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The journal of *Language and Psychoanalysis* is a fully peer reviewed online journal that publishes twice a year. It is the only interdisciplinary journal with a strong focus on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of language and psychoanalysis. The journal is also inclusive and not narrowly confined to the Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

We welcome a wide range of original contributions that further the understanding of the interaction between Linguistic Analysis and Theory & Psychoanalytic Theories and Techniques. Any relevant manuscripts with an emphasis on language and psychoanalysis will be considered, including papers on methodology, theory, philosophy, child development, psychopathology, psychotherapy, embodied cognition, cognitive science, applied dynamical system theory, consciousness studies, cross-cultural research, and case studies. The journal also publishes short research reports, book reviews, interviews, obituaries, and readers' comments.

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- Manuscripts should follow the style conventions as outlined by the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 5th edition.

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The Phenomenology of Language and the Metaphysicalizing of the Real

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Abstract

This essay joins Wilhelm Dilthey's conception of the metaphysical impulse as a flight from the tragedy of human finitude with Ludwig Wittgenstein's understanding of how language bewitches intelligence. We contend that there are features of the phenomenology of language that play a constitutive and pervasive role in the formation of metaphysical illusion.

Introduction

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, section 109

Soon after beginning work on a project on the phenomenology of language, we came upon Andrew Inkpin's (2016) recent book, *Disclosing the World: On the Phenomenology of Language*. The title of the book alone left us wondering whether there is anything remaining for us to illuminate. Indeed there is. Drawing on the works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, Inkpin presents an elegant and comprehensive account of how the experience of language and its principles of organization play a constitutive, usually prereflective role in disclosing and opening up the world. He does *not*, however, pay systematic attention to how the experience of language, in Wittgenstein's (1953) words, bewitches intelligence by playing a constitutive role in the formation of metaphysical illusion—the subject matter of this essay.

Wittgenstein's account of how language bewitches one's intelligence is a singular achievement in the phenomenology of language. In section 426 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein famously claims that the meaning of a word is to be found in the "actual use" of it, and he contrasts this understanding with the projection of a picture:

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A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense *unambiguously*. The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddled. [T]he form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 426)

Wittgenstein is claiming here that when one projects a picture as the meaning of a word, it gives one the illusion of a God's-eye view of the word's referent as a thing-in-itself, an illusory clarity that one much prefers over the "muddled" view given in the understanding that the actual meaning of a word is to be found in its multiple and shifting contexts of use. When the illusory picture is then imagined as ultimately real, the word has become transformed into a metaphysical entity. In place of the "muddled" view given by contexts of use—finite, contingent, unstable, transient—one can imagine the clear outlines of an everlasting entity. Metaphysical illusion, mediated by reified pictures, replaces the finitude and transience of existence with a God's-eye view of an irreducibly absolute and eternally changeless reality (Stolorow & Atwood, 2013). A bewitchment of intelligence by language is thereby accomplished!

In what follows, we seek to expand Wittgenstein's analysis of bewitchment of intelligence by language into a broader account of how one's prereflective experience of language shapes one's sense of the real.

The Illusion of Spatial Location

A good example, also discussed by Wittgenstein, is the use of words that properly describe geometric space to "locate" emotional experience. People speak of their *inner* experiences, their *inner* feelings, getting their anger (from the inside) *out*, taking things *in*, looking *inward* (introspection), etc. These expressions correspond to Descartes's picture of the mind as a thinking thing that has an inside with contents and that looks out upon an external world from which it is separated. The picture of the mind as an entity located in Cartesian space—a picture institutionalized in the experience of everyday language—reifies what Zahavi (2005) calls *experiential selfhood*, the "mineness" of one's experiences. Such a picture prereflectively transforms the vulnerable, context-dependent, and evanescent experience of mineness into the stability and clarity of geometric space.

The Illusion of Perceptible Essences

Another example discussed by Wittgenstein is found in the use of a single word to denote an array of items that bear a "family resemblance" to one another—i.e., items that share some qualities but not others. When such items are grouped together under one word, a reified picture is created of an essence that each of them instantiates. Psychiatry's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, for example, will present several symptoms that are claimed to be characteristic of a diagnostic entity, say depression,

and a patient is said to be afflicted with this disorder if a certain proportion of those symptoms are manifest. That is, people whose sufferings bear a family resemblance to one another become, through the reified picture that has been named, instantiations of a metaphysical diagnostic essence, an essence that can somehow be directly perceived through some form of “eidetic intuition” (Husserl, 1913/2001).

The Illusion of Transparency

Consider again, briefly, the word *mind*, a term showing a great many meanings, depending on its particular contexts of use. In one of these, a picture commonly visualized is of an entity having external boundaries and an interior with contents. As noted earlier, the spatial interiority of such a picture reifies and absolutizes the subjective sense of “mineness”, metaphysicalizing the experience of one’s perceptions, thoughts, and feelings being one’s own. When one thinks of oneself and others as possessing minds, something that may seem to be as incontrovertible as the proposition that the sun rises in the morning, experiential lives acquire a dimension of “inwardness” separating the experiencing subject from “outer” reality. In actual language use, the pictures accompanying the use of this word fluctuate, in a kind of dance of variations in which what is denoted and connoted, visualized and absolutized, shifts from moment to moment in synchrony with changes in its context.

Imagining the meaning of the term *mind* to coincide fully with its associated picture, one may also presuppose that this meaning is shared by others. The use of the word in conversation is accordingly regarded as transparent to the other, who is presumed to live in a common world and to be in contact with exactly that of which one speaks. But how can one know that the meaning of this term, and really of any word one uses, is the same for the other as it is for oneself?

Perhaps the illusion of transparency, of absolute equivalency of meaning, serves as an antidote to a painful sense of isolation accompanying the finitude of intersubjective relatedness. One person can never know with absolute certainty the experience of the other, the only possibility being a succession of ever-closer approximations. Could it be that by embracing universalized pictures of the meanings of the words one uses and diverting one’s gaze from all the deficiencies and ambiguities in mutual understanding, one is shielded from an otherwise unbearable feeling of being alone?

The Tragic and the Metaphysical

The first Western philosopher to examine systematically the relationship between the tragedy of human finitude and the ubiquity of metaphysical illusion was Wilhelm Dilthey (1910/2002). As is elegantly reconstructed by de Mul (2004), Dilthey’s life’s work can be seen as an effort to replace the Kantian *a priori*—the timeless forms of perception and categories of cognition through which the world becomes intelligible to us—with “life categories” that are historically contingent and constituted over the course of a living historical process. There is a tragic dimension to Dilthey’s historical consciousness, in that it brings out the “tragic contradiction between the philosophical desire for universal validity [the metaphysical impulse] and the realization of the fundamental finitude of every attempt to satisfy that desire” (de Mul, 2004, p. 154). Dilthey’s recognition of this tragic contradiction leads him to elaborate a hermeneutic

phenomenology of metaphysics. Dilthey's historical reconstruction of the development of metaphysics aims at no less than its "euthanasia". Although he holds that metaphysical desire is inherent to human nature, what he seeks to unmask are the illusions that this ubiquitous desire creates. Metaphysical illusion, according to Dilthey, transforms historically contingent nexuses of intelligibility—worldviews, as he eventually calls them—into timeless forms of reality. Anticipating Heidegger (1927/1962), Dilthey holds that every worldview is grounded in a mood regarding the tragic realization of the finitude of life. The metaphysicalization of worldviews transforms the unbearable fragility and transience of all things human into an enduring, permanent, changeless reality, an illusory world of eternal truths. Dilthey grasps the metaphysical impulse as a relentless tendency to transform the experience of the real—how entities are intelligible to us—into a reified vision of the REALLY real. In this essay we have contended that a certain feature of the phenomenology of language—the prereflective presumption that words refer to pictures and that the pictures depict metaphysical entities—plays a constitutive role in such illusory transformations.

Metaphysical Illusion in Everyday Life

An understanding of the reified pictures that are associated with the words one uses leads to the idea that people generally are metaphysicians. Assuming that the words that are spoken have fixed, universally transparent meanings, one is lulled away from an anxious appreciation of the contingent, ever-shifting nature of intersubjective life. What are the interrelated dimensions of experience that are engaged in this metaphysicalization of everyday existence?

One of these is that of solidity—the sense of the tangible, of the physical, of the dense and heavy. If one's words have no fixed and absolute meanings, the very foundations on which one stands threaten to dissolve into thin air.

A second dimension is one of continuity, an experience of the sameness over time of the various things of which one speaks. The pictures evoked by the words that are used are of entities showing a reassuring stability from each moment to the next, offering protection against a descent into temporal chaos.

Still another dimension is that of coherence. The pictures that one assumes capture the meanings of what is said are of wholes, of parts that form a unity or identity that is felt to exist in its own right. Stripped of such coherence, all the things of one's world, including other people and one's own very selfhood, collapse into an unbearable indeterminacy.

What would happen to the human experience of language and communication if the reified pictures one imagines as the meanings of the words that are spoken, transparently available to all, vanished and were replaced by an ongoing sense of those words' fluidity as they are used in varying contexts? What if the felt certainties accompanying our verbal exchanges with one another melted into an ever-changing incoherence and insolidity? By metaphysicalizing the words and meanings of everyday discourse, human beings confer a calming order on their experiences of life and the language used symbolically to represent them. The very same linguistic

capacities that make possible the disclosure of human finitude also provide the means by which the tragedy of finitude is evaded.

Concluding Remarks

Most often the term *finitude* is used to denote temporal limitedness—mortality. But the term can be seen to encompass all the ways in which finite human existing is limited, and each can be a source of traumatic emotion (Stolorow, 2007). For example, as we have noted, there is also the impossibility of clear and certain knowing and the corresponding finitude of intersubjective relatedness. Human beings must navigate these multiple dimensions of finitude, and they do so by creating a multitude of countervailing metaphysical illusions that serve to evade or counteract the corresponding traumatic affect. Far from being distinguished by being an *animal rationale*, the human being, as Dilthey recognized, is a being who cannot exist without metaphysical illusion, and such illusion, as Wittgenstein understood, is made possible by the phenomenology of language. Unlike Dilthey, who largely reserved the metaphysical impulse to abstract philosophical systems, we have extended it to everyday life as well. And unlike Wittgenstein, who believed that the bewitchment of intelligence by language could be overcome by good philosophizing, we contend that such bewitchment is an indelible feature of the never-ending struggle against the tragedy of finitude.

Biographical Note

Robert D. Stolorow and George E. Atwood have been absorbed for more than four decades in the project of rethinking psychoanalysis as a form of phenomenological inquiry. Dr. Stolorow is a Founding Faculty Member at the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles, and at the Institute for the Psychoanalytic Study of Subjectivity, New York. He is the author of *World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis* (Routledge, 2011) and *Trauma and Human Existence: Autobiographical, Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Reflections* (Routledge, 2007) and coauthor of eight other books. Dr. Atwood was a Professor of Psychology at Rutgers University from 1971 to 2012, and he is a Founding Faculty Member at the Institute for the Psychoanalytic Study of Subjectivity, New York. He is the author and coauthor of many articles and books in psychoanalysis, including *The Abyss of Madness* (Routledge, 2011). He maintains a private practice of clinical psychology in Providence, Rhode Island.

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A Psychoanalytic Look into The Effects of Childhood and Adolescent Migration in Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation*

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Abstract

This article takes a psychoanalytic, philosophical and socio-linguistic approach to the understanding of the short and long term socio-emotional effects of child and adolescent migrations. Through a close analysis of Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation*, the author examines the subjective meaning of a primary tongue in relation to migrants' acquisition and internalization of his/her second language. It begins with a look into the developmental meaning of language and then studies the ways in which early migrations influence subjects' short and long-term perceptions of their internalized languages, as well as the relations new comers hold with their first and later love objects. In this article migrants' stages of culture shock and integration are discussed and contrasted with the methodical textual division presented in Eva Hoffman's memoir. This work examines the significance of retrospective constructions and highlights the way in which Hoffman's recollections exemplify the inevitable wish to restore ruptures and synthesize life-long conflicting introjections. This article draws attention to the way in which migrants' initial unsettlement, which derives from preliminary and subsequent stages of linguistic, social and cultural immersions, gives way to a sensed trauma and resulting defenses. This paper suggests how with a good enough environment, emigrants' experiences often lead to integrations, as well as psychic and social growth. It asks: What occurs to the ego when its' primary language becomes lacerated following an early migration? How do individuals respond to the loss of its socio-instrumental and affective function? How do migrants' cultural experiences influence the reconstructed memory of their mother tongue? How do such memories or truths affect newcomers' initial and later conception of the host language? And, in which ways do such conceptions play a role in the fluid construction of migrants' language-related identities?

I cannot walk through the suburbs in the solitude of the night without thinking that the night pleases us because it suppresses idle details, just like our memory does...I cannot lament the loss of a love or a friendship without meditating that one loses only what one *has* never had...

Jorge Luis Borges, "A New Refutation of Time"

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Introduction

When reading language related accounts written by migrants, I am often left with the assumption that no matter how different symbolic codes may be, or how dissimilar circumstances that infringe upon each subject and language are, within varying perceptual degrees, all lived symbolic codes are universal in their dichotomized effects upon their users. As seen with many language related memoirs, and as I will soon discuss with Hoffman's text, an acquired language has both the intrinsic ability to release a sense of liberation, and expose an inexplicable trace of otherness within the self.

In a round-table discussion published in *The Ear of the Other*, Claude Lévesque addresses Jacques Derrida (1985) when describing his attachment to Quebecois, his primary tongue, as one that is impossible to appropriate. By reading the claims posed by this speaker, one can deduce that his connection with his mother tongue is affected by the gap that exists between the ideal and real perceptions he holds with regards to a primary language. Lévesque begins to construct his argument by giving voice to projected idealizations and corresponding beliefs. According to this speaker, a mother tongue should represent:

...a dream of fusion with the mother, with a tongue that is like the mother, that is nearest at hand, nourishing, and reassuring. It is a dream to be at last joined in body with the mother tongue, to recognize himself in her who would recognize him, with the transparency, spontaneity, and truth of origins, without any risk, contamination, or domination. (p. 143)

This speaker describes his libidinalized conception of a primary language as the object that should evoke the wholeness, safety and nurturance of a caring mother. We may suggest that through this illustration Lévesque offers a model of a mother tongue, which, as asserted by Akhtar (1995), "is a link to the earliest maternal imago" (p. 1069). Even though we understand that a primary tongue is an element that traces back to our origins, to our early beginnings and thus to times of dependency, need for love and fear of loss, we notice that Lévesque's dream of being as one with a highly romanticized object, creates a tension. For this speaker, the fantasized image of his mother tongue leads to a dichotomy or splitting that takes his claim to opposing grounds: from the comfort of love, reassurance, recognition and belonging, and to the clash of disappointment and alienation.

In his address Lévesque speaks to the incompatibility that exists between a desired image and the politics that shapes his colonized language. According to this speaker, in actuality, Quebecois is a tongue that is felt as "incomplete", as a "translation language", as a symbolic code that is "not purely French", "an irreducible other" (p. 143). What matters most to this article's discussion is that through a discourse that describes the particularities that embrace his symbolic code of meanings, this speaker taps into a universal aspect of language by addressing a singularity that informs all

speech, regardless of socio-political and/or personal circumstances. Lévesque epitomizes the perception of a natural, and yet impossible illusion and an ongoing human need that together give way to a sensed otherness. The incompatibility of his idealizations yields to perceptions of incompleteness and inner estrangement, to insights that knowingly and/or unknowingly dwell within all tongues.

With a focus on the relation between language and the unconscious, one may suggest that Lévesque's utterance, at least in part, embodies the anxieties that stem from an unfulfilled, deep-rooted desire. Lévesque both addresses and testifies to an emotion that can be easily annexed to what Freud (2002) called an "oceanic feeling": "a feeling of something limitless, unbounded...a purely subjective fact...a feeling...of being indissolubly bond up with and belonging to a world outside of oneself" (pp. 3-4). The oceanic feeling is a perception that Freud linked to religion and to subjects' universal need to belong, to feel protected and loved. It appears that Lévesque's words pronounce this very dream. His words express an inner desire that rests within the illusion of being adjoined to a transitional language that relates to, while signifying, a libidinal world which is part and yet outside of the self.

In view of Lévesque's argument, Derrida replies by stating that although the Quebecois language's political circumstance is singular "...not one of us is like a fish in water in the language he or she is speaking...it would be amusing to analyze the complexity, the internal translation to which our bodies are continuously submitting here, at this moment" (p. 146).

In his response Derrida refers to the otherness that erupts through our use of language and through the hopeless attempts to translate and therefore make sense of the poorly understood feelings that become symbolized and entrenched within the essence of a symbolic code. Through his brief response, Derrida highlights the conscious limitations of language and the inner estrangement that taints while highlighting speakers' irreducible perceptions. He denotes an impossible attempt to translate by signifying that language is marked by misrecognized anxieties, masked and unmasked desires, conflicts, defenses, imprints and, correspondingly, repetitions.

As seen with Lévesque and Derrida, the otherness that rises through language often gestures to a sense of strangeness within the self, to an inescapable feeling that erupts through subjects' "distinctive accents" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 5), such a feeling may come to the conscious surface by means of words and symbolizations that are carried through a lived tongue and, in agreement with Felman (1987), born from within a poorly understood unconscious (p. 105). What becomes, in my opinion, puzzling about such a perceptual definition of language is its sharp contrast to many migrants' memories of their primary tongue. If language uproots while exposing the otherness within the self, why do migrants' memory of their primary language offer its subjects a returned sense of wholeness? Why do individuals experience melancholia from a primary language's instrumental loss? Why may a sense of guilt rise in place of its replacement? Finally, how can the memory of a primary tongue, of a language that can no longer offer its speaker a subject position within the wider, host speaking community, shed light on an immigrant's post-traumatic reality?

Language dwells within and becomes ingrained as an intricate part of subjects' conscious and unconscious realities. Migrants' descriptions of their affective relation

to their primary and later languages may thus be best elucidated through an analysis of the perceived, personal changes that result from immersions within a host-foreign language and culture. Accordingly, through the analysis of Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language* this study looks into the ways in which the psychological becomes integrated with language learning. I examine the way in which the shock, crises, defenses and overall dilemmas associated with early migrations become part of subjects' transformational experiences within—and outside of—their language(s).

Analyzing Salient Socio-Linguistic Patterns within Monolingual Newcomers in Eva Hoffman's "Lost in Translation"

In this classic immigrant memoir, Hoffman offers her readers a glimpse of perceptual experiences of a life that, since the age of thirteen, has been lived between languages. Her text can be defined as a proclamation of a migrant's struggles, a need to belong, to translate and to grasp a sense of social and psychic integration. It is a testimony of linguistic estrangement, loss, internal and social dislocation. Hoffman's text is a manifestation of culture and language shock and a newcomer's need for mourning. Her main themes typify the early experiences that are often conveyed by monolingual newcomers. Towards the end of her memoir, moreover, Hoffman's narrative focuses on occurrences perceived twenty years following her socio-geographic and linguistic relocation. She transitions into a statement of long-term change, creativity, dialogic acceptance and ensuing personal rebirth.

In a memoir written at least thirty years following her emigration from Poland², Hoffman separates her avid recollections into three sections that highlight the psycho, social and linguistic stages of her journey. Against the text's structural format, and for reasons I will eventually address, I first examine the retrospective core of Hoffman's perceived experiences, and then move onto the two remaining parts of her memoir. I thus begin with an analysis of her second section entitled *Exile*, continue with section one, *Lost Paradise*, and then examine the descriptions provided under *New Life*, which is the last segment of Hoffman's self-narrative.

The Vicissitudes of Migration: Identity and Relations of Power within Language in Eva Hoffman's "Exile"

I have no map of experience before me, not even the usual adolescent kind...I don't know what one can love here, what one can take into oneself as home – and later, when the dams of envy burst open again, I am most jealous of those who, in America, have had a sense of place. (p. 159)

² *Lost in Translation* was first published in 1989. As explained under *Paradise*, she departed from Gdynia, Poland to British Columbia, Canada in 1959 (p. 3).

In a September 2012 conference titled *Strange Lands: Location and Dislocation: The Immigrant Experience*, Salman Akhtar shared his notion of migration by drawing upon psychoanalytic theory, his clinical work and his personal experiences and understandings as a migrant and analysand. This speaker's discussion focused on the subjective aspects of relocations and on the effects and complexity of the psycho-social processes that are inherent to migration. A significant observation shared by this speaker involved the correlation between migration and emotional crisis. Specifically, this psychoanalyst and psychiatrist stated that: "no matter how smooth the transition from one country and culture to another may seem, all migrations infringe upon subjects a cumulative trauma" (Akhtar 2012).

Interrelated with this assertion, Akhtar explained that: "despite skin colour, subjects' differences are not so different at all when we focus on our human needs and problems". Regardless of demographics, personal and shared histories, and juxtaposed push and pull factors that may have resulted in subjects' short or long-term socio-geographical move, all subjects are equal in their basic requirement for safety, identifications, love and temporal continuity. Akhtar suggested that the interruption of these needs poses a threat to the migrated subject, resulting in an array of anxieties and, correspondingly, in the ego's development of defenses or psychical responses, which, at least initially, destabilize subjects' inner and social worlds.

When studying current migrations to Canada and to the United States, we may consider physical safety to be part of the one universal need that is uncompromised upon migrants' socio-geographic relocation to either host country. However, as I will soon address, by becoming immersed within a host-foreign language and culture, migrants' identifications become challenged and significant libidinal relations and sense of temporal continuity become interrupted. Thus, even though physical safety is either unhampered or, in some cases, improved, during the initial stages of immersion monolingual emigrants undergo successive crises and resulting anxieties that inevitably threaten their wellbeing and sense of psycho-emotional safety.

With Hoffman's memoir, we notice recurrent themes that parallel those described in other phenomenological self-narratives on immigration. If we commence with migration's implication for language, for example, we see its congruent effect on the self. We understand that a lived symbolic code is conditioned by, and representative of, individuals' socio-affective histories. It is the vehicle that connects the self to a third space: to a conscious-unconscious area of experiencing, in which subjects' inner and social historical worlds collide. Our language thus becomes a space driven by object relations, unknown, dialectical and opposing desires, needs, transferences. It is a fertile ground for ongoing and often unwanted repetitions. Similarly, and as explained by Britzman (2006), our third space, which is for the most part governed by language, is an area of inevitable introjections and projections, where subjects knowingly and unknowingly respond to others as others respond to them (pp. 42-44, p. 49).

With Britzman's conceptualization of the third space we can comfortably say that such terrain is an area in which subjects' "I" becomes ontologically formed, where individuals experience, borrowing from Lacan (1977), the deceptiveness of language³,

³ This description of language is taken from Claire Kramsch, who quotes Lacan's *Language and Psychoanalysis*, 2017, 6 (1), 10-32
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the estrangement that often becomes unveiled through self-other relations and by means of understandings and misunderstandings rooted from within the complexity of our divided selves. Through the interpersonal ‘give, respond and take’, the imago of the individual’s reality-evoking subjectivity emerges, a subjectivity that is directly and indirectly built and contained within one’s language.

Understanding the “omnipresence of language” (Derrida, 1996, p. xx) and its significance to self-other relations and to the formation and representation of the self leads us to ask what occurs to the ego when one’s mother tongue becomes lacerated? How do individuals respond to the loss of its social and epistemological function? How do monolingual newcomers react when faced with an abrupt shift in their socio-cognitive reality, social positioning and resulting sense of self?

In *Lost in Translation*, Hoffman recollects her formal socialization during her initial moments within the public Canadian school system. She describes how, through her interactions with classmates and teachers, she felt that her heritage culture was incompatible with that of the host community. As her previous notions of herself and others became challenged, she recalls feeling overcome by uncertainty and inhibition. This is evident in “Exile” where she writes: “Since in Poland I was considered a pretty young girl, this requires a basic revision of my self-image. But there’s no doubt about it; after the passage across the Atlantic, I’ve emerged as less attractive, less graceful, less desirable” (p. 109).

From a post-structural perspective we can argue that all identities are fluid, multiple, constantly moving, changing and often conflicting. Yet we cannot ignore how the sudden change in identity experienced by migrants within all—or most—aspects of their lives makes them feel disoriented. In addition, newcomers feel othered by the lack of understanding of the language and of the cultural rules that govern their newly imposed reality. Their sensed crisis relates to the fact that the continuity of their subjectivity, of their relation to their maternal imago—which is tied to their heritage language and culture- become challenged, demoted and perceptually lost within an unattainable past.

Central to this paper is how Hoffman’s memoir links descriptions of recalled emotional despair with existing theories in applied linguistics and psychoanalysis. Her illustrated occurrences, for example, are concurrent with Brown’s second stage of culture shock⁴ in which, as quoted by Block (2007) in *Second Language Identities*, “the individual feels the intrusion of cultural differences into his or her image and security” (cited by Block, p. 60). In *Lost in Translation*, Hoffman not only gives voice to the crises that rise from experiencing a sense of not belonging within a newly imposed environment, she also expresses the manner in which the sudden introduction to an unwelcomed reality triggers an alienating sense of self-estrangement.

essay: *The Mirror Stage as Formation of the I* (Kramsch, 2009, pp. 94-95).

⁴ Brown’s first stage, that of “elation or euphoria over the newness of her surroundings” (p. 132), is not described by Hoffman through her illustrations. Instead, Hoffman’s emphasis is on the pain and loss that stemmed from having been forced to migrate. I assume that the lack of association with this initial stage provided by Brown may relate to the writer’s anticipatory/ depressive feelings of exile, which permeated her recollections related to her arrival.

In addition, the recollections of the preliminary stage of her host-foreign immersion substantiate the relationship that exists between language, thought and our bodies. She recounts how being a non-proficient host-language speaker—and therefore feeling as an outsider- affected how she saw herself and interpreted other's response to her presence:

Because I am not heard, I feel I'm not seen. My words often seem to baffle others. They are inappropriate, or forced, or just plain incomprehensible. People look at me with puzzlement...the matte look in their eyes as they listen to me cancels my face, flattens my features...I can't feel how my face lights up from inside; I don't feel from others the reflected movement of its expressions, its living speech. People look past me as we speak. What do I look like here? Imperceptible, I think; impalpable, neutral, faceless. (Hoffman, 1990, p. 147)

In agreement with Kramsch (2009), trying to embody another language alters the learner's reflexive view of the self (p. 5). Hoffman's quote also attests to how our language, the manner in which an individual sounds and how s/he is able to express her or himself "grounds the subject's social existence" (Bohórquez, 2008, p. 49). For Hoffman, not only is the language or her emotional make-up inadequate as a form of expression within her newfound reality, but her attempts at translating herself within a foreign tongue triggers her sense of being in a state of cumulative crises. Such state, moreover, makes her feel that her new language and reality suddenly estranges her from her past known self.

Furthermore, Hoffman's description marks a discernible association between language and Winnicott's (2005) psychoanalytic theory on the development of an organized personality, as well as, quoting from Hoffman's autobiography: "language as a class signifier" (p.123). Winnicott argues that individuals are affected by dynamic interactions with the other. As proposed in *Playing and Reality*, the existence of the self is postulated by having details reflected back (pp. 82-83). For Hoffman, the sensed inappropriateness of her speech, her lack in host linguistic proficiency and resulting lack in spontaneity became etiological factors that fed into the phenomenology of her physical and psycho-emotional perceptions⁵. Evidently, the vicissitudes imposed by

⁵ The emphasis on the emotionality of second language learning is evident in well-known articles on language socialization. It is read, for example in the works of Guiora (1972), Brown (1973) and, most recently, Block (2007). These researchers highlight that for young migrants there is a relation between language acquisition, native-like pronunciation and speakers' transformation within the second language (Guiora, 1972, pp. 421-422; Brown, 1980, pp. 53-54; Block, 2009, pp. 51-52). This stage of language acquisition, however, is one that follows subjects' preliminary—natural—resistance and rejection of their new reality within a new language. As seen here with Hoffman, prior to the acquisition and internalization of the host language, *Language and Psychoanalysis*, 2017, 6 (1), 10-32
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Hoffman's recalled reality became internalized. Such an internalization, moreover, came into conflict with her pre-migrational introjections and, consequently, with her subjective disorientation.

