governs China identified by Deng Xiaoping in 1992 and affirmed by Jiang at the 14th and 15th Party Congresses in 1992 and 1997. The Chinese texts of these Party Congress reports are available at cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html, accessed October 1, 2017. For Deng’s original remark, see Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” January 18-February 21, 1992, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992), p. 360.

²⁴ Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” pp. 8-9.

²⁵ William A. Joseph’s *Politics in China: An Introduction*, Third Edition, New York: Oxford, 2019, along with one brief historical reference, makes a single reference to the continued existence of five-year plans in a chapter on political economy and a similarly short mention in the chapter on the environment. Although it contains a few more scattered references, Sebastian Heilmann (ed.), *China’s Political System*, Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2017, devotes only two pages of a 427-page volume (excluding index etc.) to the planning process. A prior influential text, Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Second Edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, devotes less than two pages to planning, only to indicate its decline. For a rare and valuable account of the persistence of planning

with a focus on policy coordination instead of directly administering the economy, see Sebastian Heilmann and Oliver Melton, “The Reinvention of Development Planning in China, 1993–2012,” *Modern China*, Vol. 39, No. 6 (November 2013), pp. 580–628.

²⁶ A pioneering effort to call attention to the role of the Party’s continued construction of theory to guide its strategy is Timothy R. Heath, *China’s Governing Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014.

²⁷ Xi Jinping’s report explains that the Party was able to answer “the question of the era” and come up with “The Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era” in part owing to that “our Party has continued to uphold dialectical and historical materialism...” It maintains:

*Since our 18th National Congress, changes both in and outside China, and the progress made in all areas of China’s endeavors, have presented us with a profound question—the question of an era. Our answer must be a systematic combination of theory and practice and must address what kind of socialism with Chinese characteristics the new era requires us to uphold and develop, and how we should go about doing it. This involves fundamental issues like the overarching objectives, tasks, plan, and strategy for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era; like the direction, model, and driving force of development, and the strategic steps, external conditions, and political guarantees. As well as this, to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, we should, based on new practice, **undertake theoretical***

analysis and produce policy guidance on the economy, political affairs, rule of law, science and technology, culture, education, the wellbeing of our people, ethnic and religious affairs, social development, ecological conservation, national security, defense and the armed forces, the principle of “one country, two systems” and national reunification, the united front, foreign affairs, and Party building. [emphasis added]

Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” pp. 15-16.

²⁸ In a 2016 speech to a Politburo study session on global governance, Xi talked about “participating in actively creating governance rules in many emerging fields” such as the polar regions, the internet, outer space etc. Xi, “Improve Our Ability to Participate in Global Governance,” *The Governance of China II*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 2017, pp. 487-490. He called for China to “seize the global initiative in a new round of global competition” in “Build China into a World Leader in Science and Technology” in the same volume, pp. 294. In Xi’s 2018 Chinese New Year address, he further maintained that China “has achieved the great leap from catching up with the times to leading the times” (实现了从“赶上时代”到“引领时代”的伟大跨越). See “Address at the 2018 New Year’s Gathering (“在 2018 年春节团拜会上的讲话”), *The People’s Daily*, February 15, 2018, page 2, available at: politics.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0215/c1001-29824702.html, accessed February 19, 2018.

²⁹ There is, of course, considerable debate in the Western literature about the nature of the order. For a useful primer, see Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, *Understanding the Current International Order*, Washington, DC: RAND, 2016.

³⁰ See, for example, the discussion in G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 342-348.

³¹ Michael D. Swaine maintains that “the notion that Beijing is committed to overturning the global order invokes an exceedingly narrow and questionable democracy-centered definition of that order and thus grossly distorts the scope of the Chinese criticisms” in his “The U.S. Can’t Afford to Demonize China: The relationship between Beijing and Washington is collapsing fast, to everyone’s detriment” *Foreign Policy*, June 29, 2018, available at: foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/29/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-demonize-china/, accessed July 2, 2018. Paul Heer maintains that:

In sum, China is a challenge to the United States and its allies not primarily because of its ideology, or because it seeks to overthrow the international system or prevail over Washington in a zero-sum contest. Its challenge is not primarily to the US political and economic system or even its military security. Instead, it is—first and foremost—to the longstanding US conception of its role in the international system and within East Asia in particular. China is making a bid for strategic influence, economic and technological advantage, international respect, freedom of action, and

accommodation of its interests—all in areas where the United States has long enjoyed preeminent power and influence, and is not inclined to concede it.

