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COSMOPOLITAN MEMORY

Holocaust commemoration and national identity

> If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie?
>
> George Eliot[1]

In an influential argument, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider maintain that increasingly we are seeing a 'transition from national to *cosmopolitan* memory cultures' (2002: 88, 87; 2001). By this they mean that there has been a growth of forms of collective memory that are no longer primarily framed by the nation-state, or seen predominantly as the property of a particular nation or ethnic group, but that are instead relatively 'deterritorialised'. The Holocaust, according to their account, is 'the paradigmatic case' of such cosmopolitan memory; and has increasingly been decontextualised from its historical time and space, and, through processes of cultural mediation, turned into a universal and continually relevant 'moral story of good against evil' (2002: 98) whose central message is 'never again'. It has been turned from 'a set of facts' to 'an idea'; and increasingly is commemorated by people who have no direct connection to it (2002: 88), as witnessed not least in the proliferation of Holocaust memorials and museums and the millions of people across the globe who make treks, sometimes of thousands of miles, to visit them. Mostly, their argument about cosmopolitan memory is framed in terms of 'the global' or 'humanity', as when, for example, they argue that the deterritorialised cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust plays a significant role in the development of a cosmopolitan politics of human rights (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 100). At others, however, 'cosmopolitan' is equated with 'European', as when they claim that the developments that they chart 'contribute to the creation of a common European cultural memory' (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 87).[2]

In this chapter, I explore the argument that a cosmopolitan memory, which 'cracks the container' of the nation-state as 'memory-holder', is underway, and that we are witnessing a growing Europeanisation and/or cosmopolitanisation of memory. I do so by looking at specific cases of what Novicka and Rovisco call 'cosmopolitanism in practice' in Europe (2009). As we will see, detailed studies often reveal tensions involved in such practice and also show how cosmopolitan developments can be made part of other assemblages, and 're-territorialised' or 'co-opted' in terms of other interests, too. As Levy and Sznaider's arguments focus especially upon the Holocaust, this chapter also considers the considerable expansion of commemoration and heritagisation of the Holocaust that has occurred in Europe – and beyond it – especially since the 1980s. Part of a wider expansion of 'difficult heritage' (Macdonald 2009a), the increased public attention to the Holocaust – or what is sometimes provocatively dubbed a 'Holocaust cult', 'the Holocaust industry', 'Shoah Business' or even 'post-Holocaust necrophilia'[3] – raises questions about why it should be subject to so much new heritagisation and commemoration over 50 years since it occurred.

Cosmopolitan memory

Levy and Sznaider's argument about cosmopolitan memory is that we are witnessing a process in which 'national and ethnic memories continue to exist' but they

> are subjected to a common patterning. They begin to develop in accord with common rhythms and periodizations. But in each case, the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new… the result is always distinctive.
>
> (2002: 89)

We might conceptualize this, they say, as 'a process of "internal globalisation" through which global concerns become part of local experiences of an increasing number of people' (2002: 87). They illustrate this through a detailed charting of changes in ways that the Holocaust has been 'remembered' in Germany, Israel and the US, showing commonalities in its patterning since 1945, all of which contribute to the Holocaust becoming less 'a terrible aspect of a particular era' and instead 'a timeless and deterritorialized measuring stick for good and evil' (2002: 95).

First, there is a shift from social memory – first-hand biographical memories of those who lived through it – to historical or cultural memory, transmitted primarily through mediated representations. The latter allows for a globalisation of memory, especially through film and television. Here, they note how the US mini-series *Holocaust* in the 1970s and then films such as *Schindler's List* (1993) were widely disseminated around the world and also how they themselves universalised specific historical events into narratives of good and evil. *Schindler's*

List in particular helped to decouple the usual 'ethnic'/'national' identification of perpetration and victimhood by having a hero who is German. In such a representation, national identity is no longer depicted as the key determinant of where an individual stands in relation to the Holocaust. This, Levy and Sznaider see as part of a wider common patterning in which there is – to varying extents in the three countries – a diffusion of 'the distinction between memories of victims and perpetrators', resulting instead in a more generalised 'memory of a shared past' (2002: 103). The other common patterning of Holocaust memory, linked to its increasing universalism, is its 'future-orientation' (2002: 102). Applicable as an abstract principle, recollection of the Holocaust becomes primarily framed in terms of safeguarding against future repetition: 'Never again!' becomes the mantra.

Identification of the cosmopolitanising processes that Levy and Sznaider discuss with reference to the Holocaust have not yet been made as forcefully with reference to other countries or other 'memories'. In more recent work, however, they (sometimes with other colleagues) have sought to extend their arguments in various ways. This has included expanding the Holocaust argument to other countries, such as Austria and Poland, and exploring this too through analyses of public discourse and group interviews (Levy *et al.* 2011). Their research, they argue, provides evidence of a growing 'shared European memory', though also of national variations that they call 'reflexive particularism' (ibid.). They have also extended their argument to claim that a human rights discourse, which has its origins in the Holocaust, is now the discursive frame for any atrocity. And – in what seems a tautology but they see as part of the self-sustaining network of these ideas – they argue that (sometimes competing) cultural memories of atrocities have become the global currency for articulating notions of human rights (Levy and Sznaider 2010).

In an overlapping argument, together with Ulrich Beck, they claim that the Holocaust has informed a wider mobilisation of notions of forgiveness, guilt and restitution in international political relations – witnessed, for example, in public apologies by politicians.[4] The 'self-critique' inherent in such apologies and any associated reparations is, they argue, part of how 'cosmopolitan Europe' is being constituted (2009: 120). Thus, '[t]he radically self-critical European memory of the Holocaust does not destroy the identity of Europe, it constitutes this very identity' (ibid.). Although national histories are often referenced within this self-critique, and as part of the 'reflexive particularism' of Holocaust discussion, what is involved here, they claim, is that '[t]he nation is being remembered in order to overcome it' (2009: 125).

While Levy and Sznaider's position is primarily descriptive of a process that they are attempting to document, they sometimes present their case in terms of a normative cosmo-optimism – the view that cosmopolitanism is a good thing – as argued for by Ulrich Beck and others, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006). It should be noted here that what is meant by cosmopolitanism varies to an extent between theorists, though an 'openness to difference' is generally

regarded as a key feature.[5] As Nina Glick-Schiller and colleagues point out, however, this is typically conceptualised in terms of a binary opposition between openness and closedness, with a concomitant understanding of openness as entailing some kind of celebration of difference (Glick-Schiller *et al.* 2011: 403). They suggest instead that we might focus on 'daily cosmopolitanism', understood in terms of 'relationalities of openness across differences', in which people are seen 'as capable of relationships of experiential commonalities despite differences' (ibid.: 410, 403). This potentially expands the field of what might be considered cosmopolitan as well as allowing for attention to some of the more subtle processes of making and experiencing commonality and difference that may be involved in everyday life, though it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that binary oppositions – including between openness and closedness – may be invoked in practice.

While politically I largely share a cosmo-optimistic viewpoint, my main concern below is investigative rather than normative. To this end, I examine the cosmopolitan memory thesis in relation to anthropological research in Europe in order to examine cosmopolitanism in various spheres of social life and cultural production. I do so primarily, though not exclusively, with reference to mobilisations of Holocaust memory. In what follows, then, I first provide a background to the rise of Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation in Europe, before examining arguments about cosmopolitanism through a range of ethnographic examples. As we will see, these pose various complications and problems for the cosmopolitan memory thesis in its current form and for a straightforward cosmo-optimistic outcome, though they also highlight some significant transformations underway within European memory cultures.