Hoffman's memoir also describes how language, knowingly and unknowingly, classifies the speaker. In her text, the retrospective rationalization of her reality reads as follows:

Sociolinguists might say that I receive these language messages as class signals, that I associate the sound of correctness with the social status of the speaker. In part, this is undoubtedly true...I know that language will be a crucial instrument, that I can overcome the stigma of my marginality, the weight of presumption against me, only if the reassuring right sounds come out of my mouth...Yes, speech is a class signifier. (p.123)

With Hoffman's words we cannot overlook Foucault's post-structural view on language and power. As a young migrant, Hoffman is caught within an invisible framework that is communicatively produced: one that gives native speakers an upper-hand, while diminishing subjects with lower language proficiencies. Following the newcomer's initial rejection of the language and culture that places her at a disadvantage, a common response is the host-language learner's aggression and desire to absorb and even master the language that is directly linked to her subjectivization.

Migration and the Epistemological Internalization of Language

Based on my own memories as a new migrant, what adds to a newcomer's cumulative trauma is the emigrant's eventual realization of the emptiness caused by her primary language's eventual loss of internal meaning. During the initial stages of host-language exposure, the emigrant's primary language, aside from losing its emotive function, becomes disconnected from the migrant's new social reality, an interruption that creates an unquestionable sense of internal void. As discussed by Hoffman, when an individual's first language no longer corresponds to her social reality, the consistency of its inner significance also becomes lost. This is a period that marks a subject's psycho-emotional linguistic laceration, which is described by Hoffman as one of language's "loss of a living connection":

learners sense an internal void and disconnection with the host-foreign language. Under a psychoanalytic lens, this rejection is salient until the host-foreign language is introjected and thus internalized: Until synthesis occurs and the challenges undergone by migrants are resolved, the ego perceives the host language as a foreign, translation language that bares no relation or connection to the self.

...the worst losses come at night... I wait for the spontaneous flow of inner language, which used to be my nighttime talk with myself, my way of informing the ego where the id had been. Nothing comes. Polish, in a short time, has atrophied, shrivelled from sheer uselessness. Its words don't apply to my new experiences; they are not coeval with any of objects, or faces, or the very air I breathe in the daytime. In English, words have not penetrated to those layers of my psyche from which a private conversation could proceed...Now, this picture-and-word show is gone; the thread has been snapped. I have no interior language, and without it, interior images – those images through which we assimilate the interior world, through which we take it in, love it, make it our own – become blurred too. (pp. 107-108)

The highly affective description of Hoffman's nightly disconnection with Polish, her still dominant language depicts a tumble of linguistic meaningfulness and the subject's resulting perception of emotional crisis. Through this passage the writer describes her mourning for the living connection of the language to her affectual make-up. Through her narrative Hoffman bears witness to the way in which a linguistic dislocation leaves a deeply rooted void, silencing the self. A host-language learner's anxiety escalates when words of one's internalized language are replaced by the emptiness of a foreign tongue.

In his article *On Learning a New Language* Erwin Stengel (1939), an adult migrant and psychoanalyst, argues that when there is a change in objects' appellations from one language to the other, or from the familiar to the unfamiliar, a language learner's relation to the object in question becomes altered (p. 474). This is a topic touched upon by Hoffman. While describing her exposure to the sensed emptiness and strangeness perceived through her introduction to English words, Hoffman states:

...the signifier has become severed from the signified. The words that I learn now don't stand for the same things in the same unquestioned way they did in my native tongue. "River" in Polish was a vital sound, energized by the essence of riverhood, of my rivers, of my being immersed in rivers. "River" in English is cold—a word without an aura. It has no accumulated associations for me...it remains a thing, absolutely other, absolutely unbending to the grasp of my mind. (p. 106)

It is of no surprise to note that in *The Multilingual Subject*, Claire Kramsch (2009), who is also a migrant, chose to analyse Hoffman's *Lost in Translation* when discussing migrants' second language acquisition. While building on Antonio Damasio's theory on emotions and the somatic relations of body and mind, Kramsch explains that as a newcomer, Hoffman's English language "was reduced to its referential meanings without the symbolic aura that gave the subjective meaning and relevance" (p. 67). During the initial stages of foreign language immersion, Hoffman's English words could not transfer to her Polish river. For Hoffman English nouns had no experiential reference and accordingly, no affective trace. Stengel explains this occurrence when arguing that the resistance to the sounds and words of a new language is strongest with objects that are nearest to the subject's feelings (p. 474). Accordingly, when recalling the Anglicization of her sister's and her own name, Hoffman writes:

We've been brought to this school [referring to herself and her sister]...we've acquired new names... Mine 'Ewa' is easy to change to its nearest equivalent in English, 'Eva'. My sister's name—'Alina'—poses more of a problem, but after a moment's thought, Mr. Rosenberg and the teacher decide that 'Elaine' is close enough. My sister and I hang our heads wordlessly under this careless baptism...a small seismic mental shift...The twist in our names takes them a tiny distance from us—but it's a gap into which the infinite hobgoblin of abstraction enters. Our Polish names didn't refer to us; they were as surely us as our eyes or hands. These new appellations, which we ourselves can't even pronounce, are not us. They are identification tags...names that make us strangers to ourselves. (p. 105)

The rejection of her new name speaks of the way in which the host language further estranged her, by way of appellations, from the perception of her childhood self. Hoffman's description, moreover, gives voice to the inevitable relationship that exists between language and identity, as well as language and sometimes guilt. As interpreted by Hoffman, to receive new names in a language they can barely pronounce further highlights the initial sense of self-estrangement. Her new appellation implied a loss of her old subjectivity and the consequent guilt that comes in place of the subject's disconnection with the constructed self and the language that connects to her maternal imago.

Childhood and Adolescent Exile

Following our study of the universality of the social, emotional and psychological dimensions that correspond to the transformative phenomenon we know as migration,

we must account for the relevance that age and degree of choice have on the subject's initial and later adjustments to the host language and culture. Hoffman's *Exile* exemplifies a migrant's loss, nostalgia, need for mourning and desire to make sense of the memory of a preconscious rupture. Hoffman's descriptions of an emotional geography of the social and inner tensions undergone by migrants, brings me to analyse how the self experiences a heightened sense of loss when feeling inconsolably expatriated from her primary language and homeland.

Even though Hoffman's parents were marginally⁶ free to exercise their will when migrating with their two daughters from Poland to Canada, the title "Exile" speaks to the way the author felt after having to renounce her childhood linguistic, social and affective continuity. Consistent with this writer's perceptions, Akhtar explains that all minors are exiled, regardless of migratory circumstances. In *A Third Individuation* Akhtar (1995) quotes Grinberg & Grinberg who state that: "Parents may be voluntary or involuntary emigrants, but children are always 'exiled'; they are not the ones who decide to leave and they cannot return at will" (cited in p. 1054). Adults often choose to move away from their homeland in hopes for a better life for themselves and, if applicable, for their immediate family. This long-standing decision is commonly linked with hope, a hope that allows for the subject to better adjust to the adversities of their new life.

Based on my own recollections as a migrating child and, later as a migrating adolescent, young emigrants' initial distress and anger often follow their need to adjust after venturing outside of their known and retrospectively cherished way of life. Their negative feelings as newcomers also relate to their genuine lack of choice in migrating and in returning to their homeland at will. The sentiment that results from being choice-less is examined by Freud who in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" explains that being unwillingly passive intensifies the individual's unpleasure⁷ (pp. 141-142) and resulting deployment of defenses that are meant to counteract the sensed helplessness.

At the end of *Lost Paradise*, after recounting the comfort of her perceived past, and the anxieties that evolved in anticipation of her journey to Canada, Hoffman pronounces her emotional upheaval and resistance towards the language that correspond to an imposed, but helplessly rejected reality. When hearing others practice English on the ship, she recalls thinking: "I can't concentrate; I don't want to let the sounds in. I don't think I like English" (p. 90). For Hoffman, feeling forced into becoming a migrant affected her negative attitude toward the English language. Hoffman's response toward her perceived deterritorialization coincides with Kim Butler's explanation of the socio-emotional and psychological effects of exile. In *Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse* Butler (2001) explains that an exilic position

⁶ Hoffman's family left Poland a few years following World War II. Anti-Semitism drove her parents' diasporic 'choice'. Under "Paradise" Hoffman describes their departure as one that was neither entirely chosen, nor entirely forced (p. 83).

⁷ Children's shock relates with Freud's description of surprise in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: the occurrence of being plunged into danger without being prepared for such an experience. Such unpreparedness, argues Freud, taxes the ego's ability to adapt, which in turn increases the individual's sense of displeasure (p. 138).

“creates its own ethos of migration” by influencing subjects’ sensed hardship and their initial aptness to embrace their new reality (p. 201). For Hoffman, becoming tossed into a perceptually unfair, life-changing situation increased her sensed emotional trauma.

For migrating minors, their sensed crisis is also heightened by the element of shock that accompanies their sudden linguistic and geographic change and by their sense of feeling lost within a reality that defies their parents’ authority. This is an emotion that may be better understood by reading Hoffman’s descriptions of post-migrational family dynamics, specifically when she writes:

I adjure my sister to treat my parents well; I don’t want her to challenge my mother’s authority, because it is so easily challenged. It is they who seem more defenseless to me than Alinka, and I want her to protect them. Alinka fights me like a forest animal in danger of being trapped; she too wants to roam through the thickness and the meadows. She too wants to be free. (p. 146)

As a former adolescent migrant, I feel torn by Hoffman’s words. The sudden demotion of my parents’ authority and the switch in roles that such demotion entailed was, at least for me, extremely difficult to negotiate. I remember, for example, becoming a young translator for my parents during doctor appointments: the one who showed my mother where to sign school-related permission slips and report cards without her questioning what she was signing; being the one who felt embarrassed by my parents’ low levels of linguistic proficiencies; and, the one who, despite of my rebelliousness, was regrettably forced to fend for myself, take extended time away from school and grow up too fast.

The resentfulness and later guilt that stem from the sudden demotion of our parents’ authority can be hard to conceptualize when feelings are entrenched within the fabric of our own lives. As read with Hoffman, some children feel the dire need to protect their parents from the vulnerability that migration evokes, while others, like Alinka, rebel while trying to free themselves from the dynamics of a situation perceived to be unjustly imposed. Seeing our parents’ struggle within a language and culture they barely understand affects our view of them. They are after all our first love and as such we do bestow upon them our highest regard. The disillusionment adds to children’s and adolescents’ crisis, one that is imposed by the clash with pre-migrational introjections and with children’s and adolescents’ unspoken, yet sensed, right to feel nourished, reassured and protected as someone’s child.

Migration and Trauma

One of the most interesting aspects of Hoffman’s text lies in the vividness in her descriptions that may conceal the writer’s trauma and corresponding “inability to integrate the magnitude of perceived loss” (Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995, p.

162). Indeed, with migrational narratives, just as with the memoirs of any trauma, we note that through the act of writing individuals are able to grasp and express their emotional knowledge. In the preface of *Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of the Self*, Susan Brison writes that “piecing together a shattered self requires a process of remembering and working through in which speech and affect converge in a trauma narrative” (p. x). Brison sheds light onto the isolating character of trauma and the manner in which literature allows for subjects to remake themselves and to connect with others by giving voice to and making sense of past, dislocated occurrences. While making reference to her own history within a violent, horrifying experience, she explains that:

Saying something about the memory *does* something to it. The communicative act of bearing witness to traumatic events transforms traumatic memories into narrative that can then be interpreted into the survivor’s sense of self...it reintegrates the survivor into a community... (pp. x-xi)

Through self-reflective narratives, writers are able to name occurrences that were shock-evoking and life-changing: experiences that do not fit into their pre-existing schemas. A writer’s narrative becomes a belated attempt to reconstruct and integrate a dissociated, emotionally charged reality: a reality that uprooted the subject’s need to feel accepted, understood and reconnected with the world that, at least in part, rests outside of the self.

Likewise, Hoffman’s narrative embodies an attempt to make sense of the extent of her original sense of loss, helplessness, guilt and of the many voices and juxtaposed histories that exist within the complexity of her being (Kramsch, 2009, p. 275). Hoffman’s testimony reveals a need to mourn and heal. One can also say that her memoir is a developmental process that gives way to, while explicating her eventual hybridity.

In *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History* Cathy Caruth (1996) argues that a traumatic event is an unpleasant occurrence that tends not to be fully grasped as it occurs. Caruth states that:

...beyond the psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. The repetitions of the traumatic event –which remains unavailable to consciousness but intrude repeatedly on sight – thus suggest a larger relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be known, and is inextricably tied up with the belatedness

and incomprehensibility that remain at the heart of this repetitive seeing. (pp. 91-92)

As seen in Hoffman's memoir, the intrusion of unpleasant, inexplicable and belated emotions trigger the need to understand—by way of reconstruction- the events that may still influence the writer's present.

Theories that point to Hoffman's trauma are also found in definitions of memory. In "The Intrusive Past", for example, Van der Kolk & Van der Hart (1995) propose that unlike traumatic memory, ordinary memory is an aspect of life that is adaptive and thus easily integrated to other experiences. It is a variable social act, easily retrieved and shared. They explain that traumatic memory, on the other hand, is rooted in a frightening and novel experience that does not make sense and, in its anxiety-evoking uniqueness, resists integration (pp. 160-163). However, a key feature of psychoanalytic theory is that traumatic memory can vary. It is either a 1) non-social act: not addressed to anyone or a solitary, invariable and inflexible activity that becomes automatically triggered under conditions or situations evocative of the original, traumatic experience, or, as explained to me by my supervisor, 2) a non-integrated experience: invariable and thus repeated with particular vividness (Britzman, 2012).

These theories of trauma and memory conform to Akhtar's (2012) psychoanalytic discussions. In *Strange Lands: Location and Dislocation: The Immigrant Experience* Akhtar highlighted migrants' failure to formulate the extent of many past, transformative experiences. He explains that emigrants' traumas are preconscious and therefore 'never' forgotten. As such, immigrants' dissociations, he adds, are evident, for example, when individuals describe living in a temporary haze or a cloud. Akhtar's suggestion is brings me to highlight Hoffman's recalled reality, specifically when she writes that while on the ship she felt as is she was "living in a fog" (p. 90). Her disorientation and incapacity to negotiate a reality that in its subjective singularity was perceived as unreal is illustrated further: "The journey....makes me feel I am not quite myself and temporarily existing in a denser, more artificial medium than what I've known as ordinary life" (p. 91).

Analysing Hoffman's memoir leads us to conceptualize how her writing composes narrative memories. The experiences that are linked with the raw emotions described in *Exile* and in certain recollections offered under *Lost Paradise* embody aspects of traumatic or unformulated memories. However, when looking into most scenes described under "Paradise" and, to a lesser extent, in *New World*, the idealizations exposed through Hoffman's writing suggest that her text also offers reconstructions of implicit memories, or narrative truths, that are genuine in their perceptual and seemingly remembered disclosure. Her recollections give us an insight into the struggle to probe meaning in a new language and into how her writing performs a working through of these meanings. Thus with Hoffman we see how the literary then becomes a symbolic frame to hold her disparate parts.

Another interesting aspect of Hoffman's narrative that denotes underlying trauma is grounded in the writer's descriptions of intra-subjective splits, which, according to *Language and Psychoanalysis*, 2017, 6 (1), 10-32
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Freud as well as Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, is a common phenomenological response to subjects' deep-rooted crisis (Freud, 2006, pp. 137-139; Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995, pp. 175-176). As defined by Bohórquez (2008), these occurrences are the "here and there, now and then that disrupts the subject's sense of continuity" (p. 13). Feeling disoriented by the profound discontinuity of experience comprises a migrant's present and this in turn impacts the subject's ability to envision a cohesive future. This feeling, annexed with individuals' radical dislocation from their past, evokes a sense of being fixed in a never-ending present.

Not surprisingly, Hoffman's notion of temporal rupture is illustrated across the first two sections of her memoir. Under *Exile*, for example, she writes: "I can't afford to look back and I don't know how to look forward" (p. 116). In *Lost Paradise*, moreover, she discloses the affective and cognitive consequences of her initial inability to cope when describing that "...everything is [was] happening out of time and out of space" (p. 91). Following her eventual migration to Canada, Hoffman is explicit in describing the break in continuity when, with the use of metaphors, she says, for example, that "the tram wheels of Vancouver...cut like scissors through my life" (p. 100), and most specifically, when she describes feeling doomed by her instability to imagine a possible future: "I come across an enormous, cold blankness—a darkening, an erasure, of the imagination, as if a camera eye has snapped shut, or as if a heavy curtain has been pulled over the future" (p. 4).

A recurrent theme in migrants' recollections is the perception of a newly encountered alienation: a sense of homelessness within their new homes, and a recurrent desire to return in order to reverse their indisputable rupture. In a later essay entitled *New Nomads*, Hoffman universalizes her story when she observes that for migrants, the story of their pasts "becomes radically different from their present...the lost homeland becomes sequestered in the imagination as a mythic, static realm. That realm can be idealized or demonized... [becoming] a space of projections and fantasies..." (p.52).

To migrate is to have one's psychic-positioning, the way one situates oneself in the world, shattered. A migrant's present is correspondingly overcome by nostalgia and a sense of instability, outsideness (p. 45), and, as previously described, linguistic incompleteness.⁸

In Hoffman's *Paradise* we see the memory of her primary language, one that signals to her need for psychic continuity:

⁸ In *Representational Practices and Multi-modal Communication in US High Schools: Implications for Adolescent Immigrants* Harklau (2003) discusses how first generation migrants, grown into adulthood while living in the United States often idealize their primary culture. This idealization, argues Harklau, relates to "their distance in place and time" (90). Returning to this paper's discussion, similar to my argument with language, recent language migrants feel overcome by the sensed incompleteness imposed by their new reality. This feeling, in retrospect, alters their recollection of their past, which becomes 'glorified' for representing a lost time of 'fitting-in' as members of a linguistic and cultural majority.

...I grew up in a lumpen apartment in Cracow, squeezed into three rudimentary rooms with four other people, surrounded by squabbles, dark political rumblings, memories of wartime suffering, and daily struggles for existence. And yet, when it came time to leave, I...felt I was being pushed out of the happy, safe enclosures of Eden. (p. 5)

As suggested in this study, since our reality is perceived through language, migrants' memory of continuity and belonging becomes transferred to their first tongue. For migrants, a primary language, at least in memory, represents a depth and a sense of wholeness that an acquired tongue is unable to duplicate. Following migration, a mother tongue becomes the subject of an internalized and highly romanticized geography, of a paradise and childhood innocence that, according to translingual subjects, became perceptually lost through exile. This phenomenon supporting Derrida's (1996) assertion when, in *Monolingualism of the Other*, he suggests that a mother tongue, or at least the illusion that such tongue encompasses, "can only exist in contrast with another language" (p. 36). For newcomers, the otherness that naturally inhabits 'all' languages become absolved and replaced by the constructed memory of psycho-social continuity. Previous memories of language thus become idealized following their moment of psycho-social split. Following the inscription of what Derrida calls "an added mark" (pp. 24-29, pp. 61-69) a migrant's primary language is thus commonly embraced as a nourishing and reassuring object. Such a language becomes part of an imagined transitional phenomenon that can only exist following the fragmentation caused by the psycho-emotional trauma imposed by the life-changing act we know as migration.

Language Migrants' Third Individuation

In *Strange Lands* Akhtar highlighted the difference between migration and ongoing life-long changes. He explained how our lives are naturally shaped by a series of transformations and by everyday migrations. Life-changing events are varied and ongoing; these are usually not considered traumatic because they either occur gradually, or they are contextual and thus, for the most part 'expected'. When navigating through the chain of predictability, as with choice, our ego tends to be better equipped to adjust and slowly evolve. Instances of predictable changes can be seen with the birth of a sibling, or of one's child for example, with the start of a new school, a graduation and even with the realization that we are growing older. We understand that as we become adults we typically search for new jobs and migrate into new relationships that knowingly and unknowingly uproot while repeating our original object-relations in the form of transferences.

By contrast, the problem of socio-geographic and linguistic relocations is rooted in the subject's initial inability to cope with sudden, unknown and therefore highly unpredictable situations. It lies in the radical change of circumstances that alienate, while infringing upon the subject's sense of continuity. Migration, asserts Akhtar

(1995), “taxes the ego’s adaptive capacities and thus cause drive dis-regulations” (p. 1058). In *Strange Lands, Location and Dislocation* Akhtar (2012) also explained that there is a phenomenological resemblance between migrants’ experiences and subjects’ first and second individuation⁹ and that such a resemblance accounts for the repetition of defenses against the loss of love that surges during the earlier periods of individuals’ post-natal lives.

As described in the previous section, when migration occurs, the subject’s past becomes unattainable, as if lost in time. During socio-geographic and linguistic relocations a person’s homeland “symbolic of the mother” (Akhtar, 1995, p. 1058) is separated from the subject’s present reality. In search for comfort, a migrant commonly tries to retain the memory of wholeness, in terms of wishing for an unquestioned living and belonging. Such memories become retrospectively constructed in the form of the defense known as idealization. This is a defense that echoes Levésque’s opening remarks on his desire and need to feel as one with an uncontaminated, idealized tongue that reflects the affective experience bonded with our first love: with the love we all experienced before the introduction of our father, the law of prohibition and the eventual break that leaves us forever searching for an imagined unconditional, and reassuringly perfect love. This libidinal perfection, however, is never found.

Also echoing a response deployed during early stages of post-natal life is splitting, a defense that separates objects into good and bad, and comforting and alienating. With this unconscious regression a migrant experiences dichotomized feelings about his or her two lands and two self-representations (Akhtar, 1995, p. 1058). Stengel addresses this defense when he discusses the commonality of a migrant’s rejection and devaluation of the host language. In *Lost in Translation*, splitting can be perceived in the manner in which Hoffman expresses her dislike and detachment from the sounds of the host language when she states: “I can’t imagine wanting to talk their harsh-sounding language” (p. 105).

Such sense is highlighted in Hoffman’s (2001) essay *New Nomads*, in which she imagines that newcomers commonly feel that “their language is the true language, that it corresponds to reality in a way other tongues don’t” (p. 49). Stengel’s (1939) theory suggests that the refutation of the host language becomes evident when the subject tries to convert others to their primary language and, most commonly and concurrent with Hoffman’s assertion, by feeling that their mother tongue is the only language of genuine expression (p. 475).

Akhtar (1995) expands on this argument by including the devaluation of the host culture and its landscapes (p. 1065). The temporary problem that rises from

⁹ As explained by Akhtar (2009), the first individuation is a process that occurs during infancy. It involves the infant’s emergence from “existential symbiosis with the mother to [the development of his [or her] psychic separateness and psychic individuality” (p. 262). The second individuation, continues Akhtar, occurs during adolescence during which increased “disengagement from early objects becomes necessary for “extra-familial object relations” to occur. This individuation stage leads to intense idealizations and...struggles around control issues (p. 6).

newcomer's aggression and projected inner turmoil rests in the manner in which it seems to further isolate the individual from the overall host environment, thus providing a temporary setback to the psychic integration of the newcomer's experiences.¹⁰ The rejection expressed by Hoffman is extended to people who form part of the host community. Hoffman's anxiety is expressed, for example, under *Exile* when she writes:

There is too much in this car I don't like; I don't like the blue eye shadow of Cindy's eyelids, or the grease on Chuck's hair, or the way the car zooms off with a screech and then slows down as everyone plays we-are-afraid-of-the-policeman. I don't like the way they laugh. I don't care for their "ugly" joke, or their five-hundred-pond canary jokes, or their pickle jokes, or their elephant jokes either. And most of all, I hate having to pretend. (pp. 118-119)

Another example is presented under *New World* when this writer judges her new friends under Polish standards: "Even a relatively intelligible person, like Lizzy, poses problems of translation. She—and many others around me— would be as unlikely in Poland as gryphons or unicorns" (p. 175). Aside from the projected negativity seen in the manner of her harsh judgements, Hoffman's rejection is extended to her physical environment. She shares her recollections of landscapes and perhaps as a part of an excess in discourse, she mentions the way in which her surroundings, perhaps unwillingly, became part of her physical, and therefore affectual, reality: "These mountain streams and enormous boulders hurt my eyes—they hurt my soul...I can't imagine feeling that I'm part of them, that I'm in them" (p.100).

For Akhtar (2012), a newcomer's rejection of the host country's landscapes relates to a natural response to the individual's loss of his or her previous transitional space. In *Strange Lands* he stated that regardless of migrants' libidinal loss from old relationships, for human beings, it is easy, and unavoidable, to eventually find transferences in other people. What gets lost with migration is the subject's integration with physical surroundings. Thus, following the individual's socio-geographical relocation, a migrant "can recreate people but not the physical space". Akhtar added that the importance given by migrants to previous landscapes rests in their transitional nature: in the way in which spaces once seemed to provide the subject with a "neutral space of experiencing". Childhood landscapes become unconsciously incorporated as an external-internal reality, they are taken-in as a part of the self. These experiences are affectively remembered and often internalized as idealized memories.

The drastic loss of physical spaces triggers within the subject a sense of nostalgia and even a rejection of the places that, instead of representing part of the subject's

¹⁰ At a conscious level, however, the projection of aggression comes hand-in-hand with introjections. Together these establish, according to Klein (1975), the basis of object-relations (pp. 49-50).

internalized and highly idealized history, symbolize the physical space in which the new sense of loss and displacement has set in. A reverberation of this theme is found in much of Hoffman's writing. A very specific account that supports this argument is found with the writer's allusion to Vancouver, when she states: "Vancouver will never be the place I most love, for it was here that I fell out of the net of meaning into the weightlessness of chaos" (p. 151).

For migrants, the significance of the phenomenological resemblance of migration and the subject's first two separation-individuation phases rests in the way in which such perceived unconscious repetitions provide the individual with a road map to eventual integrations. Thus following a newcomer's identity crisis and state of psychic flux reminiscent of the adolescent's second individuation (Akhtar 2009, pp. 1052-1053), the subject eventually integrates his or her experiences. Adding to this argument we may also suggest that, if provided a good enough environment, a migrant's third individuation emerges with the acquisition and eventual incorporation of the host language: an acquisition that, similar to that of an infant's primary language, aids in the ongoing development of a subject's personality.

An Exploration into Hybrid Identities through Hoffman's "New World"

New World provides readers with descriptions of occurrences and attitudes that developed twenty years following her arrival from Poland. Grounded in self-acceptance, this section becomes a reverberation of Brown's third and final stage of culture shock: the phase in which an individual "begins to accept the differences in thinking and feeling" that surrounded him or her, and thus the stage in which the subject becomes "more empathetic with persons in the second culture". As seen with Hoffman, during this final stage she experiences what Brown calls a "near or full recovery" (cited by Block, 2007, p. 60). Having gone through the process of acculturation, Hoffman embraces her new subject position, which corresponds to a hyphenated identity¹¹, an identity that relates to her new life within language(s).

In a 1964, during an interview on German television, Hannah Arendt was asked about her experiences as a German-Jew following the World War II. To this Arendt noted that in spite of German aggression, what remained for her was her German mother tongue. In *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, Giorgio Agamben (2002), reflects on this interview and argues that what tends to remain is its remnant. He grounds his discussion in an explanation of the 'life of a language' and in the way in which a symbolic code is naturally pulled by opposing tensions: by anomia which is the one moving toward innovation and transformation, and by the current within the

¹¹ The changes undergone by Hoffman relate to the age during the time of her migration. As Akhtar (2012) suggested that unlike children and adolescents, "adults' structuralization has already taken place, and drives have attained fusion and genital primacy". This discussion is also prominent in *Third Individuation* in which Akhtar (2009) describes that in adults, the ego is better organized after the post adolescent superego is in place. Therefore, adults' moral, temporal and linguistic transformation as a result of immigration is a matter of adaptation rather than a replicated scenario (pp. 1052-1053).

terrain of grammatical norms which moves toward stability and preservation. The intersecting point between these two currents is the speaking subject or ‘auctor’ who decides what can and cannot be said through “the sayable and the unsayable of language”. When the relation between norm and anomia is broken, language dies and a new linguistic identity emerges (pp. 159-160).