See his “Understanding the Challenge from China” The Asan Forum, April 3, 2018, available at: theasanforum.org/understanding-the-challenge-from-china/, accessed: October 9, 2018,

³² Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

³³ The phrase in Chinese “只有社会主义才能救中国，只有社会主义才能发展中国。” See Xi Jinping, “Study, Disseminate, and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress,” in Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*, p. 7. While the full phrase is Deng’s, it is also arguably implicit in Mao’s combination of the phrase “only socialism can save China” and his argument that the link between imperialism and capitalism in China had retarded China’s modernization and development. See, for example, the Party’s 1939 textbook, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, printed in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume II, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, pp. 305-334, and referenced in Mao’s “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, pp. 16-17. Every leader from Deng Xiaoping has repeated the Party’s mantra that “Only socialism can save China; only socialism can develop China.” See: Deng Xiaoping, “Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation of Leadership” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume III (1982-1992), p. 302; Jiang Zemin, “Basic Conclusions Drawn from China’s 40-Year History,” *Selected Works of*

Jiang Zemin, Volume I, 2010, p. 64; Hu Jintao, “在庆祝中华人民共和国成立六十周年大会上的讲话” (“Speech at a Meeting to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China”), 胡锦涛文选第三卷 (Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Volume III), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016, p. 271.

³⁴ The full passage is:

The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the only path to socialist modernization and a better life for the people. The theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the right theory to guide the Party and people to realize national rejuvenation. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics provides the fundamental institutional guarantee for progress and development in contemporary China. The culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics is a powerful source of strength that inspires all members of the Party and the people of all ethnic groups in China. Our whole Party must strengthen our confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. We must neither retrace our steps to the rigidity and isolation of the past, nor take the wrong turn by changing our nature and abandoning our system.

Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 14. For a description of the institutions involved in the Party’s definition of socialism with Chinese characteristics as a system, see Xi, “Study, Disseminate, and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress,” in Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*, p. 10 and notes 14-16 on pp.

20-21.

³⁵ The Party dates the phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to a speech of Deng Xiaoping’s at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, but its contours became more clearly established and encapsulated in the Party’s “basic line” at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 (see note 57 below). From 1987, the title of every report presented by a general secretary to a Party Congress has included “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in its title. For the texts of Party Congress reports, see: cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html, accessed March 9, 2018. For Deng’s speech, in which he said China should “blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics” (p. 14), see his “Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume III (1982-1992), pp. 13-16. For the party’s dating socialism with Chinese characteristics to the 12th Congress, see, for example, Jiang Zemin, “Accelerate Reform, Opening Up, and Modernization and Achieve Greater Success in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” Report at the Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC, October 12, 1992, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume I, p. 203.

³⁶ Mao made this argument in his “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” p. 15, on its endurance in the post-Mao era, see the Resolution on CPC History (1949-81), p. 12. On the possibility of falling back into colonial exploitation if China abandoned its political system, see Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 speech, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume II (1975-1982), p. 174. Similarly, Xi maintains in “Uphold and Consolidate the Party’s Ideological

Leadership,” *The Governance of China II*, p. 356 that:

Since the end of the Cold War, some countries, affected by Western values, have been torn apart by war or afflicted with chaos. If we tailor out practices to Western capitalist values, measure our national development by means of the Western capitalist evaluation system, and regard Western standards as the sole standards for development, the consequences will be devastating—we will have to follow others slavishly at every step, or we subject ourselves to their abuse.

³⁷ See notes 26 and 27 above.

³⁸ Even before China’s breathtaking economic growth of the past several decades, Chinese leaders maintained that socialism’s capacity to marshal collective effort was the only means of addressing China’s backwardness. Indeed, Xi (for example, in “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” *The Governance of China*, p. 24) and his predecessors have repeatedly affirmed an argument of Deng’s that “One way in which socialism is superior to capitalism is that under socialism the people of the whole country can work as one and concentrate their strength on key projects.” See, Deng Xiaoping, “In the First Decade, Prepare of the Second,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992)*, p. 26. On the claim of faster growth under socialism, see Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-1982)*, pp. 174-176; and “The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” in the same volume, p. 236. See also Jiang Zemin, “Implement the Strategy of Reinvigorating China Through Science and Education,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume I*, p. 414, and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛

涛), “在庆祝我国首次带人航天飞行圆满成功大会上的讲话” (“Speech at the Conference to Celebrate the First Successful Manned Space Flight in China”), 胡锦涛文选第二卷 (Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Volume II), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016, p. 113. For Xi’s claim that the World Health Organization head had praised “the advantages of China’s system” see: Xi Jinping, “新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情防控工作时的讲话” (“Speech at Work on New Coronavirus Pneumonia,”) 求实 (Seeking Truth), No. 4, 2020, February 15, 2020, available at: qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/15/c_1125572832.htm, accessed March 3, 2020.

