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Introduction: Paul Grice, Philosopher of Language, But More Than That*

Klaus Petrus

> I shall first proclaim it as my belief that doing philosophy ought to be *fun*.
>
> (Grice 1986: 61)

1. From metaphysics to the philosophy of language

The British philosopher H. Paul Grice (1913–1988) is regarded as an eminent representative of *Ordinary Language Philosophy* and is well-known for his works in the philosophy of language. With only two papers – 'Meaning' (1957) and 'Logic and conversation' (1967) – he made it into every serious textbook dealing with the philosophy of language, linguistics, communication, or cognitive sciences.

Grice, however, was not only a philosopher of language. At least he would have felt exceedingly uncomfortable, if at the department of the University of California–Berkeley he had been introduced to a visitor as 'Mr Grice, our man in Philosophy of Language' (Grice 1986: 64). Grice did not attach a lot of importance to the division of philosophy into separate faculties. Philosophy, as he states in his 'Reply to Richards', published in the unofficial festschrift ***P**hilosophical **G**rounds of **R**ationality. **I**ntention, **C**ategories, **E**nds*, 'is one subject, a single discipline. [...] Or, one might even dare to say, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of them' (Grice 1986: 64). This does not rule out that philosophy has a main subject which connects all putative sub-disciplines with one another. Quite the reverse: 'It might be held that the *ultimate* subject of all philosophy is ourselves, or at least our rational nature' (ibid.: 65; his emphasis).

Indeed, rationality is the topic which figures as a kind of leitmotif throughout Grice's philosophy. He was deeply convinced that human beings – or more precisely, persons – are essentially rational beings (Grice 1991: 140ff.).

Thus Grice looked again and again at different aspects of human behaviour at the individual stages of his work, no matter whether these aspects were of a linguistic or other kind. His special interest was directed at the mental processes underlying human behaviour and making it explicable as rational behaviour at all (Truniger 2006).

Grice was aware of the fact that this approach presumes a comparatively rich ontology. It was a central part of his late philosophy to show that not only psychological concepts like *intention*, but also concepts like *final cause*, *essential property* and especially *absolute value* are indispensable to any adequate theory of human rationality (Grice 1986, 1991, 2001). Hence in his paper 'Meaning revisited', published in 1982, Grice wrote that 'the notion of value is absolutely crucial to the idea of rationality, or of a rational being' (Grice 1989: 298). Also in his 'Reply to Richards' he stated: 'I believe (or would like to believe) that it is a necessary feature of rational beings, either as part or as a consequence of part of, their essential nature, that they have a capacity for the attribution of value' (Grice 1986: 72).

As far as the ontological inventory is concerned, Grice committed himself frankly to a 'new ontological Marxism' (Grice 1991: 131). In more concrete terms, he followed the principle of *metaphysical constructivism* according to which concepts or entities of any kind can be postulated within a theory as long as they possess explanatory force (Grice 1986: 68ff., 89f.). Hence it was very important to Grice to concern himself with the *methodological* requirements of theory construction, and to account for the introduction of certain concepts or entities at the different stages of theory development.

This project of theory construction, which Grice called 'Theory-theory' (ibid.: 87), seemed to him to be an integral part of any serious science. All the same, within those areas dealing with human rationality, Grice had a certain hierarchy of theories in mind (see Chapman 2005: 173f.). *Metaphysics* takes the position of some 'first philosophy' insofar as it is fundamentally devoted to the question of which *materials* (categories, substances, subjects, attributes etc.) need to be presumed by every theory (Grice 1986: 86ff., 1991: 23–91). Within metaphysics, every further branch has its own Theory-theory. One of these branches is *philosophical psychology*, which is concerned with the nature and function of psychological concepts, and marks out the range of psychological beings (Grice 1991: 121–61). A special case of philosophical psychology is *rational psychology*, which in turn deals with the essence of rational beings as well as with the question of how their behaviour is to be rationally explained (Grice 2001). Finally Grice mentions a sub-branch of rational psychology, which deals with a special form of rational behaviour, viz. linguistic behaviour: the *philosophy of language* (see section 8, figure 1.3).

2. Grice's conception of the philosophy of language

This hierarchical structure of disciplines is interesting in various respects. In particular, it becomes clear that the philosophy of language is not a

preferred domain. Yet it is not just a discipline among others either. Rather it is part of a comprehensive *theory of rationality* within the bounds of which the concept of value is obviously of paramount importance.

It is only in his later writings that Grice laid particular stress on this very connection (Grice 1989: 297f., 369, 1991). In his 'Reply to Richards', for instance, he writes in full accord with the above exposition that 'the problems which emerge about meaning are plainly problems in psychology and metaphysics, and I hope that as we proceed it will become increasingly clear that these problems in turn are inextricably bound up with the notion of value' (Grice 1986: 73).

There are, of course, many earlier hints suggesting that Grice considered his investigation into the philosophy of language as contributions to a general account of rationality. This becomes particularly obvious with respect to his famous Cooperative Principle which he puts forward within the framework of his theory of conversation presented in 'Logic and conversation'. There is good reason to believe that the participants' cooperative behaviour can only be explained assuming that we are dealing with essentially rational beings (Baker 1989; Grandy 1989; Petrus 1996; Sbisa 2001). Consequently, it has even been suggested that the Cooperative Principle be replaced by a more basic principle of rationality (Kasher 1976).

Yet it is perfectly possible to interpret Grice's theory of speaker's meaning straight out as an analysis of rational communication (Meggle 1981; Kemmerling 1979, 1986; Petrus 1999), which is, moreover, tightly connected with his considerations about folk-psychological explanations (Grice 2001; see Grandy and Warner 1986: 15ff.). I shall return to these two points in more detail below (sections 5.3 and 6.2).

Grice's idea of a hierarchically structured edifice of sciences is informative in yet another respect: like metaphysics or philosophical psychology, the philosophy of language has its own Theory-theory. Those who concern themselves with it are, in other words, not only dealing with genuinely semantic facts but also with the question of how they approach these facts, how they construct their theories, and for what reason they postulate certain concepts or entities within these theories.

Grice has himself pursued this kind of *Theory-theory of language* (as one could call it) from the very beginning. In his 1957 paper 'Meaning' he tries to show that the concept of intention is the basic notion of any adequate theory of meaning (see below, section 6.2). But in the same breath, he clearly states the following: 'I must disclaim any intention of peopling all our talking life with armies of complicating psychological occurrences' (Grice 1989: 221). As mentioned before, Grice maintains that concepts should only be built into a, say, theory of meaning if they really possess explanatory force. The proof that it is so is part of the construction of this very theory. Concepts which do not have any explanatory value are superfluous from a theoretical point of view, and should therefore not be used. Grice followed this principle without exception. In his 1978 paper 'Further notes on logic and conversation' he

refers to it as *Modified Occam's Razor*, which he defines as follows: 'senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity' (Grice 1989: 47).