For Hoffman, Polish did not cease to exist. Yet since it became barely spoken and it no longer endured the transformations that influence all internally and socially lived languages. Polish became a symbolic code suspended in time; a fragment of the language of her parents and of her past. It signified the symbolic code that named her rupture, the tongue that became disconnected with her social and inner realities, with Hoffman’s eventual likes and dislikes, her -adult- insecurities and success. As a subject, Hoffman evolved within her new world and thus became influenced by the introjections projections, and establishment of ongoing object relations that, for the most part, existed in the third space that evolved within her English-speaking reality. Thus, in time, through her acquisition and ensuing internalization of English, Hoffman’s new tongue became the system of meanings that allowed for her to adjust as a migrant. Here we may suggest that her sense of linguistic laceration became seemingly effaced through the acquisition of English and its eventual internalization. In time, English was transformed into her dominant language, the symbolic code that gave her freedom and a second chance in world and personal views. English became a transparent medium entrenched within the fabric of her dreams (pp. 242-243) and the medium of her later triangulations.

The final section of Hoffman’s memoir is a testimony of age-related permeability, of the inevitable influence that language, history and culture have on the developing subject.¹² It bears witness to migration as a benign trauma, of our human need and desire for integration and of our ongoing need for subjective growth. *New Land* speaks to our universal drive for integration and organization, which according to Klein (1975), is one of the ego’s primary functions (p. 57). *New Lands* describes Hoffman’s eventual restructuring, one that fits with what both Klein and Kristeva call the work of Eros (Klein, 1975, p. 57; Kristeva, 1996, pp. 80-81).

Through *New World* readers are exposed to the ego’s eventual binding of the psychic division that was caused by the subject’s trauma. Hoffman’s narrative demonstrates how in time, with a good-enough environment, a migrant’s sense of nihilism subsides, her psychic equilibrium becomes re-established and her sense of new continuity can be made. The individual thus regains her sense of temporal continuity, a continuity that allows for the vision of a future to return, quoting from Hoffman (1990), “like a benediction, to balance the earlier annunciation of loss” (p. 279).

¹² Similar to Akhtar’s (2012) discussion on migration and the relevance of the age-related structuring of the ego, in *Empathy in Language Learning* Guiora et al (1972) explain that age—and therefore maturation- influences learners’ ability to learn a language and ‘sound native’ (p. 111). When discussing the concept of the ‘language ego’ this article argues that as individual’s age their ego boundaries become solidified, and this, subsequently, impacts their ego permeability, which results in the subject’s ability to assimilate native-like speech and identify with the host community (p. 112). For Hoffman, having migrated during her late childhood allowed her to transform within language and hence to eventually assimilate within the host culture.

Hoffman's pronounced transformation reflects Kristeva's (1996) understanding of the relation between trauma and creativity. The integration and transformation reveal the extent to which many individuals, after having had their language and "symbolic bonds severed" and after being silenced and thus living "outside of language and inside the secret crypt of silent pain", are able to transform themselves by eventually "rising to the levels of words and of life" (p. 80). Hoffman's *New World* engulfs the period of this writer's new form of expression and growth, as well as the period of re-fuelling and temporary return to Poland, where she realizes that just as her life has changed so too did her country of birth. Equally important, this is a period in which we see that the sense of succumbing to internal colonization and thus complying with a self-imposed notion of a perpetual newcomer ends. For Hoffman, accepting change and thus the integration of multiple affiliations and identities deepen her understanding of language as a medium for migrants' translation.

Conclusion

Hoffman's memoir brings together the themes of language, child and adolescent translingual migrational memories, trauma, identifications and translingual subject's identity constructions. Her recollections provide us with a discussion on the conflicts between host/foreign linguistic immersions and emotional trauma. This writer's classic migrant memoir exemplifies the subject's unconscious wish to synthesize conflicting introjections, to restore ruptures, and then to narrate socio-affective losses. Quoting from Hoffman's former piano teacher: migrating makes subjects feel fragile as plants with their roots exposed (p. 82). This powerful statement knowingly and unknowingly suggests how socio-geographic, linguistic and affective relocations leave migrants feeling raw and exposed. Such physical and psychic sensations return individuals to their earliest beginnings, to a time that left a mark on their affective histories and to a period during infancy that preceded language. Along with Melanie Klein, I characterize this experience through love and hate, loss, anger, guilt, recurrent anxieties and the urge for reparation.

As seen with Levésque, a primary symbolic code is charged with our human need to belong to something that exists within and outside of the self. For migrants the unconscious construction of an idealized memory of their mother tongue is also driven by a desire to restore and invent the sense of wholeness and unquestioned living they have retrospectively experienced before the marking of their conscious trauma. The otherness perceived by newcomers within language becomes dissipated and replaced by an "illusion for what one has never had" (Derrida, 1996, p. 33). Such assumptions explain why for Derrida the created notion of a mother tongue is a psycho-emotional refuge in exile. A mother tongue, as proposed by both Derrida and Adorno is never inhabitable (Adorno, 1974, p. 87; Derrida, 1996, pp. 58). Instead, it is both an exile and a restorative nostalgia. For migrants, a primary language is an unconscious invention and symptoms of loss can be found in an obsession, a lament, and protection against their abrupt break in social and subjective continuity, initial disorientation, cumulative crises and uncertainty of meaning.

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An Introduction to the Transference Unconscious

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Abstract

This paper explores the evolving definition of the term ‘unconscious’ in late twentieth century French psychoanalysis: structuralist, real, and enunciative. Each hypothetic definition of the unconscious employs a rather different reading of Freud’s discovery of the divided nature of subjective reality, adopting different approaches to the question of trace permanence and strangeness. The paper argues that an assessment of the sequence of Lacanian theories of the unconscious should be understood against the backdrop of discontinuous progress as conceptualised by French historical epistemology.

Let’s be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis, what is at stake is not reality, but truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the scant freedom through which the subject makes them present.
(Lacan, 1953)

The first thing to say about the unconscious is what Freud says about it: it consists of thoughts. (Lacan, 1968)

When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*.
(Lacan, 1976)

If you don’t take the unconscious as the subject of the unconscious, then you’re taking it as a memory, where everything is already written, and it’s a matter of getting to read what’s already written. On the contrary, if one takes the unconscious as a subject, *the ‘it’s written’ lies in speech itself*.
(Miller, 2011)

Introduction

My specific concern in this paper is the transmission of Freud’s hypothesis of the unconscious through the work of Lacan. Though Lacan’s starting point in his unceasing discussion of the unconscious is in an ethology of the image (Lacan 1953, 2006a, & 2006b), followed by the reformulation of the unconscious through structural linguistics, arguably his most famous contribution, his endpoint at a non-structured real unconscious has often been overlooked.

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In 1931, we find Lacan's first published references to the notion of the unconscious. Just one year prior to his thesis defence in which he would unfold the disorderly contradictions of diverse psychiatric accounts of paranoia, he writes disparagingly of 'the technicians of the unconscious', avowing their impotence in curing paranoia. Two years later, when publishing his *amicus curiae* of the Papin sisters' violent crime, Lacan employs the term 'unconscious' as an adjectival trait of an aggressive drive. "We could call it unconscious, signifying that the intentional content which translates it into consciousness cannot manifest itself without a compromise with the social demands integrated by the subject, that is to say without a camouflage of motives, which is quite precisely the whole delusion" (Lacan, 1933). The aggressive drive deserves the qualifier unconscious insofar as it can only attain consciousness through distortion. This proposition is in agreement with Freud's dynamic theory of unconscious formations and their modification by displacement, condensation, and transposition. Further on Lacan alludes to those "psychoanalysts themselves, who when they derive paranoia from homosexuality, style this homosexuality as unconscious, as 'larval' (Lacan, 1933). These first adjectival uses of the term 'unconscious' do not imply a theory of the unconscious as an entity, but seemingly resemble more the pre-psychoanalytic theories of Hering and Butler (Butler, 1920) and the earliest Freudian writings (Freud, 2001c), employing a theoretical style which Freud progressively leaves behind in 1900 favouring the dynamic, ontological formulations of 1915 instead of the descriptive use of the term found at the beginning of his career.

The transition from 'unconscious' as adjective to the conception of the unconscious as an entity, real or hypothetical, in the Freudian archaeological model or in the Lacanian linguistic structure, constitutes the founding axiom of psychoanalysis and the point of separation from Cartesian psychologies of consciousness (Braunstein, 2013)². Once one gifts the unconscious a genuinely real ontology, as a mental entity, and does not simply consider it a description for what remains outside consciousness at any given

² Foucault isolates four fundamental assumptions in the psychoanalytic discourse, each of which relates to a particular reading of the unconscious:

"1) A clinical codification of the procedure for making someone talk: anamneses, a system of questions, a system of interpretation akin to that practiced on bodily signs and symptoms.

2) A general and diffuse notion of causality, acting as a guarantee that, no matter how far off it might seem at first sight, the concentrated causal power of sexuality is there to be discovered. (How can we not recognize here that distinctive combination of 'pansexualism' linked to the rigorously dogmatic doctrine of psychic determinism, so characteristic of psychoanalysis?)

3) The premise that the truth of sexuality is essentially clandestine, elusive and latent. Note that this argument, when found in psychoanalysis, appears both at the level of the biological phases - the 'latency' phase, which at time Freud seemed to regard as the crucial causal factor in human beings' vulnerability to neurosis - as well as in the notion that sexuality is 'the secret' *par excellence*, so that there is an opposition between sexuality and language.

4) The logic of the censor, by which the not-permitted, the not-said, and the non-existent support and confuse one another" (Forrester, 1990).

moment, it is no longer synonymous with non-consciousness. Then the unconscious is no longer reducible to the state of sleep:

In neither [normal subjects nor neurotics], however, does the efficacy of the unconscious cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field. The presence of the unconscious in the psychological order—in other words, in the individual's relational functions—nevertheless deserves to be more precisely defined. It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious motivation manifests itself just as much in conscious psychical effects as in unconscious ones, conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that are legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense. It is thus only due to an incorrect use of the term that “psychical” and “unconscious” in this sense are confused, and that people thus term psychical what is actually an effect of the unconscious on the soma, for example (Lacan, 2006h).

The Freudian unconscious is a limited subset in the vast ensemble of mental activity that remain outside consciousness. In this way Freud moves from a descriptive to a scientific formalisation of the unconscious; it is not simply what has been repressed. It is synonymous neither with the absence of consciousness, nor with the autonomous organic functions of the body, of the nervous and endocrine systems, which remain stable beyond any need of the subject's will. (This is of course a simplification of Freud's continual reformulating of his discovery; 1915, 1920, 1923, 1926 each constitute major turning points in Freud's topology of the psychic apparatus, but are beyond the scope of this paper).

Here Lacan is arguing against various other post-Freudians who attempted to make the Freudian unconscious synonymous with biological instincts. When he claims, “The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier”, Lacan's structuralist manifesto could not be clearer.

The justification for Lacan's critique of the neurophysiological reading of Freud's discovery jumps out at the reader once one compares Freud's *Gesammelte Werke* with Ernst Jones' *Standard Edition*, where the German term *Trieb* was rendered in English as *instinct*. This is no minor occurrence of *traduttore, traditore*; the axiomatic distortion involves a core assumption. Freud's (2001d, 2001f) *Trieb* possesses grammatical structure, as does language. By rendering *Trieb* as instinct, this connotation of structure disappears; it is replaced by connotations of innateness, permanence, and organicity. Whereas Freud clearly located the drives on the frontier between the soma and the psyche, the instincts in Jones' system belong to the soma. The transformation of *Trieb* to *Instinkt* equates psychology with physiology. Such an equivalence is in line with the current dominant paradigm of neuropsychology, in which physiology and psychology are treated as synonyms in the correlative study of behaviour and neurological models. The axiomatic chasm between Jones' and Freud's lexicon reveals their models to be, in Kuhn's words, incommensurate.

Perhaps one could ascribe Jones' translation and its wholesale acceptance by the Anglo-Saxon community to a positivist refusal of any psychological division which does not reside in a visible corporal division. Freud's hypothesis of the drives obliges one to assent, even provisionally, to the notion of a psychological/linguistic space which is not clearly determined by biochemistry. In his first published work, *On Aphasia*, Freud (1953) criticises *localisationist* presumptions, preferring a dynamic approach (Solms, 2000): "As much as possible, we wish to separate the psychological point of view from the anatomical". This breaking point crystallised in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, when the choice of not publishing, or even completing the *Entwurf*, marks Freud's distancing from anatomical neurology in favour of psychoanalysis.³

Was the Freudian notion of the unconscious as possessing structure and being distinct from instincts, from emotions—after all, Freud (2001g) directly claims that affects and emotions are never unconscious—too close to metaphysics for protestant American taste?⁴ The Lacanian approach that endorses a return to Freud's psychoanalytic

³ "I can no longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched the psychology and cannot fathom how I could have burdened you with it. I believe you have been too courteous, I now see it as a kind of absurdity" (Freud, 1985, letter 82, November 1895).

⁴ "American psychoanalysts, I have argued, many of whom were trained in Europe and found themselves adapting for better or for worse to the American situation owing to the Diaspora, came to emphasize the adaptation of the human subject to the prevailing social, economic, and political environment; seeking recognition by the American medical establishment, they diligently excluded all those who might potentially jeopardize their good reputation in the public's mind - above all, those persons of 'dubious' sexual orientation and practice. Having striven to adapt to their new environment, these American psychoanalysts came to see it as part of analytic therapy to teach their analysands how to adapt to their own environments. They came to conceive of illness as the inability of the analysand's ego to adapt the analysand's id impulses to the analysand's reality. The analysand's ego was too weak for the task of adaptation, and had to be encouraged to identify with the analyst's supposedly
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unconscious is vastly more popular in predominantly catholic countries like France and many nations of Latin America. There is also of Freud's claims that the ego is subjected to the drives, ideals, and external reality, claims that go directly against the limitless optimism of the American Dream, of Calvinist ethics and the evergreen advice, *just pull yourself up by your bootstraps*. The treatment plans of ego-psychology, producing a stronger ego, would seem then to represent a direct refusal of Freud's intuition on power relations between the demands of the body, the family, and more general reality upon the self.

In any case, the Anglo-Saxon insistence of correlating the Freudian topologies with the evolutionary division of the hindbrain, the midbrain, and the forebrain appears time and again in the literature. Let us consider Dr. W.H.R. Rivers' theory of the unconscious.

I propose, therefore, to adopt as the distinguishing marks of one class of instincts: firstly, the absence of exactness of discrimination, of appreciation and of gradation of response; secondly, the character of reacting to conditions with all the energy available; and thirdly, the immediate and uncontrolled character of the response. It is interesting to note that Head and Gordon Holmes have found these characters to hold in large measure of the activity of the optic thalamus, the essential nucleus of which they have shown to be the central representative of the protopathic aspect of the peripheral sensibility and the central basis of emotive reactions. As I have already pointed out, it is clear that in this case we have to do with a structure which has come down from an early stage of the development of the nervous system. The optic thalamus is now hidden away within the interior of the brain, overlaid and buried by the vast development of the cerebral cortex. Just as I have supposed that emotive and instinctive reactions are buried within the unconscious, hidden from consciousness by the vast development of those reactions which are associated with intelligence, so do we find that the organ of the emotions and instinctive reactions

strong ego" (Fink, 2014). We mention in passing the curious proximity between psychoanalyst and shaman, a theme thoroughly addressed by Chertok, Devereux, and Ellenberger.

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has been buried under the overwhelming mass of the nervous structure we know to be pre-eminently associated with consciousness (Rivers, 1920).

As John Forrester observed, Rivers' position with regard to Freud's unconscious diverges, simultaneously substantiating Freud's method of dream interpretation while discrediting his theories.⁵ A major historical figure in the introduction of Freud's method of dream analysis to England, Rivers (1920) also published outspoken criticisms of Freud's propositions of the unconscious and the drives. And a quick perusal of the above quotation reveals multiple points of separation from Freud's theory. Rivers collapses the Freudian unconscious and the emotions into the same space, a view Freud argues against in his 1915 text on the unconscious.⁶ Moreover, Rivers founds his psychobiology on the supposition that the unconscious belongs to the deep of the human psyche, in order to construct the metaphor—one we consider of dubious scientific rigour—that the unconscious is located in the optic thalamus, since both would be hidden, one beneath the 'overwhelming mass' of the cerebral cortex, the other beneath consciousness. This metaphoric forcing, that macroscopic brain anatomy has anything to do with mental functioning, is akin to claiming a computer's motherboard must be located closer to the surface of the earth than RAM or the hard disk since it is the foundation of the computing system.

⁵ "Working on W. H. R. Rivers (1864-1922) has become something of a cottage industry in recent years. But the question that still hangs over historians is: which Rivers? Nobody has yet taken the measure of Rivers' diverse and fundamental contributions (for some indication, see Slobodin 1978 and Langham 1981). Given the constraints of this paper, let me make clear that for these purposes my Rivers is the medical psychologist, persuaded of the importance of Freudian therapeutic techniques and of dream interpretation by his personal experience as dreamer and as medical psychologist at Maghull and Craiglockhart Hospitals... Many historians, including Young (1995, 1999), have been exercised to distinguish Rivers' views and methods from those of the psychoanalysts, principally Freud. In this they have taken Rivers at his word, noting how he criticized the doctrines of the unconscious, of repression, of the importance of infantile sexuality – all the shibboleths of psychoanalysis. Yet what is most striking in Rivers' work is how under the spell of Freud he is – not at the level of theoretical concepts, where he went out of his way to criticize and disagree, but at the level of method. Indeed, the book *Conflict and Dream* would be best titled, *A Dialogue with Freud in and on Dreams*. It is a book which is "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense at its clearest: taking the exemplars of a great scientific achievement as its model and worrying away at the puzzles the achievement of that model presents and opens up" (Forrester, 2006).

⁶ "It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it that it should be known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings, and affects are concerned... We know that three vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all anxiety; or it is suppressed" (Freud, 2001g).

In opposition to this searching for an anatomical notion of depth that would correlate to the conjecture of the unconscious, the Lacanian perspective argues that the unconscious appears in a liminal space, insofar as it manifests itself at the surface level of speech and language, in a clockwork-like system of words and syllables uttered by a person, sometimes against his or her will, sometimes without awareness.⁷ It is this surface phenomenon that causes one to always say more than intended. To paraphrase Foucault, the ‘unconscious’⁸ has nothing to do with an “underlying reality on which we might try, with difficulty, to get a hold, but rather a great surface network” (Foucault, 1990, p. 105). Treating the unconscious as a great surface network implies that instead of memory storage, the unconscious is to be found in the variable separation between the ‘ribbon of sound’ and retroactive word choice. But let’s return to Rivers.

Rivers continues to separate himself from Freud, declaring the cerebral cortex to be “pre-eminently associated with consciousness” and thus distinct from the awaited location of the unconscious. Freud did not share such hypotheses of anatomic compartmentalisation. What’s more, the current state of anaesthesiology is one of ignorance as to the locations of actions and mechanisms involved in the production of reversible loss of consciousness. To quote Hameroff (2012, p. 1), “Despite 170 years of research, we as a specialty are clueless as to how anaesthetics cause reversible loss of consciousness, behaviour and memory. We know how to safely deliver anaesthesia, but quite literally, we don’t know what we are doing”. Let us presume that anaesthesia is the inverse of the state of consciousness. Current research into locating the anaesthetic action finds no evidence that anaesthetic molecules exert their effects on particular protein receptors in cell membranes (Eger, 2008). Nor does anaesthesia appear to involve an inhibiting or stimulating effect on a macroscopic region of the brain. Instead anaesthetic potency is directly correlated with cell membrane permeability, which would imply that the anaesthetic effect takes place inside cells (Seifriz, 1950). If we accept anaesthesia as the inverse of consciousness, then the field of anaesthesia research, from Claude Bernard until now, contradicts Rivers attempt to locate a modular theory of the psyche in the anatomic divisions of the brain. Freud himself warned against the epistemological error of confusing psychology with physiology so prevalent in academic psychology.

Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the Brain as with that of no other organ. The discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain and their individual relations to particular parts of the body and to intellectual activities takes us a step further—we do not know how big a step. But every attempt to discover a localisation of mental

⁷ “The dream’s manifest content, he tells us, deserves to be placed once again in the foreground. On this point, there follows a very confused discussion, based on this opposition between the superficial and the profound, which I beg you to rid yourselves of. As Gide says in *The Counterfeiters*, there is nothing more profound than the superficial, because there isn’t anything profound” (Lacan, 1978, p.153).

⁸ ‘Sexuality’ in Foucault’s version

processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve cell and of excitations as migrating along nerve fibres, has miscarried completely. The same fate would await any theory which attempted to recognise, let us say, the anatomical position of the system Cs.—conscious mental activity—as being in the cortex, and to localise the unconscious processes in the sub cortical parts of the brain. There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology to fill it (Freud, 2001g).

Now, having considered the far-reaching transformations of Freud's discovery by his English-speaking colleagues, we can delineate Lacan's place in the history of psychoanalysis with more clarity. His 'Return to Freud' was a necessary counterbalance to the biological reductionism of other post-Freudians, who in their quest to grant scientific dignity to psychoanalysis, assimilated the geography of the brain with psychoanalytic ideology. Lacan (1968) declined this detour through neurophysiology, bolstering himself instead in the Freudian discovery of the essentially cognitive or linguistic structure of the unconscious. "The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier" (Lacan, 2006h). Lacan's structuralist manifesto was a classic example of an anti-discipline, in which the introduction of a previously ignored field of study prevents a given scientific field from descending into scientism. In this way, Lacan's structuralist theory of the unconscious, from 1953 to around 1972, treats psychoanalysis as applied linguistics instead of a subset of physiology. For the structuralist Lacan, free-associations and unconscious formations follow Saussure and Jakobson's rules of synchronic versus diachronic relations and metaphor versus metonymy (Lacan, 1990).

1953, Structure & Otherness

Finally, as Lacan (2006f) frequently affirms in the structuralist period of his teaching, "the unconscious, it is the discourse of the Other." This phrase is a translation of Freud's assertion that the unconscious is always *eine andere Schauplatz* to Lacan's lexicon (Freud, 2001c). But, not so fast, we just mentioned how Jones' transformation of *Trieb* to *Instinkt* drastically modified the connotations of this fundamental psychoanalytic concept. One should note the same is true for 'discourse'. *Schauplatz*, the meaning of which we might translate loosely as the historical moment in which a story inscribes itself, doesn't necessarily have self-sufficient discursive coherence. Lacan's addition of the term 'discourse' imports structuralist notions of organisation and rule-based form. Hence, the unconscious' linguistic structure. But the attribution of discursive order to the unconscious is not a permanent feature of Lacan's hypotheses. Otherness, on the other hand, is. No matter whether we speak of the imaginary unconscious of the *Mirror Stage*, or the symbolic unconscious of the structuralist epoch, or the real unconscious, the autistic unconscious of the last Lacan,

that is to say from his seminar *Sinthome* on, the psychoanalytic unconscious is always the field of the Other. What can that mean?

In order to read this formula, *the unconscious is the discourse of the other*, let us use Lacan's structuralist definition of the Other from the fifties: the Other is the *treasure of the signifiers*, the set of phonemes and words of a language. As such, even before his/her birth, the language that a new-born's family speaks, a language that will mark the new-born's body, exists. The sexual relation between parents that the young child will interpret in his/her manner exists prior to birth. In light of this, one observes that as the unconscious reality constitutes a sexual reality, the patient's unconscious or at least his/her fundamental fantasy can be attributed to an interpretation of the parent's sexual relationship. If these prior assertions are correct, then the fundamental relation of a speaking being to language is one of *jouissance* and cognition, and not simply one of communication.⁹ What one can think and can communicate depends entirely on the words and language available. Lacan will eventually go beyond this hypothesis, throwing the optimistic notion of communication to the wayside and focusing on the regulatory function of language on the body experience¹⁰, on what he calls *jouissance*¹¹. Furthermore, this language along with the unconscious which consists of

⁹ "The newborn produces no speech sounds, however. During the first year of life, speech-like sounds gradually emerge, beginning with vowel-like coos at six to eight weeks of age, followed by some consonant sounds, then followed by true babbling. By the end of the first year, children are typically babbling sequences of syllables that have the intonation contour of their target languages. Finally, meaningful words are produced; that is, the onset of speech occurs" Nadel (2003), Yang (2004), & Yang (2013).

¹⁰ Psychoanalysis demonstrates time and again how one binds his subjective experience to the organism is anything but simple; the way in which one's body, one's body image, and language hold together shows itself to be exceptional in each case. See for example, Freud's experience in "Das Unheimliche", Winnicott's patients in "Primitive Emotional Development". The body experience always exceeds symbolization, sometimes even leading to experiences which are not located in the physical organism; "Another patient discovered in analysis that most of the time she lived in her head, behind her eyes. She could only see out of her eyes as out of windows and so was not aware of what her feet were doing, and in consequence she tended to fall into pits and to trip over things. She had no 'eyes in her feet'. Her personality was not felt to be localized in her body, which was like a complex engine that she had to drive with conscious care and skill. Another patient, at times, lived in a box 20 yards up, only connected with her body by a slender thread" (Winnicott, 1945).

¹¹ "My original idea was that the traumatic nature of *jouissance* is not due to its intensity or strength or power, but rather to the fact that it is enigmatic... The *jouissance* is traumatic for Little Hans because he has no way of understanding its source and origin, or in less psychological terms, because it is not inscribed in a signifying chain. Thus it is traumatic, not because of its intensity but because it is enigmatic. So my thesis initially was that *jouissance* is traumatic precisely in so far as it is meaningless, in so far as it escapes or exceeds the symbolic network within which it is inscribed... The broadest possible definition of *jouissance*, as Lacan understands it, is that it is synonymous with the drive's satisfaction; it is

the impact of early pre-syntactic language experiences belong to an Other—of family, culture and society—that exists prior to the subject. For this reason Lacan (1990, p. 137) claims, “the unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject¹², it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured like a language”.

Lacan proposes that the manifestations of the unconscious always possess an uncanny, foreign essence. The subject experiences his slips of the tongue, bungled actions, and dreams, even eventually his fundamental fantasy as otherly, opaque to his experience of continuity of being. “The fact that the symbolic is located outside of man is the very notion of the unconscious. And Freud constantly proved that he stuck to it as if it were the very crux of his experience” (Lacan, 2006g). It is for this reason that Lacan selected the donut to represent the shape of the unconscious subject; in Lacan’s reading of psychical reality, mental life is structured around an axiomatic fantasy which organises psychical life, but this founding axiom remains out of grasp; it is a constitutional blind spot. The genesis of the subject that implies the installation of subjective division¹³ forever excludes a part of being, rendering it inaccessible. Whether it is primary repression, negation, or foreclosure, the unconscious will always be experienced as alien, whether as hallucination or forgetting. In later Lacan, this foreignness of the Other scene moves to the body as an extimic experience.

not necessarily sexual, nor is it necessarily unpleasurable, though it can be both. At different stages of his work, Lacan states that this satisfaction can arise from imaginary, real or symbolic sources—for instance, the narcissistic *jouissance* obtained from the imaginary dyad of ego and alter-ego; the symbolic *jouissance* obtained from the *Witz* [wit], as analyzed by Lacan in *Le Seminaire. Livre V. Les formations de l'inconscient*, 1957-58 (The Formations of the Unconscious; 1998b); or the *jouissance* that arises from a symptom and whose origin is ultimately 'the real' of one's drive. In this most general definition of the term, despite its having been elaborated by Lacan at different times, these cases combine to show the different possible ways—imaginary, symbolic and real—in which human beings enjoy” (Grigg, 2012).

