



Homomorphic Lower Digits Removal and Improved FHE Bootstrapping

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Abstract. Bootstrapping is a crucial operation in Gentry’s breakthrough work on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), where a homomorphic encryption scheme evaluates its own decryption algorithm. There has been a couple of implementations of bootstrapping, among which HELib arguably marks the state-of-the-art in terms of throughput, ciphertext/message size ratio and support for large plaintext moduli.

In this work, we applied a family of “lowest digit removal” polynomials to design an improved homomorphic digit extraction algorithm which is a crucial part in bootstrapping for both FV and BGV schemes. When the secret key has 1-norm $h = \|s\|_1$ and the plaintext modulus is $t = p^r$, we achieved bootstrapping depth $\log h + \log(\log_p(ht))$ in FV scheme. In case of the BGV scheme, we brought down the depth from $\log h + 2 \log t$ to $\log h + \log t$.

We implemented bootstrapping for FV in the SEAL library. We also introduced another “slim mode”, which restrict the plaintexts to batched vectors in \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} . The slim mode has similar throughput as the full mode, while each individual run is much faster and uses much smaller memory. For example, bootstrapping takes 6.75s for vectors over $GF(127)$ with 64 slots and 1381 s for vectors over $GF(257^{128})$ with 128 slots. We also implemented our improved digit extraction procedure for the BGV scheme in HELib.

Keywords: Homomorphic encryption · Bootstrapping Implementation

1 Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows an untrusted party to evaluate arbitrary functions on encrypted data, without knowing the secret key.

K. Han—Supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. B0717-16-0098, Development of homomorphic encryption for DNA analysis and biometry authentication).

Gentry introduced the first FHE scheme in the breakthrough work [20]. Since then, there has been a large collection of work (e.g., [6–10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 31]), introducing more efficient schemes.

These schemes all follow Gentry’s original blueprint, where each ciphertext is associated with a certain amount of “noise”, and the noise grows as homomorphic evaluations are performed. When the noise is too large, decryption will fail to give the correct result. Therefore, if no additional measure is taken, one set of parameters can only evaluate circuits of a bounded depth. This approach is called leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) and is used in a many works.

However, if we wish to homomorphically evaluate functions of arbitrary complexity using one single set of parameters, then we need a procedure to lower the noise in a ciphertext. This can be done via Gentry’s brilliant *bootstrapping* technique. Roughly speaking, bootstrapping a ciphertext in some given scheme means running its own decryption algorithm homomorphically, using an encryption of the secret key. The result is a new ciphertext which encrypts the same message while having lower noise.

Bootstrapping is a very expensive operation. The decryption circuit of a scheme can be complex, and may not be conveniently supported by the scheme itself. Hence, in order to perform bootstrapping, one either needs to make significant optimizations to simplify the decryption circuit, or design some scheme which can handle its decryption circuit more comfortably. Among the best works on bootstrapping implementations, the work of Halevi and Shoup [25], which optimized and implemented bootstrapping over the scheme of Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan (BGV), is arguably still the state-of-the-art in terms of throughput, ciphertext/message size ratio and flexible plaintext moduli. For example, they were able to bootstrap a vector of size 1024 over $GF(2^{16})$ within 5 min. However, when the plaintext modulus reaches 2^8 , bootstrapping still takes a few hours to perform. The reason is mainly due to a digit extraction procedure, whose cost grows significantly with the plaintext modulus. The Fan-Vercauteran (FV) scheme, a scale-invariant variant of BGV, has also been implement in [1, 27] and used in applications. We are not aware of any previous implementation of bootstrapping for FV.

1.1 Contributions

In this paper, we aim at improving the efficiency of bootstrapping under large prime power plaintext moduli.

- We used a family of low degree lowest-digit-removal polynomials to design an improved algorithm to remove v lowest base- p digits from integers modulo p^e . Our new algorithm has depth $v \log p + \log e$, compared to $(e - 1) \log p$ in previous work.
- We then applied our algorithm to improve the digit extraction step in the bootstrapping procedure for FV and BGV schemes. Let $h = \|s\|_1$ denote the 1-norm of the secret key, and assume the plaintext space is a prime

power $t = p^r$. Then for FV scheme, we achieved bootstrapping depth $\log h + \log \log_p(ht)$. In case of BGV, we have reduced the bootstrapping degree from $\log h + 2\log(t)$ to $\log h + \log t$.

- We provided a first implementation of the bootstrapping functionality for FV scheme in the SEAL library [27]. We also implemented our revised digit extraction algorithm in HELib which can directly be applied to improve HELib bootstrapping for large plaintext modulus p^r .
- We also introduced a light-weight mode of bootstrapping which we call the “slim mode” by restricting the plaintexts to a subspace. In this mode, messages are vectors where each slot only holds a value in \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} instead of a degree- d extension ring. The slim mode might be more applicable in some use-cases of FHE, including machine learning over encrypted data. We implemented the slim mode of bootstrapping in SEAL and showed that in this mode, bootstrapping is about d times faster, hence we can achieve a similar throughput as in the full mode.

1.2 Application: Machine Learning over Encrypted Data

Machine learning over encrypted data is one of the signature use-cases of FHE and an active research area. Research works in this area can be divided into two categories: evaluating a pre-trained machine learning model over private testing data, or training a new model on private training data. Often times, the model evaluation requires a lower-depth circuit, and thus can be achieved using LHE. On the other hand, training a machine learning model requires a much deeper circuit, and bootstrapping becomes necessary. This may explain that there are few works in the model training direction.

In the model evaluation case (e.g. [4, 5, 23, 24]), one encodes the data as either polynomials in R_t , or as elements of \mathbb{Z}_t when batching is used. One distinguishing feature of these methods is that the scheme maintains the full precision of plaintexts as evaluations are performed, in contrast to computations over plaintext data, where floating point numbers are used and only a limited precision is maintained. This implies that the plaintext modulus t needs to be taken large enough to “hold the result”.