Grice's remarks on the method of *ordinary language philosophy* (OLP) are relevant in this connection too. Without doubt, throughout his lifetime Grice stuck to the central thesis of this philosophical direction, and defended it several times against more or less mischievous distortions: conceptual analysis of ordinary expressions is definitely an indispensable and integral part of (philosophical) theory construction (Grice 1986: 57ff., 1989: 172ff.). Another thing, however, he was certain about as well: 'to practice conceptual analysis is not necessarily to practice philosophy' (Grice 1989: 174). Although he considered *linguistic botanizing* as practised by John L. Austin and others at Oxford both necessary and useful, he was nevertheless in doubt as to the universal explanatory force of this method (Grice 1986: 57). Often enough it is attributed to OLP that it – unlike *ideal language philosophy* – conceives of systematic theories as being impossible. Perhaps this is merely a cliché. Should it be correct though, Grice would certainly not be a typical representative of this school (Soames 2003: 216; Atlas 2005: 45). He was not content with informal, case-by-case investigations, but doubtless thought of himself as a constructor of theories possessing as much explanatory force as possible – be this a theory of value, a theory of perception, or a theory of meaning.

3. Meaning and use

That Grice always considered the philosophy of language to be a *methodological* project as well becomes perfectly visible as soon as it comes to his attitude towards a further slogan (or cliché) of OLP: 'Meaning is use'. According to Grice, this slogan stands for a procedure which always follows more or less the same pattern (Grice 1989: 4ff.). Let us assume that we are interested in certain concepts such as 'good' or 'true'. Those who are committed to OLP will search for ordinary language sentences in which these words occur. In doing so they will find out that the *normal* use of these sentences implies that a certain condition C is fulfilled. One will, for instance, only say that Pearl Jam is a good grunge band if one is commending it (= condition C); or one will say that it is true that Ferdinand is a dangerous bull only if one knows that it is so, or if one has enough evidence to say so (= condition C). The fact that the standard or appropriate *use* of sentences like these presumes that a condition C is fulfilled is then taken as evidence that the fulfilment of C is a part of the *meaning* of those sentences containing the words in question.

This procedure was very popular with the people in Grice's academic surroundings. A case in point is Peter Strawson, who tried to show in his 1950 paper 'On referring' that Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions does not do justice to the way speakers ordinarily use sentences containing descriptive

phrases to make statements (Strawson 1950). According to Russell, the proposition expressed by sentences of the form (1) has one of the standard truth values and can be completely characterized using quantifier-variable notation like (2) (Russell 1906):

(1) The present King of France is bald.
(2) $\exists x(Fx \,\&\, \forall y\,(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \,\&\, Gx)$

Against this Strawson objects that normally the expression 'the F' (i.e. 'the present King of France') is correctly *used* only if there is an F (= condition C). Therefore this condition is a part of the *meaning* of 'the F'. If it is not fulfilled – if, as Strawson was later to put it, the *presupposition* that there is an F is false – 'the F is G' cannot be used to express a proposition which is either true or false. From this Strawson draws the further conclusion that 'neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic' (Strawson 1950: 344).

In *Introduction to Logical Theory* (1952), Strawson applies the insight that expressions of a natural language do not have an exact semantics which could be captured by the means of classical logic to the analysis of truth-conditional constants such as '&', '$\vee$', or '$\supset$' (see also Strawson 1986). In this case too he denies that these expressions can capture the meanings of the natural language counterparts 'and', 'or', or 'if'. Let us look at the following sentence (3):

(3) Mr X is in the kitchen or in the living room.

Taken as a strict truth-functional operation, (3) is true iff either one or both of the disjuncts are true, and false iff both disjuncts are false. However, in ordinary language, Strawson holds, the word 'or' has another meaning: people who use a sentence like 'p or q' do not do this because they already know that p is true, or because they already know that q is true. Rather, they utter this sentence only if they are not sure which of both is true (= condition C). If this condition is not fulfilled there is, according to Strawson, a misuse of language. In other words: It is a part of the *meaning* of a suchlike sentence that it is *used* correctly only if the speaker does not know that p is true, and does not know that q is true either. Thus it cannot be correct that the meaning of the word 'or' is adequately captured by the formal device '$\vee$' (Strawson 1952: 78ff.).

3.1 Meaning versus use

Grice does not hold the view that this procedure is fundamentally inappropriate or wrong; and he concedes that it sometimes leads to correct results. But at the same time he draws attention to the fact that the *identification* of meaning

with use can sometimes be the source of fundamental philosophical errors (Grice 1989: 4ff.), since by doing so one runs the risk of overlooking central differences between concepts like *saying*, *meaning* and *use*, or of confusing formal or semantic with pragmatic components of language (Grice 1986: 59).

It is important to note that Grice's criticism of the slogan 'Meaning is use' is first of all *methodologically* motivated. Grice emphasizes several times that it is the task of conceptual analysis to determine the actual meaning of an expression. Hence it is decisive to clearly distinguish between the actual meaning and other, additional aspects of the use of an expression. In order to do so Grice has first of all to show that there exists something like the actual meaning at all. The 1956 paper 'In defense of a dogma', written with Strawson, was to serve exactly this purpose (Grice 1989: 196–212). Had Quine been right with his objections against the analytic/synthetic distinction (Quine 1953), the concept of meaning would turn out to be a myth indeed, and conceptual analysis in Gricean style would be impossible.

In a next step, Grice needs to explain what the difference between the meaning and further aspects of the use of an expression is. A first approach is made in 'The causal theory of perception' dating back to the year 1961. Even though this paper is not dealing with issues of the philosophy of language in the narrow sense of the word, there is a section titled 'Implication', which contains an answer to Strawson's analysis of the relation between truth-conditional constants and their ordinary language counterparts (Grice 1961: 131ff.; unfortunately, this section has been left out in the *Studies*).

Grice too concedes that uttering a disjunctive statement 'p or q' normally (as he still used to say at that point) *implies* that the speaker does not know that p, and that she does not know that q either (= condition C). Nevertheless he denies that the correctness of this implication constitutes a condition for the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Neither is it a part of the meaning of 'p or q', or something which is implied by this very sentence (or by the statement made). What is implied, in other words, is no Strawsonian presupposition (Grice 1989: 269ff.). This is so because it holds for presuppositions that β is a presupposition of α, just in the case the truth or falsity of α requires the truth of β. To state it more exactly, α loses its truth-value if β is false. Against that Grice maintains that the disjunctive statement 'p or q', or the proposition expressed by it, does not cease to be true or false if the implication proves to be wrong. Hence what is implied does not contribute anything to the truth conditions of the utterance. It is not part of what was said by it, but owes itself to the use the speakers make of the sentence in question – and this is actually based on a meaning which has been captured by classical logic. As far as this use beyond meaning or – more exactly – beyond what is said is concerned, Grice comments:

> [T]he fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the

> disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but a *first shot* would be the following: 'One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing'. (Grice 1961: 132; his emphasis)

This passage anticipates a lot of what Grice is going to elaborate on in his William James Lectures. Part of it is making this principle or 'pragmatic rule' (as Strawson, with reference to Grice, calls another principle in footnote 1, p. 179 of his *Introduction to Logical Theory*) more precise, as well as erecting a typology of different implications. The first leads to Grice's considerations about the status and the role of the *conversational maxims*, whereas the latter results in the distinction between conventional and conversational *implicatures* (as he will call the above-mentioned implications). Taken together, they both form the central components of Grice's famous *theory of conversation* (see section 5).