¹² To generate his symbolic definition of the subject, Lacan borrowed from Peirce’s definition of the sign; he thus gave many variations on the following definition, the subject is represented by one signifier for another. We might say this definition truly takes flight from 1953 on with his Roman manifesto. It follows that the subject is a symbolic function, as opposed to the imaginary identity of the ego. Moreover, Lacan’s subject is not the philosopher’s subject; it is not synonymous with conscious agency. We could further say that the Lacanian subject is the subject of the unconscious; meaning that it only appears in brief moments of truth, which close again quick as lightning.

¹³ Subjective division, or the contradiction between conscious and unconscious desires was first found by Freud and constitutes the fundamental discovery of psychoanalysis. This *Spaltung*, the want-to-be is seemingly present for all, and the stabilizing function of fantasy and/or delusion is to cover over this hole in meaning and unity.

Ubiquity

In Lacan's hypothesis of the field of the unconscious, beyond being the discourse of the other, and the treasure of signifiers, and demonstrating a fundamental subjective division, the unconscious is ubiquitous. "The efficacy of the unconscious does not cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field" (Lacan, 2006h). Imagine an adolescent patient who describes his father as disgraceful and unworthy, saying that every time he trespasses the laws of society, his father becomes 'hysterical'. He claims to be much closer to his mother. Since he has been hospitalised, he claims she is the only one he misses. One he trusts his therapist, he relates his story of sexual abuse at age six. A cousin called him into the garden, far from the other members of his family, where they exchanged fellatio, '*mamadas*' he calls it. The cousin was fifteen years old. He never told anyone of this, neither his parents, nor his siblings. Then as his fifteenth birthday approaches, he enters a drug rehabilitation centre as an inpatient. During his stay he has his fifteenth birthday, and at that time loses his virginity to a younger boy.

On entering adolescence, he began to hang out with gangs, often escaping from the house and school without his parents' knowledge. His father regularly beat him for this. After intentionally flunking out of an intermediate school his father respected, but which he judged too posh, he encountered drugs. Initially he robbed his parents to for drug money, but after his first internment, he stopped robbing and begins selling drugs for money. At this time stopped attending high school. This path coming closer and closer to narcotraffic continued until the death of his best friend produced a traumatic cut. Whereas his elder brother shares his father's name and style of dress, the patient has always eschewed this style in favour of streetwear.

During his second internment, he dreams regularly of his mother, and of his best-friend who was recently killed. The fifteen, the *mamadas*, the maternal proximity and unworthy father, his flirtation with organised crime, all these historical narratives show the pervasive influence of the unconscious clockwork on the history of the subject. The laws of the unconscious are traceable in the repetitions of his desire. He remembers, from his childhood, that his mother would always ask him, repeating the old song, "when you grow up, you won't be bad will you?" The case remains unfinished, yet one can clearly observe how this apparently innocuous speech takes on the value of the Other's desire and becomes destiny. This fragment of speech does not account for the specific jouissance of his way of badness, any more than it justifies the underlying hysteric logic of the case. Instead the mode of jouissance and structure combine with the Other's speech in spinning fate.

From this point, one might propose a stronger hypothesis for the superficial, linguistic unconscious; the motifs of the unconscious are present in every speech act of a given subject. As such, searching the depths for the underlying profound being of a patient is unnecessary. The unconscious reveals itself in the most superficial of speech insofar as a person's speech always circles around the unconscious fantasy (Lacan, 1978, p. 184). In this sense, Lacan initially considered that the unconscious is the expression of a patient's history. "The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be found again;

most often it has already been written elsewhere... What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history” (Lacan, 2006d).

Ineradicable Permanence

Finally, a complete disappearance of unconscious impositions on the life of a speaking being would appear impossible. One cannot escape confirming that even at the end of analysis, having traversed the fantasy, or separated from the object, or completed the social rite of the pass, the unconscious, understood here as synonymous with the fundamental fantasy¹⁴, still and always imposes itself upon the analyst. Its fate is bound up with the transference, never completely vanishing.

In this case, the unconscious might appear as history, as the subjective registration of life’s coincidences and traumas. Immediately, this perspective runs up against the clinical evidence of singular subjects. Why did such an event mark the patient, this trauma instead of another? Why did this shared experience traumatise one and not others? The enigma of the emergence of a fundamental subjective nature poses insurmountable difficulties to a purely developmental, environmental hypothesis, *tabula rasa* style. As Leclaire observes, common opinion of trauma as caused by an event trips over the unanswerable quandary, why that day?¹⁵ If we guide ourselves by

¹⁴ Miller’s reading of Lacan provides concise definitions of fantasy and fundamental fantasy; “At first, one can simply talk about “fantasies” or “fantasmization” with a rich wealth of characters. But the distillation of those fantasies is precisely a construction effect proper to psychoanalysis, in which case we are getting close to formulas of a simplicity similar to that offered by Freud in “A Child Is Beaten”. At first, then, and like in *The 120 Days of Sodom*, we come across an entire world of characters and situations that justify the term used by Lacan to refer to this dimension: “the fantasy jungle”. But through analysis, all this is gradually cleared towards a formalization, a simplification, a sort of singularization, if I may say so, of the fantasy”. (Miller, 1984) “The construction of the fundamental fantasy is the same thing as its reduction to the drive”. (Miller 1998).

¹⁵ “Common opinion on this point is as follows: things are stabilised by an accident or happenstance, something occurred, and it will be a question of rediscovery, much in the same way as when one sees somebody twisted, as when one sees someone with his spinal column askew, one thinks, it’s because one day he fell from the ladder, so, either he remembers the day he fell from the ladder or he doesn’t, we try to rediscover it and eureka, the loose ends are tied up, we found the accidental event that provoked this fixation or that particular character, just like a scar on the face, etc... But if we look at things in a slightly more analytic fashion, slightly more distant, we first see there are many distinct identifiable events to which we could impute the distortion or the fixation in question. When we detect several events in this way, we say: it’s just because they are repetitions of the original traumatic event that we don’t find it, but we find the entire series of secondary traumas which, of course, fixated it. We always leave the first event unrecovered beyond reach.

But, if truth be told, if we look even closer, contrary to what certain child analysts who see things unfold before their eyes might think, to be honest, when push
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the examples of the formalised sciences of our time, this singular enigma can only be considered a stochastic phenomenon (Kupiec, 2009; Haroche, 2006; Hacking, 2001).

Why is another drive, or another region of the body, or a different series of symptomatic metaphors not emphasised instead? These questions oblige a logical reversal in our understanding of the causal bond between unicity, trauma, and fantasy. It seems as though something intrinsically inscribed in the speaking being, at the level of his unique relation to language, his fantasy, determines his traumas. It is not the subjective experience—or at least not memorable experience—of a historical series of events which constitutes the inaugural trauma, forging the subjective singularity and determining one's unconscious. Rather, it is the unicity of the subject, his unconscious fantasy, the incidence of language on one's body, what we might call the real unconscious, which determines the coordinates of reality that resonate. From such suppositions it follows that the coordinates of reality periodically correspond with one's unconscious fantasy, that there occurs a sort of subjective resonance that marks the subject with this accentuation, adding more meaning to his historical narrative. Thus the unconscious would be a sort of formulaic knowledge that occasionally confirms itself through one's singular vision of reality, a kind of positive feedback loop.

Such a viewpoint argues that the unconscious was already constituted, readymade, at the moment of subjective genesis. This of course begs the questions of when and what is subjective genesis. We see the tendency to find earlier and earlier moments of traumatic genesis in the works of Rank (1924) and Winnicott (1945, 1954). When the hypothesis of historical trauma is obstinately taken to the extreme, it produces pseudoscientific ideologies such as those found in constellations therapy or past life regression. One might say the coherence and rationality of a psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious, as well as its clinical safety and benevolence, relies on our not inquiring too often and too insistently into the enigmatic birth of the subject; one cannot know prehistory (Garcia-Castellano, 1997).

comes to shove any event might be considered as having produced any distortion, fixation, or deformation. So, there's something that's starting to be bothersome. Why is it on this day when he saw past that shrub, or through that open door, rather than on another day when he saw from atop the granary haystack, anyway why would such an event rather than any other have fixated the dominance of the scopic function? Of course we can construct an entire succession, but you must see that this poses the fundamental problem of what makes for an event; what makes the event, what produces it, what of this perspective is supposed to cause the fixation? The accidental, the traumatic, the series of events no doubt, provided we clarify what we mean by that, and what truly makes for the specificity or the singularity of an event and above all gives it its traumatic character... In other words, I think that to really understand what happens and what a certain type of erogenic body concerns, meaning a singularity, this famous genetic perspective must be radically dismantled" (Leclaire, 1999, pp. 74-78).

1964, *Organ or Engraving*

Lacan did not restrict his study of structural attributes of language—synchrony and diachrony—to elaborations on the concept of a combinatory, he also attempted to use these notions which order the discourse of structuralism, to bring together the psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious and the drives. In 1964, the year of his divergence from Freud, Lacan remarked that the unconscious possesses a rhythmic character in that it appears in the slip of the tongue only to disappear instantly; he ascribes this repetitive manifestation to a Sisyphean impossibility of attaining some object or truth that is always missed.

If the unconscious is what closes up again as soon as it has opened, in accordance with a temporal pulsation, if furthermore repetition is not simply a stereotype of behaviour, but repetition in relation to something always missed, you see here and now that the transference—as it is represented to us, as a mode of access to what is hidden in the unconscious—could only be of itself a precarious way. If the transference is supposed, through this repetition, to restore the continuity of a history, it will do so only by reviving a relation that is, of its nature, syncopated. We see then, that the transference, as operating mode, cannot be satisfied with being confused with the efficacy of repetition, with the restoration of what is concealed in the unconscious, even with the catharsis of the unconscious elements (Lacan, 1990).

Lacan formulated this pulsating version of the unconscious, no longer as historic truth waiting to be remembered, but as a continually missing distance between what must be said and what is said, in an attempt to bring together the fundamental Freudian concepts of the unconscious and the drives. One can see the pulsating unconscious, opening and closing, brings to mind the liminal orifices of the human body. As such, the unconscious of 1964 is a frontier space between linguistics and biology; this is where Lacan links together the transference, the drives, and the unconscious as different faces of repetition.

There is of course the question of whether Lacan's pulsating unconscious errs as Rivers' neuroanatomical unconscious did; after all, such metaphors are suspect. Though I would argue that Lacan was most likely not attempting to locate the psychoanalytic hypothesis of the unconscious in the human organism, but trying to reconcile the paradoxical dichotomy between the permanence of certain aspects of symptoms after interpretation, and levity of their witty double entendre. On the one

hand there are certain unconscious formations at the level of the bodily experience, of what he would name *jouissance* as a translation of Freud's 'death drive' and the libido bound up in it. On the other, one finds the levity, the simplicity of deciphering unconscious meanings as an effect of language structure (Miller, 2000). Freud as well was concerned with reconciling these two divergent aspects of symptomatology in psychoanalysis, as evident in the progression of his *Introductory Lectures* from "The Sense of Symptoms" to "The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms" (Miller, 2003). Perhaps the wisdom of Freud and Lacan in not jumping to neuro-metaphors involves differentiating between the biological organism and our experience of body.

Alternatively, instead of hypothesizing the unconscious as an abstract and immaterial organ¹⁶, one could envision it as the remains of the language learning process, as the engraving of certain cognitive and affective experiences on the body. The predominance of bodily elements as signifying phenomena in the analytic setting, and their potency as bridges from one repetitive discourse towards forgotten truths, would seem to argue in favour of this consideration, as does the common psychoanalytic experience of the reduction of symptoms and fantasies of an analysand towards a fundamental fantasy. The fundamental fantasy acts as a limit point of knowledge, further research into the unconscious runs up against enclosing walls, and the exit from analysis involves either the identification with this minimal enunciation of fantasy, or the relativist claim that even this fundamental fantasy is no more than fiction, just as any subjective history. Nonetheless the fact that no fundamental psychoanalytic symptom appears without intimate ties to the body argues in favour of the supposition that there is an axiomatic relation between human psychical life and the engraving of language in the subject's body. The examples are endless, the fact that a woman whose mother nearly bled to death during childbirth—and who presents an aversion to menstruation, frequent nosebleeds, frequent nightmares of maternity and pregnancy, and grammatically ambiguous speech as to her gender and sexual identity - frequently squishes her nose during sessions points to the signifying function of this body location, all the more so since minimal remarks bringing attention to her body such as "your nose" lead to free association involving new traumatic material. There is of course the scientific question of whether this is an iatrogenic phenomena, one related to counter-transference - such as differences of classical hypnotic presentations between the Nancy and Salpêtrière schools of Bernheim and Charcot (James, 1891; see also Ellenberger, 1970)—but to a certain extent, the entirety of the psychoanalytic experience is two-body experience, in which the iatrogenic effects of the analyst's unconscious are not absolutely suppressible.

Moreover, the analytic experience produces a certain ordering effect, a structuring of the unconscious of the patient. It transmutes, purifies - if you will permit the expression - from a wild state towards the clarity of the fantasy. Simply put, the patient's verbalisation of unconscious tendencies in speech and thought cause the unconscious to be structured as a function of the symbolic. This is most likely the therapeutic motor of psychoanalysis; to paraphrase Paré, *je l'écoutai, Dieu le guérit*.

Lacan recognises that the fact of elaborating symptoms and fantasies via speech produces a certain effect of organisation. "We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, by that part of it which is articulated by passing into words. It is for

¹⁶ On the flimsiness of such immaterial/material dualities see Rorty (2009).

this reason that we have the right—all the more so as the development of Freud’s discovery will demonstrate—to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no other structure than the structure of language” (Lacan, 1991, p. 42). In a certain way, the analytic act involves a passing from the unconscious as inexplicable symptoms to the verbalisation of what must have been an unconscious fantasy; this act accounts for the reduction of what Lacan names *jouis-sens*, or excitation (ecstasy and agony) derived from speech and language. In this way, the analytic experience leads to significant consequences in the analysand’s relation to language.

From the seminar *Encore* onward, one of Lacan’s greatest theoretical dilemmas consists in finding a way to bring the linguistic unconscious together with the organism, the body of human experience. He concludes this yearlong seminar with the axiomatic formulation. “The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1975, pp. 118). He attributes the otherness of the unconscious to the mysterious body and its inertia in treatment. This mystery of the body harkens back to Christine Papin’s puzzlingly innocent explanation for her Bacchian desecration of the other’s body, the body holds the “mystery of life”.

The period from *Encore* to *Sinthome* thus involves an attempt to reconcile, to treat as synonyms the mystery of the body and the unknown of the unconscious. The discourse of the Other now refers to the body’s impinging on mental life. His clinical work in this period focuses on the necessity and impossibility of interpreting the enigmatic speaking body, of how to make linguistic interpretations without speech. One sees this in the famous testimony of Suzanne Hommel (2015) for example (Miller, 2012). Yet, just three years later, Lacan no longer equates the real of the body with the unconscious. Rather he speaks of an abyss that divides the unconscious as knowledge from the real body.

Llanguage and the Mystery

The mere fact that he [Descartes] speak, since by speaking *llanguage* he has an unconscious, this lost soul like everyone else with self-respect; it’s what I call a knowledge unreachable by the subject, while the subject, he has only one signifier to represent himself in comparison with this knowledge; If I may say so, it is a representative of commerce with this constituted knowledge, for Descartes as was the custom in his time, his insertion into the discourse of his birthplace, what I call the master’s discourse, the discourse of noblaugh. That’s why he doesn’t get by with his “I think therefore I enjoy”. (Lacan, 1974)

Thus Lacan’s departure point is: the unconscious is imaginary and the construction of an operational concept of the image. Lacan’s teaching begins once he renounces this conception in favour of the one that dominates his teaching up until the end of the *Sinthome*, namely: the unconscious is symbolic. All of final accounts we have of Lacan concern a third definition that was truly given only once in these terms, in “L’esp d’un laps”: the unconscious is real. (Miller, 2012, p. 43)

What could the term ‘real unconscious’ possibly mean? First off, the final Lacan slowly reduces his tripartite Borromean chain towards the duality semblance/real. Which is to say, to make sense of the untreatable, he divides between wispy make-pretend on the one hand, and the unmoveable on the other. A new way of speaking of the distinction between appearance and reality. Thus the real unconscious is intransigent, it has to do with what cannot be modified.

The term real unconscious does not imply a complete abandoning of the hypothesis that the unconscious be composed of language material.¹⁷ Rather, the unconscious is no longer conceived of as an organised linguistic structure, which would possess predictive rules of grammar and syntax. As such it no longer justifies cyclic repetition through the artificial language model of binary code (Fink, 1995). The real unconscious is related to what Lacan names *llanguage*¹⁸, a linguistic trauma, unique to each person, which leaves no possibility for unconscious intersubjectivity. In his last period of theorizing, from the *Sinthome* on, the intersubjective unconscious is nothing other than the supposition of another who might know, another name for transference. Sometimes this intersubjective gambit permits a transmutation of the subject of the unconscious, and yet the unconscious itself remains an autistic instance. Otherwise said, Lacan’s hypothesis of the real unconscious consists entirely of a unique set of S₁, but without any link to an S₂ that would generate meaning and syntax. One could say that the S₂ terms which generate meaning only come into being through the presence of an interlocutor. In the analytic setting this role is played by the analyst along with the transference, in other words, that the patient believes speaking to the analyst has worth. But the unconscious as a collection of S₁ involves no second person. The necessary result of his move from linguistics to *linguisterie*, though arriving late, arrives unequivocally; the real unconscious, bound up with the spoken/speaking body, leaves no room for organised structure or another who would know.

Lacan still argues that the way in which the new-born received language from his surroundings determines him subjectively. More specifically, what one says of and to the new-born, and the way in which (s)he hears it marks the body in such a way that this language acquisition process then determines dreams, symptoms, and bungled actions. But it is no longer simply a question of the discourse of the other; the emphasis has shifted to the other’s manner of speaking. Beyond the structural and legal emphasis of discourse, the notion of the other’s manner of speaking accentuates intonation, pitch, volume, articulation, phoneme selection, but also subtler aspects such as breathing and cadence.¹⁹ The notion of the unconscious thus returns as a

¹⁷ “What Freud called the unconscious: a knowledge expressed in words. But this knowledge is not only expressed in words of which the subject has no any idea: it is Freud who rediscovers these words in his analyses” (Lacan, 1975b).

¹⁸ “What I put forward, by writing *lalanguage* [language] as one word, is that by which I distinguish myself from structuralism, insofar as the latter would like to integrate language into semiology - and that seems to me one of the numerous lights Jean-Claude Milner shed on things. As is indicated by the little book that I had you read entitled *The Title of the Letter*, what is at stake in everything I have put forward is the sign’s subordination with respect to the signifier” (Lacan, 1975a, pp. 101).

¹⁹ “Why write it (*Lalanguage*) as one word? The references are numerous, and Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65
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developmental trace, but now instead of involving the historical truth of a personal fiction with its traumas and secrets, it involves the process of language acquisition prior to the earliest memories. This inscription of the mother's and others', ways of speaking, constitutes the root of the real unconscious. One could even speak of the trauma of language learning. In fact, one might say this is the only true trauma, since it cannot be transmuted into semblance by the re-elaboration of new fictions. But *llanguage* is also the psychoanalytic path to a cure, one shared by the arts. Perhaps, instead of trauma, it is more appropriate to speak of an indelible mark. We have come full circle back to Peirce (1935, pp. 271) "a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea", except now the (s)he is nothing but a letter.

In a way, we have returned to Lacan's first elaboration of the historical unconscious, especially insofar as it links up with trauma. Once again the unconscious is the exclusive property of the subject, it is no longer an intersubjective space. Yet, if the unconscious is an effect of the history of the language learning, then it becomes a message in a bottle whose code no one else can ever know. It is not a knowledge that can be shared, for it is not possessed by the patient. It would be more proper to say (s)he is possessed by this writing. It follows that one must not confuse this hypothesis of the first prehistoric mark with the unconscious as a forgotten memory, a coherent thought outside of conscious experience. And that clinical work with subconscious material will gradually move from what may be sensibly understood in terms of history, to what more appropriately could be called the primordial engraving of language onto the human body.

The impact of the environment in the creation of this unconscious-*llanguage* is Lacan deriving an unconscious from the sound material of language. In this way it can be read as a final attempt by Lacan bring psychoanalysis into the fold of science, with its object of study, the materiality of language. As such it is a repetition of the structuralist manifesto, marked by his return to Rome for a third time to pronounce his speech *La troisième*. As the 1953 Rome discourse left behind biology and physiology in favour of linguistics; his 1976 passage to the real unconscious leaves behind linguistics to forge a science of the letter.

This accentuation of the *llanguage* aspect of the real unconscious instead of the unconscious as formal language or syntactic structure, puts the equivocal in the foreground.

Llanguage. The Greeks, from the time of Aesop on, were well aware that it was of absolutely capital importance. There is a well-known fable on this topic, but

Lacan explained it in this way: it is because of its homophony with 'lallation'. 'Lallation' comes from the Latin *lallare*, which the dictionaries say designates the act of singing 'la, la' to send infants to sleep. The term also designates the babbling of the infant who doesn't yet speak but who already makes sounds. Lallation is sound separated from meaning, but nonetheless as we known not separated from the infant's state of satisfaction. *Lalangu*e evokes the speech that is transmitted before syntactically structured language. Lacan says that *lalangu*e, as one word, means the mother tongue: in other words, the first things heard, to parallel the first forms of bodily care" (Soler, 2014, 25).

nobody notices it. It is no coincidence at all that, whatever language it is that one receives the first imprint of, words are equivocal. It is certainly no coincidence that in French the words ‘ne’, ‘not’, is pronounced the same as the word ‘*nœud*’, ‘knot’. It is no coincidence at all that the word ‘pas’, ‘not’, which in French, contrary to any other languages, doubles the negation, also designates *un pas*, a step. If I am, so interested in ‘pas’, ‘not’/‘step’, it is not by chance. This doesn’t mean that language in any way constitutes a heritage. It is absolutely certain that it is in the way in which language has been spoken and also heard as such, in its particularity, that something will subsequently emerge in dreams, in all sorts of mistakes, in all manners of speaking. It is in this *materialism*, if you will allow me to use this word for the first time, which the unconscious stakes hold. What I mean is that here there resides what it is that prevents anyone from finding another way of nourishing what just before I called the symptom (Lacan, 1975b).

For Lacan, *Llanguage*— if we may borrow Grigg’s translation of *lalangue* - does not constitute a patrimony. It is not a heritage of members sharing a parish dialect. *Lalangue* is quite simply the speaking being’s unique remains of the maternal language learning process, not a knowledge shared between generations, nor a brotherhood. It would be a stochastic process, unique to each person. Lacan continues his efforts to bind the unconscious to language all the while avoiding any merging with Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious.

Secondly, the real unconscious involves an attempt to link up the psychological notion of a linguistic unconscious with bodily excitation that resists words; that which words do not tame. In Freud’s theory of the psychical apparatus, the organic body influences the unconscious by the drives.²⁰ The body is also there as the material substrate of the psyche.

²⁰ “Freud placed a lot of emphasis on this. And he thought, notably, that the term ‘autoeroticism’ needed to be accentuated, in the sense that the child initially discovers this sexual reality on his own body. I permit myself - this doesn’t happen every day - to disagree - and in the name of Freud’s work itself.

If you study the case of little Hans closely, you will see that what appears there is that what he calls his *Wiwimacher*, because he doesn’t know how to call it anything else, is introduced into his circuit. In other words, to call things quietly by their name, he has his first erections. This first enjoyment manifests itself, it

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Then...The real Unconscious at Geneva?

How could people fail to appreciate before Freud that these people called men, or women on occasion, inhabit talking? It is very odd for people who believe they think not to realise that they think with words. There are things there that have to come to an end, don't you agree? The thesis of the Würzburg School, on the so-called apperception of I know not what synthetic thought that isn't articulated, is really the most delusional that a school of supposed psychologists has ever produced. It is always with the help of words that a man thinks. And it is in the encounter between these words and his body that something takes shape. Moreover, I would even use the term 'innate' in this respect— if there were no words, what could man bear witness to? This is where he places meaning (Lacan, 1989).

As he arrives at the final period of his teaching, Lacan still maintains the fundamental importance of the word, claiming that the subject takes shape in the encounter between words and body. He goes further, claiming that the word is essentially what defines the human; thought doesn't exist in a wordless vacuum, one can only think with language, though Daniel Tammet's (2007) account of numerical hypnagogic hallucinations do raise questions on whether numbers or images could act as letters.

Here Lacan coincides with the Stoics and some contemporary linguists in considering

could be said, in everyone. Is this, if not true of everyone, then verified in everyone? But this is precisely the *point* of Freud's contribution - its being verified in certain people is enough for us to be in a position to construct something upon it that has the closest of connections with the unconscious. For it's a fact, after all, that the unconscious is Freud's invention. The unconscious is an invention in the sense of a discovery, which is linked to the encounter that certain beings have with their own erection.

Being, this is what we call it, because we don't know how to say it any differently. It would be better to do without the words 'being'. Some people have in the past been sensitive to this. A certain Saint Thomas Aquinas - he is a holy man [*saint homme*] and even a symptom [*symptôme*] - wrote something called *De ente et essentia* [*On Being and Essence*]. I can't say I recommend that you read it, because you won't, but it's very astute. If there is something called the unconscious, it means that one doesn't have to know what one is doing in order to do it, and in order to do it while knowing it full well. Perhaps there is someone here who will read *De ente et essentia* and who will see what this holy man, this symptom, works out very well - being is not grasped so easily, nor is essence" Lacan (1989).

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languages primary function not to be one of communication, but rather of a sort of cognitive scaffolding, a system which permits thought. Lacan goes further still when he considers language as fundamental in the regularisation of *jouissance*. One observes a broad spectrum of anecdotal evidence for this claim, from the success of the talking cure, to the use of writing and speech to diminish manic excitement, to the simultaneous disordering of language and affective suffering as described by Artaud (1984).

Indeed the psychoanalytic experience demonstrates repeatedly that language and the Lacanian notion of *jouissance*, which might be translated in Freudian terms as libido, are intimately bound together. Nowhere is this clearer than in the example of the mystic's agony and ecstasy. The oceanic mystic experience involving limitless *jouissance* for the silent person, loses its brilliance as soon as one attempts to put it in words. Indeed, the words never measure up to the affective experience. Not only can they not adequately depict the mystic's unique *qualia*, but the very attempt to narrate this singular sensation diminishes its subjective impact.²¹ We can now see why Lacan spoke of the unconscious mystery of the speaking body. Though the symbolic and the real appear to be two distinct, irreconcilable registers—the symbolic unconscious and the excitation of the organism—they are intimately intertwined. Thus the concept of *jouis-sens*, or the enjoyment of babbling, of blah blah. From here one can distinguish two versions of excitation, one regulated and limited by the discrete nature of language, and the silent excitation of the mystic, which Lacan used as a provisional path to studying feminine *jouissance*, one unbounded by language.

The above block quotation from Lacan's 1975 Geneva lecture on the symptom is to be understood together with excerpts below from his seminar *The Sinthome*, where he speaks of unconscious effects as omnipresent, proliferated into the entirety of the speaking beings subjective life. As Lacan argued for the impossibility of thought without speech, or at least language, and he argued for the impossibility of a language act without the unconscious as a surface effect, this leads to the hypothesis that no act of thinking escapes interference from the unconscious—so long as the unconscious is defined as the set of constituent fragments of *llanguage* in addition to including the *metonymic treasure of signifiers*.

