

Problem 1 (2p) *Similarly to a model presented during classes consider a moral hazard model with two actions but risk averse principal, i.e. with utility $\sum_i v(q_i - w_i)\pi_i(a)$, for increasing, differentiable and strictly concave v .*

Problem 2 (2p) *Similarly to a model presented during classes consider a repeated for two periods moral hazard model but with different discount factors for the principal and agent: δ_P and δ_A respectively. Write the FOCs and discuss how different patience parameters influence the optimal long-term contract.*

Problem 3 (3p) *Consider the hidden information problem as analyzed during classes. Redo the first and second best calculations for the case of continuum of types, i.e. $\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ with density $f(\theta) > 0$ and cdf $F(\theta)$. As an example solve for f uniform on $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ and with $S(q) = \log q$.*

Problem 4 (3p) *Consider the hidden information problem as analyzed during classes. Redo the first and second best calculations for the more general utility function of the agent: $u(w) - C(q, \theta)$, where u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and differentiable, while differentiable C satisfies: $C'_q > 0, C'_\theta > 0, C''_{qq} > 0, C''_{q,\theta} > 0, C'''_{q,q,\theta} > 0$.*