Against this background, the theory of conversation turns out to be a *methodological* instrument (and not simply a theory of rational communication; see Lüthi 2006). And thus considered it is part of some Theory-theory as well (see section 2). What matters to Grice is a criticism of the slogan 'Meaning is use' – at least insofar as it amounts to an identification of meaning with use, and thus to a confusion of semantic and pragmatic aspects of language (Grice 1986: 59).

3.2 Meaning as a function of use

All this may suggest that Grice took the view that meaning has nothing to do with use. This, however, is not correct. On the contrary, it is thanks to him that it became obvious that the meaning of an expression is a function of what speakers do with it, or, as Grice explains in his paper 'Meaning' (1957) for the first time, *mean* by this expression on particular occasions of use.

Grice is convinced that it is constitutive of the basic concept that a speaker by doing something under certain circumstances means something in doing so. All other semantic concepts – such as, for instance, word-meaning, sentence-meaning, or what is said – are derivative and should be explicated in terms of the basic concept of speaker's meaning (see figure 1.2 on page 17). Thus considered, Grice's challenge consists in the development of a *theory of language* which neither identifies meaning with use, nor completely divorces the two. The former, if one likes to put it this way, is to be achieved by the *theory of conversation*, the latter by the *theory of meaning*. Like the theory of conversation, Grice's theory of meaning can be regarded from the viewpoint of a methodological enterprise, or as part of some Theory-theory, since in the end, Grice simultaneously pursues the project of conceptual analysis the purpose of which is to determine the actual meaning of an expression. For

this purpose, however, a solid and workable theory of meaning is called for (see section 6).

4. Theory of language

In his William James Lectures Grice repeatedly indicates what the purpose of a *theory of language* should consist in. What it comes down to is the determination of the total signification of an utterance (while 'utterance' is to be understood in a very general sense in the context of Grice's writings). In his 1968 paper 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning' he proposes the following distinctions within the total signification:

> [...] a distinction between what a speaker has *said* (in a certain favored, and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of 'said'), and what he has *implicated* (e.g. implied, indicated, suggested), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may be either *conventionally* implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase which he has used) or *nonconventionally* implicated (in which case the specification of the implicature falls outside the specification of the conventional meaning of the words used). (Grice 1989: 118; first two emphases by Grice)



Figure 1.1 Grice's theory of language

As we shall see later on, Grice is especially interested in a particular kind of nonconventional implicatures which he calls *conversational* implicatures, and which he subdivides into *particularized* and *generalized* implicatures (Grice 1989: 40f.). What, moreover, (at least indirectly) follows from passages of 'Further notes on logic and conversation' is that Grice equates the specification of the total signification of an utterance x made with a specification of what the utterer U *means* by uttering x (see Levinson 1983: 131; Neale 1992: 520; but see also Saul 2002). Roughly, this results in the spectrum shown above (figure 1.1), which a theory of language à la Grice should be able to cope with.

5. Conversation and implicatures

Grice is very concerned about stating the notions presented in figure 1.1 more precisely, and explaining how they are interconnected. Without doubt, the concept of *what is said* plays a central role in this respect. On the one hand Grice seems to take the view that what is said by an utterance is a variety of what is *meant*, or that what is said can be explicated in terms of what is meant (see figure 1.2). The concept of what is said is therefore an integral part of Grice's *theory of meaning*. On the other hand it is of eminent importance to *the theory of conversation* and the characterization of implicatures, insofar as implicatures are usually thus characterized, that U says something and means (implicates) something over and above that. In other words, the concept of what is said constitutes the interface between Grice's theory of conversation and his theory of meaning (see section 6.1).

5.1 Conventional implicatures

What U said by an utterance can, according to Grice, be understood 'to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered' (Grice 1989: 25). As Gottlob Frege already wrote in his paper 'Der Gedanke' (Frege 1918/19), Grice too notices that the conventional meaning of an uttered sentence does from time to time both fall short and go beyond what is said (Neale 2001; Horn 2007). The first holds if the sentence contains, for instance, indexical and/or ambiguous expressions (e.g. 'He is in the grip of a vice'). For an identification of what is said one needs to fix the referents of these expressions, and to eliminate ambiguities. The latter holds if the uttered sentence contains conventional devices which signal that U – as Grice puts it – over and above some central speech act performed a further, non-central speech act (Grice 1989: 122). A first example is already given in Grice's paper 'The causal theory of perception'. If U utters the sentence:

(4) Sally is poor **but** she is honest.

she strictly speaking performs two speech acts: (i) U *says* that Sally is poor and that she is honest; (ii) additionally, U *indicates* that there is a contrast between poverty and honesty (or that somebody – perhaps U herself – thinks that this is so).

According to Grice, it is decisive that the conventional device 'but' in (4) plays a part in figuring out what U meant, or – as Grice puts it – *conventionally implicated*. This very expression, however, plays no part in determining what U said by (4). In other words, *the same* is said in (4) and (5):

(5) Sally is poor **and** she is honest.

The reason for this is that the conventional implicature generated by 'but' (i.e. (ii)) contributes in no way to the *truth conditions* of the utterance (Grice 1961: 127; but see Bach 1999). This becomes immediately obvious since the conventional implicatum can be false without what is said being false (as regards the difference between implicatures and presuppositions see section 3).

Grice terms these implicatures 'conventional' because they result from the conventional meaning of words like 'but' or 'therefore'. In order to see that by (4) it is meant that there is a contrast between (Sally's) poverty and honesty nothing more than knowledge of the linguistic conventions which rule the use of 'but' is needed.

5.2 Nonconventional implicatures

It is in this respect that all the other forms of implicatures, which could accordingly be termed 'nonconventional', differ from the conventional ones (see figure 1.1). Grasping them requires of the audience some extra-linguistic considerations which provide the key for working out or calculating the implicature in question (Grice 1989: 31, 39).

As regards *conversational implicatures* the assumption is, roughly speaking, that U cooperates or wants to make a meaningful contribution to the conversation by her utterance. This in turn requires that, for instance, the utterer U and the addressee A know which purpose their conversation serves (and know this of each other as well; but see Gu 1994). That U is cooperative means that she observes the following principle (and that each of the participants supposes that this is the case and that they know this of each other): 'Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.' (Grice 1989: 26) To this *Cooperative Principle* (CP) Grice subordinates four categories of maxims and sub-maxims. *Maxims of Quantity*: (1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange); (2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. *Maxims of Quality*: Try to make your contribution one that is true; (1) Do not say what you believe to be false; (2) Do

not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. *Maxim of Relation*: Be relevant. *Maxims of Manner*: Be perspicuous; (1) Avoid obscurity of expression; (2) Avoid ambiguity; (3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity); (4) Be orderly (ibid.: 26 f.).