The rise of Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation

The timing that Levy and Sznaider see as marking a shift from social to cultural memory of the Holocaust can also be seen as that of the expansion of more widespread public Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation; as well as broadly coincident with the memory phenomenon. In various counties, such as Germany and the US, this 'Holocaust boom' began in the 1970s, with considerable further expansion in most of Europe, as well as in many countries beyond it, especially those in the New World, towards the end of the twentieth century and into the present one.[6] While the looming loss of first-hand social memory, resulting from the passing away of those who directly witnessed events, has certainly legitimated and fuelled the expansion of Holocaust commemoration, it does not fully explain it.

Other conflicts have been commemorated well before any dwindling of social memory, as Peter Novick (2000) writes of Vietnam, for example, and as can be seen for World War I and other aspects of World War II. Neither do psychological nor psychoanalytic accounts provide adequate explanation. According to these, the trauma of the Holocaust was so great that its full recognition was 'repressed'

and could only be contemplated after time had passed and as direct memory was receding. As scholars such as Novick (2000) and Kansteiner (2002) have argued, however, such explanations ignore the fact that the Holocaust was usually not so much avoided as framed in different – historically and socially specific – terms. Immediately after the war, in many countries, as Novick writes of the US, 'the Holocaust was *historicised* – thought about and talked about as a terrible feature of the period that had ended with the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Holocaust had not, in the post-war years, attained transcendent status as the bearer of eternal truths or lessons that could be derived from contemplating it' (2000: 100). In Britain the historicisation of the Holocaust also fed in to a national redemptive allegory of Britain having overcome the Nazi evil. It was further allied with a Christianised discourse of forgiveness and a more general assumption that looking back at the horrors was psychologically unhealthy. In both West and East Germany too, there was a pervasive public discourse of 'moving on' as a healthy post-war response (Moeller 2003; Macdonald 2009). This is not to say that there was necessarily forgetting, however, for at the same time there were reminders in popular media, such as the 'flood of images' of concentration camps published in the press in the aftermath of war and local forms of commemoration (Moeller 2003; Gregor 2009), though this may not have been widely embedded in familial remembering (Kaschuba 2005; Welzer *et al.* 2002).

There was also war commemoration – of World Wars I and II – across most of Europe, in which commemoration of the Jewish Holocaust was subsumed under more general World War II commemoration. This, in turn, built upon World War I commemoration and in many European countries the two world wars were mostly commemorated together, with memorials often being adapted and extended (Rowlands 1999). In Germany, for example, the usual form of commemorative language was remembrance of 'the victims of Fascism', a category that also included others such as political objectors, as well as ordinary German soldiers who died in the war.[7] Even in Israel, the first official commemoration of the Holocaust did not begin until 14 years after the war (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 92) and it remained relatively marginal and ambivalent, regarded primarily as 'a reminder of helpless passivity typical of Jewish existence outside the sovereign space of the territorial state' (ibid.: 95) until the 1960s, when it was reshaped, in the relation to the Eichmann trial and Six-Day War to being regarded as 'the culmination of the history of anti-Semitism' (ibid.: 96).

While the broadcasting of the Eichmann trial around the world raised awareness of the Nazi genocide of Jews, it was not until the 1980s, and in some cases even later, that most European countries began any state-sponsored Holocaust commemoration. There were some more or less isolated efforts, primarily by Jewish groups, but these were generally small scale and sometimes foundered through lack of wider support. In the case of Britain, for example, in 1965 a group of Holocaust survivors was refused permission to take part in events at the Cenotaph to mark the twentieth anniversary of the end of the War –

a refusal which was endorsed by leading Jewish and Christian organisations; and in 1980 the erection of a Holocaust memorial next to the Cenotaph was also refused, though the placing of a small – and largely forgotten – memorial stone in Hyde Park was allowed (Kushner 1998: 230).

Language and the global-assemblage 'Holocaust'

It is worth noting here too that the term 'Holocaust' was little used prior to the late 1970s, when the US-produced mini-series *Holocaust* – which came to be broadcast in many European countries – popularised the term, it coming to be used by many who had not seen or even heard of the series, not only in English-speaking countries but also in most others (Levi and Rothberg 2003: 12). The French director, Claude Lanzmann's, extraordinary documentary, *Shoah,* first screened in 1985, also helped to disseminate the Hebrew term 'Shoah', which some regard as more appropriate than the Greek-rooted 'Holocaust', though it has not gained the same widespread currency.[8] Although both terms had historically been used for other atrocities, during the 1980s they became firmly preceded by the definite article to designate the organised murder of Jews during World War II. This had the effect too of marking out the Holocaust as a specific assemblage (see Chapter 1), with its own particular set of properties and momentum. This was, moreover, an increasingly 'global assemblage' (Collier and Ong 2005), constituted and reconstituted in different parts of the world with specific effects. It was materialised especially in a panoply of forms of museumisation, heritagisation and commemoration, as I discuss below.

Before turning to these, however, it is worth noting other linguistic terms and semantic shifts that have also become elements in the formation of the global Holocaust assemblage. Events that had previously been cast primarily in terms of conflict between nations, and of victory and defeat, were now characterised as being to do with the Holocaust, thus putting the overriding emphasis upon the victims of Nazi terror. This reframing, however, occurred alongside, as part of an interlinked set of mutually supporting elements, a change in what Novick describes as 'the attitude towards victimhood' (2000: 8). As he puts it, since the 1960s 'victimhood' has moved

> from a status all but universally despised to one often eagerly embraced. On the individual level, the cultural icon of the strong, silent hero is replaced by the vulnerable and verbose antihero. Stoicism is replaced as a prime value by sensitivity. Instead of enduring in silence, one lets it all hang out. The voicing of pain and outrage is alleged to be 'empowering' as well as therapeutic.
>
> (2000: 8)

This shift of victimhood from being a denigrated status of the powerless and abject to providing a potentially powerful platform for articulating grievance and

seeking redress, is part of a broader identity politics and discourse of 'exclusion', as discussed in the previous chapter.

In the case of Holocaust, the reclaiming of agency that it represents has been further articulated through an increased usage of the term 'survivors' rather than 'victims', and equivalents in various other languages. Beginning in the US in the 1980s, the use of the term 'survivor' was intended to foreground the fact and achievement of endurance rather than perpetuate an emphasis on helplessness. But it caused discomfort for some of those so reclassified because it accorded agency where they felt they had none and seemed to downgrade the status of those who did not survive.[9] This is perhaps partly why its adoption has been patchy. In Germany, for example, while the term *Überlebende* – survivor – is sometimes used, it is not as widespread as *Opfer* – a term that means both 'victim' and 'sacrifice', and whose dual connotation plays into Christianised notions of sacrifice to some higher good that are deeply problematic in this context (Rowlands 1999: 142; Thomas 1999: 201).

On the one hand, then, there has been a widely shared global discourse of Holocaust that incorporates many of the same semantic elements in different languages and contexts. At the same time, however, there are particular linguistic inflections and connotations that contribute to how it plays out in specific, often national, situations. This is the case too for more material elements of the Holocaust assemblage.