³⁹ Part of the “system” of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the “basic economic system,” which, “refers to the economic system in which public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership develop side by side.” Xi Jinping, “Study, Disseminate, and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress,” p. 21, note 16. For Mao’s argument and its repetition by subsequent leaders, see Mao, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II, pp. 305-334; Deng Xiaoping, “We Shall Draw on Historical Experience and Guard Against Wrong Tendencies,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III, pp. 224-227; Jiang Zemin, “Consolidate and Strengthen the Economic Base of Socialism,” Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III, pp. 69-71.

⁴⁰ See Mao, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up!” Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume V, p. 18, and “On Coalition Government” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume III, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, pp. 254-255. For the endurance

of these themes, see for example, Jiang Zemin, “Speech at a Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume III, pp. 270-273. The tension between the necessity of the integration with the world (the “opening” portion of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening”) and the possibility this risked “spiritual pollution” undermining support for socialism in China represented a major focus of the Party’s governing challenge well before the Tiananmen demonstrations and collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. See the account in Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Under Jiang and Hu, these goals and tensions have persisted. Jiang’s signature ideological contribution “The Three Represents” asserts that the Party has always represented “advanced culture” and both Jiang and Hu held Central Committee plenums on culture during their tenures. See Jiang Zemin, “Build a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Initiate a New Phase in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, November 8, 2002, Report at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, in *Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume III, pp. 519-525. See also: Jiang Zemin, “Major Tasks on the Publicity and Ideological Front” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin* Volume I, p. 485, and “Energetically Initiate a New Phase in Promoting Socialist Cultural and Ethical Progress” in the same volume, pp. 556-571; Hu Jintao, “在社会主义先进文化引领下建设和谐文化,” (“Construct a Harmonious Culture Under the Guidance of Advanced Socialist Culture”), *Selected Works of Hu Jintao*, Volume II, pp. 538-544, and “坚定不移走中国特色社会主义文

化发展道路” (“Unswervingly Take the Path of Socialist Cultural Development with Chinese Characteristics”), *Selected Works of Hu Jintao*, Volume III, pp. 563-566. Xi Jinping’s seminal speech on this issue, delivered on December 30 2013 to the 12th group study session of the Politburo under his leadership, is “Enhance China’s Cultural Soft Power,” *The Governance of China*, pp. 178-180.

⁴¹ China’s leaders from Mao to Xi have seen “the West” as seeking to overturn its socialist system via “peaceful evolution” and “hostile Western forces” combining with forces within China to “split” the country and change its political system. Further, Beijing has long believed China’s growing integration with the world—necessary to sustain its rise—increases pressure on its domestic governance system. See Xi, “Uphold and Consolidate the Party’s Ideological Leadership” *The Governance of China II*, pp. 354-358. On Mao’s concerns about “peaceful evolution,” see, Qiang Zhai, “1959: Preventing Peaceful Evolution,” *China Heritage Quarterly*, No. 18, June 2009. See also Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume III (1982-1992), p. 368. This is also a theme of Jiang and Hu’s speeches throughout their tenures. See, Jiang Zemin, “Our Diplomatic Work Must Unswervingly Safeguard the Highest Interests of the State and the Nation,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume I, p. 303 and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), “国际形势和外交工作” (“The International Situation and Our Foreign Affairs Work”), *Selected Works of Hu Jintao*, Volume II, p. 509.

⁴² The translations in the English report vary, but the Chinese is 居安思危. The Party’s leaders have consistently urged its members to 居安思危, a term that also

appears in the 16th-18th Party Congress reports and is further the title of an official documentary composed during the Hu Jintao years about the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union. See Arthur Waldron, “Chinese Analyses of Soviet Failure: The Party,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, November 19, 2009, available at: jamestown.org/program/chinese-analyses-of-soviet-failure-the-party/, accessed October 2, 2017.