There has been much speculation about the interconnections of these *conversational maxims* (CM), their status, their order of importance, or the possibility of a reduction of these maxims to just a few or even to one single maxim (for an overview see Rolf 1994: 102ff.). Grice himself does not claim that this list is complete, or that the maxims are independent of one another (ibid.: 27). At any rate it can be noted that the maxims which belong to (CM) are predominantly the kind of maxims which govern all rational communicative practices, at least insofar as typically linguistic purposes – as, for instance, the maximally effective exchange of information – are concerned. It is exactly this very purpose of (CP) Grice has in mind, and to which he accordingly geared the maxims (ibid.: 28).

Even though Grice does not provide a definition of conversational implicatures, he nevertheless lists a number of important features (Grice 1989: 30f.). That by uttering x U conversationally implicates that p roughly means: (a) that by x U neither says nor conventionally implicates that q; (b) that x can only be grasped in accordance with (CM) (or at least (CP)), if by x U means that p; and (c) that by x U means that p, while relying, among other things, on A recognizing that (b).

Grice's basic idea consists therein that typical instances of conversational implicatures result from situations in which the utterance x would be inappropriate on the basis of its conventional meaning alone. Assuming that A wants to know whether Mr X makes a good philosopher, and thereupon U replies:

(6) Mr X has excellent handwriting and is always very punctual

by *saying* this, U clearly violates one or even several maxims (e.g. the maxims of Quantity or the maxim of Relation). In such a situation U relies on A trying to interpret (6) in such a way that it does not violate (CP) or (CM), and moreover on A being capable of 'working out' the implicatum. Grice calls this procedure 'exploitation' of the maxims, in which it is central to him that a suchlike violation is made intentionally and overtly. This at least holds for those conversational implicatures which Grice is particularly interested in: *particularized* conversational implicatures (see figure 1.1). In contrast to *generalized* conversational implicatures it takes special characteristics of the context of the utterance in order to work them out (as in example (6)). Generalized implicatures on the other hand are relatively context-independent (Hirschberg 1985; Levinson 2000). A violation of (CM) is not detected because the implicatum normally goes with the utterance. Yet there would be a violation if the implicatum was not meant as well

(Grice 1989: 37ff.). Examples for generalized conversational implicatures are not merely sentences like

(7) Mr X is meeting **a** woman this evening.

by which it is normally implicated that Mr X is meeting somebody other than his wife. Also sentences we have already come across (in section 3) and which contain logical constants belong under this rubric as, for instance,

(3) Mr X is in the kitchen **or** in the living room.

By means of (3) it is normally implicated that the speaker U does not know in which of the two rooms Mr X is.

Apart from conversational implicatures, Grice mentions under the rubric of nonconventional implicatures *en passant* one further type: *nonconventional nonconversational implicatures* (Grice 1989: 28; see figure 1.1). They differ from conventional implicatures insofar as it is not the case that they are generated on the basis of the conventional meaning of the uttered sentences. On the other hand they differ from conversational implicatures because other maxims than the ones Grice presented (CM) play a part in the inference to what is meant by U, such as, for instance, maxims of politeness.

Whether there exists a clear-cut distinguishing criterion between these maxims and (CM) is left open by Grice. As has already been mentioned, there are a lot of indications suggesting that Grice above all searched for maxims which – on the assumption that we are dealing with the maximally efficient exchange of information – govern all *reasonable* communication.

5.3 Conversation and rationality

Grice provides us with a number of tests for the presence of conversational implicatures which are, however, rather controversial (Grice 1989: 39, 43f., 59, 270f.). In the face of these controversies it seems to be more important to focus on the aspect that implicatures can be 'worked out', i.e. that they are *calculable*. In 'Logic and conversation', Grice develops a general pattern of how A is capable of grasping a conversational implicature:

> U has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q. (Grice 1989: 31)

It has often been criticized that this pattern is psychologically implausible (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995; Recanati 1995; Gibbs 1999). Doing so presumes that (CP) and (CM) are socio-psychological and thus empirically verifiable instances of conversation. This does not seem to correspond with Grice's view. He does not want to claim that we do in fact follow these maxims, but rather that it is *reasonable* for us to follow them (Grice 1989: 29). The reasons are not of an extrinsic kind; i.e. they do not approach the participants 'from the outside' and do not urge them in the form of, for instance, social pressure to behave in a conformist way: the observance of (CP) and (CM) is not a quasi-contractual matter (ibid.). According to Grice, these maxims seem rather to be of a subjective kind. That they are observed is subject to the free will of the participants, and results from the setting of certain goals which they want to achieve:

> So I would be able to show that the observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. (Grice 1989: 29f.)

As this passage shows, Grice at the same time seems to hold that (CP) and (CM) are observed *ceteris paribus* – and thus claim objective *validity* in certain respects. But what could that mean?

A possible answer can be found in Grice's considerations about the relation between rationality and value. As already mentioned in section 1, it is an essential feature of rational beings – Grice calls them 'persons' – that they are capable of attributing values (Grice 1986: 72). With that goes, among other things, the capability of evaluating goals and means which serve the attainment of these goals (ibid.: 112ff.). In the light of this idea, the participants' readiness to follow (CP) and (CM), as well as their capability of assessing linguistic behaviour in its respective context as appropriate or inappropriate, can be regarded as a manifestation of this essential feature of rational beings. Just as much as U, with a view to the goal she pursues, is concerned about taking the most effective and thus considered the most 'valuable' way, A – with this goal given – is concerned with working out in a calculability process the rationally most acceptable interpretation of what U meant. What U (and A as well) do in the actual case, becomes intelligible only if the participants mutually assume that they are essentially rational beings – and thus beings which *ceteris paribus* follow (CP) and (CM) in conversational exchange. That A and U, as Grice puts it, 'cooperate' could, thus considered, mean that Gricean persons mutually assign rationality (and with this the capability of attributing

values) to each other (Truniger 2006: 90ff.). In any case, the (mutual) supposition that (CP) and (CM) are observed would according to this interpretation bear objective validity insofar as it constitutes a condition of the possibility of conversation. Without this supposition the linguistic behaviour of those who engage in conversation would not be explainable at all.

5.4 The two sides of the theory of conversation

In the preceding paragraphs I presented Grice's theory of conversation as a contribution to a general theory of rationality. This corresponds with his idea of a hierarchically structured edifice of sciences (see figure 1.3 on page 24). Grice's theory of conversation is part of his theory of language, which in turn belongs to the philosophy of language. He conceives of the philosophy of language as a domain of *rational psychology* which for its part belongs to *philosophical psychology*. All these areas are finally to be located within 'first philosophy', i.e. metaphysics. Given that these domains all together revolve around human rationality, it is a matter of consequence that they are dealing with aspects of this subject in an increasingly specialized manner. The theory of conversation is such a sub-branch; its topic is *linguistic* behaviour insofar as it can be interpreted as *rational* behaviour.