Holocaust heritage

The most visible sign in Memoryland Europe of the proliferation of the Holocaust assemblage is the number of Jewish museums that have opened since the 1980s. Unlike the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, which opened in 1981 and was followed by a continuing wave of Holocaust museums throughout the US, most of these prefer to characterise themselves as *Jewish* museums, giving a broader presentation of Jewish life in Europe prior, and in some cases subsequent, to its decimation in the mid-twentieth century. In Germany, Frankfurt's Jewish Museum opened in 1988, Berlin's in 2001 and that of Munich in 2007; and at least 10 further Jewish museums, as well as related sites such as synagogues showing exhibitions, have opened over this period.[10] Other new Jewish museums in Europe include the Jewish Museum of Lithuania, Vilnius (1989);[11] the Jewish Museum of Belgium, Brussels (1990);[12] the Slovak Museum of Jewish Culture, Bratislava (1991);[13] Greece's Jewish Museum, Athens (1998);[14] the Galicia Jewish Museum in Cracow, Poland (2004);[15] the Jewish Museum of Rome (2004);[16] the Danish Jewish Museum, Copenhagen, designed by Daniel Libeskind, opened in 2004; and the Jewish Museum in Oslo in 2008.[17] A Museum of the History of Polish Jews will open in Warsaw in 2013.[18]

It should be noted that some of Europe's Jewish Museums have a longer history, as does that of Vienna, originally founded in 1896; the Czech Jewish

FIGURE 8.1 Jewish Museum, Berlin. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald

Museum in Prague, founded in 1906; the Jewish Historical Museum, Amsterdam (1932)[19] and London's Jewish Museum, founded in 1932.[20] But these too have all been variously supplemented, renovated and expanded in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Vienna's Jewish Museum was closed by the Nazis in 1938, after the annexation of Austria; and some of its collections were shown for a while during the 1960s by the city's Jewish community but without any state support. Then, in the 1990s a Jewish Museum was founded and opened in 1993 in Dorotheergasse. This was refurbished in 1996 – introducing its controversial holograms exhibition (see below, and Bunzl 2003); and supplemented by a further new Jewish Museum in Judenplatz in 2000, which itself underwent considerable refurbishment in 2010.[21] Currently, the Dorotheergasse Jewish Museum is being refurbished again (its holograms exhibition having been dismantled).[22] The Czech Jewish Museum was closed to the public in 1938 but from 1942 the Nazis added items from around Europe to its collections with the sinister aim of creating what they planned would become a 'museum of an extinct race'.[23] Today, Prague's Jewish Museum consists of a set of sites around the city, several of which were opened in the 1990s.[24] The Amsterdam Jewish Historical Museum was thoroughly renewed and relocated in 1987.[25] London saw the opening of the new London Museum of Jewish Life in 1983, which amalgamated institutionally with the earlier Jewish Museum in 1995, and became part of a new, single building in 2010.[26]

FIGURE 8.2 Queues of visitors at one of the sites of Prague's Jewish Museum. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald



FIGURE 8.3 Holocaust memorial Vienna, by Rachel Whiteread. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald

As well as museums, Europe has seen a massive wave of Holocaust memorials. This includes well-known examples such as Rachel Whiteread's 'inverted library' memorial in Vienna, unveiled in 2000, and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin, unveiled in 2005. It also includes numerous smaller memorials, such as plaques on houses of former Jewish citizens; and the thought-provoking 'counter-monuments', of artists such as Horst Hoheisel and Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, that seek to resist the stasis of many memorials and thus to avoid the paradoxical forgetting that some suggest is a consequence of much memorialisation (Young 1993, 2000). This commemorative activity has been accompanied by the growth of touristic production of Jewish heritage, such as that in Poland – including *Schindler's List* tours in Krakow – since the late 1990s,[27] and a wave of signs of what Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1999), in the German context, has described as a shift in the 'memory landscape' (*Erinnerungslandschaft*). These include the opening of Jewish restaurants and courses in Jewish Studies (the latter being, she notes, now more popular – overwhelmingly with non-Jewish Germans – at the University of Munich than is Gender Studies). As Ruth Ellen Gruber puts it in her lively documentation of what she calls 'the Jewish phenomenon' – a pan-European embracing of 'Things Jewish' is underway.

> From Milan to Munich, from Krakow to Cluj and well beyond, Jewish exhibitions, festivals and workshops of all types abound, as do conferences and academic study programmes on all aspects of Jewish history, culture, and tradition. Readings, lectures, seminars, talk shows and films spotlight Jewish issues; and articles and programs on Jewish subjects are being given frequent and prominent space in the print-media and on prime-time television. Private volunteers and civic organizations clean up abandoned Jewish cemeteries and place plaques on empty synagogues … Yiddish song, klezmer (traditional eastern European Jewish instrumental music), and other Jewish music – performed by Jewish and non-Jewish groups alike – draw enthusiastic (and overwhelmingly non-Jewish) audiences to concert halls, churches, clubs and outdoor arenas. Hundreds – even thousands – of new books on Jewish topics are published in local languages … Old Jewish quarters are under development as tourist attractions, where 'Jewish-style' restaurants with 'Jewish-sounding' names write their signs in Hebrew or Hebrew-style letters, use Jewish motifs in their décor, and name their dishes – sometimes even dishes made from pork or a nonkosher mix of meat and dairy products – after rabbis and Old Testament prophets.
>
> (Gruber 2002: 6)

Again, while this is frequently depicted as being about 'Jewish culture' rather than the Holocaust, the two cannot be disentangled in post-Holocaust Europe. This is made particularly and ironically evident by the fact that the embracing of Things Jewish is so frequently carried out by non-Jews in contexts in which, due to the Holocaust, only few and sometimes no Jews now live.

FIGURE 8.4 Jewish figurines for sale in Krakow. Photograph courtesy of Erica Lehrer

This is evident, for example, in Erica Lehrer's detailed account of a trade in carved wooden figurines of old-fashioned Jews – 'all men, traditionally coiffed and black-coated', with melancholic expressions (2003: 336; 2013). Produced for the expanded tourist market by non-Jewish Poles, they traffic in a stereotype that might be deemed anti-Semitic, not least in its depiction of Jews as part of a *past* that is incongruous with modernity. Yet, she argues, numerous different affects and identifications circulate around and through these souvenirs, resisting uni-dimensional explanations.[28] Some of their makers claim that they create them as a memorial duty, atoning for post-Holocaust Jewish absence; 'It is my aim not to let traces of this ancient culture sink into oblivion', said one carver (2003: 346). While this might seem disingenuous from somebody who produces them for sale en masse, others too – including Jews – may see it in similar ways. One Jewish woman from the US, owner of a substantial collection of the figurines, explained:

> 'The real significance for me, and why I was so drawn to them ... was that I felt they were a symbol, just sitting there, that Judaism would never die no matter what happened. That here in the midst of all this destruction that you saw, with few Jews left, that sitting in a market were these dolls ... That's really what it is for me. That no matter how many times you try to put the Jews down, they pop up somewhere'.
>
> (2003: 321–2)

Lehrer's research is an important reminder of the multiple and also transnational motivations that may be entangled in the growth of Holocaust heritage – even in its most apparently kitschy forms.

Explaining the Holocaust phenomenon

To some extent, the new level of public marking of the Holocaust can be seen as part of a more general public preoccupation with the past that has taken off since the 1970s and that has been discussed in previous chapters. Yet many of the arguments typically used to try to explain this do not work for the case of Holocaust remembrance. This is clearly no nostalgic looking back to a time of tradition, community or greater stability. World War and Holocaust highlight precariousness and violence, even – or, as Bauman (1989) argues, especially – in the midst of modernity and rationalisation. While there is an element of recuperating the voices of those whose experiences have been left out of many historical accounts – in this case the victims/survivors – this is not all there is to it, and it does not explain the state-sponsorship of commemorative activity in most countries, nor the form that much Holocaust commemoration takes.