⁴³ China’s top leaders consistently invoke Deng Xiaoping’s in 1988 having called for a “new international order.” See, for example, Hu Jintao, “The International Situation and Our Foreign Affairs Work”, cited above, p. 515. The foreign affairs sections of the reports delivered to Party Congresses by Jiang Zemin from 1992-2002 repeated Deng’s cry for a new international order built upon the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (和平共处五项原则). For the official definition of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” see footnote six in Xi, “Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,” *The Governance of China*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ Xi Jinping, “A New Partnership of Mutual Benefit and a Community of Shared Future,” *The Governance of China II*, p. 571.

⁴⁵ On the need for a new, regional security architecture in Asia without “Cold War” thinking and without alliances, see for example, Xi Jinping’s May 2014 speech to the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, “New Approach for Asian Security Cooperation,” *The Governance of China*, pp. 389-296. On the subject of “building a global network of partnerships,” see: Xi, “China’s Diplomacy Must Benefit Its Major-Country Status,” p. 482-483.

⁴⁶ Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p.53.

⁴⁷ For the “world safe for autocracy” argument, see Jessica Chen Weiss, “An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy,” chapter submitted for inclusion in Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle (eds.), *Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas*, available at: <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/work-in-progress.html>, accessed October 7, 2019.

⁴⁸ In Xi’s 1 July 2016 speech on the Party’s 95th anniversary, he maintains that China, with a 5,000-year history is lending vitality to socialism with a 500-year history via 60 years of achievements, during which China has gone from poverty to the second largest economy in the world in the course of 30 years. The truncated version of the speech printed in his *The Governance of China II*, pp. 32-48 as “Stay True to Our Original Aspiration and Continue Marching Forward” omits this passage, but the full text is available online at: news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-07/01/c_1119150660.htm, accessed August 5, 2017.

⁴⁹ At times, Chinese officials shorten this to “development path.” See, for example, the official text of Xi’s press statement during President Trump’s visit to Beijing in November 2017, “Mutually Beneficial Cooperation Between China and the U.S. is the Only Right Choice and the only Pathway Toward a Better Future,” *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, p. 507.

⁵⁰ Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p.9.

⁵¹ See, for example, Jiang Zemin, “The Future of Socialism Remains as Bright as Ever,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, Volume I, p. 327.

⁵² For two views of the origins of this growing confidence see Nadège Rolland, *China’s Vision for a New World Order*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #83, January 2020, available at nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf, accessed January 27, 2020, pp. 15-16, and Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnston, “Mapping China’s Global Governance Ambitions: Democracies Still Have Leverage to Shape Beijing’s Reform Agenda,” Center for American Progress, February 2019, available at americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466768/mapping-chinas-global-governance-ambitions/, accessed December 7, 2019.

⁵³ Beijing seldom directly promotes its alternative in the same sentence as a criticism of the Western model, but in one place argues how the Western model has failed, while in another passage proclaiming what China officers. See for example, the discussion in State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China and the World in the New Era” September 2019, available at: english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html, accessed March 4, 2020, p. 18, and Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), “推动构建人类命运共同体（认真学习宣传贯彻党的十九大精神）” (“Promote the Building of a

Community of Human Destinies (Seriously Study, Propagate and Implement the 19th CPC National Congress Spirit”)), The People’s Daily, November 19, 2017, available at: paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-11/19/nw.D110000renmrb_20171119_1-06.htm, accessed February 9, 2018.

⁵⁴ On socialism at a low ebb, see Jiang Zemin, “The Future of Socialism Remains as Bright as Ever,” Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume I, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2010 p. 327. On the resulting foreign policy guideline often summarized by Western scholars as “hide and bide” see Jiang Zemin, “The Present International Situation and Our Diplomatic Work,” Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume II, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2012, pp. 191-202.

⁵⁵ The 8th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 18th, and 19th Party Congress reports all contain versions of this phrase about the superiority (优越性) of socialism or of the socialist system. The texts of these Party Congress reports are available at cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html, accessed October 1, 2017. Even in the wake of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, Deng maintained: “We shall be satisfied if history proves the superiority of China’s socialist system,” in “China Will Never Allow Other Countries to Interfere in Its Internal Affairs” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992), p. 347. Jiang Zemin called exemplifying “the superiority of socialism over capitalism” one of the “fundamental tasks of socialism” in his “Speech at a Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China,” cited above, p. 268.