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the theory of conversation has another side too. As explained in section 3.2, it is essential to Grice's understanding of conceptual analysis to clearly distinguish between the meaning of an expression and other facets of its use. It is exactly this very purpose the theory of conversation has to serve as a *methodological* tool: to prevent that meaning and use are *telquel* identified. In his 'Reply to Richards' Grice notes the following:

> In my own case, a further impetus towards a demand for the provision of a visible theory underlying ordinary discourse came from my work on the idea of Conversational Implicature, which emphasized the radical importance of distinguishing (to speak loosely) what *our words* say or imply from what *we* in uttering them imply; a distinction seemingly denied by Wittgenstein, and all too frequently ignored by Austin. (Grice 1986: 59, his emphasis)

Hence Grice's theory of conversation has two sides: as a philosophical domain it covers a certain domain of a general theory of rationality; its *topic* is rational linguistic behaviour. And in *methodological* respects it serves as an instrument for the distinction between meaning and use.

6. Meaning and rationality

Like the theory of conversation, Grice's account of meaning has its two sides. As we shall see later on, it has made a contribution to the theory of

rationality as well (see below, section 6.3). At the same time it serves an important methodological purpose. Even though Grice is against an identification of meaning with use, this does not mean that the one has nothing to do with the other. On the contrary, Grice is firmly convinced that the meaning of an expression is a function of what a speaker U does with it or what she *means* by it (Neale 1992: 542 as well as this chapter, section 3). In this context, Grice needs, among other things, to clarify what it actually means to mean something by an utterance.

6.1 The analysis of speaker's meaning

A first outline of such an analysis can be found in his famous 1957 paper 'Meaning', in which against the background of the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning he pursues the question of what it means that utterances have meaning at all, and, on the other hand, the question of what exactly they mean. Roughly speaking, his analysis consists of two steps.

In a first step, the nonnatural meaning of a certain utterance x is equated with what a certain speaker U *meant* by x under certain circumstances. What she meant by x is in turn explicated by which effect U *intended* to produce in an audience A. In concrete terms, Grice's analysis goes as follows (Grice 1989: 92, 219):

(GA) 'U meant something by uttering x' is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of this fulfillment of (2).

If (1)–(3) are present, U meant, or in brief: M-intended, something by uttering x. What exactly U meant by uttering x results, according to Grice, from a specification of the reaction r intended on the part of A (ibid.: 92, 105, 220). Hence Grice explicates both the fact that U meant something by x, and the fact of what she means by uttering x, in terms of *psychological* concepts. In the first case it is the concept of intention, whereas in the second case it is the concept of (as Grice calls it) the M-intended effect, which is always a propositional attitude on the part of A. With respect to 'imperative-type' utterances it consists in A's intention to do ψ; with respect to assertive or 'indicative-type' utterances the effect consists in A believing (that U believes) that p (ibid.: 111, 123).

It is important to note that these psychological concepts are the basic concepts of Grice's theory of meaning (see also below, section 6.2): Grice conceives of meaning something by x as intending (1)–(3) or producing a reaction in the addressee A in the way explicated in the analysis. Therefore it is central to determine the status as well as the role of these concepts in

respect of the explanation of linguistic acts. This is a project Grice does not realize within the framework of his theory of meaning but within his *philosophical psychology* or *rational psychology* (Grice 1991: 121–61, 2001; see Grandy and Warner 1986a: 15ff.; Plüss 2001).

Intentions (1)–(3) have been the subject of extensive and lengthy debates (e.g. Strawson 1964; Searle 1969; Schiffer 1972). Disregarding the (technical) problems of the Gricean analysis, one thing stands out immediately: conventions do not occur. In fact it is the crux of this approach that for U meaning something by x it is not necessary that there exists a previously conventionally established relation between *the means by which* something is meant (a gesture, a drawing, or even the utterance of a sentence) and *what* is meant. Nevertheless Grice does of course not want to deny that there is something like conventional meaning. But what is meant, i.e. nonnatural meaning, is not always conventional meaning as well (the other way round, however, this holds). Also he does not deny that, in a certain respect, linguistic acts are always conventional acts, namely insofar as their medium (e.g. natural language) is conventional. Yet Grice thinks that such acts could, at least in principle, be performed without conventions as well. This idea, by the way, has some far-reaching consequences. Already in the 1960s it was applied to the analysis of a central type of linguistic actions, viz. to illocutionary acts conventionally interpreted by Austin (Austin 1962; see Strawson 1964; Searle 1969; Schiffer 1972; Bach and Harnish 1979). The debate between intentionalists and conventionalists goes on to this day (see Petrus 2006). Finally, Grice does not want to deny either that especially in the case of linguistic communication conventional means are often used to mean something which exceeds what is said. Conversational implicatures are the apt example for this (see section 5.2).

Grice, however, does not content himself with an analysis of speaker's meaning in terms of intentions. In 'Meaning' he already indicated that it ought to be the objective of a second step to explicate all other semant-ically relevant concepts on the *basis* of this prior analysis: in particular the concept of the conventional meaning of an utterance-type (termed 'timeless meaning' by Grice), and the concept of what is said by an utterance (Grice 1989: 217). As has already been emphasized in section 5, it is the concept of what is said which is important to Grice in order figure out (conventional as well as conversational) implicatures, which themselves in turn are a variety of what is meant by the speaker (see figure 1.1). Presented in a simplified way, Grice aims at proving the conceptual dependencies illustrated in figure 1.2 (Neale 1992: 543).

The arrows in the scheme, i.e. '$\alpha \rightarrow \beta$' are to be understood as indicating that the analysis of concept α is logically prior to the analysis of concept β. And this is the case iff the concept α plays a role in the analysis of concept β, and the concept β does not play a role in the analysis of concept α. The idea,



Figure 1.2 Hierarchy of concepts in Grice's theory of meaning

roughly speaking, is to provide an analysis of (1) first of all. In a second step this analysis is used in the analysis of the meaning of an utterance-type. What is said by an utterance is then explicated in terms of (1) and (2), and after that what is implicated (4) is explicated in terms of (2) and (3).

Thus conceived, Grice's *theory of meaning* consists of two parts. The first part consists in an analysis of (1), which is to be achieved by (GA), i.e. the *Gricean analysis* of speaker's meaning. The second part consists in showing that (3) can be analysed on the basis of (2), and that (2) in turn can be analysed on the basis of (1). Let us call this project, which Grice particularly tackles in his paper 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, word-meaning', the *Gricean programme* (Grice 1989: 117–37; see Schiffer 1972; Bennett 1976; Loar 1981; Avramides 1989).

6.2 Meaning and rationality

Grice's theory of meaning – no matter at which stage of his programme – is based on a very special mechanism, which is sometimes referred to as the 'Gricean mechanism' (Bennett 1976: chapter 5). Roughly speaking, its point is that the speaker U makes certain assumptions about what could lead the addressee A to produce the reaction r intended by U. Yet it is not (only) the natural features of U's x-ing which lead A, for instance, to believe that p. The reason for producing this reaction should, according to Grice, rather be one which U herself provides to A. From U's perspective the reason is that A recognizes that U intends to make A believe that p. In other words, it is exactly this recognition which should be (among others) a *reason* – and not merely a cause (Grice 1989: 92) – for A to produce the reaction intended by U, i.e. to believe that p (see condition (3) in (GA), section 6.1). In a simplified version, the pattern of the Gricean mechanism (for assertive utterances) looks as follows (Kemmerling 1991: 322):

(GM) (i) By x-ing U intends A to believe that p.
(ii) A recognizes that (i).
(iii) A believes because of (ii) that if (i) then p.
(iv) Therefore: A believes that p.