In his discussion of growing public discourse of Holocaust in the US, Peter Novick (2000) shows a detailed interweaving of activity by American Jews – including growing fears of losing their identity in the face of *reduced* evident anti-Semitism in the States – and wider events, including the Eichmann trials and the altered discourse of victimhood, which changed the frameworks within which the events of the 1930s and 1940s were talked about. What Novick dubs an increased 'Holocaust fixation' (2000: 10) in the US also had consequences for Europe, not least through the growth of American Holocaust-related tourism to Europe (e.g. Kugelmass 1992; Cole 2000). For the European case, Ruth Ellen Gruber also emphasises not simply generational change and concern over the disappearance of direct witnesses but also attention to questions of wartime activity and culpability raised by the '68er generation, especially in West Germany (2002: 15). In Eastern Europe, a 'waning of communism' also made filling what were perceived as the 'blanks' of history – dimensions ignored under communism – a moral project of self-definition, in which Jewish history became one such 'blank' to be recovered (2002: 18). In addition, she attributes the development of a more sympathetic Christian view of Jews to the 1965 *Nostra Aetate* Second Vatican declaration that withdrew the former attribution of Jewish collective responsibility for the murder of Jesus, and to Polish Pope John Paul II's attempts to build bridges with Judaism, stemming partly from his own wartime experiences (2002: 18). Furthermore, she suggests, Jews' own attempts to redefine their identities, partly in light of some of the events above, has also resulted in a turn to 'roots and heritage' (2002: 18).

As Gruber acknowledges, this turn is also part of a wider pan-European interest in heritage. And while there are significant differences from that wider heritage phenomenon, as noted above, there are also elements that are shared. In

particular, both rest on and, in a feedback loop, help to sustain the increasingly widespread assumption that the past deserves attention in the present and that it can provide lessons for the future. Indeed, the Holocaust has become a key constitutive case in the widespread positioning of history as an educational resource for the present and future. Despite the fact that it has been subject to extensive debate (especially but not only in the famous Historians' Debate (*Historikerstreit)* in Germany in the 1980s (Maier 1987)) over whether or not it should be regarded as so singular as to be unable to provide analogies with other events, it has nevertheless become the basis for numerous educational programmes across Europe.[29] These attempt to operationalise the principle of *Never again!* – a phrase that became widespread in the wake of World War II (initially with reference to war) and later more specifically in relation to Holocaust. By providing awareness of the horror of the Holocaust, educational programmes aim to help prevent future atrocity. Involved here too is not just an idea that the past is capable of providing lessons for the present and future but that there is a moral duty to look to history for such lessons. This understanding of the past as a source for moral witnessing and debate is a key feature of the late twentieth- and twenty-first century heritage and memory phenomenon that this book explores. World War II and the Holocaust – events that ravaged Europe and beyond, destroying and disrupting millions of lives – surely played a central role in shaping this particular perspective on the past.

This 'take' on history is one that we could readily consider to be a form of 'cosmopolitan memory'. Rather than history being understood as about *specific* pasts, it is plumbed as a source for 'bigger' and 'broader' 'lessons'. It is 'lifted out' of its particular settings and put to work in others. Yet, as has also been evident from earlier chapters in this book, there is much else that may be entailed in past presencing in practice. In what follows, I discuss both the specific phenomenon of Holocaust commemoration and cosmopolitan memory arguments through a set of examples drawn primarily from anthropological research. This not only provides a more fine-grained examination of what is underway 'on the ground' in particular and differentiated contexts, it also highlights other considerations, limits and paradoxes that may be involved and that theorising needs to address.

Ritual commemoration of the Holocaust

Commemorative ceremonies and ritual deserve attention as distinctive memorial forms. While these frequently occur at monumental sites, they also have a specific character as collective activity of condensed symbolic significance (Turner 1967). Individuals come together to participate in more or less choreographed actions, that contain at least some shared movements, and that are recognised as being meaningful for collective identity. This does not require that individuals need to decode the particular meanings of actions or symbols employed – indeed elements of ritual are not necessarily de-codable in this way, though they often reference other ceremonies or rituals in an inter-rituality analogous to inter-

textuality. Especially important, however, are ritual's performative dimensions – in two senses of the term 'performative'. First, the classic Austinian sense, in analogy with speech acts that accomplish what they utter – e.g. 'I promise' (Austin 1962a; see also Butler 1997). A national ritual, for example, in this sense of performative would not be interpreted as merely *expressing* the nation but as bringing the nation into being. Second, a ritual is performative also in the sense of being a form of performance, analogous with that of theatre, in which matters such as staging, scripts, props, actors and audience all contribute to the making of a specific, affectively rich, event. This form of performance is partly what makes ritual performative in the first sense.

While rituals and ceremonies are generally held at designated monuments or sites, they do not operate the same temporality as do monuments and sites. Typically the temporality of ritual and ceremony is both punctuated (i.e. at designated time-limited moments) and repetitive, often along annual cycles in the case of national ceremonies. As Émile Durkheim (1912) argued, this may have an 'effervescent' effect, re-imbuing the social with affect and significance. Due to the non-material nature of ceremonies, however, changes are usually fairly easy to introduce, meaning that even while rituals may repeat, they can respond to context and contingency, resulting in variations over time. Likewise, despite collective action, the fact that much is left verbally unarticulated in ritual may allow for divergences of interpretation, as argued in Victor Turner's classic account (1967), as well as in more recent analyses of ritualised memorial practices (e.g. Sturken 1997; Handelman 1998; Michaels and Wulf 2011).

Below I turn to two examples of Holocaust commemorative ritual – the first a 'life-cycle' ritual by Israeli citizens to Holocaust death camps in Europe; and the second, the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001. In both, I am concerned with how far ritualised public Holocaust commemoration 'cracks the container' of the nation state and offers cosmopolitan potential.

Nationalism in Israeli Holocaust commemoration in Poland

Trips by young Israelis to Polish death camps can be seen as 'a central rite … in Israel's civil religion' (Feldman 2002: 85), according to Jackie Feldman. Run since the 1980s, these organised trips have now taken hundreds of thousands of young Israelis on visits to Auschwitz-Birkenau and other camps. As Feldman describes, this practice is highly nationalistic, instilling strong and embodied, emotional senses of national identity through collective participation in ritualised activity (2002, 2008). As such, it clearly does not fit the cosmopolitan memory thesis. Because Levy and Sznaider put so much emphasis on mediated forms of memory, he argues, they 'underestimate the power of rituals and embodied practices to create coherent, totalistic local worlds of meaning' (Feldman 2008: 260). Moreover, far from disappearing or being displaced by mediated memory, such embodied ritual remains important. Nations in particular, maintains Feldman, continue to use ritual in this way, thus 'ground[ing] their ontology in

FIGURE 8.5 A ceremony at the Warsaw Ghetto (Rapaport) Memorial, Auschwitz. The Memorial, one of the very few depicting Jewish heroism, is framed as the transition and re-entry point from the Holocaust to Israel. The ceremony, generally performed immediately before boarding the bus for the airport and the voyage home, appropriates the site and the legacy of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising for the State. Photograph and caption courtesy of Jackie Feldman

FIGURE 8.6 Students line up to photograph each other by the *Arbeit Macht Frei* gate at Auschwitz. As students' albums are one of the main means of transmission of their testimony to others, the snapshots form part of the bank of images that will shape future participants' understandings of the Shoah and their expectations of the voyage. Photograph and caption courtesy of Jackie Feldman

traditional religion-based paradigms and embodied practices' (ibid.); and they further support this through a 'deploy[ment of] cultural history in service of the State' (ibid.). 'In other words', he concludes, 'reports of nationalism's death – and the victory of secularization – have been premature' (2008: 260).