In the training case, because of the large depth and size of the circuit, the above approach is simply infeasible: t needs to be so large that the homomorphic evaluations become too inefficient, as pointed out in [17]. Therefore, some analog of plaintext truncation needs to be performed alongside the evaluation. However, in order to perform the truncation function homomorphically, one has to express the function as a polynomial. Fortunately, our digit removal algorithm can also be used as a truncation method over \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} . Therefore, we think that improving bootstrapping for prime power plaintext modulus has practical importance.

There is one other work [12] which does not fall into either categories. It performs homomorphic evaluation over point numbers and outputs an approximate result. It modifies the BGV and FV schemes: instead of encoding noise and message in different parts of a ciphertexts, one puts noise in lower bits of messages, and uses modulus switching creatively as a plaintext management technique.

As a result, they could evaluate deeper circuits with smaller HE parameters. It is then an interesting question whether there exists an efficient bootstrapping algorithm for this modified scheme.

1.3 Related Works

After bootstrapping was introduced by Gentry at 2009, many methods are proposed to improve its efficiency. Existing bootstrapping implementations can be classified into three branches. The first branch [21, 25] builds on top of somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes based on the RLWE problem. The second branch aims at minimizing the time to bootstrap one single bit of message after each boolean gate evaluation. Works in this direction include [3, 14, 15, 18]. They were able to obtain very fast results: less than 0.1 s for a single bootstrapping. The last branch considers bootstrapping over integer-based homomorphic encryption schemes under the sparse subset sum problem assumption. Some works [13, 16, 28, 31] used a squashed decryption circuit and evaluate bit-wise (or digit-wise) addition in encrypted state instead of doing a digit extraction. In [11], they show that using digit extraction for bootstrapping results in lower computational complexity while consuming a similar amount of depth as previous approaches.

Our work falls into the first branch. We aim at improving the bootstrapping procedure for the two schemes BGV and FV, with the goal of improving the throughput and after level for bootstrapping in case of large plaintext modulus. Therefore, our main point of comparison in this paper will be the work of Halevi and Shoup [25]. We note that a digit extraction procedure is used for all branches except the second one. Therefore, improving the digit extraction procedure is one of the main tasks for an efficient bootstrapping algorithm.

1.4 Roadmap

In Sect. 2, we introduce notations and necessary background on the BGV and FV schemes. In Sect. 3, after reviewing the digit extraction procedure of [25], we define the lowest digit removal polynomials, and use them to give an improved digit removal algorithm. In Sect. 4, we describe our method for bootstrapping in the FV scheme, and how our algorithm leads to an improved bootstrapping for BGV scheme when the plaintext modulus is p^r with $r > 1$. In Sect. 5, we present and discuss our performance results. Finally, in Sect. 6 we conclude with future directions. Proofs and more details regarding the SEAL implementation of bootstrapping are included in the Appendix.

2 Background

2.1 Basics of BGV and FV Schemes

First, we introduce some notations. Both BGV and FV schemes are initialized with integer parameters m, t and q . Here m is the cyclotomic field index, t is the plaintext modulus, and q is the coefficient modulus. Note that in BGV, it is required that $(t, q) = 1$.

Let $\phi_m(x)$ denote the m -th cyclotomic polynomial and let n denote its degree. We use the following common notations $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\phi_m(x))$, $R_t = R/tR$, and $R_q = R/qR$. In both schemes, the message is a polynomial $m(x)$ in R_t , and the secret key s is an element of R_q . In practice, s is usually taken to be ternary (i.e., each coefficient is either -1 , 0 or 1) and often sparse (i.e., the number of nonzero coefficients of s are bounded by some $h \ll n$). A ciphertext is a pair (c_0, c_1) of elements in R_q .

Decryption Formula. The decryption of both schemes starts with a dot-product with the extended secret key $(1, s)$. In BGV, we have

$$c_0 + c_1 s = m(x) + tv + \alpha q,$$

and decryption returns $m(x) = ((c_0 + c_1 s) \bmod q) \bmod t$. In FV, the equation is

$$c_0 + c_1 s = \Delta m(x) + v + \alpha q$$

and decryption formula is $m(x) = \lfloor \frac{(c_0 + c_1 s) \bmod q}{\Delta} \rfloor$.

Plaintext Space. The native plaintext space in both schemes is R_t , which consists of polynomials with degree less than n and integer coefficients between 0 and $t - 1$. Additions and multiplications of these polynomials are performed modulo both $\phi_m(x)$ and t .

A widely used plaintext-batching technique [30] turns the plaintext space into a vector over certain finite rings. Since batching is used extensively in our bootstrapping algorithm, we recall the details here. Suppose $t = p^r$ is a prime power, and assume p and m are co-prime. Then $\phi_m(x) \bmod p^r$ factors into a product of k irreducible polynomials of degree d . Moreover, d is equal to the order of p in \mathbb{Z}_m^* , and k is equal to the size of the quotient group $\mathbb{Z}_m^*/\langle p \rangle$. For convenience, we fix a set $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_k\}$ of integer representatives of the quotient group. Let $f(x)$ be one of the irreducible factors of $\phi_m(x) \bmod p^r$, and consider the finite extension ring

$$E = \mathbb{Z}_{p^r}[x]/(f(x)).$$

Then all primitive m -th roots of unity exist in E . Fix $\zeta \in E$ to be one such root. Then we have a ring isomorphism

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &\rightarrow E^k \\ m(x) &\mapsto (m(\zeta^{s_1}), m(\zeta^{s_2}), \dots, m(\zeta^{s_k})) \end{aligned}$$

Using this isomorphism, we can regard the plaintexts as vectors over E , and additions/multiplications between the plaintexts are executed coefficient-wise on the components of the vectors, which are often called *slots*.

In the rest of the paper, we will move between the above two ways of viewing the plaintexts, and we will distinguish them by writing them as polynomials (no batching) and vectors (batching). For example, $\text{Enc}(m(x))$ means an encryption of $m(x) \in R_t$, whereas $\text{Enc}((m_1, \dots, m_k))$ means a batch encryption of a vector $(m_1, \dots, m_k) \in E^k$.