Xi frequently refers to the superiority of socialism as well. See, for example, Xinhua's coverage of his speech at the 42rd Collective Study Session of the Politburo: “习近平：继续推进马克思主义中国化时代化大众化” (Xi Jinping: Continuously Promote a Marxism in China that is Sinicized, Keeps Up with the Times, and Reflects the Masses), September 29, 2017, available at:

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/29/c_1121747887.htm, accessed October 2, 2017.

⁵⁶ Among the eight “makes clear” (明确) that define socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” in Xi's report to the 19th Party Congress is that: “It makes clear that the overall goal of deepening reform in every field is to improve and develop the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and modernize China's system and capacity for governance.” For continuity on this theme about the object of reform, see, for example, Jiang Zemin, “The Objective of Political Restructuring is to Improve the Socialist Political System,” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III*, pp. 228-232. See also Deng Xiaoping “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-1982)*, p. 304.

⁵⁷ For an excellent exegesis, of the concept of the basic line, see Heath, *China's New Governing Party Paradigm*, p. 60. From 1992, the basic line has been contained in the Party's constitution, amended at each Party Congress. The basic line (基本路线), the successor to the Maoist “general line” (总路线), is, as Heath has argued, the Party's “national strategy in a sentence.” It contains an expression of both Beijing's desired end for its present stage of socialist development and the bedrock policies designed to

get there. As amended at the 19th Party Congress, it reads:

The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and pioneering effort, making economic development the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening up, so as to see China becomes a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.

“Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017, available at news.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf, accessed November 3, 2017.

⁵⁸ Xi Jinping, “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Tanner Greer (trans.), available at: palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/, accessed July 01, 2019.

⁵⁹ In the wake of international media attention to the passage in Xi’s 19th Party Congress report about providing a new option for developing countries, Beijing has sought to dampen international concern by publicly denying the Party seeks to export its model. See, Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Build a Better World” Keynote speech at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting in Beijing, December 1, 2017, in *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, p. 525. Yet the venue Xi used was a meeting of world political parties Beijing

called precisely to promote its vision for the international order and promote its domestic governance model, holding seminars for African countries, for example, on “party-building.” See Xinhua, “Xi calls on world political parties to build community with shared future,” December 2, 2017, available at: xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/02/c_136794028.htm, accessed April 30, 2018; Xinhua, “CPC to share party-building experience with world political parties,” December 2, 2017, available at: xinhuanet.com/English/2017-12/02/c_136796024_2.htm, accessed April 30, 2018.

⁶⁰ The plan had interim targets for 1990, 2000, and 2010, each of which Beijing claims it achieved. These were identified and refined in past Party Congress reports, and in five-year plans. See notes 4, 22 and 23.

⁶¹ Another passage in Xi’s January 2013 speech only published in March 2019 similarly appears to maintain that Beijing’s mid-century goal of becoming a global leader in terms of international influence includes the influence of its governing model:

We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further, our system will inevitably mature; it is likewise inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent. Inevitably, our road will become wider; inevitably, our country’s road of development will have increasingly greater influence on the world.

Xi Jinping, “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Tanner Greer (trans.), cited above.

⁶² The classic account is F.A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

⁶³ Neil Harding, *Leninism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996, pp. 142-169. This idea is reflected in documents like China's 2016 white paper on "The Right to Development" claiming that development is the most fundamental human right. See State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "The Right to Development: China's Philosophy, Practice and Contribution" December 2016, available at: news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-12/01/c_135873721.htm, accessed June 3, 2017.

⁶⁴ Since 1992, the "general program" of the Party's constitution has explicitly identified its mission in terms of not only development and the people's welfare, but also the power of the state:

*The general starting point and criteria for judging each item of the Party's work are that it must benefit the development of the socialist productive forces, **be conducive to increasing socialist China's overall strength**, and help to improve the people's living standards.* [Emphasis added]

Here, the phrase "overall strength(综合国力)" is the same one officially translated as "composite national strength" in Xi's report to the 19th Party Congress report and which U.S. scholars in the past have translated "comprehensive national power." See "Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017," p. 4.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Human Rights Watch, "Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China's

Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims,"September 9, 2018,available at:hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs, accessed October 9, 2019.

