

# Preprocessing attacks

- Dfs
- Hellman tables
- Rainbow tables
- More apps

- \* Project presentations are ~2 weeks away!
- \* Proj report due 4 weeks



## Motivation (Hellman 1980)

There are a small # of crypto tools used everywhere

↳ AES128, SHA256, ECDSA (r.256), DH (p.256)

IDEA: Breaking AES128

Offline [one time]: cook up data structure in advance

Online [many times]: Decrypt its faster later using struct (e.g. AES-GCM)  $\approx 2^{64}$

Processing cost is obscene ... still 3 applications other than AES

# NOTES

## Why study?

- Crypto attack with no theory
- Works in practice
- Solves problem people care about
  - ↳ widely used "rainbow tables"
  - ↳ Used to break DES today

## Function inversion problem

Given:

- \* A function  $S: [N] \rightarrow [N]$  (oracle access only)
- \* A value  $y \in [N]$

find: A value  $x \in [N]$  s.t.  $S(x) = y$ , if one exists

[There are preproc attacks for OCF, Dlog, Factoring, ...]

Example:  $S_{AES}(k) := AES(k, "00000")$   $N = 2^{128}$

PRF on zero string

$S_{SHA256}(msg \in \mathcal{M}) := SHA256(msg)$   $N = |\mathcal{M}|$

↳ Used for "cracking" unsalted  $\mu$  hash;  $\mathcal{M} = \{\text{popular passwords}\}$

Preprocess  $S_{AES}$  once, break many keys at reduced cost

↳ Again, in reality preprocessing matters

\* Preproc attack on  $S_n$  inversion

In preproc attack, adv is a pair  $(A_0, A_1)$


Offline  $A_0^f() \rightarrow st_f$

Online  $A_1^f(x \in [N]) \rightarrow y$

$$P_e \left[ y = f(x) : \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow f_{\text{fun}}(n, N) \\ st_f \leftarrow A_0^f() \\ x \leftarrow [N] \\ y \leftarrow A_1^f(x) \end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

Want to minimize: Space  $S = |st_f|$

Time  $T = \# \text{ of queries } A_1 \text{ makes}$



Measure running time as # queries to  $S$ .

What we know:

[We ignore log N factors.]

Brute-force search:

$$S=O; T=N$$

$$\text{For } N=2^{128}$$

$2^{128}$  time

$2Q^{128}$  storage

Store all inverses:

$$S=N; T=O$$

$$S=T=2^{96}$$

Hellman: for random  $S_n$

$$S=T=N^{2/3}$$

All we need for  
most crypt. apps

Fiat-Shamir: for all  $S_n$

$$S=T=N^{3/4}$$

All crypt. apps

$$S=T=2^{96}$$

Consequence

- \* for dictionary of  $2^{40}$  pw.  $\Rightarrow S=T=2^{27}$   $\{$  Big savings  $\approx 3000\times$
- \* for DES cipher  $N=2^{56} \Rightarrow S=T=2^{40} \approx 64,000\times$  speedup

Can we do better?

Ans:  $ST \geq N \Rightarrow S = N^{\frac{1}{2}}; T = N^{\frac{1}{2}}$   $S=2^k; T=2^k$



Main Q: Is there a fw-inv alg using  $S=T=N^k$  (random fns or not)  $S=T=2^k$ ?

# Hellman Tables

Warm-up: Inverting  $f$  when  $f$  is "one to one" ( $f$  has "no collisions")

Preproc  $A_0$ :

- \* View  $f$  as a graph
- \* Will be a union of cycles



\* Store "Backpointers" every  $T$  steps, output as advice  
↳  $N/T$  pointers; Space  $\leq N/T$

PROOF

Online  $A^f(x)$ :


- Apply  $f$  until hitting back-ptr, follow it [Takes  $T$  calls to  $f$ ]
- Once you reach  $x$ , element before  $t$  is inv

$$\text{Take } T = \sqrt{N} \Rightarrow \text{Space} = \frac{N}{T} \leq \sqrt{N}$$

## Random functions

- PRF, Hash, etc. behave like random fns - **NOT one-to-one**
- Cycle strategy breaks  
 $(\exists \text{ many } k_1, k_2 \text{ s.t. } \text{AES}(k_1, 000) = \text{AES}(k_2, 000))$

Graph  
of  $S$



"Usually"  $\nexists$  set of  $\sqrt{n}$  "chains"  
of len  $\sqrt{n}$  that cover all points.  
 $\hookrightarrow$  Can only invert points "covered by" a chain

## General functions

- \* There will likely be  $N^{1/3}$  chains of len  $N^{1/3}$  that cover  $N^{2/3}$  points total
  - ↳ Only a  $\frac{N^{2/3}}{N^3} = \frac{1}{N^{1/3}}$  fraction of points! Succeed  $\frac{1}{N^{1/3}}$  of the time. ☹
- \* Hellmann's cleverness: "Re-randomize  $S^0$ "  $N^3$  times → Expect to succeed up to  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Define  $N^{1/3}$  Stacks of  $f: S_1, S_2, \dots, S_{N^3}$

$$S_i(x) := g_i(S(x))$$

↑ Involutory  
1-to-1



Graph of  $S_i$

Analysis

If you can invert  $f$ , can invert  $f \circ g$ :  $f^{-1}(x) = g^{-1}(f^{-1}(x))$   
 $g(f^{-1}(x)) = f^{-1}(x)$ .

Alg: Use cycle alg  $N^{1/3}$  times,  
 once per flavor of  $S$ . One should look.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Space} &= N^{1/3} \text{ pts} \cdot N^{1/3} \text{ flavors} = N^{2/3} \\ \text{Time} &= N^{1/3} \text{ steps} \cdot n^{\frac{1}{3}} = N^{2/3} \end{aligned}$$

# Rainbow tables - Used in practice [Oechslin'03]

- Save time & space as Hellman
- Innovation is to reduce # of disk accesses  
↳ Hellman needs one per step



Run  $N''$  steps and then follow back-pointers.

## More Applications

Substring search Find query string  $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^k$  in big str  $D \in \{0,1\}^n$

$$S(i) = D[i : i + k - 1]$$

Normally takes  $N$  time or  $N$  space

Applying fn inversion:  $N^{7/8}$  passes to  $D$ ,  $N^{3/4}$  space

## Compression [HW'23]

Given: long string  $D \in \{0,1\}^n$   
Is there a length-l string  $\sigma$  s.t.

$$\text{Eval}(\sigma) = D ?$$

Say that  $D$  is the  
truth table of a ckt.  
 $\text{Eval}()$  takes a ckt  
as input and evals  
it anywhere.

$$S_{\text{Eval}}(x) := D$$

With no preproc:  $2^n$  time; w/o inversion:  $S_{\overline{T}} = 2^{\frac{3n}{4}}$