Not only does Feldman's research show how Holocaust commemoration can act in service of nationalistic sentiments, it also provides a basis for criticising some of Levy and Sznaider's other assumptions. In particular, he argues that the proliferation of mediated forms of memory and the increased international traffic of people can support rather than diminish nationalism. As he explains: 'The permeability of national boundaries, the ease and relative affordability of travel, and the ability to diffuse knowledge of the voyages through mass media all enable the State to promote voyages to the dead Diaspora as a source of stable roots in the state' (2008: 260). Videos and photographs of the events enable those who have been on such visits to Poland to tell others about it, and circulate this information – and their accompanying sentiments – more widely. Moreover, Feldman argues, cosmopolitan ideas make it difficult to oppose nationalistic activity. Even when Israel engages in highly nationalistic acts, such as raising the Israeli flag during the visits in 'rituals closely resembling those of the cult of fallen soldiers' (2008: 260), Poles are rendered unable to object because 'the very recognition of the cosmopolitan (or inter-European) significance of the Holocaust makes [them] loath to openly confront Israel over the extremely nationalist (and often anti-Polish) tenor of the voyages' (2008: 260).

The UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day

That the UK government created a major new national ceremony and sponsored thousands of smaller commemorative rituals and events across the country to mark its first Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001 can also be seen as evidence of the continued importance that nations may put on ritualised activity.[30] The capacities of technical mediation were put to use here too, the new ceremony being broadcast on prime-time television. This too, however, was in service of the nation, as indicated among other things by the fact that the ceremony was attended by numerous 'national figures', including the Prime Minister and Prince Charles. Nevertheless, as I argue in my detailed analysis of the context and structure of, and debate about, the new national commemoration, while the event was thoroughly *national,* it was also a performative bid to configure the nation in a new way (Macdonald 2005a). While not directly framed in terms of arguments about cosmopolitanism, my account of the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day showed on the one hand that this was no 'breaking of the national container'. On the other, however, it showed an attempt to revise the nation itself *as* cosmopolitan.

In numerous ways throughout the planning and instantiation of the new UK Holocaust Memorial Day, the nation was referenced both directly and also indirectly through the more implicit ways that Michael Billig refers to

as 'banal' (1995; and see below). At times, this drew directly on the imagery of Britain as 'war hero' that Kushner argues is 'central to post-1945 national identity' (Kushner 1997: 10; see also Cesarani 1997). For example, the national ceremony included a film about the Bergen-Belsen camp being liberated by British troops, and another about children being brought to Britain via the Czech Kindertransport; and throughout, there was emphasis on survivors of the Holocaust and other atrocities seeking, and gaining, refuge in Britain.[31] The 'national' character of the event even trumped its potential Jewishness. As Gaby Koppel, responsible for producing the inaugural national ceremony, put it: 'we were very clear about one thing. Holocaust Memorial Day wasn't to be an event just for Jews. It was a national occasion, relevant to all British citizens' (Koppel 2001: 7).

The Holocaust was, then, 'lifted out' of a specific Jewish reference – or, in terms used earlier in this book, given greater 'semantic reach'. This was not just with reference to the diverse population of Britain, however. In addition, other parts of the world were also reached out to through reference to other atrocities, including in Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda, all of which were included in the televised national ceremony. While this was a clear cosmopolitanising move in Levy and Sznaider's sense, the nation remained intact. Indeed, in some ways it was strengthened. It was so through the repeated referencing of the country as an actor (e.g. 'Britain's role in …') and use of the first-person plural pronoun (e.g. 'our country…'), thus taking the nation's existence, agency and a collective citizenly subscription to it for granted. The nation was also strengthened by being cast as hero; through modes such as reports from refugees in Britain, reference to Britain's military role in trying to resolve ongoing conflicts, and analogies implied with Britain's role in World War II.

The depiction of Britain as a haven for those escaping persecution also, however, served to support a portrait of Britain as multicultural. This was an explicit government aim, stated in the Government Proposal for a Holocaust Remembrance Day, published in October 1999. The proposal only mentions Jews in order to emphasise that the Holocaust should not be regarded as concerning them alone: 'Although it was a tragedy whose primary focus was the Jewish people, many other groups were persecuted and it has implications for us all' (Home Office 1999: 2). The proposal goes on to spell out those implications, and the kind of Britain that the Home Office hopes the new ceremony could help support:

> The Government has a clear vision of a multi-cultural Britain – one which values the contribution made by each of our many ethnic, cultural and faith communities. We are determined to see a truly dynamic society, in which people from different backgrounds can live and work together, whilst retaining their distinctive identities, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding.
>
> (Home Office 1999: 1)

This 'vision' was also dramatised in the national ceremony in acts such as citizens of visibly different ethnicities and faiths coming together to light candles of remembrance. Depicting the nation itself as cosmopolitan – as open to different cultures and traditions – was, then, a central ambition of the new Holocaust commemoration.

It was not, however, without its contradictions and ironies. On the one hand, for example, the official rhetoric was of Britain working together with other European nations in commemorating the Holocaust. This was prompted in part by the Stockholm Forum on the Holocaust of 2000, which had spurred various other nations (including Sweden and Italy) to also begin new Holocaust Memorial Days; and that was part of a wider European concern over the Balkan wars and growing racism and anti-Semitism.[32] Yet, at the same time, the national ceremony contained representation of World War II in the form of what Kushner describes as the 'Britain alone myth' (1997: 10), in which Britain is depicted as separate from the rest of Europe and even as a solitary adversary of Germany. Some commentators also pointed out that the cosmopolitan rhetoric of openness to difference, and specifically the projection of Britain as a place of refuge, was contrary to aspects of the country's asylum and immigration legislation and practice (Yuval-Davis and Silverman 2002). Furthermore, the new commemoration was itself the basis for inter-cultural dispute, the Muslim Council of Britain refusing in 2002 to take part in the commemoration in protest at Israel's occupation of Palestine (Macdonald 2005a; Werbner 2009).[33]

What these ironies of practice showed was that while cosmopolitan aspirations worked well when safely removed from their specific context – i.e. when 'the Holocaust' operated as a generalisable case of the perpetration of evil – they could founder when reinserted into *Realpolitik*. More widely, the new ceremony showed the risk that the very premise of the Holocaust as 'offering lessons' could easily be transformed into a sacrificial trope of movement towards a higher end – as when Prime Minister, Tony Blair, commented: 'Let not one life sacrificed in the Holocaust be in vain'.[34] As Michael Rowlands points out, this trope is deeply inappropriate to the case of the Holocaust, in relation to which 'nobody can claim that the deaths served any purpose whatsoever' (1999: 142).

National identity dilemmas

Part of my argument in my analysis of the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day was that some of the main ways in which national identities have been constructed historically have become increasingly problematic. As various theorists have argued, this typically involves processes of opposition – of defining 'us' in relation to 'them' (e.g. Jenkins 1997); with this then consolidated by identifying content that can be taken as marking 'Us-ness' and constructing differentiating symbols and what in German are called '*Gegenbilder*' (counterimages) (Beck-Gernsheim 1999). In the production of nation-states there seem to be two

oppositional tendencies involved. One is externally-oriented: self-definition in relation to other nations, e.g. British versus French. War has always been one of the most fertile arenas for this kind of definitional activity, though it also goes on in more 'banal' ways, such as sport or media discussions of food (Billig 1995). The other means is internally-oriented: the identification of, say, the 'really Us/British', through contrast with the 'not-Us/not-British', within (e.g. Gilroy 1987). In the histories of all modern nation-states we can see the identification of 'out-groups' within, which serves to foster and maintain a majority identity in relation to the minority, and also processes such as the scapegoating of these minorities as sources of blame for the fact that the nation-state does not achieve the perfection to which it aspires. Nazi Germany is, of course, the most striking example of this, Jews being the principal 'Other' in this process. But the very overt and state-perpetrated way in which this process occurred in Germany should not obscure the fact that the same basic process has been at work in identity formation in other nation-states too.