The Sinthome: Real vs. Unconscious

The primary distinction between the theory of a structural unconscious and later ones does not reside in a wholesale devaluing of language, but rather an abandoning of a

²¹ "One last important thing to say before we take up the text, I would like to emphasize Angelina di Foligno's ethics: an ethics of speaking well. What she tells him [Arnoldo di Foligno], what he writes, is not equal to what she experiences. What she experiences is at the limit of the vocable: inexpressible, ineffable, indescribable, it's beyond words. And to speak of this mystical experience, to tell of her relation to God, to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, is to speak ill, speak falsely, to blaspheme! In such a way that she will often say she doesn't recognize herself in what he wrote. And even when she accepts what is written, she says that her experience, so joyous, so ardent, has in the transcription become, truly insipid" (Encalado, 2015).

grammatical approach towards a disorganised notion of language fragments. If the first period of Lacan's teaching focused on the forgotten, and the symbolic structure that necessitates repetition epitomised in the *Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"*, the unconscious as a phenomenon of the real involves moving towards a chaotic grouping of eruptions, towards what cannot be said. The lapsus is still the compass that orients Lacan's final formulation of the unconscious, but he no longer characterises it as being meaningful, or in other words predictive.

As such, the primary changes to the hypothesis of the unconscious involve the loss of any status of intersubjectivity, "No friendship here that this unconscious might supports" (Lacan, 2001). Using mutual intelligibility as a common criterion for determining language and dialect boundaries, one could say Lacan assigns absolute unintelligibility to the real unconscious that it is an idiolect.

The principal change from his earliest formulations to his final formulations of the unconscious does not involve a change to the fundamental justification. "It is difficult not to see that the lapsus is that upon which, in part, the notion of the unconscious is founded" (Lacan, 2005, p. 97). This definition of the unconscious is derived from *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* more than any other Freudian text. The principal change occurs in the reading given to these lapses. If in a first moment, they were understood as historic monuments whose deciphering would enable the recapture of forgotten subjectivity, now they are senseless. The theory of the real unconscious leaves behind the notion of a grammatically structured unconscious, as well as an intersubjective unconscious, or an unconscious modelled on the notion of repressed coherent thoughts. The parapraxes orient the final formalisation of the Lacanian unconscious, one which paradoxically distances itself from Freud's thesis of the *Trieb*, which after all were determined by a certain minimal grammar. Lacan (1976) continues to found the hypothesis of the unconscious on the eruption of nonsense in the middle of an association of ideas by a foreign element or distortion. The lapsus, the return of the repressed is considered as the image itself of the link between the conscious and the unconscious.

I try to be rigorous by pointing out that what Freud supports as the Unconscious always supposes a knowledge, and a spoken knowledge, as such. That this is the minimum that is supposed by the fact that the Unconscious can be interpreted. It is entirely reducible to a knowledge. After which, it is clear that this knowledge requires at the minimum two supports, is that not so, that are called terms, by symbolizing them as letters. Hence my writing of knowledge as being supported by S, not to the power of 2, of S with this index, this index of a small 2, of a small 2 at the bottom. It is not S squared, it is S supposed to be 2, S₂. The definition that I give of this signifier, as such, that I support from S index 1, S₁, is to represent a subject,

as such, and to *truly* represent it. On this occasion truly means *in conformity with reality*.

The True is saying in conformity with reality. Reality which is on this occasion what functions; what truly functions. But what truly functions has nothing to do with what I am designating as the Real. It is an altogether precarious supposition that *my* Real—I must indeed accept my part in it—that my Real conditions reality; the reality of your hearing, for example.

There is here an abyss which is far from, which one is far from being able to guarantee will be crossed over. In other terms, the agency of knowledge that Freud renews, I mean renovates in the form of the Unconscious, is a thing which does not at all obligatorily suppose the Real that I use...

I mean that - if indeed it is something that one can call a Freudian lucubration—that it is my own way of raising to its degree of symbolism, to the second degree, it is in the measure that Freud articulated the Unconscious that I react to it. But already we see there that it is a way of raising the *sinthome* itself to the second degree. It is in the measure that Freud truly made a discovery— and supposing that this discovery is true— that one can say that the Real is my symptomatic response. But to reduce it to being symptomatic is obviously no small thing. To reduce it to being symptomatic, is also to reduce all invention to the *sinthome* (Lacan, 2005, p. 131).

We are still in the realm of the Freudian unconscious, one which always supposes knowledge. Typically, understood in a historic variant of memory and mementos. Otherwise, the unconscious could be approached in its symbolic dimension, at the level of linguistic knowledge. Puns and wordplay that permit interpretation in a given dialect come within the competency of a symbolic unconscious. It also supposes a knowledge, but instead of the historic knowledge, it has more to do with the

machinery of a symbolic combinatory, with its related language rules.²² And here we should be attentive, if the unconscious is a knowledge built up upon a foundation of a ‘manner of speaking’ related to *llanguage* as defined above, then we have *llanguage* as a chance set of noises and silences characterised by continuity, and the symbolic unconscious as an artefact of semblance. The symbolic, intersubjective unconscious thus becomes an ethical hypothesis with little more real consistency than the supposition that the analyst possesses the intimate knowledge necessary to decipher one’s malaise. Then transference unconscious must fall away at the end of analysis along with the analyst’s fall from grace, leaving behind only the solitary unconscious.

If one argues for an unconscious structured by/as language, unless one claims unique dialects for every speaking being—which is part of Lacan’s *llanguage* argument—the apparent shared nature of language among nearly the entirety of humanity and the relatively limited number of languages, ~6909 for the 7.4 billion world population according Lewis (2009), extrapolates towards the supposition of a collective unconscious. Jung (1991, p. 43) is often credited with a mystic, religious concept of the collective unconscious, but in the 1911 edition of the *Traumdeutung*, Freud concurs with Ferenczi that “every tongue has its own dream-language”. Artemidorous’ famous account of Aristander ‘most happy interpretation’ is available in both ancient Greek and modern French, though not in English.²³ It comes down to a question of where one demarcates languages and dialects. So long as one works within the intersubjective transference unconscious, at the level of the meaning of symptoms and unconscious formations, then the language code is shared between analyst and analysand, here we are at the level of Ferenczi’s dream tongues. However, once one claims that this language is an elaborate artefact built upon *llanguage*, a hypothetic marking or regulating instrument of bodily excitation, then the probability of intersubjectivity becomes astronomically infinitesimal. It is at this level that Lacan objects to Jung’s theory of a collective unconscious.

If the unconscious is the product of a unique inscription of language from chance encounters with ways of speaking found in one’s early environment, then it would never recur in the same way for two people. But Lacan goes even further than this

²² “The unconscious supposes a knowledge, but beyond this, the unconscious is entirely reducible to knowledge. Nevertheless, what Lacan calls here the unconscious, unconscious-knowledge, is the symbolic unconscious, meaning cut off from the imaginary, from the body. And thus what he calls the unconscious properly speaking, this interpretable unconscious, one must say it is an unconscious disjointed from the body and therefore disjointed from what we call since Freud the drives, which obey another logic than that of S_1 S_2 ” (Miller, 2012, 44).

²³ “I think too that Aristander gave a most happy interpretation to Alexander of Macedon when he had surrounded Tyre and was besieging it but was feeling uneasy and disturbed by the length of time the siege was taking. Alexander dreamt he saw a satyr dancing on his shield. Aristander happened to be in the neighbourhood of Tyre, in attendance on the king during his Syrian campaign. By dividing the word satyr [σάτυρος] into σά and τυρος he encouraged the king to press home the siege so that he become master of the city. (σά τυρος = Tyre is thine.)” (Freud, 2001c) In French one finds: satyre, sa Tyre, satire, ça tire, etc.

absolute difference from inscription, arguing that living languages are in continual evolution, not only for language communities but for individuals. It would follow that if languages are in continual evolution then the notion of archetypes enveloping the totality of humanity—unless they derive from some structure besides language—could be justly described as a psychoanalytic version of the normative, reminiscent of Genet’s epiphany that everyman is equal and worth any other.²⁴ In Lacan’s terminology, this passion of interchangeability belongs to the dimension of images, and not to the discontinuous nature of language.

One creates this tongue, one creates this tongue in as much, in as much as at every instant one gives it a meaning. It is not reserved to the sentences in which the tongue is created. At every instant one gives a little prod, otherwise the tongue would not be living. It is living in as much as at every instant it is created. And that is why there is no collective unconscious, that there are only particular unconsciousness’, in so far as everyone, at every instant, gives a little prod to the tongue he speaks (Lacan, 2005, p. 133).

²⁴ “Something that seemed to me like a rottenness was in the process of corrupting my entire former vision of the world. When, one day, in a train compartment, while looking at the passenger sitting opposite me, I had the revelation that every man *is worth as much* as every other... This man had just raised his eyes from a newspaper, and quite simply had placed them, no doubt inadvertently, on my own which, in the same accidental way, were looking at him. Did he immediately experience the same emotion - and same disarray - as I did? His gaze was not that of another person: it was my own I meet in a mirror, by accident and in solitude and forgetting myself. What I experienced I could convey only in this form: I flowed out of my body, through my eyes, into the traveler’s at the same time that the traveler flowed into my own. Or rather: I had flowed, for the look was so brief that I can recall it only with the help of this tense of the verb. The passenger returned to his reading. Stupefied by what I had just discovered, only then did I think of examining the unknown man, and I came away with the impression of disgust described earlier: beneath his crumpled, rough, dingy clothes, his body must have been dirty and wrinkled. His mouth was soft and protected by a badly trimmed moustache, I told myself that this man was probably spineless, maybe cowardly. He was over fifty. The train continued its indifferent course through French villages... This disagreeable experience did not happen again, either in its fresh suddenness or in its intensity, but its consequences within me have never stopped being felt. What I experienced in the train seemed to me like a revelation: after the accidents - in this case repugnant - of his appearance, this man contained, and let me detect, what made him identical to me. (I wrote that sentence first, but I corrected it with this, more precise and more distressing: I knew I was identical to this man)” (Genet, 2013).

And so we find, in the seminars and writings from 1975-1981, the real unconscious, Lacan's sinthomatic production, progressively abandons hope in the intersubjective unconscious, moving towards a more isolated unconscious. One could say that Lacan's teaching does not end on an upbeat note. The unconscious continues to belong to the field of the Other; not as imposed rules of language and society, nor as the repository of a languages vocabulary, but insofar as it compiles the singular marks of hearing speech and learning language. Lacan's theory of the unconscious moves from a kind of knowledge without subject, to a fictional construction established on the senseless traces of *llanguage*.

This Other is located in the interior, or at least on the body of the speaking being; though we speak loosely of social institutions of culture, rites, and language, Durkheim (2014) makes a convincing case that social facts are internal to individuals, where else could they possibly be inscribed? The schizophrenic subject demonstrates that the Other is, an act of faith, faith that the throng of others is more than just an endless series of peers. It is for this reason that Lacan and Miller employ the term 'extimacy'²⁵, to speak of what remains foreign even as it is the most intimate part of a speaking being; that the closest a human gets to an ontological justification remains in the field of otherness.²⁶ The unconscious inhabits this paradoxical space. The unconscious is not found in peers, nor does it reside entirely in a shared symbolic space. Instead, its uncanny nature recalls Winnicott's invention of transitional space, yet Lacan brings the unconscious closer to the traces of the other on the one, than the collaborative intersubjective space of Winnicott (Conway, 2011).

The Last Lacan: The Senseless Unconscious of the Preface to the English Edition

In 1976 during his seminar on *l'une-bévue*, faced with the proposition that the analysand arrives at the end of analysis through identifying with his analyst, Lacan places himself in direct opposition. The identification of the patient to doctor as a means of ending the analytic experience, is exactly what we see in the famous *as-if* case described in detail by Helene Deutsch (1991). She wrote of those patients who advance very rapidly in their treatment until demanding to be recognised as worthy

²⁵ "Even in Heidegger's writings one comes upon the idea that man - being connected to the environment and to the future - is always projecting himself outside himself. What Heidegger called *Dasein* is not an interiority. He defines the existence of man not as an interiority, an inner something like ideas or feelings, but rather as a constant projecting outside. Heidegger himself invented the notion of ex-sistence - *stare* outside - that Lacan took up; Heidegger himself invented the distinction between ex-sistence and insistence. Having no interiority, one projects outside, and this repeats itself; Lacan's wordplay on "*L'instance de la lettre*" (The *Instance* [meaning 'agency' or 'insistence'] of the Letter) stems in reality from Heidegger." (Fink *et al.*, 1996, 10)

²⁶ "The term 'extimacy' (*extimité*), coined by Lacan from the term 'intimacy' (*intimité*), occurs two or three times in the Seminar, and it will be for us to transform this term into an articulation, a structure, to produce it as an S1 which would allow us to go beyond and over the confusion that we first experience when faced with such a signifier" (Miller, 2010).

analysts just as their doctor, as though manoeuvring oneself to being equal to the other justified the completion of analysis and brought along with the title of psychoanalyst, just as the other.

It is a question of much interest since it would result in certain remarks that have been advanced, that the end of analysis should be to identify oneself to the analyst. For my part, I do not think so, but this is what Balint maintains at any rate, and it is very surprising. To what then does one identify at the end of analysis? With one's unconscious? This is what I do not believe. I don't believe it, because the unconscious remains, I say 'remains', I am not saying 'remains eternally', because there is no eternity, remains the Other. It is the Other with a capital O that is at stake in the unconscious. I don't see how one could give meaning to the unconscious, except by situating it in this Other, the bearer of signifiers, which pulls the strings of what is imprudently called, imprudently because it is here that there arises the question of what the subject is from the moment that it so entirely depends upon the Other. So then, this mapping named analysis consist in what? Might it be or might it not be, to identify oneself, to identify oneself while taking some insurance, a kind of distance, from identifying oneself to one's symptom?

(Lacan, November 16th 1976)

Lacan unhesitatingly criticises the patient's identification with the analyst as the right exist from the analytic experience. Moreover he criticises any notion of harmonious identification with one's unconscious: love one's unconscious yes, yet to identify with it is out of the question.²⁷ The unconscious remains on the foreign side of the Other,

²⁷ "But if the *x* of the relation that might be written as sexual, is the signifier in so far as it is connected to phallic enjoyment, we have all the same to draw out its consequence. The consequence is that if the unconscious is indeed the support of what I told you about today, namely, a knowledge, the fact is that everything I wanted to tell you this year about the non-dupes who err means that anyone who is not in love with his unconscious errs. That says nothing whatsoever against centuries past. They were just as much in love with their unconscious as the others and they did not err. Simply, they did not know where they were going, but as regards being in love with their unconscious, they certainly were! They imagined that it was knowing because there is no need to know that one is

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essentially incomprehensible and undecipherable. Lacan is very clear in his experience of the unconscious. The unconscious forever persists as unfamiliar, whether that be as the other's language code, or the mysterious body, or the unquenchable drives.

When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*. But one has only to be aware of the fact to find oneself outside it. There is no friendship there, in that space that supports this unconscious. All I can do is tell the truth. No, that isn't so—I have missed it. There is no truth that, in passing through awareness, does not lie...

It should be noted that psychoanalysis has, since it has ex-sisted, changed. Invented by a solitary, an incontestable theoretician of the unconscious (which is not what one imagines it to be—the unconscious, I would say, is real), it is now practised in couples. To be fair, the solitary was the first to set the example...

Why, then, should we not put this profession to the test of that truth of which the so-called unconscious function dreams, with which it dabbles? The mirage of truth, from which only lies can be expected (this is what, in polite language, we call 'resistance'), has no other term than the satisfaction that marks the end of the analysis. (Lacan, 2001)

Lacan's theory of the unconscious of the 1970's is animated by an unresolved tension. The tension between the purely singular phenomenon of the unique speaking body and the apparent universal of language. In this final period he portrays the person's essential subjectivity as being shared neither with others, nor with its host. It is in this

in love with one's unconscious in order not to err. One only has to offer no resistance, to be its dupe. For the first time in history, it is possible for you to err, namely, to refuse to love your unconscious, since in short you know what it is: a knowledge, a knowledge that pisses you off. But perhaps in this impetus, you know, this thing that pulls, when the ship is riding at anchor - it is perhaps here that we can wager on rediscovering the Real a little more in what follows, to perceive that the unconscious is perhaps no doubt discordant, but that perhaps it leads us to a little more of this Real than this very little of reality which is ours, that of the phantasy, that it leads us beyond: to the pure Real" (Lacan, 11 Juin 1974).

sense that Lacan depicts the nature of language, and the unconscious, as parasitic instances. With the fall of the Other of the Other, announced by Nietzsche, the unconscious of the last Lacan is not intersubjective. For Lacan, every individual continually gives life to language in a continual recreation of living language. This language marks the body and regulates jouissance, but is not a collective experience. Instead, the radical otherness of the unconscious locates itself in the absolute distance between psychological experience and the biological organism. This would appear to be synonymous with the universal/particular distinction. During the period from *Encore* to *L'insu que sait*, Lacan fought to reduce the gap between the unconscious as an enigmatic real experience of the body and the unconscious as a language combinatory. As seen above, during his seminar on the sinthome, he separates the two, on the one hand the unconscious as knowledge in conformity with reality, on the other the real as the inexplicable which is dictated by no knowledge. The very final period of his teaching, however, from his *Preface* onward locates the unconscious as real in the field of meaningless eruptions of nonsense, and ordered language, discourse, and thought on the side of semblance. As Freud was obliged to modify his theory of dreams as wish fulfilment, due to anxiety dreams and the war neuroses, so Lacan found himself in need of modifying his structuralist formulation of the unconscious due to phenomena of the speaking body and the discovery of the sinthome.

For the very last Lacan, the unconscious is nothing more than nonsense which suddenly erupts, disrupting the semblance of the imaginary and symbolic. As soon as the unconscious manifestation reorganises and is included in the field of meaning and logic, it is now semblance. Simply a new manifestation of the fantasy of the unconscious. For Lacan, the unconscious's calling card becomes its traumatic aspect, its irreconcilability with meaning. The end of analysis marks a satisfaction commensurate with the fall of the subject supposed to know and the hope that the unconscious, essentially, organises itself through a syntax which would give meaning. The end of analysis implies a giving up on the search for the one true narrative; taking into account this dimension of lack while grasping the singular jouissance of the drive which orients us.

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Cross-Cultural Treatment Issues in Psychoanalysis

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Abstract

As psychoanalysts in a global society we encounter patients whose cultures and languages are very different from that of the analyst's, and often unknown, possibly alien to the clinician on deeper levels. In this paper I highlight the reverberations of cultural and linguistic cross-cultural phenomena, how they impact the therapeutic alliance, the transference and counter transference, and the exquisite significance of the mother tongue from the very beginning of treatment. A case presentation underscores the issues involved and my clinical approach to the multi dimensional challenges that arose in the treatment. It is my premise that the immigrant experience, being universal, requires careful attention to the specific emotional and socio-cultural conflicts that arise for the immigrant. I conclude with some recommendations, both technical and theoretical.

“You have freedom when you’re easy in your harness”. Robert Frost

Introduction

I am an immigrant. I have lived and worked in many countries. I have felt the loneliness and the *otherness* of the immigrant experience. Perhaps for this reason, cross-cultural phenomena in general, and in psychoanalytic and psychodynamic treatment in particular, have been of longstanding interest to me. In this paper I shall focus on the all-important conscious and unconscious role that the motherland’s culture and tongue play in cross-culture issues between patient and analyst as they appear in psychoanalytic/psychodynamic treatment.

The paper consists of three parts. Part I addresses the importance of the culture of origin and language of origin—the mother tongue—in the immigrant experience, with special attention to cross-cultural issues in the therapeutic relationship. To illustrate the importance and the impact of the mother tongue, I include relevant aspects of my own experiences in psychoanalysis as an immigrant. In Part II, I offer a case presentation in which I was the foreigner and the patient was speaking from within her own language and culture. In Part III, the conclusion, I consider ways of reflecting about and addressing cross-cultural issues in the service of building a treatment alliance, a holding and containing relationship for both patient and therapist.

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Part I

The Immigrant Experience, Culture, and Language

As clinicians, it is no longer unusual for us to encounter patients whose origins, socio/cultural and linguistic backgrounds are different from our own. These individuals bring added layers of challenges and conflicts in their quest for self-understanding and personal growth. In order for treatment to be effective, we, as therapists/analysts, must first attempt to understand the immigrant experience itself.

The Immigrant Experience

Who exactly is an immigrant? Many dictionaries define ‘immigrant’ as “a person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country”. In several dictionaries there is a secondary definition that states: “a plant or animal that becomes established in an area where it was previously unknown”. I found this secondary definition poignant as it illustrates the reaction of the native animals/plants to the newcomer, and illuminates the effort and stressful adaptations the new animal/plant has to make to survive and thrive in the foreign environment.

People of all ages and genders have different motivations and reasons to permanently leave their home, their motherland, their extended family and friends, to emigrate to a new land. Some are desperate to escape persecution, some are young, adventurous, curious and feel trapped by tradition and cultural chains, while others seek to find new opportunities and a better future for themselves and their children.

Regardless of the reasons for leaving one’s country, the new land invites the immigrant to leave behind anguish, despair, or unrealized dreams experienced in the motherland. On the other hand, the emigrées must deal, at some level, with where and how to store the deep ties, the pleasures and memories that are part of one’s core identity yet often conflict with the quest of establishing loyalty and connection to the new culture. *Selective forgetfulness*, partly conscious, often develops as a defense against the painful inner conflict that threatens to undermine the wished for integration of a new identity and of the capacity to benefit from the many new opportunities that beckon. While the bright face of the immigrant story is the new possibilities, the dark clouds of displacement and loss lurk just below. To belong to the new country, immigrants have to distance or disconnect from their culture and see their children increasingly abandon social customs, mother tongue, native foods, family traditions and rituals. This sense of displacement and loss is in the climate around them, in their family members and in the other immigrants they live with and befriend. Consider, for example, how the immigrant parent grieves and struggles over how to parent children who are being absorbed into a new culture; how to help them value and preserve the authentic past of their culture of origin while supporting integration into a new culture and language.

A psychological weight of guilt and shame about separation and disconnection is, I believe, inevitable in the face of such a profound sense of loss and grief that immigrants carry, consciously and unconsciously. Other feelings of guilt about succeeding or failing in the new country, shame about abandoning their own country

and traditions, as well as shame about *not belonging* in the full, real sense to the new country subtly weave themselves into this psychic turmoil. Many are likely to feel *other*, different, not understood and not *connecting* in a profound way, as they wonder, “Who am I really? Where do I belong?” A patient who had changed his name to an Anglo name recently asked me: “How do you know me? Am I Asaf’am or am I Sanford?” Sadly he added: “I am neither; no longer Asaf’am and never will I be Sanford”.

Greenson (1978) explored the immigrant’s identity conflict within the psychic structure arriving at the hypothesis that through language there could be a risk of setting up a kind of “multiple personality”. The psychic cost of coming to terms with the emotional struggle involved in burying the past, in losing an identity and in embracing a new way of life can create what Salman Akhtar (1999) calls “depressive guilt” that is defended against by a double existence or an inner split that may result when attempting to bridge what is experienced as unbridgeable, a distress that Akhtar refers to as “displacement anguish”. Consistent with Greenson’s hypothesis, Akhtar reports that many immigrants suffer from manic-depression, as if bipolarity were just like a double existence attempting to bridge what seems unbridgeable.

The sense of dual existence also exacerbates the experience of not belonging. Even well adapted and personally successful patients wrestle with a feeling that they do not truly belong in their adoptive land in the full sense of the word, nor do they any longer feel that they truly belong in their country of origin. It is a strange experience that at times can evoke a sense of a “false self” feeling that Winnicott (1960) describes in children who have to hide their true self in order to fit in and please their parents.

Belonging is a concept that carries the promise of certainty, legitimacy and security. While many immigrants feel fortunate and grateful to their country of adoption, they speak with sadness and unease when reflecting about the loss of their culture of origin. They express a gnawing sense of not being fully *legitimate* in their new country, regardless of how long they have lived there. It is reminiscent of what adults, adopted in childhood, who felt loved and are grateful to their adoptive parents say when they contemplate searching for their birth parents.

Immigration is a major transition in a person’s life. All big transitions generate a complex psychological process that may offer great opportunities, but also evoke conscious and unconscious feelings of shame, guilt and profound loss that are hard to verbalize for fear of being emotionally overwhelmed or harshly judged. While such feelings can be denied or repressed, they do not disappear. They likely constitute an undertow that plays a significant role in the suffering and malaise of the patient presenting for treatment.

The bricks and mortar of our psychic house and playground are laid early, in our ancient relationships with our mothers and fathers, and our earlier generations. Each culture lays its own bricks and mortar in its own way. We do it through language, but not only verbal language. Body language, facial gestures, sounds, dreams, colors, including certain ways of dressing and relating, are important cultural markers. These clues are not unique to immigrants but, if not attended to, can leave the immigrant patient straddling fault lines of culture, religion and political identity, and feeling very alone with these questions, even with his therapist. This brings me to the themes of

culture and language that are so crucial in discussing cross-cultural issues in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapy.

Culture and Language

Since culture and language are intrinsically intertwined, I searched for a universal definition of culture, and, in doing so, I discovered the following statement by Davis (2009) who felt that the very concept defied precise definition:

Perhaps the closest I can come to a meaningful definition of culture is the acknowledgement that each is a unique and ever-changing constellation we recognize through the observation and study of its language, religion, social and economic organization, arts, stories, myths, ritual practices and beliefs, and a host of other adaptive traits and characteristics. The full measure of a culture embraces both the action of a people and the quality of their aspirations, the nature of the metaphors that propel their lives. And no description of a people can be complete without reference to the character of their homeland...(pp. 32-33).

To this sensitive definition I would add that language holds the social, cultural and intellectual legacy of a people, the rich and complex topography of their spirit. I see language as a container and an instrument of personal freedom; as a flash of the human spirit which seeks to be known, to communicate, to organize knowledge. Language is a vehicle by which the very soul of a particular culture comes into the material world.

Words have magical power. They can bring either the greatest happiness or the deepest despair. Freud discussed the “magical power of words” in *The Question of a Weltanschauung* (1932, Lecture XXXV, p. 165) and elsewhere. The power of words has ancient, well established socio/cultural roots as seen in confessions and prayers, whether group prayer or personal expression. In these cases, the words are designed to be a force for good, for healing, for containment; a reassuring connection with a trusted *other*; a forgiving and loving experience. As such, language holds a curative power. The power of words can also be used as a malignant and toxic weapon, as in ancient curses and prophecies designed to dominate and silence others, or, in present day violent threats and dissemination of deceptive, harmful information.

Words are also the tools of psychoanalysis; *The Talking Cure*, a term used by Josef Breuer and later adopted by Freud, is now synonymous with Freud’s legacy of his brilliant insight and work. Philip Bromberg (1994) touches at the heart of the importance of language in the treatment situation when he suggests that in psychoanalysis speaking is not only about content. It is a deeply relational

communication that informs the content of what is said between patient and analyst. Likening interpretation to translation, he states that an interpretation reflects the analyst's personal grasp of the patient, which is but one of many realities.

From the art of translating literature into another language we know how delicate such an undertaking is, given the inherent diversity of languages and cultures. Translation is an art that requires many talents, but without a deep connection and feeling for the author's language and for what the author wishes to evoke in the reader, the translation risks lacking an essential, intimate component.

Bettelheim's (1982) discussion of the Strachey translation of Freud's works illustrates the subtle difficulties inherent in translating the mother tongue into a different language. In my own experience, reading Freud in English did not convey to me his masterful and very personal, relational way of writing. However, when I read Freud in German, I resonated with his ideas and way of thinking about the human psyche in a profound way. Freud wrote in a familiar, every-day German language, sometimes combining two words – a common practice in the German language – to express a feeling or idea for which one could not find a satisfying word. In English, medical terms were used instead of the familiar language. Freud used words that are every German child's earliest words, such as *das ich und das es*. In English, the use of Ego and Id are technical terms that do not elicit personal, emotional associations for the reader, while the German words *ich* (I) and *es* (it) are highly personal, identity laden expressions as are the French *moi* (I) and *ça* (it). In the Standard Edition, the word *uterus* does not convey the emotional association of Freud's use of *mutterleib* (womb), which integrates the word *mutter* (mother) with the organ itself.