⁶⁶ See Chapter 9, "A Philosophy of Certainty," in Harding, *Leninism*, pp. 219-242.

⁶⁷ See,for example, Xinhua,"China's party system is great contribution to political civilization:Xi,"March 5, 2018, available at:
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/05/c_137015955.htm, accessed March 7, 2018.

⁶⁸ "Upholding the people's democratic dictatorship" is a component of the "Four Cardinal Principles"that are part of the Party's "basic line." (See note 57 above.) Articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979,the Four Cardinal Principles have been upheld by every leader since. Both Deng's and Jiang Zemin's discussion of the justification for the dictatorship are utterly Leninist. See Deng, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-1982)*, pp. 176-177, and his"Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, p. 367. See also Jiang Zemin, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III*, pp. 216-218.

⁶⁹ Harding, *Leninism*, pp. 240-242.

⁷⁰ For an extensive discussion, see Samantha R. Hoffman, "Programming China: The Communist Party's autonomic approach to managing state security," PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2017.See also Xi Jinping, "A Holistic View of National Security," *The Governance of China*, pp. 221-222.

⁷¹ A useful study of this phenomenon is Sarah Cook, "China's Global Megaphone:

Beijing's Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Communist Party Media Influence since 2017, Freedom House Special Report, January 2020, available at: freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/01152020_SR_China_Global_Megaphone_with_Recommendations_PDF.pdf, accessed March 5, 2020.

⁷² See Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnston “Mapping China’s Global Governance Ambitions: Democracies Still Have Leverage to Shape Beijing’s Reform Agenda” Center for American Progress, February 2019, available at americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466768/mapping-chinas-global-governance-ambitions/, accessed December 7, 2019 and Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies” Texas National Security Review, Volume 2, Issue 1, December 2018, pp. 154-166, available at: [//tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/](https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/), accessed January 1, 2019.

⁷³ See, for example, Ted Piccone, “China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2018, available at: brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf, accessed March 5, 2020 and Adam Segal, Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty, Hoover Working Group on National security, Technology, and Law, Aegis Paper Series No. 1703 (June 2, 2017), available at lawfareblog.com/chinese-cyber-diplomacy-new-era-uncertainty, accessed March 5, 2020.

⁷⁴ The notion that China's rise and integration with the world has made it both more dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China has been an authoritative judgment since Hu Jintao's 2007 report to the 17th Party Congress, which declared "Historic changes have occurred in the relations between contemporary China and the rest of the world, resulting in ever closer interconnection between China's future and destiny and those of the world." See: Hu Jintao, "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects," Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 15, 2007, available at: bjreview.com.cn/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/25/content_83051.htm, accessed October 15, 2016. Xi Jinping now maintains: "As China has increased its dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs, so has the world deepened its dependence on China and had greater impact on China." See his "China's Diplomacy Must Benefit Its Major-Country Status" *The Governance of China II*, p. 481. Deng Xiaoping made the case that "we must never close our doors" on the eve of putting down the Tiananmen demonstrations, arguing that isolation brought "disasters like the 'Cultural Revolution'" and that it was "impossible to develop the economy" or keep up with science and technology in isolation. See his "We Must Form a Promising Collective Leadership that Will Carry Out Reform," *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992)*, p. 291. Deng's successors have consistently reaffirmed this view.

⁷⁵ "Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th

National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017,” p. 7; Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” pp. 6, 17, 21-22, and 51-54. See also Xi, “A New Partnership of Mutual Benefit and a Community of Shared Future,” *The Governance of China II*, pp. 569-575, and Xi, “Working Together to Build a Human Community with a Shared Future” Speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva, January 18, 2017, *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, pp. 427-440.

⁷⁶ See also note 74 above. Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16th Party Congress assessed the trend of economic globalization. See “Build A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Initiate a New Phase in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” November 8, 2002, Report at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III*, p. 511, a trend Jiang had identified in a speech to foreign affairs officials in his “The Present International Situation and Our Diplomatic Work” Excerpt from a speech at the Ninth Meeting of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Posted Abroad, August 28, 1998, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume II*, 2012, pp. 194-197. Hu Jintao assessed “cultural diversification” and the emergence of “an information society” in his report to the 18th Party Congress, trends Hu had talked about in his speech to the 2006 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference. See, Hu, “Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects,” Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 8,

2012, available at:

china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm, accessed 6 May 2017 and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), “国际形势和外交工作” (“The International Situation and Our Foreign Affairs Work”), Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Volume II, p. 505.