Modulus Switching. Modulus switching is a technique which scales a ciphertext (c_0, c_1) with modulus q to another one (c'_0, c'_1) with modulus q' that decrypts to the same message. In BGV, modulus switching is a necessary technique to reduce the noise growth. Modulus switching is not strictly necessary for FV, at least if used in the LHE mode. However, it will be of crucial use in our bootstrapping procedure. More precisely, modulus switching in BGV requires q and q' to be both co-prime to t . For simplicity, suppose $q \equiv q' \equiv 1 \pmod{t}$. Then c'_i equals the closest integer polynomial to $\frac{q'}{q}c$ such that $c'_i \equiv c_i \pmod{t}$. For FV, q and q' do not need to be co-prime to t , and modulus switching simply does scaling and rounding to integers, i.e., $c'_i = \lfloor q'/qc_i \rfloor$.

We stress that modulus switching slightly increase the noise-to-modulus ratio due to rounding errors in the process. Therefore, one can not switch to arbitrarily small modulus q' . On the other hand, in bootstrapping we often like to switch to a small q' . The following lemma puts a lower bound on the size of q' for FV (the case for BGV is similar).

Lemma 1. *Suppose $c_0 + c_1s = \Delta m + v + \alpha q$ is a ciphertext in FV with $|v| < \Delta/4$. if $q' > 4t(1 + \|s\|_1)$, and (c'_0, c'_1) is the ciphertext after switching the modulus to q' , then (c'_0, c'_1) also decrypts to m .*

Proof. See appendix.

We remark that although the requirement in BGV that q and t are co-prime seems innocent, it affects the depth of the decryption circuit when t is large. Therefore, it results in an advantage for doing bootstrapping in FV over BGV. We will elaborate on this point later.

Multiply and Divide by p in Plaintext Space. In bootstrapping, we will use following functionalities: dividing by p , which takes an encryption of $pm \pmod{p^e}$ and returns an encryption of $m \pmod{p^{e-1}}$, and multiplying by p which is the inverse of division. In BGV scheme, multiply by p can be realized via a fast scalar multiplication $(c_0, c_1) \rightarrow ((pc_0) \pmod{q}, (pc_1) \pmod{q})$. In the FV scheme, these operations are essentially free, because if $c_0 + c_1s = \lfloor \frac{q}{p^{e-1}} \rfloor m + v + q\alpha$, then the same ciphertext satisfies $c_0 + c_1s = \lfloor \frac{q}{p^e} \rfloor pm + v + v' + q\alpha$ for some small v' . In the rest of the paper, we will omit these operations, assuming that they are free to perform.

3 Digit Removal Algorithm

The previous method for digit extraction used certain lifting polynomials with good properties. We used a family of “lowest digit removal” polynomials which have a stronger lifting property. We then combined these lowest digit removal polynomials with the lifting polynomials to construct a new digit removal algorithm.

For convenience of exposition, we use some slightly modified notations from [25]. Fix a prime p . Let z be an integer with (balanced) base- p expansion $z = \sum_{i=0}^{e-1} z_i p^i$. For integers $i, j \geq 0$, we use $z_{i,j}$ to denote any integer with first base- p digit equal to z_i and the next j digits zero. In other words, we have $z_{i,j} \equiv z_i \pmod{p^{j+1}}$.

3.1 Reviewing the Digit Extraction Method of Halevi and Shoup

The bootstrapping procedure in [25] consists of five main steps: modulus switching, dot product (with an encrypted secret key), linear transform, digit extraction, and another “inverse” linear transform. Among these, the digit extraction step dominates the cost in terms of both depth and work. Hence we will focus on optimizing the digit extraction. Essentially, we need the following functionality.

DigitRemove(p, e, v) : fix prime p , for two integers $v < e$ and an input $u \pmod{p^e}$, let $u = \sum u_i p^i$ with $|u_i| \leq p/2$ when p is odd (and $u_i = 0, 1$ when $p = 2$), returns

$$u\langle v, \dots, e-1 \rangle := \sum_{i=v}^{e-1} u_i p^i.$$

We say this functionality “removes” the v lowest significant digits in base p from an e -digits integer. To realize the above functionality over homomorphically encrypted data, the authors in [25] constructed some special polynomials $F_e(\cdot)$ with the following lifting property.

Lemma 2 (Corollary 5.5 in [25]). *For every prime p and $e \geq 1$ there exist a degree p -polynomial F_e such that for every integer z_0, z_1 with $z_0 \in [p]$ and every $1 \leq e' \leq e$ we have $F_e(z_0 + p^{e'} z_1) = z_0 \pmod{p^{e'+1}}$.*

For example, if $p = 2$, we can take $F_e(x) = x^2$. One then uses these lifting polynomials F_e to extract each digit u_i from u in a successive fashion. The digit extraction procedure is defined in Fig. 1 in [25] and can be visualized in the following diagram.

In the diagram, the top-left digit is the input. This algorithm starts with the top row. From left to right, it successively applies the lifting polynomial to obtain all the blue digits. Then the green digits on the next row can be obtained from subtracting all blue digits on the same diagonal from the input and then

We can verify that the function $\hat{f}(x)$ satisfies the properties in the lemma (for the least residue system), but its degree is infinite. So we let

$$f(x) = \sum_{m=p}^{(e-1)(p-1)+1} a(m) \binom{x}{m}.$$

Now we will prove that the polynomial $f(x)$ has p -integral coefficients and has the same value with $\hat{f}(x)$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$.

Claim. $f(x)$ has p -integral coefficients and $a(m) \binom{x}{m}$ is multiple of p^e for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ when $m > (e-1)(p-1) + 1$.