Hence the point of (GM) is that A's recognition of the primary intention which U pursues in the sense of the Gricean analysis – i.e. (i) – leads to its fulfilment, i.e. to (iv). In this respect (GM) can be conceived of as an *intention-fulfilling-mechanism* (Kemmerling 2001: 79). But it would be wrong to assume that (ii) is always sufficient for A to produce the reaction r intended by U. It is likely that A makes further assumptions, and that these assumptions count as additional reasons to believe that p. As regards assertive utterances of U, A's assumption that x is a suitable means for U's purposes, that U is sincere and truthful, or reliable with respect to p, can very well be part of these reasons (Grice 1989: 294f.; see Petrus 1999: 216ff.). Either way it is assumed in this model that it is – as Grice occasionally puts it – within the *rational control* of A to produce the reaction intended by U.

All this might suggest that Grice's analysis requires that A really recognizes what U intended, or even that A actually produces the reaction intended by U because of this recognition. But in (GA) there is no mention of this at all. The analysis only requires that U has certain intentions. Therefore it is important to note that the above statements about A are strictly speaking *assumptions* which U makes about A. That U relies on the Gricean mechanism is to say that U presumes that it is within the rational control of A to produce the reaction intended by her – and not that this reaction is actually within the control of A (see Petrus 1999: 227ff.).

That U makes suchlike assumptions has its reason and reveals the deeper-lying rationality, which is inherent to the Gricean theory of meaning. If U did not rely on A taking her recognition as a reason to produce reaction r, or if U did not presume that A on her part assumes that U's x-ing is a suitable means, that U is sincere, truthful and reliable, U would hardly have a chance of reaching her goal, and of producing the desired reaction in A (Grice 1989: 219). In other words, if U did not rely on the Gricean mechanism, and did not make the relevant assumptions about A, she herself would have *no good reason* to do what she is up to. It is only on the assumption that U relies on the Gricean mechanism that her behaviour can be explained as *rational* behaviour at all.

6.3 The two sides of the theory of meaning

These brief remarks show that in Grice's theory of meaning, too, rationality plays a central part: meaning something by an utterance is an attempt to influence someone in a rational way. To this it could be objected – similarly as regards Grice's theory of conversation (see section 5.3) – that Grice's approach seems to be highly implausible from a psychological point of view. But this objection is liable to miss the point. What matters to Grice is to work out mechanisms and concepts which are indispensable to making explicable the behaviour of beings which, in the Gricean sense, mean something by a sign. And a crucial part of this explanation is provided by the Gricean mechanism.

As in the case of the theory of conversation, it should be taken into consideration that Grice's theory of meaning does not merely make a contribution to a theory of rational, linguistic behaviour. Rather – or more precisely, at the same time – it serves a *methodological* purpose. Although meaning and use are not to be identified (see section 3.2), Grice holds that these two components are not completely isolated from each other. According to him, the meaning of an utterance is rather a function of its use. What expressions mean depends on what speakers do with them or, *à la* Grice, what they mean by them. The answers to the questions of what exactly this means, and in which sense it holds for basic semantic concepts like the concept of meaning of an utterance-type or what is said as well, are provided by Grice's theory of meaning. Analogous to the theory of conversation, the theory of meaning too has always its two sides: as a philosophical domain it covers a certain domain of a general theory of rationality; its *topic* is rational linguistic behaviour. And in *methodological* respects it serves as an instrument to show that meaning is a function of use.

7. Meaning, saying, implicating

In section 6.1, I distinguished two parts of Grice's theory of meaning which, of course, are closely related: the one part – the *Gricean analysis* – deals with an explication of speaker's meaning in terms of intentions. The second part – the *Gricean programme* – is concerned with making use of this analysis when it comes to the explication of the meaning of an utterance-type and what is said. While some people think that the first part can be successfully realized along the lines of Grice's proposal, there is much scepticism about the second part. And indeed, the Gricean programme proves to be extremely difficult in detail, as Grice's own remarks show only too clearly (Grice 1989: 117ff.).

7.1 What is said

A special problem is posed by the concept of *what is said*. As can be seen in figure 1.2, Grice maintains that this concept can at least partly be explicated by the concept of the meaning of an utterance-type X. All the same, the transition from 'When uttered by U, X meant 'p' to 'By uttering X, U said that p' would be too rash. In order to say something by X, X has to possess a certain feature: doing X needs to be a *linguistic act* (Grice 1989: 87). The hand-signalling of a biker may well mean 'p', but he does nevertheless not say that p (at least not – as Grice never omits to add – in the *favoured sense* of 'say'). Grice does justice to this fact by expressly demanding that X 'is an occurrence of an utterances type S (sentence)'. At least according to some scholars (see Bach 2001a: 15), what is said *à la* Grice must then correspond to 'the elements [of the sentence], their order, and their syntactic character' (Grice 1989: 87). For the sake of simplicity, let us say that according to these

conditions what is said is *syntactically correlated* with the sentence uttered by U (see section 7.2.1).

Off-hand it may well seem as if what is said coincides with a special sort of meaning of an utterance-type, namely with *sentence-meaning*. This, however, is not correct either. Even if we disregard for a moment the problems which are posed by indexical and ambiguous expressions (see section 5.1), there are still utterances which do in fact have sentence-meaning, but by means of which nothing is said in the Gricean sense. Examples for this are provided by instances of non-literal speech such as irony (Grice 1989: 34). Assuming somebody utters sentence (8) ironically:

(8) Fred is an honest man.

Of course it is correct to say that (8) means 'Fred is an honest man'. But it would be wrong to say that by (8) U said that Fred is an honest man. The reason for this is that by uttering (8) U did *not* mean that Fred is an honest man: U has not the intention to make A believe that Fred is an honest man. If at all, by (8) U has *made as if to say* that Fred is an honest man (ibid.: 34). Thus what is said (in the strict sense) is always a variety of what is meant (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).

According to Grice what is said is therefore located in a sphere where sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning overlap, and which he terms 'conventional meaning' (ibid.: 119). But this too is not yet correct. This time, the reason is constituted by the conventional implicatures. Assuming U utters the sentence:

(4) Sally is poor but she is honest.

Grice would not want to deny that both what U means by (4), and what this sentence means is that Sally is poor but honest. Nevertheless he disputes that U said so (ibid.: 88). As explained in section 5.1., Grice claims that the meaning evoked by 'but' does not contribute to the truth conditions of (4): the (conventional) implicatum should always be capable of being false without what is said by an utterance becoming false – which, by the way, shows that what is said in the Gricean sense must always be *propositional*. Grice rather thinks that by (4) U performs two speech acts – a central one and a non-central one – and that only the propositional content of the central speech act is to be regarded as part of what is said. For this reason he stipulates that what is said is strictly speaking a form of what is *centrally* meant (ibid.: 88).