If we are to follow Bromberg and think of an interpretation as a translation, consider the complications when the difference between the language of the speaker and that of the translator becomes part of the psychoanalytic experience. This incongruence already existed for Freud and his associates in the multi-lingual world of Middle Europe, but it was only later that a few analysts began writing about it. Over the years a psychoanalytic dialogue has developed around the issue of cultural and linguistic disparity between patient and analyst. Interestingly this dialogue did not exist in the literature before about 1935. Most of the early analysts were Jewish, for example, S. Freud, K. Abraham, A. Adler, G. Simmel, M. Klein, S. Ferenczi, and H. Deutsch. They treated patients who did not speak German well and whose mother tongue was often unfamiliar to the analyst. Many of the patients were not Jewish. Did analyst and patient deal with this conundrum during their sessions?

As Europeans, both patients and analysts were traditionally educated to speak several languages; however, more often than not, it was a literary and polite aspect of the other language. For Russians, Germans, Austrians, and Italians it was socially desirable to read and be conversant in French. The Swiss, for geographic reasons, always spoke several languages. For East Europeans (i.e. the Hungarians, Romanians, and Polish) it was essential to speak at least two other major languages as their own language was confined to their relatively small country. This polyglot linguistics was mostly useful in more superficial social or business exchanges, but how did it work in the analyses of these patients?

Peter Gay (1988, pp. 388-389), in his biography of Freud, mentions correspondences
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in which Freud and other analysts complain about their difficulty with English, as well as with the use of other languages. However, there seem to be no early published writings which explicitly and organically take up the question of language and its role within psychic functioning. I wonder why, when there have been many great migrations throughout history. Economic, political and religious power struggles have been the driving force of such migrations, yet there is scant mention of cultural and linguistic trauma and identity struggles of the immigrants, except in world literature and poetry.

In Europe, the early 1930s brought uneasy political winds which prompted some psychoanalysts to leave Europe. Soon after, as the Nazis came into power, there was a forced migration of many Jewish psychoanalysts and other intellectuals. Perhaps it was the personal trauma of cultural and linguistic loss experienced by the emigrating psychoanalysts that elicited the first publications that focused on the importance of the mother tongue and of the problem of language disparity in psychoanalytic treatment.

Amahti-Mehler (1993) mentions two psychoanalysts who emigrated to other lands. The first was E. Krapf, a German psychoanalyst who emigrated to Argentina in 1935. The second was Emmanuel Velikovsky, a French psychoanalyst who took up residence in Palestine in 1938 and worked in Hebrew and other languages. They both wrote papers cited by Amahti-Mehler in which they raised important questions regarding the problems of treating bilingual patients. One of the important themes they each inquired into was if the “new” language was used intellectually and thus warded off the more archaic, pre-oedipal and oedipal/sexual conflicts (pp. 44-45).

Greenson (1978), calling attention to the vital importance of the mother tongue in psychoanalytic work, describes a patient whose earliest fears and anxieties were reported in English, but it was not until she spoke German with him that her dread, hate and repulsion of sexuality and bodily functions truly emerged. Greenson wrote, “To masturbate in English was to masturbate politely, like a lady”. To masturbate in German was “to masturbate with fantasies”. He added: “When she spoke of her lover in English, he did not exist as a vigorous force, he only existed in English. As her relationship to her mother began to dominate the analytic picture speaking in German, the importance of her lover began to dwindle” (p. 36). Greenson asserts that the mother tongue plays a crucial role in how we communicate our earliest memories and representations of self and other. In my own experience, the mother tongue can variously be experienced as poetic, dirty, harsh or melodic while the adopted language is often experienced as “neutral and safe”, stripped of visceral affect.

Hans Leowald’s (1980) reflections on language are at the core of the universal importance of language:

The fact that the signs of language must be *learned from other people* reveals to us that the word is grounded in experience in the world and within the relationship with the person from whom words are learned. We are confronted with the inherent individuality of each person’s language, both the meaning of words and the

meaning of speaking...Language ties together human beings and self and object world, and it binds abstract thought with the bodily concreteness and power of life.

(p. 204)

Loewald, himself an immigrant, illuminates the earliest experiential foundations of language, taking into account the ways in which language is interwoven through the essential developments of early life. He explains that language, in the form of the sounds of mother's speech, imbues the infant's lived experience from the beginning of life. Over time those sounds become differentiated from other sensations of the lived world as a *special* kind of sound. These special sounds grow into words, but the sounds also remain connected as memory traces to the rest of experience. For that reason they are a powerful way to recall and to communicate one's inner experience to another.

The points made by Greenson and Loewald are of profound importance, especially in the treatment situation. They are, however, much more than theoretical to me. At this juncture, I will describe my own personal experiences in psychoanalysis to illustrate how vital the mother tongue is in conveying one's deepest truths. To do this, I must first offer the reader a bit of background.

I was born in what was Palestine, now Israel. My father was a Berliner. Only the German language and culture was allowed at home. I spoke only German until I was about 5 years old. All my early memories, the songs and stories I heard were German or European. I started school at the age of five, which is when I learned Hebrew. From then on I was German girl at home and a proud Israeli girl outside.

At home I was comfortably surrounded by conservative European/German traditions, while at school and elsewhere I was, like all my friends, an aspiring activist who fiercely identified with the modern spirit of the ancient yet new land, its revived language, music, and socio/agricultural ambitions. A capitalist at home and a socialist outside, I felt split in half, sometimes in three parts given that my mother was Russian, a language that was never used at home but that she used in my presence when she cried or felt anxious.

I felt disloyal – either to my parents, or to my country and our mission. I felt *other*. Who did I belong to? Who was I? How could I plan for a future? Certainly there was no one to talk to. It was not a subject I discussed even with a best friend. It would have been too shameful to admit any ambivalence.

Years later, as a young woman and mother, I lived in a French speaking country for several years. I spent three years in analysis with a highly recommended French psychoanalyst. He claimed that he only spoke French. I spoke enough French. My French greatly improved, thanks to the analysis, but I was unable to connect with my analyst. My mind spun as I attempted to talk about my German, Hebrew, and American selves. I felt that I was failing my analyst and the analysis, that I was a burden on him. He did not respond to my lament except to interpret that perhaps I

wanted to fail, to bore him, to escape my envy and attraction to him. It was a bad experience, which exacerbated my sense of being *other* and not worthy of notice. I assumed it was my fault; I was not deep enough, not cultured enough. I recall feeling angry, ashamed and as alone and lonely as I was in my youth.

Upon returning to the U.S. I reluctantly decided to try psychoanalysis once again. My reluctance was, of course, due to my previous “failure” that fed into anxieties about never fitting in, repeating the lonely experience of being split into different personas of different languages and cultures. I chose a woman analyst who spoke with a strong German accent. I was aware of this fact, but I did not connect it to anything other than an agreeable, familiar sound. Only later on did I understand it to be the “sonorous envelope”, as Anzieu (1987) so poignantly put it. Anzieu described the primary caretaker’s voice as a sonorous envelope which surrounds the infant in a sea of sounds.

After three years, my analyst, herself an immigrant, recommended that we continue the analysis in German. I was stunned. I assured her that I no longer spoke German, could only understand a few phrases. She reminded me that German was my mother tongue, my very first language, and that my early childhood story was in German.

I was upset. I wanted to embrace the Eriksonian model of a “new self-portrait” (see below) and create a new and sparkling identity. I wanted to avoid remembering and feeling more pain than I was already experiencing in the analysis.

My analysis continued in German for several years. I became aware of the underlying and crucial importance of the mother tongue and the impact of cultural differences in a person’s psychic life and development. Speaking in German I was hurled back into sounds, words, images and memories that seemed, at times, unbearably painful. The analysis in German was a totally different analytic experience. Certain words, expressions and memories were so painful, cut me so sharply, that I could not utter the words for a long time. Much of this material I had already told and retold in English and while painful, it was my story experienced as an adult, protected by my “new language” in which I lived and worked. In German, I relived my early life in the flesh, in vivid colors, sounds, even smells. Yet, speaking aloud the seemingly intolerable, unspeakable words and feelings, I progressively sensed enormous freedom and lightness.

Learning language occurs in the first two years of life when young children treat words as objects, a primary process, as Freud and Ferenczi pointed out. When images associated to words are steeped in conflictual and/or traumatic situations, the words remain the living bearers of unresolved trauma and conflicts. The mother tongue is likely to retain the pregenital imagery of the words. For the immigrant, the new language is likely to be “polite speak”, not a vigorous force! Mother tongue has the power of implicit memory, of how the child was fed, held, how mother smelled, how her voice sounded, the intonations, the facial images, the feel of her hair, the shapes and colors of early life. Mother-country-language-rituals are imprinted so early that they are a core part of one’s identity.

Returning to the contributions of the early immigrant analysts, Fenichel (1945), also

an immigrant, theorized that the function of the superego was decisive in permitting or inhibiting the acquisition of a new language. Edith Buxbaum (1949) wrote about the role of a second language in the formation of ego and superego. Erik Erikson (1950) proposed that a new language and culture presents an opportunity for the establishment of a “new self-portrait”, similar to how he conceived of the adolescent phase of life, and to what he created for himself personally.

Interesting theories abounded, and they all had two things in common: they were Western in their orientation and were molded to fit in with Freudian meta-psychology. In the last three decades, a great deal more has been written about cross-cultural treatment. Pérez-Foster (1998), in examining cross-cultural issues, states that criticism of current practice methods sharply pointed to the Western ethnocentric biases in the theoretical assumptions that inform current practice methods. In *Immigration and Identity*, Salman Akhtar (1999) points out that the clinical literature tends to be theoretical, rich in descriptions of ethnic groups’ psychological characteristics, but often lacking in a deeper, “experience near” understanding of the dynamic and evolving process of the nature of culture.

In today’s global and rapidly growing multicultural societies, psychoanalysts/psychotherapists are faced with a complex task. They must seek to work as effectively as possible with patients whose linguistic and psychosocial dynamics are very different and often unknown to them. Language is our main tool. Freud pointed us in the direction of the power of words, of talking, and of freeing the unconscious to speak through free associations and dreams. Communication, conscious and unconscious, via language occupies the minds of psychoanalysts everywhere.

In my treatment of culturally diverse patient populations, I have had many rich experiences. Living for two years in Hiroshima, Japan, I had an opportunity to become familiar with aspects of Japanese culture that later enhanced my work with my patients. Working with Japanese individuals, I learned about the culturally determined need for *amae*, an unfamiliar concept for Westerners which is part of the very fiber of the Japanese culture (Doi, 1981). *Amae* signifies a wish for dependence, a desire to be passively loved within one’s most intimate circle, and in a diffuse way outside that circle, throughout adult life. This quest for the assurance of another person’s enduring good will allows for a degree of self-indulgence and a degree of indifference to the claims of the other person as a separate individual.

The manifestations of this trait are especially pronounced in parent/child and male/female relationships. Doi explains: “Sometimes the individual may deliberately act in a way that is ‘childish’ as a sign to the other that he wishes to be dependent and ‘seeks the other’s indulgence.’ This is an especially common and acceptable behavior in women and children” (p. 8). Akhtar (1999), alluding to *amae*, cites Yamamoto et al: “The Japanese person would feel uncomfortable in thinking of his ‘self’ as something separable from his role. To actualize oneself is to fulfill one’s family and social group expectations... to be individualistic in a Western moral sense would almost be equal to being ‘selfish’ in the worst sense of the term” (p. 95).

In my work with Japanese patients, these fundamental cultural principles were essential to building a connected and containing treatment alliance. Of course, having

also lived in Japan was very helpful in facilitating my understanding of culturally specific shame conflicts that might strike a Westerner as incomprehensible. The juxtaposition of the need for *amae* and of the deep shame attached to this need when it is not recognized or understood constitutes a serious obstacle to the development of trust and free associations.

I have been treating a Chinese American woman, married to a Caucasian, who likes to “throw in” Chinese idioms to express disdain or anger. Yet, for the last five years she has ignored any of my culturally related comments, to say nothing of my rare attempts at genetic interpretations. Her children knew their Chinese grandparents well and had expressed interest in their mother’s heritage. It is only after her mother’s sudden death, that she started to speak of the “Chinese in her”. She thanked me for not “pushing” the Chinese issue until she was ready to speak of herself as a “Chinese person”. It was a matter of respect she explained, respect for the conflict her mother had with being Chinese, and my respect for her, my patient.

A beautiful illustration of this kind of fine tuning was told by Akhtar during a lecture I was privileged to attend in 2014. He told of a Japanese young man who entered treatment with him. The patient insisted on waiting on the threshold of the office door until Dr. Akhtar verbally invited him to enter. After several months, Dr. Akhtar consulted a Japanese colleague about this matter. He learned that this was an important ritual in the part of Japan where the patient originated from. Dr. Akhtar decided not to question or analyze his patient’s unspoken request and never broached the subject. This ritual continued for several years until the end of treatment. In his presentation, Dr. Akhtar did not explain his reasoning to the audience. Personally, I thought that he was joining the patient in the service of mutual respect and intimacy. Akhtar, himself an immigrant, embraced the patient’s cultural custom and the patient felt known and understood in a country where he had to make so many personal adjustments, including speaking English to his doctor, who clearly was also foreign. Two *others* meeting and trying to make sense together.

Amahti-Mehler (1993) states that a second language may allow access to more mature self and object relations. This view is backed by others who referred to experiences working in a second language with new immigrants in Germany. Given mostly optimal conditions, such as a solid ego identity and appropriate family support, I concur with this view that is also expressed by E. Erikson (1959). However, in less optimal situations, I wonder about the psychic cost of resorting to suppressing or attempting to delete one’s core identity in the quest of adapting to a new culture. If the cost is very high, this new identity will become a layered façade but not likely to solidify the quest for psychic harmony and inner freedom.

The young and first generation immigrants speak the mother tongue at home yet use “selective forgetfulness” to embrace an American identity. They are aware that the new opportunities for their parents is one side of the immigrant story, the bright star. The other side, the dark sky, is grappling with cultural displacement and loss in their parents and their own heritage.

This is why I find it so important to focus on language in discussing cultural diversity in the consultation room. In every analysis there is a complex interplay of surface, consciously available speech and behavior, yet there are deeper dynamics operating at

unconscious or subconscious layers. It is the analyst's task to listen to the unheard melodies and make helpful interventions that will make it possible for the patient to integrate old and new, past and present, into a cohesive self, and strive for optimal pleasure and a minimum of pain in his life.

Part II

Case Illustration

I chose the following case because it captures many of the challenges, and potential pitfalls of cross-cultural treatment difficulties. The experience of “not knowing”, of learning from the patient, and of using myself in a way that transcended the frame of my psychoanalytic training was especially significant since I, the clinician, was the foreigner and my patient was a different kind of *foreigner* but in her own culture and language.

Permission was given by my patient when I asked to present her treatment at a clinical conference several years after treatment had ended.

In the quest of building a treatment alliance, and when cultural, religious and linguistic differences threatened to stall the therapeutic alliance, I was often inspired by Winnicott's deep understanding of his patients, by his 1960 Squiggle game (Winnicott, 1989; Guenter, 2007) that I turned into a Squiggle word/idea exchange. I was also influenced by the writings of Balint (1956), Greenson (1978), and Alexander (1961) as discussed by Eckhardt (2001) in my quest to create a Spielraum (play space) for my patient and myself.

Babette

A pimply, awkward girl dressed in rumpled but clean boy's clothing appeared in the outpatient clinic with her mother. Enormous sunglasses covered much of the girl's face, wild straw-like hair hid the rest. She was assigned to me as I was covering the lunch hour. The mother looked harassed and uncomfortable, the young patient seemed flat, empty.

How old is she, I wondered. What prompted them to come to the University's Child and Adolescent outpatient clinic without an appointment? Entering my office, the mother spoke angrily.

Mother (M): “Babette refuses to speak. She ran away and was gone all night. We found her in the woods nearby; she was sleeping with her dog and her father's military issue gun by her side”.

Babette's face was obscured and closed. I was nervous. I was working in a French speaking country; although my knowledge of French was quite fluent, mother was using colloquial French in a frustrated, high pitched voice that I found hard to follow. Babette remained as if not present.

Analyst (A): “When was that?”

M: “A few days ago, maybe a week, ‘entre chien et loup’, (*oh, what does that mean?*) and since then she refuses to talk. She refuses to go to her secretarial courses, she is not pretty, not girlish, she may never get married. She needs a profession. But not a word from her. No explanation, no apology. She’s not respectful. We are simple, polite people. We go to church every Sunday but Babette refuses to go. It’s a sin. The pastor tried to talk to her! She embarrasses us, and now this! I brought her here because our Toubib (physician) insisted. I have work to do on the farm – it takes 45 minutes by bus to get here from our farm. We worry that Babette is like my husband’s *toqué* mother who lives with us. These two understand each other, but Babette isn’t speaking to her either”. (*I did not know what *toqué* means but I guessed it meant nuts.*)

Mother spoke as if Babette was not in the room. She did not look at her daughter. With only 15 minutes left I asked Babette if she would be willing to spend them alone with me, while mother waited in the waiting room. The slightest nod indicated a “yes”. I told Babette that I can feel that she is suffering, is in pain, is confused. I suggested that together we could find a way to make things better for her. No response.

A: “Would you prefer to speak with someone at the clinic who is French, like you?” She nodded “No”.

I asked her if she minded that I make mistakes in French and that I am not from her country and culture.

She nodded “no”.

A: “At times I would need *your* help to correct me and help me how to say something in French; we can laugh together at my mistakes”.

No response.

I asked her if she would come to see me twice a week.

A: “ I know it is a long trip to my office but you will not have to speak unless you choose to”.

Babette nodded in agreement. We set the days and times. I gave her paper and pencil to write it down. Diagnostically I was glad to see that her handwriting was neat and orderly. I did not attempt to take a history or ask for any details. Both intuition and clinical experience informed my thinking: If I could lay a foundation for a therapeutic alliance with this mute girl, create a real relationship in which mutuality and hope is possible, the rest would unfold.

When Babette and her mother left, our administrator insisted that I read the record filled out by the mother. I knew that the administrator was displeased with my presence in the clinic; she did not trust foreigners. Moreover, she was openly embarrassed by the “uncultured” clients she often had to deal with – farmers, wine growers, foreign workers who were not well educated.

The clinic was a satellite of the Dept. of Psychiatry of the University Medical School

and thus a public service. If a patient was referred by a physician or by the school, no fee was charged to the patient. There was no official limit on the number of visits but ongoing treatments were reviewed at the clinic's weekly case conference. Most of the patients I saw at the clinic were referred to me because they were German or English speaking, as was I. Other patients, Italian or Spanish workers, had to struggle in French. I had the feeling that all the *foreigners* were administratively lumped together, myself included, as a "social burden". I knew that my treatment with Babette would be closely observed by the staff.

From the record I learned that Babette was 19 years old, the eldest of four children. Fraternal twins two years younger than she, and a brother, three years younger than herself. The family lived in a typical farm house in which Babette's father had grown up, and where the paternal *toqué* (crazy) grandmother also lives. Their farm community is composed of several small farming compounds which share one school house run by a schoolmaster and his wife. He teaches all the middle and upper school subjects to combined classrooms. There is a medical clinic consisting of one physician and his wife, the nurse. They deliver all the children in the surrounding area and follow their patients from birth to death.

Many families have the same family name because of inter-marriages and cultural traditions over the generations. Our administrator wanted to make sure I knew what I was getting into given that such families come from an unfamiliar world even to herself. Did I want the case to be transferred to a native speaker, perhaps? I debated if I should follow the administrator's veiled suggestion to refer Babette to someone who was a native speaker.

Native speaker!

That phrase reverberated within me. Suddenly I found myself wondering what *my* native language, my mother tongue actually was! Was it German? Hebrew? I thought of English as my "beloved step mother" tongue, my adult language in which I did all my post high school studies, in which I raised my children and in which I live and work. I understood the administrator's reasoning, but I did not agree with her. I suggested that being from a different culture I could offer Babette something that was fresh and intriguing enough for her to welcome and derive benefit from. I speculated that my being foreign might somewhat alleviate her sense of shame and anxiety about being seen as different, "sick" and strange. A lot of self analysis went into sorting out my decision to treat Babette. I believe that self analysis is always an important process, all the more so when taking on a cross-cultural treatment.

Why was I taking this on? What was I getting out of doing this treatment? Was I identifying with her as an *outsider*, with my own life long struggle of not belonging? Was I acting out of anger at my French analyst? Was I eager to repair my failed analysis by doing better than he did for me? I had a gnawing worry that by communicating in a language not my own, I would not be able to follow the twists and turns of the analytic process, of her associations, the word play, the emotional connotations of the words. I had experienced that very difficulty with my French analyst who made no allowances for anything that threatened the frame of his analytic stance. I was angry with him and wanted to "repair" this failed analysis by recognizing my own language handicap vis-a-vis Babette. Not knowing what "*toqué*" meant, nor

“entre chien et loup” made me realize that I would be missing the emotional resonance of these colloquial idioms; this was my handicap. I reflected on my own enormously enriching and liberating experiences of living in foreign environments and especially in Japan for two years, when I was about 28 years old.

On Babette’s part, her ready willingness to meet with me despite the long commute, and the quiet contact I felt with her, won over my concerns and what was viewed as reasonable and traditional in our clinic. I fretted about how to engage Babette. The few articles I found on “elective mutism” in late adolescence were not helpful. I sensed that Babette was a girl interrupted in her development, sometime in her early adolescence. She was probably not a “well licked cub” (a phrase attributed to Winnicott), given that her parents worked long days on the farm, and that her mother had twins when Babette was two years old and soon after, another child. And who knows what the *toqué* grandmother added to all that? (My guess that *toqué* meant nuts was confirmed; grandma was considered crazy by the family.)

Diagnostically I wondered about Grandma being a hysteric. Was Babette identifying with the grandmother as a solution to a confusing void if mother was not attuned enough, not a “good enough mother”, yet not a bad enough mother since she clearly worried about her daughter and sought help for her.

I tried to imagine what it was like to be *her* in this farming family with a crazy grandmother. What emotional flavor, what fantasies does the word *toqué* evoke in Babette? What does Babette feel about being called *toqué*, as if she had inherited a curse. What kind of help would I need if I were her? If I were so frightened and despairing that my only way to express it was to escape into the woods with my father’s military gun, my dog and fall asleep there?! The first thing that came to my mind was how lonely and alone she must feel. She cannot trust anyone, not even God, or she would have found some comfort in Church.

I wanted Babette to get to know me; I had to give her a reason to trust me as a person, not as a Toubib who treats crazy people. In our next session I told her that I would like us to get to know each other as we both really are: two people who were brought together to try and make sense and understand how she can find a happier, free way of living her life. I said ‘people’ because I was careful not to make any gender assumptions, given her ambiguous appearance. I said that we can learn from each other about lots of things, that she can ask me about what she wants to know and I will tell her if I can, and be interested in why she wants to know. She listened wordlessly, her eyes hidden behind her large sunglasses.

Babette never missed her sessions; she did not speak but her way of being with me showed interest and curiosity. It was hard for me to deal with the silence and I was anxious about the approaching case conference. Babette offered little that I could grab on to. On our sixth session I asked her what the color of her eyes was? She removed her huge glasses for a minute. They were hazel colored.

A: “I am sorry I don’t know the word for this lovely color. In English it is hazel”.

Babette smiled! It was a real gift she gave me, even though she did not tell me how to say “hazel” in French.

A: “You have a lovely smile, Babette.

She shrugged then murmured, “Your French is pretty good”.

I heard Freud remind me in a whisper that the important first step was to help the patient develop an attachment to the analyst.

This reciprocal moment confirmed my feeling that Babette was also searching for how to get close, a way to bridge our cultural and linguistic differences. But how? What does she want? What feels safe in her life?

She must like animals, they were an integral part of her life; animals are trustworthy and loyal. She trusted her dog! Animals will not hurt or demean her.

A: “This office has no windows! Let’s go to the little park nearby to see what we could find there”.

I knew that the park had a small aviary with strange, exotic birds.

Babette looked surprised and mildly interested. Sitting on a bench facing the aviary, she removed her huge glasses. Together we studied the birds. They were interacting, competing, distancing, singing, arguing, and sometimes napping. We sat in silence for a long time. In silence we walked back. The silence made me anxious. As a child I endured hours, sometimes days of silence as punishment. Now the silence felt just as powerful and isolating, especially amidst the animated chatter of the birds.

A German idiom floated into my consciousness: “ein vogel im kopf”. It is a way of saying the person is “nutty”. Then a similar idiom in French floated into my mind: “la cage aux folles” (the cage of crazies). Why did I choose to take Babette to an aviary with strange birds? Was I unconsciously expressing my ambivalence and doubt about my decision to treat Babette? Was my counter-transference undermining me?

I was rescued by an early memory of visiting my aunt’s farm in the hot summers of my homeland, in Israel, and being told to find work to do, stop “noodling” around with questions and idle talk. Farmers, my aunt informed me, prefer hard work and few words. Farmers have a different culture than city people. Farmers have their own histories, stories, wisdom, superstitions and ways of communicating. What about French farmers? What is she used to in her family and community? Without her speaking, I have no way of learning more about her. And soon I would be expected to provide a treatment plan and give a report on how the treatment is going. At the next session I asked Babette what she would like that day. Hesitantly she murmured: “The birds?”

We walked to the park and the silence ensued. I felt angry and panicky. I felt trapped. Then I recognized that her silence was her way of telling me how trapped and angry *she* felt.

A: “Babette, sometimes *I* feel like one of these birds; in captivity yet seemingly not. Protected, yet living in a way that is not natural to me, not my true-self way. Do you think that is a toque thing to feel and think?”

Babette remained silent, hidden behind her glasses.

A: “A penny for your thoughts”. I knew I was pushing her but the case conference was blinking like a traffic light on our road.

Babette murmured: “Honi soit qui mal y pense”. (Shame on he who evil thinks.)

Honi comes from the verb “honir” and means to shame or to be in contempt. This is originally an English Court idiom dating to the 14th century. It is often used by the French who regard it as an ancient French expression.

A: “Do you think I should be ashamed of myself for having these thoughts?”

She looked at me surprised.

B: “You know what that means?”

A: “We have such a phrase in English but it doesn’t have the beauty of the French words”.

Babette began to speak, and she spoke as if she had not been silent all these many weeks. I wondered why now, but I was delighted.

B: “These birds cannot fly away. I can and did. I ran away because I could no longer live with myself and my secrets. My parents worried that I would kill myself because of the gun; I took the gun to protect myself and my dog, Denver. Like the American singer John Denver. My dog and I sing together. Maybe I *am* crazy like my grandma. She *says* crazy things, I *think* them”.

A : “Did I just say something that you also think? Things that one should be ashamed of thinking or saying? Is it crazy to have feelings and thoughts that others don’t think, or don’t allow themselves to think and say?”

B: “Eh oui, you *are* strange, like one of the birds. You have an accent; my mother said you are Jewish – I don’t know Jewish people but I know that they killed Christ and drank the blood of Christian children”.

A: “How do you know that?”

B: “I heard it in church and my parents also believe it. My grandmother says Jesus is just a story and a false one. But she is toqué”.

A: “Maybe she is telling you what her opinion is, and it doesn’t match what the others think. Does that make her crazy?”

B: “If no one else thinks that way, then it’s crazy and bad”.

A: “So then it’s - ‘honi soit qui mal y pense.’ So if you think differently from the others and you talk about it, everyone will say that you are crazy?! That’s not cool,

Babette”.

I heard myself using some of her colloquial words when I was speaking.

B: “You are funny when you speak like this, my kind of French. Funny but cool. You could be my mother’s age but she is so fat and tired. She has a lot of secrets too. Do you have secrets? Who do you tell your secrets to? I have no one. They are stupid and shameful secrets”

A: “Babette, what actually *is* a secret? Why does something have to be secret? And from whom?”