Proof. If we rewrite the Eq. 1,

$$\hat{f}(x) = p \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} F_{j \cdot p}(x) = p \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (-1)^i \binom{jp+i-1}{i} \binom{x}{jp+i} \right).$$

By replacing the $jp+i$ to m , we arrive at the following equation:

$$a(m) = p \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (-1)^{m-kp} \binom{m-1}{m-kp}.$$

In the equation, we can notice that the term $(-1)^{m-kp} \binom{m-1}{m-kp}$ is the coefficient of X^{m-kp} in the Taylor expansion of $(1+X)^{-kp}$. Therefore, $a(m)$ is actually the coefficient of X^m in the Taylor expansion of $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} pX^{kp}(1+X)^{-kp}$.

$$\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} pX^{kp}(1+X)^{-kp} = p \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{X}{X+1} \right)^{kp} = p \frac{(1+X)^p}{(1+X)^p - X^p}$$

We can get a m -th coefficient of Taylor expansion from following equation:

$$p \frac{(1+X)^p}{(1+X)^p - X^p} = p \frac{(1+X)^p}{1+B(X)} = p(1+X)^p(1-B(X)+B(X)^2-\dots).$$

Because $B(X)$ is multiple of pX , the coefficient of X^m can be obtained from a finite number of powers of $B(X)$. We can also find out the degree of $B(X)$ is $p-1$, so

$$\text{Deg}(p(1+X)^p(1-B(X)+\dots+(-1)^{(e-2)}B(X)^{(e-2)})) = (e-1)(p-1)+1.$$

Hence these terms do not contribute to X^m . This means that $a(m)$ is m -th coefficient of

$$p(1+X)^p B(X)^{e-1} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (-1)^i B(X)^i$$

which is multiple of p^e (since $B(X)$ is multiple of p). ■

By the claim above, the p -adic valuation of $a(m)$ is larger than $\frac{m}{p-1}$ and it is trivial that the p -adic valuation of $m!$ is less than $\frac{m}{p-1}$. Therefore, we proved that the coefficients of $f(x)$ are p -integral. Indeed, we proved that $a(m)\binom{x}{m}$ is multiple of p^n for any integer when $m > (e-1)(p-1) + 1$. This means that $\hat{f}(x) = f(x) \bmod p^e$ for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$.

As a result, the degree $(e-1)(p-1)+1$ polynomial $f(x)$ satisfies the conditions in lemma for the least residue system. For balanced residue system, we can just replace $f(x)$ by $f(x + (p-1)/2)$. \square

Note that the above polynomial $f(x)$ removes the lowest base- p digit in an integer. It is also desirable sometimes to “retain” the lowest digit, while setting all the other digits to zero. This can be easily done via $g(x) = x - f(x)$. In the rest of the paper, we will denote such polynomial that retains the lowest digit in the balanced base- p representation by $G_{e,p}(x)$ (or $G_e(x)$ if p is clear from context). In other words, if $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$ and $x \equiv x_0 \bmod p$ with $|x_0| \leq p/2$, then $G_e(x) = x_0 \bmod p^e$.

Example 4. When $e = 2$, we have $f(x) = -x(x-1) \cdots (x-p+1)$ and $G_2(x) = x - f(x + (p-1)/2)$.

We recall that in the previous method, it takes degree p^{e-i-1} and $(e-i-1)$ evaluations of polynomials of degree p to obtain $u_{i,e-i}$. With our lowest digit removing polynomial, it only takes degree $(e-i-1)(p-1) + 1$. As a result, by combining the lifting polynomials and lowest digit removing polynomials, we can make the digit extraction algorithm faster with lower depth.

The following diagram illustrates how our new digit removal algorithm works. First, each blue digit is obtained by evaluating a lifting polynomial to the entry on its left. Then, the red digit on each row is obtained by evaluating the remaining lowest digit polynomial to the left-most digit on its row. Green digits are obtained by subtracting all the blue digits on the same diagonal from the input, and dividing by p . Finally, in order to remove the v lowest digits, we subtract all the red digits from the input.

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 u_{0,0} & u_{0,1} & \cdots & u_{0,v-2} & u_{0,v-1} & & u_{0,e-1} \\
 u_{1,0} & u_{1,1} & \cdots & u_{1,v-2} & & & u_{1,e-2} \\
 \vdots & & & & & & \\
 u_{v-2,0} & u_{v-2,1} & & & & & u_{v-2,e-r+1} \\
 u_{v-1,0} & & & & & & u_{v-1,e-v}
 \end{array}$$

We remark that the major difference of this procedure is that we only need to populate the top left triangle of side length v , plus the right most v -by-1 diagonal, where as the previous method needs to populate the entire triangle of side length e .

Moreover, the red digits in our method has lower depth: in the previous method, the i -th red digit is obtained by evaluating lift polynomial $(e-i-1)$ times, hence its degree is p^{e-i-1} on top of the i -th green digit. However, in our method, its degree is only $(p-1)(e-i-1) + 1$ on top of the i -th green digit,

which has degree at most p^i , the total degree of the algorithm is bounded by the maximum degree over all the red digits, that is

$$\max_{0 \leq i < r} p^i((e-1-i)(p-1)+1).$$

Since each individual term is bounded by ep^v , the total degree of the procedure is at most ep^v . This is lower than p^{e-1} in the previous method when $v \leq e-2$ and $p > e$.

3.3 Improved Algorithm for Removing Digits

We discuss one further optimization to remove v lowest digits in base p from an e -digit integer. If ℓ is an integer such that $p^\ell > (p-1)(e-1)+1$, then instead