⁷⁷ China Daily, “习近平主席 2016 年新年贺词 (双语全文)” (“Chairman Xi’s 2016 New Year’s Address (Bilingual Full Text)”), available at:

chinadaily.com.cn/interface/yidian/1139302/2016-01-04/cd_22925566.html, accessed March 5, 2018.

⁷⁸ China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, recently maintained:

The initiative of building a community with a shared future is inspired by the traditional Chinese philosophy that sees the world as one big family. It reflects profound thinking on the future of mankind and embodies a spirit of humanity; it points the way forward for global governance and represents the ultimate goal of multilateralism. It is a Chinese proposal on how to address today's challenges and has become an overarching goal of our major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. China is ready to join hands with all countries and make unremitting efforts to this end.

Wang Yi, “Bringing the East and West Together in Shared Commitment to Multilateralism” Speech at the 56th Munich Security Conference, Munich, 15 February 2020, available at: fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1745384.shtml, accessed

ssed February 18, 2020.

⁷⁹ See Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies,” pp. 155-156 and Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, pp. 36-40.

⁸⁰ The introduction to a collection of Xi’s speeches on China’s foreign relations compiled in 2019 begins:

Since ancient times, the Chinese nation has upheld the belief that “all under Heaven are of one family” and has advocated the ideas of peace among all nations and harmony under Heaven. The Communist Party of China (CPC) regards making new and greater contributions to humanity as its abiding mission. Since the CPC’s 18th National Congress in November 2012, Xi Jinping has called for the building of human community with a shared future.

See the “Editor’s Note,” on the first of two unnumbered pages prior to page i in Xi, On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future, cited above.

⁸¹ Hu Jintao, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” pp. 7-8, argues that making a “fetish” or a particular development model would take away the “vitality” and diversity of world civilizations, and that countries with differences in “history, culture, social system, and mode of development” should learn from one another while preserving differences. Jiang Zemin had made similar arguments, see for example, his, “Harmony Without Uniformity is an Essential Aspect of the Balanced Development of Cultures” Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III, pp. 506-507.

⁸² I am indebted to William A. Callahan, “History, tradition and the Chinese dream: socialist modernization in the world of great harmony,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, No. 96 (2015), pp. 983-1001, for the observation that the traditional Chinese concept of “harmony” can be invoked either in terms of harmony while reserving differences “harmony with diversity” or harmony via “a unified, organic order” in Callahan’s phrases. Xi’s “Community of Common Destiny” (which Callahan does not address), while it appears to invoke both concepts Callahan has identified, leans toward to the latter of the two in envisioning a tightly connected world built via BRI.

⁸³ This is clear from several of Xi Jinping’s speeches carried in *The Governance of China II* cited above. In “A New Partnership of Mutual Benefit and a Community of Shared Future,” p. 574, Xi employs his frequently used phrase: “We are ready to share our experience and opportunities with other countries and welcome them aboard our development train.” In his “China’s Diplomacy Must Benefit Its Major-Country Status” (pp. 482-483), he maintains, “We should protect China’s development opportunities and space, and work hard to form a highly-integrated, mutually beneficial network through extensive economic, trade, and technological cooperation. We should make more friends without prejudice to the non-aligned principle and build a global network of partnerships.” In a speech to a Politburo study session on global governance (p. 488), Xi declared “we must pursue the transformation of the global governance system by the following the principles of extensive consultation, joint development, and shared benefits. We must endeavor to reach consensus on

transformation proposals, and turn it into concerted actions.”

⁸⁴ In talking about national rejuvenation as the “historic mission” of the Party in the New Era, Xi’s report to the 19th Party Congress talks about the “great dream” of national rejuvenation being related to the “great struggle” (implicitly, ideological conflict to preserve the Party’s ruling status). Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 14. Indeed, Xi suggests that China’s growing strength will intensify the external pressure Beijing faces. In a March 2013 speech to PLA delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC), where Xi detailed his “Strong Military Dream” vision, he maintained (my translation):

The more our strength develops, the greater the resistance pressure and the more external risks we will face. This is an unavoidable challenge on our country’s path from big to strong. It is an unavoidable threshold we must cross to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

China Central Television, 《强军》 第一集 逐梦 (Strong Military, Episode I: “The Dream”), available at: [youtube.com/watch?v=TUYpfNSpELk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUYpfNSpELk), accessed October 8, 2017.