In a world of increased international dependency, global communication, trade and supra-national organisations, self-definition contra other nations has become less politic – though it still goes on. Post-Holocaust and in contexts of greater ethnic and cultural mixing, and sometimes vociferous identity-politics, self-definition by majorities through opposition to minorities has also become less politic, not least because minorities may be crucial in electoral terms – though it too still goes on. What is more acceptable, however, is self-definition in relation to the past. This can take the form of seeking continuities, though today these are less likely to take the straightforward triumphalist form of earlier national narratives (Samuel 1998; Phillips 1998). They can also operate oppositionally, either through contrast with a past self (as in contemporary Germany; or as witnessed in apologies for past events); or through contrast with past adversaries (though this risks being conflated with the present). Holocaust commemoration in Britain, for example, makes a contrast between Britain and Nazi Germany, and also other countries that perpetrate atrocities; and also seeks to evoke a sense of continuity with a time that is popularly seen as one when Britain was strong, people 'pulled together', shared common values, and exhibited 'moral backbone'. This potential that the past offers for different – and usually safer – kinds of identity-formation is, I suggest, a significant element in the wider turn to public history and heritage.

A cosmopolitan battle in Denmark?

One context in which strong 'us' versus 'them' national oppositions are typically made is that of war. For this reason, battles have frequently had important roles in national history, especially those that marked victories of the nation over enemies that threatened its national sovereignty. In some circumstances, however, defeats can also become part of a nation's history by acting as moments from which the nation rallied and projected itself into the future – though here

too oppositional national identity-construction as well as continuity-making is at work. The 1864 Battle of Dybbøl is just such an iconic 'noble defeat' in Danish national history, as Mads Daugbjerg (2009, 2011, 2013) describes. An event in which Denmark was defeated by Prussia and lost considerable land to what later became Germany, it nevertheless is often celebrated as the symbolic 'cradle of the "pure" Danish nation' (Daugbjerg 2011: 245), from which modern Denmark was born. Dybbøl, and especially the annual commemorative ceremonies that mark the battle, has also been the focus for considerable anti-German sentiment in Denmark.[35]

In his in-depth research at the battle site in 2006–7 however, Daugbjerg witnessed a series of interesting attempts to revise the commemorative ceremonies and the battlefield heritage centre to play down Danish nationalism and to try to be more conciliatory towards Germans and Germany. In 2001, German soldiers were invited for the first time to take part in the annual commemorative ceremony, marching and laying wreaths alongside the Danish military. The representations at the battlefield centre were also altered in order to emphasise stories of ordinary experience and shared human hardship rather than to focus on aggression between warring states. All this, writes Daugbjerg, was an explicit attempt to be 'non-national', 'post-heroic' (2011: 249) or 'cosmopolitan' (2009, 2011, 2012). The national was played down in favour of 'universal humanitarian ideals' (2011: 249).

Yet, as his detailed research shows, these attempts to 'not mention the nation' (2011) did not fully succeed. This was partly because, although the nation was mentioned less frequently in explicit terms, it was nevertheless subtly reasserted in 'banal' ways. Here, he draws on Billig's argument (1995) that nations are 'flagged' in everyday interactions through subtle means, such as *deixis* – a process in which the nation is implied (for example through linguistic reference, such as to 'our newspapers') without being explicitly named. A nice example of this in Daugbjerg's account is how in the Dybbøl heritage centre the verbal content of an audio-visual guide was altered to include more Prussian perspectives and to create what was regarded as 'a more balanced view on the war' (2011: 257). However, the audio-visual's background soundtrack, which consisted of a well-known nationalistic, martial song (whose lyrics and metaphors have been mobilised in recent years by the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party), remained unchanged. As Daugbjerg observes, visitors could sometimes be heard whistling this tune around the site after visiting the centre (2011: 257). Explicitly excised, the nation thus remained implicitly in place.

On the basis of this research, then, Daugbjerg cautions against readily accepting arguments about the nation being superseded by cosmopolitan reframing of memory. The nation is difficult to dislodge as it is subtly reasserted in banal interactions. Moreover, as I have argued for the UK case, there is also sometimes an attempt to recast the nation as cosmopolitan, witnessed in a 'conflation of cosmopolitan and national values' (2009: 443) and '"universal" values [being] celebrated as quintessentially Danish' (2009: 442).

FIGURE 8.7 Dybbøl ceremony 2006, including both Danish and (on the right-hand side) German soldiers. Photograph courtesy of Mads Daugbjerg

Incorporating Jews in the New Europe

The cases discussed above, then, variously show a persistence – and sometimes even a performance and strengthening – of the nation in what might potentially be cosmopolitan commemorative contexts. At the same time, however, some provide evidence for a reconfiguration of the nation itself as more 'multicultural' and cosmopolitan. Just how this plays out, however, is at least partly 'reflexively particular' within specific national contexts.

Matti Bunzl's discussion of the growth and form of Holocaust commemoration in Austria (2003, 2004) is also interesting in this regard, for he both shows Austria's distinctive position as well as offering a more general argument about changes underway in Europe. In relation to World War II, Austria has long regarded itself as victim of German aggression. From the 1980s, however, this self-image has increasingly been questioned, especially in light of President Kurt Waldheim's wartime activities in the Nazi *Wehrmacht* and his subsequent right-wing affiliations and the success of the Right Wing Freedom Party in Austria in the late 1990s. This, argues Bunzl (2003), played a part in a considerable expansion of public marking of Jewish heritage in the 1990s, which included the Jewish Museum developments noted above, with the contentious holograms exhibition that is the starting point for Bunzl's discussion.

Bunzl's argument is that while Jews historically 'were abjected as the nation's constitutive Other' (2003: 436), the expansion of Jewish heritage and a wider

visibility of Jewishness in the public sphere in late 1990s Austria is evidence of their inclusion. He notes that even Jörg Haider's Freedom Party began to use more positive rhetoric towards Jews during the 1990s, going so far as to elect a member of Vienna's Jewish community to a leadership position in the Party (2003: 455). This inclusion, which operates across the political spectrum, is, according to Bunzl, a function of the nation-state's being superseded by 'Europe', and thus a performance of new, European rather than national, boundaries. Jews, he writes, 'have become useful in Austria and elsewhere for the postmodern constitution of a European Self effected through the violent exclusion of a new set of Others – Muslims and Africans foremost among them' (2003: 436; 2005; see also Bangstad and Bunzl 2010). The holograms exhibition in the Jewish Museum is, he suggests, a rare and brave attempt to de-reify the Jewishness that is generally essentialised in public life (2003: 457) – in the new incorporation of Jews as much as in their earlier exclusion. The widespread negative reactions to it, however, speak to the investments in what he calls the 'cultural normalization of Jews' (2003: 457). Whether the closure of the holograms exhibition in the Dorotheergasse Jewish Museum signals a final victory of 'cultural normalisation' will depend on what kind of exhibition comes to replace it.[36]