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Data:  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$ 
Result:  $x - [x]_{p^v} \bmod p^e$ 
//  $F_i(x)$ : lifting polynomial with  $F_i(x + O(p^i)) = x + O(p^{i+1})$ 
//  $G_i(x)$ : lowest digit retain polynomial with  $G_i(x) = [x]_p \bmod p^i$ 
Find largest  $\ell$  such that  $p^\ell < (p-1)(e-1)+1$ ;
Initialize  $\text{res} = x$ ;
for  $i \in [0, v)$  do
    // evaluate lowest digit retain polynomial
     $R_i = G_{e-i}(x')$  ; //  $R_i = x_i \bmod p^{e-i}$ 
     $R_i = R_i \cdot p^i$  ; //  $R_i = x_i p^i \bmod p^e$ 
    if  $i < v-1$  then
        // evaluate lifting polynomial
         $L_{i,0} = F_1(x')$ 
    end
    for  $j \in [0, \ell-2)$  do
        if  $i+j < v-1$  then
             $L_{i,j+1} = F_{j+2}(L_{i,j})$ 
        end
    end
    if  $i < v-1$  then
         $x' = x$ ;
        for  $j \in [0, i+1)$  do
            if  $i-j > \ell-2$  then
                 $x' = x' - R_j$ 
            end
            else
                 $x' = x' - L_{j,i-j}$ 
            end
        end
    end
     $\text{res} = \text{res} - R_i$ ;
end
return  $\text{res}$ ;

```

Algorithm 1. Removing v lowest digits from $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$

of using lifting polynomials to obtain the ℓ -th digit, we can just use the result of evaluating the G_i polynomial (or, the red digit) to obtain the green digit in the next row. This saves some work and also lowers the depth of the overall procedure. This optimization is incorporated into Algorithm 1.

The depth and computation cost of Algorithm 1 is summarized in Theorem 5. The depth is simply the maximum depth of all the removed digits. To determine the computational cost to evaluate Algorithm 1 homomorphically, we need to specify the unit of measurement. Since scalar multiplication is much faster than FHE schemes than ciphertext multiplication, we choose to measure the computational cost by the number of ciphertext multiplications. The Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm [29] evaluates a polynomial of degree d with $\sim \sqrt{2d}$ non-constant multiplications, and we use that as the base of our estimate.

Theorem 5. *Algorithm 1 is correct. Its depth is bounded above by*

$$\log(ep^v) = v \log(p) + \log(e).$$

The number of non-constant multiplications is asymptotically equal to $\sqrt{2pev}$.

Table 1 compares the asymptotic depth and number of non-constant multiplications between our method for digit removal and the method of [25]. From the table, we see that the advantage of our method grows with the difference $e - v$. In the bootstrapping scenario, we have $e - v = r$, the exponent of the plaintext modulus. Hence, our algorithm compares favorably for larger values of r .

Table 1. Complexity of DigitRemove(p, e, v)


Method	Depth	No. ciphertext multiplications
[25]	$e \log(p)$	$\frac{1}{2}e^2\sqrt{2p}$
This work	$v \log(p) + \log(e)$	$\sqrt{2pev}$

4 Improved Bootstrapping for FV and BGV

4.1 Reviewing the Method of [25]

The bootstrapping for FV scheme follows the main steps from [25] for the BGV scheme, while we make two modifications in modulus switching and digit extraction. First, we review the procedure in [25].

Modulus Switching. One fixes some $q' < q$ and compute a new ciphertext c' which encrypts the same plaintext but has much smaller size.

**Fig. 1.** Bootstrapping procedure

Dot Product with Bootstrapping Key. Here we compute homomorphically the dot product $\langle c', \mathfrak{s} \rangle$, where \mathfrak{s} is an encryption of a new secret key s' under a large coefficient modulus Q and a new plaintext modulus $t' = p^e$. The result of this step is an encryption of $m + tv$ under the new parameters (s', t', Q) .

Linear Transformation. Let d denote the multiplicative order of p in \mathbb{Z}_m^* and $k = n/d$ be the number of slots supported in plaintext batching. Suppose the input to linear transform is an encryption of $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i x^i$, then the output of this step is d ciphertexts C_0, \dots, C_{d-1} , where C_j is a batch encryption of $(a_{jk}, a_{jk+1}, \dots, a_{jk+k-1})$.

Digit Extraction. When the above steps are done, we obtain d ciphertexts, where the first ciphertext is a batch encryption of

$$(m_0 \cdot p^{e-r} + e_0, m_1 \cdot p^{e-r} + e_1, \dots, m_{k-1} \cdot p^{e-r} + e_{k-1}).$$

Assuming that $|e_i| \leq \frac{p^{e-r}}{2}$ for each i , we will apply Algorithm 1 to remove the lower digits e_i , resulting in d new ciphertexts encrypting Δm_i for $0 \leq i < n$ in their slots. Then we perform a free division to get d ciphertexts, encrypting m_i in their slots.

Inverse Linear Transformation. Finally, we apply another linear transformation which combines the d ciphertexts into one single ciphertext encrypting $m(x)$.

4.2 Our Modifications

FV. Suppose $t = p^r$ is a prime power, and we have a ciphertext (c_0, c_1) modulo q . Here, instead of switching to a modulus q' co-prime to p as done in BGV, we switch to $q' = p^e$, and obtain ciphertext (c'_0, c'_1) such that

$$c'_0 + c'_1 s = p^{e-r} m + v + \alpha p^e.$$

Then, one input ciphertext to the digit extraction step will be a batch encryption

$$\text{Enc}((p^{e-r}m_0 + v_0, \dots, p^{e-r}m_k + v_k))$$

under plaintext modulus p^e . Hence this step requires $\text{DigitRemove}(p, e, e - r)$.

BGV. To apply our ideas to the digit extraction step in BGV bootstrapping, we simply replace the algorithm in [25] with our digit removal Algorithm 1.

4.3 Comparing Bootstrapping Complexities

The major difference in the complexities of bootstrapping between the two schemes comes from the parameter e . In case of FV, by Lemma 1, we can choose (roughly) $e = r + \log_p(\|s\|_1)$. On the other hand, the estimate of e for correct bootstrapping in [25] for the BGV scheme is

$$e \geq 2r + \log_p(\|s\|_1).$$

We can analyze the impact of this difference on the depth of digit removal, and therefore on the depth of bootstrapping. Setting $v = e - r$ in Theorem 5, the depth for the BGV case is