7.2 Problems with what is said

In recent years, an intense debate about the concept of what is said has flared up, taking up Grice's considerations more or less directly (for an

overview: see Pfister 2007). Since the concept of what is said has traditionally been assigned to the domain of semantics, and the concept of implicature, on the other hand, to pragmatics, this debate has at the same time been revolving around the semantics/pragmatics distinction (see contributions in Bianchi 2003; Szabo 2005; Preyer and Peter 2007). In the meantime a number of competing positions have evolved – literalism, minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, or syncretism – and an end to the debate is not within sight.

Indeed, this debate poses a challenge to Grice as well. As has become clear from the preceding section, what is said *à la* Grice possesses at least the following three features: what is said (i) is *syntactically correlated* with the sentence uttered; (ii) is a *proposition*; and (iii) is (centrally) *meant* by U. The problem with what is said now results from the observation that many (perhaps even most) sentences of a natural language – even after the determination of the referents of indexical expressions, and after disambiguation – do not express a content which possesses features (i)–(iii). Accordingly, nothing is said by all these sentences, at least in the Gricean sense. Let us consider the following examples:

(9) Maria departs.
(10) Gioacchino is too old.

Although these uttered sentences are syntactically complete, (9) and (10) are nevertheless *semantically incomplete*. They do not express a proposition, but at best a *propositional radical* (Bach 1994; but see Cappelen and Lepore 2005). In other words, nothing is said by these sentences, since feature (ii) is not present. In order to express a proposition, they need to be *completed*, that is to say it must be specified *from where* Maria departs, and *what* Gioacchino is too old *for* (see Bach 1994). This completion needs to be done in accordance with what U meant by these sentences, and thus depends on the context of the utterance. The propositions expressed by (9) and (10) could, for instance, be spelled out as follows:

(9*) that Maria departs **from Palermo**
(10*) that Gioacchino is too old **to play in the football team**

After having been completed like this, what is expressed by the examples possesses indeed features (ii) and (iii). Nevertheless it is questionable to what extent the so-specified content still does justice to requirement (i) – at least if syntactic correlation, as suggested by Grice, requires that every element of what is said correspond to some element of the uttered sentence. If one held this opinion, all features (i)–(iii) would be fulfilled, and by sentence (10), for example, it would be *said* in the Gricean sense that Gioacchino is too old to play in the football team. Otherwise nothing would be said by it.

Another conflict between the features of what is said results from sentences of the following type:

(11) Maria and Gioacchino are engaged.
(12) Maria has nothing to put on.

Once again we are dealing with syntactically complete sentences. Moreover they are – unlike (9) and (10) – semantically complete: they express a proposition, and thus fulfil requirement (ii). Yet it is – normal circumstances provided – highly unlikely that these sentences express what U meant by them. It is to be expected that U meant something more specific than he explicitly expressed. But then they do not possess the required feature (iii). Accordingly, the proposition expressed by these sentences needs to be *expanded* in accordance with what U meant (Bach 2001a; Carston 1988; 2002: 21ff.; Recanati 2004: 23ff.). In the case of (11) and (12), such an expansion could yield the following propositions meant by U:

(11*) that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged **to each other**
(12*) that Maria has nothing **appropriate for the party** to put on

If the examples are expanded like this, what is expressed by them possesses in turn features (ii) and (iii). Nevertheless, the question whether the thus specified content still does justice to requirement (i) arises once more. If it were answered in the affirmative, all the features (i)–(iii) would be given, and by (12) it would be *said* that Maria has nothing appropriate for the party to put on. Otherwise nothing would be said.

7.3 Three conceptions of what is said

The examples above show that in the end we are dealing with the question as to which of the above mentioned features priority should be given – and at the same time with the question of how narrowly or broadly the concept of what is said should be interpreted. Starting out from Grice's considerations, we can distinguish at least three conceptions of what is said (Harth 2003).

According to the *minimal* conception of what is said, only the content resulting after reference fixation of indexical expressions and disambiguation ought to be regarded as what is said. As a consequence of this conception, what is said needs always to fulfil the requirement of syntactical correlation, viz. feature (i). What is said by (10) is therefore that Gioacchino is too old; what is said by (11) is correspondingly that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged.

According to the *propositional* conception of what is said, what is said must always be truth-evaluable, that is to say, needs to possess feature (ii). Accordingly, the content of an utterance needs (where necessary) to be completed in such a way that a complete proposition is expressed by the sentence

in question. Everything else – and thus any possible expansions – is not counted as being part of what is said. What is said by (11) is correspondingly that Gioacchino is too old to play in the football team, whereas in (12) it is 'merely' said that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged.

According to the *maximal* conception of what is said, what is said ought not only to be truth-evaluable, but also and always to state the proposition meant by U. Accordingly, the content of an uttered sentence needs (where necessary) not only to be completed, but also to be expanded. What is said by (11) is therefore that Gioacchino is too old to play in the football team; and what is said by (12) is that Maria and Gioacchino are engaged to each other.

There are a lot of reasons speaking for and against these various conceptions of what is said. Which of them is finally chosen may well depend on the theoretical purpose that the concept of what is said is to serve. As has been emphasized several times, Grice himself makes high demands on this concept: what is said constitutes the interface between the two facets of his theory of language, viz. the theory of meaning and the theory of conversation. On the one hand, the concept of what is said is inherent to the concept of speaker's meaning; on the other hand it plays a central part on all the occasions on which aspects of the use of an utterance are to be determined which do not belong to the meaning in the actual sense (i.e. implicatures).

Since the delimitation of what is implicated and what is said also depends on the question of which components within the total meaning of an utterance contribute to its truth conditions, it may well be supposed that Grice would favour the propositional conception of what is said – though together with the, to his mind crucial, remark that the completion in question (where necessary) ought to be carried out in accordance with what U meant by her utterance (since what is said is always a form of what is meant). While doing so Grice would of course (have to) admit that he has overlooked the problem of semantic underdeterminacy which results from sentences like (9) and (10). Expansions, on the other hand, would in Grice's view presumably be regarded as belonging to the domain of implicatures, although for different reasons. A lot speaks for regarding cases like (12) as a particular form of non-literality. Although all the components of the uttered sentence are to be taken literally, the utterance as a whole needs to be interpreted in a non-literal sense (Bach 2001b). On this assumption U would, strictly speaking, have said nothing by (12) – as in the case of irony – but merely made as if to say that Maria has nothing to put on (see section 7.2).

Whether this is the route Grice would have taken in view of all the problems, is, as indicated, quite controversial. But on the other hand nobody disputes that the concept of what is said is assigned a key function in Grice's conception. In anticipation of the ensuing debates, Stephen Neale made the following remark towards the end of his 1992 essay on Grice's philosophy of language: 'The more one reflects on his work, the more one feels that

the notion of what is said is for Grice a fundamentally important notion in philosophy' (Neale 1992: 555).