⁸⁵ Xi Jinping, “The Belt and Road Initiative Benefits the People” August 17, 2016, in Xi, *The Governance of China II*, p. 549.

⁸⁶ The classic study of BRI is Nadège Rolland, *China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*, Washington, DC: National

Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. On the extension of BRI to Latin America, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Opening Ceremony of China-CELAC Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum and China-LAC Business Council Annual Meeting 2018" January 23, 2018, available at: fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1529529.shtml, accessed March 8, 2018. On the extension of BRI to the Arctic, see: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "China's Arctic Policy," January 2018, available at: xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/26/c_136926498.htm, accessed January 26, 2018.

⁸⁷ See "Statement by Chad Sbragia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Lieutenant General Giovanni Tuck, Director for Logistics, The Joint Staff before the U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Hearing on China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative" October 17, 2019, available at: transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/DOD%20Joint%20Testimony.pdf, accessed January 3, 2020.

⁸⁸ For a discussion of these issues, see Michael S. Chase, "The Space and Cyberspace Components of the Belt and Road Initiative" in Nadège Rolland (ed.), *Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads*, NBR, 2019, pp. 20-32.

⁸⁹ See Rolland, *China's Vision for a New World Order*, cited above and Srikanth

Kondapalli, “Regional Multilateralism with Chinese Characteristics” in David Shambaugh (ed.), *China and the World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 313-339.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Yang Jiechi, “Promote the Building of a Community of Human Destinies (Seriously Study, Propagate and Implement the 19th CPC National Congress Spirit)” cited above.

⁹¹ For an enlightening overview, see 梁治平(Liang Zhiping), “‘想象’天下’: 当代中国的意识形态建构,” (“Imagining ‘Tianxia’: Building Ideology in Contemporary China,”), David Ownby (trans.), 思想 36 (Dec. 2018): 71-177, available at: readingthechinadream.com/liang-zhiping-tianxia-and-ideology.html, accessed March 2, 2020.

⁹² Rolland, *China’s Vision for a New World Order*, p. 36.

⁹³ I had noticed the frequent use of this quotation in Xi’s speeches (the official English translations are inconsistent and the official English version of Xi’s report to the 19th Party Congress (p. 64) obscures it by rendering it: “A just cause should be pursued for the common good.” I am indebted to Callahan, “History, tradition and the Chinese dream: socialist modernization in the world of great harmony,” cited above, for pointing out the quote’s prevalence in contemporary Chinese academic writings.

⁹⁴ Tingyang Zhao (translated by Liqing Tao), *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, Staten Island, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, especially p.5, pp. 13-14, and p. 23.

⁹⁵ Xi Jinping, “Improve Our Ability to Participate in Global Governance,” p. 488.

⁹⁶ Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, especially pp. 2-3 on 45-65.

⁹⁷ Xi, “Shouldering the Responsibilities of Our Age and Promoting Global Growth Together,” *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, p. 419. I have only changed the phrase “with a shared future” to “of common destiny.”

⁹⁸ Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Build a Better World” Keynote speech at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting in Beijing, December 1, 2017, in *On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future*, p. 524

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 521. I have only changed the phrase rendered “with a shared future” to “of common destiny.”

¹⁰⁰ Xi, “China’s Diplomacy Must Benefit Its Major-Country Status,” p. 482-483; Xi Jinping, “A New Partnership of Mutual Benefit and a Community of Shared Future,” pp. 266-267.

¹⁰¹ I am indebted to Timothy R. Heath for the point that Beijing’s official foreign relations theory sees development as a panacea. On the one hand, the Party believes shelving disputes and focusing on common development will ameliorate the disputes over time as the benefits of development become more important to both sides than the original source of tension. At the same time, development maximizes China’s comprehensive national power, providing more leverage to settle the disputes both peacefully and favorably in the future. For a version of this point, see Heath, *China’s Governing Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation*, pp. 99-114.

¹⁰² Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, pp. 36-42.

¹⁰³ On these three past cases see Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008; James A. Locher II, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002; Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, Fourth Edition, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009.

¹⁰⁴ The European Commission's 2019 identification of China as "a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance" is a good starting place here. See European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council EU-China—A strategic outlook, 12 March 2019, available at: ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf, accessed March 3, 2020.