What Bunzl's argument suggests for the cosmopolitan memory thesis is that there does indeed seem to be Europeanisation underway and that a focus on Holocaust plays a constitutive part in this. However, rather than this being necessarily a positive cosmopolitan development, it is part of a new set of exclusions and the creation of Europe not as 'open to the world' but as 'Fortress Europe' (see also Gingrich and Banks 2006). It is also worth noting here, echoing arguments above, that actual practice may also diverge from public rhetoric. While there is a public performance of incorporation of Jews in the New Europe, this does not necessarily mean full or unequivocal incorporation in everyday life. Ruth Mandel's *Cosmopolitan Anxieties* (2008), for example, gives sensitive attention to numerous, often subtle, exclusions or demarcations of Jews as Other – including analogies drawn between Jews and Turks – even amidst the 'Jewish renaissance' underway in Berlin since the 1980s. Furthermore, there may be divergence from the moves towards incorporation when it comes to particular groups of Jews. In Germany, for example, there is often considerable ambivalence towards the Russian Jews who have significantly increased the country's Jewish population since 1990 (Peck 2006: 40), and who, as Jeffrey Peck notes, are 'widely regarded as merely using their real or supposed Jewishness to get out of the Soviet Union for a better life in the West' (2006: 44; see also Bodemann and Bagno 2008). In contrast to the Jewishness being recovered from the past and enshrined in heritage, actually existing Russian Jews – who often do not go to synagogue or follow kosher rules – may fail to live up to the kind of Jewishness that the 'renaissance' has been bringing into being (Beck-Gernsheim 1999: 153–6).

So far, this chapter has looked especially at the linked rise of Holocaust heritage and Jewish renaissance in Europe. In some cases at least, this rise

appears to be linked to Europeanisation and a reconfiguration of the nation as more culturally diverse and open to difference. At the same time, however, in most of these cases the nation remains an active player, and in some seems to be strengthened rather than merely 'being remembered in order to overcome it' (Beck, Levy and Sznaider 2009: 125), as Levy and Sznaider suppose. In the next section, I explore the cosmopolitan memory thesis further through a different set of ethnographic examples that are all concerned in various ways with the Balkan wars and attempts at post-war memory reconstruction.

Overcoming national sentiments in the post-war Balkans?

The Balkan wars of the 1990s are widely regarded as a resurgence of the kind of dangerous ethnic and nationalistic sentiments that it had been hoped that greater cosmopolitanisation, Europeanisation and memory of the Holocaust would prevent. That some of the atrocities of the Balkan wars came to be framed in international media through language referencing the Holocaust – with accompanying images of 'concentration camps' – was a clear mobilisation of Holocaust memory (Levy and Sznaider 2004: 153). In turn, this helped to mobilise NATO intervention and for the first time Germany participated militarily to help end ethnic cleansing. The analogy – and 'never again' motif – has also been deployed since in various attempts to 'repair' the region through numerous Europeanisation projects of various kinds. These seek to promote some kind of cosmopolitan or European identity in order to reduce ethnic and national affiliations. More widely, discourses of cosmopolitanism and of being European have been and continue to be used in popular discourse by certain groups. This does not necessarily mean, however, that these result in all of the cosmopolitan characteristics that cosmo-optimistic normative accounts, such as those of Beck, Levy and Sznaider, might hope, as we will see in the following ethnographic studies from the post-war Balkans.

Cosmonostalgia and closures

In fieldwork in post-war Belgrade and Zagreb, Stef Jansen (2009) encountered an explicit discourse of cosmopolitanism, employed by 'antinationalists'. These were individuals, usually fairly well educated, who were very critical of the nationalism that had fuelled the war. The term *kozmopolit* (or synonyms of it) was used to describe life in the cities as they had been before the conflicts arose and that anti-nationalists hoped would be restored. A student banner of the late 1990s, *Beograd is the World,* for example, expressed 'at once the city's worldliness and the desire to end isolation from "the World"' (2009: 84). What was meant by 'the World' here was 'the liberal democracies of the West' (ibid.). On the one hand, then, a cosmopolitan outlook was deployed to articulate anti-nationalist sentiments. But as Jansen points out, it was neither as future-oriented nor as straightforwardly 'open' as cosmopolitan theorising tends to expect – or hope.

Rather, references to Belgrade and Zagreb as cosmopolitan were deeply nostalgic – harking back to a pre-war 'normality'. While on the one hand they entailed an opening to the West in order to end a sense of isolation from it, at the same time cosmopolitanism was frequently articulated as a quality of the *city* in contrast to the 'primitivism' of rural life. This could be seen, as Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwander-Sievers argue of Albania in the aftermath of the Balkan conflict, as a form of 'internal "nesting Orientalism"' in which 'city dwellers … look … down on the "backward" peasants of the villages, transferring to them the stereotypical generalisations of "backwardness" ascribed to all Albanians in the dominating mental maps of the former Yugoslavia' (Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers 2006: 522). As such, maintains Jansen for his Balkan subjects, what was produced in cosmopolitan discourse was not so much an 'openness' to the other, as 'alternative closures' – 'between cities and villages, between citizens and peasants, between open, nationally heterogeneous, modern, urban life and closed, nationally homogeneous, backward, rural life' (2009: 84). In effect, what this also did was to curtail the openness to cultural and national difference that is normally seen as part of a cosmopolitan outlook. The celebration of this particular kind of urban cosmopolitanism, he suggests, ironically produced a 'flattening [of] the cultural-national differences it was programmatically open to, through emphasising (in this case, urban) sameness across its boundaries' (2009: 90). In other words, the kind of cosmopolitanism in practice here operated on the one hand to create a hierarchical boundary between the city and the rural, in which the difference of the latter was denigrated; and on the other to downplay – or close itself off towards – other kinds of difference.

History and heritage in post-war reconciliation

In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, many international organisations have been involved in various forms of 'repair work', and these have often involved organised attempts at 'memory management' (Sorabji 2006). In some cases this has involved 'intervening in the process of transgenerational transmission of trauma' (Sorabji 2006: 2) in order to encourage people to 'put the past behind them' and to 'move forward'. This is often modelled on the psychoanalytically informed idea of 'working through' traumatic memories as a means of avoiding being 'haunted' by them in the future. In other cases, or other memory management programmes, however, there have been other strategies too. In Albania, Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers (2006) argue that the international authorities have sought to foster a 'collective amnesia', by discouraging reference to the past or dismissing it as folklore, in the service of '"resetting" … to a timeless present of multi-ethnic tolerance' (2006: 526). As they show, however, this does not find compliance in a society in which historical recollection and narration are viewed as an integral part of life and, in effect, identity. The compulsion to tell 'stories' about the past is, they suggest, like a secular version of the Jewish *zakhor* – the religious prescription to transmit Jewish history to future

generations (2006: 526; Yerushalmi 1982). Moreover, in such 'story-telling', 'the storyteller and historian are the same person' and 'history, legend and personal memories are mixed' (2006: 526).

Not only does this mean that organised efforts to encourage 'collective amnesia' are unlikely to succeed, it also helps maintain strong national and nationalist myth-making in the post-war period. The significance of this myth-making for local people is typically overlooked or underestimated by the international authorities who classify it as folklore. Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers show this well through their account of how Adem Jashari, an Albanian rebel leader killed fighting against Serbian troops in 1998, has become a cult figure, memorialised at a memorial complex established at the bombed remains of houses where his family perished, and also on postcards and other memorabilia. Involved in this, producing it and also further generated by it in a feedback loop, are the kinds of national collective identity and sentiments – which sustain calls for Kosovo as an independent country – that the international authorities had hoped to avoid. Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers argue, then, that the approach of the international authorities has in some respects, paradoxically, allowed and even encouraged such nationalism through its strategies of collective amnesia. It is further aggravated by the authorities' associated refusal to address the historical specificity of the Kosovan and Albanian case, and their stance of 'not taking sides' and trying to 'keep a distance'.

