# A Novel Approach to Parameterized verification of Cache Coherence Protocols

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#### Problem of Parameterized Verification

Consdier a protocol P, a property Inv

- $P(N) \models Inv$  for any N
- not just for a single protocol instance  $P(c) \models Inv$
- Our opinion: parameterized verification is a theorem proving problem

#### State of Arts

- CMP: parameter abstraction and parameter abstraction
- Proposed, by McMillan, elaborated by Chou, Mannava, and Park (CMP), and formalized by Krstic
- construction of an abstract instance which can simulate any protocol instance
- human provides auxiliary invariants (non-interference lemmas)

## State of Arts

- invisible invariants,
- auxiliary invariants are computed from reachable state set in a finite protocol instance P(c)
- raw formula translated from BDD
- the reachable state set can't be enumerated, e.g., the FLASH protocol

## Two central and difficult problems

- searching auxiliary invariants is not automatic
- soundness problem: the theoretical foundation is not mechanized, and there is no a formal proof

## Our Motivation

- automatically searching auxiliary invariants
- Formally proving all the things: both the theoretical foundation and case studies
- A formal proof script as a formal verification product

# An Overview of Our Approach




Figure: The workflow of paraVerifier.

# Some Explanations

- paraVerifier=invFinder + proofGen
- protoocl.fl: a small reference instance of the protocol
- invFinder searches auxiliary invariants automatically
- protocol.tbl: stores the set of ground invariants and a causal relation table
- proofGen: create an Isabelle proof script protocol.thy which models and verifies the protocol
- run Isabelle script to automatically proof-check protocol.thy

#### Theoretical Foundation-Protocol

A protocol is formalized as a pair (ini, rules), where

- ini is an initialization formula; and
- rules is a set of transition rules. Each rule  $r \in rules$  is defined as  $g \triangleright S$ , where g is a predicate, and S is a parallel assignment to distinct variables  $v_i$  with expressions  $e_i$ , where S is a parallel assignment  $S = \{x_i := e_i | i > 0\}$ .

We write pre r = g, and act r = S if  $r = g \triangleright S$ .



## Theoretical Foundation-Causal Relation

#### Definition

We define the following relations

- invHoldForRule<sub>1</sub> s f  $r \equiv s \models \text{pre } r \longrightarrow s \models \text{preCond } f$  (act r), where preCond S  $f = f[x_i := e_i]$ , which substitutes each occurrence of  $x_i$  by  $e_i$ ;
- ② invHoldForRule<sub>2</sub>  $s f r \equiv s \models f \longleftrightarrow s \models \text{preCond } f \text{ (act } r)$ ;
- ③ invHoldForRule<sub>3</sub> s f r F ≡ ∃<math>f' ∈ F s.t.  $s \models (f' \land (pre r)) \longrightarrow s \models preCond f (act r);$
- invHoldForRule s f r F represents a disjunction of invHoldForRule<sub>1</sub>, invHoldForRule<sub>2</sub> and invHoldForRule<sub>3</sub>.



# Theoretical Foundation - Consistency Relation)

#### Definition

A consistency relation, i.e., consistent *invs ini rules*, that holds between a protocol (ini, rules) and a set of invariants  $invs = \{inv_1, \dots, inv_n\}$ , is defined as:

- For any invariant  $inv \in invs$  and state s, if ini is evaluated as true at state s (i.e., formEval ini s = true), then inv is also evaluated as true at the state s.
- For any  $inv \in invs$ , and  $r \in rules$ , and any state s, invHoldForRule  $inv \ r \ invs$ .

#### Theoretical Foundation - Consistent Lemma

#### Lemma

For a protocol (ini, rules), we use reachableSet ini rules to denote the set of reachable states of the protocol. Given a set of invariants invs, we have [|consistent invs ini rules;  $s \in \text{reachableSet ini rules}| \implies \forall inv \in invs. \text{formEval inv } s$