$$(r + \log_p(\|s\|_1) \log p + \log(2r + \log_p(\|s\|_1))).$$

Substituting $r = \log_p(t)$ into the above formula and throwing away lower order terms, we obtain the improved depth for the digit extraction in step BGV bootstrapping as

$$\log t + \log(\|s\|_1) + \log(\log_p(t^2 \cdot \|s\|_1)) \approx \log t + \log(\|s\|_1).$$

Note that the depth grows linearly with the logarithm of the plaintext modulus t . On the other hand, the depth in the FV case turns out to be

$$\log(\|s\|_1) + \log(\log_p(t \cdot \|s\|_1)).$$

which only scales with $\log \log t$. This is smaller than BGV in the large plaintext modulus regime.

We can also compare the number of ciphertext multiplications needed for the digit extraction procedures. Replacing v with $e - r$ in the second formula in Theorem 5 and letting $e = 2r + \log_p(\|s\|_1)$ for BGV (resp. $e = r + \log_p(\|s\|_1)$ for FV), we see that the number of ciphertext multiplications for BGV is asymptotically equal to

$$\frac{\sqrt{2p}}{(\log p)^{3/2}} (2 \log(t) + \log(\|s\|_1))^{1/2} (\log(t) + \log(\|s\|_1)).$$

In the FV case, the number of ciphertext multiplications is asymptotically equal to

$$\frac{\sqrt{2p}}{(\log p)^{3/2}} (\log(t) + \log(\|s\|_1))^{1/2} \log(\|s\|_1).$$

Hence when t is large, the digit extraction procedure in bootstrapping requires less work for FV than BGV.

For completeness, we also analyze the original digit extraction method in BGV bootstrapping. Recall that the previous algorithm has depth $(e - 1) \log p$, and takes about $\frac{1}{2}e^2$ homomorphic evaluations of polynomials of degree p . If we use the Paterson-Stockmeyer method for polynomial evaluation, then the total amount of ciphertext multiplications is roughly $\frac{1}{2}e^2 \sqrt{2p}$. Plugging in the lower bound $e \geq 2r + \log_p(\|s\|_1)$, we obtain an estimate of depth and work needed for the digit extraction step in the original BGV bootstrapping method in [25]. Table 2 summarizes the cost for three different methods.

Table 2. Asymptotic complexity of digit extraction step in bootstrapping. Here $h = \|s\|_1$ is the 1-norm of the secret key, and $t = p^r$ is the plaintext modulus.

Method	Depth	No. ciphertext multiplications
[25] (BGV)	$2 \log(t) + \log(h)$	$\frac{\sqrt{2p}}{2(\log p)^2} (2 \log(t) + \log(h))^2$
This work (BGV)	$\log(t) + \log(h)$	$\frac{\sqrt{2p}}{(\log p)^{3/2}} (2 \log(t) + \log(h))^{1/2} (\log(t) + \log(h))$
This work (FV)	$\log \log(t) + \log(h)$	$\frac{\sqrt{2p}}{(\log p)^{3/2}} (\log(t) + \log(h))^{1/2} \log(h)$

Fixing p and h in the last column of Table 2, we can see how the number of multiplications grows with $\log t$. The method in [25] scales by $(\log t)^2$, while our new method for BGV improves it to $(\log t)^{3/2}$. In the FV case, the number of multiplications scales by only $(\log t)^{1/2}$.

Remark 1. As another advantage of our revised BGV bootstrapping, we make a remark on security. From Table 2, we see that in order for bootstrapping to be more efficient, it is advantageous to use a secret key with smaller 1-norm. For this reason, both [25] and this work choose to use a sparse secret key, and a recent work [2] shows that sparseness can be exploited in the attacks. To resolve this, note that it is easy to keep the security level in our situation: since our method reduces the overall depth for the large plaintext modulus case, we could use a smaller modulus q , which increases the security back to a desired level.

4.4 Slim Bootstrapping Algorithm

The bootstrapping algorithm for FV and BGV is expensive also due to the d repetitions of digit extraction. For some parameters, the extension degree d can be large. However, many interesting applications requires arithmetic over \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} rather than its degree- d extension ring, making it hard to utilize the full plaintext space.

Therefore we will introduce one more bootstrapping algorithm which is called “slim” bootstrapping. This bootstrapping algorithm works with the plaintext space \mathbb{Z}_t^k , embedded as a subspace of R_t through the batching isomorphism.

This method can be adapted using almost the same algorithm as the original bootstrapping algorithm, except that we only need to perform one digit extraction operation, hence it is roughly d times faster than the full bootstrapping algorithm. Also, we need to revise the linear transformation and inverse linear transformation slightly. We give an outline of our slim bootstrapping algorithm below (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Slim bootstrapping

Inverse Linear Transformation. We take as input a batch encryption of $(m_1 \dots, m_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^k$. In the first step, we apply an “inverse” linear transformation to obtain an encryption of $m_1 + m_2 x^d + \dots + m_k x^{d(k-1)}$. This can be done using k slot permutations and k plaintext multiplications.

Modulus Switching and Dot Product with Bootstrapping Key. These two steps are exactly the same as the full bootstrapping procedure. After these steps, we obtain a (low-noise) encryption of

$$(\Delta m_1 + v_1 + (\Delta m_2 + v_2)x^d + \dots + (\Delta m_k + v_k)x^{d(k-1)}).$$

Linear Transformation. In this step, we apply another linear transformation consisting of k slot permutations and k scalar multiplications to obtain a batch encryption of $(\Delta m_1 + v_1, \dots, \Delta m_k + v_k)$. Details of this step can be found in the appendix.

Digit Extraction. Then, we apply digit-removal algorithm to remove the noise coefficients v_i , resulting in a batch encryption of $(\Delta m_1, \dots, \Delta m_k)$. We then execute the free division and obtain a batch encryption of (m_1, \dots, m_k) . This completes the slim bootstrapping process.

5 Implementation and Performance