Elsewhere in the post-war Balkans, there have been attempts to expressly deploy heritage as a means of trying to transcend national identifications, as Claske Vos (2011, 2012) shows in her analysis of the 'Regional programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-East Europe' begun by the Council of Europe and the European Commission in 2003. Like various other programmes before it, this aimed to produce 'integrated rehabilitation' (2011: 225) by implementing various forms of 'Europeanisation'. As she explains, 'European heritage was presented as equal to the notion of a "shared European memory" that should unite all Europeans in an attempt to "never again" have a war on European territory' (2012: 4). She looks in particular at how it operated in practice in Serbia, where it was promoted as creating the possibility to 'revisit the memories of Serbia's European past', as a tourist brochure that she quotes puts it (2011: 222). Heritage in this instance, she suggests, was promoted as 'inherently "good"' – 'a cause for celebration', as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has also observed in relation to UNESCO world heritage (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 190; Vos 2011: 234). The quest to find 'good' heritage that would help in 'integrative rehabilitation' resulted, however, in an 'avoidance of difficult heritage' (2011: 234) and a general 'distancing from ideological meaning' both in the selection of sites and their presentation (2011: 236–7). So, for example, Muslim sites were excluded as 'too problematic'. This was supported and legitimated by a bureaucratic preference for short-term success, itself promoted by what were referred to as 'European' management practices. This indicated particular technical procedures, such as using 'pilot projects' as



FIGURE 8.8 Adem Jashari monument in Tirana. Photograph by Antidiskriminator at Wikimedia Commons

'test-cases' from which 'emblematic monuments and sites' would be selected (2011: 228–9). As Vos shows, 'difficult heritage' would not only have been less assured of success according to the programme's model, it would also have proved more challenging and time-consuming to address within its time-frame and quest for the 'emblematic'. It was, therefore, excluded by these avowedly 'European' practices. Yet, it was just such problematic heritage that continued to matter to local people and that was more likely to disrupt wider Europeanising aims.

The ethnographic cases discussed in this section show that discourses of cosmopolitanism, attempts to reduce national affinities and to institutionalise Europeanisation, have been underway in the post-war Balkans, mobilised variously by international organisations and local people. What they also, show, however, is that these are more contested and complex in practice than the cosmo-optimistic arguments presume. In particular, what we have seen here is that what might superficially appear to be evidence of cosmopolitanism might entail paradoxical 'othering' or what Jansen calls 'closures'; and that international or Europeanising projects may risk evading, glossing over or even potentially aggravating the kinds of social divisions and sentiments that are viewed as problematic within the cosmopolitan position. In some instances they contribute to strengthening nationalistic sentiments and creating exclusions – such as Muslim heritage – that may threaten a cosmo-optimistic outcome in the future.

★★★

In highlighting some of the ways in which the cosmopolitan memory thesis does not operate in practice, my aim is neither to debunk the thesis nor to merely claim that practice is messy. The thesis is a powerful one that captures significant developments that are underway, especially, though not only, in relation to Holocaust commemoration. But there are other processes at work too, as the examples variously show. These include continuing processes of othering and of bounding, in which the nation remains an active agency. At the same time, however, 'the nation' is not a static entity but is itself being reconfigured – including within new forms of commemoration and heritage themselves.

Within Europe and to a large extent beyond it too, the Holocaust has become part of what we might call a 'cosmopolitan curriculum'. Knowing about it, and increasingly visiting some of its associated heritage – in Europe or outside it – has become a cosmopolitan credential. Levy and Sznaider have more recently expressed this in terms of the development of a *memory imperative,* especially in relation to human rights (2010). In research that I conducted in Nuremberg, with visitors to the former Nazi party rally grounds, many expressed their reasons for coming as a kind of moral duty – 'it's something we felt that we should do'.[37] I referred to this form of visiting as 'moral witnessing' and suggested that it entailed putting oneself in a place – a position – from which to be able to speak not only directly about the particular site and its history but wider historical matters too. My interviewees came from many countries – Australia, Britain, Canada, France, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the US as well as Germany – and most invoked their own country or nationality at some point during the interview, often to talk of how some aspect of uncomfortable history was dealt with (or not) there and sometimes to try to explain to me how I should understand their position. Talk of Germany and Germans was common to almost all interviews. Yet, although my interviewees often framed their comments in terms of nation-states and usually took for granted that these were the active agencies in creating public history, many also, simultaneously, engaged in trying to think in terms of the position of others – e.g. what must it be like to be German – and to more generally make comparisons between different ways of representing the difficult past. In other words, what different national – and also more localised – self-positioning offered was not a constraint to cosmopolitan thinking but a vantage point from which to think about others and their ways of seeing and being in the world. The outcome of this was not a form of cosmopolitanism that relied on an uncritical sense of sameness and sharing; rather, it was one that can be characterised in terms of 'relationalities of openness across differences' of the kind noted earlier in this chapter (Glick-Schiller *et al.* 2011: 410, 403). Visitors did make judgements of relatively good and bad approaches, and they sometimes judged their own countries or those of others unfavourably. Theirs was, then, a *critical cosmopolitanism* that in some ways relied upon national variation for its operation, while not being tied to it in its realisation.

Although nations were an accepted part of this discourse and although the ethnographic research discussed in this chapter clearly shows their continued significance both as frames of action and as affectively significant for their citizens, the chapter has also shown, like the previous one, that it has become more difficult to 'do nationness' in quite the ways in which it was formerly done. At the very least, gestures to alternative narratives and heritages, and to other kinds of moral legitimacy, need to be made – and perhaps harnessed to a reconfigured way of being national. This, I suggest, is something that Holocaust commemoration often – though not always, as Feldman's example shows so well – helps achieve. What we have mostly seen in the cases above, however, is not so much the nation being *displaced* or 'cracked' by cosmopolitan memory as the nation presenting itself as cosmopolitan through harnessing more widely shared pasts as part of its own. That cosmopolitanisation – of memory or society – does not necessarily require a breaking or superseding of the nation is also shown by examples such as the UK's inauguration of a Holocaust Memorial Day as part of a pan-European project. Even in the case of Austria, which Matti Bunzl presents as one in which the nation is being superseded by Europe, the fact that the ultra-nationalist and anti-European Freedom Party is making precisely the same accommodation of Jews that he sees as a New European development, suggests that it is also fully appropriable to service the nation and even nationalism.

What has emerged here, then, is a dynamic of potentially cosmopolitan developments that are sometimes appropriated to other ends or bump up against limits and other agendas in practice. Nevertheless, cutting across all of the many debates about the late twentieth-century heritage and history preoccupation – and indeed situating those debates themselves – is a casting of the past as a focus through which to debate moral and political concerns. In other words, it has become a moral forum, perhaps even the pre-eminent moral forum of our times. While the past may to some extent have long played something of this role, a more widespread public acknowledgement of differences among historians, historical revisionism, debates about school curricula, identity politics, public controversies over matters such as commemoration, and the spreading of a conception of history as potentially regressive rather than progressive (Wright 1985), have all contributed to history being publicly debatable, and to its centring as a site for political and ethical contemplation today.[38]