## A counterfactual simulation model of causal judgments


Tobias Gerstenberg, Noah Goodman, David Lagnado & Josh Tenenbaum




# Massachusetts Institute of Technology

## The simple story


We make causal judgments, by...







- Causal judgments are determined by our subjective degree of belief that the candidate cause made a difference to the outcome.
- We use our intuitive theory of the domain to simulate what the relevant counterfactual outcome would have been.


## **Exp 1: Causes & Counterfactuals**




Did (A) cause/prevent (B) ?








## Exp 2: Counterfactuals are necessary



- People's causal judgments cannot be explained without counterfactuals.
- Causal judgments differ strongly between clips where what actually happened was identical.
- Strong coupling between counterfactual and causal judgments (r = .97).


## Exp 3: Eye-tracking causality

#### **Fixations before collision**




• Many more fixations to where B would have gone in the causal and counterfactual condition.


#### Hidden Markov Model of people's fixations



#### **Fixations over time**





#### Differences in fixations between conditions




- Looking patterns between causal and counterfactual condition are very similar. Most counterfactual looks when uncertain.
- People spontaneously engage in counterfactual simulation but only in the causal condition not in the observation condition.

## The complex story





- Unifying theory of causal judgment that captures different aspects of causation in terms of counterfactual contrasts operating on a generative domain theory.
- Explains people's graded causal judgments ≥ 25 to a high degree of quantitative accuracy.
- Provides the tools to better understand causal language (cause vs. enable).



#### Acknowledgements & References

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