We implemented both the full mode and the slim mode of bootstrapping for FV in the SEAL library. We also implemented our revised digit extraction procedure in HELib. Since SEAL only supports power-of-two cyclotomic rings, and p needs to be co-prime to m in order to use batching, we can not use $p = 2$ for SEAL bootstrapping. Instead we chose $p = 127$ and $p = 257$ because they give more slots among primes of reasonable size.

The following tables in this section illustrate some results. We used sparse secrets with hamming weight 64 and 128, and we estimated security levels using Martin Albrecht’s LWE estimator [2].

Table 3. Comparison of digit removal algorithms in HELib (Toshiba Portege Z30t-C laptop with 2.6 GHz CPU and 8 GB memory)

(p, e, v)	[25]	Our method		
	Timing (s)	Before/After level	Timing (s)	Before/After level
(2, 11, 5)	15	23/3	16	23/ 10
(2, 21, 13)	264	56/16	239	56/ 22
(5, 6, 3)	49.5	39/5	30	39/ 13
(17, 4, 2)	61.2	38/5	35.5	38/ 14
(31, 3, 1)	26.3	32/8	12.13	32/ 18
(127, 3, 1)	73.2	42/3	38	42/ 20

We implemented Algorithm 1 in HELib and compared with the results of the original HELib implementation for removing v digits from e digits. From Table 3, we see that for $e \geq v + 2$ and large p , our digit removal procedure can outperform the current HELib implementation in both depth and work. Therefore, for these settings, we can replace the digit extraction procedure in the decryption function in HELib, and obtain a direct improvement on after level and time for decryption. When $p = 2$ and r, e are small, the current HELib implementation can be faster due to the fact that the lifting polynomial is $F_e(x) = x^2$ and squaring operation is faster than generic multiplication. Also, when $e = v + 1$, i.e., the task is to remove all digits except the highest one, our digit removal method has similar performance as the HELib counterpart.

Tables 4 and 5 present timing results for the full and slim modes of bootstrapping for FV implemented in SEAL. In both tables, the column labeled “recrypt init. time” shows the time to compute the necessary data needed in bootstrapping. The “recrypt time” column shows the time it takes to perform one bootstrapping. The before (resp. after) level shows the maximal depth of circuit that can be evaluated on a freshly encrypted ciphertext (resp. freshly bootstrapped ciphertext). Here $R(p^r, d)$ denotes a finite ring with degree d over base ring \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} , and $\text{GF}(p^r)$ denotes the finite field with p^r elements.

Table 4. Time table for bootstrapping for FV scheme, $hw = 128$ (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770 CPU with 3.4 GHZ CPU and 32 GB memory)

Parameters					Result			
n	$\log q$	Plaintext space	Slots	Security	Fresh/After level	Recrypt time (s)	Memory usage (GB)	Recrypt init. time (s)
16384	558	$GF(127^{256})$	64	92.9	24/7	2027	8.9	193
16384	558	$GF(257^{128})$	128	92.9	22/4	1381	7.5	242
32768	806	$R(127^2, 256)$	64	126.2	32/12	21295	27.6	658
32768	806	$R(257^2, 128)$	128	126.2	23/6	11753	26.6	732

Table 5. Time table for slim bootstrapping for FV scheme, $hw = 128$ (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770 CPU with 3.4 GHZ CPU and 32 GB memory)

Parameters					Result			
n	$\log q$	Plaintext space	Number of slots	Security parameter	Fresh/After level	Recrypt init. time (s)	Memory usage (GB)	Recrypt time (s)
16384	558	\mathbb{Z}_{127}	64	92.9	23/10	57	2.0	6.75
32768	806	\mathbb{Z}_{127^2}	64	126.2	25/11	59	2.0	30.2
32768	806	\mathbb{Z}_{127^3}	64	126.2	20/6	257	8.9	34.5
16384	558	\mathbb{Z}_{257}	128	92.9	22/7	59	2.0	10.8
32768	806	\mathbb{Z}_{257}	128	126.2	31/15	207	7.4	36.8
32768	806	\mathbb{Z}_{257^2}	128	126.2	23/7	196	7.4	42.1

Comparing the corresponding entries from Tables 4 and 5, we see that the slim mode of bootstrapping is either close to or more than d times faster than the full mode.

6 Future Directions

In this work, we designed bootstrapping algorithms for the FV scheme whose depth depend linearly on $\log \log t$. For the BGV scheme, we were able to improve the dependence on t from $2 \log t$ to $\log t$. One interesting direction is to explore whether we can further improve the bootstrapping depth for BGV.

We also presented a slim mode of bootstrapping, which operates on a subspace of the plaintext space equivalent to a vector over \mathbb{Z}_{p^r} . The slim mode has a similar throughput as the full mode while being much faster. For example, it takes less than 7s to bootstrap a vector in \mathbb{Z}_{127}^{64} with after level 10. However, the ciphertext sizes of the slim mode are the same as those of the full mode, resulting in a larger ciphertext/message expansion ratio. It would be interesting to investigate whether we could reduce the ciphertext sizes while keeping the performance results.

Acknowledgements. We wish to thank Kim Laine, Amir Jalali and Zhicong Huang for implementing significant performance optimizations to SEAL. We thank Shai Halevi for helpful discussions on bootstrapping in HELib.

A Optimizing the Linear Transform for Slim Bootstrapping

In our slim mode of bootstrapping, we used a linear transform which has the following property: the input is an encryption of $\sum m_i x^i$, and the output is a batch encryption of $(m_0, m_d, \dots, m_{d(k-1)})$. A straightforward implementation of this functionality requires n slot permutations and n scalar multiplications. However, in the case when n is a power of 2, we can break down the linear transform into two parts, which we call coefficient selection and sparse linear transform. This reduces the number of slot permutations to $\log(d) + k$ and the number of scalar multiplications to k .

A.1 Coefficient Selection

The first part of the optimized linear transform functionality can be viewed as a coefficient selection. This process gets input $\text{Enc}(m(x))$ and outputs $\text{Enc}(m'(x))$ with $m'(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n/d-1} m_{id} \cdot x^{id}$. In other words, it selects the coefficients of $m(x)$ where the exponents of x are divisible by d . The following algorithm is specified to the case when n is a power of two. Using the property that $x^n = -1$ in the ring R , we can construct an automorphism ϕ_i of R such that