8. Philosophy of language and the theory of rationality

In the course of the preceding pages I tried to go into some aspects of Grice's philosophy of language in more detail and to integrate them into a broader picture. This picture is the picture of human rationality, to draw which was Grice's primary concern (see figure 1.3). The general frame of his theory of rationality is constituted by metaphysics. Within this province exists a multitude of domains which look at the subject in increasingly more specific ways. Among them rank philosophical psychology, rational psychology, and – last but not least – the philosophy of language: its preferred, specialized field of research is defined by linguistic behaviour insofar as it can be interpreted as rational behaviour.

Grice always claimed to develop theories with the most general explanatory force possible. Thus regarded, it is crucial to his philosophical work to always and constantly reflect upon the principles of theory construction. Among others there is the question of which concepts are to be introduced



Figure 1.3 The philosophy of language within a general theory of human rationality

at which stage of theory construction, and why this is done. This question is posed in all scientific branches, and consequently also in the *philosophy of language*. Answering this question is within the scope of Theory-theory. In this respect Grice seems to be firmly convinced that this methodological enterprise is not something which is exterior to the theory of language, or a mere addition from outside. Rather (as the name suggests) Theory-theory is a component of this theory of an aspect of human rationality.

This, in the end, might be the source of the fascination of the Gricean approach: Grice's theory of language (i.e. the theory of meaning and the theory of conversation) is not only concerned with *rational linguistic behaviour,* but it is also and *at the same time* to be regarded as a contribution to the construction of a *theory* about rational linguistic behaviour.

9. The chapters

In the anthology at hand, most aspects mentioned in this introduction are deepened and sometimes controversially discussed.

In her contribution, *Siobhan Chapman* sheds light on the complex relationship between Grice and ordinary language philosophy (OLP). In particular, she suggests a movement in Grice's work initially towards the doctrines of OLP and then gradually away from them as his philosophy became increasingly formal.

Jay Atlas too starts out from Grice's emphasis on the 'ordinariness' of the intuitions about meaningfulness, synonymy and analyticity. Among other things, he examines critically Grice and Strawson's 'argument from intuition' in support of the analytic/synthetic distinction against Quine's attack on it, as well as their *reductio* argument against Quine's 'elimination' of the synonymy relation.

Anne Bezuidenhout devotes her contribution to the debate between Russell and Strawson about the status of implications of existence and uniqueness associated with the use of definite descriptions. She tries to show that Grice's claim that they are conversational implicatures rather than Strawsonian presuppositions can be accommodated within a presuppositionalist framework.

Wayne Davis has a close look at different types of negations that are not used in accordance with standard rules of logic, and raises, among others, the question of whether such irregular negations are pragmatically or semantically ambiguous. In his opinion, an implicature theory works well only for evaluative implicature denials, while other irregular negations are semantically ambiguous in an unusual way.

In her contribution, *Mandy Simons* argues for a reconceptualization of conversational implicatures, according to which they ought to be conceived of as inferences generated by observations about what a speaker has (merely) expressed. This includes observations about sentence parts whose content is

not part of what is asserted. In order to show how Gricean maxims can be applied to non-asserted content, Simons offers some reformulations of the maxims, especially of the first part of the maxim of Quantity.

According to *Jennifer Saul* there is a real conflict in Grice's theory between, as she puts it, 'Speaker Meaning Exhaustiveness' (i.e. the claim that Grice's notion of speaker-meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated) and Grice's Calculability Criterion. Saul comes to the conclusion that abandoning Speaker Meaning Exhaustiveness is the preferable alternative, which moreover leaves us with an interesting theory of conversational implicatures as a normative notion.

The central topic of the contribution of *Judith Baker* is the role of rationality, which was repeatedly emphasized in the course of this introduction. However, Baker is primarily interested in the relation of practical reasons to rationality and focuses on one particular claim and the arguments that support it, i.e. that rationality is displayed in a wider variety of actions than those done for reasons.

Mitchell Green, for his part, deals with meaning and communication and tries to revitalize the discussion of illocutionary force by relating it to social norms. In particular, he argues that force is an aspect of speaker-meaning and that according to new research in the evolutionary biology of communication, speaker- and natural meaning are more complexly interrelated than current consensus allows.

Klaus Petrus too concerns himself with the relation between illocution and Gricean-style communication. Unlike many intentionalists, he holds that Grice's theory of meaning is not suitable for the analysis of illocutionary acts, because they are not communicative acts. It is, however, appropriate for one kind of speech acts which are easily confused with illocutionary acts and which are communicative acts indeed: perillocutionary acts.

Communicative acts are likewise the topic of the contribution of *Christian Plunze*. He goes into the claim that the recognition of a communicative intention implies communication which allows different interpretations. According to one interpretation, it is appropriate to speak of successful communication if the communicative intention is recognized. According to another interpretation, the fact that the addressee does not recognize this intention does not show that the speaker does not communicate at all. Plunze offers an account of communicative acts which enables him to explain why the latter interpretation holds.

In his chapter, *Al Martinich* presents a modified version of Grice's view of the total content of what a speaker means. According to Martinich, what is said is as much a component of pragmatics as is what is implicated. This modified Gricean theory requires a defence against criticisms of the concept of what is said advanced by some minimalists, as well as against criticisms of the concept of what is said and conversationally implicated advanced by some contextualists.

Emma Borg takes such a minimalist point of view. Her starting point is the fact that in recent literature the precise account Grice offered of implicature recovery has been questioned and alternative approaches have emerged from different semantic programmes. Borg tries to show that the most popular accounts – the default inference view and the relevance-theoretic approach – face significant problems and that an account emerging from semantic minimalism is best placed to accommodate Grice's distinction between what a sentence means and what utterances of it implicate.

Nikola Kompa goes into semantic minimalism as well and contrasts it with different versions of contextualism. Like Borg, Kompa assumes that a defining feature of semantic minimalism is the so-called 'Basic Set Assumption', i.e. the assumption that there is only a small set of obviously context-sensitive expressions (mainly indexicals, demonstratives, ambiguous expressions). By looking at various forms of context sensitivity, Kompa tries to show the basic set assumption to be mistaken.

Finally *Laurence Horn* presents once more an overview of the lively debate about the status of conversational implicatures and their relation to what is said. The background is provided by criticism of the customary semantic/pragmatics distinction particularly voiced by contextualists. Horn makes the case for a relatively orthodox Gricean notion of what is said and tries to show that a minimally modified Gricean model provides a satisfying approach to the fundamental distinction between what is said and what is meant.

Note

*An anonymous referee noticed that my introduction suggests, in places, that Grice's work is set against a 'grand scheme' which he systemizes in the way I have expounded. This is countered with the claim that Grice himself was 'the most evasive about definitive interpretations of the nature of his enterprise', as the referee remarked. I agree with the latter. However, I believe that Grice did indeed perceive this work on philosophy of language, in particular, within a wider framework. My introduction is an attempt to expatiate on this framework based on the remarks made by Grice himself in his 'Reply to Richards', for instance.

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