

# LIQUN ZHUGE

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2018–May 2023 (expected)  
Dissertation Title: *Essays on Labor Economics*  
Dissertation Committee: Kevin Lang, Daniele Paserman and Martin Fiszbein

B.S., Economics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 2013–2017

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Labor Economics, Development Economics

## WORKING PAPERS

“[Bargaining over Marriage Payments: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications](#),” October 2022. Job Market paper.

“[Hukou and Guanxi: How Social Discrimination and Networks Impact Intrahousehold Allocations in China](#),” (with Kevin Lang), October 2022.

## PREDOCTORAL PUBLICATIONS (CORPORATE FINANCE)

Zhuge, Liqun, Richard B. Freeman and Dongyang Zhang (2020) “[Firm Dynamics of Hi-Tech Start-ups: Does Innovation Matter?](#),” *China Economic Review*, 101370

Zhuge, Liqun, Richard B. Freeman and Matthew T. Higgins (2020) “[Regulation and innovation: Examining outcomes in Chinese pollution control policy areas](#),” *Economic Modelling*, 89: 19-31

## PRESENTATIONS

SEHO Annual Conference, London, UK 2022  
BU Empirical Microeconomics Workshop, Boston, MA 2022  
Harvard China Economy Seminar, Cambridge, MA 2022  
BU Micro Dissertation Workshop, Boston, MA 2022 2020 2018  
WEAI Annual Conference, Online 2021  
AERE Annual Conference, Online 2021  
Queen Mary University of London, London, UK 2019  
Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, Japan 2018

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Graduate Student Fellowship, Boston University, 2018–2023

## REFeree EXPERIENCE

*International Review of Economics & Finance, Finance Research Letter, Economic Modelling, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Economic Systems, Journal of Cleaner Production*

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2020, 2021, 2022 and Spring 2021  
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics I (EC 303), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2022  
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics II (EC 204), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020  
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics I (EC 203), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2019

**DEPARTMENT SERVICE**

Student Ambassador to the Research Computing Services (RCS) 2021–2022

**LANGUAGES**

English (fluent), Mandarin Chinese (native)

**COMPUTER SKILLS:** R, MATLAB, Stata, Python, Java, SAS, Mathematica, LaTeX

**CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS:** China/F1

**REFERENCES**

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## **Bargaining over Marriage Payments: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications** (Job Market Paper)

One unique aspect of the marriage tradition in Chinese society is the presence of both a bride price, paid by the groom's to the bride's family, and a dowry, paid by the bride's family to the couple. This article develops a model in which the bride's family sets the bride price and then transfers the dowry to the new couple, who then divide their resources. Critically, the groom's family receives services from the bride since the couple typically locates near his family, and both sets of parents are altruistic towards their children. I derive the equilibrium transfers. Empirically, using both a structural collective model and reduced-form evidence, I show that a larger dowry increases the wife's bargaining power within the new conjugal household. Then using regression discontinuity, I examine the effects of a new law protecting the wife's property rights in the event of divorce. By increasing the dowry values, the law encourages larger dowries and makes both the husband and wife better off, as demonstrated by the positive effect on the bride price as well as the dowry.

## **Hukou and Guanxi: How Social Discrimination and Networks Impact Intrahousehold Allocations in China** (*with Kevin Lang*)

*Hukou*, China's system of household registration, affects access to public services and signals the strength of a person's local social network, *guanxi*. We use a collective model and data on household consumption and spouses' hukou status to show that hukou plays a crucial role in determining within-family bargaining power. Wives who bring the family more lucrative hukou enjoy significantly higher bargaining power than other wives. Still, these wives have less bargaining power than their husbands. Large differences in preferences between husbands and wives, especially regarding alcohol, tobacco, and clothing, allow us to identify these disparities.