$$\phi_i : X^{2^i} \rightarrow X^{n+2^i} = -X^{2^i}.$$

For example, $\phi_0(\cdot)$ negates all odd coefficients, because ϕ_0 maps X to $-X$. This means that $\frac{1}{2}(\phi_0(m(x)) + m(x))$ will remove all odd terms and double the even terms. Using this property, we construct a recursive algorithm which return $m'(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n/d-1} m_{id} \cdot x^{id}$ for power of two d .

- For given $m(x)$, First compute $m_0(x) = m(x) + \phi_0(m(x))$.
- Recursively compute $m_i(x) = \phi_i(m_{i-1}(x)) + m_{i-1}(x)$ for $1 \leq i \leq \log_2 d$.
- Return $m'(x) = d^{-1} \cdot m_{\log_2 d} \bmod t$ for plain modulus t .

The function $\phi_i : X \rightarrow X^{\frac{n+2^i}{2^i}}$ can be evaluated homomorphically by using the same technique used in slot permutation. Another operation is just multiplying by $d^{-1} \bmod t$. Hence we can obtain $\text{Enc}(m'(x))$. This process needs $\log d$ slot permutations and additions.

A.2 Sparse Linear Transform

The desired functionality of the sparse linear transform is: take as input an encryption c of $\sum m_i x^{id}$ and output a batch encryption of $(m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{k-1})$.

We claim that this functionality can be expressed as $\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \lambda_i \sigma_{s_i}(c)$, where λ_i are pre-computed polynomials in R_t and the s_i form a set of representatives of $\mathbb{Z}_m^*/\langle p \rangle$. This is because the input plaintext only has k nonzero coefficients m_0, \dots, m_{k-1} . Hence for each i it is possible to write m_i as a linear combination of the evaluations of the input at k different roots of unity. Therefore, this step only requires k slot permutations and k plaintext multiplications. We can also adapt the babystep-giantstep method to reduce the number of slot permutations to $O(\sqrt{k})$, and we omit further details.

B Memory Usage

In our implementation of the bootstrapping procedure in SEAL, we pre-compute some data which are used in the linear transforms. The major part of the memory consumption consists of slot-permutation keys and plaintext polynomials. More precisely, each plaintext polynomial has size $n \log t$ bits, and the size of one slot-permutation key in SEAL is $(2n \log q) \cdot \lfloor \frac{\log q}{62} \rfloor$.

Here we report the number of such keys and plaintext polynomials used in our bootstrapping. In the full mode, we need $2\sqrt{n}$ slot-permutation keys, and $2\sqrt{n} + d + k$ plaintext polynomials.

On the other hand, the slim mode of bootstrapping in SEAL requires considerably less memory. Both inverse linear transform and the linear transform can be implemented via the babystep-giantstep technique, each using only $2\sqrt{k}$ slot-permutation keys and k plaintext polynomials.

C Proofs

C.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma 1. *Suppose $c_0 + c_1 s = \Delta m + v + aq$ is a ciphertext in FV with $|v| < \Delta/4$. if $q' > 4t(1 + \|s\|_1)$, and (c'_0, c'_1) is the ciphertext after switching the modulus to q' , then (c'_0, c'_1) also decrypts to m .*

Proof. We define the invariant noise to be the term v_{inv} such that

$$\frac{t}{q}(c_0 + c_1 s) = m + v_{inv} + rt.$$

Decryption is correct as long as $\|v_{inv}\| < \frac{1}{2}$. Now introducing the new modulus q' , we have

$$\frac{t}{q'} \left(\frac{q'}{q} c_0 + \frac{q'}{q} c_1 s \right) = m + v_{inv} + rt.$$

Taking nearest integers of the coefficients on the left hand side, we arrive at

$$\frac{t}{q'} \left(\lfloor \frac{q'}{q} c_0 \rfloor + \lfloor \frac{q'}{q} c_1 \rfloor s \right) = m + v_{inv} + rt + \delta,$$

with the rounding error $\|\delta\| \leq t/q'(1 + \|s\|_1)$. Thus the new invariant noise is

$$v_{inv'} = v_{inv} + \delta$$

We need $\|\delta\| < 1/4$ for correct decryption. Hence the lower bound on q' is

$$q' > 4t(1 + \|s\|_1).$$

C.2 Proof of Theorem 5

Proof. Correctness of Algorithm 1 is easy to show. In fact, the only place we deviate from the algorithm in [25] for digit extraction is that we used the digits R_i to replace $x_{i,j}$ in certain places. Since R_i has lowest digit x_i followed by $(e - i - 1)$ zeros, we can actually use it to replace $x_{i,j}$ for any $j \leq e - i - 1$ and still maintain the correctness.

To analyze the depth, note that we used polynomials of degree p^i to compute $z_{i,i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq v - 1$. Then, to compute $z_{i,e-1-i}$, a polynomial of degree $(e - 1 - i)(p - 1) + 1$ is used. Since the final result is a sum of the terms $z_{i,e-1-i}$ for $0 \leq i < v$, the degree of the entire algorithm is given by

$$\max_{0 \leq i < v} p^i((e - 1 - i)(p - 1) + 1)$$

Since each individual term above is bounded by ep^v , the degree is at most ep^v . Hence the depth of the algorithm is bounded by $\log(e) + v \log(p)$.

We now estimate the amount of work of our algorithm in terms of non-constant multiplications. The work consists of two parts: evaluating lift polynomials and lowest digit removal polynomials. Let $W(n)$ denote the number of non-constant multiplications to evaluate a polynomial of degree n . Then the total work is

$$\sum_{i=1}^v W((e - i)(p - 1) + 1) + \ell v W(p)$$

where $\ell = \lfloor \log_p((e - 1)(p - 1) + 1) \rfloor$ is the optimization parameter used in Algorithm 1. Since we used the Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm for polynomial evaluation, we have $W(n) \sim \sqrt{2n}$. Substituting this estimate into the above formula, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i=1}^v \sqrt{2((e - i)(p - 1) + 1)} + \ell v \sqrt{2p} \\ & \sim \sqrt{2p} \sum_{i=1}^v \sqrt{e - i} + \sqrt{2p}(1 + \log_p(e))v \\ & \sim \sqrt{2pv}(\sqrt{e} + \log_p(e)) \\ & \sim \sqrt{2pev}. \end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof.

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