B: She laughed. “You are more *toqué* than my grandmother. Everyone knows these things”.

A: “So tell me. I would like to learn from you”.

B: “A secret is something you cannot tell anyone except to God. God knows my secret and will not forgive me, that is what is so bad. That is why no one would want to know such things. God has secrets too. In church there is Latin for the things that the French people are not allowed to know. If you ask, you are bad, you don’t know your place, you want what is not for you. You could bring shame and ruin on the harvest, or cause illness in others. We have lots of stories about that and they have been proven true. In America it is not like that because you are so rich there. Everyone is rich and some are even communists; they are not afraid of God, they are sinners”.

She stopped abruptly and her face clouded and closed tightly. It was the end of the session.

B: “I know that you don’t want me to come back. I said evil things, I should not have spoken. It is safer not to speak. You think I am crazy and bad”.

I understood her hidden wish to be comforted and reassured that she can express her opinions and not be humiliated or abandoned by me. She wanted confirmation that maybe it was really less risky to take a chance with me than with someone of her culture, a culture that she experienced as forbidding and unforgiving.

A. “Babette, I very much want you to come back. Let’s talk about secrets next time, and about other things that seem bad or shameful. I do not think you are crazy or bad – I think you are smart and intuitive”.

B: She brightened. “Animals like me; I am smart about them and they know it! But you are an American city person so you wouldn’t know”.

A: “Babette, humans are animals too. I am also an animal, not only a bird. I have different animals in me, maybe you do too?! We will learn more about you and me”.

I wanted to tell her about Carl Sandburg’s poem “Wilderness”. Maybe later, much later, I mused.

In our next session silence was again upon us.

A: "This silence feels like a secret without words, Babette. I have been thinking about the interesting subject of secrets".

Babette's eyes sparkled as she said she wanted me to tell her one secret before she can tell me hers. I knew it had to do with her testing to see if she could trust me; I searched my mind for a useful secret. I knew that she disliked my office which was a small, windowless room, dour and musty smelling. I disliked it too.

Acting embarrassed, I "confessed" that I didn't like my office and that I didn't like our administrator, even though she did a good job. (I was aware that her mother disliked the administrator who was, in fact, very uppity.)

Babette was delighted, then anxious.

B: "Make sure your "Chef" (boss) doesn't find out, he may not forgive you but God will. God doesn't care".

A: "Oh, you are right, God does not care. But *you* are worried about you and God".

Babette was visibly upset.

B: (after a long silence): "I am not sure that I believe in God. I don't believe that Jesus was His son. I hate our Minister, I hated my public school teacher and his false ways. I cannot go to school or church or live at home when there is so much fear and hate in me. The worst is that God knows that about me and He is angry with me".

I understood that Babette's inner rage and hatred was partly displaced onto the others only to be punished by her equally raging, harsh super ego. She must feel that there is no escape from it! Leon Wurmser (2000) describes the harsh super ego in all its many destructive shades, and much earlier, Franz Alexander (1961) stated in many papers that the main goal in the treatment must be the dissolution of the harsh super ego.

A: "Babette, are you saying that God does not want you to think your own thoughts and have questions you want to ask?"

B: "My thoughts are bad, crazy. Normal people don't have such questions - to believe in God is a God given grace; to have such questions means I am without faith, without grace, without a self. I am disloyal to my parents, to my country; I am like the weird bird that will be put away in a cage. My grandma was put in the mental hospital because she went crazy when her doggie died in a car accident. She carried on and defied God to tell her why He did this to her. When she got no answer, except that God has a plan, she refused to go to church and stopped eating".

We looked at each other.

B: "Yes, and I stopped speaking because... merde (shit), what's the point! I was never like my siblings or other kids - I was always different, asking the wrong questions,

feeling the wrong feelings, I belong to no-one”.

A: “Are there right or wrong feelings? Right or wrong thoughts, questions? Babette, these are only questions, thoughts or feelings. We cannot control what we are feeling, Babette; we *can* decide if and how we want to act on them, but we are free to have our feelings”.

B: “God would not agree with you; you are a doctor but you speak nonsense, des bêtises” (stupidity, nonsense).

A: “Is this what your parents say when you have questions or ideas they don’t approve of, or don’t know how to answer? Is thinking your own thoughts dangerous, not allowed?”

B: “They say: ‘Crazy like your grandma.’ Maybe all Americans are like you so you don’t think it is crazy. But we are different, we are French, an ancient country with great literature and a great religious spirit”.

B: (after a moment): “Tell me what you mean about not being allowed to think? I don’t understand what you mean. I am not crazy – I think a lot but my thoughts are bad, so I am lost. Even as I say these words I feel afraid, I have a stomach ache now. I wish I didn’t come here today”.

A: “How could your thoughts be bad? Whom could they harm? Jesus’s disciples thought he was the son of God – that was they thought, maybe wished, but there is no proof of this, is there? It is what we are told and it is a comforting story for many, many people. You could have your own comforting story and it could lead you to have an interesting, free life”.

B: “I do have my own story” she whispered, averting her eyes.

A: “I am glad”.

B: “You are an American! In France we say that Americans are optimistic, like naïve, innocent children; they believe that they can write their own destiny. In France we know our place and the truth about life. My story is stupid. If I tell it, you will laugh and be convinced that I am crazy, or worse – evil.

A: “Take a chance on me, Babette”.

Babette took a deep breath and shouted angrily: “I want to be like Marilyn Monroe. I have photos of her in my secret drawer. I want to be close to her and be like her. But I am so ugly! Sometimes, when no one is home I look at my breasts in the mirror in the hallway. I don’t have a mirror in my room, it’s vain. I am so upset, ashamed, telling you that I look at myself. I also touch myself and God knows that too. I want a man to look at my breasts and touch me one day the way men crave her, la Monroe”.

She continued: “We are similar: She came from a poor family and so do I. She had a crazy mother and I have a crazy grandmother. She killed herself because God

disapproved of her so she had nowhere to go. Everyone left her and she was lost. But I don't want to die. I want to be like her and live. I want to be beautiful and famous. God will punish me for that, and I am so afraid and angry”.

I was thinking that her sexual urges, and her hidden grandiosity were seeping out from under layers and layers of masochistic punishment and a harsh, vilifying super ego. We were on fragile ground.

A: “Who is disapproving of your thoughts and wishes? Is it God, your parents, your minister and maybe you, also?

B: “Yes! Of course it's God! What's the matter with you, Doc? La Monroe was a sinner. And God punished her by ordering her to kill herself or become a nun. I tried that idea but I cannot be a nun, even if that is what our minister suggested to my parents. What do you think about the nun idea, Doc?”

A: “If you don't want to be a nun, you might not be a good nun. Would God want a reluctant nun? Would Jesus want a reluctant bride?”

Babette laughed. It was her first real laugh with me.

B: “So what, *nom de Dieu* (in God's name) *could* I be?”

A: You could be free to be yourself! La liberté is a sacred French quest, isn't it? Together, you and I, we can find what will make you happier and give you pleasure in life. The first step is allowing yourself to think and feel in a less restricted way, as you are already doing”.

B: “Could my mother come here so we could talk the three of us? You have such funny ideas – I want my mother to come also. She is really depressed, you know. That is why she is fat and goes nowhere. My Dad just works and drinks beer with his pals. My mother is very lonely”.

This was Babette's first mention of her father. When will I hear more?

Babette was telling me that she felt sad for her mother whom she experienced as trapped and repressed as she herself was. She needed to get her mother's permission to continue her autonomous development; she felt guilty about feeling better, even laughing with me, when her mom is depressed and lonely.

Intense, unquestioning loyalty to cultural, religious and family tradition was part of her heritage, of what she expected of herself. On a deeper level she was now searching for a transitional play-space for herself and her mother, with me as the bridge, a transitional object. I interpreted/translated, using Bromberg's idea of interpretation as a translation; Babette heard my interpretation as agreement with her request.

We decided that if Mom wanted to, she would join us in one of the two weekly sessions.

Meeting with mom and Babette

The following lyrics from Rogers and Hammerstein's *South Pacific* came to my mind when Mom, Babette and I met.

You've got to be taught before it's too late
Before you are 6 or 7 or 8
You've got to be taught to hate and fear
You've got to be taught from year to year
It's got to be drummed in your dear little ear
To hate all the people your relatives hate,
You've got to be carefully taught.

Mom was eager to talk. She spoke about her own childhood with pride and intense loyalty for her family of origin. Her French farmer origins went back several generations. The French farmers, she affirmed, are the true, the pure French. The women were traditionally the cornerstone of the family, church volunteers and healers. Her own mother and grandmother were known healers and one brother was an exorcist. When Babette was three years old she had temper tantrums and by the time she was four she underwent child exorcism by the maternal uncle. It did not work and she was pronounced incorrigible.

The words "child exorcism" hurt my ears. I looked at Babette. She was not surprised nor upset. In fact she looked proud.

I was upset. This had every potential of being a very early traumatic event simmering in her unconscious. I concentrated on calming my anger and alarm, and reminding myself that I really knew nothing of what this meant to them and their cultural heritage.

M: "We did our very best to teach Babette to obey and follow our traditions. We had to pound it into her because she was so wild, unlike our other children. I was taught to love God and respect my parents and teachers as part of earning God's love and protection. To do otherwise would be to offend God and bring shame on my family; even cause harm to them and to our community".

A: "Harm?" I remembered Babette telling me the very same things.

M: "God's wrath and punishment. Illness, loss of income, some unimaginable tragedy. If all people just did as they wished, acted selfishly, it could bring about natural and general disaster as punishment from God. You must know that, it is all described in the Old Testament, but you can also see it today.

“We are like the Tower of Babel in our country - like a zoo filled with foreign people who don’t understand our God, our language, our ways. It is God punishing us for being selfish and lazy. Babette is not like us. She does not understand us. She likes you so much but she is not getting better”.

Babette’s mother covered her face in agitation. She seemed about to flee my office and pull Babette with her. Babette retreated into a vacant state.

A: “I see how much you worry about Babette, and she worries about you!”

M: “I worry. I am angry; she shames us. Her mind is being poisoned; a normal French girl does not have her ways. Babette is stubborn and she rejects our ways. She likes the Spanish kids who hardly speak French. She is as if not from us. Maybe God is punishing me by giving me a child so different and disrespectful. She has no fear in her. That is the worst sin. No fear of God”.

A: “Why is it important to fear God, a loving God?”

M: “You don’t get love for just being! You have to earn it with self-sacrifice and loyalty to your family and Him. My crazy mother-in-law does not believe in Jesus and so God punished her and made her mentally ill, *toqué*. Babette will be like her, already is. People are already noticing it. It shames us. We have our tradition and belief and so should she. People will hate her and ruin her reputation if she doesn’t fit in”.

A: “I understand that you are very worried about what the others say. I think you worry that I may be a bad influence on Babette because I too am an ‘*étranger*.’ You don’t know what to expect when someone is not from your community; strangers could be dangerous”.

M: “Yes, even the Germans and Italians are dangerous. I’ve had my experiences. When I was young I was a little like Babette and I learned the hard way”.

Josie perked up: “You were a little like me? Oh, tell me”.

M: “It’s a secret. It’s none of your business. That was a long time ago and I am still repenting. No need to speak of my selfishness when I was young. I am happy now”.

B: “You are not, Maman. You are not happy. You are sad and you eat too much to make yourself feel better. You don’t go out, you don’t smile, you forgot how to smile”.

M. “That is your fault. Why will you not go to church and to school? Why are you disloyal and different from us?”

Babette pounced on her mother’s secret. “Tell me your secret, *maman*! It’s very important!”

M: My secret is mine! You have your own secrets and I don’t ask you. I don’t want to know. I just want you to make a sacrifice and apologize to us and the minister”.

I was remembering that as a child I too had a secret that I named “the dead child”. It was about a part of me that I offered as a sacrifice to *belong*, to please my mother. Sacrifice was noble. It is sanctioned by all the powers. Parents sacrifice for their children, soldiers sacrifice for their country, saints sacrifice for religion. It is said to be cleansing, elevating and unselfish.

And here was Babette fighting not be a dead child. She wants to live in full color but she felt trapped. Yet not totally! Mother did seek help for her that she herself did not get when she needed it. Babette and mother were deeply connected, perhaps enmeshed, and afraid to look outside of the “loyalty trap”.

I was worried that mother will object to Babette’s continuing her treatment. Instead, mother simply did not return.

I wanted to ask Babette about the exorcism, but I saw that she had something on her mind. Now Babette wanted to bring grandmother to sessions. We discussed her wish for me to meet the important people in her life and also for me to confirm that grandma was not crazy.

I interpreted that Babette felt a responsibility of loyalty and love to help the oppressed women in her family, and that she was also longing for permission to separate and discover her own self. I said that I am getting to know her family as she experiences them, and that meeting with her mother showed us both how reliable her experience is.

Babette responded by suggesting that she would bring photos of her grandma, her dog Denver, and her favorite pig, the mother sow, named Anne – a “proud French” name. She asked to keep the photos in my office and suggested a drawer for them.

I understood that she was looking to arrange a space for me in her inner self-organization, a transitional space, and a place for herself in my office, a special place for her in my special place. I thought the drawer she chose may represent my womb where she could feel fully belonging and safe. I wondered if there was also an feminine/erotic flavor to my drawer that is now also hers to rummage in, to get to know about being feminine.

A: “Then you will have your very own space in my special space. How did you choose this particular drawer?”

B: “Why do you ask questions? I understand myself – isn’t this enough?”

A: “I am interested in your feelings and choices, Babette”.

B: “But why? no-one else, not even my parents, is interested. It’s strange. You *are* strange. I chose this space because it is just under the art books that you like. I notice everything, I am like a little spy. That is the only term of endearment I heard as a child – ‘little spy’ – because I noticed everything and was so curious”.

A: “I am glad you are telling me. Is it fun, do you enjoy spying a little?”

B: “The greatest French characters were spy-like people. Like an Eminence Grise, powerful but hidden. I love French history, all history, but you probably only like American history”.

I realized that Babette was testing if she can dare to be critical and skeptical of me. To love and be critical?! Can she attach and also be herself? Can we be different from each other and still safely connected? Her sense of self was getting stronger, the harsh super ego is receding a bit – can she trust this development? Will she be crushed and proven stupid to try and build her own path?

A: “Babette, maybe you are struggling to figure out if you can be yourself and also feel close to me. Maybe that is why you sometimes point out that you and I are so different. You wonder if you can trust me with your secrets, your feelings and thoughts and also belong to your tradition and family. Yes, we are different in language and culture but we are also close. It doesn’t have to be me or them. It doesn’t have to be them or you. There is a lot of space – like in nature. There is you and the forest, you and the mountains, you and the river, you and your family, you and me. It is not one or the other, Babette, it’s both”.

Babette teared up. She had never shown me that side of herself.

It was a risk inserting myself in a way that she could experience as highlighting our separateness. I knew it was a risk but I felt it was a good moment to do it.

A: “There is an American poem called “The Road Less Travelled” that you might like. I think I have the French translation in my book”.

B:(excitedly): “Read it to me in English”.

I read the poem to her. I was prepared to reread it in French when Babette said: “I have been taking English courses for several months. I understood almost all of it. Don’t read it in French. I understand about taking a different road. I am scared about it. Did you do this?”

A: “I would not be here, in a different country, in a different language, if I had not. And look – I got to know you and learn all sorts of new things about life”.

Shortly thereafter, about 20 months into the treatment, Babette asked to increase her sessions with me to three a week. She had found a State funded secretarial school in town, which meant that she could get her bus trip paid by the State. I noticed that she paid more attention to her appearance. The huge sunglasses were mostly gone. When I complimented Babette about a top she was wearing she responded with apparent pride that she was *copying me* in her dress and in taking English courses; it was a secret but she was telling me!

What was the “copying” about? Was it in the service of her efforts to integrate her diffuse of selves into a more coherent, genuine identity? Was her attachment to me defensive, a way to ward off an inner conflict she was dreading? To escape from being crazy like grandma by fusing with me? Was it a fantasy of coming closer to her idol,

Monroe, by way of Americanizing herself? Or was it a transitional piece of identity she was creating for herself on the way to integrating the parts of herself? I decided on the latter, for the time being.

A: “Babette, what does ‘copy’ mean to you?”

J.: “Oh, I am *stealing* from you. It’s OK to do that because it does not harm you. You have so much of yourself, you will not even notice it”.

A: “Tell me more about this”.

B: “You will not understand. But you don’t have to. I understand myself”. (Je me comprends.)

A: “I also want to understand you”.

B: “Stealing in French is not the same as in English. In the Ten Commandments it says ‘Do Not Steal.’ It is a rule. I hate rules, they make no sense most of the time. People make rules to have power over others”.

A: “You have suffered a lot because of the power that others have imposed over you. And you saw your grandmother suffer from it, and your mother, as well”.

B: “If I can’t be a guy with power then I want to be like Marilyn Monroe who had power over guys. She stole their power! Like Delilah!

A: “It didn’t work out so well for Marilyn, did it?”

B: “No. Because of rules. She did not believe in herself, but I will. That is why I say to you: ‘I understand myself’”.

A: “Can you invite me into this part of yourself?”

J. Oh, you *really* don’t understand. When I say ‘I understand myself’ it means that I don’t want to discuss it. It’s what my family says when they no longer want to discuss an issue. It’s the French way of saying ‘done,’ ‘finished.’”

A: “So when you say ‘I understand myself’ about this idea of stealing, does this mean that you don’t want to talk to me about it?”

B: “It’s nothing. It’s like cheating in school. If you are not caught – you are smart, a winner! It does not hurt anyone else and you get a good grade. If you are caught – you are a loser, a fool! That’s our way! Not cheating is just a rule that teachers make for students, but teachers also cheat, in other ways”.

In my years living there I had encountered this cultural/societal stance before; the French, it was often said, based their ethical thinking on the Cartesian way of “practical reasoning”. Thus, if you can get away with cheating – no harm done. The Anglo Saxons were considered “empirical”, depending on observation without due

regard to science and theory. It made no sense to me and I knew that debating the ethics of cheating with Babette would only distract us.

In our next session Babette was sullen and silent.

A: "What's going on, Babette?" (using her name as often as possible underscored our connection.)

B: "I am upset with you".

A: "Tell me".

B: "You were not honest with me. You did not disagree with me about the cheating thing, but you *do* disagree. Of course you disagree! You are not French, you are Anglo. But what I said, it was rubbish. I was being dishonest with myself and you did not stop me. I told my grandma about our discussion and she said: 'cheating is cheating – there is no good cheating.' Over the weekend I read Mr. Frost's poem in French. He would never cheat. If you cheat you don't own it, even if you don't get caught. When you cheat you have an ugly secret that only God knows about, and He does not forgive such things. Why didn't you tell me what you really think?"

A: "I see your point. You are right that I think differently; but look, you reflected on this matter and came to important realizations of your own. You followed your intuition and independent thinking! You own that you told me how disappointed you were in me. I did let you down. I am sorry about that, but also glad that we are talking about it freely. How does that feel to you?"

B: "It makes me feel that my grandmother is not crazy. She is a simple woman but she is smart and honest. She speaks her mind and her mind is strong".

A: "So is yours. It takes courage to think your own thoughts, be curious and free to pursue a balance within yourself".

B: "I want to be free. I want *total* freedom – not a *balance* of freedom. There is no such thing as a balance of freedom. You have total freedom and I cannot steal it from you, even if it will not harm you".

A: "Do you really think that one can be totally free, Babette? From the moment of conception we depend on our mother's health, we depend on her and others to feed and care for us. That is true in all cultures and in all times. We are not totally free but, as Mr. Frost said: 'Freedom means walking easy in your harness.'"

B: "We have the same word in french – harnais! Do you really believe that we can be free and not free at the same time? Similar and different at the same time. My grandma and me - similar in some ways and different in many ways?"

A: "Why not? Not only you and grandma. Also others. You and me. You and your siblings, your father. You don't speak about him, Babette. I hardly know anything about him or your siblings".

B: "My father is not interested in me. I don't know why. Girls are not much use on a farm. He likes my sister 'cause she is quiet and cute".

A: "How was he when you were just a little girl?"

J.: "He never played with me. He was cold. My grandmother used to tell him to pay more attention to me. She would say: 'it's not her fault.' I asked her about that but she said I had imagined the whole thing.

"I did not! There is a secret! My grandmother does not like my mother. There is something between them that feels like a bad secret. When I said this to my mother she replied: 'Honi soit qui mal y pense.' So I am the one who is bad".

A: "If you want to know more, little spy, you can find a way".

B: "You are maline (naughty); you make me laugh. I do want to know. You would say it is better to know than to imagine and feel sinful and bad. I think there is a shameful secret and that is why my father is not interested in me".

A: "What are you thinking?"

B: "I often imagined that maybe I am not my father's child. Do you remember my mother saying that she is still repenting? That it is a secret but none of my business?"

A: "I do remember. I also remember the exorcism when you were just four years old".

B: "That was just stupid. My grandmother said it was. She was angry with my mother and threatened to tell father. But I *was* really stormy and disobedient. Maybe my mother wanted to help me and herself in the only way she knew. Do Catholics in America have exorcism?"

For me this was a serious moment, a marker of an important accomplishment in our work. I noted that Babette was no longer retreating into the French versus American, me versus you defensiveness. Now Catholics existed in both cultures but could have different traditions and habits.

In this session I felt that we were two women from different backgrounds, one French and Catholic in her traditional way, and me, Jewish and multi-national, exploring the unfolding inner story of Babette's life while tending to her present and future development. In the transference, was I the healthy, modern grandma? The mother she wished to have? Or possibly a transitional "third object" to the woman she wished to become?

Epilogue

It seemed to me that Babette and I found a way of bridging and negotiating and putting to good use our cultural differences. Babette helped me overcome much of my anxiety that I would not be able to connect with her deeply enough because I did not share her mother tongue and her culture. I helped Babette know that she could trust me while remaining attached and connected to her family and culture. I felt that we were now

moving toward a phase in the analysis in which linguistic and cultural diversity had been bridged; in which both of us were walking easier, each in our own harness.

As it turned out, Babette engaged her grandmother and mother in a way that permitted her to piece the story together. Mother and father married in a hurry because mother got pregnant. Grandmother was shamed and displeased. Babette's father did not want children so soon and blamed his wife. From the very start, mother needed Babette to be the perfect child given the sinful state of her conception; mother's anxiety and depression must have seriously interfered with her attunement to baby Babette whose attachment was thus very insecure and disruptive. The rapid arrivals of twins and another child complicated matters even more. Babette was entrusted to grandmother who loved her but disliked her mother. When grandmother suffered a serious depression and was pronounced "crazy", Babette felt lost and frightened. Her adolescence recapitulated her early years: she felt abandoned, confused, and very angry.

In the hours, Babette also relived her decision to take her father's gun and her dog and escape her intolerable despair. She recognized this act as a cry for help, be it mute. She was pleased with herself because she saw her own determination to prevail somehow. It worked!

B: "I think that my mother does love me. She took me to the clinic despite the shame and what others would say. She could have tried to force me to become a nun. In her way she did the best she could. I was lucky it was you I met – a French Toubib would have been awful for me".

Babette was deeply interested in her story. She resolved to quit her secretarial school and enroll in a journalism and photography program. She decided she wanted to chronicle stories of people and events of their lives and made the decision to switch gears, underscoring that her secretarial and English courses would be most useful in this new avenue. She and I spoke about how family and cultural systems extend their roots into present generations. Secrets and unconscious motives have a very powerful yet hidden impact on our lives. It was at this junction that I had to leave for professional and family reasons and return to the U.S. It was hard for me to tell Babette and I felt both sad and guilty leaving her at such an important turning point in her developing autonomy as a young woman and a budding professional.

When I told Babette that we had six months to work, she reacted stoically. She said that she had always worried that I would leave. We spoke about the harness that is present in everyone's life; I told her that I was sad to leave but that I also was looking forward to it. She told me that she feels very differently – sad and upset about my leaving even though she knows it is what I need to do. She said she hated the idea of the harness even though it made sense, was a reality.

We spent many hours talking about how her life might unfold, what she wanted for herself in the future. She struggled with the reality that having to compromise does not mean "sacrificing" oneself as she has done for so many years. We talked a lot about "not knowing" the future but remaining curious and interested and using her "peripheral vision" to notice and use possibilities and opportunities.

To know how she experienced her past was important because it will allow her to keep it in the past; she need not let the past inform her future in a discouraging or angry way. We agreed that her quest was to focus on her “near-future” (*futur proche* – a very useful grammatical form of future) in a way that comes close to her wishes, desires and needs, while remaining aware of the “harness” imposed on all of us by the outer world.

When I left, Babette told me that she was still sad but excited about coming to the States and visiting me in *my* country. She asked me to keep one of the photos she had kept in my office to remember her by. She chose the one of herself and Denver, the dog with the American name who sings with her.

Conclusion

Conclusion is a word that I find both intimidating and misleading. I do not believe that there are reliable conclusions in matters that are not mathematically concrete. I prefer the Talmudic concept of not coming to conclusions but ever-continuing the exploration and widening scope of a given issue. Thus, in this third part of my paper, I offer my considerations of how I think about cross-cultural treatment, some ideas for technique, and some meditations on how one might reflect on the dilemmas encountered in the treatment situation.

I think of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy with émigrés as a journey to a new land where the analyst, journeying as a guest, encounters and chooses to be immersed in unfamiliar landscapes and ways of being. Personally, I have found that the struggle to reach into myself, to withhold biases and judgments, to remain curious and be receptive to different ways of perceiving the world, always brings me back to reminding myself how much I do *not* know! This is always true in our work, and all the more so when working with individuals whose culture, language and way of life may be so unfamiliar. This strangeness, this lack of familiarity, can create acute anxiety and a sense of frustration or shame in the analyst. I sometimes vacillate, on one hand, between a sense of myself as an individual and, on the other hand, an acute, uneasy awareness of being part of a vast, collective community. Then I search within myself to bridge this duality between myself and the unknown others. I reach into myself for an underlying common experience with my patient. This, I believe, is at the heart all psychodynamic treatments and is the space of profound curative possibilities, because then both patient and I share, each in our own way, the need to belong, to be *known*, an experience which is essential for healing the isolated, wounded parts of the self.

Surely both patient and analyst carry such parts within themselves. When this space is found, patients’ behaviors will not be viewed solely from within the context of a clinician’s culture and history. The logic behind seemingly strange or maladjusted behaviors may be understood as rooted in the patient’s culture and history, a logic that gives the individual his sense of identity. Not surprisingly, the reverse is often true as well. The analyst’s behavior may be experienced as foreign, distancing or even incomprehensible to the immigrant patient.

While the mother tongue is a powerful element in a patient’s relational life, analysts

cannot and do not have to speak or be acquainted with the mother tongue of a particular patient; nor can the clinician be expected to be acquainted with a patient's homeland and culture. We learn from the patient his own unique version and experience of his country and his culture, not unlike any patient's own unique story and experience of his intimate family and history. As an analyst, I wish to underscore that every analysis is cross-cultural a treatment. There is a tendency to think that the closer the patient is to our own background and experience, the more we know them, but we really do not! Our counter transference may be even more active when our background and that of the patient seem similar. I wish to highlight that no matter how familiar a patient's experience is to us, the patient has his own inner culture and must be our guide to his own, unique inner landscape.

With regard to technique, there is general agreement among analysts, RoseMarie Pérez Foster (1998) and Salman Akhtar (1999) in particular, that certain basic variables must be considered when undertaking cross-cultural treatment. They are:

- At what age did the patient immigrate?
- How well does the patient speak English, and at what age did s/he learn the language?
- Was immigration a choice or was it forced by political and/or personal circumstances?
- What is the nature and history of current and generational family ties?
- What is the history of intergenerational transmission of trauma and prejudice (inevitable, yet often only subconsciously felt or thought)
- Making an assessment of the individual's ego strength and coping mechanisms, which is critical and requires cross-cultural sensitivity and awareness on the part of the clinician
- Adopting a developmental stance within the therapeutic alliance

The developmental approach allows the patient to have a new object experience that provides a trusting connection with the new country. Language diversity can be bridged by encouraging the patient to say certain things in his/her native language, then the analyst can help the patient find words for his/her inner experiences, as well as confirm the patient's reality. During difficult impasses in the treatment, the analyst, like a good parent, affirms confidence in the patient's capacities. By establishing a developmental relationship, by expecting development, by encouraging the patient's developmental initiatives, and by acknowledging developmental achievements, the analyst fills the role of an absent or lost good parent. Akhtar (1999) writes (p. 120):

The analyst of an immigrant patient must bear in mind the relatively greater role he plays as a new object...In other words, besides helping the patient resolve his psychopathology, the analyst also seeks to release the patient's developmental potential.

I agree with Akhtar (1999) when he suggests that with recent, or very depressed immigrants "a judicious use of relatively didactic interventions can actually facilitate both ego growth and the patient's capacity for deeper self-examination" (p. 119). I

suggested to Babette that she might purchase and read Marie Cardinale's book "Les Mots Pour le Dire" (The Words to Say It). Cardinale was a French journalist who described her analysis when she was greatly depressed and feeling hopeless about herself, as Babette was at that given moment in her treatment. This involved going to the book store in town, *and* buying the book. Both tasks were formidable. Babette was frightened of going into a store in town, and reading a book written by a contemporary writer was a sin, according to her teacher and mother. The book fascinated her but going into town, looking around and spending time in the book store, being helped and advised by a young and friendly salesperson, was a gratifying and ego building experience.

In Western culture, analysts value dreams as the "royal road" to the unconscious. In my work I found that asking for dreams, explaining their value as an important story created by the patient himself and thus worthy of understanding, was often politely received but ignored. Perhaps it was felt as an intrusion, perhaps it was superstition, a kind of prophesy that *bad* dreams will come true if verbalized, and possibly all of the above. In general, there was a reluctance to approach the sharing of a dream. When one of my cross-cultural patients did offer a dream, it was about violent death wishes, and deep fears of being lost and "faceless" in an unknown, strange place inhabited by aliens with no help within or without. On the other hand, fantasies were easily shared. Fantasies, even violent ones, allowed for some mentalization, for humorous word/idea play, even cultural bridging. I have found that gentle humor, at the right moment, is a way to come join with my patient, to make sense of things together. It makes me real and human and it helped me to remain connected to my own collage of cultural identities. It paves a road to model to the patient that there are many different modes of being, different ways to hear, see and widen one's horizon to live a good, interesting life. Humor was an essential component of my work with Babette. Despite the many cultural differences, we shared humorous views of ourselves and the world. To continue, rather than conclude, I would like to suggest that we strive to create didactic seminars on diversity and cross-culture understanding in the curriculum of schools, colleges and psychoanalytic institutes. For students and practitioners of psychoanalysis, these seminars will highlight the potential countertransference dilemmas around religious, racial, political beliefs and values of the patient.

I conclude with a poem by Rumi whose words deeply resonate with my psychoanalytic work in general and in the treatment of immigrants, in particular:

THE GUEST HOUSE

This being human is a guest house.

Every morning a new arrival.

A joy, a depression, a meanness,
some momentary awareness comes
as an unexpected visitor.

Welcome and entertain them all!

Even if they are a crowd of sorrows,
who violently sweep your house
empty of its furniture,

still, treat each guest honorably.
He may be clearing you out
for some new delight.
The dark thought, the shame, the malice.
meet them at the door laughing and invite them in.
Be grateful for whatever comes.
because each is
as a guide from beyond.

Jelaluddin Rumi

—

Biographical Note

Born and raised in Israel, I was surrounded by differing cultures, languages, melodies and ways of being. It was a new country with a diverse group of people trying to figure out how to build a promising future despite past traumas, loss and grief, despite anxiety about more loss, struggling to reach each other in order to form a cohesive whole. Fascinated by this dynamic, I studied history, especially psycho-history, and then psychoanalysis. Working as a psychoanalyst, I was fortunate to live in different countries, experiencing many cultures and languages, looking to build a bridge between myself and my patients. I have come to believe that all psychological work must involve a deep understanding and interest in how the “Other” experiences themselves in their own language and culture. This belief is at the heart of my work, and is certainly the central theme of this paper. I now live and work in Los Angeles, a city whose population is a collage of diverse people, languages and cultural traditions. I maintain a private practice and am a senior faculty member at the New Center for Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, California.

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Book Review

Review of *Reading Italian Psychoanalysis*. Edited by Franco Borgogno, Alberto Luchetti and Luisa Marino Coe. London, UK: Routledge, 2016, 738 pages, ISBN: 978-1-138-93285-2 (hbk).

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The book springs out from the will, expressed by some American psychoanalysts in 2010, to have a collection of some of the most representative Italian contributions to psychoanalysis, in that Italian psychoanalysis had undertaken an original and interesting theoretical and technical configuration yet not fully known abroad. So, history and epistemology of psychoanalysis needed of such a source.

All the book's contributions have been recollected, per-argument type, in six parts.

Part I has two contributions having historical nature. The first one, by Giuseppe Di Chiara, gives a comprehensive historical outline of the Italian psychoanalytic school and its institutionalization, from the first steps, with Edoardo Weiss and Marco Levi-Bianchini at the early of 1900s, up today. The second contribution, due to Anna Ferruta, is an exposition of the developments of the knowledge and diffusion of psychoanalytic thought in Italy since the institutional foundation and the official recognition of psychoanalysis in Italy. It starts with an historical recognition of the related literature and publishers. Hence, it outlines the various trends of the Italian psychoanalytic teaching, clinical practices and applications, quoting, in a detailed manner, the related protagonists, their ideas and the main works.

Part II provides an overview of some metapsychological trends of Italian psychoanalysis. These have been mainly influenced by second and third analytic generations of different analysts and scholars, amongst whom are Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, Jacques Lacan, Jean Laplanche, André Green and Jean B. Pontalis. This gave rise to a rich and variegated psychoanalytic approach in Italy, featured by certain original reformulations of Freudian thought in the light of other, subsequent analytic developments. The contributions collected in this second part are a sample of some of these perspectives undertaken by Italian metapsychology. They are centred on: the original work of Ignacio Matte Blanco; the epistemological revisiting, by Francesco Corrao, of the foundations of Freudian psychoanalysis, pointing out the intrinsic metaphenomenal nature of its concepts which distinguish psychoanalysis from other disciplines; the work of Jacqueline Amati Mehler on the concept of Ego, and on the different conceptualisations of the notion of *object*, with respect either to theoretical context and clinical setting; the analysis of Ferdinando Riolo, clinically based, of the concept of *transformation*, from the Freudian thought to Bion's conceptions; the wide epistemological reflections of Alberto Meotti on Freud's psychoanalysis, from the general standpoint of philosophy of sciences and their methodology; the work of Francesco Napolitano on the

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philosophical and scientific prolegomena to the Freudian psychoanalytical thought, with a particular attention to the history of the concept of transference; the original rethinking of the notion of transference by Antonio Alberto Semi; the deep considerations of Giuseppe Civitarese on certain main aspects of the fundamental pair transference-countertransference and its clinical consequences; the incisive reflections by Francesco Corrotto on the general notion of *reality*, pursued from a theoretical psychoanalytic outlook; the historical-critical recognition of Francesco Barale and Vera Minazzi on the development of the representational psychic functions in child according to Freud, in comparison with the aesthetic and artistic phenomena, their perception and next psychic elaboration; and, the penetrating remarks by Fausto Petrella on the role and position of every individual, contextualized inside her or his own society and culture and their influence in the birth and development of the related metapsychological dimension, analyzed from an historical stance.

Part III relates to clinical and therapeutic context, gathering the witness of some Italian analysts. The first essay by Glauco Carloni argues on that crucial moment occurring at the first encounter patient-analyst with the related problematic of communication, hence suggesting the right modalities of carrying out the analytical setting, on the basis of Sandor Ferenczi method. The testimony by Stefania Turillazzi Manfredi is turned to the reconsideration of those techniques that James Strachey wished to adopt in an analytic setting, that is to say, countertransference, *mutative* interpretations and *listening*. Giuseppe Di Chiara introduces and defines new moments of an analytical setting, i.e., *meeting*, *telling* and *parting*, considered as main axes around which an analysis should turn; he also emphasizes the encounter patient-analyst, in its chief components such as affect and empathy, as a fundamental step in setting up and performing an analysis which should be carried on with a variety of communicative approaches (bodily, other non-verbal channels, and so forth). The intervention of Jorge Canestri revolves around the right moment in which to pick up the correct interpretations along an analytical setting, by means of transcriptions and constructions of the oral experience of the analytic discourse patient-analyst, rightly contextualized. The contribution of Antonino Ferro is centred on the notions of *grasping* and *casting*: the first one refers to those multilayer arguments which issue from setting, while the second one refers either to the past history of the patient or to the current events in the encounter with the analyst as well as other more recent aspects of patient's life which have still to be explored emotionally. Hence, Parthenope Bion Talamo presents some points of the theory of her father, Wilfred Bion, exposed through her own personal history and experience, sharing memories and the years of her childhood in order to explain some of the themes dear to her father, like the analytic attitude of being without memory and without desire, as well as the searching of the possible origins of the analyst's mental attitude. Then, Franco De Masi discusses a possible approach to serious psychic pathologies, in particular, he explores what in his view are the necessary technical judgements in the analysis of non-neurotic pathologies when classic analytical approaches are inefficacious. Gilda De Simone highlights, another time, the need to considering the relationship and interdependence between patient and analyst, above all in regard to the specific case of the crucial question of terminability of the analysis, pointing out, on the basis of the previous work of Donald Winnicott, that the conclusion of an analysis should never be the outcome of a unilateral decision. Anna Maria Nicolò exposes then an original theoretical and clinical approach due to her, with a particular care to the aspects of transference in the analysis of adolescents. Loredana Micati hence centres her

discussion on the subjective aspects felt by analyst during analytic setting, set out in regard to the transference-countertransference model. Finally, Giovanna Ambrosio revisits, in a detailed manner, the dynamic of transferral and countertransferral movements in the clinical work with a specific class of patients, namely those who are perennially in search of their ‘personal truth’.

Part IV specifically deals with the person of analyst, countertransference phenomena and the field of analytical relationships established during a clinical setting. In that, Italian school has spent a long and intense period of study just devoted to these arguments and aspects of psychoanalytic praxis. The first contribution is that of Luciana Nissim Momigliano, which, starting from the conception of the analytic setting as carried out inside the so-called *analytic couple* patient-analyst, she basically highlights how to see non-traditionally the two-way relationships which are being established between them during the related analytic dialogue; in this regard, Nissim Momigliano states that much care and attention should be put by analyst, setting up her or his mind in such a way to really and deeply feel the psychic sufferings of the patient through her or his projective identifications. According to Davide Lopez, then, the personality feature of the analyst, besides to be unavoidable and not to be meant egotistically and narcissistically, should be considered as the only, real element of otherness which allows the analyst to enter into deep contact and in affective-emotive tuning with the patient to perceive, quite emotively, her or his feeling and lived experience, in order to be of helpful for her or him. Hence, it follows the contribution of Stefano Bolognini, centred on the empathic feature of the interaction patient-analyst, till to speak of a *psychoanalytic empathy* by analyst, just to emphasize the peculiarity of the analyst’s empathy, without which no real analysis might be carried out, and that is nothing but a complex intra- and inter-psychic phenomenon which requires a certain capacity to be owned and used by analyst to reach the aims of an analytic setting. Domenico Chianese, above all on the wake of French cultural tradition, retraces the pathways of his clinical work in searching of those precious moments in which patient and analyst encounter, putting attention to the first *sight* they shed of each other, so establishing that first hidden touch upon which will be then built up the whole next setting; this preliminary *visual* level sets up, from a sensory-perceptive point of view, a kind of pre-figuration of the analytic field which next will enable that needful symbolical access allowing the analytic relationship to name and represent verbally the related images therein involved. The subsequent intervention of Roberto Speziale-Bagliacca is aimed to broaden the concept of *reverie* meant as a psychic activity having a main visual nature, not intuitive and not subjected to attention (therefore, not worked out by consciousness), as well as to propose a possible method for promoting its use in the analytic setting; furthermore, he suggests to set up and improve analyst’s ability to get time enough before assigning a meaning to the various psychoanalytic events occurring during the setting. The essay by Claudio Neri is then turned towards an investigation of the analytic field, claiming attention on the occurrence of trans-personal and trans-generational factors, which however are part of the personality of the patient (as well as of every human being) although unconsciously transmitted, but that often can interfere with the own self; moreover, Neri points out the basic bi-laterality which characterizes every analytic field (*bi-personal field*) carried out by the analytic couple, underscoring the limits of the patient and analyst actions reciprocally performed within analytic space. Then, Lucio Russo speaks of theoretical and clinical features of the narcissistic and melancholic dispositions of human psyche, highlighting in particular the

countertransference phenomena and the analyst's self-analysis when one treats these areas of the mind, characterised either by an indifferentiation state and by an archaic affectivity, which he calls *originary*. Finally, in continuation with Russo's essay, Vincenzo Bonaminio provides a 'living and human' picture of the analyst figure at work, once again pointing out on the fundamental countertransference phenomena as well as on the functions of interpretation and reconstruction exploited on the basis of patient's responses and messages which often are enigmatic, confused, tortuous and, for the analyst, anxiogenic; where the latter should then be meant as main outcomes conveyed through the communication occurring from one unconscious to another unconscious, within the analytic setting.

Part V is particularly dedicated to trauma, that, independently of the specific way in which it manifests, is always linked to the psychic features of the environmental context in which it emerges, so that the main contributions of this fifth part discuss how chief forms of trauma dependent on the poorness of those basic environmental conditions which should allow a regular psychic development. The first contribution is a reprint of a work of Edoardo Weiss (1889-1970) on trauma dating back to 1935, in which, considering this as mainly having an internal nature, he focuses on the Ego's responses consequent to the defence mechanisms activated for coping and facing external's stimuli, and that, in dependence on the degree of the reciprocal mixing of life and death drives, may accordingly trigger or not trauma. On the same line is the subsequent essay, where Roberto Tagliacozzo starts to discuss on trauma, considering it as mainly due to a lacking of environment in which patient lives and grows up, rather than originated internally; in particular, he claims the fundamental importance of family in the psychological growth of the child, for which a great role is played by the various parental objects (in the Kleinian sense) and their relations with drives and fantasies of the individual, above all during schizoparanoïd and depressive positions. On the wake of previous essay, the next discussion of Dina Vallino Macciò also focuses on the importance of family in child's growth and development, identifying those so-called *pathogenic identifications* which will generate later a so-called *anxiety of non-existence* by which an individual feels herself or himself to lie on a *deathly condition* hindering the explication of the main individual features, like to understand own emotions with respect to the other ones; in such patients, it seems that any form of personal mental existence be missing, so Vallino Macciò outlines, accordingly, some possible lines of therapeutic intervention, suggesting how to treat analytically them as well as exposing what phenomenology stands out from the related analytic setting. Hence, the next intervention of Franca Meotti begins with the consideration of those possible relationships and analytic situations which are being established between patient and analyst, during an analytic setting, that negatively and deconstructively interfere, for instance, with transference and countertransference phenomena underpinning the setting itself, so making this latter ineffective; hence, she identifies their origins into an inadequate (Kleinian) maternal object (by Meotti, named *parasitic object*) with which such patients precociously identified themselves, but that denied them any initial childish expression of vitality such as needs, demands, desires and fantasies, notwithstanding the caregiver taken pretty good care of the child, in a material sense. Starting with the witness of a particular clinical case, also the next essay by Franco Borgogno is on the continuation of the same line of discussion undertaken by Vallino Macciò and Meotti; indeed, he describes how the first elements of a certain missing psychic agency can gradually spring out from an analysis conducted in a patient who is lacking of it, by

means of an analyst who temporarily identifies herself or himself with the same illness afflicting the patient, and showing then, just to this latter, how the analyst herself or himself felt and experienced all the related involved processes and feelings through her or his own Self. Afterwards, in respect of Winnicottian tradition, Andreas Giannakoulas argues on the difficulties of the task of reparation and restitution of an absence, as well as on the impact of the general mother's mood, with a particular attention to the "dead mother" state and to the maternal depression, either on patients and on the growth process of the child, showing too which disorders may accordingly arise, among which are mind-body dissociation from the mother's depression, depersonalization linked to insufficient self-representation by an unelaborated mourning of parents, etc. Again in regard to family, Giovanna Goretti Regazzoni stresses the main importance of its structural completeness, pointing out what psychic damages may give rise the "emotional" absence of one parent or both; she also mentions the occurrence of violence and mental abuse by one parent, trauma producing. Furthermore, Goretti Regazzoni claims, in particular, to pay very much attention to the severe traumatic consequences arising from the many ways in which mental space of a child may be traumatically compromised and violated within familial context, just due to certain behaviours performed by parents. The last essay by Tonia Cancrini is then turned to discuss the guilt in childhood and adolescence, experienced, above all, in a conflictual (e.g., due to separations) and variously problematic (e.g., for the occurrence of a mourning) familial environment; she also examines, on the basis of her clinical experience, what dangerous psychic situations may give rise not-well overcome Oedipal conflicts, so claiming what crucial, unavoidable and primary role is played by a good internal and external parental couple, not only for children, but also for adults, and even for analysts when considered as a kind of "outside parents".

The last Part VI is mainly centred on a particular but important topic, that regarding the origins of the mind and some related phenomena, paying attention to its emotive-affective components as issuing from the early fusional experiences child-mother; further contributions of this sixth part are also on certain emotive-affective involvements occurring during analytic setting. The first two contributions are reprints of works due to Eugenio Gaddini (1916-1985) and Franco Fornari (1921-1985). Gaddini's work argues on *imitation*, considered as a 'primitive' psychic phenomenon, prior to either introjection and identification, occurring in disorders of the identity as defective process of identification in which object is not perceived as such but rather as a prolongation of own body, hence belonging to the bodily Self; from an early primitive stage, imitation may then evolve singularly or together other psychic processes with which will become more or less integrated. The work of Fornari is on the origins of affectivity in the child, that he retraces as early in the intrauterine life, whose mnestic traces unconsciously will trigger the desire to go back to that lost blissful world of unity with mother where there were neither needs nor desires. So, according to Fornari, it is just from this nostalgic and unavoidable tension towards the initial intrauterine lived experience that next psychic life affectively will spring out, with the rising of the soul which is already deeply rooted in the maternal womb, the real place of the first *psychic birth* from which every other thing comes from. Hence, it follows the essay by Simona Argentieri on the pre-verbal, pre-symbolic and pre-object aspects of the mind conducted through an historical-critical review of the various defence mechanisms from Freud to contemporary times, so accomplishing, at the same time, to a useful comparison among some different patterns of

psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. The intervention of Eugenio Gaburri is then turned to claim attention to those pre-verbal moments occurring during analytic setting which are, in a certain sense, difficult to be identified among the emotive and affective forces present in the inherent analytic field; he also discusses some related projective identification phenomena standing out from this situation of undifferentiated pre-verbal emotive interactions, like the so-called *personifications* by analyst, which are prodromic to the occurrence of countertransference. Then, in some particular clinical cases, like in those dealing with psychotic subjects, the emotive atmosphere becomes so turbulent to make difficult the identification of the many, various objects involved in the analytic exchange patient-analyst, so Gaburri provides, to this end, some related possible suggestions of clinical practice. Afterwards, the essay by Marta Badoni has a chief clinical-therapeutic aim, telling us what happens when analyst treats patients suffering of a mind-body separation, trying as well to identify the possible causes of this breaking. Her experiences say us that, often, this situation should bring back to events occurred between child and mother and, above all, to her carelessness in regard to that plethora of child's messages which must be taken into account. It follows the intervention by Adolfo Pazzagli, on the analytic treatment of those forms of, so to speak, minor psychosis which he calls *white psychoses*, mainly characterised by certain disturbances of the boundaries of the own Self, sensations of dispossession and alienness, suggesting clinical methods at psychoanalytic level, mainly turned toward the investigation of the primitive memories of the patient. Then, the contribution by Agostino Racalbutto revolves around hysteria and its psychoanalytic pattern, considered to be the heart of the clinical practice and of the theoretical framework of psychodynamics, as its history confirms. In discussing such a disorder, Racalbutto identifies a primary hysteric nucleus, as a non-pathogenic germ of this possible illness, just cultured in the early, fusional relationships child-mother which are liable to potentially make pathogenic this archaic nucleus later, when such relationships have not been tuned in a right emotive and affective tone with respect to that archaic and overwhelming maternal pole which would tend just to pathologically prevail without the intervention of the suitable paternal action warranting the basic dialectic female-male, so predisposing otherwise to the hysteric syndrome releasing in the body. The last essay is due to Riccardo Lombardi which is mainly a clinical witness on those psychic phenomena which are placeable between mind and body, are said to be primitive mental states, and are mainly due to a hiatus existing amongst body, emotions and thought, featuring patient's discourse. So, Lombardi suggests to set up analysis at a sensitive-perceptive and bodily level, in order to re-establish a gradient among those different mental states which are subtended by either her or his bodily phenomena and the related abstract themes of her or his discourse uttered along setting.

In conclusion, we may say that this book has surely given a great and original contribution to the history of psychoanalytic movement in Italy, of course providing a wide yet limited portrait which, notwithstanding its comprehensive amplitude, necessarily excludes other as much respectable Italian scholars and psychodynamic trends (among which are the Jungians, the Lacanians, the Adlerians, the anthropoanalysts, also the antipsychiatrists, and so on) but without the intention to alluding to any possible hierarchic classification among them, besides currently not possible to be performed at the epistemological level.

We furthermore appreciate the constant intertwinement between theory and clinical practice, always present in almost every contribution to this book, with included, where possible, the related historical context and right epistemological stance. Moreover, as many contributions treat singular and special clinical cases, so proposing accordingly clever and original theoretical interpretations and frameworks as well as precious psychotherapeutic insights, the book is surely indicated for both theoretician and clinicians. Furthermore, the related new analytic techniques, employed in many clinical cases and witnesses there described, will surely turn out to be very useful and innovative.

So, we expect and wish that every country may publish a similar book related to the history of own psychoanalytic tradition, to be widely shared in order to everyone may appreciate the psychoanalytic contribution of own country or of abroad. Because, generally speaking, we think that, only maintaining a constant, constructive and useful comparison among different cultural traditions, whatever be the involved discipline, the vital dialectic between different cultures may give rise to a real and effective progress of human knowledge. This is, according to us, the best outcome that such a book may give, from either an historical-epistemological standpoint and a more properly psychoanalytic stance.

Book Review

Review of *Language Disorders in Children and Adolescents*. By Joseph H. Beitchman, Elizabeth B. Brownlie. Abingdon, UK: Hogrefe, 2014, 130 pages, ISBN: 978-0-889-37338-9 (hbk).

Reviewed by Anonymous Author¹

Language impairment is potentially a life-long disability that is related to increased risk for significant academic, social, emotional and behavioural problems. Its manifestation in children and adolescents as language-learning disability is considered to be a lifespan issue. “*Language Disorders in Children and Adolescents*” sheds light on this complex issue by concisely presenting evidence-based practice and a brief introduction to advances in psychotherapy. The conciseness accentuates the user-friendliness of the content along with easy to follow guidance relating to most common language disorders. Despite the centrality of analytical theory-based discussion, practical treatments and clinical practices draw on a “theory to practice” approach to language disorders. In fact, language disorders and language impairments appear mostly in childhood, and the comprehensive description of the symptoms and their treatments, which are presented in this book, can clarify this issue significantly.

The book is divided into four main parts along with two additional chapters accommodating some further readings, tools and resources for assessing and investigating language disorders. The chapters are organized in a clear and concise manner outlining theories, diagnosis as well as treatment of language disorders in children and adolescents.

In the introductory chapter, Beitchman and Brownlie provide a description of language disorders and language impairment along with a clear explanation of the relevant technical terms. The choice of chapter topics offers a comprehensive overview of language disorder and impairment as well as associated issues. The reader is also introduced to comprehensive definitions of language disorders and language impairments in children and adolescents. Chapter 1 is a primer that provides with detailed information ranging from terminology and definitions to epidemiological and diagnostic procedures and documentation. Two main diagnostic criteria, namely ICD-10 and the DSM-5, have been considered as major sources of information and practice. The chapter also discusses the differences between expressive and receptive language disorders. Language assessment and language screening are introduced as useful tools to gain a sense of conditions that might need further investigation.

Once the essential groundwork is established, in Chapter 2, Beitchman and Brownlie go on to discuss different overarching theories and models of language disorders in children and adolescents. The subtle and clearly complex interplay between language and various aspects of development is a recurrent theme throughout the book. In addition, the role of critical periods for language acquisition are discussed in relation to parenting, social environment and cognitive processes; all these have been

¹ Correspondence concerning this review should be addressed to the Editor-in-Chief Dr. Laura A. Cariola. Email: laura.cariola@ed.ac.uk

enumerated as important issues in understanding language impairment. It could be stated that this chapter illustrates the complex connection between language developmental procedures and language impairment, on the one hand, and environmental and social factors that affect psychological outcomes, on the other.

Following this, Chapter 3 deals with the fundamental issues of diagnostic approaches toward language disorders and impairments. These diagnoses include both the assessment of speech and language along with the assessment of behavioural and emotional issues. The chapter also states that clinicians should consider the importance of clinical presentations when assessing language impairment (LI) with comorbid disruptive behaviour disorders, and LI and comorbid anxiety disorder identified language profiles should also be discussed and reviewed together with parents and the child to target the specific area of deficiency.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth discussion of treatment guidelines with a due emphasis on cognitive functioning aspects of language impairments. It ends with guidelines for further reading and a very useful appendix of resources for working with children, young people and their parents. It was suggested throughout the content that the focus of investigating a disorder should emphasize the language and its components, although the deficits in other domains, such as speed of processing or memory problems may be the actual causes of the language impairment. It is suggested that for improved treatments, all available pathways should be utilized and by doing this, to make use of the beneficial support from parents, teachers and peers. Many important problems are pragmatic in nature. These include, resistance of parents and children due to slow speed of progress and a lack of commitment to the therapeutic goals. This issue has been acknowledged in the new categorization of language impairment by the American Diagnostic System, which perceives stuttering and pragmatic impairments as important and overlooked subcategories of LI.

It should be taken into consideration that treatments are most effective for children with less severe language disorders while they may not function to their highest capacity for children with severe disorders and difficulties that are likely to persist throughout children's' whole life span. The way society treats those who have language impairment and speech disorders can potentially affect children's language achievement, and such social aspects should be considered especially when it comes to bilingual children who learn two languages simultaneously.

In addition, it should be noticed that providing culturally un-biased assessment and treatment protocols could increase the quality of any investigation about language impairments. Moreover, for a better assessment, psychiatric disorders should be differentiated from learning disabilities or neurological diseases. Consideration of such an issue could enhance the quality and comprehensiveness of this book in terms of both theoretical and practical dimensions. Given that many factors are involved in prognoses and outcome of treatments, a straightforward guidance and explanation should be provided to support coping with possible complications, such as difficulties in understanding and using language as a social interaction, which can result in experiencing anxiety and depression as well as other emotional problems that may aggravate the situation.

Overall, it could be suggested that this is a very accessible book capturing the theoretical and practical aspects of language disorder and each chapter encompasses an array of key information for the experienced and novice readers. This well referenced book does a good job of discussing specific research studies that inform the topics being discussed. I found this book filled with practical tools and guidance from the early stages of diagnosis to treatment. In addition, as well as useful tables, shaded boxes provide summary points. Students will find it particularly helpful as an introduction to theory and practice.

I highly recommend this book to all those concerned with language difficulties, including psychologists, psychiatrists, teachers and speech and language therapists, as well as parents.